DOCSLIB.ORG

Half-Full Or Half-Empty? Framing of UK–EU Relations During the Brexit Referendum Campaign

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Journal of European Integration ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/geui20 Half-full or half-empty? Framing of UK–EU relations during the Brexit referendum campaign Tatiana Coutto To cite this article: Tatiana Coutto (2020) Half-full or half-empty? Framing of UK–EU relations during the Brexit referendum campaign, Journal of European Integration, 42:5, 695-713, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2020.1792465 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2020.1792465 Published online: 19 Aug 2020. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 182 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 1 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=geui20 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2020, VOL. 42, NO. 5, 695–713 https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2020.1792465 Half-full or half-empty? Framing of UK–EU relations during the Brexit referendum campaign Tatiana Coutto Centre D’études Européennes Et De Politique Comparée (Cee/Sciences Po), Marie Sklodowska Curie Fellow ABSTRACT KEYWORDS This article analyses the political construction and politicisation of UK– Framing; content analysis; EU relations by British parliamentarians in Westminster and in the Brexit referendum; European European Parliament (EP) between May 2015 and May 2017. Using Union computer-assisted content analysis techniques and qualitative analysis of sampled speeches, we investigate how parties used frames and emotions in order to mobilise voters. Results indicate that the ‘Leave’ campaign succeeded in triggering sentiments of distrust and anger against the establishment and mobilizing voters while, economic arguments used by ‘remainers’ failed to convince citizens from deprived areas of the benefits of EU membership. Intra-party divisions were stronger among Westminster members than in the EP, but the visibility of the ‘Leave’ discourse in the EP was disproportionately higher to the number of pro-Brexit parliamentarians. Polarisation and values-based arguments are observed in the EP early in the campaign, suggesting that the process initiated at the European level and then migrated to the national level. Introduction: the construction of the ‘referendum crisis’ ‘The British people have made a choice. That not only needs to be respected – but those on the losing side of the argument, myself included, should help to make it work.’ With these words Prime Minister David Cameron acknowledged the result of the 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum (‘EU referendum’) and announced his resigna­ tion. The narrow victory of the Leave camp reflecteda deeply divided country (Hobolt 2016): euroscepticism became more socially distinctive and widespread (Goodwin and Heath 2016, 331), populism was encouraged and a sense of ‘ontological anxiety and insecurity’ emerged among Remain supporters (Browning 2018, 341). The referendum raised questions about ‘British identity’ and imperial nostalgia, and brought up concerns about the relation­ ship between England, Scotland and Northern Ireland (Shannon 2015; Clarke and Newman 2017; Kenny 2017). The campaign catalysed the politicisation of UK–EU relations and exposed the pitfalls of EU polity system, which was in turn instrumentalised by illiberal figures in the continent. The events in the UK compromised even more the legitimacy of the EU, which was already regarded as uncapable of addressing economic, social and security challenges (Dinan, Nugent, and Paterson 2017; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2018). CONTACT Tatiana Coutto [email protected] Centre D’études Européennes Et De Politique Comparée (Cee/Sciences Po). © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 696 T. COUTTO Politicisation and contestation of EU (of which Brexit is an acute manifestation) brought up the risk of the emergence of a disintegration dynamic (Rosamond 2016, 868). The possibility of a referendum, raised by Cameron in his Bloomberg speech in 2013, initiated a crisis in British politics that deeply affected UK–EU relations. By ‘crisis’ we mean a socially constructed and highly political period of instability and transition when a decisive intervention becomes not only possible but necessary (Hay 1996: 254). The speech opened an avenue for overt contestation of ‘common-sense’ policy prescriptions from challenger parties (Laffan 2014, 266), exposed deep divisions within the Conservative and Labour groups (Lynch and Whitaker 2018), and lead to a ‘drama of accountability and blaming’ typical of moments of crisis (Boin et al. 2010, 706). UK politics entered a state of exception and social panic that justified decisions that would not seem feasible otherwise (Roitman 2013). The period between General Elections (GE) of 2015 and 2017 reflects also an European crisis, marked by the intensification of politicisation of EU membership and polarisation of political discourse. This context gave visibility and legitimised, to a certain extent, the emotional populist-authoritarian rhetoric that mobilised a share of voters by bringing together the fear of the foreigner, the anger against the elites and a ‘concrete’ alternative to restore not only the economy but above all the national pride (Levinger 2017; Warren 2018). A similar phenomenon had been observed by Wendler (2014) when analysing other National Parliamentary Debates on EU Treaty Reform. This article seeks to investigate how UK–EU relations have been framed by British representatives in the House of Commons (HoC) and in the EP, and how these frames relate to the increasing politicisation observed along the referendum process. We focus on the following questions: when and how have social, economic, institutional and security issues been used by representatives to justify their stance (leave or remain)? How may the patterns of politicisation of these issues vary according to political party, stance and institutional setting (Brussels or Westminster)? Finally, drawing on Atikcan (2018) and Bennett (2019), we verify the blurring of party lines – that is, whether representatives were loyal to their party or personal beliefs. Following Entman’s (1993) definition of framing as a process of selection and emphasis of perceived aspects of reality as well as on Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) typology, we identify the dominant frames and study their evolutionary process. Furthermore, we explore the use of emotions in the construction of UK–EU relations since they (like frames) are ‘intensifiers’ of ideas and attitudes that may render salient aspects that would be otherwise neglected by the public (Freeden 2013, 7). Our results confirmthe hypothesis that anger, triggered mainly by ideas of patriotism, pride and sovereignty, proved to be a more powerful driver in the refer­ endum, thus shedding light on the process through which narratives about the EU evolve in periods of crisis. Media and Parliamentary discourse on UK-EU relations Political communication literature indicates that the historically embedded narrative that opposed British interests to those of a Germany-controlled ‘Europe’ was still present in certain political and media discourses, and particularly strong among challenger parties and tabloid press (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000; De Vreese 2005; Daddow 2012). Press coverage of the referendum was marked by low visibility of analysts and academics (11% JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 697 of the articles) and Labour politicians (17%), as opposed to the high exposure of Leave campaigners (74%) (Levy, Aslan and Bironzo 2016). The economy was by far the most covered issue, followed by immigration (the most prominent issue among voters) and health (Hobolt 2016, 1262). In the week before the referendum, ‘Brexit’ and the ‘EU’ were the subject of 77% of all newspaper articles on UK political issues (Moore and Ramsay 2017, 14). We also observe a higher visibility of migration issues, and its securitization as freedom of movement was linked to terrorist attacks (Vasilopoulou 2016, 222). Poor knowledge of EU institutions coupled with the weak presence of everyday symbols such as flags and Euro notes have limited individuals’ identification with the Union and contributed to low public support for integration in the UK (Cram 2012; Startin 2015). The two main parties have historically approached EU politics in an ‘indirect and potentially less electorally risky manner’ by focussing on general views rather than specific policies (Sherrington 2006, 70), thus helping party leaders from providing clear cues to their voters (Curtice 2015). Pro-remain politicians were careful to overtly support the EU, while Eurosceptics of varied political leanings frequently spoke against it (Forster 2003; Startin 2015) – a trend confirmed in Wenzl’s (2019) analysis of MPs’ speeches given in Westminster between 2015 and 2016. As shown by Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley (2017), the association of EU membership and negative emotions might have played a critical role in the narrow victory of the Leave camp. While parliamentary debates gained visibility during the campaign and after the referendum, analyses comparing the discursive practices in Westminster and in the EP remain overlooked. Cross-country analyses have shed light on patterns of politicisation and polarisation of national parliamentary debates about the EU (Hutter and Kerscher 2014; Wendler 2014), but the specificities of each national context limit the explanatory power of these studies. The focus on British politicians
Recommended publications
  • Brexit: Where Is the EU–UK Relationship Heading?

