From Political Islam to Islamic Politics

JISP L

JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC POLITICS

FROM POLITICAL ISLAM TO ISLAMIC POLITICS

DISCIPLINE-ORIENTED RESEARCH ARTICLE A CRITICAL APPROACH BASED ON KANT ON DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY: CULTURAL OR SYSTEMIC DEMOCRATIZATION? BY ALI IHSAN KAHRAMAN

DISCIPLINE-ORIENTED RESEARCH ARTICLE A CRITICAL APPROACH ON THE CROWDING-OUT EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COALITIONS TO REGIONALISM: THE CASE OF ISRAEL’S INCLUSION TO CENTCOM BY HURSIT DINGIL

ISLAM-ORIENTED RESEARCH ARTICLE

IBN KHALDUN AND POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY: A HISTORICAL RE-READING ATTEMPT BY MUCAHIT BEKTAS

DISCIPLINE-ORIENTED POLICY PAPER

THE RE-EVALUATION OF RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY SHOAIB KHAN

ISLAM-ORIENTED POLICY PAPER

THE ORIGINS OF SALAFISM IN ISLAM BY CAGRI KOSAK

BOOK REVIEW THE HELL OF GOOD INTENTIONS: AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY ELITE AND THE DECLINE OF US PRIMACY BY CAGRI KOSAK VOLUME: 1 ISSUE: 1 YEAR: 2021 E-ISSN: 2791-7525

ISSUE DOI: 10.2021/jispol.v1i1 JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC POLITICS

Journal of Islamic Politics (JISPOL) a peer-reviewed international academic publication that is published twice a year in July and December. JISPOL focuses on contributing to academic knowledge on the mental interrelationship between clas-sical Islamic thought and contemporary academic disciplines. JISPOL focuses on the future of Muslim World.

Volume: 1 Number: 1 Year: 2021 Online ISSN: 2791-7525 Issue DOI: 10.2021/jispol.v1i1

Indexes: Google Scholar

www.jispol.com journal of ıslamıc polıtıcs EDITORIAL TEAM

FROM POLITICAL ISLAM TO ISLAMIC POLITICS

VOL.1 NO.1 E-ISSN: 2791-7525

OWNER EDITOR IN CHIEF ALI IHSAN KAHRAMAN ALI IHSAN KAHRAMAN

ASSOCIATE EDITORS

POLITICAL SCIENCE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS MUSTAFA EDIP CELIK NURULLAH TIRMAN

REGIONAL STUDIES BUSINESS & MANAGEMENT ABDESSAMAD RAGHIBI ANAS ALAOUI MDAGHIRI

ISLAMIC ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HAKKI KEMAL YILMAZ PHD

XENOPHOBIA POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY PHD PHD

PUBLICATION COORDINATOR DESIGNED BY AHMET SAGLAM ALI IHSAN KAHRAMAN journal of ıslamıc polıtıcs ADVISORY BOARD

ADVISOR/UNIVERSITY JISPOL DISCIPLINE

Afifi AL-AKITI, Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies Political Science

Ahmet Faruk AYSAN, Hamad Bin Khalifa University Business & Management

Altay ATLI, Bogazici University International Relations

Berdal ARAL, Istanbul Medeniyet University International Relations

Burhan ULUYOL SAITI, Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University Islamic Economics

Cihat TERZIOGLU, Istanbul Medipol University Business & Management

Giray GOZGOR, Istanbul Medeniyet University International Economics

Hafas FURQANI, Universitas Islam Negeri Ar Raniry Islamic Economics

Hassan KHALILIEH, Haifa University International Relations

Hatice KARAHAN, Istanbul Medipol University International Economics

Helin SARI ERTEM, Istanbul Medeniyet University Regional Studies

Ihsan ISIK, Rowan University Islamic Economics

Isa YILMAZ, Istanbul Medeniyet University Islamic Economics

Kadir TEMİZ, Istanbul Medeniyet University Regional Studies

M. Aslam HANEEF, International Islamic University of Malaysia Islamic Economics

Muhammad Kabir HASSAN, University of Orleans Islamic Economics

Majid WADOOD, Tokyo University Business & Management

Mansor IBRAHIM, The Global University of Islamic Finance- Islamic Economics

Manzoor K. AFRIDI, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Islamic Economics

Muhammad KHAN, International Islamic University, Islamabad Regional Studies

O. Ismath BACHA, The Global University of Islamic Finance Islamic Economics

Ozden Zeynep OKTAV, Istanbul Medeniyet University Regional Studies

Sadık UNAY, Istanbul University International Relations

Selim KAYHAN, Necmettin Erbakan University Islamic Economics

Shoaib KHAN, University of Mumbai Regional Studies

Tarikqullah KHAN, Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University Islamic Economics

Zeyneb Hafsa ORHAN, Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University Islamic Economics journal of ıslamıc polıtıcs TABLE OF CONTENTS

FROM POLITICAL ISLAM TO ISLAMIC POLITICS VOL.1 NO.1

ALI IHSAN KAHRAMAN/RESEARCH ARTICLE THE CRITICAL APPROACH BASED ON KANT ON DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY: CULTURAL OR SYSTEMIC 7 - 29 DEMOCRATIZATION?

HURSIT DINGIL/RESEARCH ARTICLE A CRITICAL APPROACH ON INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COALITIONS: THE CASE OF ISRAEL’S INCLUSION TO 30 - 44 CENTCOM

MUCAHIT BEKTAS/RESEARCH ARTICLE IBN KHALDUN AND POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY: 45 - 57 A RE-READING ATTEMPT

SHOAIB KHAN/POLICY PAPER THE RE-EVALUATION OF RUSSIA’S ENTRY TO THE MIDDLE 58 - 72 EAST

CAGRI KOSAK/POLICY PAPER 73 - 82 THE ORIGINS OF SALAFISM IN ISLAM

CAGRI KOSAK/BOOK REVIEW THE HELL OF GOOD INTENTIONS: AMERICAN FOREIGN 83-88 POLICY ELITE AND THE DECLINE OF US PRIMACY ALI IHSAN KAHRAMAN https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9514-7210

ISTANBUL MEDENIYET UNIVERSITY EMAIL: [email protected]

Submission Date: 01.05.2021 Review Date: 20.05.2021 Acceptance Date: 24.05.2021 Publication Date: 17.07.2021 JISPOL Structure: Discipline-Oriented Research Paper JISPOL Discipline: International Relations Special Field: International Relations Theories

Vol.1 No.1 E-ISSN: 2791-7525 DOI: 10.2021/jispol.v1i1.1

THE CRITICAL APPROACH ON DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY: CULTURAL OR SYSTEMIC DEMOCRATIZATION?

ABSTRACT This article suggests that the democratic peace theory made a mistake in its Kant readings. To argue this suggestion, this paper is organized as follows. Firstly, an unheeded dimension of Kantian philosophy about the democratization process of states and societies will be introduced. Secondly, the connections between the democratic peace theory and Kant will be revisited in terms of this unheeded dimension. The aim of this section is to prepare the discussion on the failure of Democratic Peace Theory on Kant. Thirdly, the empirical analysis based on three difference and wide datasets which are World Governance Indicators 2016, the Uppsala Conflict Database Program 2016 (UCDP), and Polity IV. Theconc- luding remarks will summarize how the democratic peace theory misread Kant.

Keywords: Kantian Philosophy, Democratic Peace Theory, Liberal Democracy, Democratization, Republic

To cite this article: Kahraman, A.I. (2021). The Critical Approach on Democra- tic Peace Theory: Cultural or Systemic Democratization. Journal of Islamic Politi- cs, 1(1), 7-29. journal of ıslamıc polıtıcs vol. 1 no. 1

INTRODUCTION

After the Global Economic Crisis, the international system has experienced many essential changes in terms not only of practical relations but also of its philosophical or ideological roots. The last one can be the discussions on liberal democracy. Especially, the rise of populism and conservatism in international politics gives momentum to the debates on the aftermath of liberal democracy. The policy preferences of the US in Trump administration shifted the illiberal/conservative economic and trade policies to the origins of the world economic system. The rise of economic conservatism has also some political reflections on states. The discussions on liberal democracy has also started to encourage critics on theoretical frameworks related to liberal democracy. Dem- ocratic Peace Theory, indeed, has been criticized for a long time in terms of its application to the practical world; however, the reflections of rise in economic conservatism on politics make the re-evaluation of democratic peace theory.

This article suggests that the democratic peace theory made a mistake in its Kant readings. To argue this suggestion, this paper is organized as follows. Firstly, an unheeded dimension of Kantian philosophy about the democratization process of states and societies will be introduced. Secondly, the connections between the democratic peace theory and Kant will be revisited in terms of this unheeded dimension. The aim of this section is to prepare the discussion on the failure of Democratic Peace Theory on Kant. Thirdly, the empirical analysis based on three difference and wide datasets which are World Gover- nance Indicators 2016, the Uppsala Conflict Database Program 2016 (UCDP), and Polity IV. The concluding remarks will summarize how the democratic peace theory misread Kant.

THE UNHEEDED DIMENSON OF KANTIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The discipline of international relations is a field under the influence of various academic disciplines. Political science, sociology, and economics are at the forefront of these disciplines. To understand international politics, academics must utilize not only from the international relations discipline, but also from political science, sociology, and economics and Immanuel Kant is a philosopher academic who influenced the roots of many academic discipline. While Kant’s studies on liberal state thought and republican institutions led to important discussions on political philosophy, his famous work ‘Perpetual Peace’ maintains its

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importance among the sources used to solve the problems of today’s international arena (Gözen, 2014, p. 32). As a result of the developments in the 20th century, studies on international relations are almost under the occupation of questions on the ‘causes of wars’. However, especially after the end of the Cold War and the start of proxy wars, the questions in international relations have started to change, too.

The main and new questions of the international relations discipline after this change consist of problems like the reasons for the implemen- tation of state policies (Palmer & Morgan, 2006), foreign policy decision mechanisms (Jervis, 2017), the effect of differences in state regimes on international relations (Doyle, 1982, 1986; Garnham, 1986), differences between cultures/civilizations (Huntington, 1993), global security (Deudney & Deudney, 2009). However, the question of the sustainability of peace in an international arena without interstate wars and but with proxy wars also occupies the minds. Kant’s work titled ‘Perpetual Peace’ has given a very effective legacy for answers and also for critics about the sustainability of peace. At this point, the democratic peace theory is one of the products of the various efforts aimed at revealing this legacy of Kant. On the other hand, Kantian political philosophy should be revisited to see the unheeded dimension before entering the critics on the efforts of Democratic Peace Theory.

Kant has put forward important views on relations between states long before the launch of the first academic chair of international relations (Gözen, 2014, p. 32). Within years of ages, a substantial and wide literature has existed on Kant’s contributions to international relations. However, just as Kant’s ideas in a wider range can be adapted to many disciplines, there is no single application within the discipline of international relations. The ideas that Kant put forward did not reflect in a single direction within the discipline of international relations. Many different flows of information and theories in the international relations discipline led to the formation of different academic branches about Kant’s thoughts in this discipline. However, two poles in the international relations literature seem like becoming prominent which can be called cosmopolitanism and sovereign state.

Whereas the pole of cosmopolitanism suggests that Kant’s idea generally predicts international law based on the morality of duty, the pole of the sovereign-state argues that political philosophy should be under-

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stood within the logic of the nation-state. In the second half of the 20th century, some theoretical and academic efforts have been made to bring these two poles closer to each other. However, even these efforts are separated into two categories and can be called as unsuccessful. One side argued that cosmopolitanism is at the center of Kantian philosophy although sovereign-state has an important place. On the other hand, the other side suggested the reverse, and that sovereign-state under the concept of a federation of states is at the center of Kantian philosophy whereas cosmopolitanism has an important place.

Michael Doyle and Andrew Linklater are famous representatives of this dilemma between the poles of sovereign-state and cosmopolitanism, respectively. Linklater is very famous with reference to Kant’s legacy for cosmopolitanism (Franceschet, 2001, p. 216). For Linklater, Kant’s legacy means the concept of human emancipation, which is the founder of the concept of nation. He suggested that the biggest problem of the modern world is the emancipation of man, and the way Kant showed is eye-opening. Linklater argued that Kant showed the awareness of the human’s capacity to construct the social world as the only way for human liberation (Franceschet, 2001, p. 217). The reason why Linkla- ter is at the cosmopolitan pole of the dilemma in the literature on Kant emerges through his answer to the question of how humans can take a role in this construction process.

Linklater suggested the irrelevance of Kant’s arguments on sovereign state with the role of humans in the process of constructing the social world. Although Kant himself had given this construction role to the state, Linklater emphasized that the state today has no common with the Kantian state. The Kantian state consists of a structure that guarantees the emancipation of people and is responsible for ensuring that they can be safe while they are liberated. The Kantian state fulfills this emancipation duty towards everyone, who lives within the borders of the state and who signs the national contract, with its commitment to the Declaration of Human Rights issued after the French Revolution. As a result, the Kantian state is inclusive in contrast to the case of the state today.

For Linklater, the state ceased to be inclusive and became a more ex- clusionary actor within the process. For instance, the immigration policies of states of today can be a very important exemplification for the transformation of the state from inclusiveness to exclusiveness. Addi-

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tionally, it is controversial to what extent the state structure and powers represent the will of people, as well. As a result, Linklater suggests that today’s state is not the same as Kant’s envisioned state and therefore it cannot be the main actor of Kant’s main issue, the liberation of man. In other words, Linklater tried to explain how Kant could achieve peace not through states, but with a post-sovereign world structure (Waller & Linklater, 2003, pp. 1–4).

Doyle is accepted as the founder of the Democratic Peace Theory which constitutes the other pole of Kant’s studies. He claimed important liberal legacies in Kant’s writings. The first one is the taming of anarchy, and the second one is about the aggression of liberal countries towards non-liberal rather than liberal. Doyle argued the realization of both legacies is dependent on the establishment of the republican government regime because the republican regime literally tames anarchy within the state borders. Beyond this capability of republican government regime in domestic politics, it also causes liberal countries to force non-liberal countries transiting to a republican regime. For Doyle, the relation of Kantian Philosophy to the international relations exists at this point: The inherently-peaceful liberal countries due to their republican regime will inherently enforce non-liberal countries to be peaceful by leading them to accept republican regime as the government system. In other words, as Kant put it, republican countries are more inclined to determine and coordinate their will and actions in accordance with the basic principles of international justice.

In this perspective of Doyle, the increase in the number of liberal states in the world guarantees the Kant’s dream of Perpetual Peace, as well. Therefore, a sustainable peace is possible only among liberal states. In other words, liberal countries do not resort to war to resolve their problems. This argument with an empirical test clearly reveals Doyle’s argument on Kant’s legacies. To put it briefly, because of the absence of wars among liberal states, problems between any two liberal states can be resolved in accordance with the international law. As a result, if all countries in the world had become liberal, then the biggest problem of the humanity, war, would be totally eliminated from the world.

As a result, studies on Kantian Philosophy have grounded in international relations literature on a dilemma between cosmopolitanism and sovereign-state. Therefore, as the dilemma in the Kantian philosophy appeared, the idea that Kantian political philosophy was insufficient to

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understand international relations has disappeared (Ağcan, 2012, p. 2). However, studies in international relations based on Kantian philosophy need to ignore never the possible vicious circle resulting from avoiding the other side of this dilemma. More clearly, a study on the pole of cosmopolitanism cannot get respectful results by avoiding the impacts of sovereign-state. And the reverse for studies on the pole of the sovereign state is also true, too.1 Because of the high probability to get into this vicious circle, Bartelson has explained the reason for this high probability as the following:

“Most contemporary studies on Kant tend to miss some of Kant’s thoughts by ignoring or unknowingly skipping his thoughts on his founding political philosophy. Instead, they kept repeating the problems that Kant was trying to solve on his own” (Bartelson, 1995, p. 255)

This article examines the idea that Democratic Peace Theory led by Doyle has also got in such a vicious circle and has failed to solve the problem. This article argues that the arguments of the Democratic Peace Theory cannot be based on Kant. The main question in this debate is to what extent the liberal state in Democratic Peace theory corresponds with the liberal republic state predicted by Kant. This article also argues that the answer to this question is embedded within how a country de- mocratizes. In other words, Kant gives his priority to study on democratization of society whereas Democratic Peace Theory accepts systemic democratization as sufficient. The next section discusses the essential characteristic in the Kantian Philosophy that Democratic Peace Theory has missed.

THE BLIND SPOT OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY: THE CULTURAL/SYSTEM- IC DEMOCRATIZATION DEBATE

This article interprets the reduction of Kant’s philosophy on international relations to the forms of the relationship between states and people as an incomplete understanding. The reason is that Kant doesn’t see the meeting of the relations between people and states on a democratic basis as sufficient ground for the realization of the Perpetual Peace. If a study misses the difference between the democratization process of state structure and of society, getting into the vicious circle is the destiny of that study. This unawareness results in the inability to establish the context of international relations with Kant through the right chan- nels.

