Goal-Directed Thought and Behavior Are Often Unintentional

Goal ≠ Intent: Goal-Directed Thought and Behavior Are Often Unintentional Author(s): John A. Bargh Source: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1990), pp. 248-251 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449760 . Accessed: 16/02/2011 10:39

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COMMENTARIES

Goal 7 Intent: Goal-DirectedThought and BehaviorAre Often Unintentional

John A. Bargh New YorkUniversity

Here I focus on two key features of Lewis's proposed mation-processing models of behavior have also been ex- model of intentionality:(a) that an individual's(adult as well plicit in hypothesizing a close connection between environ- as infant) behaviormay be driven by goal-systems activated mental features and behavioralgoals. Miller, Galanter,and directly by environmentalevents and (b) the implicationsof Pribram(1960) relatedthe operationof well-learnedplans in this nonconscious goal activation for the concept of inten- response to environmentalcues to that of innate animal in- tionality. The essential point for which I argue is that in the stincts, contending that "the description of the conditions courseof his interestingand valuableanalysis of the develop- underwhich various skilled componentswill be triggered,or ment of intentionality,Lewis has unnecessarilyassumed an released, is much the same in both cases" (p. 82). And in equivalence between the concepts of intentional and goal their detailed models of how goals and intentions become directed, an assumptionthat is contradictedby a substantial activatedto then guide and control behavior,both Wilensky body of researchon unintendedthought and action. (1983) and Normanand Shallice (1986) called for frequently used internalgoal representationsto be vigilant for the pres- Automatic Activation of Internal Goal ence of events in the environmentrelevant to them, the occur- Representations by Environmental Stimuli rence of which would activatetheir control of perceptionand behavior. In his targetarticle, Lewis takes exception to Piaget (e.g., Others have argued for environmentallydriven goal ac- 1936/1952) and other theorists who have denied inten- tivationon functionalgrounds: that to deal with the complex- tionality to infants' behavior.Lewis proposeda model of the ity of the environment, especially the social environment, developmentof intention, correspondingroughly to levels of one needs to quickly understandthe goals and motives of the increasingawareness of the intentionitself. The humanorga- person or people one is dealing with, and to respond (both nism is said to advance from a lack of awareness of the reactively and proactively) with appropriategoals and plans intended outcome (as in reflex movements, breathing), to of one's own (see Schank & Abelson, 1977; Simon, 1967). possessing explicit goals and plans but which are environ- People seem naturallyto encode and understandthe behavior mentally activated, to being able to consciously and inter- of others in terms of their intentions and goals (Read & nally activate goals and plans. A subtle but provocativefea- Miller, 1989; Trzebinski, 1989); for example, Brewerand his tureof the model is that an adultis capableof all five of these colleagues (Brewer& Dupree, 1983; Lichtenstein& Brewer, levels of intentionality. It is not the case that as the child 1980) found that what people rememberedbest over time moves through the levels that he or she is primarilyat one about anotherperson's behavior was not the actual behavior level of intentionality(perhaps with some backsliding),until so much as the person's overall intentions. This immediate achieving the fifth and final (mature)rung. Instead, the vari- categorizationof the other's intents and goals, especially as ous levels are discussed as capabilities, so that under the they affect oneself, enables the quick adoptionof an appro- model an adult's awarenessof the goal currentlydriving his priateresponse strategy.In real-timesocial interaction,there or her behaviormay vary from none at all to complete. Lewis is usually little time to contemplate goals and plans, but specifies a mechanism for such environmentallyactivated rathera need for quick thought and action (Rothbart,1981). goals: