Differences in Negativity Bias Underlie Variations in Political Ideology John R
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University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Faculty Publications: Political Science Political Science, Department of 2014 Differences in negativity bias underlie variations in political ideology John R. Hibbing University of Nebraska-Lincoln, [email protected] Kevin B. Smith University of Nebraska-Lincoln, [email protected] John R. Alford Rice University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscifacpub Part of the Political Science Commons Hibbing, John R.; Smith, Kevin B.; and Alford, John R., "Differences in negativity bias underlie variations in political ideology" (2014). Faculty Publications: Political Science. 67. http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscifacpub/67 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications: Political Science by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2014) 37, 297–350 doi:10.1017/S0140525X13001192 Differences in negativity bias underlie variations in political ideology John R. Hibbing Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588 [email protected] www.unl.edu/polphyslab Kevin B. Smith Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588 [email protected] www.unl.edu/polphyslab John R. Alford Department of Political Science, Rice University, Houston, TX 77005 [email protected] http://politicalscience.rice.edu/ Abstract: Disputes between those holding differing political views are ubiquitous and deep-seated, and they often follow common, recognizable lines. The supporters of tradition and stability, sometimes referred to as conservatives, do battle with the supporters of innovation and reform, sometimes referred to as liberals. Understanding the correlates of those distinct political orientations is probably a prerequisite for managing political disputes, which are a source of social conflict that can lead to frustration and even bloodshed. A rapidly growing body of empirical evidence documents a multitude of ways in which liberals and conservatives differ from each other in purviews of life with little direct connection to politics, from tastes in art to desire for closure and from disgust sensitivity to the tendency to pursue new information, but the central theme of the differences is a matter of debate. In this article, we argue that one organizing element of the many differences between liberals and conservatives is the nature of their physiological and psychological responses to features of the environment that are negative. Compared with liberals, conservatives tend to register greater physiological responses to such stimuli and also to devote more psychological resources to them. Operating from this point of departure, we suggest approaches for refining understanding of the broad relationship between political views and response to the negative. We conclude with a discussion of normative implications, stressing that identifying differences across ideological groups is not tantamount to declaring one ideology superior to another. Keywords: attitudes; conservatives; liberals; negativity; physiology; psychology; politics 1. Introduction or “rightist” may be relatively recent (etymologically they John Stuart Mill called it “commonplace” for political are typically assumed to date to the French Revolution, systems to have “a party of order or stability and a party of but they appear to be much older; see Laponce 1981)but progress or reform” (1991). Ralph Waldo Emerson agreed, the political division they describe is ancient and universal noting that “the two parties which divide the state, the (Bobbio 1996;Jost2006; Jost & Amodio 2012;McCarty party of conservatism and that of innovation, are very old, et al. 2006). Is Emerson right in his claim that this division and have disputed the possession of the world ever since it springs from a deep, possibly innate part of the human con- was made,” and he inferred that this “irreconcilable antagon- dition? Does political temperament vary from person to ism must have a correspondent depth of seat in the human person because the physiology and psychology constituting condition” (1903). The antagonism between two primal human nature also varies from person to person? If so, mindsets certainly pervades human history: Sparta and how are the individuals who support parties of stability and Athens; optimates and populares; Roundheads and Cava- order psychologically and physiologically different from liers; Inquisition and Enlightenment; Protagonus and those who support parties of progress and innovation? Plato; Pope Urban VIII and Galileo; Barry Goldwater and Existing research offers only incomplete answers to George McGovern; Sarah Palin and Hillary Rodham these questions. All too often, the questions are not even Clinton. The labels “liberal” or “leftist” and “conservative” asked. Folk wisdom and much scholarly research assumes © Cambridge University Press 2014 0140-525X/14 $40.00 297 Hibbing et al: Differences in negativity bias underlie variations in political ideology political orientations are products of socialization, learned Though twin studies are valuable for assessing the from parents and family, acquired by osmosis from sociode- general roles of heritability and various categories of mographics, or conditioned exclusively by environmental environmental influence (shared and unshared), they say situations and cultural contexts. The logic here is reason- little about the specific sources of influence within those able; authority figures encountered at impressionable broad categories. Accordingly, efforts are underway to early stages of life, as well as broader circumstances experi- identify particular genetic regions or even particular enced later seem obvious sources of influence on a range of genes that might relate to politics (Fowler & Dawes personal and social orientations including those relating to 2008; Hatemi et al. 2011; McDermott et al. 2009; Settle politics. Yet the effects of parental socialization on political et al. 2010). Yet although intriguing, it is not clear genopo- orientations are fairly meager (bivariate correlations typi- litics research can comprehensively illuminate the source of cally running between 0.1 and 0.3) with the exception of the “irreconcilable differences” that Mill, Emerson, and identification with social groups such as a political party others have long suspected to be the basis of political (Jennings & Niemi 1968; Niemi & Jennings 1991). beliefs. Any given candidate gene (or genetic region) is Adding socidemographic variables such as age, education likely to explain only a small fraction of the variance in a level, and family income to models of political attitudes complex quantitative trait like political temperament and and behavior only modestly increases explanatory horse- statistically isolating meaningful relationships amongst power (Plutzer 2002). Moreover, sociodemographic vari- such marginal impacts is difficult. That situation is reflected ables in and of themselves do not explain the precise in the poor replication record of candidate gene association factors at work in structuring preferences. In sum, political studies, particularly when they involve interactions with any orientations do not seem to be the automatic result of par- of a large number of possible environmental influences. ental socialization and sociodemographic circumstances. For example, Fowler and Dawes (2008) identified allelic To the surprise of many (but see Merelman 1971), it is variation in two genes involved in the serotonin system increasingly clear that Emerson’s intuition was right. Poli- (the transporter 5-HTT and the degrader MAO-A) that sys- tics might not be in our souls, but it probably is in our tematically correlated with political participation. A reana- DNA. More than 25 years ago Nicholas Martin and lysis of the same data by Charney and English (2012) Lindon Eaves (Martin et al. 1986), using a standard twin using different procedures did not reproduce that design on a large sample, produced heritability estimates finding, and replications have fed the controversy as between 0.2 and 0.4 for attitudes on a wide variety of pol- much as resolved it (see Deppe et al. 2013; Fowler & itical issues (e.g., capital punishment, disarmament, abor- Dawes 2013). So although twin studies suggest that political tion). More recent twin studies consistently confirm these orientations may be heritable, identifying the particular findings and extend them to behaviors such as voter genetic pathways that lead to political orientations constitu- turnout (Alford et al. 2005; Bell et al. 2009; Bouchard & tes a daunting challenge. McGue 2003; Fowler et al. 2008; Hatemi et al. 2007; The same could be said, however, about identifying 2009; 2013; Klemmensen et al. 2012; Smith & Hatemi the particular environmental pathways that lead to politi- 2013). Given the many assumptions undergirding twin cal orientation. Twin studies repeatedly point to a strong studies, it is important to note that alternative techniques influence of the unshared environment and a fairly weak for estimating heritability that do not rely on twins report role of the shared environment on political orientations. slightly smaller but still statistically significant effects of Traditional research on the correlates of political