Volume 4 Number 3, 1992

Hemisphere Volume 4 Article 1 Issue 3 Summer

1992 Volume 4 Number 3, 1992

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A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS

Summer 1992 Volume Four • Number Three Seven Dollars

Venezuela: Will Democracy Survive? Andres Serbin, Arturo Uslar Pietri, Rafael Caldera

Justified Optimism? The Military and Peace in Central America Jose Z. Garcia, Steve Levitsky, Gabriel Aguilera Peralta

Baseball’s Caribbean Connection Martin F. Murphy

Purcell on the Cuban Democracy Act Baum on Stopping Airborne Drug Traffickers Clark on Costa Rica’s Export Strategy Green on GATT: The Right to Life Forms Pacini Hernandez on Bachata: Raw to Rosy Payne on Manley’s Legacy

Hemisphere

A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS

Summer 1992 Volume Four • Number Three Seven Dollars

EDITORIAL STAFF LETTERS TO THE EDITOR Editor: Anthony P. M aingot Deputy Editor: Richard T ardanico Associate Editors: Eduardo A. Gamarra, Mark B. Rosenberg Assistant Editor: Sofia A. Lopez COMMENTARY Book Review Editor: Kathleen Logan Bibliographer: Marian Goslinga Risky Business? The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 Editorial Assistant: Rene Ramos Circulation Manager: Raquel Jurado by Susan Kaufman Purcell Copy Editor: Michael B.Joslyn Production Assistants: Cristina Finlay, Pedro P. Stopping Airborne Drug T raffickers by Richard J. Baum Garcia, Teresita Marill, Vilma Zamora CONTRIBUTING EDITORS Jan et M. C hernela Raul Moncarz REPORTS Elena de Jongh Lisandro Perez Damian J. Fernandez Luis P. Salas Costa Rica’s Export Strategy by Mary A. Clark Jo h n D. French Kevin A. Yelvington D ennisJ. Gayle GATT: The Right to Life Forms by Paula L. Green EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD Bachata: From Raw to Rosy by Deborah Pacini Hernandez Don Bohning Guido Pennano Manley’s Legacy by Anthony Payne Ettore Botta A lejandro Portes Wolf Grabendorff Sally Price Alistair Hennessy David Ronfeldt Harry Hoetink Selwyn Ryan Franklin W. Knight Steven E. Sanderson FAXFILE Vaughan Lewis Saskia Sassen Larissa A. Lomnitz Andres Serbin A braham F. Lowenthal Carol A. Smith Andres Oppenheimer Yolande Van Eeuwen Robert A. Pastor Arturo Villar FEATURES AnthonyJ. Payne Juan Yaries

Hemisphere (ISSN 08983038) is published three Venezuela: Will Democracy Survive? times a year (Fall, Winter/Spring, and Summer) Venezuela: Reversal or Renewal? by Andres Serbin by the Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida International University. Copyright © 1992 A Culture of Corruption by Arturo Uslar Pietri by the Latin American and Caribbean Center, Flor ida International University. All rights reserved. Venezuela in Crisis An Interview with Rafael Caldera Hemisphere is dedicated to provoking debate on the problems, initiatives, and achievements of Latin America and the Caribbean. Responsibility for the Justified Optimism? The Military and Peace in Central America views expressed lies solely with the authors. Military Questions in El Salvador by fose Z. Garcia EDITORIAL, CIRCULATION, AND ADVERTIS ING OFFICES: Latin American and Caribbean Taming the Honduran Military by Steve Levitsky Center, Florida International University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199. Telephone: (305) 348- Guatemala's Military Transition by Gabriel Aguilera Peralta 2894. FAX: (305) 348-3593. Please address manu scripts and editorial correspondence to the Deputy Editor. SUBSCRIPTIONS: US, USVI, PR, and Canada: $20 REVIEW FORUM a year; $36 for two years. Elsewhere: $27 a year; $50 for two years. Please make check o r money Baseball’s Caribbean Connection by Martin F. Murphy order (US currency only) payable to Hemisphere. Credit card orders (MC/VISA only) are also acceptable. PUBLICATIONS UPDATE This docum ent was produced at a cost o f $5,209.00 or $2.60 per copy. Civil-Military Relations in Latin America by Marian Goslinga Drug-War Psychology tive course of action even after that the military is “appointing” identifying an institutional weak itself when he writes in the same I read with keen interest Raul ness that he cites as a contributing article that they were ordered into Barrios M oron’s article, “Bolivia: cause of the militarization. the “war” by their democratically The Psychology of Drug War” elected leader, who is heavily influ (Hemisphere, Fall 1991). He indi enced by the US. cates that at least one side of the Low-intensity The author also believes the “drug war” is implementing an im poster warns “that Bolivia’s current portant part of low-in tensity con warfare— the category rural development program, De- flict doctrine—psychological under which drug sarrollo Altemativo, seems to have be warfare. I am careful to say one come a mere complement for an side because I suspect that the operations are incipient campaign of low-intensify “other side” is also using tech warfare.” A mere complement? Or niques that could be defined as included— is not a a matter of perspective? A plethora psychological warfare tactics. In “Western doctrine. of literature in the military/low- deed, using Barrios Moron’s own ” intensity conflict field strongly ar definition of psychological warfare, It can be seen in the gues for alternative development his article would constitute a psy programs as part of the overall chological warfare operation, an at writings of Mao strategy and strongly cautions tempt to win the hearts and minds against using the military instru of the readers by manipulation of Tse-tung (Protracted ment as the sole instrument to ad the information. War, Guerilla War) dress insurgencies—the category Barrios Moron’s manipulation under which drug operations are of the information is obviously and Che Guevara included. slanted against the Bolivian mili This is not a “Western” doctrine. tary’s involvement in the drug war. (Guerrilla Warfare). It can be seen in the writings of This is not, however, a condemna Mao Tse-tung (Protracted War, tion of the author’s view. Given Guerilla War) and Che Guevara Bolivia’s authoritarian history, a Barrios Moron states that the (Guerrilla Warfare), even though it concern for the continuation of Bo poster “conveys an unequivocal un is not specifically labeled “psycho livian democracy against the back derstanding of the military’s self- logical warfare.” Some of the most drop of increased militarization is appointed role.” Self-appointed? prolific writers urging that social certainly valid. On page 14 he cites the US gov development be made the major Of even greater concern, ernment’s financial support and thrust in counterinsurgency opera though, is the ossification of view technical backing for the Bolivian tions are members of the military. points into two distinct camps. This army’s psychological warfare opera There is far too much literature is precisely what the author is accus tions. On page 16 he alludes to the in the field to review here, but a re ing the Bolivian military of doing, US role in the militarization effort: cent article by US Army Captain creating an either you’re “for us” “the poster asserts the Bolivian—as Michael Ligon, a special forces- or “against us” attitude by manipu opposed to US—origins of the anti qualified military intelligence offi lating information. He shows his drug campaign,” and refers to the cer, addresses this professional bias by his contradictory statements “strategic impositions of the US concern. He cites US Army Field concerning who is responsible for drug war.” In addition, on page 15, Manual 100-20, Military Operations the military’s antidrug role, his fail he cites the signing of the US- in Low-intensity Conflict, which iden ure to include the plethora of mili Bolivian bilateral drug agreement, tifies the integrated approach of tary literature that cautions against “under which President Jaime Paz political, economic, and military the exclusive use of the military in Zamora agreed to order the Boliv operations necessary for counterin such a role, and by not following ian army into the war on drugs.” surgency and counternarcotics op through with a suggested alterna How could Barrios Moron argue erations to be successful. Captain

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Ligon expresses the concern that the institution that is the most Regarding Sovereignty this coordinated approach, while likely to replace the vacuum left current in the US, is not being should the military return to a Irving Louis Horowitz’s “Shadow addressed in the overseas coun purely external defense role: the of a Nation” (Hemisphere, W inter/ ternarcotics strategy. “The weak police. Spring 1992) provides an excellent link lies in not having an economic In reality it is drug trafficking analysis of why Panama is an excep alternative to offer drug producing that is the threat to Bolivian na tional and atypical Latin American nations. ... In the war on drugs, a tional security and the consolida nation. Indeed, in many respects, it purely military approach is not the tion of their democracy. It is drug is an artificial nation. But when he answer” (“LIC, Counternarcotics trafficking that the people have ventures into policy recommenda and Small-Scale Agriculture,” Spe turned to because of their extreme tions that follow from his charac cial Warfare: The Professional Bulletin poverty and it is drug trafficking terizations, he falls into all sorts of of the fohn F. Kennedy Special Warfare that has resulted in the US “strate perceptual traps. That the Reagan Center and School, Winter 1991). gic impositions.” It now appears and Bush administrations followed Captain Ligon offers a two that the psychological warfare oper the same logic makes it no less re pronged economic strategy to ad ations of both sides have been a grettable. dress this problem. The first is a success. There is no serious talk of The Carter-Torrijos treaties at program of the Benson Institute economic and agricultural pro least held out the promise that the for Small-Scale Agriculture that al grams, nor talks to address what bitterness and enmity of US-Pana- locates a certain amount of land to institution has the strength to en manian relations could be ended, crops that provide a well-balanced force any democratically enacted that the US would withdraw grad diet while still raising the farmer’s law should the military leave the in ually from Panama, and that the average annual income. Captain ternal security arena. Failure to long-sought Panamanian control Ligon states that this program has comprehend the desperation felt over the canal would be achieved. already proved to be successful in by both sides in this escalating Although the withdrawal has been Ecuador. The second strategy is “war,” as well as the resultant lack a reluctant process, and its spirit based on a program of the Founda of negotiations, are the real threats violently devastated by the US inva tion for the Promotion and Devel to Bolivian democracy. sion of 1989, at least the timetable opment of Microenterprise that has been observed. Horowitz's view distributes low-interest loans to Sgt. Cliff Nelson of US vital interests—which he did market vendors in the “informal Metro-Dade Police Department recognize might be “real or pre sector” of La Paz, Bolivia. Miami, Florida sumed”—calls into question the Finally, Barrios Moron states whole strategic concept on which that “contributing to the military’s Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed the treaties were based. And his ar renewed sense of mission and in are those of the author alone, and not guments that certain Panamanian dispensability has been the institu necessarily those of the Metro-Dade postures cannot be tolerated by the tional breakdown of the police, Police Department. US are the thinnest kind of ration- caused by widespread drug-related corruption.” Despite his identifica tion of the role the police are play ing in the changing role of the military, no where does Barrios Moron call for the reconstitution of the police force. He is not alone Hemisphere welcomes letters to the editor. Letters must be typed double-spaced, and in this. There appears to be a great are subject to editing for clarity and length. deal of research on the military and numerous calls for a reduction Please address letters to: The Deputy Editor, Hemisphere, Latin American and Carib in the military’s role in civil affairs, bean Center, Florida International University, University Park, Miami, FL 33199; but little research and support for FAX (305) 348-3593.

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Letters to the Editor

alization for whatever blatant viola eignty, the very sovereignty that subjected to the worst sort of sub tions of Panamanian sovereignty Horowitz wants to deny to small jugation, split down its middle by a this country might carry out. Horo countries like Panama. zone where foreign law ruled, and witz is saying, in effect, we really Horowitz appears to base much corrupted by constant interference didn’t mean it when we signed of his argument on the strategic in its politics by US proconsuls. those treaties. Too bad, but we’re necessity of the Panama Canal—a That the country became a “politi big and you’re small. waterway whose strategic and eco cal shadow without state substance” We did take Panama, as Teddy nomic value has steadily declined— should be no surprise. Even a rea Roosevelt liked to boast. But surely and extends the logic to the right sonable chance at enduring politi that sort of power politics in US- of the US to fix the neutrality of cal development was precluded by Latin American relations has out Panama. That logic, perfectly con the relationship between the two lived its usefulness. Violent and sistent with the Reagan-Bush view countries. extraordinarily destructive inva of the world, is a perverse justifica “In a world of strategic consid sions of sovereign states, like the tion for an endless series of mis erations,” Horowitz argues, “those 1989 invasion of Panama, coupled chievous follies and police-like of sovereignty are at times pre with the forcible kidnapping of a interventions around the continent empted.” Indeed, they are, and head of state—legitimate or not— and the globe. If Panama is indeed therein lies the tragedy of recent set dangerous precedents that will a “shadow of a nation,” much of US foreign policy. That policy has haunt us in the future. To hold the blame for that lies on the US. been characterized by a sort of poli that US law applies anywhere and For most of Panama’s history as an tics of the bully, in which the US that we will enforce it anywhere is “independent” state, it has been flexes its muscle and applies its an outrageous extension of sover caught in the shadow of the US, military power only in safe situa tions. Grenada, Panama, Nicara gua, and Iraq are the most recent examples. Doing so does not legiti mate it, and the disregard of na tional sovereignty in favor of a Links blatant hegemonic role for this country is a two-edged sword. A HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT nation, superpower or not, that ig nores long-standing principles of international law, the Rio treaty, “Links provides the best and the UN Charter, simply cannot overview I have seen of have it both ways. When we disre critical issues affecting the gard sovereignty, we weaken the very foundation of orderly inter health of disadvantaged national relations. We cannot ar peoples. It is a must for gue for world order at the same anyone concerned with the time we are ignoring world institu tions like the International Court links between health and of Justice (as in the Nicaraguan social justice case). I fear that Horowitz’s logic is — David Werner, only a thinly veiled and weakly ar author of Where There gued rationalization and apology for foreign policies that insult Is No Doctor other states, weaken respect for international law, and do a great □ Subscription to Links. disservice to any hopes that the US might stand for something noble $ 12 for one year; $25 institutions and foreign; in the world. The people of Pana $3 for individual copies ma, and the rest of Latin America, deserve better. ^ Send your name and address along with a check to: Links, P.O. Box 202, New York NY 10276. Jack W. Hopkins School of Public and Environmental Affairs Indiana University

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 INFO-SOUTH ABSTRACTS Latin American Information System

Deborah R. Farrell, Editor University of Miami Only Info-South Abstracts regularly sear INFO-SOUTH ches worldwide for the most significant cur ABSTRACTS rent information on economic trends, political events, and social change in Latin liilin \nu-rimn Inform,Hum System America. Citations are drawn from more than 1500 journals, news magazines, news papers, and newsletters published in Latin America, Europe, the United States and elsewhere in the world. For each article, Info-South research analysts supply an ab stract written in clear and precise English. Each quarterly issue includes between 2500-3000 abstracts with full bibliographic citations. Organized primarily by country, abstracts are classified by principal subject within each country group. Covers important and hard to access publications including:

Este Semana (Costa Rica) El Espectador (Colombia) Que Pasa (Chile) Gazeta Mercantil (Brazil) A Classe Operaria (Brazil) La Prensa (Nicaragua) Busqueda(Uruguay) Presencia (Bolivia) Universal (Venezuela) Published Quarterly Published in cooperation with the Institute of Interamerican Studies/North-South Center University of Miami Subscription rates: Individuals and lnstitutions:$380/yr Domestic first-class mail add $40/yr Foreign surface mail add $40/yr Foreign airmail add $60/yr

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Hemisphere • Summer 1992 C 0 M M E

Risky Business? The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992

by Susan Kaufman Purcell

he stated purpose of This is the case regarding their rec cated in third countries and Cuba. Congressman Robert ommendation that telecommunica The Toricelli bill, however, would Toricelli’s (D-NJ) “Cuban tions between the US and Cuba be change this situation by broaden Democracy Act of 1992,” permitted, along with payments to ing the embargo. Specifically it introduced in the House Cuba for the services it provides. would prohibit ships that enter of Representatives on Feb This is also true regarding the Cuban ports to trade with Cuba ruaryT 5, 1992, is the prom otion of provision for the US president to from loading and unloading cargo “a peaceful transition to democracy provide aid through nongovern in US ports within 180 days of visit in Cuba.” It is m ore likely, how mental organizations for individu ing Cuba. In addition, it would ever, that the proposed bill will un als and groups promoting peaceful deny tax deductions to US subsidi dermine the good relations that democratic change in Cuba. New aries for otherwise deductible ex exist between the US and its demo policies proposed in the bill would penses on the portion of their cratic friends in the hemisphere allow donations of food and the ex income that is based on trade with and Europe while falling far short port of medicines to Cuba. (At pres Cuba. of its stated goal. ent, medicines can be donated, but The Toricelli bill would also The authors of the so-called not exported.) penalize countries providing assis Toricelli bill admit that “events tance to Cuba in any form, includ in the former Soviet Union and ing trade subsidies and grants, by Eastern Europe have dramatically making them ineligible for US aid, reduced Cuba’s external support The Toricelli bill inclusion in free-trade agreements and threaten Cuba’s food and oil and debt-reduction programs, or supplies.” They also acknowledge would scuttle current participation in the Enterprise for that Cuba’s economy will not “sur the Americas Initiative. This sec vive current trends.” The problem, negotiations to tion of the bill seems to be aimed as they see it, is that Fidel Castro’s at Latin America and, if imple “intransigence” makes it more establish a North mented, would seriously under likely that “there could be a col American free-trade mine current US policy toward the lapse of the Cuban economy, social region. For one thing, it would scut upheaval, or widespread suffering.” area and could tle current negotiations to establish They imply that their bill would a North American free-trade area, prevent that unhappy outcome and undermine antidrug since Mexico would refuse to let allow the Cuban people a peaceful Washington dictate the nature of transition to democratic rule, and programs in the its relationship with third coun they propose to achieve this end Andean countries. tries. For another, it could under with a combination of sanctions mine drug-eradication programs in and incentives. the Andean countries and prevent The chosen incentives are the new accords patterned on the least problematic as they include Brady Plan from being signed with some policies already in effect. The authors of the bill, however, important debtor countries like consider incentives alone insuffi Brazil and Argentina. cient to guarantee a peaceful tran The sponsors of the bill seem to sition to democracy. Among other believe that the US has more to Susan Kaufman Purcell is vice presi measures, they advocate a tight gain than to lose by offering Latin dent of the Department of Latin Ameri ening of the sanctions already in American countries a choice be can Affairs at the Americas Society in place against Cuba. The current tween going along with a tougher New York City. She is co-editor of Latin embargo only prohibits trade be US policy toward Cuba or going America: US Policy after the Cold tween the US and Cuba, not be their own way and foregoing US War (New York: Americas Society, tween third countries or even aid. They are wrong. A North 1991). subsidiaries of US companies lo American free-trade agreement,

6 Hemisphere • Summer 1992 new debt-relief plans, and US aid during the Cold War, when Cuba’s icy toward Cuba in bringing about to Latin American countries to cur alliance with the USSR posed a seri a peaceful transition to democracy. tail drug production and traffick ous strategic threat, but this is no The assumption seems to be that in ing are not examples of US charity longer the case. W ithout the USSR, creasing the pressure on Castro will or sacrifice. Instead they are poli Cuba reverts to what it was before leave him with no alternative but to cies that ultimately will benefit the Castro’s turn to both communism accept an economic and political US at least as much as Latin Amer and the Soviet Union—a relatively opening. Yet the opposite may be ica. Consequently, sanctions that the case. Castro is now internation risk destroying such programs are ally isolated; his few remaining irrational and self-defeating. friends are almost exclusively other Of course, these tougher sanc dictatorships. By penalizing coun tions would come into play only if Is it really worth itfor tries that trade with or provide aid the Latin American countries the US to risk seriously to Cuba, the US could end up caus chose to continue trading or pro ing these countries to defend and viding assistance to Castro’s Cuba. damaging its relations possibly help Cuba as a way of pun In theory they could decide to ishing the US for encroaching on change their current policies in with important allies their sovereign rights. order to avoid triggering the new in order to achieve its Changing the current policy by sanctions. The reality, however, is broadening the embargo would more complicated. Latin America policy goals in Cuba ? also distract world attention from does not like to be told what to do what Castro is doing to his own peo by Washington. It is very sensitive The answer might ple and focus it instead on what to US threats to its sovereignty, for the US is doing to Cuba. In addi well-known historical reasons. The have been “yes ” tion, it would undermine the end of the Cold War has produced during the Cold War, broad consensus that exists within a welcome improvement in US- the US regarding Cuba, and US Latin American relations and the but no longer is it so. policy toward Cuba, in ways that reduction of anti-US sentiments, would be reminiscent of the un but nothing could better guarantee happy conflict over Central Ameri a resurgence of the old distrust and can policy that dominated the animosity than an effort by Wash 1980s. It is difficult to see how ei ington to force Latin America to poor island country with ten mil ther development would advance adopt its Cuba policy. lion people. It is therefore difficult US interests in Cuba. O ther areas of the world less to argue that a policy of accelerat The best US policy toward dependent on US aid than Latin ing the collapse of an already col Cuba is the current US policy. It America would be affected by the lapsing Cuban economy, or even of has broad support within the US, is proposed bill less directly. Canada, ensuring a peaceful transition from already accepted by most of our Western Europe, and Japan, how dictatorship to democracy in Cuba, democratic friends abroad, and it ever, all trade or have financial rela justifies undermining US relations is contributing to the collapse of tions with Cuba and would not take with important friendly democra Cuban communism. Admittedly it kindly to a law prohibiting their ves cies that wish to pursue different does not guarantee a peaceful dem sels that docked in Cuban ports policies toward Cuba. ocratic transition in Cuba, but nei from loading or unloading cargo Moreover, it is unclear how a ther does the proposed “Cuban in US ports for 180 days. policy that would accelerate the Democracy Act of 1992.” ■ Is it really worth it for the US to economic collapse of Cuba, while risk seriously damaging its relations simultaneously offering possibili with important allies in order to ties for increased US-Cuban com Editor’s Note: Testimony presented to achieve its policy goals in Cuba? munication, would be any more the House Committee on Foreign Af The answer might have been “yes” successful than the current US pol fairs, March 25, 1992.