the repeatedassociation of particulargoals and actions Thus, it is highly likely that with sufficient experience in a with particularenvironmental events. particularsocial situation, one's behavioralgoals are largely That the stimulus environmentcan come to directly and determinedboth by global featuresof the setting (e.g., party, automatically activate an individual's goals and intentions meeting with higher status individual) and by local features within situations, as called for in Lewis's Level II, is a pro- of the interactionpartner's behavior (e.g., reactingto a ma- posal with some precedent (see reviews by Bargh, 1990; nipulation attempt), to subsequently determine behavior Gollwitzer, 1990). The early Germanwill psychology (e.g., within that situation (Bargh, 1990; Langer, 1978). Ach, 1935) endorsedthe principleof the direct activationof motives and goals by those environmentalobjects frequently Intentions as Desires for Goals associated with them in the past (see Gollwitzer, 1990). In a similar fashion, Lewin (1935) in his field theory arguedthat Should we, however, label such behavior "intentional"? behaviorwas "steered"by the objects in the currentenviron- Lewis notes that Piaget (e.g., 1936/1952) believed that an ment, throughtheir activationof the individual'sbehavioral action could be goal directedbut not intentional;the infant's goals associated with them (pp. 49-50). More recent infor- behavior was said to be unintentionalalbeit goal directed COMMENTARIES 249 because the internal goals of the infant could only be acti- No Need to Assume That All Goals vated by the immediate stimulus environment. Only when Are Intentionally Held the child had developed the ability to create goals and plans in the absence of external events relevant to those directly In addition to opening these existential worm-cans, and so that the behaviorwas inter- goals plans, goal guiding Lewis's assumption that all goal-directed behavior is inten- would label the resultant behavior nally activated, Piaget tional is also clearly unnecessaryto achieve his own for "intentional." goals the article, which are "to reduce the mixed model Piaget Lewis, on the other contends because "all hand, that, offers to a single one in which intentions appear from the intentionshave desires" for specific outcomes, any behavior and to address "the of the directed toward beginning" problem development achieving a particulargoal that also evi- of intention." As for the first to that infants dences a desire for that purpose, argue goal thereforemust be intentional.In show from the results in his he intentionality experimental reported experiments demonstratesa covariation between the the article, all that is needed is to assume that intentional infants'emotional of or and theirattain- responses joy anger, behavioris that which is directedtoward achieving a desired or to attainthe of of the ing failing goal presentation smiling goal-state (I = G + D). In fact, the design of the face and Sesame Street theme Because the infants experiment song. seemed to follow directly from this showed emotional evidence of a desire for the novel assumption. event, As for the second of the article, the Lewis that their purpose assuming argued goal-directed arm-pullingbehavior of intentions and is not for was intentional: equivalence goals necessary Lewis's distinctionsbetween the five levels of intentionality. What these levels correspondto are levels of awareness of Theycould stop their arm pulling if theyso desired, one's intentions. That can in how aware are and so we can people vary they arguethat its continuationreflected a of the intentions their behavior is a desire to do so. guiding valuable point, Alternatively,Piaget (1936/1952) and because Lewis assumes that all intentions are wouldargue that neitherdesired to norwere in- (and goals) they desired the individual terestedin engagingin this task. ... It was not the by having them, nothing in his discus- child who desiredbut the outcomethat controlled. sion of the differentlevels contradictsthe I = G + D model This is how Piagetavoided imparting to the 8-week- or requiresthe I = G model. Therefore, Lewis's majorcon- old the mentalproperty of intentionality. tributionsin his article do not requirethe I = G assumption.

