Journal of European Integration

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Half-full or half-empty? Framing of UK–EU relations during the Brexit referendum campaign

Tatiana Coutto

To cite this article: Tatiana Coutto (2020) Half-full or half-empty? Framing of UK–EU relations during the Brexit referendum campaign, Journal of European Integration, 42:5, 695-713, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2020.1792465 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2020.1792465

Published online: 19 Aug 2020.

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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=geui20 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2020, VOL. 42, NO. 5, 695–713 https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2020.1792465

Half-full or half-empty? Framing of UK–EU relations during the Brexit referendum campaign Tatiana Coutto

Centre D’études Européennes Et De Politique Comparée (Cee/Sciences Po), Marie Sklodowska Curie Fellow

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS This article analyses the political construction and politicisation of UK– Framing; content analysis; EU relations by British parliamentarians in Westminster and in the Brexit referendum; European European Parliament (EP) between May 2015 and May 2017. Using Union computer-assisted content analysis techniques and qualitative analysis of sampled speeches, we investigate how parties used frames and emotions in order to mobilise voters. Results indicate that the ‘Leave’ campaign succeeded in triggering sentiments of distrust and anger against the establishment and mobilizing voters while, economic arguments used by ‘remainers’ failed to convince citizens from deprived areas of the benefits of EU membership. Intra-party divisions were stronger among Westminster members than in the EP, but the visibility of the ‘Leave’ discourse in the EP was disproportionately higher to the number of pro-Brexit parliamentarians. Polarisation and values-based arguments are observed in the EP early in the campaign, suggesting that the process initiated at the European level and then migrated to the national level.

Introduction: the construction of the ‘referendum crisis’ ‘The British people have made a choice. That not only needs to be respected – but those on the losing side of the argument, myself included, should help to make it work.’ With these words Prime Minister David Cameron acknowledged the result of the 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum (‘EU referendum’) and announced his resigna­ tion. The narrow victory of the Leave camp reflecteda deeply divided country (Hobolt 2016): euroscepticism became more socially distinctive and widespread (Goodwin and Heath 2016, 331), populism was encouraged and a sense of ‘ontological anxiety and insecurity’ emerged among Remain supporters (Browning 2018, 341). The referendum raised questions about ‘British identity’ and imperial nostalgia, and brought up concerns about the relation­ ship between England, Scotland and Northern Ireland (Shannon 2015; Clarke and Newman 2017; Kenny 2017). The campaign catalysed the politicisation of UK–EU relations and exposed the pitfalls of EU polity system, which was in turn instrumentalised by illiberal figures in the continent. The events in the UK compromised even more the legitimacy of the EU, which was already regarded as uncapable of addressing economic, social and security challenges (Dinan, Nugent, and Paterson 2017; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2018).

CONTACT Tatiana Coutto [email protected] Centre D’études Européennes Et De Politique Comparée (Cee/Sciences Po). © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 696 T. COUTTO

Politicisation and contestation of EU (of which Brexit is an acute manifestation) brought up the risk of the emergence of a disintegration dynamic (Rosamond 2016, 868). The possibility of a referendum, raised by Cameron in his Bloomberg speech in 2013, initiated a crisis in British politics that deeply affected UK–EU relations. By ‘crisis’ we mean a socially constructed and highly political period of instability and transition when a decisive intervention becomes not only possible but necessary (Hay 1996: 254). The speech opened an avenue for overt contestation of ‘common-sense’ policy prescriptions from challenger parties (Laffan 2014, 266), exposed deep divisions within the Conservative and Labour groups (Lynch and Whitaker 2018), and lead to a ‘drama of accountability and blaming’ typical of moments of crisis (Boin et al. 2010, 706). UK politics entered a state of exception and social panic that justified decisions that would not seem feasible otherwise (Roitman 2013). The period between General Elections (GE) of 2015 and 2017 reflects also an European crisis, marked by the intensification of politicisation of EU membership and polarisation of political discourse. This context gave visibility and legitimised, to a certain extent, the emotional populist-authoritarian rhetoric that mobilised a share of voters by bringing together the fear of the foreigner, the anger against the elites and a ‘concrete’ alternative to restore not only the economy but above all the national pride (Levinger 2017; Warren 2018). A similar phenomenon had been observed by Wendler (2014) when analysing other National Parliamentary Debates on EU Treaty Reform. This article seeks to investigate how UK–EU relations have been framed by British representatives in the House of Commons (HoC) and in the EP, and how these frames relate to the increasing politicisation observed along the referendum process. We focus on the following questions: when and how have social, economic, institutional and security issues been used by representatives to justify their stance (leave or remain)? How may the patterns of politicisation of these issues vary according to political party, stance and institutional setting (Brussels or Westminster)? Finally, drawing on Atikcan (2018) and Bennett (2019), we verify the blurring of party lines – that is, whether representatives were loyal to their party or personal beliefs. Following Entman’s (1993) definitionof framing as a process of selection and emphasis of perceived aspects of reality as well as on Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) typology, we identify the dominant frames and study their evolutionary process. Furthermore, we explore the use of emotions in the construction of UK–EU relations since they (like frames) are ‘intensifiers’ of ideas and attitudes that may render salient aspects that would be otherwise neglected by the public (Freeden 2013, 7). Our results confirmthe hypothesis that anger, triggered mainly by ideas of patriotism, pride and sovereignty, proved to be a more powerful driver in the refer­ endum, thus shedding light on the process through which narratives about the EU evolve in periods of crisis.

