Volume 4 Number 3, 1992
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Hemisphere Volume 4 Article 1 Issue 3 Summer 1992 Volume 4 Number 3, 1992 Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/lacc_hemisphere Part of the Latin American Studies Commons Recommended Citation (1992) "Volume 4 Number 3, 1992," Hemisphere: Vol. 4 : Iss. 3 , Article 1. Available at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/lacc_hemisphere/vol4/iss3/1 This work is brought to you for free and open access by the Kimberly Green Latin American and Carribbean Center (LACC) Publications Network at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hemisphere by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Volume 4 Number 3, 1992 This issue is available in Hemisphere: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/lacc_hemisphere/vol4/iss3/1 Hemisphere A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS Summer 1992 Volume Four • Number Three Seven Dollars Venezuela: Will Democracy Survive? Andres Serbin, Arturo Uslar Pietri, Rafael Caldera Justified Optimism? The Military and Peace in Central America Jose Z. Garcia, Steve Levitsky, Gabriel Aguilera Peralta Baseball’s Caribbean Connection Martin F. Murphy Purcell on the Cuban Democracy Act Baum on Stopping Airborne Drug Traffickers Clark on Costa Rica’s Export Strategy Green on GATT: The Right to Life Forms Pacini Hernandez on Bachata: Raw to Rosy Payne on Manley’s Legacy Hemisphere A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS Summer 1992 Volume Four • Number Three Seven Dollars EDITORIAL STAFF LETTERS TO THE EDITOR Editor: Anthony P. M aingot Deputy Editor: Richard T ardanico Associate Editors: Eduardo A. Gamarra, Mark B. Rosenberg Assistant Editor: Sofia A. Lopez COMMENTARY Book Review Editor: Kathleen Logan Bibliographer: Marian Goslinga Risky Business? The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 Editorial Assistant: Rene Ramos Circulation Manager: Raquel Jurado by Susan Kaufman Purcell Copy Editor: Michael B.Joslyn Production Assistants: Cristina Finlay, Pedro P. Stopping Airborne Drug T raffickers by Richard J. Baum Garcia, Teresita Marill, Vilma Zamora CONTRIBUTING EDITORS Jan et M. C hernela Raul Moncarz REPORTS Elena de Jongh Lisandro Perez Damian J. Fernandez Luis P. Salas Costa Rica’s Export Strategy by Mary A. Clark Jo h n D. French Kevin A. Yelvington D ennisJ. Gayle GATT: The Right to Life Forms by Paula L. Green EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD Bachata: From Raw to Rosy by Deborah Pacini Hernandez Don Bohning Guido Pennano Manley’s Legacy by Anthony Payne Ettore Botta A lejandro Portes Wolf Grabendorff Sally Price Alistair Hennessy David Ronfeldt Harry Hoetink Selwyn Ryan Franklin W. Knight Steven E. Sanderson FAXFILE Vaughan Lewis Saskia Sassen Larissa A. Lomnitz Andres Serbin A braham F. Lowenthal Carol A. Smith Andres Oppenheimer Yolande Van Eeuwen Robert A. Pastor Arturo Villar FEATURES AnthonyJ. Payne Juan Yaries Hemisphere (ISSN 08983038) is published three Venezuela: Will Democracy Survive? times a year (Fall, Winter/Spring, and Summer) Venezuela: Reversal or Renewal? by Andres Serbin by the Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida International University. Copyright © 1992 A Culture of Corruption by Arturo Uslar Pietri by the Latin American and Caribbean Center, Flor ida International University. All rights reserved. Venezuela in Crisis An Interview with Rafael Caldera Hemisphere is dedicated to provoking debate on the problems, initiatives, and achievements of Latin America and the Caribbean. Responsibility for the Justified Optimism? The Military and Peace in Central America views expressed lies solely with the authors. Military Questions in El Salvador by fose Z. Garcia EDITORIAL, CIRCULATION, AND ADVERTIS ING OFFICES: Latin American and Caribbean Taming the Honduran Military by Steve Levitsky Center, Florida International University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199. Telephone: (305) 348- Guatemala's Military Transition by Gabriel Aguilera Peralta 2894. FAX: (305) 348-3593. Please address manu scripts and editorial correspondence to the Deputy Editor. SUBSCRIPTIONS: US, USVI, PR, and Canada: $20 REVIEW FORUM a year; $36 for two years. Elsewhere: $27 a year; $50 for two years. Please make check o r money Baseball’s Caribbean Connection by Martin F. Murphy order (US currency only) payable to Hemisphere. Credit card orders (MC/VISA only) are also acceptable. PUBLICATIONS UPDATE This docum ent was produced at a cost o f $5,209.00 or $2.60 per copy. Civil-Military Relations in Latin America by Marian Goslinga Drug-War Psychology tive course of action even after that the military is “appointing” identifying an institutional weak itself when he writes in the same I read with keen interest Raul ness that he cites as a contributing article that they were ordered into Barrios M oron’s article, “Bolivia: cause of the militarization. the “war” by their democratically The Psychology of Drug War” elected leader, who is heavily influ (Hemisphere, Fall 1991). He indi enced by