Thus the key point of contention seems to be whether or Unintended Goal-Directed Thought and not the goal of arm pulling was set internallyby the infants' Behavior Are Commonplace desires or purelyexternally by the outcome of the armpulling (the visual and auditoryevents). In other words, what makes Most important, in my there are cases in the infants' goal-directed behavior intentional for Lewis is opinion, many which goal-directed behavior is not intentional or desired. their evidentialdesire to achieve thatgoal: Intention= Goal- Often people who have experienced a traumaticlife event directedbehavior + Desire for goal (I = G + D). So far, so cannot stop about it; think about good. thinking they obsessively the event to the point of distractionand an inability to func- tion in their daily life (Horowitz, 1975; Martin & Tesser, Does a Leaf Have Desires? 1989; Millar, Tesser,& Millar, 1988; Pennebaker,1989; Tait & Silver, 1989; Wenzlaff,Wegner, & Roper, 1988). As Mar- At other points in the article, however, Lewis equates the tin and Tesser(1989) pointed out, the uncontrollablerumina- = concepts of intentional and goal directed (I G), arguing tions in these cases are certainly goal directed, as they con- that "all goal-directedsystems are intentional," "thatinten- stitutea titanic strivingtoward resolution of a frustratedgoal; tion is built into goals and that action is associated with for example, to tell one's deceased fatherone loves him, or to desire," and that "goals contain desires." If so, then by somehow understand(and thus control in the future) a trau- definition infants have intentions, because no one disputes matic, essentially uncontrollable life event such as being that the infant's behavior is goal directed. In fact, as Lewis raped. Motives and goals such as these, which are per- points out, this definition of intentionalitywould also mean sistently pursued but not satisfied, tend to gain in strength that a leaf intentionally moves toward sunlight, and T-cells and operate outside of awareness, capturingawareness and intentionally go after foreign proteins. But herein lies the becoming the current goal when no stronger current goal inconsistency in Lewis's argument:Where is the leaf's desire exists (Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Kuhl, 1986). But at the same for sunlight? If emotion and desire are strong correlates of time, the goal-directed ruminationsare not desired by ob- intentions, and if it was necessary to document the infant's sessed individuals;they desire instead to regain control over desire for the smiling face-Sesame Street song display to their own thoughts (Pennebaker,1989; Tait& Silver, 1989). demonstrate in intentionality the infant, why is intentionality Such cases clearly violate Lewis's assumptionthat every- later ascribed to goal systems for which desires and motives thing goal directed is intentional. If intentions are desires to are difficult to accept? Does Lewis also want to argue that attain specific goal-states, as Lewis argues, then goal-di- plants have emotions and desires? rected cognition that is highly undesired cannot be inten- What about inanimate goal-directed systems? Following tional. It might be argued, however, thatobsessional thought Lewis's we logic, might want to argue that rivers inten- is an abnormalcase, and in normalmental functioninggoal- tionally rush to the sea. Or, with the early cyberneticists in directedthought and behaviorare always intended.But unin- Vallacherand Wegner's(1989) fictitious "GreatMoments in tended yet goal-directed behavior is common in normallife Psychology," identify the thermostat as an intelligent life as well, as Norman (1981) documented in his collection of form! "action slips." These are unintendedacts thatoccur when the 250 COMMENTARIES presence of environmentalcues relevantfor a habitualaction Note "capture"one's behavioreven though the habitualaction is time to the hard- inappropriatethis particular (e.g., driving John A. Bargh, Department of Psychology, New York and on the ware store on Saturdaymorning finding yourself University, 6 WashingtonPlace, Seventh Floor, New York, way to work instead;William James, 1890, gave the example NY 10003. of a husbandbeing sent upstairsby his wife to dress for an dinner and found her an hourlater unexpected party being by References in his nightshirtasleep in bed). These are cases of Lewis's Level II in which the habitualgoal is activated intentionality, of the In E. Ab- the relevantenvironmental cue, but for which the result is Ach, N. (1935). Analyse des Willens [Analysis will]. by derhalden(Ed.), Handbuchder biologishen Arbeitsmethoden(Vol. 6, an unintendedbehavior. Part E). Berlin: Urban & Schwarzenberg. A final class of cases in which behavior may be goal Atkinson, J. W., & Birch, D. (1970). The dynamicsof action. New York: directedyet not desired is when we are manipulatedby others Wiley. to do in theirinterests but not in ours. The Bargh, J. A. (1989). Conditional automaticity:Varieties of automatic in- something perhaps In J. S. Uleman & J. A. of social is full of demonstrationsof fluence in social perception and cognition. history psychology