    Brexit: Where Is the EU–UK Relationship Heading?

    Simon Hix Brexit: where is the EU–UK relationship heading? Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Hix, Simon (2018) Brexit: where is the EU–UK relationship heading? Journal of Common Market Studies. ISSN 0021-9886 (In Press) DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12766 © 2018 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/89976/ Available in LSE Research Online: August 2018 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. The JCMS Annual Review Lecture 2018 Brexit: Where is the EU-UK Relationship Heading?1 Simon Hix London School of Economics and Political Science 1 I would like to thank Angus Armstrong, Catherine Barnard, Theofanis Exadaktylos, Anand Menon, Jonathan Portes, Brendan O’Leary and Simon Usherwood for their helpful comments on an earlier version.
  • Hyperdemocracy: Euroscepticism and Elections in the United Kingdom

    Hyperdemocracy: Euroscepticism and Elections in the United Kingdom

    History in the Making Volume 12 Article 13 January 2019 Hyperdemocracy: Euroscepticism and Elections in the United Kingdom Edward Reminiskey CSUSB Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/history-in-the-making Part of the European History Commons Recommended Citation Reminiskey, Edward (2019) "Hyperdemocracy: Euroscepticism and Elections in the United Kingdom," History in the Making: Vol. 12 , Article 13. Available at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/history-in-the-making/vol12/iss1/13 This History in the Making is brought to you for free and open access by the History at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in History in the Making by an authorized editor of CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. History in the Making Hyperdemocracy: Euroscepticism and Elections in the United Kingdom By Edward Reminiskey Abstract: In the early hours of June 24th, 2016, the results of a referendum asking the United Kingdom to determine its membership status in the European Union were made official. Decided by a slim majority, the decision was made by the electorate to leave the European Union. To characterize this moment as being uncertain would be an understatement. It stood as a major turning point in twenty-first century politics, and presents an opportunity to explore the recent phenomenon affecting liberal democracy. “Brexit,” as it would be referred to, instigated scholars to ask important questions about the contemporary state of liberal democracy. What happens when a liberal democracy undermines itself? How can scholars characterize the latest trends in liberal democracy? This paper attempts to answer these types of questions by viewing recent developments in the United Kingdom, utilizing the lens of hyperdemocracy theory, and applying it to elections and political media analysis.
  • The EU Referendum and EU Reform

    The EU Referendum and EU Reform

    EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE The EU referendum and EU reform Evidence Volume Catherine Bearder MEP, Ashley Fox MEP and Glenis Willmott MEP—Oral Evidence (QQ 126-133) ........................................................................................................................................................ 4 Bertelsmann Stiftung, Centre for European Policy Studies and European Policy Centre—Oral Evidence (QQ 134-139) ......................................................................................................................... 19 Elmar Brok MEP and Danuta Hübner MEP—Oral Evidence (QQ 120-125) .............................. 33 CBI, TheCityUK and TUC—Oral Evidence (QQ 53-64) ............................................................... 44 The Centre for Cross Border Studies—Written Evidence (VEU0008) ...................................... 65 Centre for European Policy Studies, Bertelsmann Stiftung and European Policy Centre—Oral Evidence (QQ 133-138) ......................................................................................................................... 80 Convention of Scottish Local Authorities—Written Evidence (VEU0006) ................................ 81 Professor Laura Cram and Professor Andrew Scott—Oral Evidence (QQ 98-105) ............... 89 Alun Davies AM, Suzy Davies AM, Rt Hon Lord Elis-Thomas AM David Melding AM, and William Powell AM—Oral Evidence (QQ 22-27) .......................................................................... 115 Suzy Davies AM, Alun Davies AM, Rt Hon Lord Elis-Thomas
  • The Brexit Vote: a Divided Nation, a Divided Continent

    The Brexit Vote: a Divided Nation, a Divided Continent

    Sara Hobolt The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Hobolt, Sara (2016) The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent. Journal of European Public Policy, 23 (9). pp. 1259-1277. ISSN 1466-4429 DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1225785 © 2016 Routledge This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67546/ Available in LSE Research Online: November 2016 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided Continent Sara B. Hobolt London School of Economics and Political Science, UK ABSTRACT The outcome of the British referendum on EU membership sent shockwaves through Europe. While Britain is an outlier when it comes to the strength of Euroscepticism, the anti- immigration and anti-establishment sentiments that produced the referendum outcome are gaining strength across Europe.
  • Brexit: Initial Reflections