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Commentary

Stopping Airborne Drug Traffickers

by Richard J. Baum

t is time the US escalated the agencies are authorized to fight thousand sorties to destroy the war against drugs by giving drugs as they would any grave na Latin American cocaine cartels. federal drug-interdiction agen tional security threat: by employing Still, there is no reason why US cies the authority to shoot all necessary force to protect US air-interdiction agencies cannot be down drug-trafficking planes. lives. The Persian Gulf War, rather instructed to adjust their rules of Nothing short of direct force is than the current battle against engagement to include the pru sufficient to deter the pilots who drug trafficking, much more accu dent application of force against routinelyI shuttle their deadly cargo rately reflects what US citizens envi airborne drug traffickers. The rules of processed cocaine between the sion as a true war. During the Gulf of engagement can, and should, be eastern coast of South America and War the US armed forces devel altered. the Caribbean. The US govern oped the plans and deployed the Every conflict has its rules of ment already possesses the trained resources necessary to fulfill the engagement. Even in the Persian personnel and equipment to allow mission outlined by President Gulf War—a seemingly all-out ef such force to be used without seri George Bush and his staff. It then fort—US forces were instructed to ous risk to the innocent. It may not implemented those plans until the attack only what were classified as be long before Congress realizes mission’s objectives were met. military targets in order to mini that appropriating billions of dol Compared with the Iraqi army, mize civilian casualties. The use of lars a year for drug interdiction is the enemy in the struggle against force is a continuum, the level em meaningless if US agencies do not drugs is an evasive target indeed. ployed being dependent on politi have the authority to use force. Major cocaine traffickers are not cal and military objectives as well as Surely it would be preferable to limited to national territories or to the capabilities of the enemy. In employ nonviolent means to cap particular bases of operation. They the case of fighting airborne drug ture, try, convict, and incarcerate are dispersed throughout the An traffickers, it is imperative the airborne drug traffickers. These dean region in countries that do continuum be shifted towards days, however, US law enforcement not possess the capabilities to elim greater use of force because the agencies never capture a traffick inate them, even if, as in the case current level has proved to be in ing pilot. Trafficker tactics, com of Colombia, they have the will to sufficient. bined with the legal constraints fight them aggressively. The “sol The network of planes and pi within which US agencies work, diers” of drug organizations are lots controlled by a drug cartel is have made trafficking pilots the not easily identifiable. The most im perhaps its greatest vulnerability. untouchables of the drug trade. portant personnel in the cartels are The entire drug-cartel enterprise is Only by altering its approach and more likely to be “business peo heavily dependent on air transpor encouraging our hemispheric allies ple”—bankers and lawyers toting tation. In the coca-growing regions to do the same can the US govern brief cases—than uniformed sol of Peru and Bolivia, traffickers fly ment combat the threat posed to diers carrying machine guns. in the critical chemicals and sup its citizens. Thus US forces cannot enter plies used in coca processing and foreign nations to capture and kill then fly out the cocaine paste or War against Drugs the soldiers of the drug cartels. Yet, base to processing sites. Once the when a plane load of the cartel’s cocaine is fully processed, most of The phrase “war against drugs” is deadly product enters interna it is flown out of the Andes, occa misleading. It suggests that US tional airspace destined for the US, sionally to US territorial waters, or, the question becomes altogether more commonly, to the Caribbean, different. northern Guatemala, or southern Richard J. Baum is a Republican staff The US does not have to con Mexico for transport across the member of the House Select Committee tinue its struggle with international US-Mexico border. Though a sig on Narcotics Abuse and Control. The drug traffickers in a manner that nificant amount of cocaine is trans views expressed in the article are his makes the struggle impossible to ported on cargo ships, traffickers alone, and not those of the House Select win. Obviously the US government much prefer the speed and control Committee. cannot send its air force on a few provided by air transport.

Hemisphere . Summer 1992 A Shoot-Down Policy another safety measure, it could be and on the ground, and targets required that the drugs be recov would be chosen only if intelli If the US government initiates a ered and tested by US personnel gence reports had suggested when “shoot-down” policy against traf positioned on land or sea, who and where the drugs were to be ficking planes in international air would quickly communicate the re dropped. space, then other governments will sults to the US plane. Finally, con Perhaps US antidrug forces likely take similar action within tinual efforts to communicate with would not shoot down a plane their own borders. Strategically key the trafficking plane, in order to every day, but even a handful of governments, such as those of convince the pilot to land, would “examples” would serve as a potent Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, have also have to be required. Traffick deterrent. Moreover, costs to traf already shown interest in, as well as ing pilots who wanted to avoid fickers would rise as pilots de limited capability of, forcing down being shot down would turn them manded escalating fees. If enough or shooting down trafficking air selves in and face charges in the planes were shot down, it could craft. With the US government US. Such pilots would serve as ex even become difficult for traffick leading by example while provid cellent sources for US intelligence. ers to find pilots with the appropri ing technical and intelligence assis Implementing such safeguards, ate training and lack of regard for tance to other governments and especially that of testing the sus personal safety to transport their air-interdiction agencies, drug- pected cargo, would be time drugs. And if the Andean and Mexi- rients were to join such p balance of power in : would substantially ots aimed at airborne ers would be heard ivorld, sending the ;very trafficker that Hemisphere fist drugs had truly l LATINA?

A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS

Provoking debate on the region’s problems, initiatives and achievements . . .

Providing an intellectual bridge between the concerned publics of North America, Latin America and the Caribbean. lN Hemisphere ■ ■ ■ ■ JDIES A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS Jables, FL 33124

Provoking debate on the region’s problems, initiatives and achievements . . .

Providing an intellectual bridge between the concerned publics Hemisphere • Summer 1992 of North America, Latin America and the Caribbean. Commentary

Stopping Airborne Drug Traffickers

by Richard J. Baum

Mail this form with payment to: Hemisphere, Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International Hemisphere • Summer 1992 University, Miami, FL 33199. Or call (305) 348-2894 or fax (305) 348-3593 and charge it to your credit card. A Shoot-Down Policy another safety measure, it could be and on the ground, and targets required that the drugs be recov would be chosen only if intelli If the US government initiates a ered and tested by US personnel gence reports had suggested when “shoot-down” policy against traf positioned on land or sea, who and where the drugs were to be ficking planes in international air would quickly communicate the re dropped. space, then other governments will sults to the US plane. Finally, con Perhaps US antidrug forces likely take similar action within tinual efforts to communicate with would not shoot down a plane their own borders. Strategically key the trafficking plane, in order to every day, but even a handful of governments, such as those of convince the pilot to land, would “examples” would serve as a potent Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, have also have to be required. Traffick deterrent. Moreover, costs to traf already shown interest in, as well as ing pilots who wanted to avoid fickers would rise as pilots de limited capability of, forcing down being shot down would turn them manded escalating fees. If enough or shooting down trafficking air selves in and face charges in the planes were shot down, it could craft. With the US government US. Such pilots would serve as ex even become difficult for traffick leading by example while provid cellent sources for US intelligence. ers to find pilots with the appropri ing technical and intelligence assis Implementing such safeguards, ate training and lack of regard for tance to other governments and especially that of testing the sus personal safety to transport their air-interdiction agencies, drug- pected cargo, would be time drugs. And if the Andean and Mexi trafficking organizations would be consuming. Nonetheless, if shoot- can governments were to join such substantially weakened. Such an air- down authority were granted, the an effort, the balance of power in interdiction strategy may represent US government would alter its in the drug war would substantially the US government’s best chance terdiction operations. Instead of shift. The shots aimed at airborne of cutting the flow of cocaine to its dispersing resources in an effort to drug traffickers would be heard national shores. patrol an entire area where traf around the world, sending the Of course, the most important fickers might be, it would focus on message to every trafficker that drawback of using force against single trafficking planes. Multiple the war against drugs had truly airborne drug traffickers is the assets would be deployed in the air commenced. ■ chance of making a mistake—of shooting down and possibly killing individuals who are not involved in drug trade. Though a degree of iQUE PASA EN AMERICA LATINA? risk is inevitable, it must be remem bered that such risk is always in volved in serious operations of law enforcement and national security. Let the Most certainly the risk must be min imized. Hence, if US agencies do JOURNAL OF receive shoot-down authority, they must be allowed to operate only INTERAMERICAN within narrow confines that mini mize the use of force to the most STUDIES appropriate circumstances. AND WORLD AFFAIRS Sorting the good guys from the bad guys can be difficult for air- interdiction agencies because drug Keep you traffickers are able to mix in with informed hundreds of other small aircraft on legitimate flights. Fortunately traf fickers give themselves away when they drop drugs from the hold of their planes, since they generally do not land during delivery opera tions. Considering US surveillance A GLOBAL UNIVERSITY and intelligence capabilities, it would not be difficult to require that, prior to the use of force, the INSTITUTE OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES drug drop be witnessed by an air The North-South Center • P.O. Box 248134 • Coral Gables, FL 33124 borne law-enforcement officer. As

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 REP Costa Rica’s Export Strategy

by Maty A. Clark

osta Rica is widely re ties—the Caribbean Basin Initiative Sustainability garded as the success (CBI), the globalization of produc story of the Caribbean tion, and plenty of foreign aid to In spite of Costa Rica’s short-term Basin, rebounding as it smooth the transition. success, several problems call into did from economic crisis question the sustainability of its in the early 1980s to its nontraditional export strategy. Per current position as a regional haps the most serious and imme leader in export-led growth strat diate problem is the sheer cost of egies. The country fought its way In spite of Costa Rica’s promoting nontraditional exports. back from rock-bottom statistics in The expense exacts a heavy toll on 1982: a debt-service ratio of more short-term success, both the fiscal budget and the bal than 50%, nearly 100% inflation, ance of trade. The most pressing and a 40% drop in real wages, not several problems call issue involves the main fiscal in to mention a three-year record of into question the centive to nontraditional export sinking per capita GDP. To make ers: an export-tax credit known as matters worse, Costa Rica de sustainability of its the Certificado de Abono Tributario faulted on its foreign debt in (CAT). CATs were originally 1981—months before Mexico did nontraditional export awarded to firms exporting non so—and eventually accumulated traditional commodities regardless one of the world’s highest per cap strategy. of the company’s nationality, size, ita external debts. For the first time geographic location, or product since 1949, there was serious con line, with the provision that the ex cern about the possibility of social ports must contain a minimum of unrest threatening the regime. 35% national value-added. The tax- Changes in the world economy Costa Rica’s recovery since the credit certificate equals up to 20% and regional geopolitics had early 1980s has indeed been impres of the FOB value of a firm’s non abruptly closed off some develop sive: the country remains politically traditional exports and is negotia ment options and presented oth stable and, while the distribution of ble on the Costa Rican stock ers. The old model—based on income may have become more un exchange. import substitution and externally equal and the external debt con In the late 1980s the CAT pro financed state investment—ran out tinues to menace, indicators of gram came under fire from both of steam. In this setting the Costa economic growth, inflation, em within the administration of Oscar Rican government fell under in ployment, and real wages have im Arias and from the World Bank for tense domestic and foreign pres proved significantly. Perhaps most draining the public-sector budget. sure to adopt a new strategy, based impressive of all, the country’s non CAT expenditures were 19 times on deregulating the economy and traditional exports have boomed, greater in 1989 than they were in reorienting production toward mar well-balanced as they are between 1984, and by 1990 they were ex kets outside of Central America. agricultural products, seafood, and pected to account for 8% of the This new strategy promised Costa light manufactures. Clothing assem central government’s budget. Rica the benefits of new opportuni- bly, flowers and ornam ental plants, Given substantial fiscal deficits, fresh and frozen fish and shrimp, documented cases of corruption in and fresh pineapple lead these new the CAT system, and evidence that Mary A. Clark is a doctoral candidate export industries. a few large companies benefited in political science at the University of Can the spectacular export disproportionately from the pro Wisconsin at Madison. She is co-author growth of the 1980s provide a sta gram, CATs are being gradually re of “Non-Traditional Agricultural Ex ble basis for a new development duced. Investors warn, however, ports in Latin America: A Reapprais model? How do nontraditional ex that reducing CATs makes export al, ” Latin American Research ports contribute to national devel ing less attractive, especially for do Review (Spring 1992). opment needs? mestic firms, and they predict a

10 Hemisphere • Summer 1992 consequent serious downturn in perform essentially the same func based on macroeconomic policies, the growth of nontraditional ex tions as those performed by Costa principally currency devaluation ports. Rican government agencies. and market deregulation, that have Another problem linked to ris been orchestrated by the US gov ing exports is that of rising im ernment, the International Mone NONTRADITIONAL EXPORTS tary Fund, and the World Bank. In ports. Many of Costa Rica’s OUTSIDE OF CENTRAL AMERICA nontraditional exports are light the context of intensifying world manufactures—apparel being the wide competition for, and spatial prime example—that are assem 600 relocation of, nontraditional ex bled and exported by foreign firms port firms—including the forma tion of regional trade blocs—does enjoying the tax-free entry of input 500 materials. By subsidizing these im Costa Rica’s current success in ports to the previously mentioned attracting such investment from 400 extent, the Costa Rican govern abroad promise to foster local de ment is promoting budget deficits velopment? by not taking advantage of this po 300 Although agriculture and sea tential source of tax revenue. More food are steady contributors to over, it is perpetuating some of the 200 nontraditional exports, the most basic problems that neoliberals dramatic growth has occurred in light manufacturing and, more re have stressed in their critiques of 100 the nation’s long-standing policy of cently, tourism, the focal points of import-substitution development: CINDE’s efforts. Most of the em local dependence on foreign sup 1985 1990 ployment created by these in plies, trade deficits, and inflation. Source: Centro de Promocidn de dustries is low wage and low skill. Exportaciones e Inversiones (CENPRO) In the case of nontraditional ex According to proponents, however, port firms, dependence on foreign such employment benefits Costa supplies ranges from office sup For instance, AID founded the Rica because it increases family plies to pre-cut fabric and ma Coalition Costarricense de Iniciativas income by absorbing “supplemen chinery. para elDesarrollo (CINDE) in 1982 tary” earners—primarily women— Aside from the debate about the to pursue the same objectives as in the case of the urban-based economic costs of export promo the Costa Rican government’s garment industry, or provides jobs tion, considerable political contro Centro de Promotion de Exportationes to regional pockets of high unem versy surrounds the questions of e Inversiones (CENPRO). After years ployment, as tourism does. who should direct export-promo- of turf battles, the better-financed Whatever the role of such em tion efforts and how the new strat CINDE now carries out most of the ployment may be in local labor egy should be implanted into the functions that were performed by markets and household econo country’s institutional structure. CENPRO. Unlike CENPRO, how mies, there remains a larger, un Several Costa Rican officials feel ever, CINDE is neither part of the answered question: toward what that external involvement in non Costa Rican government nor ac pattern of national development traditional export promotion has countable to the Costa Rican pub do these jobs contribute? Thus, will cost the country its sovereignty. For lic. It appears that CINDE has been Costa Rica progress from offering example, in 1988 an advisor to the more successful in attracting for itself as a light-assembly export Arias government accused the US eign export-oriented investment to platform to building relatively so of setting up a “parallel state” in Costa Rica than CENPRO ever was. phisticated, vertically integrated Costa Rica consisting of several Given the superiority of its AID- domestic industries? O r will it con nongovernment agencies funded backed funding, technical exper tinue to compete with other less- by the US Agency for International tise, and determination, CINDE developed countries for foreign Development (AID). These AID- has embarrassed CENPRO’s de investors seeking low-cost produc funded, nongovernment agencies fenders. But CINDE’s success is tion sites with privileged access to

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Reports: Trade and Ecology

NONTRADITIONAL EXPORTS tional agricultural export indus AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORT EARNINGS tries is purchased from national growers, small-farmer participation in the new export promotion scheme is quite limited. Where 1984 1990 it does exist, small farmers are plagued by problems such as plant diseases, poor technical assistance, lack of knowledge of market con ditions, inadequate credit, and a weak bargaining position with exporters. Large and small growers make intensive use of pesticides in culti vating the new export crops be cause achieving the flawless appearance crucial to their suc cessful marketing creates extra headaches in tropical climates. Yet the excessive use of pesticides Source: CENPRO threatens the sustainability of ex port promotion in two ways. First, evidence indicates that large amounts of pesticide residue left on produce jeopardize entry into ^POSITION OF NONTRADITIONAL EXPORTS, 1 the US, the principal market for nontraditional agricultural prod ucts. To make matters worse, esca lating cycles of increasing pest resistance and stepped-up pesticide

Fresh Pineapple 3 8.4 application may reach the point in the near future where production must be abandoned altogether. Fresh and Frozen Fish and Shrimp 4 4.8 The fact that the Dominican Re public reached this point with sev eral nontraditional crops by the Flowers, Ornamental late 1980s should serve as a warn Plants, and Foliage ing for Central America. Second, fragmentary evidence Textiles Non-drawback 58.8 indicates frightening consequences for human populations and the nat ural environment. Growers from Textiles Drawback (Maquila) 180.9 Costa Rica and other Central Amer ican countries report symptoms of pesticide illness as well as bird and Source: CENPRO and ECONOFIN {San Jos6) fish kills stemming from contami nated fresh water sources. They also report the destruction of for the US market? The specter of a ally contribute more value-added est areas as a result of the opening possible North American free-trade to the local economy. The leading of new export-production sites. agreement, which could undercut firms in the nontraditional agricul There is no telling what the longer- Costa Rica’s current attractiveness tural sector, however, are foreign, term impact may be on animal pop to foreign investors, makes the ex- not domestic. Superior access to ulations, soil, and ground water. port-platform option increasingly market information, transporta risky. tion, technological expertise, and Compared with tourism and credit favor relatively large foreign Challenges light manufacturing, nontradi firms. Since only a small portion of A few years of spectacular export tional agricultural exports gener production in the leading nontradi figures are not worth the long-