the US. cates that at least one side of the Low-intensity The author also believes the “drug war” is implementing an im poster warns “that Bolivia’s current portant part of low-in tensity con warfare— the category rural development program, De- flict doctrine—psychological under which drug sarrollo Altemativo, seems to have be warfare. I am careful to say one come a mere complement for an side because I suspect that the operations are incipient campaign of low-intensify “other side” is also using tech warfare.” A mere complement? Or niques that could be defined as included— is not a a matter of perspective? A plethora psychological warfare tactics. In “Western doctrine. of literature in the military/low- deed, using Barrios Moron’s own ” intensity conflict field strongly ar definition of psychological warfare, It can be seen in the gues for alternative development his article would constitute a psy programs as part of the overall chological warfare operation, an at writings of Mao strategy and strongly cautions tempt to win the hearts and minds against using the military instru of the readers by manipulation of Tse-tung (Protracted ment as the sole instrument to ad the information. War, Guerilla War) dress insurgencies—the category Barrios Moron’s manipulation under which drug operations are of the information is obviously and Che Guevara included. slanted against the Bolivian mili This is not a “Western” doctrine. tary’s involvement in the drug war. (Guerrilla Warfare). It can be seen in the writings of This is not, however, a condemna Mao Tse-tung (Protracted War, tion of the author’s view. Given Guerilla War) and Che Guevara Bolivia’s authoritarian history, a Barrios Moron states that the (Guerrilla Warfare), even though it concern for the continuation of Bo poster “conveys an unequivocal un is not specifically labeled “psycho livian democracy against the back derstanding of the military’s self- logical warfare.” Some of the most drop of increased militarization is appointed role.” Self-appointed? prolific writers urging that social certainly valid. On page 14 he cites the US gov development be made the major Of even greater concern, ernment’s financial support and thrust in counterinsurgency opera though, is the ossification of view technical backing for the Bolivian tions are members of the military. points into two distinct camps. This army’s psychological warfare opera There is far too much literature is precisely what the author is accus tions. On page 16 he alludes to the in the field to review here, but a re ing the Bolivian military of doing, US role in the militarization effort: cent article by US Army Captain creating an either you’re “for us” “the poster asserts the Bolivian—as Michael Ligon, a special forces- or “against us” attitude by manipu opposed to US—origins of the anti qualified military intelligence offi lating information. He shows his drug campaign,” and refers to the cer, addresses this professional bias by his contradictory statements “strategic impositions of the US concern. He cites US Army Field concerning who is responsible for drug war.” In addition, on page 15, Manual 100-20, Military Operations the military’s antidrug role, his fail he cites the signing of the US- in Low-intensity Conflict, which iden ure to include the plethora of mili Bolivian bilateral drug agreement, tifies the integrated approach of tary literature that cautions against “under which President Jaime Paz political, economic, and military the exclusive use of the military in Zamora agreed to order the Boliv operations necessary for counterin such a role, and by not following ian army into the war on drugs.” surgency and counternarcotics op through with a suggested alterna How could Barrios Moron argue erations to be successful. Captain Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Ligon expresses the concern that the institution that is the most Regarding Sovereignty this coordinated approach, while likely to replace the vacuum left current in the US, is not being should the military return to a Irving Louis Horowitz’s “Shadow addressed in the overseas coun purely external defense role: the of a Nation” (Hemisphere, W inter/ ternarcotics strategy. “The weak police. Spring 1992) provides an excellent link lies in not having an economic In reality it is drug trafficking analysis of why Panama is an excep alternative to offer drug producing that is the threat to Bolivian na tional and atypical Latin American nations. ... In the war on drugs, a tional security and the consolida nation. Indeed, in many respects, it purely military approach is not the tion of their democracy. It is drug is an artificial nation. But when he answer” (“LIC, Counternarcotics trafficking that the people have ventures into policy recommenda and Small-Scale Agriculture,” Spe turned to because of their extreme tions that follow from his charac cial Warfare: The Professional Bulletin poverty and it is drug trafficking terizations, he falls into all sorts of of the fohn F. Kennedy Special Warfare that has resulted in the US “strate perceptual traps.