1 For a detailed literature review on Kantian political philosophy, please see (Ağcan, 2012)

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This article sees overlooking the context of the democratization process of society as the main cause of the unawareness in the cosmopolitanism/sovereign-state dilemma. This section reveals the transformation of the cosmopolitanism/sovereign-state dilemma to the cultural democratization-systemic democratization dilemma. For this purpose, the definitions of cultural democratization and systemic democratization in Kantian philosophy must be made.

Maybe, the most important concept in Kantian political philosophy is the morality of duty. People and states must principally fulfill their duties to live in peace within states and in international politics. No person can live in peace with another person without fulfilling his moral duties in daily life. No states can make peace sustainable without fulfilling its moral duties in international politics. Therefore, not only Perpetual peace but also even instant peace in international relations depends on the fulfillment of the morality of duty.

Kant defined the morality of duty as the awareness of a person about the rights of another person, too, for pursuing his all freedom while he knows his own rights to pursue his own freedom. An individual can become a moral and virtuous individual to the extent of this awareness. Therefore, anyone acting without unawareness on others’ rights, won’t have fulfilled his social duty, and at the end, he will lose his existing rights in process, as well. In Rustow’s words, it is impossible for individuals without internalization of democracy by this awareness to prepare a just and democratic constitution (Rustow, 1970, p. 337). Therefore, fulfillment of moral duties, in other words cultural democratization, is at the core of democratic constitutions.

On the other hand, systemic democratization is the other important pole of the dilemma about Kantian philosophy and reflects the sovereign state. Its importance arises from its role in guarantying the occurrence of cultural democratization. In other words, systemic democratization protects the gains from the fulfillment of the morality of duties by individuals, by forming state institutions. However, as cultural democratization needs the majority fulfilling the morality of duties, systemic democratization needs the sustainability of democratic institutions. At this point, one of the biggest problems for the sustainability of institutions has been whether a generation can pass on its achievement for democratic institutions to the next generation. The main reason, too,

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for the possible failure in the sustainability in democratic institutions is the uncertainty for the acceptance of the next generation on democratic institutions.

A comparison in ideal between generation X and generation Y can be a good exemplification. Assume that generation X lives before generation Y and has an important experience for issue A. On the other hand, for the collective mind in generation X, issue A can be also a problem for generation Y in the future. In case that generation Y experiences issue A, its collective mind can behave differently from what generation X behaved about issue A. Therefore, generation Y will probably be able to live the problems that generation X prevented. Across this probability for generation Y, generation X has two alternatives:

1. Transferring the experience in issue A to generation Y 2. To make the response of generation X to the issue A systemic independent from the incumbent generation

The success of the first alternative always depends on generation Y, because generation Y may not be able to be as successful as generation X in taking action against issue A. This failure results in the continuity of issue A. However, generation X doesn’t want the continuity of issue A, not only because of its visionary worldview but also because of some rational purposes. Considering the common period in which generation X and Y live and under the governance of generation Y, the remain of issue A can have some real consequences for generation X as well. Therefore, preference for the first alternative always carries a risk for generation X. In reverse, the second alternative seems more correct for generation X to choose. More clearly, if generation X establishes a system that permanently eliminates the problems from issue A, then generation X can have the chance to protect itself against the negative consequences of issue A, regardless of the attitude of generation Y. As a result, the establishment of systemic institutions can be seen the definitive solution for generation X.

The Kant question “how to achieve peace” can reflect the ‘systematization’ problem between generations X and Y. To understand such kind of reflections, assume that Kant is from generation X and that generation Y would come to the governance of the society, in which Kant lived, after 40 years. Kant as a member of generation X has given the answer to the question of how to achieve peace in his workings. If human beings fulfill

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the morality of duty and do their part within the framework of this morality, they will realize their cultural democratization. In a society consisting of individuals who have achieved their cultural democratization under the guidance of their individual and rational mind, peace can be achieved. If the cultural democratization in question can be sustained for generations through systemic democratization, Perpetual peace will be achieved.

Thus, Kant not only raised the question of how to achieve peace but also raised the question of how to preserve peace and sought an answer to this. The preservation of democratization for generations X and Y has been possible by systemic democratization as a result of the establishment of social contracts and republican institutions. As a result, due to the republican institutions, the peace provided by Kant’s generation will be transferred to generation Y, and thus the Perpetual peace will be achieved.

THE PRIORITY OF CULTURAL DEMOCRATIZATION OVER SYSTEMIC DEMOC- RATIZATION IN KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY

The answer of Kant’s political philosophy to the question of how to achieve Perpetual peace can be read in this way in the dimension of cultural-systemic integration. However, when a question is asked following the reverse logic, a problem arises. In our opinion, the dilemma experienced in the studies on Kant within the discipline of international relations stems from this. The reverse logic is this: Does cultural democratization come first or systemic democratization in order to achieve Perpetual peace in Kant’s philosophy? Before defending the article on this question, it should be noted that the reason why studies under the discipline of international relations remain between the cosmopolitanism-sovereign state dilemma is that these studies prioritize systemic democratization. Because both the sovereign-state and the idea of cosmopolitanism were built on protecting the gains of democratization against potential dangers, protecting is a function of systemic democratization. The sovereign-state is the main tool of preventing people and events that do not fulfill the morality of duty from breaking the social contract, thus protecting democratic values and gains.

On the other hand, cosmopolitanism also paves the way for people living in different borders and who may have prepared different constitutions for this reason, to continue their democratic gains beyond

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borders. In other words, cosmopolitanism is an international constitution that protects people’s rights in the international arena. As can be seen, both the cosmopolitanism school and the sovereign-state school focused more on the preservation of the Kantian philosophy than on the establishment of peace. But the answer to the question of whether cultural democratization or systemic democratization comes first is given in this article as cultural democratization comes first. Because you cannot protect something without creating it. Therefore, it is necessary to establish mechanisms for establishing peace, not peace keeping mechanisms. In this respect, cultural democratization precedes systemic democratization.

Kant’s favoritism for cultural democratization can be resourced from his idea that a non-philosopher law-man can only apply existing rules and determine whether these rules need improvement. For Kant, non-philosophers think of the superiority of power in social relations; however, it hasn’t superiority. In reverse, philosophical considerations are supe- rior and the resource of power in social relations (Kant, 1983, p. 126). In this respect, the priority of cultural democratization over systemic democratization is very clear in Kant’s own studies.

The following question is essential about the prioritization of systemic or cultural democratization in Kantian Philosophy: is it possible for a state and constitution formed by unjust people to be just? For Kant, it is impossible, because he stated that “a people or a union of people needs a system of laws, a just structure, that is, a constitution, under a will that unites them, since they interact with each other” (Kant, 1996). Therefore, first people must have the concept of rights and consciousness on the morality of duty for their state to be just. Additionally, the state built on the concept of right and justice cannot be established without relying on “pure reason”. For only pure and virtuous reason necessitates the constitution, which is the basis of just laws between individuals. Therefore, constitutions based only on pure and virtuous reason cannot be just. Consequently, the occurrence of just laws depends on the existence of virtuous people with pure reason. As a result, because people’s justice is before the state, cultural democratization precedes systemic democratization in Kantian philosophy.

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DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY UNDER THE LIGHT OF THE PRIORITY OF CULTURAL DEMOCRATIZATION

In his article, titled “Kant, Legacy of Liberals and Democratic Peace”, Doyle suggested a correlation between the increase in the number of liberal states in the world and the decrease in the number of wars. Doyle determined four criteria about the liberalization of states, inspired by Kant’s Perpetual Peace. These are 1. market economy and private property, 2. independent sovereign policies, 3. citizens to exercise their legal rights, and 4. the existence of a liberal and republican government that represents the free and independent elections of citizens. Accord- ing to these criteria, Doyle divided the states in the world as liberals and non-liberals and determined that wars between liberal states are less. The reason for fewer wars between liberal states is their non-aggressive policies against each other and this will decrease wars as the number of liberal states in the world increases. In this respect, Doyle has made an empirical analysis of wars in the world, based on Kantian philosophy.

But these criteria are purely for systemic democratization because they are all institutions of a liberal system. However, as we presented in the relevant section, Kant’s main claim is not just about the systemic democratization of the state. On the contrary, the prerequisite for the system to establish these institutions is that citizens fulfill their morals of duty. This is also referred to in this article as cultural democratization. At this point, the question is whether Doyle’s suggestion about peace between liberal states would change under the lights of the prioritization of cultural democracy over systemic democratization. In other words, is Doyle’s claim about the sustainability of peace between liberal countries failed under the perspective of cultural democratization? To answer this question, it would be useful to examine Doyle as well as his critics of democratic peace theory.

The criticization of the Democratic Peace Theory under the cultural-systemic democratization dilemma is not unique to this article. Layne’s famous article could be the first critique on Democratic Peace Theory and emphasized the non-persuasiveness of its suggestions due to the inappropriateness of the claims to the facts (Layne, 1994, p. 6). More- over, Layne argued that even democratic institutions didn’t produce the results as the predictions by Democratic Peace Theory in various cases. For this article, this failure of Democratic Peace Theory stated by Layne

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must be examined from the cultural-systemic democratization debate. The contribution of this article may be to transfer the critiques on democratic peace theory from the case studies to philosophical studies. The main argument of this article is the democratic peace theory has not the capability to affect the cultural-systemic democratization debate but is affected by it.

Based on Kant’s argument on Pacific Peace, Doyle argued in the pool of peace between liberal states. In other words, liberal states either never fight each other or they rarely threaten each other with force when they come to the point of war (Doyle, 1982, p. 213; Layne, 1994, pp. 7–8). In contrast, the warlessness cannot occur between totalitarian and autocratic regimes. Despite any occurrence of peace conjuncture, nonliber- al states like autocratic and totalitarian regimes cannot maintain that conjuncture because their interests can be lacked of anytime in that peace conjuncture (Doyle, 2006, p. 214). As a general formulization, liberal states tend to be naturally in peace whereas non-liberal states are naturally in tendency to be in war. However, for democratic peace theory, the peace tendency of liberal states are conditioned to the regime of their interlocutors. Therefore, liberal states’ tendency to warlessness is only for liberal states.

On the other hand, it must be noticed that the democratic peace theory suggests the peaceful tendency of liberal states not arisen from the peace pool, because the peace pool is the result of attitudes of liberal states to each other rather than being the reason of their attitudes. In other words, a liberal country is not inclined to war against another liberal country; but it can take an aggressive and belligerent attitude towards an non-liberal country. In addition, as Doyle admits, according to statistics, liberal countries can even be more war-proneness than non-liberal ones (Chan, 1984, pp. 617–648). In conclusion, for democratic peace theorists, non-liberal states have not any choice but being liberal to be a part of the peace pool and to avoid the war-proneness of liberal states (Russett et al., 1995, pp. 164–184).

Doyle examined the formation conditions for peace pool between liberal states in the Three Definitive Articles in Kant’s writings titled Perpetual Peace (Doyle, 1986, 2006; Russett et al., 1995). For the first article, leg- islative, executive and judicial institutions must have created a check and balance system as signals of separation of powers. For the second article, states with republican and liberal institutions form an interna-

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tional federation among themselves. For the third article, a cosmopolitan law within the international federation is established appropriate to the domestic republican liberal law. If these three conditions are realized, then the Perpetual Peace can be achieved. The governments in liberal states cannot decide on war due to the fact that their citizens have a say about the aftermath of governments because of their unwillingness to respond to the citizens about the material and moral costs of the war.

THE CULTURAL-SYSTEMIC DEMOCRATIZATION DEBATE AND THE DEMO- CRATIC PEACE THEORY UNDER THE LIGHTS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN- DEX

After the hidden dimension of Kantian philosophy titled cultural-systemic democratization dilemma has been discussed, this section reveals, positively or negatively, the connections between the democratic peace theory and this dilemma. The raising question at this point is on the relation of democratic peace theory with the cultural-systemic democratization debate. Critical studies on democratic peace theory generally concentrates on the war-proneness of liberal states regardless of the regime of interlocutor countries (Layne, 1994, pp. 50–86). However, Doyle rejected this kind of critics by remembering that liberal states are prone to war against illiberal states. Therefore, the peace tendency is only valid for liberal states.

At this point, the critics of democratic peace theory can be criticized because of their failure to tackle with unit of analysis. The raising question about the relation between the war-proneness of liberal states and cultural democratization can be the starting point. In other words, how can a liberal state assumed with cultural democratization be war prone even to the non-liberal states? Therefore, the war-proneness of liberal states can be explained if systemic democratization is taken as the unit of analysis whereas it is impossible when cultural democratization is taken as unit of analysis.

After revealing the theoretical failure of democratic peace theory on liberalization of world states, this article will also check this argument with an empirical analysis. This test will be made through controlling whether cultural democratization or systemic democratization is the main driver of peace pool. The null hypothesis is that cultural democratization is the main driver. In other words, in contrast to the democratic peace theory arguing in the sufficiency of republican and liberal

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institutions, this article hypothesizes its insuffficiency without cultural democratization because of the misjudgement of the democratic peace theory on the first three articles of Kant’s Perpetual Peace. To make the control this null hypothesis, this article takes numerical data from three different databases which are World Governance Index (WGI) 2016, the Uppsala Conflict Database Program 2016 (UCDP), and Project Polity IV.

The World Governance Index measures the perception of 214 states and state-like structures in the world in the eyes of their citizens in six governance dimensions under three headings. These six dimensions can be seen in Figure X. Accordingly, the perception of a state administration can be monitored under three main headings: the election, obser- vation and changes of governments, whether they actively implement their policies and the respect of the citizens and states of the country for economic and social institutions. Within the cultural-systemic democratization debate, the first two of these titles will be able to measure systemic democratization, while the last one will be able to measure cultural democratization.

This conclusion can be reached by starting from Kant’s philosophy. The respect of citizens and state institutions towards economic and social institutions corresponds to Kant’s morality of duty. We can see this clearly when we look at the criteria under this heading: rule of law and corruption control. While the rule of law principle fully corresponds to Kant’s morality of duty, corruption control can also be considered within the same framework. As a result, the formation of a perception that there is no corruption in a state can be considered as an indication that people and the state respect each other’s economic rights and know where their economic freedom ends. Therefore, in this article, the rule of law and corruption control will be considered as indicators of cultural democratization.

In addition, the second database to be utilized, UCDP, is the product of a project that records any conflict and conflict-like events around the world since 1989.2 According to UCDP, for an event to be coded as a conflict, ‘an organized party must have caused at least one death by using its armed force against another organized party or against ci- vilians’ (Sundberg & Melander, 2013, pp. 523–532). The aim of UCDP is to analyze whether the determination of the democratic peace theory about the war past of liberal and of non-liberal states is correct. In 2 To reach all information in this dataset, please visit http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/

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this respect, it will be evaluated whether the non-democrats are in a non-fighting attitude by determining the states of the states between the years of war 1989-2015 according to the regime types.

The database of the Polity IV project will be used to determine which state is democratic and which is not. The Polity IV project is a database project that shows the periods when states entered into schism, faced military coups, experienced revolutions and moved away from democratic rule, and classifies states from 1946 to the present under four groups, from democracy to autocracy. This project scores 167 countries around the world on a scale of -10 to 10, with full democracy (10), democracy (6:9), open anocracy (0:5), closed anocracy (-5:0) and autocracy (-6:-10). ) are classified as The information obtained from the Polity IV project, on the other hand, will show the status of the examined state on the basis of systemic democratization.

Thus, the cultural democratization of countries by looking at WGI, the systemic democratization of countries by looking at Polity IV project and the situation of countries about war and conflict by looking at UCDP will be examined. As a result, in the triangle of Kant, cultural-systemic democratization and democratic peace theory, it can be questioned where the theoretical discussion corresponds to in practice. A few points need to be highlighted here. First, since the number of countries covered in all three databases is not the same, the number of states covered in this section will be limited to the minimum number (167) that the Polity IV project has examined. Although this situation does not harm the health of the analysis, it results in the inability to examine some countries in the world.

Secondly, the criteria of the WGI and Polity IV projects were considered to agree with Kant’s criteria in the cultural-systemic democratization debate. This has also been explained. However, although this subject needs to be criticized, this subject is left to future studies. The third point is that while the citizens themselves should be taken as the analysis unit, the analysis unit in all the databases here is the state. It should be noted here that, as emphasized in the relevant section, it is very difficult to obtain data on the level of cultural democratization of citizens. But the perception of states in the eyes of citizens can serve as a proxy for cultural democratization. Therefore, although WGI has pro- duced results at the state level, it ultimately gives an idea of the state of society.

