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Situation Update Key Figures Methodology SYRIA mVAM Bulletin 33 - January 2019 No improvement in household food security as many areas of the country continue to be affected by conflict and displacement Situation Update Key Figures Methodology - The cold winter weather in Syria is affecting tens of thousands of people across the country. Millions of people living in tents or damaged buildings 1,589 This mVAM bulletin is based on data collected via live telephone are without power or heating and face severe shortages of all basic Households Surveyed interviews in January 2019 from households in locations across necessities. Syria. The telephone numbers called were generated using Key Points random-digit dialing. - In eastern Syria, military operations against Islamic State in Deir-ez-Zor governorate are significantly impacting the civilian population. An 18% estimated 2,000 people are trapped in Hajin, one of the few remaining Poor Food Consumption in Dar'a HTR Starting from July 2017, districts were combined into 19 strata based on their level of accessibility. Since January 2019, the - Food consumption deteriorates IS-controlled areas in Deir-ez-Zor. Those that have managed to flee Hajin reported increasingly desperate conditions in the city, with diminishing accessible areas are Aleppo, As-Sweida, Al-Hasakeh, Damascus, in most of Syria’s south-eastern services and extremely high food prices. Since 22 January, more than 42 Dar’a, Hama, Homs, Rural Damascus, Quneitra, Deir-ez-Zor and areas. 10,000 people have arrived at the Al-Hole camp in Al-Hasakeh governorate. Average Respondents Age Ar-Raqqa, Lattakia and Tartous. Hard-to-reach (HTR) areas are The total camp population is approximately 34,000 people and 1,000-1,500 Aleppo HTR, Dar’a HTR, Quneitra HTR, Idleb HTR, Deir-ez-Zor and displaced people continue to arrive every day. The United Nations and other Ar-Raqqa HTR, Homs and Hama HTR, and Rural Damascus HTR. -Female headed households show humanitarian organizations continue to scale up the response to the influx 10% The sampling frame groups together areas with similar geography and accessibility, allowing for a large enough sample size to make a worse diet and higher levels of of new arrivals, who are provided with food, shelter, winterization and Female hygiene kits and medical and protection services upon their arrival. statistically significant comparisons. coping compared to households 90% More details on the methodology can be found here: - In north-western Syria, the September agreement between Russia and Male http://vam.wfp.org/sites/mvam_monitoring/read_me_syria.pdf headed by male. Turkey was followed by a significant decrease in ground fighting and airstrikes. However, January saw an increase in fighting in Idleb between - As shortages of fuel and cooking non-State armed groups, placing civilians at risk and resulting in injury and 11% 31% death. gas hit Syria starting from Returnee IDP November 2018, more - In the South, some 42,000 people remain stranded in Rukban along the 57% Syria-Jordan border. Conditions in the informal settlement have continued Resident households especially in to deteriorate since the last humanitarian convoy to the area in November. Preparations are underway for the second inter-agency convoy to the hard-to-reach areas are reporting Rukban settlement. The convoy will include trucks carrying WFP food 44% high prices for fuel as their main assistance for some 42,000 people. Rural challenge 56% Sources: Flash Update 1: Displacement from Hajin, Deir-ez-Zor Governorate 4 February 2019, Briefing to the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria New York, 30 January 2019 Urban Accessible Hard To Reach SYRIA mVAM Bulletin 33 - January 2019 Poor food consumption deteriorated in Homs, Hama, Dar'a and Rural Damascus Map1 : Percentage of households by aggregated governorate with poor and borderline Food Figure 2 : Percentage of households with poor and borderline FC in the last six months according to - In January 2019, around 31 percent of the surveyed households reported having inadequate food Consumption (FC) (January 2019) consumption of which 10 percent poor and 21 percent borderline. Head of Household Sex <15% Female Male - Typically, households’ diets consist mainly of staples, sugars and fats that are consumed almost 15-25% daily. Vegetables and dairy products are eaten every other day, proteins and fruits are consumed >25% on average twice a week, while pulses are rarely consumed. -A significant increase in the share of households reporting a poor food consumption has been recorded in accessible areas of Rural Damascus, Homs and Dar'a and in hard hard-to-reach areas of % % % 5 9 3 Homs, Hama and Dar'a (Figure 1). % 3 2 % 2 2 6 - The percent of households that reported borderline food consumption increased from 5 percent 2 2 % % in December 2018 to 26 percent in January 2019 in Tartous governorate, while it almost halved in % % 0 0 9 9 % 2 2 1 1 Homs % from 42 percent in December 2018 to 25 percent in January 2019 and it decreased by 9 7 1 % % % two-thirds in Hama from 33 percent in December 2018 to 11 percent in January 2019. 