What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power Author(s): Jeffrey W. Legro Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 515-534 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20446501 . Accessed: 16/05/2011 13:50

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What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power

JeffreyW Legro

China's nationalpower isgrowing rapidly, but what China will do with itsnewfound capabilities remains an issueof contentious debateamong scholarsand policymakers.At theheart of theproblem is thedifficulty of diviningfuture intentions. Two arguments have dominated thedebate. One focuseson power and likelyChinese revisionism.The otherhighlights China's growinginter dependenceand likelyfuture satisfaction. Both areproblematic in termsof logicand evidence.They offerlinear projections that ignorethe way thatChina's futureis likelyto be contingent-especiallyon theinteraction of foreignpolicy ideasand events.Relative power and interdependenceare importantbut theirimpact ismediated throughthe doctrines leadersuse to justifyaction and establishauthority: those ideasare prone to change in regularways-and with themChina's intentions.If thisargument is right, policyprescriptions that advocate containing, engaging, or somemix of the two (i.e.,hedging) in relationswith China need tobe reconfigured.

The "risingChina" problemis not justabout power, lead toenduring satisfaction in theexisting international order? China to be a "status butpurpose. China has consistentlystressed that its Today appears quo" power.4 developmentas amajor powerwill be peacefuland Will it remainso? non-obtrusive.Yet in theUnited States thereis, as one Existinganswers to thisquestion lack thevery thing U.S. Deputy Secretaryof State put it,a "cauldronof anx needed:a generalexplanation of contingent change in the iety"over China's future.1Expert testimonybefore the intentionsof China.5 The problemis not simplyan issue U.S.-China Economic and SecurityReview Commis ofChina's secrecy or repressionof freeexpression since the sion, a body thatmonitors and reportsto Congress on problemof futureintentions applies to democraciesas bilateralrelations, has focusedheavily on uncertaintyover well as dictatorships.6Even ifwe had access to theinner China's intentions.2In February2007, Vice President workingsof theChinese government today, it isunlikely Cheney cautionedthat China's recentanti-satellite test thatinformation would tellus about futureaims. Even if and generalmilitary build-up were "notconsistent with China todayhas somesecret plan forworld hegemony or China's statedgoal of a 'peacefulrise."'3 The stomachsof world harmony,those aims will be subjectto changeby strategistsare churning. China'svery growth and theprocess by which itunfolds. It israre when a pressingpolicy issue connects so directly Ironicallyeven China's top leaders,despite their concen toa criticalgap in thescholarly literature. Such is thecase tratedpolitical power, cannot know with certaintywhat with the impactof the riseof China on world politics. theircountry will want. Will growingpower lead Beijing to challenge inter Indeed,that is what thetwo views dominating the debate nationalnorms, rules, and institutions-possiblygenerat on China argue,although they see differentinevitable ingdangerous conflict among major powersin East Asia if futures.The firstfocuses on China'spower and claimsthat not elsewhere?Or mightChina's integrationin theinter China's desirefor revision will grow as China's relative nationaleconomy, its growing middle class,and increas capabilitiesincrease despite what Beijing thinkstoday. In ingparticipation in international institutions and exchanges thisview other countries must do all theycan tocontain a risingChina becauseat somepoint China willwield its new-foundpower to challengeglobal order. The second JejfreyW Legrois Professor and Chair in theWoodrow viewhighlights China's growing interdependence andargues WilsonDepartment of Politics and Co-Directorof the thatsuch conflict can be avoidedby continuing to engage GoverningAmerica in a GlobalAge Program at theMiller China,which will builddomestic interests in China that Centerof Public AJfairs, University ofVirginia (legro@ favorpolitical liberalization and accommodationto the virginia.edu).The author thanks Robert Ross, Tang Ship rulesof theprevailing international system. Both answers ing,Brantly Womack, and Zhu Fengfor helpful comments tap intodeep-seated forces shaping China, but both are andDaniel AaronWeir for excellent research assistance. flaweddue to theirlinear projection of the futureof

DOI: 2007 Vol. 5/No. 3 515 10.1017/Si537592707071526 September 1 Art'icles IWhat China Will Want

Chinesepolicy towards international order-be itthe con vis theirdomestic critics. Likewise, when China displays flictualrevision expected by power theorists or theharmo consistentrevisionist tendencies, such ideas should be nious integrationpredicted by interdependenceadvocates.7 penalized-but onlywhen influentialopposition groups China'sdiplomatic future, however, is likelyto be more are promotingmore attractivealternative ideas. Other contingentthan either the power or interdependenceposi wise,no matter how loathsomeany particular approach, if tionsallow. To highlightcontingency requires that some thealternative is even lessdesirable, dramatic pressure for thingbe saidabout what thefuture depends on-no small rapidchange isproblematic. Therefore, it behoovesthe problemwith a countrylike China thatis authoritarian internationalcommunity to be proactive(not just reactive and non-transparentonmany issues.What policymakers tobehavior) by nurturing groups and ideasin China that most need,scholars have found difficult to study.8Clearly offermore benign replacementsto the less desirable in thecase ofChina both itsrelative power and itseco alternatives. nomic interdependenceaffect its foreign policy. The issue Naturallyin all theseareas, thepotential for outside of courseis how thetwo will do so over time.9 influenceon a countryof China's sizeand regimetype has I arguethat their influence depends on a thirdmeshing significantlimits. Yet we knowfrom the Soviet experience gear-national ideasabout how to achieveforeign policy thateven in authoritarianstates, slow patient efforts to goals. Such ideasperform three critical functions: they supportreformers can have an impact.'2The futureof empowercertain domestic interests groups over others, Chinawill not be decidedby theactions of others, but the theygenerate expectations against which performanceis actionsof outsideparties have influencedChina's orienta assessed,and theyeither facilitate or impedethe possibil tion in thepast (e.g.,Nixon and theopening of China) ityfor a new strategyto emerge.Specifically, when Chi andmay do so again in thefuture. nese expectationsabout thebenefits of integratingin the I approachthe problem of therise of China fromthe extantinternational order are defied by eventswith nega perspectiveof internationalrelations theory, not as an area tiveconsequences, an opportunityexists for domestic crit specialist.Thus I will emphasizehow developmentsin ics to challengethat orthodoxy. Whether changeactually China relateto a generalpattern seen inother great pow occursdepends, however, on thedistribution of replace ersin theirattempts to revise,join, or separatefrom global ment ideasthat affects whether critics can coordinateon a order.The goal is topoint out theproblems in thecurrent feasiblealternative world view. debate,offer an alternativeview, and exploreits contem This approachoffers some twistson familiarthinking. poraryrelevance. A good startingpoint is todefine what Contraryto thepower-centric view of China, themost exactly"future intentions" means and tooutline the nature dangerousscenario in thefuture is not the"rise" of China, of currentChinese intentions.The articlethen explores but rupturesin China's economic growth. Opposed to the how power and interdependencearguments deal with economic interdependenceposition, economic engage intentions,offers an explanationfor change and continu mentneed not leadto harmony. Countries that undertake ity,and exploresthe implications for the future of China's rapidintegration have generated considerable systemic con intentions. flict.'0China itselfhas displayedwide variationin its approach,be itcooperate with, challenge, or separateitself frominternational society over thepast two centuries. China and Contemporary The point isnot thatpower or economicliberalization is International Order unimportant,but ratherthat those factors interact with Intentionsrefers to what China plans todo. Here I focus dominantideas in particular ways to shapeenduring pat specificallyon plansfor dealing with theinternational order. ternsof nationalbehavior. In generalterms, states deal with internationalorder in In termsof policy thismeans thatneither a contain threeideal ways: integration,revision, and separation.The mentnor engagement policy is a reliableconsistent choice. first,integration, refers to nationalstrategies that accept Indeed, thedominant view todayamong policymakers thedominant principles, rules, and norms of what Hedley acceptsthis advice by advocating a "hedging"strategy that Bull called"international society." 13 Typically such states pursuesboth optionssimultaneously with theparticular areseen as "statusquo," "satisfied,"or "conservative"pow mix of strategy(conflictual vs. cooperative)dependent on ersbased on theirdesire to work within theinternational Chinese behavior.'I system.A secondcategory includes those states that ana The argumenthere offers a somewhat different and more lystsrefer to as "dissatisfied"or "revisionist," but themean proactiveview: it suggeststhat managing a risingChina ingis the same: they involve efforts to fundamentally revise will dependnot on behaviorper se but on thenature of the internationalsystem. Such revisiontypically breeds thedominant ideas. When China espousesideas and action conflictsince other countries are prone to defend that thatfavor cooperative integration, itmakes senseto do as same order.14A thirdapproach is seen in states that much as possibleto ensurethat their internal supporters attemptto removeor separatethemselves from the orbit gain positivefeedback and "I toldyou so" leveragevis-ai of prevailinginternational norms and practices,much as