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 range degradation of Costa Rica’s natural resources. With a decade of experience, critics and proponents alike recognize the pitfalls of the Latin American current scheme of nontraditional export promotion. The time is ripe Labor News to push the new export model to Sponsored by the Center for Labor Research and Studies and the ward more equitable and sustain Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida International University able development. Costa Rica may find greater sta bility by intensifying the current movement toward trade diversifica tion, in terms of both finding new markets for nontraditional exports John D. French, Editor and renewing efforts to establish re The only publication exclusively dedicated to: gional trade agreements. Export in centives should be reduced and News on Latin American trade unions used selectively to target the types of industries and jobs that offer and their struggles Costa Rica higher wages, more sta ble employment, and technological News on Inter-American labor solidarity transfers. Lastly, environmental protection is crucial not only if The latest research high-value agricultural products are to become permanent export about labor, workers, and women commodities, but also for the health of growers and the con News on labor studies organizations and projects servation of flora and fauna. Such policy reform requires two things: increased government ad ministrative capacity and a political □ Please enter my subscription (two issues) for US $15.00 (US $30.00 institutional). coalition demanding and support Back issues US $7.50 individual / $15.00 institutional. ing such changes. Improved mana □ Please send me gerial capacity is compatible with a ___ sets of the English and Non-English bibliographies of recent books and articles on smaller but more efficient state. In Latin American labor at US $6.00. an age of austerity, the problem copy(ies) of "Labor Studies in Brazil," by Sonia de Avelar (Occasional Paper #1), at will be locating the resources to US$1.00 each. train and pay more sophisticated __ copy(ies) of "Recent Studies on Organized Labor and the Working Class," by Hobart state administrators. The second re A. Spalding (Occasional Paper #2), at US$2.50 each. quirement is that political parties, ___ copy(ies) of "Colombia Balance Huelgmstico de 1990," by Alvaro Delgado above all, the Partido Liberation (Occasional Paper #3), at US 2.50 each. National, pull away from their cur ___ copv(ies) of Robert Alexander: The Complete Bibliography of a Pioneering Latin rent preoccupation with the de mands of exporters, the financial Americanist at US $12.00. sector, and the international bank Please make check payable to "Florida International University." ing and aid community to incor porate peasants and the urban working and middle classes into political coalitions unified by a Address broad vision of sustainable devel opment. Any support for such coalitions faces the formidable obstacles posed by the fragility of Mail this form with your payment to: Latin American Labor Studies Publications Costa Rica’s economic situation Center for Labor Research and Studies and its need for major injections Florida International University University Park-W MO TR #2 of capital from foreign investors Miami, Florida 33199 and international financial institu tions. ■

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Reports: Trade and Ecology

GATT: The Right to Life Forms

by Paula L. Green

ome of the world’s biggest ties along with the knowledge re A perfect illustration of Third companies are waging a quired to use them. As if that were World fears is the case of US pat little-publicized, high not enough, these nations con ent No. 559. This patent gives its stakes war over the patent tend, the multinationals later re holder all rights to a rare variety of rights to plants, animals, turn the supposedly pilfered goods flower found in the distant rain for and other life forms. Ac to the developing countries—pre ests of Guatemala. A US citizen ob cording to the experts, the contest viously patented and now sporting tained the patent in the 1940s after could ultimately yield billions of a huge price tag. Walter Reid, se stumbling across the unique strain dollars in royalties for patent hold nior associate at the World Re while vacationing there. According ers from the sale of new medicines, sources Institute in Washington, to Mooney, “He selected the best crop varieties, or even breeds of DC, summed up the conflict this of the seeds, destroyed the rest and animals developed from the initial way: “The developing countries say took out a patent on the variety,” patents. The companies, and their the North is patenting genes devel which is now known as “Black huge product development budg oped by farmers in the South . . . , Prince.” ets, are pitted against developing and then the patented crop varie The current Uruguay Round of nations that claim that the corpora ties are being sold back to the GATT talks is the first to address tions are stealing their natural re the protection of intellectual prop sources to fuel the development erty. Such property includes pat process. ents and trademarks as well as Backed by their governments, Developing nations copyrights on everything from multinationals like Monsanto are computer software to films to video pressing their case in Geneva, accuse the recorders. With the general nego where the 103 signatories to the multinationals of tiations bogged down in a bitter General Agreement on Tariffs and controversy over agricultural sub Trade (GATT) have been strug stealing Third World sidies, no one interviewed for this gling for more than five years to report was willing to predict the write new rules for world trade in plants and crop final result of the associated Ge goods and services. According to neva talks on the protection of in Monsanto’s William Duffey— varieties along with tellectual property. “The outcome general patent counsel for the St. the knowledge of the talks depends on what hap Louis-based chemical giant—pat pens on other areas of negotia ents are “needed to give incentives required to use them. tions,” said Abdulgawi Yusuf, legal to researchers to take risks . . . , to policy director for the UN Con try and develop pharmaceuticals ference on Trade and Develop and agro-chemicals. If there’s no ment (UNCTAD). “The issue of patent protection for discovery, farmers in the South. They (West patents will be the last issue to be companies like ours are not going ern companies) are getting the decided. It requires political deci to invest that kind of money for genes free of charge and selling sions.” new medicines and new agro the patented products back to the The rifts at the GATT negotiat chemicals.” farmer. . . . That’s the political de ing table extend beyond the tradi Confronting them, however, bate.” According to agro-economist tional North-South divisions. While are the developing nations that ac Pat Mooney, policy coordinator for the US and Japan advocate patent cuse the multinationals of stealing Canada’s Rural Advancement Foun ing all life forms, up to but not in Third World plants and crop varie- dation International, “The fear is cluding humans, the EC takes a that those who have the knowledge more pragmatic view. Karl Falken- and legal means will canvass and berg, a counselor in the EC delega Paula L. Green is a reporter covering ransack the forests of the Third tion to GATT, said the community international trade and business for the World and claim rights to whatever has no stated negotiating position Journal of Commerce. they see.” on the issue but will “wait to see

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 what’s in it for us.” Mooney ob mercial use, the original invest getting the company to do it right,” served that the EC delegation has ment would never be recovered.” said Jason Clay, director of re resisted the patenting of any life He concluded by stating that the search for Cultural Survival, which forms above the level of a plant. UK parent company—which he is based in Cambridge, Massachu Some Western corporations in says is not involved in animal re setts. “I’m suspicious of conven sist that “inventions” based on life search—favors the patenting of life tions and treaties.” forms such as microorganisms forms up to the level of plants. According to Abdulgawi Yusuf need patent protection because Many nations, however, want to of the aforementioned UNCTAD, their reproduction is tougher to exclude the patenting of life forms developing nations should be work control. London-based Imperial from the negotiations simply be ing to protect intellectual property Chemical Industries PLC, through cause the information is so new. rights to their plants, animals, and its ICI seed division, takes that posi “The implications of the technolog genetic resources before the sub tion. According to Tim Roberts, ical advances are too uncertain. We stances are taken out of the coun who is intellectual property man want to see how the new biotech tries by Western companies and ager for ICI, an industrial inven nology may evolve,” said Antonio government agencies. "Many times, tion must be designed and built Trombetta, Argentina’s negotiator one hand doesn’t know what the before it can be reproduced, but a on intellectual property rights. “It’s other is doing. The awareness has living organism can reproduce it too early a stage to have an interna not really reached the policymak self once it is released. He stressed tional agreement. It would be diffi ing stage. The only thing (devel that companies need protection cult to change.” oping nations) can do for now is for costly biotechnological develop Cultural Survival, a human- resist as much as they can the pat ments that could improve the en rights organization for indigenous enting of genetic resources.” ■ vironment—developments like people, does not believe interna microorganisms that can clean up tional trade talks and treaties are hazardous wastes or a new type of the best ways to preserve either the potato plant that produces twice, life forms or the knowledge of de Editor’s Note: Adapted with permission the norm al yield. As Roberts put it, veloping nations and their native from //^'Journal of Commerce (De “Unless there’s protection for com communities. “My attention is on cember 16, 1991). RIENNER

Woodrow Wilson Center Conflict and Competition Current Studies on Latin America The Latin American Church in a Changing Environment __ • Is There a Transition to edited by EDWARD L. CLEARY and Democracy in El Salvador? HANNAH STEWART-GAMBINO DEMOCRACY edited by Joseph S. Tulchin with Gary Bland 1992 •hc/$32-pb/$ 16.95 1991 • pb/$9.95 NATIONAL SECURITY • Cuba and the United States Democracy vs. Will the Cold War in the Caribbean End? National Security edited by Joseph S. Tulchin and Rafael Hernandez Civil-Military Relations in 1991 • pb/$9.95 Latin America • Economic Development and Environmental PAUL W. ZAGORSKI Protection in Latin America 1991 • hc/$35.00 • pb/$l6.95 edited by Joseph S. Tulchin with Andrew I. Rudman “A wealth of solid information. . . . informs rather than Japan and Latin America in preaches.”— Times o f the Americas • 1991 • pb/$9.95 the New Global Order • From Dictatorship to Democracy edited by SUSAN KA UFMAN PURCELL and Rebuilding Political Consensus in Chile ROBERT M. 1MMERMAN edited by Joseph S. Tulchin and Augusto Varas 1992 • pb/$9.95 1991 • pb/$9.95 An Americas Society Publication Lynne Rienner Publishers 1800 30th Street • Boulder, Colorado 80301 • (303) 444-6684

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Reports: Music

Bachata: From Raw to Rosy by Deborah Pacini Hernandez

ith m ore than 3.5 million albums sold and six hit singles since its 1990 re lease, Bachata Rosa, by the Dominican Republic’s Juan Luis Guerra and 4.40, is the most commercially successful recording in the recent history of Latin American music. In 1992, when major US rock perform ers had to cancel dates or reduce prices because of faltering ticket sales, 4.40 commanded $35 a ticket in solidly booked appearances throughout their US tour. Given that the venues were in the US, such success was a first for a Latin American band, but not the last for 4.40. After skyrocketing onto the Billboard charts, their popularity Backyard Bachata was noted by the likes of the New York Times, Rolling Stone, the Village not until the 1970s that the term Voice, and even the Wall Street Jour available to these self-taught rural bachata came to include guitar- musicians. nal, but despite the volume of ac based music. Only then did it join The post-Trujillo era witnessed claim, very little attention has been the ranks of Dominican and other paid to the history and nature of profound demographic and social Hispanic-Caribbean genres such as changes. When Trujillo died in the bachata genre that inspired sev bolero, son, guaracha, guajira, corrido, eral of the songs in Bachata Rosa. 1961, 70% of the Dominican Re and ranchera. public’s 3 million people lived in While guitar-based ensembles rural areas. With the fall of the die Origins had long been the preferred music tatorship, rural migrants began to in the Dominican Republic’s rural The Diccionario de la Lengua Es- pour into the capital city of Santo areas, beginning in the 1930s the Domingo, and they took their panola defines “bachata'’ as a spon accordion-based merengue was sin taneous and informal backyard preference for guitar-based music gled out and favored by the dic with them. Though Santo Domin get-together. In rural areas of the tator Rafael Trujillo, who in the go was soon ringed by shantytowns Dominican Republic, bachatas in 1940s and 1950s personally began clude plenty of food and drink and filled with the unemployed and to encourage—by patronizing top- desperately poor, guitar-based are enlivened by either guitar or notch orquestas (or big bands)— accordion-based music, but it was music—so closely associated with new, sophisticated versions of the the rural and urban poor—was un rural merengue that were meant for able to challenge merengue's hege the urban salon. Compared to mony. Nevertheless, opportunities Deborah Pacini Hernandez is assistant these large cosmopolitan ensem did open up for guitar music, if director of the Center for Latin Ameri bles, rural guitar trios appeared only on a small scale. Small, inde can Studies at the University of Florida. rustic and provincial. Thus, while pendent recording studios and Her publications include “Cantando la guitar-based music continued to be producers provided new opportu cama vacia: Love, Sex and Gender Re played by folk musicians at bachatas nities for poor and inexperienced lationships in Dominican bachata, ” and other social gatherings, few if Dominican musicians to record, Popular Music (1990). any recording opportunities were while, at the same time, small local

Hemisphere ■ Summer 1992 radio stadons catered to a widen that acquired the negative conno ing variety of tastes. Rural musi while neighborhood barras, or bars, tation of rural backwardness and were sometimes associated with cians who were unable to record or vulgarity. Bachata was shunned by prostitution, they were the only promote their music during the major radio stations in urban areas, public spaces available to residents Trujillo era began to finance their and record stores in urban, middle- of poor neighborhoods for music, own records and to seek radio play class areas refused to sell it. dancing, and drinking. The music wherever they could find it. The most often played at barras and col- first to do so were Jose Manuel mados was bachata, which, unlike Calderon, Luis Segura, and Oscar the other popular genres, was sel Olmos. Their ensembles, whose in “I have a little car dom if ever heard on major radio strumentation has changed little to or television stations. this day, consisted of two guitars, that’s a delight bongos, and maracas. If I’m with a woman These early pressings were Raw Bachata poorly recorded, produced, and it goes faster By 1980 bachata reflected the na m anufactured. Still, they found im tion’s worsening economic condi mediate acceptance in the country I keep my car in the tion. Extended romantic courtship side and urban shantytowns, where carport and a lifetime of marriage were no people with rural origins contin longer valid ideals in these urban ued to prefer guitar-based music. But I take it out for my shantytowns, where unions tended Most of the music produced was of to be short-lived and dictated by the bolero genre, although other gui- female neighbor money. The lyrics of bachata cor tar-based genres were recorded as respondingly became more sexu well. The romantic song texts, com Come here, neighbor, ally explicit, reflecting the crude posed by people with little if any and don’t be afraid shantytown realities of barroom formal education, were usually brawls, lack of money to provide written in a rather rustic and un I ’m going to take the for a stable relationship, and tran adorned style, little resembling the sient affairs. Where boleros had ex florid Cuban boleros that they were car out to give you pressed exalted feelings of eternal imitating. love, bachata lyrics more frequently The decade of the 1960s, then, a ride” expressed simply the desire for im was the formative period for the mediate sexual gratification. Mean bachata, when its distinctive fea — Excerpted from “ElCarrito” while, tourists, visiting Dominican tures were established: the basic by Tony Santos (1985) expatriates, and highly sophis guitar-centered ensemble with its ticated Dominican TV with its unpolished singing style, collo seven color stations and US satel quial language and imagery, and a While bachata was denied access lite broadcasts, flaunted a lifestyle preoccupation with relationships to promotion and distribution that was unattainable to the poor. between men and women. This through the channels available to In the 1980s a variant of the sex guitar-based music—so clearly other forms of popular music, its ually explicit song, the dobk sentido grounded in the customs and popularity among the rural and (double meaning), was popular problems of the poor—became urban poor expanded throughout ized by a younger generation of the object of increasing criticism the 1970s. Sold in markets and bus singers such as Tony Santos, Julio and disparagement. Bachata was stops all over the country, the 45- Angel, “El Solterito del Sur,” and Bias unfavorably compared with salsa, rpm disks filled the shelves in Duran. In these songs, objects of orquesta merengue, and balada, as makeshift street stalls owned and daily life—vehicles, food, utensils— well as US rock, which together operated by people belonging to became metaphors for body parts dominated the mainstream Do the same low socioeconomic class and functions. The verbal play, minican music scene. as bachata musicians and their au relying on the contrast between During the 1970s, as the Domin dience. Nonetheless, the major mundane objects and explicit sex ican Republic’s economic and so means of dissemination was, and uality, was considered extremely hu cial fortunes seemed to be on the still is, the colmado, or neighbor morous by the bachata audience; it rise, the middle and upper classes hood store, whose owners main was shocking, however, to main regarded the rustic guitar-based tained their record collections stream Dominican society and be music as incompatible with the up-to-date in order to please the came the target of severe criticism. country’s newly acquired modern customers and to encourage them The term "bachata," which in the self-image. For the first time the to linger, socialize, and, of course, previous decade simply implied music was labeled “bachata,” a word buy more beverages. Moreover, rural backwardness and ignorance,

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Reports: Music

came to suggest another set of so Romantic bachatas continued to a fundamental difference between cially unacceptable features that be produced, though most of these the stark simplicity of street bachata were attributed to the “underclass,” songs expressed a specific subset of and Guerra’s elegant, sophisticated including illicit sex, violence, and emotions related to love, such as version. The latter can be catego heavy drinking. despair, indignation, and the suf rized as bachatas only because they To their credit, the musicians fering caused by deception and be are rendered with the typical ba who still played the more romantic trayal. Trouble was almost always chata instrumentation of guitar, variety of bachata resisted these dis attributed to an unfaithful woman, maracas, and bongos, and are sung paraging associations. Around but one can discern that these in an emotional, plaintive manner. 1982 they began publicizing per songs also implicitly expressed the In the case of “Burbujas de amor,” formances as fiestas de amargue (bit breakdown of traditional family the similarity extends to the use of terness). The music became musica structure, frustration at lack of life sexual double meaning in the lyr de amargue. a reference to the feel choices, and an increased percep ics. The crude shantytown reali ing of nostalgia and suffering that tion of drinking and violence as ties—so clearly reflected in the characterized their music. This was valid responses to these personal grassroots bachata—are absent. a deliberate attempt to confer so and social crises. Bachata, unlike Guerra is not alone, however, in cial prestige upon the musician the sophisticated, internationally drawing upon bachata for artistic in and the audience by distinguishing successful merengue, did not reflect spiration. In fact, the “dressed up” the merely embittered songs from a glitzy middle-class lifestyle unat bachatas that have emerged in the the “vulgar” ones, thereby associ tainable to the bachata audience. wake of Guerra’s success are re ating the more romantic variety ferred to in the Dominican Re with social respectability. For ex public as tecnobachatas. Because ample, one newspaper reporter as Bachateros adapted they have transformed it into serted, "Amargue denotes sorrow something exotic and palatable and sadness, bachata carousing and the stereotype and for the middle-class audiences that vulgarity” (Hoy, August 25, 1983). scorned it, these musicians might It is hard to say whether it was flaunted it with be criticized for exploiting the ba the new name, the appeal of the total disregardfor chata. Still, in G uerra’s case at least, sexually explicit lyrics, or other he has drawn upon the genre in socioeconomic factors that were the disapproval much the same way he has drawn responsible for a brief surge of upon other Dominican folk genres widespread interest in bachata, but of mainstrea m in the past—with respect and integ for a short period it became fash rity. It is also significant that he ionable listening for the Domin Dominican society. chose the word “bachata'' instead of ican middle classes. The better the more polite term "amargue,” known performers such as Luis thereby expressing solidarity with Segura began playing in elegant The world reflected in bachata was the music in its more socially un hotels and nightclubs for standing- neither an aspiration nor a fantasy, acceptable form. room-only crowds. This intrusion but a reality considered vulgar and Guerra’s admirers should into mainstream society did not uncouth by mainstream society. Ba bear in mind, however, that his occur, however, without resistance chateros adopted the stereotype and bachatas—composed by a sophis and controversy. A concert held in flaunted it with total disregard for ticated and economically com 1983 at the national university in the disapproval of mainstream Do fortable urban intellectual—are Santo Domingo was severely criti minican society: the very directness interpretations of a local genre firmly cized by the university’s dean as of bachata songs posed a deliberate rooted in the social realities. Ideal being unworthy of presentation at challenge to the values of a society ly his commercial windfall will a public institution. The polemic that consistently excluded bachata's trickle down to bachata musicians— that followed the concert and the practitioners and audience. who themselves have never enjoyed dean’s comments revealed deep even a glimmer of his success—in class and regional divisions in the form of a permanent cultural Dominican society. The boom de Rosy Bachata legitimacy within the Dominican amargue, as it was called, was short Enter Juan Luis Guerra and 4.40. Republic. Even better, perhaps Do lived, though, and by 1985 the Their extraordinary success has put minicans and other fans of Latin music was again relegated to its the previously despised bachata on American music will seek out re former underclass contexts and to the international music map. How cordings by street-level bachateros so its inferior and virtually invisible close are the recording’s key songs that they can hear and support ba status in mainstream Dominican to the grassroots bachatas upon chata as it was, and is, made—by society. which they are based? First, there is people on the margins of society. ■