Media and Parliamentary discourse on UK-EU relations Political communication literature indicates that the historically embedded narrative that opposed British interests to those of a Germany-controlled ‘Europe’ was still present in certain political and media discourses, and particularly strong among challenger parties and tabloid press (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000; De Vreese 2005; Daddow 2012). Press coverage of the referendum was marked by low visibility of analysts and academics (11% JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 697 of the articles) and Labour politicians (17%), as opposed to the high exposure of Leave campaigners (74%) (Levy, Aslan and Bironzo 2016). The economy was by far the most covered issue, followed by immigration (the most prominent issue among voters) and health (Hobolt 2016, 1262). In the week before the referendum, ‘Brexit’ and the ‘EU’ were the subject of 77% of all newspaper articles on UK political issues (Moore and Ramsay 2017, 14). We also observe a higher visibility of migration issues, and its securitization as freedom of movement was linked to terrorist attacks (Vasilopoulou 2016, 222). Poor knowledge of EU institutions coupled with the weak presence of everyday symbols such as flags and Euro notes have limited individuals’ identification with the Union and contributed to low public support for integration in the UK (Cram 2012; Startin 2015). The two main parties have historically approached EU politics in an ‘indirect and potentially less electorally risky manner’ by focussing on general views rather than specific policies (Sherrington 2006, 70), thus helping party leaders from providing clear cues to their voters (Curtice 2015). Pro-remain politicians were careful to overtly support the EU, while Eurosceptics of varied political leanings frequently spoke against it (Forster 2003; Startin 2015) – a trend confirmed in Wenzl’s (2019) analysis of MPs’ speeches given in Westminster between 2015 and 2016. As shown by Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley (2017), the association of EU membership and negative emotions might have played a critical role in the narrow victory of the Leave camp. While parliamentary debates gained visibility during the campaign and after the referendum, analyses comparing the discursive practices in Westminster and in the EP remain overlooked. Cross-country analyses have shed light on patterns of politicisation and polarisation of national parliamentary debates about the EU (Hutter and Kerscher 2014; Wendler 2014), but the specificities of each national context limit the explanatory power of these studies. The focus on British politicians allows us to avoid excessive variation, and to isolate the institutional setting variable (which could not be done if we focused exclusively in one parliament). This way we can better understand how framing and politicisation take place at different political levels, and how these processes may interfere with each other. Finally, results allow for further comparisons between politicians and other political actors such as the media and lobby groups, which have been the object of various recent studies on Brexit (Zappettini and Krzyżanowski 2019).

Framing of EU politics and policy processes Framing influencesthe politics of policy-making as political participation and mobilization depend on information received from leaders and the media (Laffan2014 ). Their potential effect on public opinion becomes particularly relevant in politically polarised contexts where direct democracy instruments are adopted (Morel and Qvortrup 2018). Academic works on framing of EU-related issues tend to focus on specific events such as treaty revisions and elections (Hawkins 2015), while others compare the mobilizing effect of the media across the EU (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2006; Schuck, Vliegenthart, and de Vreese 2016). A more recent strand investigates how elements such as public debt and the influx of refugees are framed as crises and its impact on domestic politics (Schimmelfennig 2014; Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017; Börzel and Risse 2018). Looking at the relation­ ship between crises, public opinion and political competition, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2018) analyse how parties use economic, migration, sovereignty/democracy and national 698 T. COUTTO frames to mobilise euroscepticism and obtain political payoffs.Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) identify five types of frames used to report European politics: conflict frames emphasize opposition between individuals, groups or institutions and are common during presidential elections, referenda and in ideologically driven debates (Dennison and Geddes 2018). The human-interest frame uses individual stories with the aim of explaining complex problems (Price, Tewksbury, and Powers 1997). Economic conse­ quences frames appeal to ‘rational decisions’ and protect the politician from being ideologically committed to a specific policy, but has a mild mobilizing effect. The morality frame puts events ‘in the content of religious tenets or moral prescriptions’, while the responsibility frame links the cause or solution of a problem to specific actors (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000, 96). The typology provides a blueprint that allows us to observe the evolution of framing between May 2015-May 2017, and how they may relate to predo­ minant emotions in ‘leave’ and ‘remain’ discourses at national and European political levels.

