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United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Iraq/Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons Learned

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United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Iraq/Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons Learned United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Iraq/Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons Learned INTERVIEW #123 Interviewed by: Charles Cecil Interview date: January 12, 2011 Copyright 2011 USIP & ADST INTERVIEW SYNOPSIS Participant’s Understanding of the PRT Mission The interviewee, a U.S. Department of Agriculture employee, was the agricultural advisor at PRT Chaghcharan in Ghowr province, Afghanistan, from January 2010 to December 2010. His international PRT was staffed by eight countries under Lithuanian leadership. His role was to build the capacity of Afghan agricultural officials, to help establish an agricultural extension service, and to provide assistance to Afghan farmers. Relationship with Local Nationals Observations: The interviewee’s relations with Afghan nationals were “rather good.” Contacts were mostly with the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock, usually centering on weekly visits to the ministry’s district offices. Initially it took some time for his Afghan counterparts to understand that the interviewee did not have access to funds to use for development projects, but eventually they accepted him as a valuable source of training, both for members of the extension service and for farmers themselves. Other contacts were with the district agricultural high school, where he worked to teach training methodology to the teachers of the school through weekly visits. Insights: The Afghan concept of time and the importance attached to an appointment as a promise to meet are very different than in our culture. Did the PRT Achieve its Mission? (Impact) Observations: Educated Afghans working for the PRT were constantly hired away at higher salaries by NGOs. Afghan officials were also frequently rotated or replaced. There were four directors of agriculture during the interviewee’s 12 months. Such personnel turbulence made it difficult to maintain momentum in the work of the PRT. But the mere presence of the PRT helped to reduce local internecine conflicts which in turn allowed some small projects to be accomplished, including building two high schools, improving the hospital and undertaking some road repairs. 1 Insights: Reinforcement through follow-up visits by other advisers would be very helpful in ensuring that the skills that were taught are perpetuated. Overall Strategy for Accomplishing the PRT Mission (Planning) Observations: The U.S. component of the PRT had its own plan, but the interviewee is not aware of any larger plan for the PRT as a whole. Since it was Lithuanian-led, this was partly a language issue. Rule of law, small development projects, and agricultural extension advice were the U.S. component's main activities, with occasional public diplomacy work. The interviewee never received guidance from the embassy. Once a week the civilian members of the PRT met with the military members to coordinate activities for the next week. There was also a daily meeting to deal with transport issues for the following day. There was also a weekly meeting to review the security situation. Insights: Being on the outlook for other, non-USG sources of funding can enable a PRT member to facilitate activities that we ourselves cannot fund. The interviewee saw that the Japanese had financial resources and were interested in building schools. So when he learned that the agricultural high school was leasing its facilities he brought the two sides together and the Japanese agreed to fund the building of a new agricultural high school. What Worked Well and What Did Not? (Operations) Observations: Language can be a big obstacle at an international PRT. Some members know little or no English. International turn-over is rapid; some members stay six months, some only four. Younger international officers usually responded negatively to requests, for fear of taking risk; requests usually had to be made to more senior officers to get a positive response. Information flowed well between other USDA advisers in- country and to USDA in Washington. Aside from that, there was no noticeable communication from other USG sources. The interviewee felt that USAID officers were often fixated on launching and completing projects during their own tour and did not give adequate consideration to whether an activity was sustainable by the Afghanis. He felt that USAID placed insufficient emphasis on capacity-building and training. Pre-departure training in the U.S. was good, except that it is aimed at those going to American-led PRTs and thus some training did not apply to the interviewee who was assigned to an international PRT. Since about one-third of the Afghanistan PRTs are internationally led, this situation must be common and should be addressed. Insights: If assigned to an international PRT, find the Danes and get to know them since their armed forces are experienced in international deployments, are easy to work with and speak excellent English. Sometimes a PRT’s bringing public attention to a situation - - the case of an abused woman is cited -- can achieve a better, or less bad, result. Lessons: Do not try to do anything your first two months after arriving. Instead, go to as many meetings as you can, go out of town with anyone who is having meetings, meet people, go to all the briefings you can go to, gather information and then start thinking about what you want to do. The interviewee found that to be the best advice he received. 2 THE INTERVIEW Q. For starters would you tell us what your assignment was and what period of time did it cover? A. My assignment was to be the agricultural advisor at PRT Chaghcharan in Ghowr province. I was assigned there from January 9th 2010 to December 30th 2010. Q. Did you have any previous experience in the region? A. No. Q. At the time of your arrival what level of capability in the local language did you have? A. None. Q. What is your understanding of the PRT mission? And how did you fit into it? A. From the standpoint of the USDA (United States Department of Agriculture), we were sent to Afghanistan to provide expert advice and to teach, train, mentor, build the capacity of the ministry of agriculture of the Republic of Afghanistan and that was my specific duties and I was a member of a Provincial Reconstruction Team. It is an international provincial reconstruction team, staffed by eight different countries and I was part of the American civilian element in combination with a State Department officer and first one then latter two USAID officers. Q. Tell us more about the composition of the team. A. It was run by the Lithuanian military with two Lithuanian civilian advisors. We had military contingents from Croatia, Ukraine, Georgia, and Denmark. Then we had EUPOL (European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan) policemen from Romania, Lithuania, Poland and Finland. Two Japanese civilian advisors, a small American logistical military advisory team, and an American office of, when I got there, two Americans and later it went up to four Americans. Q. And what were the functions of those four Americans? A. One was Department of State. One was USDA. Two were USAID. Q. So tell us again what your particular mission was. And that is going to lead me into a series of questions about your contacts with host country nationals. A. The USDA provide expert agricultural advice to other U.S. agencies and then our particular mission was to help the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock 3 (MAIL) in Afghanistan create an extension service, basically somewhat similar to the agricultural extension service we have in the US. And to increase their skill levels and increase their levels of cooperation with each other and help them in this mission of providing agricultural assistance to Afghan farmers. Q. So how would you characterize your relationship with host country nationals? A. Rather good. Rather good. Q. Who did you interact with and how often and for what kinds of reasons? A. The major contact of course was with the provincial and also district elements of the Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Livestock. I also would’ve interacted with the Afghan Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Rural Development, Ministry of Irrigation and Electricity, Ministry of Environment at a much lower level of interaction because some of my functions would occasionally cross into theirs. Q. What kinds of agreements or activities would result from your interactions with them? A. Well, again my interaction was to provide training and technical assistance. USDA does not have any funds of our own to do any development work, to write any grants and this is an international PRT so there were no U.S. CERP (Commander’s Emergency Response Program) funds involved. Q. So you had no access to any kind of U.S. government money? Or any other source of funds? A. None. Q. In your work with your Afghan counterparts, did they ever undertake commitments or promises to do things? A. Yes. Q. And how where they at fulfilling their promises and commitments? A. They became better over time. It can be…their sense of time and their sense of timeframe for doing things was quite different than in a western sense. Being very structured, we would be and learn very quickly that just because you ask and say “I’ll come back next Tuesday at 10 o’clock” and he writes it down in his book and says “yes”. If you show up the next Tuesday at 10 o’clock he probably won’t be there because you didn’t call him that morning for the appointment. As far as he’s concerned you will call him that day. They plan one day at a time. So they’re very different and it took a little bit of work to get them used to the idea that I wasn’t going to come there with a grant, with any money.
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