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 *42 New from University Press of Florida

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Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Reports: Jamaica

Manley’s Legacy by Anthony Payne

ew political leaders in years at that point, we can indeed one of “muddling through” on the Latin America and the evaluate the merits of the “new basis of a structural adjustment pro Caribbean return to of Manley” thesis. The key issue is not gram inherited from the outgoing fice a second time, and so much Manley’s altered political Edward Seaga administration. Com fewer still by reelection style—which may simply have re pletely reversing the psychology of after a previous defeat. flected tactical judgments—or even the 1970s, when the politics of One of the notable exceptions was his core ideological beliefs (which change was his dominant ethic, Jamaica’s Michael Manley and his may have changed less than has Manley announced that he would People’s National Party (PNP). In been generally assumed), but rath not “agree to changing anything in February 1989—more than eight er his actual management of the Ja the management of the economy” years after Prime Minister Manley maican political economy from unless he was “absolutely sure that and the PNP were soundly rejected change is going to help and make by voters for failing to build demo things better in some way.” cratic socialism in Jamaica—Man Manley’s new With the public-sector deficit in ley was again in office as prime flated by the costs of rebuilding minister. approach developed after Hurricane Gilbert in 1988 The Michael Manley of 1989 and the burst of spending with was, to all appearances, a very haltingly, with Manley which Seaga had tried to win the different figure from the radical election, the Manley government firebrand of a few years earlier. perhaps having been had virtually no scope to introduce The international media quickly rather more dragged its mildly social-democratic pro dubbed him the “new” Manley. gram. Though it reached agree They noted that he now wore busi along by events than ment with the International ness suits rather than the open- Monetary Fund (IMF) on a $66 necked karebas fashionable in cotifidently charting a million standby program, the gov Jamaican governmental circles in new course. ernment was unable to hold the the 1970s, that he spoke warmly economy to the IMF targets, lead about future close relations with ing the administration to formally the US than as opposed to Cuba, devalue the currency in October and that he appeared to have es February 1989 onward. Here, at 1989. The failure to m eet IMF tar chewed the language of socialism least, there is unequivocal evidence gets also led to the suspension of for that of political moderation of a new Manley at work. His new the standby agreement and the in and free-market economics. approach did not manifest itself im auguration of the second stage of But was there really a “new” mediately on reelection, but devel the new Manley administration. Manley? It is an appropriate time oped haltingly, with Manley and While a new deal with the IMF to ask this question, for at the end his government perhaps having was quickly made, it almost imme of March 1992, Manley resigned as been rather more dragged along diately ran into trouble. Manley prime minister and left Jamaican by events than confidently charting publicly argued that the breaches politics after 40 years of active and a novel course for the Jamaican po that occurred were technical, always controversial involvement. litical economy. Nevertheless, in as caused by the delay of bilateral do Since his new government had sessing the changing character of nors making promised payments. been in office for more than three Latin American and Caribbean de The IMF, on the other hand, in velopment in the 1990s, the cumu sisted that the Jamaican govern lative result was significant. ment had not gone far enough Anthony Payne is reader in politics at towards retrenchment and that a the University of Sheffield in England. The Evolution further devaluation was needed. He is co-editor o/Modern Caribbean Yet, tension did not reach the Politics (Johns Hopkins University Manley’s 1989 government evolved heights of the Manley-IMF conflict Press, 1992). through four stages. The first was of the late 1970s, and the political

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 mood in the country remained deepened its commitment to de fully committing his government to quiet. The PNP did reasonably well regulation by lifting all foreign- deregulation. As a consequence, in local elections in March 1990 exchange controls. Manley told he left his administration little time and the announcement of sub Jamaicans this action was necessary for the benefits of neoliberal policy stantial fuel price rises in April of to kill off the black market in for to emerge. that year did not generate distur eign exchange, implying that the bances. Manley himself was out of currency had to be left to find its the country for much of the sum true market value. As the value of After Manley mer of 1990, undergoing major sur Jamaica’s currency relative to the This was the political context of gery, with P. J. Patterson serving as US dollar fell by 36% in September- Manley’s March 1992 resignation. acting prime minister. November 1991, prices continued Given his ill health, speculation Indeed, it fell to Patterson to to rise steeply. In light of these dif had long existed that his retire launch the change of direction ficulties, Manley’s government m ent from politics was imminent, that initiated the next, and per with Patterson being the obvious haps most important, stage in the successor. Nonetheless, in a shock PNP government management of ing move at the end of 1991, Patter the economy. In a surprise move in son left the government following September 1990, the government The government’s a heated debate over cabinet pro floated the Jamaican dollar. Al neoliberal strategy has cedure. He was under pressure though the administration main because of his role in a scandal tained foreign-exchange controls, been one enormous involving the waiver of duties to the new policy allowed commercial the local Shell Company. Addition banks to buy and sell hard cur gamble, bom of an ally he wanted to be free to cam rency, with an average weighted paign for the post to be vacated by rate being calculated from those inability to think of Prime Minister Manley. Though he rates operating in the commercial any other viable was replaced as minister of finance, sector. Petroleum and diesel it was significant that he retained prices, meanwhile, were also de alternative in the his position as PNP’s chairman. regulated. Although Patterson was re Patterson and later Manley context of the global garded as less popular among party announced that these were not ascendancy of activists than Portia Simpson, the measures of expediency, but rather only member of the cabinet to the latest in a long line of govern challenge him for the leadership ment maneuvers by which Manley after Manley resigned, Patterson in turned his back on the protected fact won the electoral contest by a and regulated Jamaican economy large margin. Thus he has taken of the past and embraced the new over responsibility for the govern world of deregulation and liber sank rapidly in the polls. To many ment’s new neoliberal economic alization. As he declared, “now that observers it looked as if Manley’s strategy at a time when there is we are embarked on the course, I, government could be the first one- already less than two years to go for one, am excited by the chal term government in the history of before the latest moment—Febru lenge.” Jamaican two-party politics. Manley ary 1994—when the next election Deregulation was part of Ja publicly acknowledged that his poli can be called. maica’s continuing dialogue with cies were causing hardship but re There is actually little that Patter the IMF. The previous agreem ent peatedly stated that they were son can do to influence the elec was in effect reinstated and later irreversible. The currency’s value tion’s results. In effect, what the replaced with a new standby deal. continued to slide, falling by an “new” Manley government did was Nevertheless, the Manley govern other 16% on the third anniversary to ask the Jamaican people to suf ment remained hard-pressed by for- of the government’s election, and fer severely in order to create the eign-exchange shortages and in its how far it might fall was anybody’s basis for an export platform capa 1991 budget again had to increase guess. ble of at last propelling the econ taxes and cut subsidies, this time Indeed, the government’s strat omy into self-sustaining growth. with more severe consequences egy has been one enormous gam Local and foreign businesses have for its popularity. ble, born of an inability to think of greater incentives to invest in Ja The renewal of IMF support any other viable alternative in the maica today than ever before. The prefaced the fourth phase of the context of the global ascendancy of success or failure of the new strat Manley administration. In Sep neoliberalism. Manley came reluc egy now depends on how they re tem ber 1991 the administration tantly and slowly to this view before spond. ■

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 F AX

Insider briefs on people and institutions shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

Article 27— Watch Out of Treasury—specifically its Office marked by corruption and mis of Foreign Assets Control (FAC)— management. Cerezo himself dis In one of his most far-reaching re issued General License No. 8 on appointed many with his desultory forms to date, Mexican president February 5, 1992. The General Li personal and political style. It was Carlos Salinas de Gortari amended cense allows, on a case-by-case no surprise then, that despite Article 27 of the constitution, there basis, specific licenses to be issued ample prior notice, the former by giving communal farmers the authorizing certain US-Haiti ex president expressed his regrets at right to mortgage, rent, or sell ports and imports. According to being unable to attend this year’s their land. Reports indicate that the newsletter, the “FAC, generally conference observing the fifth anni the new law could affect half the a sleepy office hidden in the annex versary of the Esquipulas II Peace acreage in the country and as Treasury Department building, has Accords. Instead, Cerezo sent a much as 30% of the population. been overwhelmed with applica thoughtful statement on the his Despite the reported surge in inter tions for specific licenses.” toric peace treaty in a lengthy est on the part of foreign investors telefax to conference officials. in this newly available real estate, The recipients were startled, not some analysts worry that much of by the document itself, but by the the rural population will be forced point of origin stamped at the top off the land. The consequences of Worth Seeing of each page: Hotel Fantasy Island. the revised Article 27 could be The American Federation of Arts The hotel is located in the Bay Is further complicated by the North has organized an international lands of the Caribbean, where American Free Trade Agreement. tour of short films from Latin Cerezo was enjoying a cruise in Mexican negotiators have been re America. Directed byjulianne his yacht. luctant to open the country to un Burton of the University of Califor limited corn and bean imports. nia at Santa Cruz, the exhibition The combination of rural reforms presents 36 works from 12 coun coupled with a gradual opening of tries and encompasses fictional this formerly protected market subjects, documentaries, and ani No Lo Contendere could result in the large-scale dis mations. The offerings have been A Hudson Institute briefing paper location of rural workers, driving organized into six programs: “The on opportunities in Latin America them into urban areas on both Land,” “People at Work,” “Change provides a predictable outline of sides of the US-Mexican border. and Conflict,” “Masculine/Femi the region’s changing business en nine,” “Heroes and Healers,” and vironment. On Cuba, the docu “Creativity and Expression.” The ment predicts some instability once fall 1992 tour will include Miami Castro falls in the 1990s. According Exceptions to the US Embargo (August 16-September 20), Los An to the analysis, “The role of the of Haiti geles (September 28-November 9), exile community will be a difficult Columbia, Missouri (October 2- factor if exile groups seek political Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.— November 6), Madrid (November power, as many apparently will, a Miami-based firm specializing in 21-28), and Newport Beach, Cali and Cubans on the island regard international trade law—pulls no fornia (December 18-February 14, them as foreigners. Regime propa punches in its April 15, 1992, Trade 1993). ganda has portrayed the exiles as and Industry Report newsletter. In an millionaires planning to buy the article on exceptions to the US island and recreate a Batista-style trade embargo against Haiti, the society, and only time will tell how firm notes that the US Department At Least He’s Consistent deeply those arguments have sunk in. ” The author? None other than for Unfortunately for Guatemala, m er Reagan administration assis Christian Democrat Vinicio Ce- tant secretary for inter-American Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg rezo’s presidency (1985-90) was affairs, Elliott Abrams.

22 Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Fools and Follies vice chairman Randall L. Tobias convinced—absolutely convinced— remains upbeat. Speaking before a that in passing the NAFTA, the Glenn Garvin, who was the Washing crowded Greater Miami Chamber free trade agreement with Mexico, ton Times' reporter in Nicaragua in of Commerce meeting just days the North American—we call it 1983-89, has published Everybody after the incident, he assured his North American Free Trade Agree Had His Own Gringo: The CIA & business audience that “we are not m ent—it will create m ore jobs. I’m the Contras (New York: Brassey’s, discouraged from investing in the convinced that it’s good for the en 1992). The pithy forward to the region because of this single vironment. I believe a more pros long-awaited book sets the tone for event.” No wonder. As Tobias perous Mexico, and there’s going Garvin’s hard-charging style. Writ pointed out later in his address, to be prosperity on both sides if we ten by analyst P. J. O ’Rourke, the AT&T’s Latin American product can get the proper kind of agree forward lauds the author for indulg sales soared from $6 million in ment, will be able to address itself ing in “no heavy breathing over 1989 to $150 million in 1991: to these environmental problems. I Iranian arms deals.” O’Rourke fur a growth rate of 250%. believe a more prosperous Mexico ther states that “Garvin shows us will be an even better m arket for contra political leaders whose van US goods. And so I do not accept ity and quarrelsomeness turned the wisdom of some that says that a contra governance into something trade agreement is going to result like an International Convention simply in an export of jobs. It is not of First Wives,” and that “Garvin Backyard Low Politics going to do that, and I believe that puts all the fools and their follies Now that there is no more Soviet we ought to keep pressing for it. I into perspective.” threat in Central America and a don’t care what the politics of it peace treaty has been signed in El are. I think it is best and I want to Salvador, the US can focus on is do exactly the same thing—this sues that were neglected during NAFTA, this North American Free World Bank Environment the ideological struggles of the Trade Agreement—I want to do ex Roundup 1980s. Evidence of this is the fact actly the same thing with the suc that the US trade representative cessful conclusion of the Uruguay The World Bank’s Patrick Low is placed El Salvador in the Annual Round.” the editor of “International Trade Report on Major Trade Barriers to and the Environment,” a series of United States Exports (1991). El research papers prepared by lead Salvador was cited because of its ing environmentalists and trade willingness to condone the piracy specialists from academia and the of works copyrighted in the US. World Bank. Topics of the 18 pa The citation subjects El Salvador to On the Move pers range from “Trade Policy and possible retaliation against its ex Stuart Lippe, who formerly served Pollution” to “Tropical Forests and ports to the US. in the US Foreign Service, has Trade Policy: The Case of Indone joined Radio Marti as director of sia and Brazil.” They are available research. in the World Bank Discussion Papers, no. 159 (April 1992). What Did He Say? David E. Lewis has been appointed the new assistant secretary of state President George Bush has often for Caribbean development of the been accused of “bushisms,” or Departamento deEstado of the gov AT&T Phone Home speaking a language that only he ernment of Puerto Rico. Lewis for understands. For example, at the merly worked in Nicaragua at the While some may be disturbed by Dearborn-based Economic Club of Coordinadora Regional de Investiga- the attempted coup in Venezuela Detroit on March 13, 1992, the ciones Economicas y Sociales (CRIES) on February 4, 1992, AT&T board president said: “I am absolutely and with the Ford Foundation.

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 FEAT Venezuela: Reversal or Renewal? by Andres Serbin

Democracy and civilian... control over the military have distinguished Venezuela from the bulk of Latin American states. Did the country’s attempted coup of 1992 portend the reversal of regional progress toward democracy and demilitarization?

he attempted coup against introduced as part of a severe aus years the political gap separating Venezuelan president terity package that sharply diverged the masses from the Perez govern Carlos Andres Perez on from the populism of Perez’s initial ment and party constituencies February 4, 1992, was par term in office (1978-83)—pro from their leadership grew in ticularly surprising be voked three days of riots and loot creasingly wide, especially given cause, for more than ing. For the first time since the the sharp contrast between the Tthree decades, Venezuela has been pacification of leftist guerrillas in ostentatious lifestyle of the Vene politically atypical among Latin the early 1970s, the Venezuelan zuelan upper classes and the wors American countries. This atypical ening economic hardships of the status derived from four political rank-in-file population, more than features: first, a stable democracy, The political gap 40% of whom live below the offi based on the consensus of the lead cially defined poverty line. ing political parties; second, civil separating the masses In this context, reinforcing the ian control over the armed forces, political alienation of the Venezue including rotation of commanders, from the Perez lan majority has been widespread nonintervention in political life, government and party and unpunished corruption. Nu and generous social benefits; third, merous scandals in current and pre social democracy, characterized by constituencies from vious administrations have involved a capacity to permit the upward so government functionaries, military cial mobility of wide sectors of the their leadership grew leaders, and entrepreneurs. These population; and fourth, substantial scandals have generally received petroleum profits that have sus increasingly wide. light treatment by a political system tained this democratic social and whose appointed officials are de political framework. pendent on the old guard of politi Fissures in this framework began army intervened to quell civil dis cal parties. Combined with the to appear shortly after Perez as turbances. The number of civilian harsh socioeconomic conse sumed the presidency of Venezuela deaths probably exceeded the offi quences for most of the popula for the second time in 1988. On cial figure of 600. The cost of mate tion, the impact on public opinion February 27, 1989, an increase in rial damage in the country’s main has been to undermine the legiti the price of public transportation— cities was extensive as well. macy of both the judicial system Nonetheless, this dramatic popu and the political system in general. lar response had little impact on The combination of plunging liv Andres Serbin is professor of sociology President Perez—newly converted ing standards for Venezuela’s ma at the Universidad Central de Vene as he was to neoliberalism—or the jority and plunging confidence in a zuela and director of the Instituto political elite in general—which political system increasingly identi Venezolano de Estudios Sociales y was progressively losing political fied with elite corruption and os Politicos (INVESP). He is the author touch not only with the vast major tentatious consumption is the o/Caribbean Geopolitics: Toward ity of Venezuelans but also with explosive ingredient that underlay Security through Peace? (Lynne their very own political parties. In the attempted coup of February Rienner Publishers, 1990). deed, during the subsequent three 1992.

