Whose Bills? Corporate Interests and Conservative Mobilization Across the U.S. States, 1973-2013 The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Hertel-Fernandez, Alexander W. 2016. Whose Bills? Corporate Interests and Conservative Mobilization Across the U.S. States, 1973-2013. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33493552 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA Whose Bills? Corporate Interests and Conservative Mobilization Across the U.S. States, 1973-2013 A dissertation presented by Alexander Hertel-Fernandez to The Committee on Higher Degrees in Social Policy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Government and Social Policy Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts May 2016 © 2016 Alexander Hertel-Fernandez All rights reserved. Dissertation Advisor: Theda R. Skocpol Alexander Hertel-Fernandez Whose Bills? Corporate Interests and Conservative Mobilization Across the U.S. States, 1973-2013 ABSTRACT In recent decades, conservative groups have become increasingly active in mobilizing corporations to press their interests not just on the U.S. Congress and federal agencies, but also on legislatures in the fifty U.S. states. Why and how has such mobilization occurred, what accounts for its effectiveness in certain contexts, and what has been the response from liberal actors? To develop answers to these questions, this dissertation examines the rise and impact of one group – the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) – and two of its allies, the State Policy Network (SPN) and Americans for Prosperity (AFP), on the American political economy. Using a combination of archival evidence, interviews, and quantitative analyses, I document the ways that ALEC has developed especially effective strategies for negotiating the tensions inherent in coalitions between diverse businesses and political conservatives, and also how the group has exploited the low levels of policy resources available to lawmakers in many state legislatures. Next, I illustrate how the two newer networks – SPN and AFP – have bolstered ALEC’s efforts in the states. Using two important case studies – retrenchment of public employee bargaining rights and the implementation of the Affordable Care Act – I show how the strength and coordination of these three networks exerts an independent effect on the substance of state policy. I also discuss the reasons why left-wing efforts to construct a similar infrastructure of iii progressive cross-state lobbying groups have faltered. In the final empirical chapter, I look at the companies that have chosen to participate in ALEC and SPN. I find that above all, companies with greater threats from public policy were more likely to rely on these organizations. The second half of the chapter turns from explaining participation in ALEC to its effects on individual companies. My analysis shows that companies that participate in ALEC for longer periods of time are more likely to hold conservative policy stands and to exhibit less socially responsible labor and environmental practices. The conclusion summarizes the major contributions of the dissertation, and discusses its implications for debates about money in politics and political representation in an era of increasing inequality. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE PAGE i COPYRIGHT PAGE ii ABSTRACT iii TABLE OF CONTENTS v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vi PREFACE 1 INTRODUCTION 7 CHAPTER 1: THE EVOLUTION OF A CORPORATE-CONSERVATIVE COALITION 25 CHAPTER 2: MAPPING THE DISSEMINATION OF BUSINESS POLICY PROPOSALS 82 CHAPTER 3: WHY LEGISLATORS RELY ON CORPORATE-CONSERVATIVE IDEAS 127 CHAPTER 4: A LITTLE HELP FROM THEIR FRIENDS 164 CHAPTER 5: FEISTY CHIHUAHUAS VERSUS A BIG GORILLA 213 CHAPTER 6: THE COMPANY YOU KEEP 240 CORPORATE-CONSERVATIVE MOBILIZATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 303 WORKS CITED 329 CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 368 CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 374 CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 379 CHAPTER 6 METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 385 v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Achieving durable political change across the U.S. states requires broad coalitions of diverse and committed supporters. The same, I have learned over the past six years, is true for dissertations. My committee members – Theda Skocpol, Peter Hall, Cathie Jo Martin, and Kathy Thelen – have each provided their own invaluable mix of encouragement and advice. Kathy helped spark an interest in political economy and inequality during my undergraduate years at Northwestern, and has been a terrific mentor ever since. Indeed, it was thanks to her that I saw Peter and Theda in action at a workshop on historical institutionalism in college – and decided that political science was where I wanted to be. After arriving at Harvard, Peter’s generous