Britain's Nuclear Dustbin
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Assessing the Risk of Terrorist Attacks on Nuclear Facilities Summary
POST Report 222 July 2004 Assessing the risk of terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities Summary Assessing the risk of terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities July 2004 Report 222 Summary The events of September 11th 2001 heightened concerns over the potential for terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities. The purpose of this report is to provide Parliamentarians with an overview of what is publicly known about the risks and the consequences of such an attack, either at a facility in the UK, or overseas, with very direct impacts in the UK. This report identifies the main issues of concern according to reports in the public domain, and highlights areas where understanding is limited due to lack of publicly available information. The key points made in this report are as follows: • There is sufficient information in the public domain to identify possible ways terrorists might bring about a release of radioactive material from a nuclear facility. However this information is not sufficient to draw conclusions on the likelihood of a successful attack, or the size and nature of any release. • After September 11th 2001 additional protection measures have been put in place to increase security and to strengthen emergency planning at and around nuclear facilities. However, full details are not in the public domain. • Nuclear power plants were not designed to withstand some forms of terrorist attack, such as large aircraft impact, but existing safety and security regimes provide some defence. • Published reports suggest that, in a worst case scenario, the impact of large aircraft on certain facilities could cause a significant release of radioactive material with effects over a wide area. -
Reactor Report, Section A
Nuclear Reactor Hazards Ongoing Dangers of Operating Nuclear Technology in the 21st Century Report Prepared for International April 2005 Nuclear Reactor Hazards Ongoing Dangers of Operating Nuclear Technology in the 21st Century Report Prepared for International by Helmut Hirsch, Oda Becker, Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt April 2005 Nuclear Reactor Hazards 3 About the Report’s Authors: Dr. Helmut Hirsch, Scientific Consultant, Hannover, Germany: [email protected] Lead Author, as responsible for sections, A, B.1 C, D.1.i, iii, iv Dr Helmut Hirsch is a self-employed consultant for nuclear matters and was the founder and staff scientist of Gruppe Ökologie Hannover. In his career he has held a variety of posts and commissions including: - Since1990 a Member of “Forum für Atomfragen” (FAF), an expert commission providing advice in nuclear matters to the Austrian Federal Minister for the Environment: In 2004: Participation in study concerning the risk of terror attacks to the Grafenrheinfeld spent fuel interim storage facility (planned; Germany), for the City of Schweinfurt, Germany: In 2003: Participation in a study of possible hazards due to the spent fuel storage facility at Skull Valley, Utah (USA): Since 2002 participating, as nuclear expert, in the Technical Support for the Monitoring Process for the Czech NPP Temelín, working for the Austrian Federal Environment Agency (Vienna): Between 1991 – 1998: Member of expert commission providing advice to the state government of Lower Saxony (Germany) in nuclear matters. Oda Becker: Scientific Consultant, Hannover, Germany: [email protected] Author of Sections: B.2, D.2 Oda Becker is a physicist, who has been working in the field of nuclear safety for many years. -
The Reality of the Fukushima Radioactive Water Crisis Shaun Burnie Greenpeace Germany
2020.10. Stemming the tide 2020 The reality of the Fukushima radioactive water crisis Shaun Burnie Greenpeace Germany Greenpeace Germany 1 © Shaun Burnie / Greenpeace Thanks also to Dr. Ian Fairlie and Dr. David Boilley for advice and comment. Note on text content: throughout this report we refer to Greenpeace. This refers to Greenpeace Japan and Greenpeace East Asia, unless otherwise stated. Published in October 2020 by Greenpeace East Asia and Greenpeace Japan 2 The reality of the Fukushima radioactive water crisis Contents Overview 05 Main findings 06 Current status 08 Reactor pressure vessel (RVP) cooling 08 The problem of groundwater/rainwater entering reactor buildings 09 Failure of the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) 10 Poor technology choices and the failure of ALPS 11 Adsorbers 12 pH adjustments in relation to water chemistry 12 Secondary processing in ALPS 2020 13 Strontium-90 and other hazards 14 Carbon-14 in the contaminated water – an admission 15 Flaws in tritium risk analysis 17 Failure to address the tritium problem 20 Long-term storage as an alternative to discharge 21 A clear case for pressing the pause button 24 Human rights under threat 25 Conclusion 27 Appendix 29 Endnotes 30 Author: Reviewers: Editor: Shaun Burnie, ([email protected]) Kazue Suzuki, Mari Chang, Caroline Roberts Senior Nuclear Specialist, Greenpeace Hideyuki Ban, Daniel Simons Germany Greenpeace Germany 3 © Shaun Burnie / Greenpeace 4 The reality of the Fukushima radioactive water crisis Overview Two years after our first report on the crisis,1 more than a million tons of radioactive water is still sitting in tanks at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, site of the catastrophic meltdown in March 2011. -
Nuclear Monitor #690
JUNE 26, 2009 | No. 690 THORP, LIVING ON A KNIFE-EDGE, TO BE CLOSED FOR SEVEN MONTHS Sellafield Ltd, the company that operates THORP (Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant) under contract to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), is facing yet another extended shut-ddown of THORP - this time for an estimated 7 months - when the only High Level THORP, LIVING ON A KNIFE- EDGE, TO BE CLOSED FOR Waste Evaporator configured to deal with THORP's high level waste SEVEN MONTHS 1 is taken off line for a major investigation. "NEW" NUCLEAR REACTORS, SAME OLD STORY 3 (690.5959) CORE - The closure comes dependent on the regular and reliable as little surprise given that Company operation of A & B. Their unreliability in GERMAN ENVIRONMENT reports and presentations over the last recent years however has resulted in MINISTER: NUCLEAR year have clearly anticipated the need to Sellafield Ltd having to place orders for 2 INDUSTRY IS LYING 5 take action on the plant's operational new Evaporators (D & E). Of similar AREVA AND EDF: BUSINESS future because of increasing problems in design to C, the first of the new PROSPECTS AND RISKS IN managing the dangerous high level Evaporators is not expected to come NUCLEAR ENERGY 6 waste (HLW) produced not only by into operation before 2014, the project THORP, but also by the Magnox currently being only at the stage of site SWEDISH NUCLEAR reprocessing plant (B205) and the foundation work. The original cost of BP INDUSTRY WANTS REACTOR effluents from the site's Vitrification plant 90 million is understood to have WASTE FACILITY AT (WVP).