24 Hemisphere • Summer 1992 From Macroeconomic Upswing to Attempted Coup Ironically, the deterioration of liv The “Golpistas”: Who Are They? ing conditions for the majority, the declining faith in the political sys There is a cottage industry of books on the “F-4,” the February 4, 1992, tem, and the attempted coup coin coup attempt in Venezuela. The chief conspirator, Lieutenant Colonel cided with the first positive signs of Hugo Chavez, is being lionized by many a politician and journalist. President Perez’s neoliberal pro While he, and his fellow conspirators, continue to have a popular fol gram: a 9.2% rate of economic lowing, the polls indicate decreasing support for a military solution. In growth in 1991 and a rate of in a poll taken just four days after the coup attempt, El Nacional found flation that did not exceed 30.7%. that 37% supported the attempt, 20% were indifferent, and 43% were Accompanying these signs of re opposed. By May 4, 1992, the same newspaper reported that 88% of the covery was the growing confidence most recent poll favored a solution within the democratic system. of foreign investors and multilat The golpistas claim to be followers of the doctrines of Simon Bolivar eral financial institutions in the and his teacher, Don Simon Rodriguez. While this explains the adop Venezuelan economy, as well as tion of the name “Movimiento Bolivariano" for their movement, it ex Perez’s early 1992 announcement plains pitifully little else. The following information on the golpistas has that a large-scale social project been widely publicized: would be started to distribute the » Three of the four major leaders (Lieutenant Colonels Hugo Chavez, benefits of economic recovery Jesus Ortiz, and Francisco Urdaneta) had been under surveillance for more equitably. the past eight years for their activities against what they called “the Months after the coup attempt, oligarchical chiefs” of the armed forces. Two years ago they were ac there is yet little consistent informa cused of planning to kidnap the top military commanders (El Univer tion about the ideological orienta sal, February 5, 1992). tion of the rebel military leaders. ■ The total num ber of acdve rebels was two battalions— the Paracaidis- Indeed, their attempt to seize tele tas deAragua and the Brigada Blindada de Valencia (with 30 tanks)—as vision stations failed, they made no well as others stationed at Maracaibo’s missile base. Their attack on other major efforts to disseminate the presidential palace and other political locations was met with stiff proclamations through the mass resistence from the Guardia Nacional and the president’s own guards. media, they burned their propa- The threat that the loyal air force (equipped with F-16s) would be gandistic materials when the sent into action was a major reason why the golpistas surrendered. attempted coup failed, and gov * Their surrender message noted that “for now” they failed and that ernment censorship has minimized “new situations will come along.” commentary on the opposition’s ■ As far as any ideology or program, little is evident. The oldest golpista, motives. Still, the opposition’s Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Arias Cardenas, commander of the mis so-called Movimiento Bolivariano sile base of Maracaibo, speaks in Biblical terms about justice and hon expressed the discontent of a sig esty (El Nacional, March 5,1992). The joint letter of February 12, nificant portion of the military’s 1992, by Lieutenant Colonel Chavez and others to the governor of middle-level command. They were Zulia has a distinct Theology of Liberation tone: references to Christ, unhappy with Venezuela’s socioeco to the voice of “the Church which is committed to the people,” “ideal nomic problems, the corruption of ism,” “participatory democracy,” anticorruption, etc. political and military leadership, * Of the 357 officers captured, only 55 were still in custody by April 26, the weakening of democratic insti 1992. tutions, and the frustrated expecta tions of the masses. Another source of military discontent was dissatis Editor's Note: Information collected by H emisphere staff. faction over the long-standing negotiations on the Venezuelan-

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Features: Venezuela

Colombian border in the poten the implementation of the “social also established a Consejo Consultivo tially oil-rich Golfo de Venezuela. megaproject,” for which he has ob consisting of representatives of AD Together, these sources of mil tained multilateral funding. Even as well as independent and opposi itary dissatisfaction intersected with so, the recent decrease in the tion parties. This measure, to a diffuse and ambiguous national world-market price of petroleum gether with the appointment of a ist discourse, whose inflections raises doubts about the ultimate new head of the Ofitina Central de stressed the domestic conditions of scale of the program. Information, may improve the gov Venezuela without linking them to ernment’s lines of communication hemispheric and world trends. The with the population in general. By rebel conspiracy, however, was lim the same token, the transfer of a se ited to a few sectors of the armed ries of corruption cases to the attor forces and, apart from some late ef The fundamental ney general may, in the short term, forts to arm university students in improve the Perez administration’s the city of Valencia, failed to in challenge confronting image in the struggle against cor corporate civilians. Reflecting the ruption. depth of discontent among the po President Perez is litically isolated golpistas at the mo not that of improving ment of surrender, their apparent “For Now” leader, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo his government’s Yet the fundamental challenge Chavez, declared that they would confronting President Perez is not give up “for now.” image, but rather of that of improving his government’s seriously reforming the image, but rather of seriously re The Aftermath forming the Venezuelan political Venezuelan political system. Such reform must establish Following the defeat of the gol effective mechanisms for political pistas, Venezuela’s party leaders, system. control over corrupt practices and entrepreneurs, labor unions, and for political participation that re neighborhood associations de sponds to the expectations of di clared their support for democ verse sectors. In this respect, the racy. Nevertheless, voices of Perez administration needs to im dissidence called attention to the On the other hand, Perez’s ef plant a series of proposals formu conditions underlying the at forts to form a coalition govern lated by the Comision de Reforma del tempted overthrow of the Perez ment, incorporating the leadership Estado. Among these are proposals administration. Among the dissi of his own party, Action Democratica to reform the electoral system so as dent voices were former social- (AD), along with that of opposition to eliminate the existing top-down Christian COPEI president Rafael parties, has proved unsuccessful. manipulation of electoral ballots by Caldera and leaders of the Movi- The new cabinet that Perez ap entrenched party elites (known as miento alSocialismo (MAS). Signifi pointed following the coup “cogollos”) and to reform the judi cantly, even though civilians did attempt has not substantially re cial system. not participate in the coup at duced the administration’s strong If these and other serious politi tempt, public opinion polls re ties to the technocratic team that cal reforms are not carried out, vealed that more than 30% of the formulated its original neoliberal then sooner or later the “for now,” population supported the golpistas. policies, though the addition of as declared by golpista Hugo Cha In short, beyond the attempted some AD members to the team has vez, may internalize as a more coup itself lies an alarming accu modified its approach and eased crystallized—and hence more ex mulation of popular grievances tensions between AD and the Perez plosive—amalgam of both the pop that the Perez administration, as administration. The new cabinet in ular protests of February 27, 1989, well as the political leadership in cludes as interior minister former and the attempted coup of Febru general, must recognize and re AD presidential candidate Luis ary 4, 1992. Such an explosive solve. Unfortunately, so far there Piherua Ordaz, widely respected force not only could put an end to are few encouraging signs of such for his honesty and seen as having more than 30 years of democracy progress. a key role in combating corrup in Venezuela, but also could por On the one hand, the Perez ad tion. It also included as foreign tend the weakening or reversal of ministration has spoken not of a minister, until he resigned in June Latin America’s regional progress major change of course but of the 1992, a m em ber of the social-Chris- toward democracy. ■ introduction of “flexibility.” In es dan party COPEI. The socialist sence, Perez has said that the only party MAS refused to participate. significant policy change will be In apparent compensation, Perez (Translated by Hemisphere staff)

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Venezuelan Opinion

THE POLITICAL SYSTE

Should political parties be abolished Will political parties make because they are corrupt and ineffective, necessary changes to save Which concept best describes or should they be changed because themselves, or are they Venezuela’s political system? they are necessary for democracy? impossible to save?

Don’t Know/ Unanswered (7.0%) Democracy (89.0%) Should Be Left Alone (4.0%)

Should Be Abolished (7.0%

Don’t Know/ Unanswered (7.0%)

Dictatorship (5.0%) Another System (2.0%) Should Be Will Make Necessary Changed (82.0%) Changes (64.6%)

Source: Adapted from El Nacional (Caracas)

MM SHOULD PEREZ RESIGN? EVALUATION OF STATE POLICIES (PERCENTAGES)

PEREZ SHOULD RESIGN 45

PEREZ SHOULD NOT RESIGN 45

DON’T KNOW/UNANSWERED 10

IF PEREZ RESIGNS, WHO SHOULD BE NAMED INTERIM PRESIDENT?

Rafael Caldera 20

No one. Perez should not resign. 18

Arturo Uslar Pietri 9

Eduardo Fernandez 5

Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez 3

The Military 3

Don't Know/Unanswered 30

Several others were mentioned by 1% or less of the sample. Source: Adapted from El Nacional (Caracas)

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Features: Venezuela

A Culture of Corruption by Arturo Uslar Pietri

true culture of corrup were prepared to manage. To risky business ventures, and all tion has been develop make matters worse, this wealth fell forms of pleasure and opportunism ing in Venezuela for totally into the hands of the state. afforded by political and economic more than 20 years. One could not expect the people power. The majority was not ex Corruption is defined who have exercised the power in cluded from this carnival of easy as the process of decom Venezuela during the last 25 years wealth. With an eagerness that position,A destruction, putrefaction, to understand and avoid the nega should have been directed to edu and eradication that is produced in tive consequences of this rapid cation or health care, the state has living organisms when the vital wealth and channel it toward what sponsored and promoted every im force that gave them life and pur I called, many years ago, a policy of aginable kind of gambling, includ pose has ceased to exist. “planting the oil”—the healthy de ing the easy money derived from In the moral field a similar velopment of the society and econ speculation. Consequently, regard phenomenon happens when the omy of the country. Not only was for work and savings has gone by individual or society enters, for this not done, but because of a the wayside. The gamesters’ state whatever reason, into a process of fatal weakness—the temptation of promoted, through every means of disintegration, decomposition, and power and excess and intellectual communication, every game of putrefaction, in which moral values limitation—the elites, along with chance, from horse-racing and lot and ethical principals begin to dis the majority of the society, scram teries to an evil complex of clandes appear and to be substituted by ab bled to take advantage of that for tine gaming organizations, which ject and base appetites. tune in all of its possible forms. could not have existed without the Historically many societies have The country was converted into large-scale complicity of govern been destroyed by this sickness. It an immense fools’ paradise, in m ent functionaries. To all of this, is active and present in all human which all, as in a trance, stood in one has to add the virtual impunity organizations unless a constant ef line to achieve some share of this of all those who have committed fort is made to prevent it and to great supply of personal benefits. crimes of illicit enrichment. create an efficient moral prophy The government became irrespon This culture of corruption is laxis. Human beings are not virtu sibly costly, propagating a lifestyle corroding the soul of the country ous by nature, but we can acquire of ostentation, extravagance, and and cannot be confronted and cor virtue, in some sense, by profound pathological consumerism that rected with mere proclamations of conviction. As Lord Acton said, penetrated all levels of social life. intent to amend or isolated ges “Total power corrupts,” particularly As such, not only were the norms tures of repentance. We have to go when demonic temptation to do so of moral conduct and intelligent to the core, attacking the corrupt encounters no obstacles. utilization of wealth perverted, but practices of gamesters, felons, and there was ample opportunity for the state. We have to establish effec The Temptation of the proliferation of all imaginable tive norms and real examples of Power and Excess forms of theft, impudent splendor, moral and civic conduct. We have illicit enrichment, and abuse of to educate for work, savings, and Venezuela was a backward and power. service and not for the enjoyment poor country at the beginning of of easy wealth and splendor. This is this century. Suddenly, in the last A Carnival of Appetites the challenge that Venezuela has quarter of a century, there ap before it, if it truly wants to am end peared an immense wealth that The entire country seemed to its destiny, cure its vices, and reach neither government nor citizenry submerse itself in a carnival of ap its true destiny. ■ petites. Consumption and ostenta tion were reflected, according to social rank, by Hollywood-style Editor’s Note: Adapted from El Nacio Arturo Uslar Pietri is a political com mansions, fleets of luxury automo nal, March 8, 1992. mentator whose columns appear regu biles and private airplanes, luxuri larly in El Nacional (Caracas). ous apartments, shell enterprises, (Translated by Hemisphere staff)

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES ANNOUNCES TWO NEW PUBLICATIONS ON THE CARIBBEAN

Publication No. 41 ($25.00) Publication No. 43 ($25.00 Nova Scotia and the Fighting Maroons: Resistance and Rebellion in Suriname: A Documentary History Old and New

Guest Editor Guest Editor Mavis C. Campbell Gary Brana-Shute

Preface and Acknowledgement Introduction Introduction Gary Brana-Shute A Documentary History Notes The History of the Suriname Maroons Appendix Wim Hoogbergen Note on Author Slave Religion in Suriname Humphrey Lamur

Legal Resistance to Slavery in Eighteenth Century Suriname To Order, indicate the number of copies for each Rosemary Brana-Shute issue, providing your name and address, and mail to the address below: The 'Usual Barbarity7 of the Asians? Indenture and Resistance in Suriname ____ Publication No. 41 ($25.00) Rosemarijn Hoefte ____ Publication No. 43 ($25.00)

Add $2.00 for Postage/Handling The Maroon Insurgency: Anthropological Reflections on the Civil War in Suriname For Orders Under 10 Copies H. U. E. Thoden Van Velzen ORDERS OVER 10 WILL BE SHIPPED UPS AND BILLED ACCORDINGLY Suriname: Transcending Ethnic Politics the Hard Way YOUR NAME______Edward Dew STREET ADDRESS______Old Shoes and Elephants: Electoral Resistance in Suriname Gary Brana-Shute CITY______Preludes to the Exodus: Surinamers in the Netherlands STATE/ZIP CODE Gert Oostindie

MAIL TO: A Reluctant Embrace: Suriname's Idle Quest for Independence Studies in Third World Societies Peter Meel Department of Anthropology College of William and Mary Dissonance in Discourse: The Politics of Afro- Williamsburg, VA 23185 Surinamese Culture in Netherlands PHONE 804/221-1055/1056 Wilhelmina van Wetering

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Features: Venezuela

Venezuela in Crisis

An Interview with Rafael Caldera

r. Caldera, as one of the corruption that had been an inte that institutions are good when the originators of this political gral part of all dictatorships. I insist people who manage and represent system, you know it well. on emphasizing this latter point be are honest and patriotic. The best When and where did the cause it is now popular to say that institutions in the world deterio first fissures in the system corruption is a result of 34 years of rate when they are in the hands of become apparent? democracy; it is not true that cor people without noble interests and ruption began with democracy, nor who use them for their own con Paradoxically the deterioration is it true that there was no corrup venience. in the system began when Vene tion under the dictatorship. What zuela obtained a fairer price for its is true is that it was the [Carlos What is the remedy: changing the oil. When we sold oil at $2 a barrel, Andres] Perez administration that people without changing the system? even after we subtracted the cost of initiated the criminal insanity of production and split the rest be contracting unnecessary debts. The system . . . ? I wish you tween the government and the would tell me what is the system multinationals, we thought of our you are going to change. Are you selves as relatively rich. We were going to change democracy? Are concerned at that time with correct you going to abolish the congress? ing fundamental affairs. Based on The best institutions in Are you going to establish a monar the figures presented by the most the world deteriorate chical constitution? The reality is impartial economists, we now know that people speak of the system in that we have never been as well off when they are in the vague terms, no one wishes to be as we were before the oil boom; precise. Specifically we can im our gross national product grew, hands of people prove the system by introducing a we industrialized, unemployment series of institutions or practices was reduced, and inflation was prac ivithout noble interests such as the popular referendum , a tically nonexistent, as was for all and who use them for reform of the judicial system, may practical purposes the foreign debt. be by instituting the office of prime When the flow of money started, their own convenience. minister or an ombudsman for it engendered two particularly seri hum an rights. But all this presup ous processes and trends: first, the poses that the country’s established tendency to easy accumulation and democratic constitutional system earnings permeated all social sec will not be altered, what will be al tors, and second it reached into Given the extraordinary income we tered is how it functions. My spe the top political levels of the state. were receiving, we could have un cific proposal covers seven points: This “facilismo” spawned a type of dertaken great programs and ■ The creation of a high judicial corruption that we had combatted works for Venezuela without get commission to represent not only tenaciously during the first 15 years ting into debt. Definitely this debt the legal profession but the coun of democratic government. The is the cause of the asphyxiating try as a whole. This commission fact is that in those years this de pressure that the International will select the candidates from mocracy had as goals not only polit Monetary Fund is currently exert which congress selects the mem ical liberty and respect for human ing on the country. bers of the supreme court. It will rights, but the battle against the also have the authority to dismiss Are you sure about this? forthwith any magistrate or judge—no matter the rank— Rafael Caldera was president of Vene I am positive. Additionally, one when it is convinced that an offi zuela from 1969 to 1974for the social- of the very serious things occurring cial is not complying with his/her Christian party COPEI. He is expected in Venezuela is that we blame every judicial duty. to run for the sixth time in 1993 as an thing on the system when it is peo ■ The introduction of a funda independent. ple who are responsible. The fact is mental charter regulating the

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 function of political parties. This should include transparency in the management of its funds and setting limits to its functions; since parties are the fundamental ;Ya salio la Guia del instruments of democracy, we should stop them from being the Periodismo Centroamericano! mechanisms of clientelism, of pragmatism, and of abusive pow er; in other words, we should Esta publication avoid the so-called partidocracia (oligarchy of the party). de 188 paginas ■ The creation of the post of prime contiene: minister who will share responsi bilities with the president and • Nombres de mas de who can be dismissed with a vote 3.000 periodistas of no confidence from the cham bers; once this occurs there will • Datos sobre have to be a shuffling of the cabi 27 periodicos net. • Information sobre 208 ■ The creation of the post of om emisoras de radio budsman for hum an rights so that society can have a spokes Detalles de 34 canales man, a sort of catarsis y de amparo de television (a protector and upholder of rights) when tremendous viola * Mas datos sobre tions are committed. revistas y periodicos ■ We need to categorically estab • Nombres de las lish the right to information, one escuelas de of the many rights that are essen periodismo y tial and clear to so many sectors sus profesores of the society. ■ Any change in the constitution, • Las even the making of a totally new corresponsalias one if necessary, should require the convening of a constitutional assembly that responds to a popu lar mandate, not to the will of a select few. Y un ciimulo de information util sobre Centroamerica y Panama. ■ Another very important matter that should go into the constitu Solo 45 dolares. tional reform is a transitory dispo Ingresos de la venta de la Guia estan destinados a un fondo para el sition that reduces the present funcionamiento de un centra de entrenamiento para periodistas centroamericanos. constitutional presidential period by at least a year; in other words, after making the constitutional s c envienme ejemplar/es de la Guia del Periodismo Centroamericano reform, we should proceed to renew all public offices. The oft- Nom bre ______

repeated phrase that this is the Direccion . last opportunity for democracy truly applies to our situation. ■ Ciudad

Escriba su cheque a nombre de CAJP Endowment Fund y envie este formulario a PROCEPER o Central American Journalism Program Editor’s Note: Reprinted from Revista Apartado 1253-1002 Florida International University San Jose North Miami, FL 33181 ZETA (Caracas), March 12-23, 1992. Costa Rica USA

(Translated by Hemisphere staff)

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Features: Civil-Military Relations

Military Questions in El Salvador

by Jose Z. Garcia

...... Political crisis in the 1980s bolstered the military’s formidable power in Central America. Paradoxically, however, it catalyzed a peace process that promises to tame the military’s might Given the realities, is the optimism justified? ______I l ______JS ______;

n January 16, 1992, the system when the international com Colombian president Belisario guerrillas and govern munity is distracted or has with Betancur, former Venezuelan for m ent of El Salvador drawn from Salvadoran affairs. eign minister Reynaldo Figueroa, signed agreements end and US law professor Thomas ing the country’s 12-year- Burgenthal, has been appointed to old civil war. The peace investigate and reveal the facts in accords owe much of their success What remains unclear unresolved cases of gross human to international pressure. By the rights abuse committed by the time the Bush administration came is whether there exists armed forces of both sides. And to office in 1989, US policymakers a Comision Ad Hoc has been ap were tired of funding the seem enough goodwill on pointed to evaluate and supervise ingly endless war in El Salvador all sides to create a a host of reforms contemplated for and wanted out. Moreover, the in the armed forces. ternational collapse of communism viable political system was eloquent testimony that time was not a friend to the guerrillas of in the absence of Down-sizing the Armed Forces the Ejertito Farabundo Marti de Libera Based on the accords, the armed tion National (FMLN). Success at international pressure. forces will be reduced by 50%, to the negotiating table occurred 31,000 officers and troops. This fig when both sides acknowledged in ure, however, represents roughly ternational realities and agreed to twice the size of the armed forces negotiate what am ounted to a On paper the accords are ex in 1979, when the war began, and promise to reincorporate the guer tensive and create institutions to is artificially high. For several years, rillas into mainstream political ensure compliance. One thousand army commanders, for various rea life—a process that will take place UN observers will spend the next sons, have exaggerated the actual under UN supervision and with in few months supervising the demo number of troops under their com stitutional mechanisms designed to bilization of the guerrillas. A Comi mand. The figure 31,000 repre increase the public accountability sion para la Consolidation de la Paz sents one-half the public security of the military and security forces. (COPAZ) has been formed that forces, and in fact, may represent a What remains unclear is whether includes civilians representing all reduction of only 10,000 or so. Fur there exists enough goodwill on parties in the legislature. Its pur thermore, the accords do not guar all sides to create a viable political pose is to verify compliance with antee a reduction in the size of the the agreements. One of COPAZ’s most politically relevant military tasks will be to supervise the resolu group, the officer corps, which, in Jose Z. Garcia is director of the Center tion of land disputes between those cluding security forces, currently for Latin American Studies at New who hold title to land in areas af numbers some 2,100—twice the Mexico State University. He has written fected by civil war and those now size of the 1979 officer corps. The numerous articles on the Salvadoran occupying that land. A Comision de major substantive change involves armed forces. la Verdad, composed of former the dissolution of the five Batallones