    Brexit: Initial Reflections

    Brexit: initial reflections ANAND MENON AND JOHN-PAUL SALTER* At around four-thirty on the morning of 24 June 2016, the media began to announce that the British people had voted to leave the European Union. As the final results came in, it emerged that the pro-Brexit campaign had garnered 51.9 per cent of the votes cast and prevailed by a margin of 1,269,501 votes. For the first time in its history, a member state had voted to quit the EU. The outcome of the referendum reflected the confluence of several long- term and more contingent factors. In part, it represented the culmination of a longstanding tension in British politics between, on the one hand, London’s relative effectiveness in shaping European integration to match its own prefer- ences and, on the other, political diffidence when it came to trumpeting such success. This paradox, in turn, resulted from longstanding intraparty divisions over Britain’s relationship with the EU, which have hamstrung such attempts as there have been to make a positive case for British EU membership. The media found it more worthwhile to pour a stream of anti-EU invective into the resulting vacuum rather than critically engage with the issue, let alone highlight the benefits of membership. Consequently, public opinion remained lukewarm at best, treated to a diet of more or less combative and Eurosceptic political rhetoric, much of which disguised a far different reality. The result was also a consequence of the referendum campaign itself. The strategy pursued by Prime Minister David Cameron—of adopting a critical stance towards the EU, promising a referendum, and ultimately campaigning for continued membership—failed.
  • The Electoral Determinants of “Brexit”

    The Electoral Determinants of “Brexit”

    The Electoral Determinants of “Brexit”: Politics of Fear and Hope Master Thesis Wander Luís Carvalho de Amorim 402059 International Public Management and Policy (IMP) Faculty of Social Sciences Erasmus University Rotterdam 1st reader: Dr M.A. Beukenholdt-Ter Mors 2nd reader: Dr J.L.M. Hakvoort 27/07/2017 Word count (excluding appendices and references): 23,058 PREFACE “Live as if you were to die tomorrow, Learn as if you were to live forever” Desiderius Erasmus i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This August I complete four years since I put myself in a plane, left my country, Brazil, and headed to adult life in the absolute unknown. My destination was Rotterdam: for me, in fact, it became the gateway to Europe. A Europe that has relentlessly instilled me with intense challenges, discoveries, experiences, emotions and learning. That’s what I was looking for, after all. The completion of my MSc in International Public Management & Public Policy has always been within the key objectives of my masterplan – it was not, however, the main one. Following the teachings of Desiderius Erasmus, the main objective of my journey has always been, above all, to live and to learn; and what is life but the best teacher? From Rotterdam then I’ve got to build a life that now spreads all over this continent. Lives, loves, tastes, faces... Europe has become so ingrained in my footprint I can only feel I’ve been successful in those objectives I set out to achieve. In that sense, Erasmus Universiteit, where it all began, has also become my “main port of knowledge”: the knowledge cycle, though, however rich, is of course not yet fully closed, and that’s why I present you this master thesis.
  • 1 Inevitability and Contingency: the Political Economy of Brexit1 Placing

    1 Inevitability and Contingency: the Political Economy of Brexit1 Placing

    Inevitability and contingency: the political economy of Brexit1 Placing Britain’s vote on 23 June 2016 to leave the European Union in historical time raises an immediate analytical problem. What was clearly the result of a number of contingencies, starting with the 2015 general election where we can see how events could readily have turned out otherwise and was a shock to the British government that had not prepared for this outcome might also represent the inevitable end of Britain’s membership of the EU seen from the distant future. This paper seeks to take both temporal perspectives seriously. It aims to provide an explanation of the vote for Brexit that recognises the referendum result as politically contingent and also argue that the political economy of Britain generated by Britain’s position as non-euro member of the EU whilst possessing the offshore financial centre of the euro zone and Britain’s eschewal in 2004 of transition arrangements on freedom of movement for A8 accession states made Brexit an eventual inevitability, saving a prior collapse of the euro zone. Keywords: Brexit, European Union, Cameron, the euro, freedom of movement Britain’s vote on 23 June 2016 to leave the European Union (EU) presents a temporal paradox. Seen from the distant future, Brexit is likely to appear the inevitable outcome of the long history of Britain’s membership of the EU and its predecessors. Britain joined a partial economic union whose rules had been determined by others, when that union became a currency union it was unwilling to sacrifice monetary sovereignty and opted-out, and when that currency union produced an economic crisis that both required more political union and had spill-over effects for Britain, membership was rendered unsustainable.
  • Life After BREXIT: What Are the UK's Options Outside the European