51 6 Perspectives on Politics Figure 1 "worldrevolution" and "threeworlds theory"rhetoric of China's outlook on international order revisionismand givesless emphasis to itsself-proclaimed role as "leaderof theThird World."20 InsteadChina Dominant Orthodoxy todayshows most of themarkers of a conservativegreat Qing (1800-1860) Separatist poweraccepting the basic principles of theexisting inter nationalorder.21 China joined theWorld TradeOrgani zation,has cooperatedmore fullywith theUnited States Republican (1896-1939) Integrationist since the9/11 attacks,and regularlyparticipates in G-8 meetings.China's continuedpromotion of "the Five Era Mao (1949-1976) Revisionist Principlesof PeacefulCoexistence" or thecall fora "new politicaland economicorder that is fairand rational" Deng (1978 - ) Integrationist seemvague.22 China's commitmentto revisingthe sys temto benefitdeveloping countries seems most relevant when it involvesmeasures related to China's own growth or toconcerns of sovereigntyrelated to itsown history as a targetof imperialism.23 TokugawaJapan attempted to do in thenineteenth cen To suggestthat China acceptsthe basic principlesof tury,or Myanmar has done in thecontemporary period. today'sinternational order is not to say thatit prefers no Intentionsis a termthat is often associated with aimsor change inworld politics.Certainly China is dissatisfied goals or interests.It is useful,however, to distinguish with someaspects. Three importantones areU.S. domi betweeninterests and theideas that states adopt toattain nance, the statusof Taiwan, and externalpressure to theirinterests. Broad interestsshow relativelylittle varia democratize. tionboth within and among states.States have always China favors"multipolarization" and "democratiza soughtsecurity from external threats and especiallyin the tion"in internationalrelations-i.e., that all states(or at twentiethcentury, economic prosperity has also emerged leastgreat powers) have a more equal sayand theUnited as a core responsibilityof government.'5 As JiangZemin States"hegemonism" (or any other predominant country) declaredin 1997,China seeks"the goal of beingprosper less influence-especiallyin termsof theU.S. abilityto ous and strong"-anaim sharedby Chinese leaders(and use forceto achieve its goals or to intervenein thedomes othernations) throughout the ages. China's desire to be a ticpolitics of othercountries.24 That sentiment,however, "richand strongcountry" and to"enrich the people" dates is hardlyunusual and is sharedby most major powers, back toat leastthe late nineteenth century.16 Today China includingAmerica's European allies. China has a special iscertainly intent on increasingits "comprehensive national sensitivityin suchmatters due to the linkbetween its 17 power." colonialpast, subsequentindependence, and the legiti Ifsuch fundamental goals seem relatively constant over macyof theCommunist regime (which bases itsauthority longperiods of time,ideas about how to achievethose inpart on successfullyrestoring China's autonomy). goals are not.They have rangedfrom the violent over The second,and related,issue is Taiwan. China favors throwof internationalorder to thedesire to remainaloof reunificationand rejectsany move thatenhances Taiwan fromit, to an urge to integratewithin it.As seen in fig ese independence.Since 1979 ithas advocatedpeaceful ure 1, China's own historyover thepast two centuries reunificationover "liberation" (but has alsodeveloped mil showsvariation among these positions. itarycapabilities suited to Taiwan as a target).China in By thistypology, China's current intentions are mostly thisissue, as with Tibet or otherdisputed territories, por integrationist.China is joiningand working within the traysitself as defender of theextant rules. Unification with rulesof theextant system. The wellspringof thisstatus Taiwan inChina's view isa "domesticissue" over which a quo approachis found in Deng Xiaoping'sascent to lead sovereignstate must make itsown internaldecisions. As ershipin 1978. Since thattime, China has not sought Mao proclaimedto theUnited Statesin 1970, "Youhave separationfrom the system nor has itaspired to overturn occupiedour Taiwan Island,but I have neveroccupied it.Instead it has increasinglyopted forinvolvement. This yourLong Island."25 orientationhas manifested itself in significant increases in The combinationof a desirefor autonomy and reuni internationalinstitutional membership as well as more ficationwith Taiwan is fuelingwhat is also anomalous informalcooperative behavior with theexisting powers.'8 forgreat powers (with the exception of theUnited States) This integrativeorientation was cautiousin theearly in thecontemporary system-a relativelyrapid defense Deng period,but in thepast fifteenyears has pickedup buildup.Although it isdifficult to fathomexact numbers considerablemomentum. There is room to debate the and levelsof spendingdue toChina's secrecyon these depthof Chinese integrationwhether it is shallowor issues,it has bumped itsmilitary spending some 15 per enmeshed-but thetrend is clear.'9 China has leftbehind centa yearfrom 1990-2005 with a 17.8 percentincrease

September 2007 1Vol. 5/No. 3 517 Articles IWhat China Will Want

announcedfor 2007. The overalllevel-with estimates aspiresto greaterdemocratic reforms, the "most impor rangingfrom $45-100 billion is still,however, a fraction tantand fundamentalprinciple for developing socialist of est.U.S. militaryspending of $440 billion (fy2007, politicaldemocracy in China" isthe leadership of theCom excluding the $50 billion supplementfor Iraq and munistParty.30 In short,political competition is rare, pop Afghanistan).26 ular politicalchoice forthe leadershipof thecountry is China hasmade significantprogress in itscapabilities notpermitted, the press is tightlymanaged, the internet is (includingin ballistic and cruisemissiles, submarines, air filteredand blockedwith amazingsophistication, religion craft,and amphibiousoperations) that are mostly related iscontrolled by thegovernment, and human rights accords to regionalchallenges, especially with regardto scenarios areverbally acknowledged but not fullyimplemented.31 involvingTaiwan. Assuming thatthe Chinese economy Despite thisstanding, it is notable thatChina isnot triplesby 2025,Chinese military spending is expected to advocatingthat states adopt similar political systems to its climbto somewhere between $185 billionto $400 billion own,or thathuman rights norms are illegitimate.32Instead (i.e., lessthan the current U.S. defensebudget). The Chi Beijingemphasizes that principles such as sovereignty,sta nese continueto facesignificant geopolitical challenges bility,and territorialintegrity should trump such consid fromneighbors such as India,Russia, Japan, and theUnited erations.33China doesnot ruleout democracy in itsfuture, States,not tomention internalchallenges and demands itjust insists that it will followits own path, style of democ on publicspending. Given thisoutlook, it isunlikely that racy,and timing.For the timebeing, the international thecurrent scale of China's military modernization signals norm seemsto emphasizedemocratization (i.e., moving more thana desire to protectits version of autonomy, in a liberaldirection) not theend stateof democracy(a which problematicallyincludes Taiwan and raisesissues somewhatundefined goal). China's statements and actions overother disputed areas in theEast and SouthChina fitthat profile-as discussed later, it isslowly liberalizing Seas.27 albeitat a slowpace andwith reversals.Overall, despite Finally,China may havemost of theattributes of a thetension over human rights and democratization, China's normalmajor powerin theinternational system, but it is currentoutlook ismostly integrationist. distinctfrom other contemporary great powers in one importantway: it is theonly non-democracy. This trait The Limits of Power and suggeststensions and disagreementwith emergentnorms Interdependence of internationalsociety regarding human and political The debate overChina isnot aboutwhat China wants rights.28In its internationalrelations, China isquick to today,but what itmight want tomorrow.The riseof make hayout of relationswith countries,that by a democ China could lead to a fundamentalreorientation ofChi racy standard,may be stigmatizedor less desirable nese thinkingand perhapsa challengeto world order,as partners-as seen in the strongrelationship China has thosewho focuson powerpredict. Or China could increas beenbuilding with Iran,North Korea, theSudan, Myan inglyenmesh itself in and supportthe existing rules of mar, and Russia. internationalsociety, even undergoing political democra To theextent democracy becomes a definingfeature of tization,as most who emphasizeChina's growinginter internationalsociety-and countriesare forcedto choose dependenceforesee. Both offeran importantvision, but betweendemocracies and non-democracies-China might both arehalf blind in ignoringthe contingent nature of indeedbecome a revisionistpower. Indeed, some have China's futureintentions. argued(and China has not disagreed)that China offersa differentmodel of development-"theBeijing consensus" thatchallenges the U.S.-dominated "Washington consen Power sus."29That view featuresstrong government-directed Power theoriesexpect a clearshift in a revisionistdirec growth,rigorous protection of sovereignty,and thedevel tion.As RobertGilpin once put it,"As itsrelative power opmentof asymmetricforms of defenseto combatother increases,a risingstate attempts to changethe rules gov more powerfulcountries (e.g., theUnited States). In erningthe system."34 John Mearsheimer concludes that extremecircumstances (perhaps a globaleconomic melt China'sgrowing capabilities will mean it"would not be a down), such a visionmight become a rallyingpoint for statusquo power,but an aggressivestate determined to resistanceto thesociety that now exists. achieveregional hegemony."35 Denny Roy expectsthat At thepresent time, China's notionof democracyis "China'sgrowth from aweak, developing state to a stronger, "thedemocracy of dictatorship"or onewhere people are more prosperousstate should resultin a more assertive the"master of thestate"-Kafkaesque terms that refer to foreignpolicy ... bolder,more demanding,and less somethingthat is not democracyas it isgenerally under inclinedto cooperate with theother major powersin the stood.Instead power resides in thehands of theCommu region."36The basic thrustof theseanalyses is thatrising nistParty and all otherpolitical entities must followits powerleads to a growinggeopolitical appetite and a likely lead or pay a blood price. Indeed even todaywhen China changetoward revisionism.