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 de Infanteria de Reaction Inmediata As cohesive as they were power fact that tandas immediately junior (BIRI) created to respond to ful, tandona members were often to the tandona are quite small, mak FMLN action. Some of these, such accused of covering up for one an ing full replacement of the tandona as the BIRI Atlacatl, have acquired other in suspected cases of gross problematic. Thus, the remaining reputations as gross violators of violations of hum an rights or fi tandona members in the high com human rights. nancial conflicts of interest. Just mand are likely to retain their posi The greatest institutional distor as resentment against their power tions of authority—including their tion within the armed forces is began to rise among junior tandas, still substantial influence over the caused by the extraordinary num one tandona member, Colonel selection of political leadership— ber of junior officers who were re Guillermo Benavides, was accused until 1994, when a new president cruited during the civil war. In of conspiracy in the infamous 1989 will be elected. By that time the 1991 approximately 1,500 first and Jesuit murder case. Extraordinary tandas of the early 1970s will have second lieutenants were in the pressure by human rights organiza matured enough to assume power. armed forces, twice as many as are tions and the US government fi To the degree that tandona needed to balance out the 540 offi nally caused Benavides to be tried members continue to be influential cers of higher grades. Any effort in civilian court—the first such within the armed forces, some made to cut military costs after the resentm ent against the army will war is likely to focus on these offi persist. The tandona has become a cers. Nevertheless, since many of While Cristiani symbol—of human rights abuse in them served in the most dangerous some quarters, of corruption in positions during the war, the case may have sound others, and, in general, of the civil for cutting junior officers is politi war itself. While President Cristiani cally sensitive. Moreover, some administrative reasons may have sound administrative observers fear the social conse reasons to keep the tandona at the quences of suddenly cashiering to keep the tandona at head of the armed forces, doing so 700 warriors into an economy that the head of the armed will impede national political rec suffers from high unemployment onciliation. rates. On the other hand, their forces, doing so mill continued presence in the armed forces is likely under the best of cir impede national Postwar Politics and the Armed Forces cumstances to create a degree of political reconciliation. instability within the institution, A major achievement of the peace which could eventually have politi accord process in El Salvador was cal significance. Salvadoran history that for the first time since national has known many instances of inter- instance in Salvadoran history— independence in the early nine generational military conflict that and resulted in a conviction carry teenth century, the role of the have evolved into larger national ing a 30-year sentence. Resentment armed forces has been debated, power struggles. against the tandona on the part of negotiated, and acted upon by po junior tandas partly explains why litical parties, the government ad The Tandona this punishm ent was accepted with ministration, guerrillas, and the in the armed forces, even as resent military itself. This achievement Within the top leadership structure ment against the conviction exists alone is significant and has im of the armed forces, no military within the military in general. plications at least as wide-ranging graduating class cohort group, or Tandona members have recently as the results of the negotiations so tanda, in the past 50 years has been been replaced in all important far. Civilian actors are likely to in as powerful as the famous class of troop commands except the vital sist in the future that the subject of 1966. The “tandona," or large Primera Brigada, and several mem the armed forces remains on the tanda, is so nam ed because of its bers accused of various wrong public agenda. If so, the peace ac unusually large size of 46. By the doings were sent abroad in 1991 cords will have indirectly taken the mid-1980s tandona members occu or were otherwise isolated in incon country a step toward the develop pied most of the important troop sequential posts. Nonetheless, tan ment of shared democratic norms. commands in the armed forces, dona members retain significant With regard to the military, and after Alfredo Cristiani became administrative influence within the the most important feature of the president in 1989, some of them armed forces since the minister of peace accords is the separation of moved into dominant positions defense and other key members of domestic police functions from the within the defense ministry while the high command are tandona armed forces. The accords call for others maintained key troop com members. Another factor con the creation of a new entity, the mands. tributing to their influence is the Politia National Civil (PNC), by the

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Features: Civil-Military Relations

end of 1992. The PNC will assume a major reduction in the political war. From the 1950s onward, the the public security functions pre impact of the armed forces on Sal armed forces, as instruments of viously exercised by the Guardia vadoran society, another necessary this oligarchy, extracted increasing Nacional, Policia Nacional, and Poli but insufficient condition for de amounts of power and privilege for na de Hacienda, which were con mocracy. their services. By the late 1970s abu trolled and staffed by the armed sive military behavior became more forces. In addition, the PNC will of a focal point for opposition (es have its own training academy and pecially in the eyes of non-Salva will be controlled exclusively by ci dorans) than the less tangible but vilian national government officials Ultimately the future more fundamental relationship be through the Ministerio del Interior. tween the oligarchy and other sec These steps reverse a more role of the armed tors of society. than a century-old trend in which Though the civil war is over, it the armed forces exercised increas forces depends on the is unclear whether these patterns ing control over both internal secu will reemerge. Democratic theory rity and national defense. In 1912, quality of the political and the experience of other Latin for example, the Guardia Nacional system that emerges American countries suggest that, was created by the armed forces until all major political actors can and placed under their control in during the postwar agree to create and abide by rules order “to protect private property of the game that limit coercive mili especially in rural agrarian zones” period. tary involvement in politics, the lon (Revista de la Fuerza Armada [San gevity of the current peace process Salvador], 10:38, 1978, p. 17). By is in doubt. the 1970s virtually all law enforce For the time being, interna ment institutions were controlled tional scrutiny and the transpar by the armed forces and were often Future Role of the Armed Forces ency built into the peace accords associated with human rights abuse. will probably cause both sides to Removal of domestic security During the civil war, the Salva abide by the agreements, albeit re functions from armed forces con doran armed forces had to learn luctantly and behind schedule. trol implies far more than possible how to fight a guerrilla war. Eventu Compliance thus far has been slow improvement in human rights treat ally they also had to learn flexibility on both sides. The real test will ment, however. It was through the in the art of making political alli occur when the Left is able to exercise of national guard, police, ances, not only domestically but demonstrate with ballots what it and customs functions that the internationally as well. Now the could not demonstrate with bullets: armed forces acquired sufficient elimination of their internal secu that it has strong political support. knowledge, networks, and pres rity functions and the careful scru When the Left demonstrated ence throughout the country to be tiny of their political role will surely such support in the past, civilian able to govern. And it was partly teach the armed forces the costs of groups tied to the ruling oligarchy through the exercise of these func overextending themselves as an in were always ready to sacrifice de tions that the military managed to stitution. Still, the Salvadoran mili mocracy. Whether the pattern re control the political activities of tary has survived, and after 12 years peats itself again will depend on its citizens from the 1950s to the of war its basic values and mentality the resolve with which democratic 1970s, when the army controlled remain astonishingly unchanged. forces forge a. minimum alliance to an “officialist” party—the Partido de Hence, it is not to the armed forces preserve themselves. Finally, in this Conciliation Nacional—that won all that one should look for guidance postm odern civil war, international elections. The ruling Alianza Re- toward democracy, but rather to interests—such as governments, publicana Nacionalista (ARENA) it the postwar dynamics of civilian human rights and church groups, self was founded in part by the late politics. and writers—played important Major Roberto D Aubuisson, whose Ultimately the future role of the roles in articulating issues and mon support base included village elites armed forces depends on the qual itoring events, including the very he had helped across the country ity of the political system that negotiation of the war’s end. Now in his position as chief of intelli emerges during the postwar pe that the country is no longer en gence of the Guardia National dur riod. Since 1932 a small oligarchy gulfed in war and thus is no longer ing the late 1970s, when death using military force has refused to a focus of world attention, El Salva squads began to operate on a na acknowledge the political legiti dor’s democratic prospects depend tional scale to eliminate suspected macy of large sectors of the polity, to a significant degree on the con leftists. In sum, removal of police especially organized labor. This tinued scrutiny and passion of forces from military control implies refusal is the root cause of the civil these players. ■

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Armed Forces & Society

Claude E. Welch, Jr., Editor Armed State University of New York at Buffalo Forces & _ The leading interdisciplinary publication devoted to the study of the military estab Society lishment and civil-military relations in all \N IMHUJISC IP! |\\K\ |<>< RN\I parts of the world. The journal provides an international forum for a wide range of topics, including war, revolution, recruit ment and conscription policies, arms con trol, peacekeeping, military history, economics of defense, and strategic is sues. R ecent A rticles : Congress and the Politics of Military Reform Daniel Wirls El Salvador: The Military and Politics James Nathan Setup: Why and How the U.S. Air Force Lost in Vietnam Earl H. Tilford, Jr. African-American Women in the U.S. Military Brenda L. Moore Public Opinion and Superpower Strategic Arms Robert Mandel

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Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Features: Civil-Military Relations

Taming the Honduran Military by Steve Levitsky

n few areas of Honduran soci General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, “internal crimes,” while “civilian ety is the lack of civilian con armed forces chief from 1982 to courts should try all other crimes.” trol over the armed forces 1984, the military adopted a more Leonidas Rosa Bautista, president more manifest than in the jus repressive orientation, cracking of the Colegio de Abogados, expresses tice system. The Honduran down on unions, peasants, stu a similar view. According to legis military refuses to allow its dents, and leftist politicians in the lator Salatiel Urbina of the Partido members to be tried in civilian name of “national security.” Accord Liberal, “All cases in which soldiers courts,I even when they commit ing to CODEH, between 1981 and are involved in crimes against ci common crimes. And civilian au 1984, 218 political assassinations, vilians should be tried in civilian thorities, fearful of confronting 110 “disappearances,” and 1,984 courts. If I am a soldier and I shoot the military, do not challenge the illegal arrests took place. Though someone in a bar, there is no rea armed forces’ claim to “military ju human rights violations have de son for me to be tried in a military risdiction.” As a result, members of creased since the mid-1980s, Ameri court.” Yet the military claims ju the military have become virtually cas Watch reported that “political risdiction in all cases where sol untouchable by civilian law. “In killings of student, union and peas diers commit crimes. Since the place of a state of law,” the Comite ant leaders continued through the country’s police force and investi para la Defensa de los Derechos Hu- end of ’90 and the first months of gative bodies are run by the armed vianos en Honduras (CODEH) re ’91.” Military officers were impli forces, the military has been able ported in July 1991, Honduras “has cated in brutal crimes against civil to ensure that its members stay out a state of illegality.” ians on several occasions in 1991, of civilian courts. The Honduran military, it yet soldiers are never tried in civil The problem is that seldom should be noted, is somewhat dif courts and few are convicted in have military tribunals brought jus ferent from those of El Salvador military tribunals. tice. Military judges are active mili and Guatemala. Unlike the armies tary members appointed by the of its neighbors, the Honduran A “Shield of Impunity”? armed forces. Trials take place army has never been linked to the within military installations, are oligarchy, but rather has tradition The military bases its refusal to be closed to the public, and are in no ally m antained ties with the pop subject to civil jurisdiction on arti way responsible to the civilian judi ular sectors. In the 1970s the cle 90 of the Honduran constitu cial system. “The military justice military government of Oswaldo tion, which declares that “military system’s track record is not very Lopez Arellano (1972-75) openly jurisdiction is recognized for good,” acknowledges one US em aligned itself with peasant and crimes of a military order.” Ac bassy official. “You’ve got second labor movements against economic cording to Colonel Napoleon lieutenants judging colonels, which elites. This explains why many Hon Santos Aguilar, the armed forces is very difficult to do.” Lawyer and durans do not view the country’s interpret “military jurisdiction” to legislator Luis Alberto Rubi of the military as highly repressive. In include “all cases that involve offi Partido Liberal says, “The army is deed, the Honduran military’s cials or enlisted men” in the active using military jurisdiction as a human rights record—though far service of the military. Nonetheless, shield of impunity. It’s totally un from clean—is considerably better lawyers, scholars, and politicians constitutional. They’re judging than those of the Salvadoran and across the Honduran political spec themselves.” Guatemalan armies. trum are nearly unanimous in in That changed somewhat in the terpreting military jurisdiction as 1980s. U nder the leadership of applying “strictly to military mat Judicial Weakness ters” such as mutiny or other Despite widespread opposition to crimes committed during war. militaryjurisdiction, few politicians According to retired general or judges have challenged it. AJuly Steve Levitsky is a doctoral student in Walter Lopez, armed forces chief 1991 legislative proposal to “clarify” political science at the University of from 1984 to 1986, the military the definition of military privilege California at Berkeley. should claim jurisdiction only over was immediately buried in the H on

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 duran congress, and the country’s though it hurts to say it, military au der of Riccy Mabel Martinez, a supreme court has thus far refused thority is superior to civil authority.” high-school student whose muti to rule on any cases concerning mil The military took similar action lated body was discovered on July itary jurisdiction. Such a ruling in the case of former defense minis 15 of that year. Martinez had last would set a precedent for future ter Colonel Erick Sanchez, who on been seen at a local army barracks civil-military conflicts by defining, June 9, 1991, shot civilian Gustavo two days earlier, where she report once and for all, the limits of mili Funez, leaving him semiparalyzed. edly went to seek her boyfriend’s tary jurisdiction. Reportedly drunk and enraged release from military service. Both “The judicial authorities have after an argument with a fellow military and civil investigations always been afraid of the armed officer, Sanchez shot Funez, who were launched, but when on July forces,” said CODEH lawyer Linda apparently was an uninvolved by 26 civil judge Maria Mendoza or Rivera. Yet, Manuel Gamero, direc stander. After a brief investigation, dered the arrest of two high army tor of the daily newspaper Tiempo, a military tribunal absolved San officials, Colonel Angel Castro and argues that such fears are no chez of the crime, declaring that Captain Ovidio Andino, the police longer justified: “If the supreme Sanchez had shot the unarmed refused to carry out the order. Po court ruled that these military lice commander Guillermo Pare crimes should be tried in civil des told the press, “I am not going courts, what would happen? Would to authorize this order . . . these there be a coup? Would they kill boys are in active service and we the justices? Of course not.” Ac In 1991 civilian and have military jurisdiction.” The cording to CODEH, the justice sys military authorities daily Tiempo called Paredes’s state tem ’s “abdication of civil authority” ment a “manifestation of the domi is the fundamental reason the mili clashed over the issue nance of military authority over tary’s impunity continues to exist civil authority.” in Honduras. of military jurisdiction The army then took custody of In 1991 civilian and military au in three major cases. Castro and Andino, refusing to thorities clashed over the issue of turn them over to civil authorities. military jurisdiction in three major On each occasion the Judge Mendoza petitioned su cases. On each occasion the armed preme court president Oswaldo forces openly refused to cooperate armed forces openly Ramos to grant the civil court juris with the civilian justice system, and diction over the case. Yet, after a each time civilian authorities refused to cooperate July 30 meeting with armed forces proved unable to exert control. with civilian chief Luis Alonso Discua, Ramos In the first case, known as the “El announced the case would be pur Astillero” massacre, Colonel Leonel authorities. sued by both the military and civil Galindo is suspected of paying his courts, thus refusing to order the farmhands to attack a group of military to turn over the two offi peasant squatters on his land. Five cers. Earlier that month Discua peasants were killed in the attack had publicly declared that Castro on May 3, 1991. A military investi Funez out of “self-defense.” At the and Andino should be tried in mili gation concluded soon after the end of 1991, Sanchez rem ained on tary tribunals. Asked whyjudge massacre that “no soldiers were in active military duty. According to Mendoza was unable to take cus volved,” and although Galindo was Rivera, also prosecuting the San tody of the two officers, Ramos de supposedly taken into military cus chez case, civilian judge Wilfredo clared that the ‘judicial authorities tody, he was not tried. As the massa Mendez “never even began pro are powerless” and that Mendoza cre was a “common,” rather than ceedings” against Sanchez and “im “is not the Bionic Woman or Won military, crime, civil judge Leo peded me in my accusatory work.” der W oman.” nardo Banegas asked the armed Funez, for example, was never forces to release Galindo to the called to civil court to make his ini civil court system. They refused. tial charges. Rivera called the civil Antimilitary Pressures Judge Banegas then petitioned the judge’s failure to act a “mockery of Two critical factors, however, inter supreme court to rule on the case’s justice.” Legislator Salatiel Urbina vened to prevent the murder of jurisdiction, but according to says that “the fact that Sanchez was Riccy Mabel Martinez from being Linda Rivera, who represents the declared innocent tells the world forgotten, and may well have trans families of the murdered peasants, that it is the military and not civil formed the case into a turning “Something always happens so that ians who rule this country.” point in Honduran civil-military the supreme court doesn’t make a The most widely publicized 1991 relations. First, the US embassy, vir ruling. ” Banegas adds that “al case surrounded the rape and mur tually silent during the repression

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Features: Civil-Military Relations

of the 1980s, began to publicly said a CODEH official. Still, do that those officers deemed to have demand that justice be done. On mestic pressure also played a criti committed crimes against civilians July 23 Ambassador Crescencio cal role in the Martinez affair. The are punished internally rather than Arcos declared that there was the brutality of the murder, as well as sent to civilian courts, Custodio need for “a just and transparent ju the almost certain involvement of says the office has yielded “some dicial system to resolve this and military personnel, produced an positive results.” More important, other cases,” since “democracy is unprecedented outburst of anti the supreme court announced in not just elections, but providing military sentiment. A series of large November 1991 that it would in every citizen, humble as he or she student demonstrations in August vestigate both the Galindo and may be, equality before the law.” A 1991 frightened the military, which Sanchez cases and make a ruling week later the embassy called on responded by filling the capital on the jurisdiction of each. Accord the Honduran government to with soldiers. The news media was ing to former armed forces chief “bring the authors of this horrible also very active, keeping the case Lopez, “If the court rules that these crime to justice,” and offered the on the front page for weeks and cases belong in civil courts, two technical assistance of the FBI to providing a forum for antimilitary things will become clear: one, that assist with the case. views. According to CODEH presi high officers are involved in hu Arcos’s unprecedented inter dent Ramon Custodio, the press man rights violations, and two, that vention made an immediate and “played an incredibly important these officers can and should be powerful impact by strengthening role. ... If the armed forces hadn’t tried in civilian courts.” the position of the civil authorities. had to confront the press cam So far, however, neither According to a US embassy official, paign, the student mobilization, Sanchez nor Galindo have been Arcos’s statement “allowed others and international pressure, they charged and the investigation into to come out and criticize the mili might have arranged the pardon of the Martinez killing has moved tary,” as politicians could “shield the soldiers.” slowly, amid charges that impor themselves behind Arcos” in their tant evidence has been tampered attacks on the armed forces. Em “We’ve Lost Our Fear” with. In addition, the July 1991 boldened by the US position, su murder of human rights activist preme court president Ramos The Martinez case may have long- Marco Tulio Hernandez and the declared on August 2 that the Mar lasting effects on Honduran civil- September 1991 assassination of in tinez case “has to go to the civil military relations. In addition to digenous leader Vincent Matute re courts. . . . Why do doctors, econo strengthening the resolve of civic main unsolved. Fear of the military mists, workers, peasants, and busi leaders, it has had an empowering has not disappeared, particularly ness people but not soldiers submit effect on the population in gen among judges in rural areas. More themselves to civil law?” The mili eral. According to Honduran politi over, many question whether the tary leadership, on the other hand, cal analyst Victor Meza, the case current reform movement could denounced Arcos’s “intervention “permitted antimilitarism to be be sustained without US pressure. into the internal affairs of our coun come public . . . the army is no Legislator Luis Alberto Rubi asks, try” and called for the ambassador longer a taboo subject.” This pub “The day we don’t have Arcos, to be declared persona non grata. lic empowerment, sociologist Leti what will happen? Will impunity It is evident that, given the ex cia Salomon has argued, “is very remain?” traordinary degree of US influence promising because the moment ci Yet others maintain that the tide in Honduras, Arcos’s stance could vilians feel they can challenge the toward civilian control over the mil not be ignored. On August 21 it military and seek justice for abuses, itary is irreversible. “Because we was announced that defendants real changes will take place.” The have lost our fear of the military, Castro and Andino would be tried military is clearly on the defensive. the boots and the uniforms don’t by the civil court system. At the “Soldiers know things are not like mean anything anymore,” said Fa same time, however, the military before,” says the president of the ther Elias Ruiz, who has braved announced that both officers had Asociacion de Prensa Hondurena, Mi death threats in his effort to bring been released from the armed guel Osmando Mejia. “They have Colonel Galindo to justice for the forces and would be tried as civil to be careful. If they kill someone May 3 massacre. Hondurans can ians, thereby avoiding a precedent- now, they may not remain untouch only hope that his bravado is in setting trial of military officers by a able.” deed true. ■ civilian court. Several important steps have Few Hondurans doubt that been taken towards ending impuni Arcos’s intervention was decisive in ty. In September 1991 the national the Martinez case. “If Arcos hadn’t police opened up a complaints of Editor’s Note: Adapted with permission made that statement, the military fice, reportedly at the request of from Mesoamerica (San Jose, Costa would have absolved the officers,” the US embassy. Despite the fact Rica), January-February 1992.