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The first conclusion obtained by looking at the aggregated analysis of the databases is that countries ruled by autocracy can also create a pool of peace. We can explain this argument as follows. According to the WGI, cultural democratization – the rule of law and corruption control – is high (0 out of 0). According to the UCDP data of the autocratic countries, there has been no war between them since 1946. It is necessary to make a point here. When the subsequent studies are examined, according to the data of the Polity IV project, some countries that were autocratic in 2013 have been transitioned to democratic orders since 1946.3 For this reason, a claim can be made such as “The fact that countries that were autocratic in 2013 have not been in a state of war since 1946 does not mean that the autocracy can create a pool of peace among themselves” and it can be argued that the main argument of the article in your hand is invalid. But in our opinion, this inference would be wrong. Because the main argument put forward in this article is not that a pool of peace can be formed among autocratic countries. This situation does not seem to fit the facts.

However, the main argument in this article is that it is important not to be a systemic democracy, but to be a cultural democracy for the peace pool that Kant claims to be. Therefore, even if it is an autocratic country, a state whose society has completed the cultural democracy stage has a situation where it does not prefer war in the international arena. However, we can support our argument with democratic countries as well. As an example, Pakistan and India are two countries governed by democracy according to the Polity IV project. However, the cultural democratization levels of these two countries are low according to the WGI. In fact, it has started to fall below 0 in the last few years. However, according to UCDP data, there have been 20 armed conflicts with more than 25 deaths between these two countries since 1946 at the state level, and this situation still continues. Therefore, although both are democracies, these two countries do not hesitate to use arms against each other. Therefore, although they have finished their systemic democracy stage, the low level of their cultural democracies caused these two countries to not hesitate to use weapons against each other.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

One of the most important theories of the second half of the 20th century, which focuses on Kant’s contribution to the field of international 3 To see the figures on rule of law and corruption based on WGI, you should see Annex 2.

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relations, is the theory of democratic peace. The main argument put forward by this theory is that liberal/democratic states will not prefer to use arms against each other and therefore a pool of peace will be formed between liberal/democratic countries. They based these claims on Kant’s political philosophy. But, as demonstrated in this article, both theoretically and practically, this argument of the democratic theory of peace is wrong or incomplete because the theory misread the first of Kant’s three defining articles. In Kant’s political philosophy, there is a bi-polar discussion area: cultural and systemic democratization. The democratic peace theory saw Kant’s requirement for countries to establish republican institutions as the completion of the systemic democratization of countries. However, Kant emphasized cultural democratization, not systemic democratization. For the establishment of republican institutions, it is imperative that citizens fulfill their morals of duty. In order to examine this argument on a practical level, a harmonized analysis of the WGI, Polity IV and UCDP databases has yielded data supporting this argument of the article in your hand. As a result, we can say that the democratic peace theory, which we can see as the suc- cessor of Kant in the field of international relations, has reached wrong data about Kant. Therefore, in order to understand Kant’s contribution to the field of international relations, it is necessary to study not only the dimensions of the discipline of international relations, but also political philosophy without ignoring it.

REFERENCES

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Bartelson, J. (1995). The Trial of Judgment: A Note on Kant and the Para- doxes of Internationalism. International Studies Quarterly, 39(2), 255. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600849

Chan, S. (1984). Mirror, Mirror on the Wall...: Are the Freer Countries More Pacific? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28(4), 617–648. https://doi. org/10.1177/0022002784028004003

Deudney, D. H., & Deudney, D. H. (Eds.). (2009). Bounding power: Repub- lican security theory from the polis to the global village (3. printing, and 1. paperback printing). Princeton University Press.

Doyle, M. (1982). Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. Philosophy and

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Public Affairs, 12(3), 205–235.

Doyle, M. (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. The American Political Sci- ence Review, 80(4), 1151–1169.

Doyle, M. (2006). Kant and Liberal Internationalism. In P. Kleingeld (Ed.), To- ward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and His- tory. Yale University Press.

Franceschet, A. (2001). Sovereignty and Freedom: Immanuel Kant’s Liberal Internationalist “Legacy.” Review of International Studies, 27(2), 209– 228.

Garnham, D. (1986). War-Proneness, War-Weariness, and Regime Type: 1816- 1980. Journal of Peace Research, 23(3), 279–289.

Gözen, R. (2014). Uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri.

Huntington, S. P. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22. https://doi.org/10.2307/20045621

Jervis, R. (2017). How statesmen think: The psychology of international politics. Princeton University Press.

Kant, I. (1983). Perpetual peace, and other essays on politics, history, and morals (T. Humphrey, Trans.). Hackett Pub. Co.

Kant, I. (1996). The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge University Press.

Layne, christopher. (1994). Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace. International Security, 19(2), 5–49. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539195

Palmer, G., & Morgan, T. C. (2006). A theory of foreign policy. Princeton Uni- versity Press.

Russett, B., Layne, christopher, Spiro, D. E., & Doyle, M. (1995). The Demo- cratic Peace. International Security, 19(4), 164–184.

Rustow, D. A. (1970). Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. Comparative Politics, 2(3), 337. https://doi.org/10.2307/421307

Sundberg, R., & Melander, E. (2013). Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event

Dataset. Journal of Peace Research, 50(4), 523–532.

Waller, M., & Linklater, A. (2003). Political loyalty and the nation-state. Rout- ledge.

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ANNEX I. REGIME TYPES IN POLITY IV - 2013

COUNTRY REGIME TYPE CAYMAN ISLANDS N/A AFGHANISTAN Failed CENTRAL AFRICAN Failed ALBANIA Democracy REPUBLIC ALGERIA Open Anocracy CHAD Closed Anocracy AMERICAN SAMOA N/A CHILE Democracy ANDORRA N/A CHINA Autocracy ANGOLA Closed Anocracy COLOMBIA Democracy ANGUILLA N/A COMOROS Democracy ANTIGUA AND BAR- N/A CONGO, DEM. REP. Open Anocracy BUDA CONGO, REP. Closed Anocracy ARGENTINA Democracy COOK ISLANDS N/A ARMENIA Open Anocracy COSTA RICA Full Democracy ARUBA N/A CÔTE D’IVOIRE N/A AUSTRALIA Full Democracy CROATIA Full Democracy AUSTRIA Full Democracy CUBA Autocracy AZERBAIJAN Autocracy CYPRUS Full Democracy BAHAMAS, THE N/A CZECH REPUBLIC Democracy BAHRAIN Autocracy DENMARK Full Democracy BANGLADESH Closed Anocracy DJIBOUTI Open Anocracy BARBADOS N/A DOMINICA N/A BELARUS Autocracy DOMINICAN REPUB- Democracy BELGIUM Democracy LIC BELIZE N/A ECUADOR Open Anocracy BENIN Democracy EGYPT, ARAB REP. Closed Anocracy BERMUDA N/A EL SALVADOR Democracy BHUTAN Open Anocracy EQUATORIAL GUINEA Closed Anocracy BOLIVIA Democracy ERITREA Autocracy BOSNIA AND HERZE- Failed ESTONIA Democracy GOVINA ETHIOPIA Closed Anocracy BOTSWANA Democracy FIJI Closed Anocracy BRAZIL Democracy FINLAND Full Democracy BRUNEI DARUSSA- N/A FRANCE Democracy LAM FRENCH GUIANA N/A BULGARIA Democracy GABON Open Anocracy BURKINA FASO Closed Anocracy GAMBIA, THE Closed Anocracy BURUNDI Democracy GEORGIA Democracy CAMBODIA Open Anocracy GERMANY Democracy CAMEROON Closed Anocracy GHANA Democracy CANADA Full Democracy GREECE Full Democracy CAPE VERDE Full Democracy

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GREENLAND N/A LIECHTENSTEIN N/A GRENADA N/A LITHUANIA Full Democracy GUAM N/A LUXEMBOURG Full Democracy GUATEMALA Democracy MACAO SAR, CHINA N/A GUINEA Open Anocracy MACEDONIA, FYR Full Democracy GUINEA-BISSAU Closed Anocracy MADAGASCAR Open Anocracy GUYANA Democracy MALAWI Open Anocracy HAITI Failed MALAYSIA Democracy HONDURAS Democracy MALDIVES N/A HONG KONG SAR, N/A MALI Open Anocracy CHINA MALTA N/A HUNGARY Full Democracy MARSHALL ISLANDS N/A ICELAND N/A MARTINIQUE N/A INDIA Democracy MAURITANIA Closed Anocracy INDONESIA Democracy MAURITIUS Full Democracy IRAN, ISLAMIC REP. Autocracy MEXICO Democracy IRAQ Closed Anocracy MICRONESIA, FED. N/A IRELAND Full Democracy STS. ISRAEL Full Democracy MOLDOVA Democracy ITALY Full Democracy MONACO N/A JAMAICA Democracy MONGOLIA Democracy JAPAN Full Democracy MONTENEGRO Democracy JERSEY, CHANNEL N/A MOROCCO Closed Anocracy ISLANDS MOZAMBIQUE Open Anocracy JORDAN Closed Anocracy MYANMAR Closed Anocracy KAZAKHSTAN Autocracy NAMIBIA Democracy KENYA Democracy NAURU N/A KIRIBATI N/A NEPAL Democracy KOREA, DEM. REP. Autocracy NETHERLANDS Full Democracy (North Korea) NETHERLANDS AN- N/A KOREA, REP. (South Democracy TILLES (FORMER) Korea) NEW ZEALAND Full Democracy KOSOVO Democracy NICARAGUA Democracy KUWAIT Autocracy NIGER Democracy KYRGYZ REPUBLIC Democracy NIGERIA Open Anocracy LAO PDR N/A NIUE N/A LATVIA Democracy NORWAY Full Democracy LEBANON Open Anocracy OMAN Autocracy LESOTHO Democracy PAKISTAN Democracy LIBERIA Democracy PALAU N/A LIBYA Failed

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PANAMA Democracy SWITZERLAND Full Democracy PAPUA NEW GUINEA Open Anocracy SYRIAN ARAB REPUB- Autocracy PARAGUAY Democracy LIC PERU Democracy TAIWAN, CHINA Full Democracy PHILIPPINES Democracy TAJIKISTAN Closed Anocracy POLAND Full Democracy TANZANIA Closed Anocracy PORTUGAL Full Democracy THAILAND Democracy PUERTO RICO N/A TIMOR-LESTE N/A QATAR Autocracy TOGO Closed Anocracy RÉUNION N/A TONGA N/A ROMANIA Democracy TRINIDAD AND TO- Full Democracy BAGO RUSSIAN FEDERA- Open Anocracy TION TUNISIA Open Anocracy RWANDA Closed Anocracy TURKEY Democracy SAMOA N/A TURKMENISTAN Autocracy SAN MARINO N/A TUVALU N/A SÃO TOMÉ AND N/A UGANDA Closed Anocracy PRINCIPE UKRAINE Democracy SAUDI ARABIA Autocracy UNITED ARAB EMI- Autocracy SENEGAL Democracy RATES SERBIA Democracy UNITED KINGDOM Full Democracy SEYCHELLES N/A UNITED STATES Full Democracy SIERRA LEONE Democracy URUGUAY Full Democracy SINGAPORE Closed Anocracy UZBEKISTAN Autocracy SLOVAK REPUBLIC Full Democracy VANUATU N/A SLOVENIA Full Democracy VENEZUELA, RB Open Anocracy SOLOMON ISLANDS Democracy VIETNAM Autocracy SOMALIA Open Anocracy VIRGIN ISLANDS N/A (U.S.) SOUTH AFRICA Democracy WEST BANK AND N/A SOUTH SUDAN Closed Anocracy GAZA SPAIN Full Democracy YEMEN, REP. Open Anocracy SRI LANKA Open Anocracy ZAMBIA Democracy ST. KITTS AND NEVIS N/A ZIMBABWE Open Anocracy ST. LUCIA N/A ST. VINCENT AND THE N/A GRENADINES SUDAN Closed Anocracy SURINAME Open Anocracy SWAZILAND Autocracy SWEDEN Full Democracy

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ANNEX II. THE GRAPHICS ON DEMOCRATIZATION OF PAKISTAN AND INDIA

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ANNEX III. THE GRAPHICS ON DEMOCRATIZATION OF PAKISTAN AND INDIA

Toplam Number SütunE ketleri Sa rE ketleri Government of Honduras Government of Jordan Government of Malaysia Government of Netherlands Government of Nicaragua Government of Pakistan Government of Russia( Soviet Union) Government of Syria Government of Thailand Government of Tunisia Government of Turkey Government of United Kingdom Government of United States of America GenelT oplam Albania 11 Argen na 11 Cyprus 1 1 El Salvador 1 1 France 11 2 Honduras 1 1 Hungary 1 1 India 20 20 Indonesia 41 5 Israel 1 2 3 Panama 11 GenelT oplam 1 1 4 1 1 20 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 37

Table 1. Wars of Democracies

Toplam Number SütunE ketleri Sa rE ketleri Government of Ethiopia Government of India Government of Iraq Government of Myanmar( Burma) Government of Russia (SovietU nion) Government of SouthK orea Government of Taiwan Government of Vietnam( NorthV ietnam) GenelT oplam China 21 14 10 18 Eritrea 3 3 Iran 10 10 NorthK orea 5 5 GenelT oplam 3 2 10 1 1 5 4 10 36

Table 2. Wars of Autocracies

29 HURSIT DINGIL https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0836-0620

ISTANBUL MEDENIYET UNIVERSITY EMAIL: [email protected]

Submission Date: 05.05.2021 Review Date: 16.05.2021 Acceptance Date: 24.05.2021 Publication Date: 17.07.2021 JISPOL Structure: Discipline-Oriented Research Paper JISPOL Discipline: Regional Studies Special Field: Middle East Politics

Vol.1 No.1 E-ISSN: 2791-7525 DOI: 10.2021/jispol.v1i1.3

A CRITICAL APPROACH ON INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COALI- TIONS: THE CASE OF ISRAEL’S INCLUSION TO CENTCOM

ABSTRACT This paper develops a critical approach on the relative significance of regionalism as an explanatory framework and examines what kind of developments have occurred harming this relative significance. For this purpose, it closely looks atthe relationship between international military coalitions and their regional partners. The main argument of this paper is this relationship will harm the regional alliances, and indirectly the regional peace stability. Even though the international military coalitions say their main goal is to make the peaceful environment stabilized, this paper suggests that the actual result may be an increase in the lack of confidence between regional countries. This lack of confidence will also harm the regional peace stability in reverse to the aim of international military coalitions. This result can be called the crowding-out effect of non-regional coalitions.

Keywords: International Military Coalitions, Regional Relations, CENTCOM, Middle East, Israel

To cite this article: Dingil, H. (2021). A Critical Approach on International Mi- litary Coalitions: The Case of Israel’s Inclusion to CENTCOM, Journal of Islamic Politics, 1(1), 30-44. journal of ıslamıc polıtıcs HURSIT DINGIL

INTRODUCTION

The significance of regionalism has been increased so much to understand the international system and its ongoing. Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers, developing powers have been interested in developing their ties with their neighbors. Besides the several motivational resources of this preference of states, it has also changed the perspectives to understand the international political order. Before these crises in 1991 and 2001, hegemonic competition and bipolar world order theories could give many incisive insights to evaluate the circumstances in world politics. However, after these crises, the theories have lost their efficiency and alternative explanations have taken momentum. Hurrell (1995), Kelly (2007), Katzenstein (2005), Buzan (2010), Mearsheimer (2010), Dieter (2009), Mittel- man and Falk (2000), Thompson (1973) are academicians to study explanatory frameworks and regionalism is one of the most preferred ones. The almost a quarter-century after the Soviet collapse in 1991 and the US political crises in 2001 has many experiences that can change this evaluation from hegemonic stability to regionalism.

This paper develops a critical approach on the relative significance of regionalism as an explanatory framework and examines what kind of developments have occurred harming this relative significance. For this purpose, it closely looks at the relationship between international military coalitions and their regional partners. The main argument of this paper is this relationship will harm the regional alliances, and indirectly the regional peace stability. Even though the international military coalitions say their main goal is to make the peaceful environment stabilized, this paper suggests that the actual result may be an increase in the lack of confidence between regional countries. This lack of confidence will also harm the regional peace stability in reverse to the aim of international military coalitions. This result can be called the crowding-out effect of non-regional coalitions.