518 Perspectives on Politics This view of China has twovariations, the "patient The problemwith thisargument however is that power hegemon"and the "innocentgiant." In the firstview, isnot destiny.There areanalytic and empiricalanomalies China is likeGermany in theWeimar period,patiently thatconfound such a spareview. We might,for example, biding its timeuntil it is strongenough to reconfigure assumethat states are concernedfirst and foremostwith an oppressiveinternational order. Hans Von Seeckt,the power,but thattells us nothingabout how theythink headof theoutlawed (shadow) Germany army is reputed theycan best achievepower-by challengingthe world, to have declaredin the 1920s, "Firstwe'll get strong, cooperatingwith it,or ignoringit. Because international thenwe'll takeback what we lost."37Deng supposedly relationsare complex and road testinggrand strategies is advised,"Observe calmly; secure our position;cope with difficult,states show laggedresponses at best to external affairscalmly; hide our capacitiesand bide our time;be conditions.The possibilityof effectiveadjustment to inter good atmaintaining a lowprofile; and neverclaim lead nationaldemands is further impeded by thefact that "the ership."38The implication,of course,is thatafter power state"is not a singleactor but an aggregationof leaders isachieved different policies will follow.Lieutenant Gen with differentconstituencies, each with varyingpercep eralMi Zhenyu,Vice Commandantof theAcademy of tionsand preferences.45 Aggregating those preferences into MilitarySciences, put itmore bluntly:"[As for the United a coherentcollective choice faces a varietyof hurdles.46 In States,]for a relativelylong time itwill be absolutely short,grand strategy is filteredthrough domestic politics. necessary thatwe quietly nurse our sense of ven Empirically,states do not alwaysexpand theirforeign geance.... We must concealour abilitiesand bide our policyas power increases(nor do theylimit it as power time."39 declines).Historical anomalies are common.47 In theFirst A secondview of China is as an "innocentgiant" that WorldWar, America emerged as thedominant power in may not be revisionistright now, but is likelyto shiftin internationalrelations, but itsinvolvement and goalsdid thatdirection as it gains power.China may genuinely notexpand, but contractedin theinterwar period. China believe its risewill be peaceful,but once it has gained in theQing eradid notalter its isolationist ideas to deal enoughresources, it is likelyto want more and bewilling with theencroaching and threateningEuropean powers to concede lessand henceput up with lessof thestatus even thoughthe securitysituation indicated mounting quo. Sometimessuch shifts will beprovoked, not by China, dangers.And in termsof power trajectories,Britain and but by theinsecure actions of thedeclining hegemon, in theUnited Statesdid notgo towar with eachother at the thiscase theUnited States.40 turnof the twentiethcentury, even as theUnited States Not only is revisionismlikely according to power theo surpassedBritain as thedominant international power.48 rists,but so too isconflict. Power transitions are viewed as National strategycan rarelybe understoodby referenceto a quintessentialsource of war in theinternational arena.41 externalconditions alone. This isespecially the case when nationshave histories that Nor have ideasfollowed the balance of powerin lock leavethem aggrieved. Thus thereis concernthat China, step.China has been consistentlyweaker thanthe dom likeother countries that feel they have historically gotten inantpowers of world politics since at least the late theshort end of thestick, are particularly prone to attempt nineteenthcentury, yet itsideas have varied between sep to revisethe international system.42 arationin Qing China to integrationin Republican and These powerarguments correctly identify key elements contemporaryChina to revisionismduring Mao (see fig shapingChinese foreignpolicy and internationalrela ure 2). We might viewChina's power trajectory,not tions.Chinese leaderspay close attentionto powerand staticposition as beingmost important,but thattrajec geopolitics.43Indeed, to theextent that China is inter toryhas been rising(with fits and starts)since thecom ested in joininginternational society, it should,by the munists seizedcontrol of themainland. China's ideas, veryprinciples of thesystem, have an interestin balance however,have made shiftsbetween revisionismand ofpower politics. And China iscertainly focused on increas integration. ing itsown powerand balancingU.S. power inAsia.44 And contraryto the "risingChina" thesis-i.e., that There are also good reasonsto believe that Chinese aims foreignpolicy ambitionsgrow with relativepower and influencewill growin some respects as China's power Chinawas most revisionistwhen itwas atone of itsweak grows.It would be a trueanomaly if some portionof estpoints in termsof relativepower-i.e., afterMao came China'snew-found wealth were not directedto increased topower. andmore modern military capabilities. Scholarshave attempted to modify the power view to Likewisepower transition theorists rightly point to the take intoconsideration such anomalies.One notion is higherprobability of internationaltensions when power thatstates are shapednot justby rawpower, but also by transitionsoccur. It iseasy to imaginethat a more power "intentions."50Power transition scholars have longnoted fulChina might use itscapabilities in ways that raise hackles that"national satisfaction with thestatus quo" isas impor of those(e.g., the United States)used to callingthe shots tantas transitions.Inboth instances these factors are viewed inAsia without such constraints. as distinctfrom, and not reducibleto, power. They clearly

September 2007 IVol. 5/No. 3 519 ArticIes iWhat China Will Want

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implythat we cannotunderstand and predictwhat states Overall,the more thatChina iseconomically and socially will dowithout knowing how theythink about appropri entwinedwith other major powers (e.g., the United States) ate action.51Yet theydo not addressthe key issue of when themore itgains from the overall system and themore it such thinkingis likelyto change-or not. has to lose in changingthe system or engagingin major conflict.57We mightalso anticipate that as China partici pates in thesystem it will also changeit, in consultation Interdependence and agreementwith othercountries, more to itsliking. A differentresponse to Chinese power comes from those These relatedarguments that support engagement cer who believethat China's material improvement and social tainlycapture an importantinfluence on Beijing'sthink evolutionthrough interdependence with theworld give ingtoday. China has becomecaptivated by theeconomic riseto domestic political forces that favor integration and growththat has accruedfrom its openness to the inter supportthe existing system. This will occur througha nationaleconomy. Such interactionhas generatedmore numberof mechanisms. First, government officials that significantdomestic political interests that favor opening. takepart in internationaldiplomacy and negotiations over While thegrowth of theChinese middle class is still timecome todefine their interests in ways more consis nascent,there is some evidence to suggest increasing wealth tentwith thesystem.52 may affectforeign policy opinions.58 The People'sRepub Second,China's increasingparticipation in theworld licof China remainsan authoritarianstate yet Chinese economyis expectedto give riseto domesticeconomic citizenswill also attestto thefact that their political situ and politicalinterests that press for even greater liberaliza ation today is vastlymore liberal and open than itwas in tion.53For example,as China modernizes, its middle class thepre-reform period and becoming more so.59And finally and its resources grow (see figure 3) 54-a trend that has China realizes that it does have much at stake in the cur historicallybeen a forcefor political democratization. rentsystem-with incentives to become more engaged.60 Finally as China opens, the increase in travel and edu This explanationusefully points us to thefact that world cationabroad (see figure4),55 thespread of freespeech politicsis enacted through domestic politics and what hap and ideason theinternet (see figure 5),56 and experiments pens inChina's foreignrelations can affectthose politics, with evenlimited voting and choiceare expected to inspire potentiallychanging them dramatically over time. a tastefor liberty that feeds democratizing impulses that The problemwith theseinterdependence arguments is willmore happily align China with internationalstandards. thatthey, like their power-centric debating opponents, are

52!O Perspectives on Politics Figure 3 Figure 4 Disposable income of Chinese city dwellers Chinese students studying abroad