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Guatemala’s Military Transition by Gabriel Aguilera Peralta

ntil 1982 the Guatemalan chological warfare—in an attempt economic and political demands of military exercised a di to win the “hearts and minds” of the masses or to create the percep rect role in the creation the masses. tion that such demands could be of a seemingly endless satisfied within the institutional succession of authoritar channels of the status quo. ian governments. The This updated version of counter massiveU corruption, electoral fraud, insurgency doctrine was refined in and repressive politics of these A second major step in both the Centro de Estudios Militares regimes fueled both the contempo and the Estado Mayor (the executive rary economic crisis and a wide the development of the body of the armed forces) in the spread and well-documented late 1970s and early 1980s. It was climate of grave human rights theory of Guatemalan subsequently galvanized by the abuse. In 1982, however, the presi strengthened military capacity of dency of General Romeo Lucas counterinsurgency the country’s guerrilla forces— Garcia was overthrown in a military warfare was the whose growing m om entum was coup, and a process of democratic signified by their 1982 amalgama transition began. The question is military’s realization tion as the Union Revolutionaria why did some military circles de National Guatemalteca (URNG)— cide to gamble on an alternative, that any society and finally put into practice under democratic path? characterized by the two transitional military govern The reason, it seems, was the ments that existed between the fall emergence of an alternative to re extreme poverty and of Lucas Garcia and the formation pression as a strategy for defeating of a constitutional government Guatemala’s insurgent movements. inequality would be under Christian-Democrat Vinicio In the conservative view, achieving Cerezo. Based upon their new con victory in counterinsurgency war vulnerable to ceptions, these interim govern fare justified systematic military insurgency. ments implemented a two-pronged reprisals against the general popu policy. On the one hand, they lation, particularly those suspected launched all-out military offensives of providing sustenance, protec that—at a terrible cost in lives and tion, and recruits to insurgent ar damage to the social fabric, particu mies. A more sophisticated, liberal larly to indigenous communities in strain of this philosophy sought to The modernization of counter the countryside—devastated the in make the approach more flexible insurgency strategy, however, did surgent support network and left and effective by recognizing the not end with the addition of psy the guerrillas in disarray. At the social-structural roots of insurgency chological warfare. Another major same time, they prepared for the and adding a new element—psy- step in the development of the free elections that culminated in theory, if not the practice, of Gua the Cerezo presidency by rebuild temalan counterinsurgency warfare ing the party system and creating a was the military sector’s realization constitutional assembly. Gabriel Aguilera Peralta is coordinator that any society characterized by ex of studies on international relations for treme poverty and inequality would the Guatemala program of the Facultad always be vulnerable to insurgency. Political Consequences Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales In that light, a strategy of preven The ultimate results, though, were (FLACSO), as well as coordinator of the tion would be a far more valuable not exactly what the strategy’s ar working group on “Fuerzas Armadas, weapon in combating insurgency chitects had expected. To begin Sociedady Defensa Nacional”for the than psychological warfare, and with, the liberal wing of military Confederation Latinoamericana de the key to this “preventive” strategy leadership remained a minority, Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO). would be to either satisfy the socio outnumbered by a conservative

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Features: Civil-Military Relations

tion of courses such as human rights, the incorporation of rela tively progressive civilian educators into military faculties, and the ini tiation of civil-military leadership forums to discuss questions of na tional security within the liberal ized framework. The latter have been linked to the Centro de Es- tudios de la Estabilidad Nacional through the past efforts of a lead ing military modernizer, former defense minister General Hector Gramajo, as well as to current plan ning to establish the Escuela Supe rior de Estudios Estrategicos. It is through these reforms that the modernizers seek to eventually alter the military mentality.

The Future of Civil-Military Relations Clearly the military’s liberal sector has been strong enough to initiate Adapted from El Periodico (Barcelona), March 28, 1992. and defend Guatemala’s transition to democracy as well as the internal reform of the armed forces. None military caste whose members widespread violations of human theless, the future of both political feared that democratization would rights. In this respect, the US Em democratization and military lib present new political opportunities bassy, which has clearly supported eralization is uncertain as long as for the insurgents. A reflection of the military modernizers, has the country’s internal war goes on. this divergence was the debate over sharply criticized Guatemala’s re With this in mind, what has been ending the guerrilla war by means cord of human-rights abuses, partic the role of civilian political players? of a negotiated settlement. Presi ularly with respect to the murders At first it was perhaps limited to dent Cerezo and the liberal wing of of US activists Mirna Mack, Mi whatever political space the mili the armed forces supported this ap chael Devine, and Dianna Mae tary was willing to cede. While Presi proach, suggesting an agreement Ortiz. dent Cerezo initially attempted to within the framework of the August The split within the executive broaden this space, two attempted 1987 Esquipulas II initiative for ranks of the armed forces leads to coups forced him to take a defen Central American peace and de a key question concerning the sive posture. His successor, Jorge mocratization. In contrast, the con long-range balance of civil-military Serrano, who took office in 1990, servative wing not only opposed relations: to what degree is the Gua made his objective the strengthen the approach but attempted two temalan military willing to relin ing of his constitutional authority coups against the Cerezo adminis quish its traditional spheres of as head of the military. Though the tration. power? While the liberal wing is political dominance of the armed Equally reflective of the political disposed to cede power in order to forces remains solidly intact, Se divergence between the military’s undercut the insurgent threat, the rrano has made substantial prog liberal and conservative wings is conservative wing is equally insis ress with respect to selecting high the persistence of human rights vio tent that it must maintain power in military officials and reducing the lations. It is well documented that, order to achieve the very same ob military’s invulnerability to charges in spite of the country’s democrati jective. of human rights violations. cally elected presidencies, death In any case, the liberalization of The clearest evidence of grow squads encrusted within the the Guatemalan armed forces con ing civilian power, however, is that government’s national-security tinues with the introduction of cur the military allowed Serrano to initi machinery and connected with re riculum reforms at various levels of ate direct negotiations with URNG. actionary sectors of civil society con training and education. Spearhead As a result of these talks, which tinue to commit serious and ing the reforms are the introduc took place throughout 1990, a

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 negotiated end to the internal war counterinsurgency campaign—to has become a distinct possibility. In combat the widely recognized sofar as they have strengthened the Debate within the problem of urban crime. And the nexus between the government’s military has acted to protect the civil machinery and the liberal sec Guatemalan armed Biosfera Maya, an immense park in tor of the armed forces, these de forces is beginning to the northern province of Peten, velopments point to a long-term against incursions by illegal tree- reorganization of Guatemalan civil- converge with wider cutters from across the Mexican military relations. In this regard, it border. should be recognized that, as in Latin American The Guatemalan military con the case of El Salvador, a successful military trends by fronts a paradox: while political conclusion to peace negotiations crisis has led to the institution’s would be a definitive step toward considering possible growth, modernization, and matu demilitarization and the redefini ration, Central America’s emerging tion of the military’s role. The lib new roles. regional order promises to de-em- eral sector of the armed forces phasize the role of military forces. seems to have accepted this possi If this regional promise indeed crys bility. tallizes, then democratic civil-mili vation. For example, the Guatema tary relations could well become a lan military’s small air and naval Central American and Guatemalan forces are already substantially in reality. ■ volved in the interception of drug traffic. Further, the military is de ploying its system of urban con trol—originally constructed for the (Translated by Hemisphere staff) c c A

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nerica Central America in Context

imunity groups; Slide Show presentations and forums on the historical roots Social Studies, of current events with strategies for teaching Central Ameri- rUal texts, histo- can students and for teaching North Americans about the region... urs Model Educational Programs | ings with Minis- The Books Project uses process-based writing strategies to teachers’ union bring the voices of Central American refugee children into the Central American classroom as they publish their own bilingual stories . . .

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Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Features: Civil-Military Relations

tion of courses such as human rights, the incorporation of rela tively progressive civilian educators into military faculties, and the ini tiation of civil-military leadership forums to discuss questions of na tional security within the liberal ized framework. The latter have been linked to the Centro deEs- tudios de la Estabilidad Nacional through the past efforts of a lead ing military modernizer, former defense minister General Hector Gramajo, as well as to current plan ning to establish the Escuela Supe rior de Estudios Estrategicos. It is through these reforms that the mnHprni7Pr»{ seek tn pventuallv

Adapted fromYX Periodico (Barcelona), March 28, 1992. military caste whose members widespread violations of human feared that democratization would rights. In this respect, the US Em present new political opportunities bassy, which has clearly supported for the insurgents. A reflection of the military modernizers, has this divergence was the debate over sharply criticized Guatemala’s re ending the guerrilla war by means cord of human-rights abuses, partic of a negotiated settlement. Presi ularly with respect to the murders dent Cerezo and the liberal wing of of US activists Mirna Mack, Mi the armed forces supported this ap chael Devine, and Dianna Mae proach, suggesting an agreement Ortiz. within the framework of the August The split within the executive 1987 Esquipulas II initiative for ranks of the armed forces leads to Central American peace and de a key question concerning the mocratization. In contrast, the con long-range balance of civil-military servative wing not only opposed relations: to what degree is the Gua the approach but attempted two temalan military willing to relin coups against the Cerezo adminis quish its traditional spheres of tration. power? While the liberal wing is Equally reflective of the political disposed to cede power in order to divergence between the military’s undercut the insurgent threat, the liberal and conservative wings is conservative wing is equally insis the persistence of human rights vio tent that it must maintain power in lations. It is well docum ented that, order to achieve the very same ob in spite of the country’s democrati jective. cally elected presidencies, death In any case, the liberalization of squads encrusted within the the Guatemalan armed forces con government’s national-security tinues with the introduction of cur machinery and connected with re riculum reforms at various levels of actionary sectors of civil society con training and education. Spearhead tinue to commit serious and ing the reforms are the introduc-

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 negotiated end to the internal war counterinsurgency campaign—to has become a distinct possibility. In combat the widely recognized sofar as they have strengthened the Debate zvithin the problem of urban crime. And the nexus between the government’s military has acted to protect the civil machinery and the liberal sec Guatemalan armed Biosfera Maya, an immense park in tor of the armed forces, these de forces is beginning to the northern province of Peten, velopments point to a long-term against incursions by illegal tree- reorganization of Guatemalan civil- converge with voider cutters from across the Mexican military relations. In this regard, it border. should be recognized that, as in Latin American The Guatemalan military con the case of El Salvador, a successful fronts a paradox: while political conclusion to peace negotiations military trends by crisis has led to the institution’s would be a definitive step toward considering possible growth, modernization, and matu demilitarization and the redefini ration, Central America’s emerging tion of the military’s role. The lib new roles. regional order promises to de-em- eral sector of the armed forces phasize the role of military forces. seems to have accepted this possi If this regional promise indeed crys bility. tallizes, then democratic civil-mili As a consequence, debate within vation. For example, the Guatema tary relations could well become a the Guatemalan armed forces is be lan military’s small air and naval Central American and Guatemalan ginning to converge with wider forces are already substantially in reality. ■ Latin American military trends by volved in the interception of drug considering possible new roles traffic. Further, the military is de ranging from antidrug trafficking ploying its system of urban con initiatives to environmental conser- trol—originally constructed for the (Translated by Hemisphere staff) N E C C A

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Hemisphere • Summer 1992 R E V I E W Baseball’s Caribbean Connection

by Martin F. Murphy

Sugarball: The American Game, straight on the past and present re 1970s. They now represent the larg the Dominican Dream alities of Dominican baseball. est group of non-US born players. by Alan M. Klein. New Haven: Yale Baseball did not arrive in the Dominican sports folklore and University Press, 1991. 179pp. + x. Dominican Republic with the US sports pages maintain their own er $19.95. ’ occupation of 1916-24, as many be roneous images. Poor kids are told lieve. It came, rather, from Cuba in “you can make it, if you try,” and El Beisbol: Travels through the the 1880s. Though an import, it be that “the streets of America really Pan-American Pastime came the Dominican game. But it are lined with gold, at least for pro by John Krich. New York: Prentice Hall, was not until Jackie Robinson— fessional ballplayers.” Few kids un 1989. 272pp. + xv. Paperback. $8.95. among others—broke the “color derstand that the vast majority of barrier” in the 1950s that US major- professional baseball players lan league teams took an interest in re guish in the rookie and minor The Tropic of Baseball: Base cruiting Dominican ballplayers. leagues. Most of those fortunate ball in the Dominican Republic and gifted enough to make it to by Rob Ruck. Westport, Conn.: Meckler, the US earn an average gross salary 1991. 205pp. + xx. $37.50. of less than $10,000 a year and re Poor kids are told ceive only $15 to $25 a day for ex arefoot boys playing base penses while they are on the road. ball with mitts fashioned “you can make it, Instead of traveling in planes, they from milk cartons, any ride up to nine hours a day in re round object serving as a ifyou try, ’’and that cycled passenger buses. And they ball and any long stick as play ball seven days a week to a bat, with a sugar-cane “the streets of America crowds that average less than 1,500 plantationB providing the backdrop. really are lined in such out-of-the-way towns as These images provide an irresis Peoria and Utica. tible human interest angle for with gold, at least In a conversation with a Do foreign journalists. Add multimil minican who played for a Chicago lionaire Dominican major leaguers for professional White Sox farm team, the player and the story has the makings of a both lamented and relished his Horatio Alger tale—a seductive mo ballplayers. ” present and future. Over his first tif for North American audiences. home-cooked Dominican meal in US newspapers and magazines eight months, he spoke about how serve up a kaleidoscope of these he was getting old and had, at best, images throughout the year. Un Ninety percent of Dominicans fall a few years left to make it out of fortunately most of these stories into the category of black in US the A league and into the majors; are the same. The same images, racial taxonomy, a group that sim how when he needed a new mitt an fallacies, and superficialities are re ply was not perm itted to play with agent would provide it, hoping he peated. Authors Alan Klein, John white major-league ballplayers un would someday sign a lucrative con Krich, and Rob Ruck set the record til Robinson came along. To be tract. He related to me the social sure, Dominicans did play North pressures he encounters when he Americans before then, but both returns to his community in the their teammates and opponents Cibao, the fertile valley in the cen Martin F. Murphy is associate professor were African-Americans from the ter of the island of Hispaniola. of anthropology and, a Fellow of the Kel Negro Leagues. With a few excep Family, friends, neighbors, and logg Institute for International Studies, tions—by and large standouts such hangers-on all assume that he University of Notre Dame. His most re as Juan Marichal, the Alou broth makes millions of dollars like cent book is Dominican Sugar Planta ers, and the Carty brothers—Do Pedro Guerrero of the St. Louis tions: Production and Foreign minicans did not break into US Cardinals. When he doesn’t share Labor Integration (Praeger, 1991). major-league baseball until the his “wealth,” they say he is selfish

42 Hemisphere • Summer 1992 and tacano (cheap). In the midst of organization, but he had made it intimately tied to the study of soci the laments, he affirmed he would to the “bigs” in grand style: Juan ety and culture, especially the study make it to the real White Sox team. Samuel was voted 1984 National of a particular society and culture. He just needed to work hard, not League Rookie of the Year by the Klein’s anthropological study is be a “head case,” and “if God was Sporting News. organized around the theme of the willing” he would someday play in dialectic between hegemony and re Chicago’s new Comiskey Park. sistance. Hegemony, he argues, is Dreams do not die easily, even Most poor and expressed in the control that US with heavy doses of reality. Most culture (in the form of baseball) poor and working-class boys not working-class boys and capitalism (in the form of only fantasize about being in the major-league organizations) exert big leagues, but know someone not only fantasize over Dominican sport and society who “was signed” by a major-league about being in in general. Resistance, he claims, is organization. Their friends or rela evidenced by the national hero wor tives seldom made it past the re the big leagues, but ship of Dominican ballplayers who cruits’ academies in the Dominican have long dominated the big Republic or the rookie league in know someone who leagues—Juan Marichal striking Florida. Nonetheless, as a re out gringos, Pedro Guerrero or minder that some do “get called “was signed” by George (“Jorge”) Bell blasting a up,” even the biggest superstars— a major-league home run off America’s best pitch like Pedro Guerrero, George ers. Every hit, every strike pitch, (“Jorge”) Bell, Tony Fernandez, organization. every heroic catch by a Dominican and Julio Franco—spend the win is a source of national pride. ter at home. Indeed, the guys to The model is compelling, but whom the gringos pay millions of Klein’s treatment of it is often dollars a year are never very far Sports and the Study ot Society forced, and a number of his state away—a lesson I learned to my Using a variety of disciplinary and ments about the Dominican Repub embarrassment. theoretical approaches, scholars lic are simply erroneous. The most As I was riding a bus from the have demonstrated that sport is a striking of these—that the country capital city of Santo Domingo to valid area of social inquiry and that exhibits the lowest per capita in San Pedro de Macoris in 1983, my the study of sport can inform us come in the Western Hemisphere seat mate struck up a conversation. about society and culture. But they (p. 9)—ignores, among other coun He looked like most other 20-year- have set a difficult task for them tries, the Dominican Republic’s old m en from San Pedro. He was selves. They must face two oppos closest neighbor: Haiti. Klein is at even wearing a Philadelphia Phil ing camps. Many in the snobbish his best when describing how Do lies T-shirt, as did many young Do US intellectual community like to minican players and fans behave in minican men that winter, months think of themselves as somehow the stadium and discussing the after the team had won the Na above the study of games. On the young recruits—the “Wannabees.” tional League pennant. He told me other hand, many sports fans want These chapters provide ethno that he played for the Phillies or to see sport on its own terms, not graphic insights, but are unfortu ganization; but I was not to be clouded with social analysis and nately tainted by the author’s duped. I was certain that the man commentary. preoccupation with differences had confused fantasy with reality; In this setting, Klein’s Sugarball between Dominicans and North there was nothing special about and Ruck’s Tropic of Baseball at Americans. Klein seems unable to him. Nine months later, however, tempt to walk the fine line between interpret Dominican culture with his picture appeared on the front baseball lovers and more rigorous out constant reference to his own. page of the sports section of the scholars. The two books amply Rob Ruck is an historian by Listin Diario. Not only was he in demonstrate that the study of vocation and a lover of baseball deed a ballplayer in the Phillies sport, in this case, baseball, can be and good literary style by nature.