Methodology The period analysed in this paper period is divided into three phases: (a) pre-campaign, which began with the victory of the Conservatives on 5 May 2015 and finished on 20 February 2016, when Cameron announced the date of the referendum; (b) campaign, from 21 February until the vote on 23 June 2016 and; (c) post-referendum, from 24 June 2016 to 5 May 2017. Our first goal is to identify the most salient topics in this debate and when they became to be referred to as a crisis. We then analyse to what extent framing of the referendum may vary depending on the institutional setting and individual stance on EU membership. Using computer-assisted sentiment analysis com­ plemented with qualitative study of purposely sampled speeches, we test to what extent the claims that the ‘Remain’ narrative fitinto the archetype of ‘Project Fear’ and that it was uncapable of making a positive case for EU membership. That is, to what extent the ‘Remain’ discourse relate to sentiments of fear and negativity. Likewise, we examine whether the ‘Leave’ campaign has been accurately dubbed as ‘Project Anger’. Finally, following the literature on second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Marsh and Mikhaylov 2010), we verify whether we see clearer cues and stronger positions in the EP than in Westminster – a behaviour that tends to benefit challenger and radical parties. The quantitative part of the study seeks to identify the main issues and dominant frames used by the main UK parties – Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats (LibDem) and United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). For MPs serving in the HoC, we used a public dataset of speeches collected from Hansard by Odell (2019) and stored as a CSV, and as a tibble class in RDS files for R programming language. Our population consists of speeches with more than fifty words made during debates and statements of all MPs serving between 2015 and 2017 (N = 112,251 speeches). We also include the MP’s stance during the referendum (leave or remain), which is available at publicwhip.org.uk. To analyse the speeches made by the 74 British MEPs we used the LinkedEP dataset, manually coded the position of each MEP in the referendum and used the package tidytext (Silge and Robinson 2016; R Core Team 2017). For the sentiment analysis, we used the NRC Word-Emotion Association Lexicon, or EmoLex (Mohammad and Turney 2013), which maps a list of 14,000 English words into eight emotions (anger, fear, JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 699 anticipation, trust, surprise, sadness, joy, and disgust) and two sentiments (negative and positive). For the topic analysis, we built a dictionary based on the one proposed by FIXME, which maps a list of 176 words into 19 policy issues. The qualitative analysis is based on a purposive sample of speeches and statements made by the leaders of the four main parties from May 2015 to May 2017. The selected communications were given at the following occasions: (a) at party conferences in 2015 and 2016; (b) following the announcement of the date of the referendum on 20 February 2016; (c) following the official launching of the campaign on 16 April 2016; (d) last speech before the polls and (e) following the result of the referendum (in total ten speeches per party leader). For each speech, we identify the dominant issues and frames, its tone and their view on UK–EU relations. The transcriptions were obtained from the parties’ websites as well as from Hansard (which provides a comprehensive account of the proceedings of the HoC), UKPOL political speech digital archive and EP website.

Results and discussion EU affairs in Westminster and EP debates: topics and policy issues The UK referendum has prompted discussions around EU policies, institutions and raison d’être throughout the two-year period. Nevertheless, their visibility in the parliamentarian debate varied considerably: unsurprisingly, elections, G7 conferences and EU Council meetings triggered interventions concerning the EU (Figure 1). Another peak is observed in February 2016, when Cameron spelled out his view of a ‘good deal’ for Britain that included, inter alia, restrictions to freedom of movement and to social benefits for EU migrants, but which had weak emotional appeal. During that period, approximately 4,000 out of 6,000 contained the term ‘EU’ or ‘European Union’ (Figure 1).