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overlydeterministic.61 They assumethat once China has benefitedmost fromChina's opennessare eitherin, or beenhooked up to theinternational system there is little linkedto, the Communist party that rules China andpro chanceit will everchange directions. Internationalist fac videsfor stability that attracts international investment.63 tionsprofiting or learningfrom integration are expected Indeed,it may be thata democraticChina-one where to snowball,pushing the country further in thatdirec ruralpeasants and otherdisenfranchised groups have a tion.This view,however, also runsinto analytical traps say-would be distinctlyopposed to thetype of integra and historicalanomalies. tionnow occurring.64 Analytically,it has a difficulttime accounting for how Democratizationis a precariousprocess-democratizing interestswithin societies"add up" to national policy statesare oftenprone to conflictunder thepressures of choices.62For example,what numberof internetusers new-foundnationalism stoked by exaggeratedexpecta translatesinto a freespeech society that prefers democ tionsunrestrained by fledglinginstitutions. Contempo racy?Right now theChinese governmentis matching raryChinese nationalism threatens to be theMr. Hyde to stridestoward freedom of expressionwith itsown control theDr. Jekyllof the "reformand opening"policy that of theinternet and press.Likewise it isdifficult to deter Deng initiated.65Economic interdependencemay be a mine how a growingmiddle classor expansionin China's forcethat works against conflict, but it isnot a failsafe-as internationalsectors will fitwith politicalliberalization seen in theinterdependence of theearly 1900s inEurope compatiblewith internationalsociety. Those who have thatended in theGreat War.

Figure 5 Figure 6 Chinese Internetusers Chinese economic interdependence

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Nor doesglobalization-the shrinking of theglobe and economicpressures) and tomake senseof how theymight increaseddensity of contactswithin internationalsociety conjointlycause outcomes-i.e., how powerand inter due to technologicaladvances-guarantee Chinese inte dependenceinteract with ideasthrough predictable mech gration.The potentialinterdependence of China in the anismsto causeoutcomes. The centralemphasis in what system-in termsof thedeclining costs of transportation followsis on therole of ideas(simply because it is theleast and communicationand therelative openness of theworld understood)but the importanceof powerand transna tradeorder-has been occurringfor decades. Whether tionalpressures will also be clear. China tookadvantage of thepotential gains of interdepen dencewas at leastin part a Chinese policychoice that ForeignPolicy Ideas and Intentions needsto be explained.66For example,as seenin figure 6,67 States tendto formulate Chinese interdependencehas not been drivensimply by broad concepts-almostopera tionalphilosophies-that orient their international themarch of technology,but insteadby Chinese ideas behav ior.As largesocieties, (and thoseof others)about how much China shouldbe nationsrequire ideas that signify to theirmembers what engaged in theworld. Thus, Chinese interdependence theystand for; as largeorganizations they to declinedfollowing the rise of Mao's revisionismand when requireideas guide themin theirinteractions in China began to recalibrateafter the disastrous Cultural theinternational arena. "Ideas," as I use theterm here, are notmental constructs of Revolution,interdependence began to rise-especially after individuals,but insteadthe col 1978. lectivebeliefs of societiesand organizationsabout how to act. The historyof nationaleconomic modernization via Examplesof beliefsabout "good policies"from the engagementwith the internationalarena is filledwith foreignpolicies of major powersinclude: storiesof countriesundertaking integration and thenlater * "non-entanglement"in European politics (United moving in theopposite direction. Here we might think States,1776-1941) ofWeimar Germany'sshift under Hitler or Japan'sshift * territorialexpansion on the continent(Germany fromTaish6 democracyto theShowa era or even the 1890-1945) retreatof theUnited Statesin theinterwar period. China * isolationfrom extensive foreign interaction or pres itselfreversed directions in moving fromQing China to ence (Japan1640-1868) NationalistChina and thenreversed again in the transi * integrationas a normalpower (SovietUnion/Russia tionto Communist China. 1986-present) In sum,both power and economic interdependence may push strategyin particular directions but suchmoves They areembedded not only in somehuman brains, but havealso been reversedeven when powerand interdepen most importantlyin the collective memories, national sym denceconditions remain fairly constant. Similarly, some bols,government procedures, educations systems, and rhet timesstates may stickto theirplans even as conditionsof oricof statecraft.69 powerand interdependencealter significantly. Why? Such viewsmatter because theyare a guide tonational action and can shapewhat stateswant to achieveover time.Naturally state leaders strategically plan theiractions The Meshing Gear: Collective Ideas but theyoften do so againsta backdropof certaindomi Neitherpower nor interdependencedirectly shaped Chi nantnational ideas about what generalbehavior is appro nese grand strategybecause such systemicfactors are priate.These ideasmay be contestedby some groups within enactedthrough domestic politics and decisionmaking. societiesbut stillserve as a guidefor the collective "nation." There areof coursemany typesof domestictheories of Promotedby thosewho benefitand nurturedby habit, politics.Here, however,I want to concentrateon the theygrow roots. As organizationtheorists point out, par central(and misunderstood) role of enduringforeign pol ticularlywhen groupshave intangiblegoals such as "secu icy ideas in domesticpolitics and subsequentnational rity"or "wealth"states will focus theirefforts around behavior. doctrinesof action ratherthan actual goals. Put differ There is a largeand veryinsightful literature on how ently,ideas become intentions.70In foreignaffairs, such collectiveideas (e.g.,beliefs, norms, discourses, culture, ideas arewhat ErnestMay has called "axiomatic" etc.) "matter"in foreignpolicy.68 What isusually missing formulationsderived from history that become accepted in thesearguments is how ideasmatter in theirown trans assumptionsof policy.71 formation.The literatureis very good on how collective National ideasabout internationalorder are difficult to ideasmight keep intentionsfixed, but lessclear on how changefor a numberof reasons.First, they have constit theyaffect change. To suggestthat ideas play a rolein their uenciesthat benefit from them and thusare energized to own transformationis not to argue thatoutcomes are promoteand defendthem. Second, suchdominant ideas whollycaused by ideas.It isuseful to distinguish the impact becomeingrained in public rhetoric and bureaucratic pro of ideasfrom other factors (e.g., strategic circumstances or ceduresthat make themresilient like all traditionsthat are

522 Perspectives on Politics Figure 7 Collapse Desirable Results - Continuity

Events Contradict <1 Ideas on UndesirableResults -* Collapse WorldOrder (potentialchange Events Confirm-* Continuity see Consolidation)

institutionallyentrenched. Third, becauseof thiseffect triesthen use thosebaselines to assess-and supportor theybecome normalized not justas means toachieve ends, critique-existingpolicies, depending on events.When but also as a standardof what thenation should do, or eventscontradict collective expectations and theconse evenwhat it is (i.e., identity). quencesare starkly undesirable, change is more likely.Such TokugawaJapan came to be definedby itspolicy of situationsfacilitate change by givingammunition to the excludingforeigners and itsleaders appealed to thattra opponentsof thecurrent orthodoxy, allowing them to ditionto sustain their position. Similarly, the United States rallysupport to theirside while supportersof thecurrent was distinguishedby itsrefusal to "get entangled" with the orthodoxyare put on thedefensive. For example,the sep suspecttraditional powers of Europe in thefirst 150 years aratistapproach of theQing Empirewas finallydisrupted of itsexistence and presidentspaid homageto thatnorm by the1895 Japanesevictory in theSino-Japanese War. (e.g.,Harding in the1920s) inorder to bolster their pop That eventset off a raceamong outsiders to control China ularity.72China in thenineteenth century in theface of and encouragedforces within China to challengetradi foreignincursions attempted to hew toa traditionalQing tion,including in foreignpolicy.74 Middle Kingdommentality despite its waning authority. Inmost othercircumstances, continuity is likely.For It is thereforenot surprisingthat continuity is thenorm example,continuity can be expectedwhen deviations from in foreignpolicy ideas. Those who want to challengetra existingideas lead to undesired outcomes. When theUnited ditionface significant hurdles. It isoften hard for individ Statesintervened inWorld War I itviolated its longstand uals toknow ifothers desire change and ifthey do, how ing tabooagainst entanglement in Europe's politics. The much theywill riskacting on suchpreferences. Lacking resultsof World War I broughtwidespread disillusion such information,they cannot be sureif their own desire ment in theUnited Statesand theAmericans embraced and effortsfor change (should theyexist) will have any anew theirtradition of "no-entanglement"inEurope. In effect.They must mount a case forwhy theold ideaswere suchsituations, defenders of theold ideas(as theAmeri defunct,which can involveconsiderable effort, and because can isolationistsdid) will be able tomake politicalhay it threatenstradition, invites social and politicalcriticism. by claiming"told you so,we shouldnever have strayed Likewisethe formation and institutionalizationof new fromour triedand truetradition." Intervention inWorld ideasbreeds strife and uncertaintybecause particular ori War I, theyargued, had been a disastrousmistake. entationsoffer differing costs and benefitsto domestic Likewisecontinuity is even likely when dominantideas groupsthat can stalemateover which, ifany, new direc are ignoredyet desirable results occur. It ishard togather tion ismore desirable.Continuity, therefore, is a potent momentumto change collective ideas when outcomesare force.Yet asMay pointsout, entrenchedforeign policy agreeable.Consider, for example, the dearth of investiga conceptsare nonetheless vulnerable to transformation"as tionsof largestock market increases that no one expected historygrows" and countries"see the past ina new light."73 versusthe special commissions that always seem to form The interestingquestions are when and how? to examine unexpectedstock market crashes.When outcomesare desirable, it isdifficult to generate momen VWhenOrthodoxy Disintegrates tum to reorientbureaucracies and alter traditions.The Implicitin theabove discussion is thefact that change is delegitimationof an extantorthodoxy requires events that not a singlephenomenon but involvestwo stagesthat both contradictits logic and have undesiredconse must be explained:collapse of theold ideasand consoli quences.In suchcircumstances, individuals will bemore dationof thenew. Both stages,I argue,are affectedby motivatedand more likelyto challenge those ideas, believe pre-existingideas. othersare of a likemind, and hence thepossibilities for In thecollapse stage, pre-existing ideas affect how lead changeare more significant. ers justifypolicy and seta baselineof socialexpectations Figure7 depictsthe branching logic of collapseinvolv ofwhat should result.Political opponents within coun ingthis interaction of ideasand consequences.

