What China Will Want: the Future Intentions of a Rising Power Author(S): Jeffrey W
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What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power Author(s): Jeffrey W. Legro Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 515-534 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20446501 . Accessed: 16/05/2011 13:50 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=apsa. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Perspectives on Politics. http://www.jstor.org Articies What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power JeffreyW Legro China's nationalpower isgrowing rapidly, but what China will do with itsnewfound capabilities remains an issueof contentious debateamong scholarsand policymakers.At theheart of theproblem is thedifficulty of diviningfuture intentions. Two arguments have dominated thedebate. One focuseson power and likelyChinese revisionism.The otherhighlights China's growinginter dependenceand likelyfuture satisfaction. Both areproblematic in termsof logicand evidence.They offerlinear projections that ignorethe way thatChina's futureis likelyto be contingent-especiallyon theinteraction of foreignpolicy ideasand events.Relative power and interdependenceare importantbut theirimpact ismediated throughthe doctrines leadersuse to justifyaction and establishauthority: those ideasare prone to change in regularways-and with themChina's intentions.If thisargument is right, policyprescriptions that advocate containing, engaging, or somemix of the two (i.e.,hedging) in relationswith China need tobe reconfigured. The "risingChina" problemis not justabout power, lead toenduring satisfaction in theexisting international order? China to be a "status butpurpose. China has consistentlystressed that its Today appears quo" power.4 developmentas amajor powerwill be peacefuland Will it remainso? non-obtrusive.Yet in theUnited States thereis, as one Existinganswers to thisquestion lack thevery thing U.S. Deputy Secretaryof State put it,a "cauldronof anx needed:a generalexplanation of contingent change in the iety"over China's future.1Expert testimonybefore the intentionsof China.5 The problemis not simplyan issue U.S.-China Economic and SecurityReview Commis ofChina's secrecy or repressionof freeexpression since the sion, a body thatmonitors and reportsto Congress on problemof futureintentions applies to democraciesas bilateralrelations, has focusedheavily on uncertaintyover well as dictatorships.6Even ifwe had access to theinner China's intentions.2In February2007, Vice President workingsof theChinese government today, it isunlikely Cheney cautionedthat China's recentanti-satellite test thatinformation would tellus about futureaims. Even if and generalmilitary build-up were "notconsistent with China todayhas somesecret plan forworld hegemony or China's statedgoal of a 'peacefulrise."'3 The stomachsof world harmony,those aims will be subjectto changeby strategistsare churning. China'svery growth and theprocess by which itunfolds. It israre when a pressingpolicy issue connects so directly Ironicallyeven China's top leaders,despite their concen toa criticalgap in thescholarly literature. Such is thecase tratedpolitical power, cannot know with certaintywhat with the impactof the riseof China on world politics. theircountry will want. Will growingpower lead Beijing to challenge inter Indeed,that is what thetwo views dominating the debate nationalnorms, rules, and institutions-possiblygenerat on China argue,although they see differentinevitable ingdangerous conflict among major powersin East Asia if futures.The firstfocuses on China'spower and claimsthat not elsewhere?Or mightChina's integrationin theinter China's desirefor revision will grow as China's relative nationaleconomy, its growing middle class,and increas capabilitiesincrease despite what Beijing thinkstoday. In ingparticipation in international institutions and exchanges thisview other countries must do all theycan tocontain a risingChina becauseat somepoint China willwield its new-foundpower to challengeglobal order. The second JejfreyW Legrois Professor and Chair in theWoodrow viewhighlights China's growing interdependence andargues WilsonDepartment of Politics and Co-Directorof the thatsuch conflict can be avoidedby continuing to engage GoverningAmerica in a GlobalAge Program at theMiller China,which will builddomestic interests in China that Centerof Public AJfairs, University ofVirginia (legro@ favorpolitical liberalization and accommodationto the virginia.edu).The author thanks Robert Ross, Tang Ship rulesof theprevailing international system. Both answers ing,Brantly Womack, and Zhu Fengfor helpful comments tap intodeep-seated forces shaping China, but both are andDaniel AaronWeir for excellent research assistance. flaweddue to theirlinear projection of the futureof DOI: 2007 Vol. 5/No. 3 515 10.1017/Si537592707071526 September 1 Art'icles IWhat China Will Want Chinesepolicy towards international order-be itthe con vis theirdomestic critics. Likewise, when China displays flictualrevision expected by power theorists or theharmo consistentrevisionist tendencies, such ideas should be nious integrationpredicted by interdependenceadvocates.7 penalized-but onlywhen influentialopposition groups China'sdiplomatic future, however, is likelyto be more are promotingmore attractivealternative ideas. Other contingentthan either the power or interdependenceposi wise,no matter how loathsomeany particular approach, if tionsallow. To highlightcontingency requires that some thealternative is even lessdesirable, dramatic pressure for thingbe saidabout what thefuture depends on-no small rapidchange isproblematic. Therefore, it behoovesthe problemwith a countrylike China thatis authoritarian internationalcommunity to be proactive(not just reactive and non-transparentonmany issues.What policymakers tobehavior) by nurturing groups and ideasin China that most need,scholars have found difficult to study.8Clearly offermore benign replacementsto the less desirable in thecase ofChina both itsrelative power and itseco alternatives. nomic interdependenceaffect its foreign policy. The issue Naturallyin all theseareas, thepotential for outside of courseis how thetwo will do so over time.9 influenceon a countryof China's sizeand regimetype has I arguethat their influence depends on a thirdmeshing significantlimits. Yet we knowfrom the Soviet experience gear-national ideasabout how to achieveforeign policy thateven in authoritarianstates, slow patient efforts to goals. Such ideasperform three critical functions: they supportreformers can have an impact.'2The futureof empowercertain domestic interests groups over others, Chinawill not be decidedby theactions of others, but the theygenerate expectations against which performanceis actionsof outsideparties have influencedChina's orienta assessed,and theyeither facilitate or impedethe possibil tion in thepast (e.g.,Nixon and theopening of China) ityfor a new strategyto emerge.Specifically, when Chi andmay do so again in thefuture. nese expectationsabout thebenefits of integratingin the I approachthe problem of therise of China fromthe extantinternational order are defied by eventswith nega perspectiveof internationalrelations theory, not as an area tiveconsequences, an opportunityexists for domestic crit specialist.Thus I will emphasizehow developmentsin ics to challengethat orthodoxy. Whether changeactually China relateto a generalpattern seen inother great pow occursdepends, however, on thedistribution of replace ersin theirattempts to revise,join, or separatefrom global ment ideasthat affects whether critics can coordinateon a order.The goal is topoint out theproblems in thecurrent feasiblealternative world view. debate,offer an alternativeview, and exploreits contem This approachoffers some twistson familiarthinking. poraryrelevance. A good startingpoint is todefine what Contraryto thepower-centric view of China, themost exactly"future intentions" means and tooutline the nature dangerousscenario in thefuture is not the"rise" of China, of currentChinese intentions.The articlethen explores but rupturesin China's economic growth. Opposed to the how power and interdependencearguments deal with economic interdependenceposition, economic engage intentions,offers an explanationfor change and continu mentneed not leadto harmony. Countries that undertake ity,and exploresthe implications for the future of China's rapidintegration have generated considerable systemic