Westminster EP

All speeches Speeches containing ‘EU’ or ‘European Union’ All speeches*

*All speeches given at the EP are

considered as related to the EU

Figure 1. Number of speeches according to stance in the referendum. 700 T. COUTTO

Although ‘remainers’ from different parties accounted for most of the seats in the Commons, we observe an increase in the proportion of ‘pro-leave’ speeches in February and March 2016. Other peaks are observed in the run-up to the referendum, when Theresa May became the new PM in July 2016, after the publication of the ‘Government’s “Plan for Britain” and the Notification of Withdrawal Bill’ (January 2017), and after the dissemination of the Brexit White Paper (February 2017). The proportion of speeches per political party follows the distribution of seats in the Parliament: 331 Conservatives, 232 Labour, 56 SNP, 8 LibDem, remaining stable when we compare the total population (all speeches) with those that refer to the EU. Exceptions include a lower number of EU-related interventions among Labour MPs in March 2016 (24.1% of the total but only 18.7% of EU speeches), and an increase following the result of the referendum in June (23.9% of the total and 29.4% of EU-related) and July 2016 (26.2% and 34.2%, respectively). ‘Remainers’ were the main contributors to the discussions, which reflected MPs’ positions (479 votes against 158). However, pro-leave MPs were more vocal after specific events such as EU Council meetings, when potential friction with the EU became evident. Communications that evoked a ‘soft Brexit’, a second referendum or no Brexit at all triggered harsh declarations from ‘leavers’ and pushed the government to reiterate their ‘trust in the British people’ as there was no opt-out from Brexit, as stated by the PM at the party conference on 2 October 2016. A different dynamic is observed among the 73 British Brussels-based MEPs due to the fewer number of speeches, party diversity and presence of the radical right. The 2015 election did not have affect the number of speeches, which were predominantly pro- remain at that time. On the other hand, the refugee crisis fostered a more active participation of UKIP members in the debate. Their discourse was characterised by short, percussive and anger-provoking interventions that appealed to national pride and securitised of migration – which in turn was not distinguished from asylum. We observe a combination of conflict(us versus them) and responsibility frames, where the EU is described as uncapable of protecting Europeans from a ‘flow of biblical proportions’ of migrants and terrorists (Farage, 09/09/2015). On the top of that, common policies per­ ceived as ‘unfair’ or inefficient such as agriculture as fisheries were heavily criticized by ‘leavers’ in the EP (but less so in HoC speeches about the EU (Figure 3)) and skilfully linked to the deterioration of ‘British values’ and way of life. The 2015–2017 period is also marked by strong polarisation in the EP, where UKIP and Labour (which adopted a unanimous and unequivocal position against Brexit) dominated the debate. Labour MEPs, for example, praised the European imprint on environmental policy, protection of civil rights and energy provision (Figure 3). Intra-party cleavages are observed exclusively among the Conservatives, who paid a modest contribution to EP debates: on average, 12.7% of the speeches, compared to Labour (36.7%) and UKIP (40.2%). The sentiment analysis indicates that parliamentarians in both Westminster and Brussels adopted and overall positive tone in their speeches, and that this trend remained stable after the referendum (Figure 2). In line with the literature on populism and Brexit (Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza 2017; Vasilopoulou and Wagner 2017), pro-leave MPs’ speeches tended to be more associated with anger than pro-remain ones, most notably in the EP, thereby confirming the ‘project anger hypothesis’. Looking at the ensemble of speeches given in Westminster, we see that pro-remain MPs failed to adopt a significantly positive tone compared to ‘leavers’ (Figure 2). This JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 701

Westminster EP

All speeches Speeches containing ‘EU’ or ‘European Union’ All speeches*

*All speeches given at the EP are considered as related to the EU

Figure 2. Sentiment analysis according: most prominent emotions in Westminster and EP speeches.

