Problem Definition by Presidents Lyndon B
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville ScholarWorks@UARK Theses and Dissertations 8-2009 Talking Us Into War: Problem Definition By Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and George W. Bush Barbara Ellen May Warner University of Arkansas, Fayetteville Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd Part of the American Politics Commons, Public Administration Commons, and the Rhetoric and Composition Commons Recommended Citation Warner, Barbara Ellen May, "Talking Us Into War: Problem Definition By Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and George W. Bush" (2009). Theses and Dissertations. 45. http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/45 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. TALKING US INTO WAR: PROBLEM DEFINITION BY PRESIDENTS LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND GEORGE W. BUSH TALKING US INTO WAR: PROBLEM DEFINITION BY PRESIDENTS LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND GEORGE W. BUSH A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy By Barbara Ellen May Warner Bachelor of Arts in English, 1978 University of Hawaii Master of Science in Journalism, 1993 University of Kansas Master of Arts in Government, 1997 Johns Hopkins University August 2009 University of Arkansas ABSTRACT How presidents talk us into war merges the study of problem definition in public policy with the study of rhetoric in communications. Using both qualitative and quantitative methods, this research analyzes the key words used by two presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson and George W. Bush, to persuade us into escalating a war in Vietnam and engaging in a pre-emptive war in Iraq, respectively. The findings indicate that presidents repeat words that are patriotic, emotive, metaphorical, symbolic and religious, tapping into American themes of Manifest Destiny and even predicting dire outcomes if we do not accept their definitions of the dangers and rewards involved in going to war. The study also finds that presidents develop a sustaining narrative that highlights what problem definition literature calls a “causal story,” which identifies the harm done, describes its cause, assigns moral blame and claims government is responsible for the remedy (Stone 1989). This research indicates that Johnson used far less antithetical, religious and repetitive language than did Bush, in some cases strikingly so. This work relies upon the literature on problem definition, presidential rhetoric and presidential leadership as a backdrop for studying the major speeches of these two presidents prior to their escalation or initiation of war. It employs content analysis using the computerized program, NVivo 7. The study concludes that while we may not be able to measure the degree to which various audiences are persuaded by presidential rhetoric, we can see that presidents, who wield the powerful bully pulpit, carefully choose their words and repeat them often to afford themselves maximum persuadability with their audiences as they try to talk us into war. Such language also appears designed to quell dissent and to enlarge the authority of the president. This dissertation is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council Dissertation Director: _______________________________________ Dr. Brinck Kerr Dissertation Committee: _______________________________________ Dr. Andrew Dowdle _______________________________________ Dr. Jefferson D. Miller DISSERTATION DUPLICATION RELEASE I hereby authorize the University of Arkansas Libraries to duplicate this dissertation when needed for research and/or scholarship. Agreed __________________________________________ Barbara Warner Refused __________________________________________ Barbara Warner ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thanks to my husband, Gary Warner, and the many friends who lived through this work with me. Special thanks to Dr. Brinck Kerr, my dissertation adviser and mentor, for his steady patience, reliable wisdom and great friendship. I am also grateful to Dr. Andrew Dowdle and Dr. Jeff Miller for their valuable input, their tremendous scholarship and their diligent service on my committee. And finally, thanks to Dr. Will Miller for his wisdom and guidance through the initial years of my studies. v DEDICATION This work is dedicated to my father, Albert May, and to my mother, Evelyn Crawford May, neither of whom, to my great regret, lived to see this or other accomplishments, but who are the reason for all I do. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. INTRODUCTION 1 A. Importance of Presidential Rhetoric 2 B. Power of Presidential Rhetoric 3 C. Research Questions 4 D. Importance of the Research 5 E. Research Plan 8 II. LITERATURE REVIEW 10 A. Introduction 10 B. Presidential Rhetoric 11 C. Policy Typologies 26 D. The Nature of Political Rhetoric 33 E. Presidential Rhetoric as a Policy Tool 37 F. Rhetorical Presidency 39 1. Foreign Crisis Rhetoric 41 2. Antithetical Appeals 44 3. Use of Symbols 45 4. Use of Metaphors 51 5. Use of Frames 54 6. Presidential Religious Rhetoric; Moral Leadership 56 G. Presidential Policy Leadership Through Rhetoric 68 H. Conclusion 74 III. DATA, RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 76 A. Data 77 1. Speeches Chosen For Analysis 77 2. Speech Sources and Selection Criteria 77 3. List of Speeches 81 B. Research Design 89 1. Content Analysis 94 2. Advantages/Disadvantages 95 3. Potential Problems 96 C. Methodology 97 vii IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON SECULAR LANGUAGE 101 A. Introduction 101 B. The Qualitative and Quantitative Findings 103 C. Conclusion 140 V. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE 147 A. Introduction 147 B. The Qualitative and Quantitative Findings 150 C. Conclusion 166 VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 170 A. Discussion of Empirical Findings on Secular Language From Chapter IV 170 B. Discussion of Empirical Findings on Religious Language From Chapter V 178 C. Advancing the Literature 184 D. Suggestions For Future Research 187 1. Defining Problems By Predicting the Future 187 2. Other Areas of Potential Research 196 E. Limitations of the Research 201 F. Summary and Discussion 201 REFERENCES 219 viii CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION “Policies and words are inextricably linked – the former cannot be conjured in the absence of the latter.” Robert Schlesinger, White House Ghosts: Presidents and Their Speechwriters On April 7, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson gave his famous “Peace Without Conquest” speech at Johns Hopkins University, his first consummate speech laying out his rationale for why the United States was at war with Vietnam and why he thought this war that he had inherited was worth continuing. On March 5, 1965, Johnson had given orders to commence Operation Rolling Thunder, a sustained bombing raid on Vietnam, which escalated the war (Battlefield Timeline, PBS).1 On September 11, 2001, terrorist-controlled planes demolished the World Trade Center in New York, damaged the Pentagon and crashed in a field southeast of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. On March 19, 2003 (American time), President George W. Bush began a concerted attack on Iraq called Operation Iraqi Freedom (September 11: Chronology of Terror, CNN; The Invasion of Iraq, Frontline). Both presidents waged different wars. Johnson’s war was a continuation of a gradual involvement and was called a “conflict,” as the U.S. never made a formal 1 Through its Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 7, 1964, Congress had already given Johnson broad war powers to deal with North Vietnamese attacks on U.S. forces, following a purported attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on two U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, on August 2, 1964. That resolution gave Johnson broad war powers to deal with North Vietnamese attacks on U.S. forces. 1 declaration of war against Vietnam (Reitano 2004, 29).2 Bush’s war was a pre-emptive effort that was actually declared a “war.” Both presidents used pre-war/escalation rhetoric to garner support for their wars/conflicts. They used patriotic language, religious language, metaphors, symbols, manifest destiny language and antithetical language that drew stark delineations between good and evil. Importance of Presidential Rhetoric Presidents must rally popular and political support for their wars and conflicts because these events often require great expenditures of the nation’s resources, as well as the service and lives of its citizens and often that of other countries. War creates added economic costs, shifts in policy concentrations, heightened public scrutiny and global concern. One way presidents rally support for their wars is through their speeches, which they use to define problems and offer solutions. When they define problems, they put them on the systemic and institutional agendas. Cobb and Elder define the systemic agenda as “all issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political community as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the jurisdiction of existing governmental authority” (1983, 85). They define the institutional agenda as “that set of items explicitly up for active and serious consideration of authoritative decision- makers” (1983, 86). 2 Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Johnson’s Under Secretary of State, called the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution “the functional equivalent of a declaration of war,” according to Reitano (2004). 2 As Hart, a scholar of the American presidency, explains, “public speech no longer attends