Political Legitimacy and the Post-Colonial State in the Pacific: Reflections on Some Common Threads in the Fiji and Solomon Islands Coups

Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change ISSN: 1323-9104 (Print) 1469-9974 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cpar19 Political Legitimacy and the Post-colonial State in the Pacific: Reflections on Some Common Threads in the Fiji and Solomon Islands Coups Greg Fry To cite this article: Greg Fry (2000) Political Legitimacy and the Post-colonial State in the Pacific: Reflections on Some Common Threads in the Fiji and Solomon Islands Coups, Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change, 12:3, 295-304, DOI: 10.1080/713604485 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713604485 Published online: 19 Aug 2010. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 220 View related articles Citing articles: 3 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cpar20 Download by: [Australian National University] Date: 14 December 2016, At: 14:57 Paci ca Review, Volume 12, Number 3, October 2000 Political Legitimacy and the Post-colonial State in the Paci c: Re ections on Some Common Threads in the Fiji and Solomon Islands Coups* GREG FRY (Australian National University) The recent hostage crises in Fiji and the Solomon Islands quickly merged into a series of deeper crises to do with the political legitimacy of the government of the day, of the Constitution, of ‘democracy’, and even of the idea of the post-colonial state itself as a continuing political entity. While the other twelve post-colonial states in the Paci c share many of the common threads in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, these are unlikely to turn into ethno-nationalist crises concerned with the very survival of democratic change, the system of governance and of the state itself. When members of the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) militia, together with some members of the Malaitan-dominated police force, kidnapped the Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, Bartholomew Ulufa’alu, on 5 June 2000, the international media called it a ‘copycat’ coup.1 This was a reference to the assumed in uence of the actions of George Speight and his armed group in taking the Chaudhry Government hostage in Fiji just two weeks earlier. At a super cial level it certainly looked similar in style. Andrew Nori, the front man for the Solomon Islands hostage-takers, like Speight, is a civilian, in this case a lawyer. It was also evident, as in the Fiji case, that important elements in the state security forces were directly involved or complicit. The Fiji hostage-taking obviously did not, however, cause the political crisis behind the Solomon Islands coup. There had been a rapidly deteriorating political situation for the previous 18 months. And there had been open talk of the possibility of the serious con ict between rival militias deteriorating even further into civil war and a breakdown of the constitutional order (Prime Minister Ulufa’alu had formally requested Australian police assistance just weeks before). Nevertheless, the taking of state power in this way, at this time, was undoubtedly inspired by the hostage-taking in Suva. There were also other direct links between the two events. The crisis in Fiji signi cantly affected the efforts of the Ulufa’alu Government to create a secure space in which the deep-seated causes of the con ict could be dealt with. In the days just before the * I wish to acknowledge very informative conversations with John Naitoro (National Centre for Development Studies, ANU) and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (School of Social and Economic Development, University of the South Paci c). I remain wholly responsible for the opinions expressed here. 1 See, for example, Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, ‘Solomons’ Copycat Coup’, The Australian (6 June 2000), p. 1; and Greg Ansley and Bronwyn Sell, ‘Copycat Coup Waiting to Happen’, The New Zealand Herald Online (12 June 2000). ISSN 1323-9104 print/ISSN 1469/9974 online/00/030295-10 Ó 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd 296 Greg Fry hostage-taking in Suva, Ulufa’alu had requested a hurry-up in the police assistance that was to come from Fiji and Vanuatu as part of a Commonwealth regional police group. In the event, the Fiji police contingent did not come because of the hostage crisis in Suva. The Fiji crisis also made it impossible for the Commonwealth envoy, Sitiveni Rabuka, to travel to Honiara to continue his mediating role in the Solomon Islands crisis. He had been due to return to the Solomon Islands the day after George Speight’s men entered the Fiji parliament. Speight had not only shown the way to overthrow constitutional and democratic government; his actions had stopped Fiji’s important contribution to peacemaking in the Solomon Islands at a crucial juncture in that crisis. As in Fiji, the MEF insurrection sparked not just one crisis but crises at many levels. First, there is a crisis associated