Web Attack Survival Guide

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Web Attack Survival Guide WHITE PAPER Web Attack Survival Guide What Is Your Worst Security Nightmare? Receiving a “ransom note” with an ultimatum to pay millions of dollars or to watch your company’s website buckle under a deluge of DDoS requests? Or opening an ominous Google alert that reveals your company is the next target of a hacktivist campaign? Or discovering the application framework that powers your website is riddled with vulnerabilities—and learning it will take months to fix them? What Do You Do When Your Worst Nightmare Becomes Reality? The Web Attack Survival Guide describes today’s application threat landscape, including the attack methods and tools used by hacktivists and cybercriminals. It explains the processes and the technologies you can use to safeguard your website from attack. It also helps you prioritize security efforts and it lists security tips and tricks that you might otherwise have overlooked. After reading the Web Attack Survival Guide, you will be able to confidently face an impending web attack with a well-thought out strategy. A Blueprint for Web Attack Survival 1 Understand the Threat Actor 2 Develop a Security Response Plan 3 Locate and Assess Applications and Servers 4 Strengthen Application, Network, and End-Point Security Controls 5 Counter the Attack: Monitoring and Tuning Procedures When Under Attack 6 Bring in the Experts: Optional Security Consulting Services 7 Conduct a Post Mortem of the Attack The State of Application Security The Application Threat Landscape 74% of organizations received Web applications sit at the top of the list of hackers’ favorite attack targets. In fact, 75% of all a DDoS attack in the past year1 cyber-attacks target web applications. Most websites suffer dozens of attacks per day and some 86% of all websites have at sites sustain, on average, up to 26 attacks per minute. least one serious vulnerability2 While web attacks are not new—they have existed since the dawn of the Internet—one attack trend 75% of all cyber-attacks target is the emergence of hacktivism and prolonged attack campaigns. 3 web applications Rise of Hacktivism 33% of all websites had at least Hacktivism vaulted onto the scene and into the collective imagination in late 2010, with the one serious vulnerability every emergence of hacktivist groups like Anonymous, LulzSec, and Anti-Sec. Initially targeting financial day of the year in 20124 institutions, Anonymous and its imitators quickly moved on to dozens of other government and business targets. Within two years, 58% of all data theft5 was attributed to hacktivist attacks. In 2012, new players, like the Syrian Electronic Army, AnonGhost, and Iranian Cyber Army, joined the party and launched a spree of attacks against U.S. banks and other western targets. Many of these attacks combine traditional web attacks, like SQL injection and cross-site scripting, with Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) assaults. Hacktivist attacks not only pose public relations disasters for the targeted companies, but many also result in costly data breaches and prolonged website outages. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks Go Commercial Besides the specter of hacktivism, organizations must contend with DDoS attacks launched by competitors or cyber extortionists. These industrialized DDoS attacks can be extraordinarily powerful—hundreds of times greater than typical bandwidth levels, reaching over 300 Gbps or more. And DDoS attacks are becoming more advanced in order to outwit conventional security controls. Instead of simply inundating targets with a flood of TCP or UDP packets, many DDoS attacks now exploit application and database flaws. Fighting Back Every day, hackers unleash massive attack campaigns designed to take websites offline, steal DDoS Attack Tools Used by confidential data, and deface content. Fortunately, organizations can prepare for and repel these Hacktivist and Commercial attacks. Based on feedback from application security consultants and from IT security personnel DDoS Services on the front lines of attack, this survival guide lays out a step-by-step plan to fend off web threats. 1 “2012 Data Breach Investigations Report,” Verizon Business, 2012 2 “WhiteHat website Security Statistic Report,” WhiteHat Security, 12th Edition 3 Gartner Research 4 “State of Web Security,” Ponemon Institute 5 2012 Data Breach Investigations Report,” Verizon Business, 2012 2 Web Attack Survival: Step-by-Step Strategy Step 1. Understand the Threat Actor To prepare for an attack, the first step is to understand the threat actor. What enemy do you face? “If you know your enemies A well-known hacktivist group such as Anonymous or the Syrian Electronic Army? A script kiddie? and know yourself, you will Industrialized cybercriminals? Research their attack techniques and identify the tools that they use. not be imperiled in a hundred Monitor Social Media battles... if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, If hacktivists have threatened your organization, then track social media sites such as Twitter, you will be imperiled in Facebook, and YouTube for updates about their attack methods and timelines. Hacktivists may every single battle.” discuss vulnerabilities or weak points of your site. – Sun Tzu, The Art of War6 Hacktivist groups will also disclose the types of DDoS attack tools that volunteer recruits can use to attack your site. Armed with this information, you can create application security signatures to easily block these attack tools. With several recent attacks, hacktivists have published “booster packs” that configure attack tools to exploit web vulnerabilities or URLs in the targeted websites. Be aware of the contents of these booster packs, so you can implement policies to repulse them. Profiling cybercriminals is more challenging than profiling hacktivists, simply because cybercriminals do not advertise their methods or strategies. Unless you monitor hacker forums, your best option is to talk to peers in your industry about attack sources, techniques, and tools.7 Be sure to read hacker intelligence reports and security research that pertain to your industry. Step 2. Develop a Security Response Plan Change Is If your organization is the target of a specific attack campaign, like a DDoS attack or a hacktivist Unavoidable attack, then you should organize an incident response team that will manage security response efforts. The response team may potentially need to be available around-the-clock. Depending on Your incident response team the severity of the attack, assign 24x7 coverage to assure that someone is available to respond to may need to apply security new threats, immediately. policies quickly during an attack. Determine whether The security response team will most likely be composed of IT security personnel, but may include you need to relax your internal members from the networking and application development teams. approval processes to ensure you can rapidly adapt to Red Team changing attack vectors. Create a “red team”—a team of security engineers that will look for vulnerabilities that attackers could exploit. The red team should evaluate all potential risks including, application, network, end-user, social engineering, and even physical threats. 6 Although over-quoted, Sun Tzu’s suggestions—from preparation, to the art of deception, to battle tactics—are surprisingly apropos for defending against web attacks. 7 Security information sharing and analysis organizations include National Council of ISACs, Financial Services ISAC, SANS Internet Storm Center, and National Healthcare ISAC. 3 Your Little Black Book of Contacts Prepare a contact list with the names, phone numbers, and email addresses of the following groups: 1. IT security (including members of your security response team), IT operations, networking, application development, database administration, legal, and executive management 2. DNS and Internet Service Providers 3. DDoS Protection Services 4. Relevant security specialists or consultants—for example, record the contact information of field engineers at your web application firewall (WAF), Security Information and Event Management (SIEM), and Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) vendors. You may need to enlist their help when you are under attack. Document Network and Server Information Security Tip Gather network and server information, including: DO: Keep your response 1. IP addresses of web servers, databases, DNS servers, network firewalls, web application firewalls, plan information, network database firewalls, and routers and switches diagrams, and IP address 2. Disaster recovery IP addresses, if applicable schemes secure. Also, prepare network architecture diagrams of all data centers at risk. If architecture diagrams DON’T: Email your already exist, review them, and make sure they are up-to-date. network architecture and contact lists to the entire Notify Executive Management and Employees security department or When you know about an impending attack, inform your executive management team about the store them in a public file threat and provide periodic status updates. In addition, you may need to warn company employees share titled “Steal me first.” of the attack. For DDoS attacks, notify all relevant users of potential application or network downtime. If your organization faces a hacktivist attack or a targeted attack, instruct users to update any non-secure passwords and educate them about the risk of phishing attacks. Prepare your IT personnel for social engineering threats. Ask them to verify any IT helpdesk and password change
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