    Life After BREXIT: What Are the UK's Options Outside the European

    P APER BREXIT01 #CEPBREXIT Life after BREXIT: What are the UK’s options outside the European Union? Swati Dhingra and Thomas Sampson CEP BREXIT ANALYSIS Life after Brexit: What are the UK’s options outside the European Union? It is highly uncertain what the UK’s future would look like outside the European Union (EU), which makes ‘Brexit’ a leap into the unknown. This report reviews the advantages and drawbacks of the most likely options. After Brexit, the EU would continue to be the world’s largest market and the UK’s biggest trading partner. A key question is what would happen to the three million EU citizens living in the UK and the two million UK citizens living in the EU? There are economic benefits from European integration, but obtaining these benefits comes at the political cost of giving up some sovereignty. Inside or outside the EU, this trade-off is inescapable. One option is ‘doing a Norway’ and joining the European Economic Area. This would minimise the trade costs of Brexit, but it would mean paying about 83% as much into the EU budget as the UK currently does. It would also require keeping current EU regulations (without having a seat at the table when the rules are decided). Another option is ‘doing a Switzerland’ and negotiating bilateral deals with the EU. Switzerland still faces regulation without representation and pays about 40% as much as the UK to be part of the single market in goods. But the Swiss have no agreement with the EU on free trade in services, an area where the UK is a major exporter.
  • Britain's No-Deal Debacle?

    Britain's No-Deal Debacle?

    Britain’s No-Deal Debacle? The Costs at Home and Likely Setbacks Abroad John Ryan STRATEGIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2020 LSE IDEAS is LSE’s foreign policy think tank. Ranked #1 university affiliated think tank in the world in the 2019 Global Go To Think Tank Index. We connect academic knowledge of diplomacy and strategy with the people who use it. CONTENTS Brexit—Endgame of the Reluctant European?— 4 The Phase of Scepticism 1945-2016 No-Deal Brexit Consequences for Ireland 7 The 2020 Irish Republic Election Result 11 Has Recast Ireland’s Political Dynamics A Joe Biden Presidency and Congress May 14 Block US-UK Post-Brexit Trade Deal Conclusion 18 References 20 ‘‘ Britain’s No-Deal Debacle? The Costs at Home and Likely Setbacks Abroad | John Ryan 3 he UK left the EU on 31 January 2020 after 47 years of membership. If a No-Deal Brexit Tbecomes a reality, it may not only be a sore The historic awakening for Boris Johnson and his government, but ‘‘commitment by the also for the United Kingdom as a whole. In this paper, US government to I will examine UK scepticism over Europe as a long- the peace process established phenomenon as well as the failure over the withdrawal agreement and the problems with the in Northern Ireland poorly executed UK strategy for Brexit negotiations. is a factor, but in I will then look at how a No-Deal Brexit scenario will addition the Irish complicate the economic and political consequences American vote ‘‘ for Ireland, and the associated repercussions for trade matters in US negotiations for the UK with the United States.
  • Our Guide to Britain's EU Referendum