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Figure 8 Consolidation None orMany -* Continuity(of old ideas) Replacement Ideas Undesirable Feedback -* Continuity

One Desirable Feedback * Consolidation (change)

Conditionsof New Orthodoxy relativepower can lead todisappointing results that con Evenwhen dominantideas are delegitimated,however, tributeto theirdelegitimation. Consider thedecline of change is not automatic.Consolidation, like collapse, theQing-era tributesystem and sinocentrismunder the faceshurdles that feed inertia. Individuals may agreethat weight of superiorEuropean and Japanesecapabilities theold viewhas to go butmay not be able to agreeor thatexposed their fragility in thelate nineteenth century. coordinateon what new orthodoxyshould be theguide. Likewise,the number and natureof replacementideas so Such a dynamichas been chartedin thestudy of revolu centralto consolidation is shapedby thepolitical activity tion,but it also exists in foreignpolicy disputesand and resourcesof interestgroups and individualsthat pro debates.75The consolidationof a new foreignpolicy mote them.Economic interdependenceand thepromises approachdepends not only on the collapseof theold of growthinherent in it can indeedstrengthen those in ideas,but also on thedistribution of replacementideas, favorof such ideas.78Long-term efforts that encourage especiallythe existence of a prominentalternative. When internationalexchange can facilitatethe riseof replace thereare no developedalternatives or when thereare ment ideas in particularsocieties.79 Thus the successof many equallystrong alternatives, the resultcould be a ideascan alsobe shapedby thedegree a countryis involved returnto theold thinkingdue todefault in thefirst case in theinternational economy. and deadlockamong factionsin thesecond. For exam Overall,then, the account of foreignpolicy change (and ple, inQing China in thenineteenth century, Sinocen continuity)offered here iscontingent. It dependson the tricseparation from the encroaching international society interactionof thedominant foreign policy ideasof states was so dominantthat there were virtuallyno groupsof with theresults encountered, as well as thedistribution of any importwith developedreplacement ideas to guide replacementideas in a particularsociety and theirinitial China's foreignpolicy.76 success,if any. To stresscontingency isnot to forgoexpla The sustainabilityof a neworthodoxy (when a promi nation.80We can posit thatfuture intentions will depend nent replacementdoes exist)over a longerperiod often on thedegree to which theexpectations of particular dom hingeson somedemonstration of itsefficacy. Ideas that inant ideas are defiedby events,negative consequences enduredo so because theyappear to generatedesirable result,and somesocially viable replacementidea exists. results.When thosenotions do not,revanchists often find This generallogic seems to have wide applicationin the fertileground to argue for a returnto theold ideas.This historyof greatpowers, and thoughthere are differences, was thecase inWeimar Germany when theresults of Ver coversboth democratic and authoritarianregimes.8' What saillesundermined the liberalinternational policy of the followsis a briefillustration of how someof thecentral fledglingSocial Democratic government.Versailles also dynamicscaptured by the logicmight play out in the spawnedthe May FourthMovement inChina thathelped futureof China's current"reform and opening"view on discreditfledgling liberal democracy notions.77 internationalorder described above. Figure8 depictsthe way thatthe distribution of replace ment ideasand theirdemonstrated efficacy foster or inhibit The Contingent Path of China's change. Future Intentions This argumentfeatures ideas as a meshinggear-one The argumentabove highlightsparticular signposts as thatinteracts with otherfactors and in doing so has its importantfor understanding what China mightdo with own influence.National strategiestherefore are a product itsgrowing power in thefuture. Most centrally,the lon ofmulti-causal influence. Prior ideasplay a rolebut of gevityof China's integrationistorthodoxy will dependon coursedo not unilaterallydetermine all aspectsof new theexpectations itgenerates in thedomestic arena and the orthodoxies.Consider, for example, the role of therelative resultsthat are experienced(collapse considerations), as powerof actors,which often shapes negative and positive well as on thenature of theideas that might replaceinte feedbackto prevailing ideas. Dominant concepts that ignore gration(consolidation factors). I addresseach in turn.

524 Perspectives on Politics justificationsand Expectations These two themes,economic modernization and sov ContemporaryChinese leadersjustify and promotethe ereignty,may look closelylinked to the realistfocus on dominantintegration idea-i.e., "reformand opening" -in powerand autonomy.The keydifference, however, is that twodifferent ways. Chineseleaders justify them not based on increasingChina's The first,and most important,justification of current security,but on betteringthe livingstandard of Chinese policyis thatintegration within theexisting international citizens.Likewise, China's obsession with Taiwan and other orderprovides the best means fornational economic devel territoriesishard tounderstand from strictly a power per opment.82China remainsa governmentrun by a commu spective.Without knowingChina's history and thecen nistparty. Yet the legitimacyand popularsupport of the tralityof Taiwan toCPC legitimacygains, it is impossible governmentdoes not reston socialistideology, but instead tounderstand the role this issue can play inChinese pol on economicperformance. "Well-off Society" not "Work iticsand securitydecision-making. ersUnite" is thenational mantra. President Jiang Zemin's Economicdevelopment and sovereigntycan of course 2002 addressto the16th Party Congress put thisclaim alsobe in tensionwith one another,a factthat does much starkly: to explainthe complexity of contemporaryChinese poli cies.86Integration can lead to deep inroadson issuesof It isessential for the Party to give toppriority to development in sovereignty.For example,membership in theWorld Trade governingand rejuvenatingthe country and open up new pros Organizationbrings with ita numberof significantimpli pects forthe modernization drive . . . theprogressiveness of the cationsfor the Chinese socialand politicalorder, not the Partyis concrete and historical,and itmust be judgedby whether theParty promotes the development of theadvanced productive leastof which ismajor turmoilin themassive Chinese forces.83 agriculturalsector and growinginequality within Chinese society.87 The FifthPlenary of the 16th PartyCongress of the CPC inOctober 2005 calleddevelopment "the overrid ingprinciple and thekey to resolvingall problemsfacing AnticipatingEvents thatFavor Change China."84The dominanceof the integrationorientation The durabilityofChina's integrationist foreign policy, there in contemporaryChinese foreignpolicy is largelybased fore,will dependon how resultsmatch socialexpectations on economic considerations.Integration according to relatedto economic growth and sovereignty.Events related the reformand openingorthodoxy serves China's rapid toChina's integrationthat represent significant setbacks development. toeither of thoseissues would be occasionsfor China to The secondmajor justificationfor integration within rethinkintegration. the existing internationalorder is that it enhances The firstsituation where the integrationistorthodoxy sovereignty-understoodin termsof independenceand would be vulnerableinvolves troubles in China's eco territorialintegrity. That is, integrationshould prevent nomicmodernization. From thisviewpoint (and incon the typeof colonial subordinationof thepast and the trastto therise of China debate) themost likelyscenario infringementof China by outsidepowers. A defining inwhich China will alterits integrationist mindset isnot pointof historyfor the Communist Party (CPC) leader with thegrowth of Chinese powerbut, instead,major ship is the"century of humiliation" China enduredunder rupturesin thattrajectory that could put thedominant theinfluence of imperialistpowers (e.g., the West, Japan). "openness"view on a slipperydefensive. A reasonablecase One of theCPC's main claims to authorityis that it can bemade thata levelingof Chinese economicgrowth liberatedChina fromthat outside influence.85Integra is as likelyin thefuture as isChina's riseto supremacy.88 tionfacilitates such a goal byproviding access to institu Especiallyvis-'a-vis current Chinese expectations, this would tionalfora where globalpolitics are decided thatmight be a deeplydisillusioning experience if China's govern affectChina's autonomy.Such integrationalso provides ment is somehowimplicated. That is, in theabsence of the imprintof major powerstatus, confirming that the downturnsthat affect all countriesor unforeseencrises, countryis no longersimply an objectmanipulated by criticsof thecurrent orthodoxy will have incentiveto use more powerfulWestern countries or Japan,but an impor falteringChinese economicprospects to rallypolitical tantactor itself. authorityaround a newapproach to theinternational sys The most concretemarker of sovereigntyfor China tem.The motivatingsource in sucha scenariowill be the todayis Taiwan. China expectsthat its participation in combinationof surprisingeconomic setbacks contrasted theextant institutions and conventionsof world politics with optimisticexpectations generated by leadersseeking will help to fulfilla desire (seeminglywidespread across legitimacy. thepolitical spectrum) to unite the mainland and Taiwan. The declineof economicgrowth would encouragepre Such participationallows China to stymieefforts by Tai viouslysilent groups that oppose integration.China's rapid wan toclaim sovereign international standing and tobuild developmenthas led todaunting gaps betweenrich and itSown internationalsupport. poor.89Social protestsand disturbancesappear to have