Figure 3. Dictionary-based topic analysis: Westminster and EP speeches before and after the refer­ endum (selected topics). phenomenon might be due to the fact that most of these parliamentarians were in the opposition. The politicisation of housing and health crises provided an alternative political narrative to the austerity policies; however, in prioritising opposition to the Conservative party rather than EU membership, Labour provided arguments that reinforced the rela­ tionship between the EU and the degradation of life standards, thereby providing fuel for the ‘leave’ campaign. Before the referendum, ‘Remainers’ in the HoC adopted a more 702 T. COUTTO negative discourse when only the speeches related to the EU are considered, which confirms the argument that the ‘Remain’ campaign did not make a positive case for Britain’s EU membership (Figure 2). Particularly interesting is the stark difference between the tone of Labour representatives in the EP, which was clearly more positive along the whole period studied. The dictionary-based topic analysis of Westminster speeches confirms that pro-remain MPs focused predominantly on pragmatic arguments (‘we are better in the EU than out’) and on macroeconomic and commercial indicators (GDP, trade with the EU) that did not reflect the social and economic disparities across the UK. We also observe a more pronounced emphasis on social agendas such as housing, health, employment, among remainers, although this might be due to the fact that these are issues traditionally championed by the left (Labour, SNP, Greens). Pro-leave MPs, by contrast, tended to focus more on agendas associated with the right such as law/crime and defence. They were also more vocal to link trade to the idea of a global Britain that would ‘forge bold new trade deals with growing economies’ (Johnson 2016a). They were also keener to raise issues related to agriculture (although this topic was marginal in HoC debates) and ‘traditional industries such as fishing, which had been devastated by the EU’ (Shannon 2015). These trends remained unchanged after the referendum except for welfare and finance/banking, where we see a higher number of speeches from pro-remain MPs. Equally important is the low number of speeches containing the terms ‘migrant’, ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum seeker’, which suggests a dichotomy between parliamentary and campaign discourses. In the EP, speeches made by pro-remain British MEPs focused predominantly on a wide array of areas such as science/research, environmental protection, energy, education and agriculture. They also stressed workers’ rights such as the working time and posted workers directives, and civil rights established under EU legal framework. Security mechanisms such as intelligence sharing and the European Arrest Warrant (Dance 26/ 11/2015) were also frequently mentioned among remain supporters from various political traditions. Pro-leave MEPs, by contrast, referred much more frequently to individuals such as Jean-Claude Juncker, Donald Tusk, Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron, as well as to EU institutions (most notably the Commission, the ECB and the ECJ). Both ‘leavers’ and ‘remainers’ talked about trade in their speeches (Figure 4), but the latter emphasised the importance of the single market while pro-leave portrayed Brexit as an opportunity for a more global Britain. After the referendum – as the need to negotiate the terms of UK’s withdrawal from the EU became of evident – trade became more present in the speeches of pro-remain MEPs, which increased the visibility of this policy area (Figure 4).

A more nuanced picture: qualitative insights Pre-campaign phase The period between the 2015 Election and the definition of the date of the referendum – described by former LibDem leader Nick Clegg as the victory of ‘fear and grievance’ over liberalism (Clegg 08/05/2015) – was marked by a high degree of uncertainty around the evolution of UK–EU relations. In his first speech after the scrutiny, Cameron praised his government as responsible for adopting fiscal discipline, avoiding a major economic crisis and devolving powers to the regions. The discourse mentioned job opportunities, child JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 703

Westminster EP

All speeches Speeches containing ‘EU’ or ‘European Union’ All speeches*

*All speeches given at the EP are considered as related to the EU

Figure 4. Dictionary-based topic analysis: monthly topic salience over time (selected topics 2015–2017).

care and tax cuts in order to ‘help 30 m people cope with the cost of living’, but did not appeal to voters’ emotions, on the contrary: in deprived areas the speech reinforced the conflict between ‘ordinary people’ and the cosmopolitan elite keen on freedom of move­ ment and the EU. The speech was predominantly inward-oriented and had no reference to foreign policy. Notwithstanding, the PM confirms the organization of ‘that in-out referendum’, without however providing further details about it (Cameron 08/05/2015). By creating such unstable ground, Cameron encouraged the emergence of alternatives for UK–EU relations that had not been an option so far. We consider this moment as the crystallization of the referendum as a crisis. While the Downing Street speech contained no reference to security issues, the politicisation of migration and increasing popularity of the UKIP (12.4% of the vote, compared to 3.1% in 2010) provided ammunition to hard-eurosceptic conservatives, who pressured Cameron to include further restrictions to the freedom of movement in the negotiations with the EU (Dennison and Goodwin 2015). In the months that followed the election, stricter border controls and cuts on migrants’ benefitswere a central element of a comprehensive strategy to provide ‘decent homes, better childcare, controlled immigration and lower taxes’ to British families (Cameron 06/10/2015). This phase was marked by a significant incidence of conflict frame, as expressed in Cameron’s promise to ‘battle’ for a good deal for Britain, and ‘a fair fight over the referendum’ (The Guardian 16/12/2015). A significant number of Conservative and Labour politicians choose not to declare their position, which prevented an unambiguous pro-EU narrative from emerging and countering the conflict frame. Minority parties, by contrast – most notably UKIP and the SNP gained visibility due to their capacity to deliver clear cues to voters. To the latter, the referendum was also an opportunity to present 704 T. COUTTO