This paper is organized as follows. The first section reveals the historical background of regionalism in international relations. It focuses on the period especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and after the 9/11 crisis of the United States although regionalism has sounded before. The second section summarizes the mutual interaction between international military coalitions and regional political movements. Indeed, this paper essentially takes regionalism as the dependent variable in this relationship. However, it is also aware of the counter-effects of a dependent variable on the interdependent variable in any formula. Therefore, to crosscheck the main argument about the harmful

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effect of international coalitions, this paper examines the effect of regionalism on international coalitions. The third section seeks to the insights from the decision of the US CENTCOM to include Israel. The interpretation of the possible scenarios is on the core of this section for the peace stability or peace possibility in the Middle East long-lasting sought. The last section concludes the paper.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF REGIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The international political order has experienced very fundamental changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 9/11 crisis of the United States. Even though it seems like that the former has raised the positive expectations for human freedom and that the latter has threatened world security, both have increased the anxieties about how the future of the world would shape. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the integration of the Russian Federa- tion without any aggression was the main agenda of the western powers. On the other hand, the political and economic sustainability of the newly interdependent countries were also very important to keep the international political arena away from any aggression. As hegemonic stability theory suggested, the international political order could realize this purpose only under a security umbrella of a hegemon that was also away from any aggression. On the other hand, after the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in 2001, the idea of a ‘security umbrella’ has completely collapsed because the US became an ‘assailable’ country. This assailableness has made the US a more aggressive country and obliged to follow harder security policies all over the world. This essential change in the US security policy has transformed the story in world politics. This transformation can be interpreted under two important phases: the security phase after 2001 and the economic phase after 2008.

I. THE SECURITY PHASE AFTER 2001

Besides the collapse in the minds about the idea of a ‘security umbrella’, the aggressive security policy of the US all over the world has made its interlocutor countries more anxious about their sovereignty and security. Additionally, the statement of incumbent President George Walker Bush which enforced world states to be with the US or to be against the US caused these countries to search for alternative models to keep safe their sovereignty and security. Because of the impossibility of isolation in the international political structure under the pressure of American aggression, many countries have sought to improve their relations with other countries than the US. The most probable countries to establish an alliance were of course the neighboring countries. In

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this sense, many regional powers tried to improve their relations with neighbors and also to decrease the problems with them. Russian Medvedev Doc- trine, Turkish policy called Zero Problems with Neighbors, the acceleration of the EU Enlargement process, Chinese membership to the World Trade Orga- nization, the establishment of new international initiatives like the Alliance of Civilizations under the United Nations can be good exemplifications for the trials of new alternatives against US aggression. By improving ties with the closest territories, the related states tried to establish a safe area out of their borders to keep away any militaristic threat to their territories. In addition, they believed that a good neighborhood could increase the capability to isolate the United States in any case of a rise in tensions.

The increase in the neighborhood and the trial to decrease problems with any country makes regionalism a more popular theoretical framework to understand world politics after 9/11. Although the security concerns may be the main motivation for states to follow this policy, it cannot be said as the sole explanation tool of regionalism. Additionally to the security concern, the trading state concept was also a trending concept in international relations to make sense of the increase in the compassion of the states. To take stronger steps to be a wealthier state, any states need to increase its trade with other countries in favor of its current account balance. For them, this ‘international compassion’ could increase the opportunities to have a bigger trade volume. For instance, the protocols between Turkey and Armenia in 2009 proposing the establishment and development of diplomatic ties between two states have been explained under the motivation of Turkey to increase its trade (İşeri & Çelik, 2015). The Russian interest in the ex-Soviet states became more sensible with the argument that Russia sought control of natural gas resources in Central Asia [citation]. China sought to maintain and to make sustain its incredible growth rates since 1980s. Therefore, the concept of trading state handled as a very significant term to explain the change in states policies, and also in world politics during the first decade of the millenium. However, the US economic crisis in 2007 leaded the story begun in 2001 to shift from the security anxieties to economic concerns all over the world.

II. ECONOMIC DIMENSION

In 2007, the mortgage sector of the US has lived a deep crisis and the banks in the US that were too big to fail were on the verge of bankruptcy. In those days, many economists had started to talk about the re-birth of Keynesian economic models to save the world economy from a whole collapse. The US Government might apply Neo-Keynesian economic policies to the US Economy by buying

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the debts of the banks to the stakeholders in the mortgage crisis; however, this type of policy was only towards the domestic labor and real market of the US. In addition to these Neo-Keynesian policies in good and services markets within the US, the Federal Reserve (FED) has also implied very big quantitative easing economic pockets to finance the US budget. On the other hand, because the US dollar is accepted as the reserve currency in world trade, this quantitative easing for the US domestic markets has some results for the markets outside the US. This result was very simple: The export of the US debt crisis to the international economic system. Although this export was the natural result due to the almost-fully-integrated-money system in the world, it also has some other results in the perspectives of states on the world economic system and their possible responses to it.

Briefly, world states have preferred to respond to the security crisis in 2001 by improving their ties with their neighbors. On the other hand, they were obliged to take precautions against any possible economic problems coming from any countries in the world including their neighbors. As a result, while world states had a positive face in international politics after 2001, they must shift from this positivity to skeptical neutrality after 2007. While improving ties have sounded like the most efficient tool for a secure environment from US aggressive security policy, neo-conservative economic policies have allowed securing their existing wealth in international politics. This hard shift from security positivity to economic skepticism has some important results for the increasing trend of regionalism. Whereas this paper examines these results in the next section, it can be noted that the security concerns all around the world, necessary or unnecessary, have increased and also still is increasing the need for non-regional military coalitions as an alternative defense mechanism against regional threats. Even though establishing or joining any regional and non-regional coalitions sounds very normal to keep states’ security sustainable, this paper suggests the necessity of asking for the results of these coalitions on regionalism. To do this, the next section will interpret the mutual interaction between international military coalitions and regionalism.

THE MUTUAL INTERACTION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COALITIONS AND REGIONALISM

Wolford suggested that international military coalitions can produce political results ‘from successful coercion to the outbreak of war to wide-ranging confrontations that draw neighbors and distant powers alike into counter-coalitions’ (Wolford, 2015, p. 3). And he suggested that these political outcomes

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raise two important questions. The first one is what the impact of military coalitions is on the probability of war and peace. The second one is on the probability of provocation of coalitions to counter-coalitions and the expansion of conflicts.

These two questions also reflect the dilemma for regional countries about their security. While states aim to deter the security threats by joining the international military coalitions from their regions too, this participation also encour- ages the sustainability of those threats. The serve of international military coalitions as a safe area for its members attracts more states to participate in international military coalitions. The Commands of US Army all over the world are the most famous example for these international military coalitions beyond the institutional military unions like NATO. Even though they also started as a regional military alliance, they become inter-continental military alliances.

Theoretically, the transition from regional to inter-continental characteristics causes perception to occur such as regional alliances without international references are less preferable for states to keep their security sustainable. The deterrence capability of big international military alliances like NATO usually makes states in and out of their regions more responsive to the possible supports of international coalitions. On the other hand, any conflict of interests with any regional state pushes a state to get closing the international coalitions. The rapprochement between a regional state and an international military coalition generates the counter-rapprochement between the conflicted regional state and another international military coalition.

In the case of the absence of an alternative international military coalition, the conflicted regional state can make itself isolated from regional alliances as well as international cooperation in further problems. The magnitude of the institutional and military infrastructure, the diplomatic ties, and opportunities from the participation to an international military coalition are the deter- minants of the domination of the international coalition over regional alliances. Therefore, in consequence, international military coalitions have usually a destroyer effect on regional relationships.

As international military coalitions have various impacts on regionalism, regionalism is reversely also impactful on the shaping of international military coalitions. Regional alliances generate important political and economic benefits for states. For instance, the ASEAN members have agreed on the demil- itarization of almost 100 km area from borders. This agreement has created

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a safe zone for neighboring countries without any intervention of an international military coalition. This safe area means the end of possible threats from neighboring states and non-state actors, the possibility of the launch of economic zones between each other. Such kinds of benefits become indispens- able for states within the process, and these existing benefits from regional ties are a limitation for shaping the areas of influence of international military coalitions.

The interaction between the international military coalitions and regionalism consists of substitutive relations rather than complementary relations. Indeed, both have some security and economic benefits for states; however, they cannot be in compatible relations with each other. Because this paper examines Israel’s case to be included in CENTCOM from the perspective of the domination of CENTCOM over regional peace stability, the limitations of regional relations to CENTCOM’s domination over the Middle East are left to further researches.

The series of economic crises after 2007 in the US has generated a very sufficient ground for a destroyer effect on improving regional relations. As- ad dressed, many European, Asian, Latin American and Middle East states have deeply experienced the impacts of the economic crisis in the US and many of them started to imply more conservative economic policies and trade tariffs to secure their assets from possible international crises in future. Because of the inseparable relation between economics and politics, conservativeness in economics brought skepticism in foreign relations. Therefore, the positive discourses like soft power, mutuality, common future, etc. have experienced a hard decrease in their significance in foreign policies of states that followed a more softening profile in international politics after 2001. In skeptical psychology, skeptics seek for trustable partners. The more crisis is bigger, the more the partner must be bigger to be trustworthy. Therefore, neo-conservatism after 2007 pushed the states bigger economic alliances that could also serve as a security alliances. The states without such an alliance become alone and vulnerable in the international politics.

Because international military alliances give the perception of the necessary and sufficient ground for economic stability and solid security, many states preferred to seek for international military alliances rather than regional positive relations. For instance, Turkey sought for the support of Russia to eliminate the terrorist organizations like PYD in Syria rather than remedying relations with and compromising Syrian government. Egypt has sought for international military cooperation to gain the control of Sinai Peninsula from

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terrorist organizations rather than compromising Saudi government, for example. Ukraine, Georgia have always waited an international alliance against Russian aggression against their territorial sovereignty rather than improving relations with Russia. Poland and Germany didn’t try to have good relations rather than seeking for international support to each other. South China Sea states like China, Vietnam, and Cambodia have never sought for resolutions of property problems in South China Sea, but they tried to find an international partner to protect their rights on South China Sea.

The examples on the substitutive relation between international alliances and regionalism can be increased. However, the point is to see the capability of international alliances to dominate regional partnerships. In all examples, there was a starting point for becoming away from regional alliances and for seeking international partners. In the next section, this paper discusses possible scenarios of the Israel’s inclusion in CENTCOM on the regional relations despite the Abraham Accords which sounds like an improving the regionalism in the Middle East. In other words, the dynamics of Wolford’s argument on the counter-coalition effect of international military coalitions will be applied to the Middle East after the CENTCOM decision on Israel.

THE CASE ANALYSIS OF ISRAEL’S INCLUSION TO CENTCOM

Israel’s inclusion in a non-regional military coalition is not new for the Middle East, indeed. Before the decision of CENTCOM to include it, Israel has been also a member of EUCOM. Because of the fundamental problems with Muslim Arab states, Israel has had continuously security problems since its establishment. Although Israel wasn’t an object of serious attacks that could challenge its existence since the Six-Day War except for Hamas and Hezbollah, the possibility of an existential challenge has been always at the core of Israel’s foreign policy agenda. In addition to Israel’s attitude that its arm has the power to struggle with its all enemies [citation], it didn’t ignore being in international military alliances like EUCOM. These international military alliances have allowed Israel to deter these continuous regional threats from Hamas and Iran, as far as possible. In cases of unavoidable wars with Hamas and Iran leaded Hezbollah, Israel has fought them to show its military power and to test its new military equipment like Iron Dome, unmanned air vehicles, etc.

On the other hand, Israel has also tried to legitimize its Israel’s Settlement Policies by stating itself victimized. Because of the alliance with Israel un-

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der international military coalitions like NATO and EUCOM, the international community is contented with just blaming Israel due to its illegitimate settlement policies, especially around al-Quds. However, due to the support of international military coalitions, the inefficiency of the international mechanisms that can enforce Israel to apply the decisions of International Courts has made non-regional alliances more effective and desirable for Israel since its establishment announcement.

The inclusion in CENTCOM has been the last incident that increased the international support behind Israel. To look at the reflections of the inclusion decision, the Pentagon announcement must be evaluated, firstly. On Friday, January 15th, 2021, the Pentagon issued an important announcement re- garding Israel’s inclusion in the CENTCOM. The Inclusion Statement stated about the change in Israel’s position. “The United States today made a change to the United Command Plan. The 2020 Joint Command Plan removed Israel from the U.S. European Command’s area of responsibility and placed it in the responsibility of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)”. It means the change of Israel’s position in the international security alliances. In addition, the Penta- gon expressed in the announcement that “The reduction of tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors after the Abraham Accord provides a strategic opportunity for the United States to bring together key partners against common threats in the Middle East. Israel is one of the leading strategic partners of the United States.”

In addition to this statement from the US, Israel has also addressed the positive side of this inclusion to the normalization process through Abraham Ac- cord by referring to the same enemy with the Gulf States in the region. Moshe Patel, head of the Missile Defense Organization of the Israeli Defense Ministry, said that Israel could also hold joint exercises with new allies in the Gulf. He stated that “from an engineering perspective, of course, there are many advantages. Since we have the same enemy, both sides can share information, for example, sensors can be deployed in Gulf countries.” Patel made these assessments after the military exercise with the participation of officials from the US Missile Defense Agency to test Israel’s David’s Sling and Iron Dome air defense systems.

Concerning the impact of this decision on regional relations, the announcement stated that this step emerged as strengthening support of the Normalization Agreements. The Abraham Accord, signed in September 2020, is considered a turning point that initiates normalization between Gulf states such as the UAE and Bahrain, and Israel. Additionally, as a result of these normalization

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agreements, the Gulf States, firstly, recognized Israel as a state in contrast to the historical non-recognition policy and began to cooperate with Israel in the fields of economic, political, and security. Within the scope of Normalization Agreements, Israel signed some cooperation protocols with the UAE, especially in the field of defense industry and security. On the other hand, Normalization Agreements offer new routes for flight paths. Moreover, the new routes also contain non-participant countries. For instance, Saudi Arabia also opened its flight areas to Israel like other countries although it is not part of the Normal- ization agreements.

Following the Abraham Accords and the Protocols, the Qatar crisis in 2017 was also resolved in the latest period of Trump’s government while regional tensions have increased. Immediately after this resolution, the US recognized the UAE and Bahrain as the Main Security partners, as they grant them special status in military and security matters. Kuwait was then made the main Non-NATO ally. This definition means that Countries that are given the right to cooperate with NATO countries militarily, participate in joint military exercises and be privileged in arms purchases.

CENTCOM decision is a step to realize the Normalization Agreements in practice although a top-down normalization occurs in the Agreements, a step is needed to make this kind of rapprochement permanent since officials and employees working in institutions can work together smoothly. In other sense, interoperability and maturation of interagency coordination can be achieved through ongoing interaction in practice. However, those steps taken after the normalization agreements can be considered as the process of building the Middle East security architecture. Although the architecture of this alliance against Iran theoretically begins with the normalization agreements, strengthening and the maturation of this alliance requires institutionalization as the second step. This step can also be considered as an indication with the long-lasting projections. Some allegations like Arab NATO raised the question whether Arab countries would succeed in formation such an alliance. In this context, the CENTCOM decision can give a good answer to this question. While independent Arabs can pose a threat to Israel, an institutionalized security architecture can really be considered as a well-designed response that meets existing needs and addresses security vulnerabilities.

While looking at the collaborative promises of Normalization Agreements and the inclusion of Israel’s in CENTCOM, the anxiety about the possible counter-coalitions can sound as improper. Because the comprehensive statements by the generals of CENTCOM and Israel, the interlocutor Arab states can be-

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lieve in the probable gains from the Israel’s inclusion to CENTCOM through Abraham Accords. On the other hand, the existing critical issues like al-Quds, the settlement policy of Israel, the expansionary ideological background of Zionist movement that have dreams for the lands of Arab states have the potential to harm the circumstances of Abraham Accords. Additionally, the fault lines within the Israeli politics has risen within the process and this situation may have the potential to return Israel from some of its promises to the Arab states in Abraham Accords. Reversely, because of these fault lines, Arab states can return from the Abraham Accords due to their possible threat perceptions.

The developments after the attacks of the Israeli Army to al-Aqsa in April 2021 have shown the possible results of the fault lines and possible counter-coalitions in the Middle East despite the Abraham Accords. After the attacks of radical Zionists to the al-Aqsa Mosque and the intervention by the Israeli police to Palestinian protesters have resulted in never-seen-before incidents. The Israeli citizens in Lud called 1948 Arabs who have never clashed with Israel started to uprise against the Israeli government. Additionally, a mass of people come to the Israeli border from Jordan and Lebanon to support the Palestinian protesters for Al-Aqsa. This kind of counter-movements of civil society within Israel and from other countries has some kind of presses on their states to take a position against Israel’s settlement policy and al-Aqsa aggression.