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risensteadily in recentyears, increasing from 8,700 in Jiangalso identifieda second group with alternative pref 1993 to 87,000 in 2005.90 Involvementin theWorld erencesfor China's foreignpolicy. He called it"those with TradeOrganization (W1TO) is puttingsignificant pres leftisttendencies" (distinct from the old Marxist variety) sureson poor farmersand peasantswho cannotcompete. who critiquereform-and internationalinvolvement As longas theeconomy is booming, some of thesepeople as contributingto social injusticeand inequality.In the can transferto other types of jobsor thegovernment can currentcontext, this might includefarmers, rural citizens, providesome form of subsidy.91Yet ifgrowth falters in a inlandcities, and parts of themilitary or Communist party way thatmakes thegovernment seem complicit, this sys who havenot sharedequally in China's development and temlooks brittle. could rightlyblame reform and opening or participation in Second,events supported by theinternational commu theglobal order (think WTO) as thecause. In foreignpol nitythat China seesas neo-colonialor which move Tai icysuch tendencies translate into social support for halting wan towardsindependence could help to undermine and reversingChina's integrationin thecurrent order. If China's currentintegration orthodoxy. For example,the thecommunique from the Fifth Plenary Session of the16th 1999 bombingof theChinese embassy in Belgrade fueled PartyCongress in October 2005 isan indicator,the chal nationalismand strengthenedopponents of opening.92 lengefrom the Left-and theinequality of growth-is of Much, of course,will dependon theparticular circum particularconcern to theleadership of Hu Jintaowho has stancesand whether they make Beijinggovernment seem emphasizedthe more egalitarian goal of "harmonioussoci complicit.Taiwanese efforts to establishformal indepen ety"in contrast to Jiang's mantra of "well-offsociety."97 dencecause deep concernin China-indeed thetype that A thirdposition would comefrom those who arecritical can setthe stage for China to takeaggressive efforts on an ofglobalization and western values, but arenot necessarily issueseen as priorityeven by "reformist"governments. isolationistor anti-capitalist.These peoplemight advo Taiwaneseindependence efforts in 2004-2005 weremet catea nationalistrealpolitik policy that favors amore con by a strong(and self-defeating)reaction from Hu Jintao frontationalstrategy with theWest, stabilityand central andNational People's Congress passing anti-secession leg authorityat home,while pursuing a softline and integra islationwhich authorizedChina to use forceagainst Tai tionin Asia. Think of thisperhaps, as theplatform for the wan ifit continued to push forindependence.93 resurgenceof amodern day "Middle Kingdom" role where China would exerciseincreasing hegemony within Asia while perhapsdistancing itself from overall international Replacementsfor "Reformand Opening" order.98 If reformand openingdoes falter,what then?Presumably Absentbetter information, itwould appear thatthose some sortof alternativepath. Anticipating such a new who would emphasizewithdrawal-either the new Left approach,however, depends on a key factorthat is espe or realpolitikers-wouldoccupy the rhetorical high ground ciallyelusive in theChinese case: thenature and distribu shouldfuture events defy the "opening" justifications of tionof replacementideas about international society within theChinese government with cleardisappointing results. China.94The outlinesof threereplacements are discern Both offera greaterdifference with current dominant inte able in an admittedlyopaque view.95 grationideas (Rightistswant evenmore integration)and The firstwas identifiedby JiangZemin as a challenge would likelybe in a betterposition to drawoff the lan to his own "reformand opening"emphasis in theyears guageof nationalismto make theircase.99 Chinese strat followingthe 1989 Tiananmen Square fiasco.96Jiang egywill of course alwaysbe a mix of thesedifferent labeledthis the threat from the "Right." For thegovern approaches;the issue is the direction of shiftand thedegree ment, thedanger from the Right involves those who would towhich one orientationdominates. attemptto pursue economic and politicalliberalization at To theextent that a factionalaccount of Chinese poli an evenmore rapidpace at theexpense of theParty and tics is overdrawn(e.g., because the decisionmaking socialstability. In recentyears the CPC hasbeen especially dynamic is one of consensus,not groups fightingover focusedon thischallenge and has gone togreat effort to control)then any change in foreignpolicy thinkingwill luresuccessful businessmen into theparty and welcome demandespecially negative results and could takeconsid thereturn of Chinese fromabroad who mightotherwise erabletime, just as itdid inQing China.'00 If thereis a be a voice formore forcefulpolitical change. Think here continuedshared view that"isolation is themajor factor of thosewho havebenefited most fromrapid integration explainingChina's decline"and "openingfueled China's butwho arenow chafingunder CPC constraintsor believe rise,"then shifting significantly away fromreform and Chinamust takereforms to thenext level (e.g. rule of law, openingwould not happen quickly.101Although not so education)at a fasterpace-e.g., thenew private business dominantas theseparatist mentality of Qing China, inte men or state-ownedenterprise executives, artists or intel gration todayenjoys a privilegedstatus against which lectuals,coastal city regionsand theirofficials, or even replacementidea proponents may have a hard timemak partsof thebureaucracy that have an interestin integration. ingheadway.