    Our Guide to Britain's EU Referendum

    JUNE 2016 The Brexit briefs Our guide to Britain’s EU referendum THE BREXIT BRIEFS ON JUNE 23rd Britain will hold a referendum on whether to remain in or leave the European Union. This will be the country’s most important vote in at least half a century. Alas, the debate has often been neither informative nor enlightening. The Economist is not neutral: we are convinced that a decision to leave (a so-called Brexit) would be bad for Britain, Europe and the world. But we also believe in the importance of objective analysis and reasoned argument. Over the past few months we have published a series of factual briefs that examine the main issues around Brexit. To help interested readers, we have now assembled all our Brexit briefs together. Zanny Minton Beddoes, Editor-in-chief CONTENTS 1. March 5th 2016 7. April 16th 2016 13. May 28th 2016 TRUTH AND LIES BUSINESS BUREAUCRACY Voters want clear facts about the Most businesses want to stay in the EU Brexiteers say they will scrap much EU European Union. They are given myths but some are cautious of saying so regulation, but they may not end up instead doing so 8. April 23rd 2016 2. March 12th 2016 THE TERMS OF THE DEAL 14. June 4th 2016 EUROSCEPTICISM Being out of the euro and Schengen HOW TO LEAVE Hostility to the EU in Britain is different gives Britain the best of both worlds Britain’s withdrawal process from the EU from anything found on the continent could be long and painful 9.
  • 'The Legal Profession's Responsibility for Brexit'

    'The Legal Profession's Responsibility for Brexit'

    ‘The Legal Profession’s Responsibility for Brexit’ Damjan Kukovec LL.M. S.J.D (Harvard), Senior Lecturer, Middlesex University School of Law, London. Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at Harvard Law School and at Hong Kong University. Abstract This paper argues that Brexit is a collective failure of the legal profession. The existing legal narrative of the European Union implies that power relationships reflect the division of institutional and sovereign competences. This misrepresentation was passed onto the general public who framed their personal frustration in this conventional narrative and demanded “taking back control”. The vote for Brexit resulted from a combination of four key features of this narrative - the ethos of interdependence, the promise of inclusion of the other, the claim of people’s political incapacity and the policymaking in terms of the extent of national sovereignty. This framework does not offer an explanation of the United Kingdom’s true position in the Union and in the world as well as gives false hope to those belittled and excluded. This chapter suggest an alternative account of the Union and calls for a new research agenda needed for the future of Europe – inquiring into the role of lawyers in the deconstruction of the European Union. Key words: Brexit; Constitutionalism, Taking Back Control, The Legal Profession, Power, Sovereignty, Political Capacity, Deconstruction of the European Union Introduction The United Kingdom electorate’s decision in the 2016 referendum to leave the European Union sent shockwaves around Europe and the world. The difficult negotiations and the inability to secure a withdrawal agreement for an orderly Brexit showed that the UK’s decision to leave the Union was not thought through.
  • Project Fear: How the Negativity of the Referendum Campaign Undermines Democracy

    Project Fear: How the Negativity of the Referendum Campaign Undermines Democracy

    Project Fear: How the negativity of the referendum campaign undermines democracy blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/06/13/project-fear-how-the-negativity-of-the-referendum-campaign-undermines- democracy/ 13/06/2016 The referendum debate is not living up to its democratic ideals. Both sides of the divide have focused heavily on negative, fear-based arguments to make their case, which prevent democratic engagement among the electorate. Charlotte Galpin shows how this negativity is inhibiting critical reflection and fostering cynicism. She also notes that the debate is non-inclusive, with an striking absence of minorities and female experts in the campaign. Referenda, along with other forms of direct democracy, are seen as an important element of democratic decision-making. They give a voice to the people in key constitutional issues, bringing decision-making to the citizens. Sara Hobolt notes that they have been increasingly used at key moments in European integration, seen as one way to improve EU democracy. Back in 2009 and 2010, the pro-European Liberal Democrats were calling for a referendum on EU membership to ‘settle the arguments’ once and for all, to have an open debate about the pros and cons of membership. So far, the referendum debate is not living up to these democratic ideals. While Vote Leave has accused David Cameron of running Project Fear, both sides have focused heavily on negative, fear-based arguments to make their case –‘Project Fear meets Project Fear’. Fear has long been used as a strategy of negative campaigning. But the fear stories used by both sides of the campaign and in the media prevent democratic engagement with the arguments, create divisions, and foster political cynicism.