Beyond the pressures of civil society, the acceleration of diplomatic connec- tion between Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon is the sign of the counter-coalition against Israel and the other signatories on Abraham Accords within the Middle East. The most serious counter-fact against Israel can be thought of as this rapprochement between Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Also, ‘Kuwait has individually condemns the Israeli settlement policy and the Palestinians evictions from al-Quds’ (Chalhoub, 2021). The reactions of ‘Kuwaiti, Moroccan, and Pakistani parliamentary members to Israeli Knesset Members from the Zionist Union in the Inter-Parliament Union assembly in Saint Petersburg in 2017’ have also shown the sensitivity of some regional and non-regional countries to the Palestinian and al-Aqsa (Winer & Ahren, 2017). Although these reactions have never noteworthy responses from Israel since its establishment, they have some limitations in the Middle East and have resulted in the stability of regional peace.

The negative anxieties from Israel’s inclusion in CENTCOM are not only because of the existing imbalances within the Middle East but also because of the possible effects on Transatlantic relations. This inclusion may refer the change in the US strategic mind not only for the Middle East but also for Eu-

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rope. In other words, the removal of Israel from the EUCOM responsibility area means that the US doesn’t want the improvement of the relations between European countries and Israel, anymore. While thinking of the normalized relations between Israel and some Arabian Gulf countries, any improvement between European countries and Israel may have negative reflections in the US strategic mind like losing its areas of influence in Europe as well as in the Middle East. Therefore, in the US strategic mind, there is a substitutive and competitive relation between the US and European countries for military presence in the Middle East. On the other hand, the announcement referred to the meaninglessness of understanding the change in the position of Israel as a product of the competition between Europe and the US. Reversely, the rejection of Arab states to recognize Israel was the main cause for Israel’s presence in the European Commands Area of Responsibility.

This recognition and the following normalization process between some Arab states and Israel ends up the necessity for Israel’s presence in European Com- mands Area. Therefore, the removal of Israel and the inclusion of the CENT- COM is not a sign of the competition between Europe and the US, but it will only bring opportunities for cooperation with partners in the US central force region. Despite any reactions from the European Union since then, this change may result in the occurrence of another fault line between Europe and the US. Even though this removal from EUCOM won’t have any result in the US-Eu- rope relations, it leads to a division between European states.

As seen in Figure 1, Europe as the continent is separated into two parts as countries only recognizing Israel and countries recognizing both Palestine and Israel. Additionally, a large survey conducted by ComRes for CNN in 2018 asked more than 7,000 Europeans in seven countries about their view on Is- rael shows an important sign for the future. According to the results, ‘while 57 percent of respondents aged 65 years or older have a positive image of Israel, only 32 percent of people younger than 35 say they do’ (Hirsch & Coi, 2021). This differentiation within the European society by generation may be the sign of a negative ongoing situation for Israel in Europe. If this separation within the European society doesn’t have any result for the Israel-Palestinian issue or the regionalism movements in the Middle East, it will have most probably on the situation of regionalism in Europe. Furthermore, as Israel increases its aggressive policies on Palestine and al-Aqsa, the negative ongoing in Europe will accelerate in the same level.

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CONCLUSION

The security crisis after 2001 and the economic crisis after 2007 have defi- nitely opposite effects on the effectiveness of regionalism in the international political structure. The former has accelerated the positive reactions of neighbors to each other whereas the latter caused them to keep in skepticism in neighboring relations. Of course, as Buzan, Baldwin, Mearsheimer and other academics argued, regionalism become a level of analysis in international relations and a sub-system with its separative characteristics from international political system. On the other hand, the last decade of the world history has moved to a completely opposite directions because of the two important crisis of the US in 2001 and 2007.

Figure 1. Europe Map of recognition Israel and Palestine

The relative significance of regionalism that Buzan et al. suggested have also affected by this side slip in international politics. This paper argues that Is- rael’s inclusion to CENTCOM will be the next example of the crisis of regionalism. While Abraham Accords seems like an improvement in regional ties, the inevitable occurrence of the counter-coalition like between Turkey, Jor- dan, Kuwait, Qatar, and Lebanon against Israel’s policies shows the reality on the aftermath of regionalism. The international support especially in the fault lines like al-Aqsa has only acceleration of the bad destiny of regionalism. To resolve this crowding-out effect of internationalism on regionalism, theoretical understanding of international coalitions must be more deeply studied in further researches.

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REFERENCES

Acharya, A., & Buzan, B. (Eds.). (2010). Non-Western international relations theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia. Routledge.

Calleya, S. C. (2018). Regionalism in the post-Cold War world. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1746973

Chalhoub, D. (2021, May 8). Kuwait condemns new settlements, Palestin- ian evictions in Jerusalem. Anadolu Agency. https://www.aa.com.tr/ en/middle-east/kuwait-condemns-new-settlements-palestinian-evictions-in-jerusalem/2233259

Dieter, H. (2009). Changing patterns of regional governance: From security to political economy? The Pacific Review, 22(1), 73–90. https://doi. org/10.1080/09512740802651151

Hirsch, C., & Coi, G. (2021, May 21). Where Europe stand on the Israeli-Pal- estinian conflict: Polls. Politico. politico.eu/article/europe-poll-israel-palestine-conflict/

Hurrell, A. (1995). Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Poli- tics. Review of International Studies, 21(4), 331–358. JSTOR.

İşeri, E., & Çelik, N. (2015). Kafkasya Güvenlik Kompleksi’nde Türk-Ermeni Açmazı. In Ö. Z. Oktav & H. Sarı Ertem (Eds.), 2000’li yıllarda Türk dış politikası: Fırsatlar, riskler ve krizler (1. basım). Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık.

Katzenstein, P. J. (2005). A world of regions: Asia and Europe in the Ameri- can imperium. Cornell University Press.

Kelly, R. E. (2007). Security Theory in the “New Regionalism”’. International Studies Review, 9(2), 197–229. JSTOR.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). The tragedy of great power politics (Updated edi- tion). W.W. Norton & Company.

Thompson, W. R. (1973). The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory. International Studies Quarterly, 17(1), 89–117. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/3013464

Väyrynen, R. (2003). Regionalism: Old and New. International Studies Re- view, 5(1), 25–51. JSTOR.

Winer, S., & Ahren, R. (2017, October 19). Israeli lawmakers walk out of summit amid anti-Israel onslaught. The Times of Israel. https://www. timesofisrael.com/israeli-lawmakers-walk-out-of-summit-over-anti-is-

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rael-onslaught/

Wolford, S. (2015). The politics of military coalitions. Cambridge University Press.

44 MUCAHIT BEKTAS RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN UNIVERSITY EMAIL: [email protected]

Submission Date: 19.05.2021 Review Date: 01.06.2021 Acceptance Date: 06.06.2021 Publication Date: 17.07.2021 JISPOL Structure: Islam-Oriented Research Paper JISPOL Discipline: Political Science Special Field: History of Political Islam in Turkey

Vol.1 No.1 E-ISSN: 2791-7525 DOI: 10.2021/jispol.v1i1.4

IBN KHALDUN AND POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY: A RE-READING ATTEMPT

ABSTRACT Despite the deep analytical legacy on political Islam movements in Turkey, this paper agrees in the absence of the impact of civil society on the journey of political Islam movements in the literature. This paper examines the political Islam movement in Turkey from the perspective of Ibn Khaldun on changes in the political system of a community. The Bedouin-Hadara struggle is at the core of this examination in the first section, and this article first explains how the bedouin-hadara struggle shapes the political system of that community and the cycling effect of the political system on this struggle. The second section tries to integrate civil society into the journey of political parties. This effort opens a new perspective on political Islam studies such as the connectedness between political Islam and non-political daily life. The third section reveals the re-reading of the journey of political Islam by integrating civil society with the help of Ibn Khaldun’s Cyclical Theory. Lastly, the article concludes. Keywords: Ibn Khaldun, Political Islam, Turkey, AK Party, National Vision Movement *Special thanks to Ali Ihsan KAHRAMAN for his help in corrections of English version of this Article.

To cite this article: Bektas, M. (2021). Ibn Khaldun and Political Islam in Tur- key: A Re-reading Attempt, Journal of Islamic Politics, 1(1), 45-57. journal of ıslamıc polıtıcs vol. 1 no. 1

INTRODUCTION

The journey of Political Islam in Turkey is very concerned in recent years. The transformative impact of Erdogan’s leadership on Turkey’s politics has very much raised these concerns. On the other hand, the journey of Political Islam in Turkey doesn’t consist only of Erdogan’s leadership, and therefore, all studies about it start the journey from the launch of the National Vision movement. Maybe, due to its more longevity, National Vision Movement can have more affected the ongoing political Islam in Turkey. Martin and Barzegar (2010), Sabet (2008), Eligür (2010), Linjakumpu (2008), Waardenburg (2002), Raba- sa and Larrabee (2008) etc. has studied on political Islam in Turkey. On the other hand, this paper argues the failure of studying political Islam only from stories of political parties. Political Islam has another very important and also the base of political parties. This part is the civil Muslim society and it can be named as the forgotten start point of the political Islam movement in Turkey.

Despite the deep analytical legacy on political Islam movements in Turkey, this paper agrees in the absence of the impact of civil society on the journey of political Islam movements in the literature. However, political Islam couldn’t be limited to the politics and the analytical frameworks of political science. Because of the impartiality of civil society from the political life, studies on political Islam must include the social dimensions of ordinary Muslim citizens. The integration of social dimensions and political movements is, in contrast, a very hard issue to study (Baali, 1988). Although there are many conceptual frameworks in the literature, this paper prefers to take Ibn Khaldun’s Cyclical Theory on the Bedouins-Hadaras struggle for authority on the Castle. The appropriateness of Ibn Khaldun’s Cyclical Theory for this paper is resourced by its coherent approach to the relationship between civil society and the political actors (Alatas, 2014).

In contrast to the modern approaches, Ibn Khaldun saw civil society and the political actors as the same parts of political movements. Therefore, political leaders are not those who tried to gain the support of inactive civil society, but they are the representatives of the active civil society for their purpose. Even though the political Islam movements in the 20th century has been acting in a representative democratic system, their representativeness was never independent from Muslim communities. Muslim communities have determinative effects on the political actors of political Islam. This paper examines the political Islam movement in Turkey from the perspective of Ibn Khaldun on changes in the political system of a community. The Bedouin-Hadara strug-

46 journal of ıslamıc polıtıcs MUCAHIT BEKTAS

gle is at the core of this examination in the first section, and this article first explains how the bedouin-hadara struggle shapes the political system of that community and the cycling effect of the political system on this struggle. The second section tries to integrate civil society into the journey of political parties. This effort opens a new perspective on political Islam studies such as the connectedness between political Islam and non-political daily life. The third section reveals the re-reading of the journey of political Islam by integrating civil society with the help of Ibn Khaldun’s Cyclical Theory. Lastly, the article concludes.

THE BEDOUIN-HADARA STRUGGLE IN IBN KHALDUN

Ibn Khaldun was a very important philosopher in Islamic thought history who has been also called “the father of sociology” in Islamic thought. Therefore, studies on Muslim communities must take care of his workings, and they may also study more on Ibn Khaldun. Beyond mostly-known concepts like umran and asabiyyah in Ibn Khaldun’s philosophy social structure, his framework of bedouin-hadara struggle suggests very interesting analysis tools for socio-political change and the rise and falls of sovereign powers (Önder & Ulaşan, 2018). Moreover, his concepts and frameworks can apply to the post-hegemonic world order, for Cox (Cox, 1992). In this section, this bedouin-hadara struggle will be introduced in terms of its effects on the socio-political system.

Very briefly, for Ibn Khaldun, a community consists of two important identities called bedouin and hadara. The Bedouins are the poor and uncivilized people in that community who lives out of the castle of hadara who are the rich and civilized people living in the Castle. They don’t have any prosperity rights, any equality of opportunities in the community. They cannot reach the opportunities in the castle of hadara and also have no information about the opportunities within the castle of the hadara. On the other hand, hadaras don’t want bedouins to know anything about the opportunities in the castle not to share them with bedouins. However, this situation of bedouins and hadaras isn’t perpetual, and on its own time, bedouins understand their wealth difference from hadaras. This is the motivational and momentum point at which bedouins start to believe in the existence of their rights to utilize those opportunities (Ibn-Khaldūn & Rosenthal, 1987). This is also the starting point of socio-political change in Ibn Khaldun.

Ibn Khaldun explained the change process by focusing on the journey of the Bedouin movement. For him, this change process is the journey of the con-

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quest of Hadara’s castle by Bedouins. However, Bedouins must get into the three important steps for a successful last attack for conquering. The three steps are 1. psychological step, 2. preparation step, and 3. attacking step. For Ibn Khaldun, all potential bedouins in all societies have experienced these three steps for a successful conquering attack and to take a share from the wealth in the Hadaras Castle (Ibn-Ḫaldūn & Rosenthal, 1987). Lastly to the introduction, the analysis based on Ibn Khaldun’s Cyclical Theory must be made at the micro-political level at the psychological level, at the institutional level in the preparation step, at the macro-political level in the attack step. Therefore, this paper changes the naming of steps as the following; 1. Mi- cro-political level, 2. Institutional level, and 3. Macro-political level.

The first step is about the psychological conditions of Bedouins. At the beginning of this step, Bedouins are aware of their poverty, but they don’t believe that they can alleviate the poverty. The more Bedouins recognize the opportunities of Hadaras Castle, the more their belief and encouragement themselves to alleviate the poverty increases, too. Whereas the leaders of Bedouins early awaken to the opportunities, the recognition of ordinary members of the Bed- ouin community takes a longer time. Additionally, transferring this self-encouragement to social consciousness happens in a period, shorter or longer depending on the psychological capabilities of the community. As a result, the self-encouragement period is called the psychological step.

The second step is about obtaining the right and necessary tools for the strong last attack against the Hadaras to conquer the castle. This step takes the longest time, indeed, because it includes efforts for maintaining motivation, obtaining equipment, increasing education, earning capital, for raising in- vestigation activities. For example, earning the capital to obtain a sufficient amount of military equipment for the last strong attack requires privacy, hard- working and well-directed strategies to succeed. On the other hand, maintaining asabiyah and motivation at the same level within the Bedouin community is very hard throughout this step because some of Bedouin community members cannot believe in the possibility of salvation from nomadism. Therefore, the Bedouin community has the potential to produce something harmful to its success, also. Additionally, those non-believers can change from time to time and case-by-case.

This changeability makes the failure risk very dynamic and also makes a non- stop struggle against itself required. On the other hand, not only inner conditions but also environmental conditions have important impacts on the Bed-

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ouins’ success in this step. To obtain the necessary and sufficient equipment, Bedouins must buy first war equipment like a sword. However, the domination of Hadaras in the war-equipment market can put the clamps on Bedouins’rise. Therefore, the secrecy of Bedouins’ efforts in this step is also very important. As a result, Khaldun called this step the longest period of Bedouins’ struggle-cycle.

The third and last step is totally about the war against Hadaras and means a life or death issue for Bedouins. If they are successful in the war, they conquer the castle and the Hadara government ends. If they fail, then they cannot survive as a separate community from Hadaras. Additionally, the domination of Hadaras government will strengthen. The successfulness of Bedouins depends on their capabilities, strategies, preparation, asabiyah, motivation. Ibn Khaldun generalizes that Bedouins are the victors of wars against Hada- ras because of their relaxivity against Bedouins, especially in the preparation step. Clashes of interest between the elites within Hadaras are also another significant cause of their failure in the war against Bedouins. By utilizing those clashes, the leaders of Bedouins can succeed to split their enemies, and they can also compromise with one part within Hadaras. The overconfidence of Hadaras is another usual cause of the failure of Hadaras, for Ibn Khaldun. The overconfidence causes also relaxivity and insufficient preparation for the war with Bedouins. As the result, the wars between Bedouins and Hadaras usually result in the victory of Bedouins, not due to the strength of Bedouins but due to their weaknesses.

Ibn Khaldun’s Cyclical Theory seems not to have any relation to social change, but relating to a war environment in the pre-modernity era. However, the aftermath of the Bedouins’ victory usually results in the transformation of victorious Bedouins to the new Hadaras. This paper agrees that his analysis framework includes many ideas for social changes in the modernity as well as post-modernity era because of the analytical tools on the transformation of Bedouins both in before and after periods of the war (Cox, 1992). Especially, his analytical framework can be generally applicable to Turkish politics in which any community can be felt alienated from other ideological, ethnic and religious, etc. parties. Because of such alienations, the struggle between different identities in Turkish politics becomes an unavoidable feature of Turkish politics. Therefore, Ibn Khaldun’s Cyclical Theory is very applicable to Turkish politics and this article applies it to the journey of political Islam. Additionally, the application of a Muslim philosopher’s framework has the potential for very interesting inferences about political Islam and will be very contributive to the

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literature on political Islam movements all over the world.