1 % 0 % 8 8 6 2 % % 4 1 1 % % % 1 0 0 1 9 9 9 1 -In January, a deterioration in terms of food consumption has been reported among female-headed 1 t t c c v v g g n n p p c c e e households and among households staying as guests. Female headed households are constantly o o e e a a u u J J O O D D S S reporting a significant worse food consumption (51 percent inadequate food consumption) A N A N compared with male-headed households (28 percent inadequate food consumption), see Figure 2. *areas displayed with gray color have no available information Borderline Food Consumption Poor Food Consumption Figure 1 : Percentage of households by aggregated governorate with Poor and Borderline Food Consumption in the last six months Map 2 : Average weekly consumption (January 2019 ) by aggregated governorates for Aleppo HTR Al-Hasakeh As-Sweida Damascus Proteins 15% 23% 34% 37% Dar'a Dar'a HTR Deir-ez-Zor/Raqqa HTR Hama 22% 18% 27% 32% Homs Homs and Hama HTR Lattakia Rural Dam HTR 22% 34% 32% 34% Rural Damascus Tartous National mean 26% 35% 31% 2 days 3 days 4 days v v v v t t t t g g g g c c c c p p p p n n n n c c c c o o o o e e e e u u u u e e e e a a a a J J J J O O O O A S N D A S N D A S N D A S N D *areas displayed with gray color have no available information SYRIA mVAM Bulletin 33 - January 2019 Displaced households increasingly resorted to food based coping strategies - In January, households from Hama continue to report the highest use of food based coping Figure 3 : Mean rCSI in the last six months according to Map3 : Mean rCSI by aggregated governorates (January 2019) strategies across the country. - The average rCSI increased significantly in hard-to-reach areas of Deir-ez-Zor and Displacement Status <10 Ar-Raqqa, in Rural Damascus and Lattakia (Figure 4). 10-15 IDP Returnee Resident 15-20 6 . 0 2 9 . 2 >20 - The level of coping strategies increased among returnee and displaced households: 2 9 . 8 1 1 8 . 1 average rCSI for these households was 16.3 and 18.9 respectively. 3 . 1 7 7 6 4 . 0 . 6 1 . - As Figure 5 shows, a general increase in the use of all food based coping strategies was 5 5 5 1 9 7 7 5 . 1 1 . 1 0 1 7 . 3 4 3 3 reported by returnees and IDPs in January compared to December 2018. 1 . 8 . 3 1 . 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 - Households renting accommodation or staying as guest reported a significant higher rCSI compared to December 2018 and also compared to households owning their home (Figure 3). These findings suggest that there is an increased probability of food insecurity among households who do not own a home. t t t c c c v v v n n n g g g p p p c c c e e e o o o e e e a a a u u u J J J O O O D D D S S S A A A N N N *areas displayed with gray color have no available information Figure 4 : Mean rCSI by aggregated governorates in the last six months Figure 5: Percentage of households who adopted All coping strategies in the last six months according to Accomodation Type Aleppo HTR Al-Hasakeh As-Sweida Damascus Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Less Expensive Food 62% 66% 70% 68% 66% 73% e Buy Food on Credit m Reduce Number of Meals 50% 48% 56% 54% 54% 63% 15.9 17.2 o Restrict Consumption 12.6 13.2 h t Borrow Or Help 50% 53% 61% 54% 55% 54% Dar'a Dar'a HTR Deir-ez-Zor/Raqqa HTR Hama n Limit portion Size e R Spend Savings 21% 15% 16% 13% 16% 11% 22.7 Sell Assets 6% 17.3 Less Expensive Food 68% 65% 71% 72% 59% 64% 15.8 15.7 Buy Food on Credit t Reduce Number of Meals 56% 52% 57% 52% 49% 50% Homs Homs and Hama HTR Lattakia Rural Dam HTR s Restrict Consumption e u Borrow Or Help 43% 51% 64% 59% 43% 56% 18.8 19.9 G Limit portion Size 14.9 17.6 Spend Savings 14% 19% 18% 12% 15% 8% Sell Assets Rural Damascus Tartous National Less Expensive Food 53% 53% 54% 52% 51% 54% e Buy Food on Credit m Reduce Number of Meals 38% 35% 45% 37% 41% 35% 5.1 o Restrict Consumption h 16.6 Borrow Or Help 29% 38% 40% 42% 41% 40% 14.7 n Limit portion Size w v v v v t t t t g g g g c c c c p p p p n n n n O Spend Savings 15% 15% 20% 13% 18% 14% c c c c o o o o e e e e u u u u e e e e a a a a J J J J O O O O A S N D A S N D A S N D A S N D Sell Assets SYRIA mVAM Bulletin 33 - January 2019 In the words of respondents Each month, respondents are asked to identify the main problems their families are facing.
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