Bargh (Eds.), Unintendedthought (pp. 3-51). New York:Guilford. people's lack of awareness of the true influences on their Bargh, J. A. (1990). Auto-motives: Preconscious determinantsof social behavior (see Bargh, 1989). Cognitive dissonance experi- interaction.In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino(Eds.), Handbookof ments relied on the fact that subjects would not be aware of motivation and cognition (Vol. 2). New York:Guilford. the of the social influence exerted the Brewer,W. F., & Dupree, D. A. (1983). Use of plan schematain the recall power by experimenter and of actions. Journal to induce them to lie to another about the in- recognition goal-directed of ExperimentalPsy- subject chology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9, 117-129. terestingness of the experimental task (e.g., Festinger & Dennett, D. C. (1984). Elbow room: The varieties offree will worthwant- Carlsmith, 1959). In bystanderintervention studies, subjects ing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. are not awareof the influence thatthe numberof otherpeople Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of in forced compliance. Journal of Abnormaland Social Psychology, 58, presenthas on their own willingness to help a person need 203-210. (Latane & Darley, 1970). Persuasionresearchers have cata- Freedman, J. L., & Fraser, S. C. (1966). Compliance without pressure: logued techniques for attitudechange, such as the "foot-in- The foot-in-the-doortechnique. Journal of Personalityand Social Psy- the-door"technique (Freedman & Fraser,1966), thatwork to chology, 4, 195-202. induce a to behave in to Gollwitzer, P. M. (1990). Action phases and mind-sets. In E. T. Higgins & person ways diametricallyopposed R. M. Sorrentino Handbook motivationand not to that (Eds.), of cognition (Vol. theiroriginally statedintentions (e.g., buy particu- 2). New York:Guilford. lar car). In all these cases, individualsare being manipulated Horowitz, M. J. (1975). Intrusiveand repetitivethoughts after experimen- to behave in ways inconsistent with their desires and inten- tal stress: A summary.Archives of General Psychiatry, 32, 1457- tions. It is a not-uncommonexperience to feel regretand self- 1463. after an in which one has to do James, W. (1890). Theprinciples of psychology (Vol. 1). New York:Holt. reproach episode agreed Kuhl, J. (1986). Motivation and information processing: A new look at something one really did not want to do. decision making, dynamic change, and action control. In R. M. Sor- rentino& E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbookof motivationand cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 404-434). New York:Guilford. Preserve an Important and Useful Distinction Langer,E. J. (1978). Rethinkingthe role of thoughtin social interaction.In J. H. Harvey, W. J. Ickes, & R. F. Kidd (Eds.), New directions in attribution research (Vol. 2, pp. 36-58). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence In summary,to be intentionaland to be goal directed are ErlbaumAssociates, Inc. two separate things, and it is better to leave them as two Latane, B., & Darley, J. M. (1970). The unresponsive bystander: Why separateconcepts thanto obfuscatethe truestate of affairsby doesn't he help? New York:Appleton-Century-Crofts. Lewin, K. (1935). A dynamictheory of personality: Selectedpapers. New assuming they are isomorphic. 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Lewis's Level II is the belief that one is Miller, G. A., Galanter,E., & Pribram,K. (1960). Plans and the structure intentionality) being behavior. New York:Holt. controlled by the environment.As Dennett (1984, 52; see of p. Norman, D. A. (1981). Categorizationof action slips. Psychological Re- also Uleman, 1989) pointed out, however, the idea of "con- view, 88, 1-15. trol" refers to the ability of person A to drive person B into a Norman, D. A., & Shallice, T. (1986). Attention to action: Willed and state that A wants B to be in; that is, control is desired automaticcontrol of behavior.In R. J. Davidson, G. E. Schwartz,& D. causation, not causation alone. If the environmentis Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self-regulation: Advances in re- merely search and New York:Plenum. our own habitual then the source of the theory (Vol. 4, pp. 1-18). activating goals, Pennebaker,J. W. (1989). Stream of consciousness and stress: Levels of desire for the goal remains internal, and we are not being thinking. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintendedthought controlled(Bargh, 1990). Justas it is useful andinstructive to (pp. 306-326). New York:Guilford. distinguishbetween control and causationin this way, so too Piaget, J. (1952). The origins of intelligence in children (M. Cook, it is useful (and a betterfit to if the similar Trans.). New York: InternationalUniversities Press. (Original work empiricalfindings) published 1936) distinction between "intentional" and "goal directed" is Read, S. J., & Miller, L. C. (1989). Inter-personalism:Toward a goal- preserved. based theory of persons in relationships. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Goal COMMENTARIES 251