RE-READING OF POLITICAL ISLAM MOVEMENT IN TUR- KEY

Reading the political Islam movement in Turkey should start from the end of the First World War. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire caused Muslims to become the new Bedouins in international politics because they lost their castle and all prosperity even in their lands like the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and North Africa. In addition to the references to Ottoman Empire by political Islam leaders in Turkey, the position of the Ottoman Empire in incumbent international politics shifts it to the center of political Islam. Its western counter-partners in its classical period have also referred to the Islamic characteristics and the protective role of the Ottoman Empire for Islam. Because it ended up in the 20th century, any political movement having claims on Islam must be automatically related to Ottoman Empire (İnalcık, 2000). Additionally, the relation of political Islam movements in Turkey with the Ottoman Empire arises not only from its Islamic characteristics but also from Turkish characteristics (Eligur, 2010). Therefore, because of the stronger relations of political Islam movements in Turkey with the Ottoman Empire, this paper preferred to start their psychological step from the end of the Ottoman Empire.

I. MICRO-POLITICAL STEP OF POLITICAL ISLAM MOVEMENTS

Even though the end of the Ottoman Empire is the start point of political Is- lam, it wasn’t the sole determinant of the psychological step of political Islam movements in Turkey. The establishment of a secularist regime has also a destructive psychological effect on Muslims. Because the micro-political level is the level of analysis in the psychological step, Muslims and their psychology are at the core of the analysis. The hard policies of the secularist regime against Islam and Muslims had doubled the destructive psychological effect for Muslims. Therefore, the beginning of the self-encouragement of Muslims starts from the destruction of the destructive effect. However, the hard policies of the secularist regime against Muslims made this destruction effort also very hard. Believing in the re-gaining of the lost prosperity couldn’t become widespread among Muslims.

In the first two decades of the Turkish Republic, many Islamic signals have experienced many transformations. As the political Islam movements continuously referred, for example, the Adhan had changed from its Arabic version to Turkish version. Islamic education was prohibited. The Hagia Sophia was

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closed to praying in it and its official status was changed from mosque to museum. Covering headscarves in state institutions and education was also prohibited for long years. These prohibitions make belief in the regaining of the lost prosperity very hard. In consequence, the return of Adhan to its original Arabic version, the return of Hagia Sophia’s status to the mosque, the liberation of Islamic signs in daily life like the headscarf becomes the motivation resource of political Islam movements in Turkey.

After the start point of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the psychological step has experienced also some revival efforts, too, beyond the destructive developments. Maybe like all similar ideological movements, political Islam movements in Turkey have started their revival efforts in literary publishing. Poets, books, journals were the platforms in which Islamic thoughts had been addressed. As these journals had widespread within Muslims society, the motivation of the Muslim community has very barely increased. In the first decade of the Turkish Republic, some politicians have tried to take place in politics especially in the trials for transition to the multi-party democratic system. However, because all of them were individual efforts, this paper accepts them in the micro-political step. However, the failures of trials for the multy-party system due to various reasons had also negative impacts on the motivations of the Muslim community.

On the other hand, the selection of Necmeddin Erbakan as the President of The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) in May 1969 can be called the end of the micro-political step and as the start of the institutional step. Indeed, in terms of the reflection of Ibn Khaldun’s change mechanism in the modern and post-modern era, the basic symbol of the transition from micro-political step to institutional step is the establishment of a political party that has Islamic claims. However, because Erbakan was the leader of the first political party with Islamic claims, his presidency of TOBB can be considered as a part of the institutional step. His presidency also gave the motivation Muslim community to make investments and to earn necessary and sufficient capital for the macro-political step (Baykal, 2021).

II. INSTITUTIONAL STEP OF POLITICAL ISLAM MOVEMENTS

The establishment of the National Vision Movement (NVM) and its journey to come to the governance of Turkey has comprised the whole institutional step of political Islam movements. Therefore, the experiences of NVM tell everything about the institutional step. In the beginning, the NVM seemed to be composed of the ideals of Necmeddin Erbakan in Turkish politics. The three parties led

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by Erbakan were closed by the Constitutional Court due to the claims that they were at the origin of anti-secularist activities and organizations (Kartal, 2020). On the other hand, Erbakan has launched a new party with a different name after all ‘close decisions’. His decisiveness to be in Turkish politics was also, on the other hand, the exact end of the micro-political step of political Is- lam movements. Indeed, the presence of the National Order Party (MNP) in the coalition of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) was the biggest development in the journey of political Islam movements in Turkey. After a very short life of MNP, Erbakan has launched National Salvation Party (MSP) and it had a very important role in Turkish foreign policy.

The role of MSP in the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974 could be called an early attempt to start the attack on the castle of Hadaras, which were secular regime institutions in Turkey. Representatives of MNP and of political Islam movements stated many times that Erbakan as the vice-Prime Minister of Turkey has commanded the Army to start the operation despite the opposition of the incumbent Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit who was also the president of CHP. For those representatives, Erbakan has waited for the international vis- its of Ecevit to get the authorization to command the Army (Baykal & Çaha, 2021). These declarations of representatives showed the early efforts to start the attack on the castle of secularists. However, the military coup in 1980 has broken not only the efforts of political Islam movements but also the increase of other ideological and ideational movements.

Another important turning point for the political Islam movements in Turkey was the government of the Wealth Party between 1996 and the Municipality elections in 1994. In the 1994 elections, Wealth Party under Erbakan’s leadership has won the presidency of three municipalities which were Istanbul, An- kara, and Diyarbakır. These three Municipalities were very important for the secularist regime and also for political Islam movements. For the secularist regime, any loss in any elections meant the success of political Islam movements. For Political Islam movements, Istanbul was the economic capital city of Turkey and Diyarbakir was very important for reaching the Kurdish issue. Ankara was already important because it was the capital city of Turkey, and therefore, it was at the heart of the state bureaucracy. As a result, the victory of the Wealth Party can be considered as the starting point of the macro-political step of political Islam movements in Turkey. However, like MSP, the Wealth Party was also closed in 1998 and its governance has been ended by a post-modern military coup.

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In conclusion, the Wealth Party governance era can be called the third unsuccessful attack of political Islam movements to get control of the castle of the Secularist regime in Turkey. However, under the Wealth Party governance, many issues like headscarves in public institutions and education, the return of Hagia Sophia to a mosque, the liberation of Quran education, and of Islamic foundations couldn’t be completely resolved. Indeed, the victory of a post-modern military coup to overthrow the Wealth Party government means also the incomplete institutionalization of political Islam movements in Turkey to overthrow the secularist regime. Additionally, the coalition partner, True Path Par- ty (DYP), also didn’t support the Wealth Party against the coup despite its center-right politics and partially Islamic discourse. It also reflected the broken line in the asabiyah level of the Muslim community as Ibn Khaldun claimed as a reason for the unsuccessfulness of any Bedouins movement. However, it must be noticed that the trial for Wealth Party between 1994 and 1997 was stronger than the trial of MSP amid the Cyprus Peace Operation to start the final attack on the castle of the secularist regime. Finally, the transition to the macro-political step has been broken until the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government.

III. MACRO-POLITICAL STEP OF POLITICAL ISLAM MOVEMENTS

The AK Party has come to the governance in a very important conjecture for Turkish domestic and international politics with very high claims. The governance of the AK Party government has also transition effects on the political Islam movements. For an earlier conclusion, under the AK Party governance for 20 years, Turkey experienced the victory of Bedouins, the transformation of old Bedouins to new Hadaras, and lastly the launch of the new Bedouin community in Turkish politics. In other words, political Islam movements in Turkey have won the final attack on the secularists’ castle; they become the new owners of the castle and gained Hadara characteristics; and, they also saw the launch of a new Bedouin community consisting of newly-formed secularists and new local identities. In this section, the re-reading of the historical process of the AK Party government will be made under these three stages.

The destructive economic crisis of Turkey in 2001 and the Iraq and Afghan- istan wars in 2003 were the most important issues of Turkish politics while AK Party has come to the governance. However, the AK Party governance has a very different character from its predecessor Wealth Party in terms of the journey of political Islam. While Wealth Party was perceived and accepted as the threat to the regime of Turkey because of its political Islamic discourses, the AK Party government has been perceived and accepted as the savior of the

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Turkish economy with its a few differentiated political Islamic characteristics. Erdogan, the leader of the AK Party and also the former president of Istanbul Municipality in 1994, has said that ‘AK Party has taken off the National Vision Movement’s shirt’.

AK Party has accepted conservative democracy as its basic ideology and it never would follow the path of the National Vision Movement. For example, it would give the priority to save the Turkish economy from the debt crisis in 2001 and to solve structural problems to reach sustainable economic growth. In contrast to the Erbakan’s government, Erdogan didn’t take the classical problems of political Islam like the headscarf in public institutions at the beginning although it has a sufficient majority in the Turkish Assembly to solve those problems. Erdogan’s preference not to take them to his agenda also caused him to be criticized in the Muslim community that has been waiting for such a majority for long years.

In addition to domestic politics, Erdogan’s government didn’t have similar preferences with Erbakan’s government in foreign policy, too. Erbakan has launched D-8 consisting of eight Islam countries in the world to establish an economic partnership and political alliance between them. However, Erdogan’s government took the European Union full membership process as the first priority in foreign policy which was also the first priority of the secularist regime and which was called by Erbakan as the Christianity Union. The contrasting positions of the AK Party and National Vision Movement can be exemplified with various events like the co-chairmanship of the Great Middle East Project, strengthening alliance with Israel. Erbakan has so much criticized Erdogan about such policies as the leader of Felicity Party (SP) since 2003 to this death. Despite the hard criticization of his opponents, Erdogan’s government has always protected its conservative characteristics behind the domination of democratic characteristics.

The domination of democratic characteristics has brought the chance to harm so much the castle of the secularist regime. As the constitutional reform in 2010 was claimed as based on democratic values and as it was totally rejected by secularist parties and elites, it can be called the final attack on the castle of secularism in Turkey. Although this final attack, referred to in Ibn Khaldun, and could reach success with the help of another secular community to the Kemalist secularists, inheritors of political Islam movements were at the leadership of this final attack.

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As the destiny of political Islam has been much discussed in recent years in Turkey, this paper agrees that the journey of political Islam started at the end of the Ottoman Empire and ended at the Constitutional Reform in 2010. Indeed, many analysts can think of the change in the election system of the President of Turkey as the final attack of political Islam to the secularist castle.

However, this paper argues that this change in the election system is not part of the last step of the journey of political Islam movements in the 20th century; but it is part of the first step of political Islam movements in the 21st century. As Ibn Khaldun’s Cyclical Theory suggested that a new cycle for a Bedouin movement starts after the end of the cycle focused, this argument sounds very consistent. After the 2010 Constitution Reform, political Islam movements have introduced a new cycle and phase. In Ibn Khaldun’s Cyclical Theory, this must be the new micro-political or psychological step of the news cycle. There- fore from Ibn Khaldun’s Cyclical Theory, the Muslim community in Turkey will get on a new journey and this paper argues in the 2010 Constitution Reform as the starting point.

It also means that Muslims in political Islam movements of the 20th century have been challenged by being the new Hadaras in the new cycle as the victors of the 20th cycle. From the reverse perspective, they are also challenged by the launch of the new Bedouins community. As a forecast, if the general rule of Ibn Khaldun’s Cyclical Theory that Hadaras lose, the Muslim community must be the next loser. On the other hand, as Ibn Khaldun suggested again, the status of the Muslim community in the next cycle will be determined by the preferences of Muslim communities in the micro-political step of the news cycle.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper tries to re-read the historical journey of political Islam movements in Turkey. In the literature, political actors of political Islam movements usually are analyzed as separate from the civil society. This paper considers that such interpretations miss the determinative effects of civil society on the destiny of political Islam movements. Their historical legacy and cumulative structure cannot be ignored in the analysis and predictions of the future of Muslim communities. Because of such failures, this paper argues the contribution of Ibn Khaldun’s Cyclical Theory to this field because of its focus on the historical legacy. In the examination, the start point of political Islam’s journey is the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the endpoint is the Constitutional Reform in 2010 in the Turkish Republic. In this respect, this article suggests

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that political Islam movements in Turkey are in the new micro-political step as Muslims’ psychology is shaping. The dynamics of this new micro-political step must be studied in further researches.

REFERENCES

Alatas, F. (2014). Applying Ibn Khaldun: The recovery of a lost tradition in sociology. Routledge.

Baali, F. (1988). Society, state, and urbanism: Ibn Khaldun’s sociological thought. State University of New York Press.

Baykal, Ö. (2021). National Vision as a Right-wing Political Movement. Muha- fazakar Dusunce / Conservative Thought, 17(60), 34–58. The Belt and Road Initiative Reference Source.

Baykal, Ö., & Çaha, Ö. (2021). National Vision Movement and Civil Society. MİLLİ GÖRÜŞ HAREKETİ VE SİVİL TOPLUM., 17(60), 139–163. Sup- plemental Index.

Cox, R. W. (1992). Towards a post-hegemonic conceptualization of v/ orld order: Reflections on the relevancy of Ibn Khaldun. In J. N. Rosenau & E.-O. Czempiel (Eds.), Governance Without Government (pp. 132–159). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/ CBO9780511521775.007

Eligur, B. (2010). The mobilization of political Islam in Turkey. Cambridge University Press.

Ibn-Haldūn, ‘Abd-ar-Rahmān Ibn-Muhammad, & Rosenthal, F. (1987). The Muqaddimah: An introduction to history. Routledge and Kegan Paul [u.a.].

İnalcık, H. (2000). The Ottoman Empire: The classical age 1300-1600. Phoe- nix Press.

Kartal, R. N. (2020). A Brief Critical Analysis of National Vision Movement on Theoretical and Practical Level: Erbakan’s Model of Teo-De- mocracy. DergiPark. http://ekutuphane.medeniyet.edu.tr/edsre- solve?tgurl=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&d- b=ir00559a&AN=tuda.article.745823&lang=tr&site=eds-live

Linjakumpu, A. (2008). Political Islam in the global world (1st ed). Ithaca Press.

Martin, R. C., & Barzegar, A. (Eds.). (2010). Islamism: Contested perspectives on political Islam. Stanford University Press.

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Önder, M., & Ulaşan, F. (2018). Ibn Khaldun’s Cyclical Theory on the Rise and Fall of Sovereign Powers: The Case of Ottoman Empire. ADAM AKADEMİ Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 8(2), 271–307. https://doi. org/10.31679/adamakademi.453944

Rabasa, A., & Larabee, F. S. (2008). The rise of political Islam in Turkey. RAND.

Sabet, A. G. E. (2008). Islam and the political: Theory, governance and international relations. Pluto Press.

Waardenburg, J. J. (2002). Islam: Historical, social and political perspectives. W. de Gruyt

57 SHOAIB KHAN https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0727-3453

UNIVERSITY OF MUMBAI EMAIL: [email protected]

Submission Date: 20.05.2021 Review Date: 20.06.2021 Acceptance Date: 30.06.2021 Publication Date: 17.07.2021 JISPOL Structure: Discipline-Oriented Policy Paper JISPOL Discipline: Regional Studies Special Field: Russia and the Middle East

Vol.1 No.1 E-ISSN: 2791-7525 DOI: 10.2021/jispol.v1i1.5

THE RE-EVALUATION OF RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

ABSTRACT This paper focuses on Moscow’s activity in the Middle East. The main aim is to study that after the re-emergence of Russia it has sent a message that it is a power to be recognized in the region. It also studies on the growing competition the west will face from Russia other than China in that area politically and economically. It concludes on the Russia confidence of its success in the Middle Eastern strategy based on the principle of balancing between the different regional players.

Keywords: Russia, Syria, United States, Middle East Politics, the New Troika

To cite this article: Khan, S. (2021). The Re-evaluation of Russia’s Strategic Presence in the Middle East, Journal of Islamic Politics, 1(1), 58-72. journal of ıslamıc polıtıcs SHOAIB KHAN

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, Moscow has increased its activities in the Middle East as a shock to many, especially with its decision in Syria to strike. Kremlin has used its air and missile operations as the main strategy carried out with sophisti- cated weaponry. This strategy demonstrated that Russia is a modern military superpower with a global reach when it decided to launch a large-scale operation outside Russia’s backyard. Despite of its inflexibleness in this decision, Kremlin also forecasted and feared that this decision can bring further political crises in Yemen, Lebanon, Libya, and Iraq. The increase in the tension in the Saudi-Iran relations also makes Kremlin’s fear much more realizable. However, Kremlin will continue to promote this grand vision in the Middle East to make this region coherently secured, as it will generate a model for Russia to cope with the challenges from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Promoting this vision with the current conflict patterns is much harder alone. Russian operation in Syria is much related to its struggle to impact shaping the world order, beyond its regional goals (Suchkov, 2016). This paper examines the elements of Russian strategy.