526 Perspectives on Politics Influencing Intentions The pointhere isnot to pursuewhat has come to be Understandingfuture intentions is a significantand crit theperceived wisdom in dealingwith China's unknown icalchallenge for both scholarsand policymakers.I have futureintentions-i.e., a hedgingstrategy. Such an ap arguedthat one way (byno means theonly way) to think proachcounsels that the other countries prepare them about theevolution of intentionsis as a productof change selvesfor any eventuality and respondin kind. However, and continuityin dominantideas about foreignpolicy. doingso suffersfrom two problems. It isoverly passive in Situationsinvolving the combination of unmetexpecta itsdependence on simplyreacting to what happens in tionsand undesiredconsequences are likelyto facilitate China.And most importantit isoverly focused on China's collapsewhile thosewhere conceptualexpectations are behaviorand not attentiveenough to the ideasbehind fulfilledor desiredconsequences occur favorthe continu action and how theyrelate to thedomestic politics of ityof orthodoxy.Consolidation of a new foreignpolicy authorityin China. A simpleresponse to behaviormay approach-and hence setof intentions-isenhanced by unnecessarilystrengthen revisionist forces in Beijing. theexistence of a prominentreplacement idea thataligns If thegoal isto incorporateChina intothe international with desirableresults. systemin a way thatmakes thesystem operate in a fashion If thisargument is right,it impliesthat understanding acceptableto all, however, it is important to reinforce those thefuture of a "risingChina" means lookingbeyond, but Chineseleaders and movements that have staked their legit notover, power and interdependence.The effectsof power imacyon thepositive aspects of integration.A modern-day and interdependenceare certainlyimportant for under repeatof theundermining of pro-liberalizationadvocates standingChina's attitude towards international order. Rel byWestern action-as occurredwhen theVersailles Treaty ativepower has shapedChina's past thinkingtowards the producedthe May FourthMovement and a reactionary dominantrules and norms of theinternational system. The China-would be a disaster.This may mean making an extra penetratinggeopolitical reach of Western power had much effortto assure payoffs to China forparticularly bold moves todo with why Qing China had theincentive to change its in termsof integration-orin termsof restraintvis-a-vis longenduring tributary system and sinocentrism.Like Taiwan.The point isnot simplyto impedehardliners and wise, theinterdependence approach rightly highlights how help softliners.Indeed, doing either might be desirable theopenness of China and growthof internationaltrade dependingon theideas and expectations they are promoting. and contactshas helped develop constituencies and liberal There isof coursea riskin supportingChinese devel forcesin China thatotherwise might not exist.But these opmentthrough integration. Itmay lead-throughunfore twoconstant structural forces cannot account for the vari seenevents, or miscalculation, or inadequatesupport-to ationover time in Chinese ideas about how torelate to inter aChina thatstrengthens enough to be dangerous,but has nationalsociety. To do thatwe must also heed thecontingent notyet changed enough internally to be satisfiedwith the ways thatforeign policy ideas relate to events, as well as the normsof thesystem.'02 In suchcircumstances, where inte replacementideas that form within China. grationistideas are undermined, China may well look to In termsof policy,this argument cautions against the anotherand much lessdesirable set of ideas toguide its choice thatexists among the threemain alternativesin foreignpolicy. thecurrent U.S. policydebate: engaging, containing, or To dealwith thisscenario, it makes sense,then, to be hedgingagainst the rise of China. Any might be appro proactive-topay attentionto thepotential replacement priatedepending on what particularpolicy China ispur ideascirculating in China and theirbackers-ones that suingand how thatrelates to theChinese government's may somedaybe conceptualkings. For example, it is impor rationalefor its actions. To theextent Beijing leadersare tantthat long-term efforts be made to strengthenthose attemptingto build theirauthority and legitimatetheir Chinese groupsand individualswho would support,in rulebased on actionsthat challenge international order, theevent of significantsetbacks to reformand opening, otherstates should object toor penalizesuch actions. For replacementideas that are more desirablethan an aggres example,U.S. policies towardthe Soviet Union-e.g., sive,separatist nationalist approach to foreign policy. There theCarter and Reagan defensebuildup, the response arehistorical precedents for such a transformativeinflu to the Soviet deploymentof new SS-20 Euromissiles, ence.Efforts taken over many years by a varietyof groups and the aid to theMuhjahadeen in thewake of the in theUnited States (and inBritain) after World War I Soviet invasionof Afghanistan-helped to undercutthe hadmuch to do withwhy internationalism(a fusing of Brezhnev"correlation of forces"thinking that argued that geopoliticsand Wilsonianism) was a coherentreplace theexercise of Sovietpower served the USSR's interests. ment forisolationism in American strategy after World The dynamicwas not justa balancingof powerbut an War II.103Likewise during the Cold War, U.S. andEuro underminingof ideas.Likewise, should China pursue pean interactionwith an evenmore authoritarian and closed aggressivepolicies thatundermine international order, SovietUnion helped"new thinking" (and not someother othercountries and organizationsshould sanctionand thinking)take shape as a viablereplacement when theold delegitimizethem. Sovietforeign policy dogma disintegrated.'04

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Of course,the limits of outsideinfluence on a country 15 Rosecrance 1986. 16 at ofChina's sizeand complexity,especially given the popu Jiang Zemins Report the 15* National Congress of larChinese desire for autonomy and non-interference from theCommunist Party ofChina, September 12, 1997. foreigners,are significant.Moreover, China's authoritar http://www.fas.org/news/china/1997/970912-prc. iangovernment and lackof transparencylimit the ability htm; Hao andWang 1978, 171. toclosely follow and shapeinternal developments. China's 17 Pillsbury 2000. futurein theworld will be largelyof itsown making. Yet 18 See Kent 2002; Johnston 2003, 2004a. as seen inhistory, outside influence has sometimesplayed 19 Cf. Wang 2000 and Johnston 2001. a role in the evolutionof China's approach to inter 20 Such themes are common in speeches from the nationalsociety-from the Opium Wars to theMay Fourth 1970s. See for example, the keynote speeches at the Movement to theearly Cold War period to thecurrent 10th(1973) and 11th(1978) PartyCongresses. In to integration.Central to thishistory-and China's future Jiang's address the 16thNational Congress of the arenot just theperils of poweror thepromises of inter Chinese Communist Party inNovember 2002, there dependence,but also how theyrelate to theway China was virtually no mention of this traditional role. Hu thinksabout theworld. Jintao's leadership has placed somewhat more em phasis on it. 21 Ross 1997. Notes 22 The five principles, which have been included in the are 1 Zoellick 2005. Chinese constitution, 1) respect for sovereignty 2 for the from the summer See, example hearings held 2) non-aggression 3) non-interference 4) equal and to now. of 2006 up http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/ mutual benefit 5) peaceful co-existence. to hearingarchive.php 23 Jiang Zemins Report the 16thNational Congress s to 3 Vice President Remarks theAustralian-American of theChinese Communist Party,November 8, 2002. Leadership Dialogue, Shangri-La Hotel Sydney, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/ recent Australia, February 27, 2007. http://www. 49007.htm. Chinas "reassurance diplomacy" a whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/02/ in South East Asia suggests mode of cooperative not 20070223.html leadership easily equated with domination or 4 Johnston 2003. balancing behavior, but is nonetheless compatible a 5 Friedberg 2005 offers typology and contingent with extant norms. See Medeiros and Fravel 2003; a analysis of future relations that lacks general expla Shambaugh 2005. to us events move one nation tell whether will in 24 Wen, 2007. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/ direction or another. 2007-03/03/content_818952.htm 6 Copeland 2000a. 25 As quoted inWestad et al. 1998, 135. some 7 Friedberg 2005 documents that there is varia 26 Yardley and Lague 2007 and Office of the Secretary tion in on this dichotomy?some who focus power of Defense, 2006. not see some are et do inevitable conflict and liberals 27 Crane al. 2005 and Annual Report toCongress: The more pessimistic. Military Power of thePeoples Republic ofChina 2006. a uncer 8 For study that explores the link between 28 See Foot 2000; Barkin 1998; Payne and Samhat about intentions or tainty and cooperative conflic 2004. tual strategies, see Edelstein 2000. 29 Ramos 2004. The classic 9 synthesis of power and interdependence 30 "Building of Political Democracy inChina," Infor is (without ideas) Keohane and Nye, 1977. mation Office of the State Council of the People's 10 See and Snyder 1991 Solingen 1998. Republic of China, October 2005, Beijing, http:// 11 The National Security Strategy of theUnited States of news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-10/19/ America (March 2006) "seeks to encourage China to content_3645750.htm. and Kahn 2007. make the right strategic choices for its people, while 31 Foot 2000, 3. we other saw a hedge against possibilities." http://www. 32 Chinas respect for human rights downturn in as on whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/. See also Carter and 2006 China cracked down dissent likely in on Perry 2007, 16-22; Council Foreign Relations, anticipation of the 2008 Olympics. See Human U.S.-China Relations: An A AffirmativeAgenda, RightsWatch, World Report 2007. http://hrw.org/ Responsible Course, Independent Task Force Report englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11 /chinai 4867.htm. 59 (April2007). Small advances are also sometimes made. For exam 12 Thomas 2001; Evangelista 1999. ple, theHuman RightsWatch report in 2005 noted 13 See Bull 1995. thatChina amending its constitution inMarch 14 See to Morgenthau 1966, 38ff;Wolters 1962, 81-102. 2004 include guarantees on private property and