Cameron as irresponsible for playing ‘fast and loose with our place in Europe’, to confirm SNP’s commitment to independence, and make the positive case for ‘Scotland, and the U. K, to stay in the EU.’ (Sturgeon 17/10/2015). Early and clear support for remaining part of the ‘European project’ was promptly publicized by the LibDems, Greens and Sinn Féin. These parties used emotional cues and positive language to encourage the ‘remain vote’, but they were in large part appealing to a cosmopolitan elite rather than the ‘real people’ that are penalized by delocalization, ‘excessive’ migration and a changing country where they no longer seem to fit. The analysis of the selected speeches shows conflict and responsibility as the most frequently used frames, as predicted by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), although its use varied according to the political party. Cameron pictured himself as the responsible for a solution to the allegedly excessive intrusion of the EU in British politics. UKIP and hard eurosceptics blamed the EU for erosion of national sovereignty, thus triggering a more visceral response from voters who felt ‘left behind’ and mobilising citizens who had never engaged with the electoral process. Responsibility and conflict frames were frequently used by Labour and SNP to attack the Conservatives, which hampered the emergence of a cohesive ‘remain’ narrative. The economic consequences frame is used by all pro-remain MPs, although more frequently by both europhile and soft eurosceptic conservatives. This frame was used in negative campaigning against pro-remain groups, labelled as ‘project fear’ by brexiteers (The Telegraph 25/01/2016). The sentiment analysis confirms previous findings (Mckenzie 2017) of a predominantly negative tone of leavers’ Westminster speeches and their association to emotions such as anger and sadness in the months that preceded the referendum.

The campaign The campaign phase was marked by further information about Cameron’s negotiated deal, but also by the realization that Brussels not willing to negotiate on restrictions of the four freedoms spelled out in the Treaty (goods, capital, services, people). The conflict frame used by the PM backfiredas it became clear that he had lost not only ‘battle’ against the EU but also the trust of the electorate. In Westminster, Labour and Conservatives relied on utilitarian arguments an economic consequences frame, which have a weak mobilization capacity since they lack emotional appeal. Following the strategy used in the Scottish referendum in 2014, Conservatives’ speeches stressed the severe crises that would arise in case of Brexit. The importance of preserving the status quo was clearly evoked by the Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne is his Ryanair speech, when he compared leaving the EU to ‘a one-way ticket to a poorer country’ according to ‘the IMF, the OECD, to hundreds of economists’ (Osborne 2016). This strategy proved proble­ matic since aggregate economic indicators are not a convincing threat, and also because of the stigmatization of poverty. Anti-Brexit partisans sought to forge a coherent and cohesive position within each party, but inter-party coordination was quite weak. While we observe a stronger and passionate case for remain among the centre-left, clear cues from the Labour party leadership were not observed until two months prior to the referendum. This aspect, coupled with the absence of individual stories capable of giving a ‘human face’ to the remain campaign reinforced the image of the EU as an elite-driven entity disconnected from the reality of ordinary men and women (proudly describe by Farage as ‘the little JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 705 people’). As the date of the referendum approached, we see a clear change in the tone of Corbyn’s discourse and a strong emphasis on ‘social Europe’. Examples such as social and worker’s rights (maternity leave, limitation of working time and rights of posted workers) guaranteed by EU legislation and benefits granted by member states such as discounted electricity charges in Denmark, Germany and Portugal become more visible in Labour speeches (Corbyn 16/06/2016). Notwithstanding, Corbyn remained critical of the EU, regarded as an institution the British should change from within, which confused his voters and weakened the Labour case for remaining in the EU. During the campaign the LibDems stressed that ‘the referendum was not only about the economy’, but also about the liberal legacy that would be left for future generations (Farron, 11/05/2016). Thanks to their unambiguous position regarding EU membership, the party was also in a better position to openly criticize the use of false information by the ‘leave’ campaign and the absence of policy guidelines to manage Brexit (Farron, 06/ 06/2016). Both LibDem and Labour discourses insisted on the conflict frame. The former, however, stressed the opposition between remainers – who personified liberal values of tolerance and freedom – and nostalgic leavers. Labour, by contrast, used the conflict frame to oppose their views of social justice to the Conservatives’ focus on austerity. Once again, the lack of a coordinated message confused voters and obscured the benefits of EU membership. The Leave campaign was led by many voices, but one same message: that leaving the EU would allow the UK to prosper again and to offer a better future for its citizens. Brexit was framed as an act that would unleash Britain’s ‘tremendous untapped potential’ (Gove 19/04/2016) and to ‘set ourselves free from an organization that only serves its own interests’ (Stuart 13/04/2016). Pro-leave politicians regardless of political leaning politicized the difficulties faced by public services, thus jumping on the bandwagon of a crises narrative that had been fuelled by the Labour party since 2010. Responsibility for such a situation was attributed to an external enemy: the EU and the elites who benefit from it. Stuart’s claim that Brexit would restore UK’s public services by investing the ‘£350 m paid to Brussels every week in schools, the NHS, the environment, and cutting the deficit’ was frontally attacked by LibDem and Greens leaders Tim Farron and Nathalie Bennett (06/06/2016) in a cross-party rally in London. However, an equally strong counter narrative capable of giving hope to those who heavily depend on public services did not emerge.