with the hostage-taking itself, the terrorising of the individuals and families involved, and nding the tactical means of ending the unconstitu- tional threat of force in a situation where there is a signi cant amount of sympathy with the objectives of the coup-makers in signi cant segments of the wider community. The hostage crisis in Honiara, like that in Suva, has also created a security crisis for many in the wider community outside the group directly being held hostage. They have also created a severe economic crisis for both countries. More broadly, the hostage crisis in each country quickly merged into a series of deeper crises to do with the legitimacy of the elected government, of the constitution, of ‘democracy’, and even of the idea of the post-colonial state itself as a continuing political entity. This is not just because the handful of coup-makers have in each case claimed their actions in the name of a larger community which nds the current governance arrangements to be unjust or against their interests, or that changes to governance arrangements form the central demands of the hostage-takers. It is also because important segments of the wider society, and of the state itself, clearly are sympathetic to their objectives and share their interests. In each case the coup-makers have tapped a pre-existing concern about the legitimacy of the existing system of governance, whether from self-serving or sincere motives. The negotiations to end the hostage crises have therefore become intertwined with negotiations about the future governance of these states. These questions of political legitimacy and the construction of future arrangements were being considered under duress and only by some parts of society. In Fiji, for example, those for whom most citizens voted at the last election were held captive and therefore could not provide input in a debate about the shape of future governance, and Indo-Fijians are too intimidated to say anything publicly concerning these matters. Even indigenous Fijans are generally afraid to speak against the ethno-nationalist line in case they are seen to be against their own ‘people’. In the Solomon Islands, the MEF forced Prime Minister Ulufa’alu to resign and told the members of parliament to assemble and choose a new Prime Minister. Six members were not present. The outcome, the election of a reportedly pro-MEF Prime Minister, Mannaseh Sogovare, was very likely affected not only by the intimidation of those parliamentarians present, but also of some of those who were unable to be there because of reported threats to shoot at the plane on which they were travelling if it landed on Guadalcanal. For many commentators, Fiji and the Solomon Islands have thus become the eastern extension of an ‘arc of instability’, or ‘arc of crisis’, already said to stretch from Aceh, through Ambon, Timor, West Papua, and Papua New Guinea.2 For some, the ripples from the Fiji hostage crisis and the Solomon Islands coup go further, if not as cause, then as symptom, of a region-wide malaise in the Paci c islands. While some commentators see other Paci c island countries as dominos ready to fall—the Australian Prime Minister named Papua New Guinea in this regard, for example—others see them as having all but 2 See, for example, Michael Maher, ‘Islands in the Storm’, The Bulletin (20 June 2000), pp. 24–26. Political Legitimacy and the Post-colonial State 297 fallen, citing independence issues in New Caledonia, con ict over Bougainville’s status in relation to Papua New Guinea, a political assassination in Samoa, widespread corruption, law and order problems in Papua New Guinea, and failing economies throughout the region. They portray a seriously fragmented and anarchic region that has failed economically and is looking increasingly vulnerable to ‘balkanisation’.3 Before considering this broader claim to a region-wide legitimacy crisis in the post-colonial states of the Paci c, I propose to further explore the nature of the legitimacy crises in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, to suggest some common threads between them. The Legitimacy Crises in Fiji A preliminary point to note about the legitimacy crises in Fiji is that they are longstanding. Although tapped by the hostage crisis, they have their roots in long historical processes to do with colonialism, post-colonial development, the nature of political leadership and the changing interpretation of traditional customs and identities. The tensions were particularly evident from the start of the post-colonial state between the Indian community and the indigenous Fijians, and between the various regions and confederations within traditional Fijian society. Added to this are the changing class and urban-based interests that emerged as a result of post-colonial development. These issues came to a head with Rabuka’s coups of 1987 when signi cant Fijian interests saw the newly elected Bavadra Government, and the system of democratic governance that produced it, as illegitimate.

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