POST Report 222 July 2004 Assessing the risk of terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities Summary Assessing the risk of terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities July 2004 Report 222 Summary The events of September 11th 2001 heightened concerns over the potential for terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities. The purpose of this report is to provide Parliamentarians with an overview of what is publicly known about the risks and the consequences of such an attack, either at a facility in the UK, or overseas, with very direct impacts in the UK. This report identifies the main issues of concern according to reports in the public domain, and highlights areas where understanding is limited due to lack of publicly available information. The key points made in this report are as follows: • There is sufficient information in the public domain to identify possible ways terrorists might bring about a release of radioactive material from a nuclear facility. However this information is not sufficient to draw conclusions on the likelihood of a successful attack, or the size and nature of any release. • After September 11th 2001 additional protection measures have been put in place to increase security and to strengthen emergency planning at and around nuclear facilities. However, full details are not in the public domain. • Nuclear power plants were not designed to withstand some forms of terrorist attack, such as large aircraft impact, but existing safety and security regimes provide some defence. • Published reports suggest that, in a worst case scenario, the impact of large aircraft on certain facilities could cause a significant release of radioactive material with effects over a wide area. However, some analysts question the accuracy of these reports, and argue that accurately targeting these facilities would be difficult. • A successful attack would be highly unlikely to cause large numbers of instant fatalities. Although it would have the potential to affect extensive areas of land and cause large numbers of cancers, its impact would depend on how effectively appropriate contingency plans were implemented. • Even an unsuccessful attack could have economic and social repercussions and affect public confidence in nuclear activities such as power generation. • Published reports draw widely different conclusions about the consequences of attacks on nuclear facilities, due to differing assumptions about the size and nature of the release, weather conditions and efficiency of countermeasures. • Media coverage of the risk of releases of radioactive material from nuclear facilities focuses mainly on the consequences of worst case scenarios, without discussing the likelihood of their occurrence or explaining assumptions made. • Analyses carried out by UK nuclear operators to investigate the consequences of accidents at nuclear plants could be used to further understanding of the potential consequences of terrorist attacks. However these analyses are largely not publicly available. The scope of further work would be limited without such information. A four page summary of this report is available from POST, or on www.parliament.uk/post Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Background to this report 1 1.2 Objectives of the report 1 1.3 Structure of the report 2 2 Types of nuclear facility 4 2.1 Introduction 4 2.2 Types of activity 4 Civilian nuclear power 5 Research reactors 5 Uses of radioactive material 6 Military activities 6 Radioactive waste 8 Transport 8 2.3 Overview of nuclear activities in the UK 8 Civilian nuclear power 8 Other civilian activities 11 Military activities 11 3 Regulation of nuclear activities 14 3.1 Key points 14 3.2 Introduction 14 3.3 Causes of exposure to ionising radiation 14 3.4 Safety regulation in the UK 14 Safety Assessment Principles for nuclear plants 16 3.5 Environmental regulation 16 3.6 Security regulation 17 3.7 Security arrangements at civilian nuclear facilities 17 Physical protection of nuclear facilities 17 Non-proliferation 17 3.8 The Office for Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS) 19 Interface between regulators 19 3.9 Security arrangements at military facilities 19 4 Vulnerability assessments part 1: the nature of the threat 21 4.1 Key points 21 4.2 Introduction 21 4.3 The current threat of sabotage 21 4.4 Intelligence reporting within government 22 4.5 Potential modes of attack 23 The Design Basis Threat 23 Other scenarios 24 Attack during transport 25 5 Vulnerability assessments part 2: physical robustness 26 5.1 Key points 26 5.2 Introduction 26 5.3 Engineering principles for nuclear plants 26 5.4 Classification of accidents at nuclear plants 28 5.5 Safety provisions and the terrorist threat 29 July 2000 Report 138 Frequency of occurrence 30 6 Vulnerability assessments