Post-referendum Despite the earlier claim that a vote for leave would be a ‘leap in the dark’, Cameron described the referendum as ‘a gigantic democratic exercise’ in a country where ‘we trust people with big decisions’ (Cameron, 24/06/2016). His discourse sought above all to ‘unframe’ the crisis that had taken hold of UK–EU relations during the campaign by underscoring Britain’s economic health reassuring financial markets and citizens affected by Brexit. Different from Cameron’s speeches, Theresa May used morality frame to promote the idea of solidarity based on the ‘spirit of citizenship’ that would make Brexit work for everyone, and not for an elite that shared more values with Brussels (‘citizens of nowhere’) than with ordinary fellow citizens (May 05/10/2016). There seems to be, however, an instrumental use of the morality frame as a means to divert attention from two irreconcilable needs: to ‘give British companies freedom to operate within the single 706 T. COUTTO market’ while regulating migration and rejecting the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. This narrative reflectedthe perception that the EU would not survive another crisis of that proportion after the situation in the Eurozone and the impasse on the asylum system and migration quotas, which would give the UK bargaining power. Following the ‘seismic result’ of the referendum, Farage (28/06/2016) praised ‘the little people’ that were capable to stand up against the establishment and sought to claim ownership for the outcome. Shortly after the referendum Farage quit the leadership of the UKIP (which he left in 2018) and reinvented himself as people’s watchdog for the UK–EU negotiation process. In the EP debates became more polarized as pro-EU members emphasize common values and regional identities to make a passionate (and visible) case for EU membership and ‘begging’ the EU not to let them down (Smith, 28/06/2016). The referendum also provided an opportunity for a brief return of the LibDems to the political scene, where they openly criticized the campaign based on ‘statistics and bully­ ing’, and sought to re-establish themselves as ‘free market, free trade pro-business’, and the only one real opposition party (Farron 20/09/2016). Corbyn also sought to reinvent itself as a watchdog of negotiations in order to ensure that they ‘deliver the protections our country needs’ (Corbyn 25/06/2016). While admitting that the campaign failed to convince ‘millions of natural labour voters who feel left behind’, the tone, subject and framing of the discourse did not change as the Tories were framed as the main ‘respon­ sible for mismanagement of the state, rising inequality, housing crisis, people earning less than the living wage and for demonizing migrants.’ (Corbyn 28/09/2016).