Russian strategy in the Middle East has involved several elements especially after the downfall of Gaddafi in Libya. While blocking all decisions of Western and Arab powers against Assad regime at the UN Security Council, Putin has indicated that Russia would be an important player in the region that must be taken into consideration. For example, Russia continuously rejected to establish a no-fly zone against Assad regime in Syria, and by this way, it prevented a similar case to happen to the downfall of Gaddafi after imposition of the no-fly zone in Libya. Despite this kind of confrontations with the Western powers and their regional allies, Russia has also sought ways to be perceived in a cooperation with them. For instance, Kremlin has been cooperating with the US and European authorities to prevent weapons of mass destruction and chemical weapons in Iran. Therefore, Russia followed a very careful strategy between playing as an important player and keeping in the game as a player.

Beyond this careful strategy at the global level, it has also a very smart strategy for regional powers in the Middle East. The main aim of Russia has been to break the relations between Western powers and their regional allies. Attempt- ing to isolate Saudi Arabia and its Gulf and other Arab allies from the West has been Moscow’s regional strategy in particular by trying to raise Western fears that they actually support Wahabi militant forces (M. Katz, 2015). Additional- ly, Russia also has implied a strategy to make the regional powers ineffective

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in the regional politics. For example, Russia has supplied heavy arms to the regime in Damascus to save it from a complete collapse. Besides this strategy to support Assad regime, it has also collaborated with other regional actors opposing the possible downfall of Assad regime. These actors has been fearing a replacement of Assad regime by a regional actor like the Shia-dominated government in Iraq.

Indeed, Russia has tried to return to the Middle East since the disintegration of the Soviet Union (SCCB). The unfinished quest of Russian identity consisting of Slavic, Muslim, Asian and European nations has guided its foreign policy; and therefore, there has been no change in Russian foreign policy. The interaction between the two spaces and the ideological ambitions is the heritage of Russia from the Tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet periods. To fully understand the weight of the heritage of Soviet orientalism today, researchers need to seek the reflections of Russian political elites on Russian foreign policy through the prism of Muslim civilization.

Russia has tried to build bridges with the Muslim world due to its intention to play a defining role in the Middle East. However, especially the militant threat of Chechnya and Dagestan on the Russian territorial integrity. In addition, the memory of the war against mujahideen in Afghanistan in 1988s has increased the concerns on improving relations with the Muslim world in the Middle East. Similar to its discourse of ‘fighting against terrorism’ in Central Asia, Russia has also perceived and declared any destabilizer event in the Middle East as terrorism. This ‘terrorist’ declaration becomes a rapprochement in discourse between Western powers and Russia although they declared the opposite actors to each other as terrorist. On the other hand, the rapprochement in discourse may be an alternative diplomatic vision to those of the western diplomatic circles.

Beyond these strategies of Russia, the Middle East has experienced many significant events in the last decade. For instance, the US has left its hidden guarantor role in the Middle East political order. Russia has militarily invaded into the Syrian war and this invasion was a dramatic demonstration of how the strategic game in the Middle East has been different from pre-Arab Spring period. While considering the retreatment strategy of the US and the aggressive strategy of Russia together, return to the hegemonic position in the Middle East will be very difficult for any US government in the near future. Even though the US has voluntarily withdrawn from the Middle East (Sput- nik, 2016), the Russian increasing influence makes Russia for Middle Eastern

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countries a potentially ally with which easier to align. Therefore, the US and NATO are confronting a danger that regional countries can ignore an alliance with them because alliance with Russia is, too, benefittable. As a result, the strategic presence of Russia to support status quo in the Middle East and the appropriateness of regional politics to invasions of foreign powers makes the relationship with Russia more transactional for Middle East countries.

ENERGY GAMES

The Middle East has been the center of a rivalry between great world powers since World War I which ended with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. These powers aim to develop relations with regional states after the discovery of substantial energy reserves, particularly in oil. The region emerged as an important source of energy globally since the 1930s and the key to the stability of the world’s economy. According to BP’s Energy Outlook for 2035, the Middle East remains the world’s largest oil-producing region; with 810 billion barrels in proven reserves - almost 50 percent of the world’s total. Its share of global supply is expected to fall from 32 to 28 percent over the next few years, but return to 32 percent by 2035.

Although the Western media persists in warning of apocalyptic consequences of probable nuclear conflict between Iran and Israel, a probable conflict with Russia about its long-term plans on Israeli-Cypriot gas and oil reserves in the East-Mediterranean can have very similar results. The support of the public in its traditional partners in the Middle East can represent a tectonic plates in the regional politics. This public support also seems like strengthening Rus- sian support to its regional partners for both Iran and Syria. In the Middle East, Putin’s strategy involving a multitude of planning and already competing for pipelines is too complex. Gazprom and Rosneft which are the Russian gas and oil giants respectively, are the main actors of the Rus- sian expansionary strategy in the Middle East. Syria and Turkey has much more significance for Gazprom’s and Rosneft’s activities in the energy sector because they are on the transportation ways from the Middle East to Europe and from the Caucasus to the Middle East.

While Russian economy is ailing, the economic alliance especially with this two important actors can help Russia boost its economy. Additionally, low oil prices and the sanctions of the Western countries to Russian goods and services makes these alliances with Turkey and Syria much more significant. If Russia continues to resist to invading Crimea and to support the militants in

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Eastern Ukraine, it needs to maintain the economic stability despite the increasing sanctions from the West. Therefore, the support of Turkey and Syria are very important for Russia. On the other hand, the Russian increasing military presence in the Middle East doesn’t have only a political dimension to make Western powers accepting itself as a global power. Economically, the military presence promotes the Russian effort for maintaining its economic stability because the Russian military presence made the world oil market more secured and caused a small rally in oil prices based on the speculation of shortages in different regions of the world.

Russia’s presence in the Middle East makes sense even from customer perspective. For customers, Russia is the competitor to Middle Eastern oil suppli- ers, especially Saudi Arabia. A war in the Middle East in which Saudi Arabia is one of the parties makes Saudis oil supplies less reliable and more risky. Additionally, by its new airbase in Syria, Russia can coordinate with Iran to disrupt the shipments from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea terminals. Con- sequentially, through its military presence strategy, Russia can make its own supplies more reliable, as well as it can speculate the oil supplies of its com- petitors, especially Saudi Arabia. Therefore, for economic stability of Russia, the Middle East seems like protecting its significance in the Russian foreign policy.

Gazprom and the Russian state generally expand their ties with countries of the region for Russia’s benefits and with this in mind; they want a presence in the Mediterranean for its strategic and geopolitical importance. If Gazprom was successful in obtaining a stake in the Leviathan Field, Russia would not only have been a part of the Mediterranean energy game but its influence would also have expanded in the Middle East. Russia’s support for the Assad regime in Syria and its military intervention with Daesh are also part of the Kremlin’s strategic policy in their projections for the future of the Middle East and the Mediterranean region.

Russia holds the world’s largest proven reserves of natural gas, most of which wait to be explored and continuously is the alternative to Saudi Arabia to be the top oil producer (Goodrich & Lanthemann, 2013). Russia supplies a third of the total oil and gas demand of Europe and also starts to export much more the East Asian markets. The domination of oil and gas sector in the Russian economy makes the energy resources more than an object of commercial policy. Nearly, half of the Russian government’s budget consists of energy revenues and the maintenance of this capital flow from energy resources is very

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instrumental for new investments in military industry. Despite the possible vulnerability because of the increasing dependence of Russian economy on energy revenues, energy resources and energy economy are on the core of Rus- sia’s national security, of regime stabilization, and also of turning to the world politics as a great power (Goodrich & Lanthemann, 2013).

To enter into and shape the Middle East politics, Russia uses its energy card to obtain the advantages of energy exporting cooperation and aims to have closer contacts with major oil-producing countries with further penetration into the Middle East. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, Russia had actively made contacts with Hamas and greatly enhanced its political influence in the Middle East, in contrast to the classical pro-Israeli policy of the United States.

SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In the mid-1970s, Soviet foreign policy suffered several setbacks towards the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli wars and conflictual situations were the main reason of those setbacks. For instance, President Anwar Sadat expelled most Soviet military advisers from Egypt in 1972 and abrogated his treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow in 1976. The Arabs widely blamed insufficient Soviet support as a hurdle for the Egyptian army’s further movement towards Tel Aviv after Egypt’s complete victory against Israel in the October 1973, war. The conclusion is that Moscow didn’t have any influence on Israel’s policies and that no countries than the US couldn’t steer Israel to follow a counter-policy to its existing policies. Therefore, many Arab governments including Syria cooperated with the US to seek a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1970s, Moscow was on the diplomatic sidelines because of the domination of the US. Additionally, the Shah of Iran has got closer alliance with the US and this was a big advantage for the US. Additionally to Iran, all conservative Arab monarchies Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Unit- ed Arab Emirates except for Kuwait were also firmly linked with the West; they all refused even to exchange embassies with Moscow. The only allies of Soviet Union were Iraq and South Yemen. However, considering the ineffectiveness of South Yemen in the regional politics and of Iraqi Communist Party in Iraqi domestic politics, Soviet Union didn’t find effective rooms of maneveur in the regional politics against its competitor at the global level, the US (Yodfat & Yodfat, 1983).

This story seemed like broken in 1978-79 when Soviet Union appeared to gain

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influence in the Gulf and the Middle East in consequence of the Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel. This Accord alienated almost all Arab governments since it didn’t make any provision for the recognition of an independent Palestinian state in the international arena. However, Israel gained many room of maneveur against those Arab governments. The Camp David Accords caused many Arab governments to break their ties with Egypt and to criticize the sponsorship of the US for their development because they felt Israel’s domination over the Palestinian issue. Additionally, this domination meant the absolute defeat of those Arab governments even on the table, after the Six-Day Wars. The Camp David Accords dramatically started the rapprochement process between many Arab governments including anti-Communist Saudi Ara- bia and the Soviet Union. While adding the Iranian revolution leaded by rising Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979 with the anti-American discourse, the story in the Middle East seemed to reverse in terms of the balances between the US and Soviet Union in regional politics of the Middle East. As a result, Moscow hoped to ally with Tehran and all other Arab governments on the basis of a common anti-American foreign policy (M. N. Katz, 1986).

This reverse in the regional politics steered the Soviet Union to switch its position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. At first, in 1950s, it tried to maintain a friendship policy with Israel. For instance, it abstained from and allowed the passage of Security Council Resolution 95 in 1951. That Resolution chastised Nasser’s Egypt because of its prevention Israeli ships from using Suez Canal. Soviet Union was the first state presenting its credentials to the incumbent President of Israel in Jerusalem in December 1953. In that credential, Soviets declared their goodwill for Israel’s intention to use Jerusalem as its capital. This move was followed by other communist states and Israel gained a room of maneveur in international politics in those days, too. Arab states strongly protested the Soviets pro-Israeli move in 1950s (Khouri, 1986).

However, in response to the Israeli preference for the alliance of the US rather than the Soviets, the government of the Soviet Union has extremely reversed its position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For instance in January 1954, Soviet Union vetoed another Security Council resolution relating to the Syrian-Israeli water dispute in favor of Israeli arguments, in contrast to the friendship policy at first. Also many other resolutions recognizing Israeli rights could not pass because of the Soviet veto policy as complained by Israeli governments. Moreover, the Israeli demand for direct negotiations with the Arab states didn’t receive support from the Soviets, to which Arab states also opposed. In addition, Soviet Union followed and encouraged its satellite states to follow the

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discourse that Zionism was a tool used by the Jews and Americans for racist imperialism. Moreover, the meaning of the term Zionism was defined by the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union. That definition was that modern Zionism were the militant chauvinism, racism, anti-communism, and anti-So- vietism (Prokhorov, 1973). In accordance to this policy, a major support from the Soviet Union to the Arab states was also the deal between the Armies of Czech Republic and Egypt in August 1955. By this agreement, the Soviet Union supported Arab regimes over Israel after the mid-1950s and during the Cold War.

Like in the Israeli case, requirements of the superpower competition with the US principally influenced the Soviet policies towards the Middle East until the end of the Brezhnev government. The relations with Syria, South Yemen, Sadat’s Egypt and Khomeni’s Iran has many similar-dramatic changes in the alliance with Soviet Union (Golan, 1991). However, the USSR’s local goals, strategies, tactics and ideological dictates used to achieve a greater regional involvement were frequently reviewed. These revisions unavoidably resulted in the reduction of Soviet and Communist influence over the Middle East (Beck- er & Horelick, 1970). Another important reason of the reduction in Soviet’s influence was the low interest and involvement of the Communist movement resourced by the weakness of the Communist movement in its projections for development and expansion. Additionally, the directions of its foreign policy course to the Middle East generated the weaknesses of the Communist movement. The prominent aspect of Soviet foreign policy was the dualism of advocating a worldwide revolution and assuring its own national security. On the other hand, the justification for Soviet involvement in the Middle East was based on the notion of the proximity of this area to the Soviet homeland. How- ever after the Second World War, the Middle East was primarily Western and increasingly an American sphere of influence when the Soviet Union decided to tackle the Middle East.

In conclusion, the main resource of the Soviet power in the Middle East was its military support to Syria and Nasser’s Egypt even though this close relationship between Soviets and Arab regimes wasn’t comparable to the alliance between the US and Israel. In his memoirs, Nixon underlined that the Soviets were seeking achieve its long-desired classical aim to access land, oil, power, and the warm waters of the Mediterranean rather than ideological conver- sions. Therefore, Soviets were perceived as aiming to increase and to expand their presence in the Middle East, rather than for expanding and promoting communism.

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PUTIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the significance of the Middle East didn’t decrease in the Russian foreign policy. Russia’s interests naturally steered itself to stand its superpower position in a region despite its given limitations resourced by the Soviet collapse. The Middle East has usually very appropriate characteristics to maintain superpower position after the collapse of Ottoman Empire (Berman, 2001). In the late Yeltsin era in which the Russian identity and its new role had its roots but Putin has subtly deflated the balloon of US. The main power of Putin in the region has been its cleverly manipulations to the developments in the region including Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, Iraq, Syrian conflict and other regional issues. Three decades ago, Russia was a very different place, and the Middle East was not a top priority. However, the turning point in the Russian Middle East policy was the Putin’s turn to full control in 2005 and 2006. After Putin obtained the full control over Russian state mechanism, Putin has many achievements in its Middle East relation. Nevertheless, the extent of the success of Putin government for long-term economic and strategic interests in the Middle East can only be seen by the time (Nizameddin, 2013).

As an example for those manipulations, Russia’s support to Kurds in terms of western perceptions aims to divide Europe and NATO. As Turkey downed a Russian jet in 2015, Russia retaliated by amassing its forces on the Turkish border to secure a base in the Syrian Kurdish region. The armed forces of Turkey and Russia were engaged in fighting just a few kilometers away from each other. As a result, the clash could either unwillingly drag into a war or result in a complete lost of Putin’s all credibility for establishing a common defense pact. As a response to a possible Turkish-US alliance against Asad regime, Moscow has led the autonomous Kurdish regional governance in Syria to launch the first overseas representative. The Russian support to the Kurd- ish campaign has also meant its support to the Kurdish claim to be never a part of the Turkish, Iranian or Syrian administration.

The emergence of the Russia–Iran–Iraq–Syria alliance is of deeper concern that may challenge every component of U.S. policy in the region. Such an alignment could have destabilizing impacts far beyond the borders of Syria and may have far more important consequences than simply bringing more actors into the war against DAESH. The intelligence sharing between Russia, Iran and Iraq seems to have reached to the extent to which US policymakers dismay much more. Moreover, the Iraqi government has welcomed the Russian

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support and some Iraqi politicians are calling more Russian military support which will undercut the importance of US military support. Therefore, the US diplomats and military leaders in Baghdad now must compete not only with Tehran in dealing with the Iraqi government, but also with Moscow, as well. Through the military and diplomatic offensive strategies, Russia is launching its major long-term power broker as a rival to the US’ long-standing role in the Middle East. The substitution is resourced by the zero-sum game in the Middle East power balances.

Putin’s consistency in his approach to the Syrian conflict and Moscow’s un- expected success in holding its own against Washington led to the perception in Moscow of growing respect from leaderships in the Arab World. Moscow needs to deal with the leaders in the countries with counter-Russian reflexes in their foreign policy attitudes. Some countries in the Middle East has started to consult with Russia about regional issues, to lobby for Russian support, and to return to the Russian military market. Fortunately, for Putin, he has also benefited from the West’s mistakes and intervention fatigue.

THE TURKEY-RUSSIA-IRAN TROIKA AND THE KREM- LIN’S INTEREST

Tehran has been expanding its areas of influence in the Middle East, including the geography from Baghdad to Beirut. The problem within the Sunni population in the Middle East can be the main course of this expansion in the Iranian areas of influence despite its sectarian policies and discourses. For instance any sort of political solution to the problems within the Sunni majority in Syria would officially end the rule of the minor dominant Shiite communities. On the other hand, Russia is focusing far beyond the stability of Assad’s government. Russia’s main focus is to reduce the influence of Euro- pean as well as NATO forces in the region in order to gain the full control on the ground.