528 Perspectives on Politics a human rights "signals growing acknowledgment of PremierWen Jaibao have argued thatChinas mod human rights."Human RightsWatch, "Human ernization depends on peace and thatChina's "rise" Rights Overview: China," inWorld Report 2005. would not lead to policies that pose threats or come at http://hrw.Org/english/docs/2005/01/13/ the expense of other countries. See Suettinger china9809.htm. 2004. (http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/ 33 Zhang 1998, 177-193; Wen 2007. 20044/rs.pdf) and Zheng 2005. 34 Gilpin 1981, 187. See also Zakaria 1992. 61 For a synthesis of the two that overcomes some of see 35 Mearsheimer 2001, 402. these problems, Copeland 2003. 36 Roy 1994, 149-168, 159-160. 62 See Garrett and Lang 1996. It also applies to social 37 Geyer 1981, 107. ization arguments about China as well. an 38 Hong Kong Jing bao, No. 172 (5 November 1991), 63 For argument thatChina is unlikely to liberalize 84-86, in FBIS-CHI, 6 November 1991, 28-30 as in any foreseeable time frame seeMann 2007. cited inWhiting 1995. 64 Waldron 2004. 39 Quoted inMosher 2001, ch. 1. 65 Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Snyder 2000. Gries 40 See Copeland 2000b. 2004. see 41 E.g., Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981; 66 The Western powers of course had a say on this Kim and Morrow 2000b. For dif outcome as well. U.S. after Mao came to 1992; Copeland policy of a see was at ferent strategies managing such situation, power largely aimed isolating China. Schweller 1999. 67 Trade data is the total current value of imports and 42 Waldron over current 1995. exports the total GDP. See http:// For an a 43 argument thatChina has long strategic chinadataonline.org/member/macroy/. see tradition of realpolitik thought, Johnston 1995. 68 Berman 2001; Adler 2002. 44 Pillsbury2000; Qin 2001. 69 See Anderson 1983; Halbwachs 1992; Kertzer 1988. case 45 In the Chinese see, Dittmer 1995, 1-39. 70 E.g., themission statement for theUnited States State is a more 46 Gilbert 1987, 185-204 Department of "Create secure, demo For a of seeWalt 47 variety examples, 1987; Snyder cratic, and prosperous worldfor the benefitof the Stein and Rosecrance 1991; 1993; Kupchan 1994. American people and the international community'? 48 transitions occur see Most power without conflict. See http://www.state.gov/rn/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/ De Soysa, Oneal, and Park 1997. 23503.htm. On the general organizational dynamic as 49 Relative power is given a composite of the relative see Selznick, 1949, 69-70, 250-259; Selznick 1957, on share of absolute total global data six categories: 16;Wilson 1989. energy consumption, iron& steel production, mili 71 May 1962. tary expenditure, military personnel, total popula 72 SeeToby 1997,323-364; Adler 1957. tion, and urban population. See National Material 73 May 1962, 667. Capabilities Study (v3.01) http://www.correlatesof 74 Gong 1984; Zhang 1991. et war.org and Singer al. 1972, Singer 1987. 75 On consolidation in the literature on revolutions, 50Walt 1987; Schweller2006. see e.g., Goldstone 1991. to 51 Lemke 2002. Ruggie 1982 speaks to the need 76 As the future revolutionary Sun Yatsen wrote to consider as well as an reason we purpose power. official in 1893, "the why have not 52 Johnston 2001. achieved much (relative to other countries that had 53 Frieden and Rogowski, 1996. opened up); public opinion and entrenched ideas 54 The index number of 100 for real disposable income simplywill not allow it."Mitter 2004, 32. was in 1978 equal to 343.4 RMB. See http:// 77 See Hunt 1996, 77ff. chinadataonline.org/member/yearbook/default. 78 This is the thrust of Frieden and Rogowski 1996 asp?StartYear= 1984&EndYear=2006. and ties inwell with Copeland 2003. 55 www.chinadataonline.org. For data prior to 1985, 79 See Keck and Sikkink 1998; Thomas 2001. see China Statistical Yearbook, 633. 80 Friedberg 2005 rightlypoints out the difficultyof on 56 Statistical Reports theDevelopment ofChinese predicting the futurewhen it depends on events that available at we cannot is to Internet, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/en/ foresee.Nonetheless, it possible index/index.htm explicate the conditions and mechanisms through 57 Rosecrance 1986; Russett and Oneal 2000. which eventswill produce different futures. 58 Johnston 2004b, 603-628. 81 See Legro 2005. 59 Zhao 2000, 11-12; Johnson 2003, 551-554. 82 Downs and Saunders 1998/99 argue thatChina has on 60 Building arguments offered by scholars, Chinas valued economic development ahead of nationalist leaders such as General Hu and Secretary Jintao goals.

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to The Isolationist New York: 83 Jiang Zemins Report the 16thNational Congress of Adler, Selig. 1957. Impulse. theChinese Communist Party-,Fewsmith 2003, 3. Free Press. successor to Communities: See too recent speeches by Hu Jintao, Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined the and Nationalism. Jiang, that offer similar themes, e.g. "President Hu Reflections upon Origin Spread of Verso. Outlines Work Agenda for 2005," http://www. 2d ed. London: The the constitution chinaembassy.org.il/eng/xwdt/tl78046.htm. Barkin, Samuel. 1998. evolution of 84 Communique of the 15th CPC Central Commit of sovereignty and the emergence of human rights norms. tee Plenum, October 9-11, 2005. http://www. Millennium 27 (2): 29-53. 2001. and culture in china.org.cn/english/features/45280.htm. Berman, Sheri. Ideas, norms, an 85 Lampton 2001, 25Iff.; Zhao 2004. For example political analysis. Comparative Politics 33 (2): of this view of history see Chinas October 2005 231-50. a white paper "Building Political Democracy in Bull, Hedley. 1995. The Anarchical Society: Study of to New China," especially Section I, "A Choice Suited Order inWorld Politics. 2d ed. York: Columbia Chinas Conditions." University Press. 86 Wu2001. Carter, Ashton, andWilliam Perry. 2007. China on the 87 Riskin and Khan 2000; Lardy 2002; Eckholm march. National Interest 88 (March/April), 16-22. 2002, 1; Kahn 2004a, 2004b. Checkel, JeffreyT 1997. Ideas and International Political 88 Goldstein and Lardy 2004. Dollar 2005, 48-58. Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and theEnd of the et War. New Haven: Yale Press. 89 Wang al. 2007. www.l32.203.59.36:81/Group/ Cold University "Chinese Communist Fifth Session papers/papers/PMMA-2007-07.pdf. Party Plenary on Xinhua News 90 Data based figures released by Chinas Public Communiqu??Text." 2005. Agency Bureau, Domestic October 11. Security www.zonaeuropa.com/ Service, Beijing, 20061115_l.htm. See also Tanner 2004, 137-156. Christensen, Thomas. 2003. The PartyTransition: Will a new 91 Lin 2007. it bring maturity inChinese security policy? 92 See Zhen 2000; Gries 2004. China LeadershipMonitor 5,Winter, http://www. 93 Cody 2005. chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20031 /tc.html,4-6. note as -. or a monster? 94 Seasoned China specialists the difficulty 2006. Fostering stability creating East Asia. sessing the nature and strength of competing coali The rise of China and U.S. policy toward tions, e.g., Christensen 2003, 4-6. International Security 31 (1): 81-126. 95 On different factions, see Swaine and Tellis 2000, Cody, Edward. 2005. "China SendsWarning toTaiwan 83-86; Johnston 2003; Yan 2001, 35; Deng and with Anti-Secession Law." Washington Post, March 8, see Gray 2001, 5-16. In general, Dittmer 1995, A12. to 1-39; Nathan 1973, 33-66. Copeland, Dale. 2000a. The constructivist challenge A review Secu 96 Jiang Zemins Report at the 14* National Congress of structural realism: essay. International theCommunist Party ofChina, 1992. rity25 (2): 187-212. -. 97 "Chinese Communist Party Fifth Plenary Session 2000b. Origins ofMajor War. Ithaca: Cornell Communiqu??Text," Xinhua News Agency Do University Press. -. mestic Service, Beijing, October 11, 2005; Kahn 2003. Economic interdependence and the future 2005; Li 2005a, 2006. of U.S.-Chinese relations. In International Relations 98 Kang 2004, 165-81; Khoo and Smith 2005, Theory and theAsia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry 196-205. and Michael Mastanduno. New York: Columbia to 99 E.g., the appeal in-group/out-group biases?see University. on Gries 2004. Council Foreign Relations. 2007. U.S.-China Rela 100 Heer 2000, Li 2005a. tions:An AffirmativeAgenda, A Responsible Course. 101 Yan 2001, 35. Independent Task Force Report 59 (April). 102 Christensen 2006, 81-126. Crane, Keith, Roger Cliff, Evan S. Medeiros, James C. 103 Divine 1967;Cull 1990. Mulvenon, andWilliam H. Overholt. 2005. Modern see 104 In the Soviet case, Lynch 1987; Checkel 1997; izing China's Military: Opportunities and Constraints. Santa CA: Rand Evangelista 1999; Richmond 2003. Monica, Corporation. Cull, Nicholas John. 1990. SellingWar: The British References Propaganda Campaign against American Neutrality in Adler, Emanuel. 2002. Constructivism and international World War II. New York: Oxford University Press. relations. InHandbook of International Relations, ed. Deng, Yong, and Sherry Gray. 2001. Introduction: Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons. Growing pains?China debates its international future. 10 London: Sage Publications. Journal ofContemporary China (26): 5-16.

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