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Review Forum

Unlike Klein’s Sugarball, whose pri that’s when the hot pot that’s been customed to seeing some of the mary mission is to test scholarly cooking for a century boils over” world’s greatest baseball players dis hypotheses through the study of (pp. 269-70). Roberto Clemente re play their skills in their home coun baseball, Ruck’s Tropic of Baseball is turns to lead the troops, Juan Mari- try. Since the mid-1980s, however, unabashedly about the game itself. chal’s trademark “high kick proves few Dominican major leaguers play His book, then, is written for fans. useful in evading the barbed wire “winter ball” to audiences of their As a scholarly work, however, it sub on army bases” (p. 270), US gov fellow countrymen, and those who tly teaches the history of Domini ernors and senators are replaced do so tend to play a shortened can society and culture to an by umpires, games are played in season. Tony Pena, of the Boston audience of North American base “Anti-Yankee Stadium,” and “the Red Sox in the summer and the ball fans. Indeed, his description White House becomes the Tan Aguilas Cibaenas (Cibao Eagles) in and analysis of the development of House” (p. 271). the winter, is the noteworthy excep baseball in the Dominican Repub tion and thus is now a national lic is the definitive treatment of the hero. Pena is not enough of an ex topic. ception to save attendance, how In ElBeisbol, journalist John As quickly as ever. As Dominican fans have come Krich employs a grander view than to recognize the declining quality that of Klein or Ruck; he discusses Dominicans emerged of winter baseball, the number of five principal suppliers of major- fans present in the stadium has league ballplayers (the Dominican as solid and even plummeted. Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, Another key reason for plung Puerto Rico, and Venezuela). He superstar major-league ing attendance is that the Domini also approaches Hispanic Carib players, professional can economy has been in shambles bean baseball with no academic since 1984. The economic crisis pretensions and tells his story with baseball’s popularity has brought prolonged daily black the wacky and whimsical flair of a outs that limit night games. More Hunter Thompson. Krich’s ap in the country is important, the lion’s share of proach makes for fascinating read Dominican fans comes from the ing—an adventure in the tropics, declining even faster. working class, a group that can no with baseball and the history of US longer afford the admission price. dominance over Latin America as Ruck also notes an important the unifying themes. In short, recent shift in sports interest in the Krich has written a book for politi country: basketball is beginning to cally progressive US baseball fans. The Future of Dominican Baseball supplant baseball as the Domini No fan can finish this book without can national sport. Many Domini appreciating the social and politi Baseball is still a vital part of Do can youths now view baseball as the cal problems of Caribbean Basin minican popular culture, but as game of the older generation, of nations and the inequities in US- both Klein and Ruck remind us, all rural areas, and of the poor. Bas Latin American relations. Whether is not well in the Dominican game. ketball is the new passion of the discussing Mexican, Venezuelan, As quickly as Dominicans emerged emerging urban lower-middle or Dominican baseball, Krich has in disproportionate numbers as class. Michael Jordan m ania is on the unique talent of combining solid and even superstar major- the rise in the Dominican Repub tales of individual passion with league players, professional base lic: Chicago Bulls T-shirts and high- broad historical events. Sexual liai ball’s popularity in the country is top sneakers are now the youth sons exist side-by-side with racial declining even faster. The reasons fashion rage, and the new-style confrontations. Salsa rhythms and are myriad and diverse. They are re “wannabees,” “wanna be like Mike.” fried plantains inhabit the same lated to the declining quality of win So far, only one Dominican, canvas with dictatorships and US ter ball in the Dominican Republic, Tito Horford, has made it to the military occupations. economic crisis, and competition National Basketball Association Krich’s wildest political fantasies from another US-born sport. (NBA) and his tenure was brief. are found in his last chapter, “The Major-league ballplayers who Will the second half of the 1990s Reconquest.” Latin ballplayers con toil for their millions of dollars dur bring an onslaught of Dominican quer US baseball and society as ing the summer in the US are now roundball players to the NBA? leftist guerrillas: “. . . all the Latin reluctant to play during the Domin Nonetheless, and regardless of the leaguers simultaneously put down ican winter season. They argue that possible future success of Domini their mitts and pick up machetes. they need to rest and cannot risk cans in the NBA, basketball in the The banana republics become base a career-ending injury for a few Dominican Republic, like baseball, ball republics once and for all. And pesos. Dominican fans grew ac will always be a Dominican game. ■

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 THE TIGER AND THE CHILDREN New and Fidel Castro and the Judgment of History Roberto Luque Escalona Fidel Castro has long claimed that he would be absolved by history. Recent This volume tests Castro’s claim against fact and finds that history will condemn the long-standing dictator of Cuba. Escalona’s work is filled with a level of intimate detail unrivaled in any other analysis. ISBN: 1-56000-027-9 (cloth) 212pp. $29.95 Books on ISBN: 1-56000-593-9 (paper) 212pp. $14.95 POVERTY, NATURAL RESOURCES, Latin AND PUBLIC POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA U.S.-Third World Policy Perspective Series, No. 17 America Sheldon Annis, editor Rural poverty and environmental degradation are steadily worsening in Central America,undercutting the prospects for regional peace and economic recovery.This volume analyzes strategies that aim to re Order from your bookstore or direct duce poverty and protect the environment in the region. from the publisher. Major credit cards ISBN: 1-56000-015-5 (cloth) 280pp. $24.95 accepted. Call: (908) 932-2280 ISBN: 1-56000-577-7 (paper) 280pp. $15.95 REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY Transaction Publishers A Handbook for Practitioners Department 492LA5 Ernesto Betancourt Rutgers University transaction New Brunswick, NJ 08903 Betancourt shows how to evaluate the politics and actions of leader ships in different revolutionary contexts (totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic), using the Cuban and Uruguayan experiences as case studies. ISBN: 0-88738-411-0 (cloth) 196pp. $29.95 ENVIRONMENT AND LABOR IN THE CARIBBEAN Caribbean Perspectives, Volume 2 Joseph Lisowski, editor This volume focuses on the eastern Caribbean, exploring aspects of management and climate; social, literary, and educational concerns; and includes an extended study of the labor situation in the U.S. Virgin Islands. ISBN: 1-56000-584-X (paper) 128pp. $19.95 CUBA ANNUAL REPORT: 1989 Office of Research and Policy, Voice of America-Radio Marti Program United States Information Agency This annual statistical handbook provides fundamental data on Cuba, including in-depth reviews of Cuban foreign policy, the national econ omy, military allocations and manpower, political control, cultural developments, and ideological shifts. ISBN: 1-56000-016-3 (cloth) 350pp. $59.95

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Hemisphere • Summer 1992 PUBLIC AT

Civil-Military Relations in Latin America

by Marian Goslinga

hroughout Latin America’s modern history, militarism and authoritarianism have been the norm, and democracy and reform the exception. In the 1950s, for instance, 12 out of the 20 republics were ruled by militaryjuntas. Yet by 1961, 11 of the 12 had been eliminated. Only a year later, a new wave of military coups had begun as a result of which, by 1964, seven new militaryjuntas were in office. It has been estimated that, between independence and World War I, the Spanish-American republics experienced 115 successful mili T tary coups and many times that number of abortive military revolts (Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, rev. ed., Praeger, 1961). In the 1980s and early 1990s the military seemed to be on the retreat as country after country chose to experiment with constitutionally elected government. Nonetheless, recent events in Haiti, Peru, and Venezuela appear to have swung the pendulum the other way. At the least they have proven that the Latin American military remains a powerful wild card. Until Latin American democracy is able to shed its eggshell fragility, this vicious circle is apt to continue in definitely. The literature listed below is one indicator of the durability of military influence on Latin American government and political affairs.

Una aproximacion al rol y a las ta- Argentina, el ejercito que tenemos. America. Paul W. Zagorski. Boulder, reas pendientes de las Fuerzas Ar Jorge Grecco, Gustavo Gonzalez. Bue Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, 1992. madas en la transition paraguaya a nos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 217 p. $35.00; $16.95 paper. [Ana la democracia. Ambal Regis Ro 1990. 220 p. [An institutional por lyzes the problem of establishing mero. Perspectiva International trait of Argentina’s armed forces civilian control over the armed Paraguaya, v. 2 (January/June based on interviews with their lead forces in the Latin American de 1990), p. 95-116. [Analyzes the ers and other members of the de mocracies.] military’s role in Paraguay since fense community.] the downfall of the Stroessner re El Salvador: The Military and Poli gime in February 1989.] Between Confrontation and Ac tics. Martin C. Needier. Armed commodation: Military and Gov Forces and Society, v. 17 (Summer Argentina y los nexos militares. ernment Policy in Democratic 1991), p. 569-88. Leobardo Urrutia Juarez. Hispano Argentina. David Pion-Berlin. /owr- Americano, v. 99 (August 1991), nal of Latin American Studies, v. 23 En nombre de Dios. Raul Marin. p. 39. [Describes the government’s (October 1991), p. 543-71. [Dis Pensamiento Propio, v. 9, no. 7 (Janu- efforts to break up the money laun cusses civil-military relations in Ar ary-February 1991), p. 20-21. [Ex dering and drug trafficking begun gentina and the policies of Raul amines Guatemalan president under the military regime.] Alfonsin during 1983-89.] Jorge Serrano Elias’s promise to bring the armed forces under civil Argentina’s “Dirty War”: An In Beyond Elections. Tina Rosenberg. ian rule.] tellectual Biography. Donald C. Foreign Policy, no. 84 (Fall 1991), Hodges. Austin: University of Texas p. 72-91. [Discusses the military’s Explaining the Long-Term Main Press, 1991. 387 p. $37.50. [Exam role in Latin America in general.] tenance of a Military Regime: ines the interaction between the Panama Before the U.S. Invasion. armed forces, guerrillas, and or De Geisel a Collor: o balan^o da Steve C. Ropp. World Politics, v. 44 ganized labor since the 1930s, fo transigao. Bolivar Lamounier. Sao (January 1992), p. 210-34. cusing on the 1970s and 1980s.] Paulo: Sumare, 1990. 197 p. [Dis cusses the transition from military From Military to Civilian Rule. government to civilian rule in Bra Constantine P. Danopoulos. London: zil during 1974-89.] Routledge, 1992. 256 p. $79.95. Marian Goslinga is the Latin Ameri [Examines civil-military relations in can and Caribbean librarian at Florida Democracy vs. National Security: South America, Central America, International University. Civil-Military Relations in Latin and the Dominican Republic.]

46 Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Las fuerzas armadas y la transition Military Bureaucracy, Political Op on the attitudes and interests of var a la democracia en America Latina. position, and Democratic Transi ious social groups.] Gustavo Cuevas Farren. Politico, tion. Alex E. Fernandez Jilberto; nos. 22/23 (June 1991), p. 83-99. Anfbal Yariez, trans. Latin American The Next Steps in Central Amer [Discusses the military’s attitudes Perspectives, v. 18 (Winter 1991), ica. Bruce L. R. Smith, ed. Washing towards the democratization pro p. 33-65. [Discusses Chile’s political ton: Brookings Institution, 1991. cesses in Argentina, Brazil, and scenario after Allende’s defeat.] 87 p. $9.95. [Paper presented at a Uruguay.] conference held in Washington, The Military in Latin America: Is DC, June 19-21, 1990; discusses po Gewerkschaften und Militarre- the Retreat for Good? Fernando litical, economic, and military is gierung in Peru. Achim Wachendorf. Bustamante. Bulletin of Peace Pro sues.] Heidelberg: Heidelberger Ver- posals, v. 21 (December 1990), laganstalt, 1989. 553 p. [Discusses p. 371-84. [Presents the possibility Nicaragua’s Permanent Crisis: Rul relations between labor unions and of a reversal in the pervasive trend ing from Above and Below. Mark the military in Peru, 1968-80.] towards military coups and repres A. Uhlig. Survival, v. 33 (Septem sive militaryjuntas of the 1970s.] ber/O ctober 1991), p. 401-23. [Discusses the relations between Honduras. Jennifer Rosenberg. The Military Regime and the Re Violeta Chamorro’s government Mesoamerica, v. 10, no. 11 (Novem structuring of Land Tenure. Patri and the Frente Sandinista military ber 1991), p. 9-10. [Reviews the cio Silva; Nancy Plankey Videla, forces.] growing controversy over the trans. Latin American Perspectives, military’s role in the country.] v. 18 (Winter 1991), p. 15-32. [Fo Uma nova concepcao estrategica cuses on Chile’s Pinochet dictator para o Brasil: um debate necessa- Is Democracy Possible in Haiti? ship.] rio. Armando A. F. Vidigal. Politica Ernest H. Preeg. North-South, v. 1, eEstrategia, v. 7, no. 3 (July-Septem- no. 1 (June 1991), p. 34-39. [Dis ;Mision cumplida?: Civil-Military ber 1991), p. 304-24. [Focuses on cusses Haiti’s political situation Relations and the Chilean Political Brazil’s military strategy within the after the February 7, 1991, election Transition. Brian Loveman.Journal context of a new international su of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and ques of Interamerican Studies and World Af perpower structure.] tions the stability of Haitian democ fairs, v. 33, no. 3 (Fall 1991), p. 35- racy.] 74. [Reviews the constitutional Of Victims and Executioners: Ar framework that has emerged since gentine State Terror, 1975-1979. 1973 and examines the tensions fol David Pion-Berlin, George A. Militarism and Politics in Latin lowing the installation of a civilian Lopez. International Studies Quar America: Peru from Sanchez Cerro government in 1990.] terly, v. 35 (March 1991), p. 63-86. to Sendero Luminoso. Daniel M. [Data from Argentina’s Comision Masterson. New York: Greenwood Mobilization at the Grassroots: Nacional sobre la Desaparicion de Per Press, 1991. 345 p. [Analyzes Peru’s Shantytowns and Resistance in Au sonas (CONADEP).] political situation during 1930-68 thoritarian Chile. Cathy Schneider. with emphasis on the role of the Latin American Perspectives, v. 18 “Order and Progress”: A Political armed forces.] (Winter 1991), p. 92-112. [De History of Brazil. Ronald M. Schnei scribes the opposition in the “po- der. Westview Press, 1991. 486 p. The Military and the Politics of blaciones" to the military regime.] $55.00. [Traces the course of repre Change in Guyana. Ivelav L. Grif sentative democracy in Brazil with fith. Journal of Interamerican Studies A Nation of Enemies: Chile under emphasis on the military’s role.] and World Affairs, v. 33 (Summer Pinochet. Pamela Constable, Arturo 1991), p. 141-73. [Discusses devel Valenzuela. New York: Norton, Organization of American States opments since independence with 1991. 367 p. [Describes political Repudiates Suriname Military emphasis on the 1980s.] and social developments, focusing Coup. Luigi R. Einaudi. Foreign

Hemisphere • Summer 1992 Publications Update

Policy Bulletin, v. 1 (January/April 15, 1991), p. 57. [Discusses the de v. 14, no. 159 (March 1991), p. 45- 1991), p. 136-37. [Includes the fense of democracy in the event of 50. [Discusses the challenges facing statement of the OAS Permanent a new tide of military coups in the Aylwin government as it moves Council of December 28, 1990, as Latin America.] towards consolidating democracy well as the text of Resolution 554.] in Chile.] Sin novedad en el frente. Grace Panama. Steve Levitsky. Meso- Gibson. QuePasa, no. 1063 (August The Unfinished Republic: Brazil. america, v. 10, no. 7 (July 1991), 1991), p. 12-13. [Discusses the im Jose Murillo de Carvalho. Americas, p. 11-12. [Summarizes the plan to proving relations between the mili v. 48, no. 2 (October 1991), p. 139- abolish the military.] tary and the government in Chile.] 42. [Discusses the civil-military rela tions under Deodoro de Fonseca.] Politics and Identity in the Argen Social Action and Development: tine Army: Cleavages and the Gen The Case of Brazil. C. A. Medina. Which Path to Peace: Reorienting erational Factor. Silvio Waisbord. Community Development Journal, Central America’s Armed Forces. Latin American Research Review, v. 26, no. 3 (July 1991), p. 172-77. Michael Dewar. International Defense v. 26, no. 2 (Spring 1991), p. 157- [Traces the demise of military dicta Review, v. 24, no. 7 (July 1991), 64. [Discusses the military’s chang torships in Latin America during p. 706-7. [Describes the changing ing role in democratic Argentina.] the 1980s with special reference to focus of the armed forces in Nicara the growth of social movements in gua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and The Popular Sector Response to an Brazil.] Honduras.] Authoritarian Regime: Shantytown Organizations since the Military The Struggle for Democracy in Whither the Latin American Mili Coup. Philip Oxhorn. Latin Ameri Chile, 1982-1990. Paul W. Drake, tary? Gabriel Marcella. North-South, can Perspectives, v. 18 (Winter 1991), IvanJaksic, eds. Lincoln: University v. 1, no. 2 (August-September p. 66-91. [A new look at civil-mili- of Nebraska Press, 1991. 321 p. 1991), p. 34-37. [Discusses the chal tary relations in Chile.] lenge facing Latin America of inte La transition chilena: un corte de grating the military into society Presidential Elections and Political caja. Manuel A. Garreton. Nexos, and asserting civilian control.] Transition in Latin America. Hel- gio Trindale. International Social C------\ Science Journal, v. 43 (May 1991), p. 301-14. The Changing Hemispheric El proceso de dialogo-negociacion durante el primer ano de ARENA Trade Environment: [Alianza Republicana Nacionalis- Opportunities and ta]. Carlos Lozada. Estudios Cen- O bstacles troamericanos (ECA), v. 45, nos. 500-501 (June-July 1991), p. 439-63. [Describes ARENA’S first year in Mark B. Rosenberg, Editor power and its relations with the Salvadoran armed forces.] Leading international trade specialists analyze options for hemispheric trade, including the likely impact of a North American free trade Reconceptualizing Latin American agreement and a single European market and the roles of Japan and the Authoritarianism in the 1970’s: Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. From Bureaucratic-Authoritarian- ism to Neoconservatism. Hector E. Contributors: Luis Abugattas, Myles Frechette, Marian Goslinga, Wolf Schamis. Comparative Politics, v. 23 Grabendorff, Gary C. Hufbauer, Tetsuro lino, Carolyn Lamm, Henry Nau, (January 1991), p. 201-20. Riordan Roett, Mark B. Rosenberg, Jeffrey J. Schott, Barbara Stallings. The Root of All Evil. A. Cockburn, R. McKerrow. New Statesman Society, September 1991. 165 pp. 6 x 9. v. 4 (March 15, 1991), p. 22-23. ISBN 1-879862-01-8 Paperback, $11.95 (S/H, add $1.25 per book).

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