Conclusions While the origin of the ‘referendum crisis’ dates back to 2013, it was not before the 2015 election that leaving the EU emerged as a possible (and, to some actors, desirable) event, thus becoming the object of intense political debate. The analysis confirms the use of framing public policy issues such as healthcare and housing as crises with the aim of holding mainstream parties (and in particular individual politicians) accountable for the dismantling of a fictional and idealized British way of life. Such tactic was successful in changing the levels of political support for the status quo, in line with the studies carried out by Boin,’t Hart, and McConnell (2009). The victory of the Leave campaign became possible once the public acknowledged the existence of a crisis of the state and under­ stood it as stemming from the interference of technocratic, supranational (therefore undemocratic) bodies on British sovereignty. In line with previous works about media coverage of the referendum and campaign materials, we observe that the leavers and remainers organizations succeeded in shaping the referendum agenda, which focused predominantly on economic and migration- related topics (Oliver 2017). We note, however, that the speeches made by ‘leave’ politicians avoided explicit references to ‘migration’ in order to avoid any explicit associa­ tion between Brexit and racism that could discourage moderate voters. By contrast, crime, the lack of opportunities in the job market and degradation of public services (most notably health care) were integral part of the framing of UK–EU relations, and frequently associated to agendas supported by the Remain camp such as free trade and austerity. The emphasis on the economic consequences frame by the Remain camp proved insuffi­ cient to mobilize part of the population which already suffered economic hardship and JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 707 social deprivation, and who traditionally does not engage with politics via elections. There was no emotional response and little identification between those who felt left behind and pro-remain arguments, even when they were made by left-wing leaders. The analysis confirms the incidence of ‘second order effects’ on the referendum (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Marsh and Mikhaylov 2010). In fact, we observe clearer stances, stronger polarisation and higher levels of party cohesiveness in the EP than n Westminster. Challenger personalities (rather than just parties) occupied the European political space more efficiently: while only 32 out of the 72 British MEPs were in favor of Brexit, they delivered the majority of the speeches during the referendum campaign. They were also capable of sending clear cues and poignant messages advocating anti-systemic voting as a means to achieve a better future. While proportional use of the time is observed in Westminster, pro-EU arguments had already been weakened by the incor­ poration of ‘soft Eurosceptic’ discourse into the mainstream political narrative (De Vries and Edwards 2009). On top of that, arguments based on aggregate statistics failed to establish emotional bonds between the people and the EU, and proved innocuous to counter the popular rejection to Cameron himself. The politicisation of the eurozone and migrant/refugee crisis has not resulted in a constructive debate about the need to reform citizens’ representation and the relations between the UK and the EU. By promoting political polarisation, challenger parties wea­ kened the political center, which remains a space where they are not capable of operating. The deeply rooted narrative that frames UK–EU relations as a zero-sum game was essential to the development of the crisis fame and to the construction a straight-forward discourse that blamed European liberal values (expressed in the idea of the four freedoms) for the increasing insecurity experienced by the British people. The crisis discourse had arguably controversial statements capable of triggering anger and fear, but at the same time offered an alternative (and therefore hope). The process of framing the EU as an opponent and as the source of a deep malaise contributed to the emergence of ‘a peculiar form of a socially constructed utopia’ where an idealized past was projected into the future and became possible through a vote to leave the EU (Wellings and Gifford2018 ; Krzyżanowski 2019, 468). The process that resulted in the UK exit from the EU can be regarded as an uncoordi­ nated attempt of mainstream parties to deal with polarisation and to findalternative ways to counter the rise of populism and its promise of delivering ‘policies that really work’. The referendum set the context for a fierce electoral campaign (as seen in presidential systems) that limited the power of parliamentarian debate in shaping voters’ decisions. Put shortly, we observe second-order effectsin a poll of utmost importance for British and European politics that will have significant and long-lasting effects on British and EU politics. Once this dynamic was set in motion, parties had no choice but to support the decision of ‘the British people’. The use of economic (‘rational’) arguments failed to counter the narrative that associated the EU to inequality and lack of opportunity, which is the reality of numerous constituencies in the UK. In these areas, crisis politicisa­ tion and the absence of an ideology-based case for the EU angered (and mobilised) voters who felt ‘felt behind’ and proved critical to the narrow victory of the ‘Leave’ camp. 708 T. COUTTO

Acknowledgments

Research for this article has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant project No. 841111. I would like to thank the editors of this special issue, as well as the two anonymous reviewers for their comments. I gratefully acknowledge the input provided by participants of the international workshop on “The Framing of Crises in Europe” organised by Benedetta Voltolini in 2017 as well as those who attended the ECPR/SGEU conference in Paris in 2018, in particular Sara Hobolt, ÖzlemAtikcan and Colin Hay. I would like to thank Ben Farrand (Newcastle Law School) and the participants of the workshop on Communicating Europe, which provided me with useful insights regarding this research work. I also thank Roland Rathelot for the help with the data collection. All remaining errors are the author’s own.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

This work was supported by the FP7 People: Marie-Curie Actions [MEDPOL/841111].

ORCID

Tatiana Coutto http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9400-3752

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Appendix

Westminster EP All speeches Speeches containing ‘EU’ or ‘European Union’ All speeches*

*All speeches given at the EP are considered as related to the EU

Figure 1. Sentiment analysis according: emotions in Westminster and EP speeches.

s e h c e e p s

l l A

r e t s n i

m r t o s

e U

E

n W g o i n i n n U i

a n t a n e o p c

o s r e u h E c

e e p S

s e h c

e P e E p s

l l A

*All speeches given at the EP are considered as related to the EU

Figure 2. Dictionary-based topic analysis: Westminster and EP speeches before and after the referendum (other topics). JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 713

Westminster EP All speeches Speeches containing ‘EU’ or ‘European All speeches* Union’

Figure 3. Dictionary-based topic analysis: monthly topic salience over time (2015–2017).