part 3: security arrangements 31 6.1 Key points 31 6.2 Introduction 31 6.3 Guarding of nuclear sites 31 6.4 Changes made since September 11th 2001 33 Information in the public domain 34 6.5 External assistance 35 6.6 Security at civil nuclear sites in France 37 6.7 Security of civilian nuclear activities relative to other industries 37 7 Vulnerability part 4: evaluating the consequences 39 7.1 Key points 39 7.2 Introduction 39 7.3 Health hazards associated with radioactive materials 39 The biological effects of ionising radiation 39 7.4 Pathways for exposure of people to radiation 41 Environmental dispersion of radionuclides 41 Modes of exposure 43 7.5 Protecting the public in the event of a radioactive release 43 7.6 Modelling the consequences of a release 46 8 Reactors 49 8.1 Key points 49 8.2 Introduction 49 8.3 Nuclear reactors - background 50 How power reactors work 50 Buildings at a nuclear power plant 51 8.4 Reactor safety 51 Controlling the reaction 51 Cooling the reactor core 51 Containing radioactive material 51 8.5 Reactor designs 52 Nuclear reactors worldwide 52 Power plants in the UK 52 8.6 Accidents at nuclear reactors 55 Examples of accidents at nuclear reactors 56 8.7 Terrorist attacks at nuclear reactors 57 Studies in the public domain 58 Aircraft impact 58 Vehicle bombs 61 Ground-based attack 62 Attacks using Liquid Natural Gas or Liquefied Petroleum Gas tanker ships 62 Other modes of attack 63 8.8 Research reactors 64 8.9 Consequences of a release from a nuclear reactor 65 Characteristics of release 65 8.10 Case studies 66 Modelling studies – Sizewell B 66 Data from the Chernobyl accident 67 8.11 Spent fuel storage 70 Security issues associated with spent fuel storage 70 Vulnerability of UK facilities 72 Consequences of an attack on a spent fuel cooling pond 73 9 Reprocessing plants 74 9.1 Key points 74 9.2 Introduction 74 9.3 Background 75 9.4 Sellafield 76 Main activities 76 Terrorist threat 77 9.5 High level liquid waste (HLLW) at Sellafield 78 Safety issues 78 Terrorist attacks 79 Consequences of a release 80 9.6 Plutonium 81 9.7 Other facilities 82 9.8 Emergency planning at Sellafield 83 9.9 Dounreay 85 Activities 85 Safety 85 Radioactive material on the Dounreay site 86 9.10 Cap de la Hague 86 Vulnerability assessments 87 9.11 Issues 87 International variations in policy on reprocessing and spent fuel management 87 Future radioactive waste management options in the UK 87 Policy developments 88 10 Transport of radioactive material 90 10.1 Key points 90 10.2 Introduction 90 10.3 Regulation of transport of radioactive material 90 Safety regulations 91 Security regulations 92 Types of security risk 93 10.4 Case studies 94 10.5 Transport of spent nuclear fuel 96 Design of flasks 96 Risk assessments in the public domain 97 10.6 Transport of separated plutonium 99 Terrorist threat 100 10.7 Transport of nuclear weapons 100 10.8 Transport by sea 101 10.9 Limitations of public domain information 103 11 Contingency Planning 104 11.1 Key points 104 11.2 Introduction 104 11.3 Organisation of emergency management within government 106 11.4 On-site emergency management 106 Preparation 106 Initial Response 106 11.5 Off-site emergency management - local level 108 Preparedness 109 Initial Response to off-site emergencies 113 Recovery following a release of radioactive material 114 11.6 Regional level 115 11.7 National level response 115 Preparation 115 Initial response 117 11.8 International arrangements 118 Preparation 118 Initial response 118 11.9 Releases during transport 119 12 Conclusions 120 13 Annexes 122 14 Glossary and Abbreviations 135 Boxes Box 2-1 Radioactive, fissile and nuclear materials 4 Box 2-2 Uses of radioactive material 5 Box 2-3 Nuclear facilities in France and Belgium 9 Box 2-4 Classification of radioactive waste 10 Box 2-5 Organisation of nuclear activities in the UK 13 Box 3-1 The principles of radiological risk assessment in the UK 15 Box 3-2 IAEA guidelines on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities 18 Box 3-3 The Office for Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS) 20 Box 4-1 The Design Basis Threat at US civilian facilities 24 Box 5-1 Aircraft impact 27 Box 6-1 The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Constabulary (AEAC) 32 Box 6-2 Armed response at nuclear facilities in the US 33 Box 6-3 BNFL National Stakeholder Dialogue 35 Box 6-4 UK Air Defence 36 Box 6-5 Security at civil nuclear sites in France 38 Box 7-1 Measuring radiation effects on the human body 40 Box 7-2 Available evidence on cancer risk from ionising radiation 41 Box 7-3 Properties of key radionuclides associated with nuclear fission 45 Box 7-4 Emergency reference levels (ERLs) 46 Box 7-5 The COSYMA model for predicting the radiological consequences of a release 47 Box 8-1 Nuclear reactors 53 Box 8-2 Severe accidents at PWRs and gas-cooled reactors