feedback helped me enormously as I developed the ideas for this dissertation (and its less- successful predecessor). Cathie has been a terrific sounding board and cheerleader throughout the whole process, even (and especially) during the dark days of the job market. None of this dissertation, however, would have been possible without my chair, Theda, who has taught me so much about the careful study of political organizations over time. It has been an incredible privilege to learn from – and ultimately collaborate with – her on our research related to the shifting U.S. political terrain. Her model of rigorous and civically engaged scholarship is a standard to which I will continually strive. Beyond my committee, I have received the very helpful advice of other scholars in writing this dissertation. Nick Carnes, Lee Drutman, Jacob Hacker, Steve Teles, and Rob Mickey were especially generous with their time and comments. I have also been lucky in the colleagues I have met in graduate school, who have provided me with emotional and intellectual sustenance – and made the whole experience fun. I have been so happy to call Kostya Kashin my roommate, coauthor, methodology guru, and friend. Volha Charnysh, James Conran, Leslie Finger, and Jeff vi Javed were the best writing (and moral support) group I could have asked for. Noam Gidron deserves special thanks for his generosity of feedback – and friendship. Even from across the country, Leah Stokes and Matto Mildenberger continue to provide support at just the right moments. Last, but by no means least, I am thankful for my family. Nate, my partner in everything, was patient and loving throughout everything that graduate school entailed. He knew exactly when to celebrate the victories and how to talk me through the harder moments. My Minnesotan family – Melissa, John and Anna – offered lots of encouragement and many wonderful escapes to sunny beaches. My sister Sarah’s courage and compassion has been an inspiration for me. And my parents, Adriela and Tom, have been behind me in everything I have ever done – from Super Saturday projects in West Lafayette church basements through to graduate school in Cambridge. They have been incredible role models and my hope is that this work reflects what they have both tried to teach me about the power of using social science to tackle big questions. This dissertation is dedicated to them. vii PREFACE Gene Whisnant is a genial retiree from central Oregon who loves to talk baseball. After 27 years of service in the Air Force, Whisnant decided to get involved in politics, and has served in Oregon’s lower chamber since 2003.1 Shortly after arriving in the legislature, Whisnant was approached by a former state senator, who encouraged him to consider joining a national association of legislators called the American Legislative Exchange Council (or ALEC, for short). Describing his longstanding involvement in that group, Whisnant smiles and proudly notes that while all legislators are automatically members of the non-partisan, non-profit National Conference of State Legislatures, he has made the decision to join and stay involved in ALEC on his own, readily paying the $50 dues required by the group each year. What makes Whisnant so proud of his participation in ALEC? He notes that the first thing to understand about what he gets from the group is how many state legislators in Oregon are actually serving only part-time, “working their tails off” to get anything done. And while he is retired, giving him more time to spend on the job as opposed to his younger colleagues, Whisnant notes that he does not have much help from expert staffers who could do research for him. His staff consists of his wife, who works half-time, and an aide who works three days per week when the legislature is in session (reported in Cole 2012). Whisnant’s situation is far from uncommon. In recent years, Oregon legislators were paid about $22,000 per year – hardly enough for a family to live on without a second job or another source of income. Though this may come as a surprise for readers not immersed in the day-to-day work of state politics, Oregon !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 This biographical information is from Whisnant’s interview with Travis H. Brown at the 2013 annual ALEC meeting. Available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-RPdSvabMsk. 1 actually pays its legislators only a bit less than the national average in states that offered salaries to their members.2 The state ranks at about the national average for the number of staffers per elected official as well.3 Across the United States, many legislatures are run without much in the way of professional lawmakers or staff. Without that help, how does a state legislator like Whisnant with so few resources get the ideas, research, legislative language, talking points, polling, and expert witnesses that are necessary to make policy? That’s where ALEC comes in.