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Intention, Intentionality,and the ConstructiveCharacter of Scientific Knowledge

Michael Chapman Universityof British Columbia

If knowing is a process of active construction,then it is so month-oldsincreases duringthe extinctionphase of an oper- both for childrenand for scientists. However, developmental ant conditioning experiment, along with corresponding psychologists typically ignore their own active role in con- changes in their expressions of joy and anger, can be ex- structingknowledge of children'sdevelopment, even if they plainedonly by attributingintention to themin the formof the adopt a constructivist stance with respect to children's desire to obtain the reward by means of the instrumental knowledge of the world. The constructiverole of scientists is response. most apparentin their active determinationof the meanings attached to theoretical concepts. Their failure to acknowl- To evaluate this argument, one must be clear about the edge the constructedcharacter of meanings can result in a meaningof the centralconcept of intentionality.According to species of "conceptual confusion," in which meanings are Searle (1983), the philosophical concept of Intentionality assumed to be fixed and variations in usage go unnoticed. must be distinguished from the more familiar concept of Many fruitless controversies in developmentalpsychology, intentions. (Following Searle, I capitalizethe formerbut not debated in terms of fact or method, revolve in large part the latter.) Intentionalityis the directed propertyof certain around such neglected differences in meaning. The age at mental states, as described previously; intentions are the which some competence or ability develops is a prominent causal antecedentsof actions and, as such, are only one type example (Chandler& Chapman,in press). of Intentionalmental state. The fact thatthese two termshave I believe Michael Lewis's article on the development of the same etymological root is coincidental;Searle (1983, p. intentionality,thoughtful and articulatethough it may be, is 3) called it a "pun." However, Lewis confuses these two neverthelesscharacterized in partby such conceptualconfu- concepts, and the main thrustof his argumentis invalidated sion. In brief, his basic argumentcan be reconstructedas as a result. follows: Consider the evidence that even 2-month-olds desire re- wards and that they exhibit joy or anger depending on 1. In constructivisttheories, as opposed to mechanistic whether those desires are satisfied or not. At most, this is theories, an active role is attributedto the organism with evidence that they possess certain Intentionalstates (desire, respect to the environment. joy, anger, frustration),not that they have intentions. That 2. Action has an irreduciblymental componentwhich is desires do not entail intentionsis easy to see: In momentsof intentional in the sense that it is directed toward something weakness, i may have entertainedthe desire to own a new (Searle, 1984). Miata and a seaside condominium,but, lacking the requisite 3. Piaget's theory that infants develop intentionalbehav- means, I have not yet intended to acquirethose items. Less ior only in the fourth stage of sensorimotordevelopment is easy to see, perhaps, is the possibility that a desire can cause problematicbecause it raises the questionof whereintentions an action without intention(even an action that results in the come from and why one must assume their existence after fulfillment of the desire in question). For example, X is driv- Stage 4 if one did not do so before that time. ing down the freeway when he feels a sudden desire to 4. The problems of such a "mixed model" (i.e., one in swerve into the next lane and cause an accident;the experi- which intentioncomes into existence duringa certainperiod ence unnerveshim so much that he attemptsprecipitously to in development) can be avoided if one adopts instead the exist the freeway, thereby causing an accident. propositionthat all goal-directedsystems are intentional.In Searle's (1983, pp. 92-94) solution of such seemingly this view, intentionsare assumedto exist from the beginning paradoxicalexamples is to assume that intentions(both prior of life and develop throughan ascending series of levels or intentions and intentions-in-action)have a causal content: types. The content of the intention-in-actionto raise my arm is the 5. The fact that the instrumentalbehavior of 2- to 8- experience of my arm moving up as the result of having that