Turkey is the non-Arab party in this strategic game and it unavoidably is dragged into this conflict. The Russian support to YPG and PYD in the North Syria against DAESH can be called the starting point of Turkish involvement in the Syrian civil war. By this support in addition to the US and Europeans’, YGP and PYD have success against DAESH in the North Syria although Turkey often referred them as the extension of Kurdistan Workers Party, PKK, which has been also internationally recognized as a terrorist organization. Turkey’s response to the Western and Russian support can be thought of as insufficient

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because the first priority of all powers in the region is to fight against DAESH for the protection of regional stability. Therefore, Turkey seemed to be torn between its national security and launching a humanitarian environment in Syria. On the other hand, the Moscow declaration has been in association with the Turkey’s efforts to shape the Syrian issue appropriate to the harmony of Turkey’s national security concerns and humanitarian aid to refugees.

The reason may be that any start to negotiate for a peace process between Assad regime and its opposition might mean declaring the end of the Assad regime, and indirectly any harm to the Russian strategic presence in the Middle East. The Astana talks hoped to lead further peace negotiations between As- sad’s regime and military opposition forces, but the current talks will definite- ly pursue a long-awaited resolution of the conflict. Beyond the requirement of including regional players in the Astana dialogue, it would be really hard that the Troika halts the bloodshed in another part of Syria in the current status of the conflict without the assistance of international players (Shahbazov, 2017).

In the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi, these three countries agreed to shift their focus to a political settlement as DAESH is expelled from Syria by Da- mascus troops supported by Russian army. The leaders of Russia, Iran, and Turkey have tried to establish an intra-Syrian dialogue environment among all segments of Syrian society by calling representatives of the Syrian government and the opposition to participate in the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi. The agreements between Russia, Turkey, and Iran are proof of the fact that they have taken the initiative to solve Syria’s crisis and will not give it up. The situation is still sensitive as everything depends on the political will of not only Russia, Iran, and Turkey but also other countries that have an impact. However, the participation of Iran and Turkey in the peace process has largely deprived the United States of maneuvering space in Syria (Jiavao, 2017).

The UN and the international community, unfortunately, did not succeed to end the Syrian war and stopping the refugee crisis. After Sochi agreements, new hope for cooperation has raised. However, the international community and the United Nations, too, assumed effective responsibility in the struggle against terrorism and the crisis management. On the other hand, Russia with its political and military power seems to avoid the risk of arrogant behavior, which can endanger the peace process success (Caşın, 2017). The violent conflict seems to move towards a possible stalemate ove the future of the country especially after Washington has lost its ground to Moscow. Although Assad has a strong support from Putin, many analysts believe that this support is

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not unconditioned. The most important concern for Russia is the control and security of its bases in the Mediterranean rather than the sustainability of Assad regime. The naval facility in Tartus is the example of Russia’s important bases. In that sense, Moscow may only have been interested in using its intervention in Syria as a way to try to position itself as a great power.

Indeed, the relative smaller importance of the Middle East for Russian economy proves that Russia’s interests are not economically-driven. For instance, the Gulf States have the financial strength unlike Moscow’s traditional partners, Egypt and Syria to make the high-cost investments that Russia’s domestic economy craves. Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, the Russian Direct Invest- ment Fund (RDIF), has entered into co-investment deals with the sovereign wealth funds of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to make equity investments in the Russian economy. These investments stretch across a variety of commercial enterprises, agriculture, and infrastructure (RDIF, 2013). On the other hand, the economic activities of Russia in the Middle East isn’t only related to monetary gain. The economic opportunity provided to Rus- sia in regional relations generates the financial support to political activities of Russia.

CONCLUSION

Moscow has been surprised by the resurgence of its influence in the Middle East as much as any other capital. Russia is now in a stronger position with national leaderships across the Middle East than it was in 2011. Even the Ukranian crisis and its diminish in the Wahabi Arab public opinion couldn’t end Russian resurgence in the Middle East. Therefore, the US has to take Russia’s interests into account in its relations in the Middle East. On the other hand, Russia has much to do in relation to its domestic politics while achieving its areas of influence in the region. The recent engagement between Moscow and Riyadh about Hamas and Hezbollah, for instance, aims to convince regional actors to refrain from expressing solidarity with Chechen rebellion. As being the only major power independent from the Middle Eastern oil and gas, it has very important advantage to establish economic relations and political alliances beyond the energy sector. For this purpose, Russia must focus on those countries confronting Western economic sanctions like Turkey because of its competitive advantage in its exports compared to Western countries. Last to the economic relations, Russia is interested in the Middle Eastern energy sector due to very different reasons from China, the US, or the EU. As a major player in the international energy market, Russia has an interest in keeping

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the prices high while deterring key energy-producing countries from jeopar- dizing its market share in Europe.

The Soviet Union became strongly involved in the Middle East region after the ending of the Second World War. Before the Mid-1950s, the Arab world was never a high-priority region for the Soviet Union’s foreign policy and the actual penetration to the Middle East region dates from the period of Khrush- chev. Noted by Trenin that the strategic borders along the southern perimeter during the Soviet era were not precise. Indeed, most Soviet leaders, including Brezhnev and Kosygin, showed no or small interest in that region, and only a minority favored the extension of the socialist community toward the Middle East.

Russia’s deployment of forces to Syria marked a new chapter in Moscow’s involvement in the Middle East and raised profound concerns about Russian strategy which can be called repercussions for broader regional security. It is exactly about Kremlin’s Middle East policy under Vladimir Putin and that it resulted in the dispatch of Russian military power to Syria. On the other hand, Russian presence in the Middle East has different meanings and results for the US and its allies in the region. The ultimate goal of Russia is to return to the Middle East as a super-power. As explained, Russia had to do much more like intelligence-sharing deal with Syria, Iran and Iraq against DAESH. Despite its lack of assets for intelligence-sharing in the region, the symbolism of Russia’s partnership with Iraq is very noteworthy while Iraq has been under US invasion.

Moscow emphasizes the short-term nature of its intervention, yet Russia should remember that going in is the easy part. In a costly foreign adventure that Moscow could risk at a time when the Russian economy looks increasingly vulnerable. The missing point is the fallibility about the results of the Syrian strategy to engage the US in a dialogue on equality base; and by this way Russia can make US admitted its interlocutor position for global security. The USA-led coalition collapsed because of the prevention by the troika of Rus- sia-Turkey-Iran. This new balance of power potentially makes the historical partnership between Russia and the Middle Eastern countries stronger.

The Syrian society has the self-determination rights to shape the future of their country. However, the humanitarian aid, reconstructing the country, normalization process in the domestic politics are the concerns connected to the applicability of the self-determination rights. After the peace talks and the

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dislodgement of DAESH from the country, some experts say that the power dynamics are being solidified and that the war proxies are taking potential steps to resolve the civil war. It is worth noting that three of these deals were announced after Western sanctions on Russia were enacted in 2014. Although these sovereign wealth funds did not violate sanctions as secondary sanctions have not been implemented with Kuwait increasing its pre-existing investment with RDIF in 2015. The Gulf states like many Middle Eastern countries have not been happy with constraints by Western sanctions against Russia. Its investments in the Middle East are the part of its economic policy in the Mos- cow’s efforts to build a sanction-proof economy, besides regional trade activity.

In Sochi, the troika gained the victory in the Syrian crisis thanks to the military and political stability. The statements by Trump and Putin were also an important step to end the war and to pass to the political solution. The Sochi Summit has been a precedent international platform to target the con- solidation for a common purpose in the Middle East and Eurasia. There is no consensus about the best approach for the West with regard to Russia in the Middle East. The interrelation between Russian diplomacy in the region and its West confrontation leaves no illusions for the dynamics of Russia in the Middle East. In response to any anti-Russian policies of the West anywhere in the world, Russia will not hesitate to take its advantages in any situation, elsewhere in the world.

In conclusion, the Western policymakers must keep in mind that currently, Russia is confident of its success in the Middle Eastern strategy based on the principle of balancing between the different regional players. Rapprochement with Iran, success in Syria, the strengthening of ties with Egypt, and the development of dialogue with Israel and the GCC further cement its self-as- surance. The influence of Russia’s approaches towards the Middle East consequently will be challenging.

REFERENCES

Becker, A. S., & Horelick, A. L. (1970). Soviet Policy in the Middle East. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R0504.html

Berman, I. (2001). Russia and the Mideast Vacuum. Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies. http://www.mafhoum.com/press/55P3. pdf

Caşın, M. H. (2017, Kasım 23). Sochi Summit and Fate of Assad. Valdai Club. https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/sochi-summit-and-fate-of-assad/

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Golan, G. (1991). Soviet policies in the Middle East: From World War Two to Gorbachev (Reprinted). Cambridge Univ. Press.

Goodrich, L., & Lanthemann, M. (2013, Şubat 21). The Past, Present and Fu- ture of Russian Energy Strategy. Stratfor. https://worldview.stratfor. com/article/past-present-and-future-russian-energy-strategy

Jiavao, L. (2017, Kasım 24). Rocky Way to Peace in Syria After Significant Russia–Iran-Turkey Summit. Xinhua Silk Road. https://en.imsilkroad. com/p/70742.html

Katz, M. (2015). Conflicting aims, limited means: Russia in the Middle East. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/191176/PB201_Russia_in_the_Middle_ East.pdf

Katz, M. N. (1986). Russia & Arabia: Soviet foreign policy toward the Arabian Peninsula. Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

Khouri, F. J. (1986). The Arab-Israeli dilemma. Syracuse Univ. Press.

Nizameddin, T. (2013). Putin’s new order in the Middle East. Hurst.

Prokhorov, A. M. (1973). Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Sayı 21. c.). Macmillan. https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=6FkNAQAAMAAJ

RDIF. (2013). Russian Direct Investment Fund and Mubadala establish a co-investment fund. Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF). https:// rdif.ru/Eng_fullNews/253/

Shahbazov, F. (2017, Ocak 24). Will the “Troika format” of Astana Talks bring peace to Syria? Al-Arabiya. https://english.alarabiya.net/perspective/features/2017/01/24/Will-the-Troika-format-of-Astana-talks- bring-peace-to-Syria-

Sputnik. (2016, Ocak 4). US loses in the Middle East, while Russia jumps in at the right time. Sputnik News. https://sputniknews.com/middlee- ast/201601041032669547-russia-us-middle-east/

Suchkov, M. (2016, Ocak 15). Russia’s Plan for the Middle East. The National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-plan-the-middle- east-14908

Yodfat, A. Y., & Yodfat, A. (1983). The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsu- la: Soviet policy towards the Persian Gulf and Arabia. Croom Helm.

72 CAGRI KOSAK MARMARA UNIVERSITY, EMAIL: [email protected] PhD. STUDENT

Submission Date: 15.05.2021 Review Date: 13.06.2021 Acceptance Date: 20.06.2021 Publication Date: 17.07.2021 JISPOL Structure: Islam-oriented Policy Paper JISPOL Discipline: Political Science Special Field: History of Islamic Sects

Vol.1 No.1 E-ISSN:2791-7525 DOI: 10.2021/jispol.v1i1.6

THE ORIGINS OF SALAFISM IN ISLAM

ABSTRACT This article tries to understand the occurrence conditions of Salafism to partially reveal a framework for Salafi mentality. To do this, comprehension of Salafi mind is a requirement and fulfilling this requirement is only possible by re-visiting the dilemma between its means of rules and traditions. This article analyzes the extent and the motivation sources of Salafist stance against traditions, innovations, and other denominations of Islam. In this analysis, this article asks in a historical context the extent to which Salafism stands against the other sects of Islam. The- refore, attitudes and interpretations of founding fathers of Salafism against similar issues to traditions and innovations are on the origin of this analysis because of the impossibility of recognition of Salafi mentality without seeking the roots of the faith (aqida) of Salafism.

Keywords: Salafism, Islam, Islamic Sects, Origins of Salafism

To cite this article: Kosak, C. (2021). The Origins of Salafism in Islam,Journal of Islamic Politics, 1(1), 73-82. journal of ıslamıc polıtıcs vol. 1 no. 1

INTRODUCTION

Salafism has significance not only for Islamic theological perspective and Is- lamic political theory, but also in real politics of the today’s world. But like all other significant issues in the real politics, the historical roots and mental basis of Salafism must be understood and conceptualized. In this respect, this article tries to understand the occurrence conditions of Salafism to partially reveal a framework for Salafi mentality. To do this, comprehension of Salafi mind is a requirement and fulfilling this requirement is only possible by re-visiting the dilemma between its means of rules and traditions.

Members of Salafi movements are prone to act in what their rules steer them. Therefore, the creed of all Salafi movements must be based on the Salafi mentality. In Salafi mentality, the literal interpretation has a strong determinative role on the religious life and also attitudes to other Islamic movements. Quran and Hadith have the centered place in Salafi traditions. Appropriately to the center place of Quran and Hadith in Salafi mentality, many Salafi movements accept traditions as well as innovations as corruption from the roots of Islam. At this point, this article analyzes the extent and the motivation sources of Salafist stance against traditions, innovations, and other denominations of Islam. In this analysis, this article asks in a historical context the extent to which Salafism stands against the other sects of Islam. Therefore, attitudes and interpretations of founding fathers of Salafism against similar issues to traditions and innovations are on the origin of this analysis because of the impossibility of recognition of Salafi mentality without seeking the roots of the faith (aqida) of Salafism.

In addition to the founding fathers’ mentality, the historical context of Salaf- ism is also very critical for this analysis. . Because of that historical context also leaded Salafi movements to have a bad image in people’s mind, especially in Western society. To correct the biased image of Salafism in the eyes of even Middle Eastern people, the texture of Salafism can generate a beneficial analysis tool although some Arab countries have been strongly and negatively affected by the aggressive and violently behaviors of Salafi movements. Finally, this article explains how Salafi movements differently attitude to other sects of Islam.

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PROMINENT SALAFI SCHOLARS

Conceptually, Salafi means the follower of the Prophet Mohammed and his companions. In this respect, all Muslims must be considered as Salafi because all Muslims have been also proclaimed by Prophet Mohammed as his followers and companions. However, by the time, Salafism turned to a branch of Islamic denomination and also is claimed to accept only Quran and Hadith. In earlier periods, the name of this branch was as ahl al Hadith. By the time, the scope and the content of this branch has dramatically changed and called as Salaf- ism.

The word Salaf in Arabic literally means past or predecessors and refers in Islamic terminology to the scholars in the first period of Islam who had their own methods in religious issues. Additionally, the term salaf al-saleh (pious predecessors) to the first three generations after the beginning of the prophecy. A Prophetic tradition has been shown as a justification that “the best people is my generation, then the generation after my generation, and then, those who come from them” (Wiktorowicz, 2006). Therefore, the ultimate goal of Salaf- ism of Salafism is to take the first three generations as leaders for themselves and to understand and to practice Islam like them. In other words, they aim to protect Islamic roots from manipulations by purifying it from all outside influences and innovations (bid’a). Living a pious and simple life as Prophet Mohammad and the three following generations is the sole way to realize the aim of purification.

This section explains the contribution of prominent Salafi scholars to the Salafi creed (aqida), chronologically and analytically. Despite the Salafi claim to never use any sources except Quran and Hadith, the contributions of prominent Salafi scholars is very important to understand the change in Salafi creed. The reason is the subjectivity of the interpretation style of Salafism on religious texts to these prominent scholars.

Ahmad bin Hanbal is one of the most important scholars in Salafi school. He was born in Basra, Iraq in 780 and has been also considered as the founder of Hanbali school which is among four legal Islamic jurisprudence schools. He is famous for his deliberate choice of mursal hadith (hadith with a missing link) over any kind of reasoning in the absence of concrete evidence. The main reason of his prominence in relation to the historical story of Salafism was his defense against theologians of Mu’tezila in the Mihna event (The Encyclopedia of Islam, 2014). He said that: “If they are not Ahl al-Hadith, then I do not know

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who they are” (Fath al Bari 1985). Usually, researchers understood the words the people of Hadith as the people of Sunnah. After the Mihna event, the view against Mu’tezila has emerged with the support of Abbasid Caliph al-Mamun to the reaction of Ahmad bin Hanbal against Mu’tezila (The Encyclopedia of Islam 2014). Although Salafis are considered as closer to the Hanbali school of Islamic law, Ahmed bin Hanbal, indeed, uphold the Salafi aqidah and rejected rationalism by strictly drawing his rulings from Quran and and the Sunnah.

Another important scholar was Ibn Taymiyya because of his contribution to the systematization and elaboration of Salafi school. He was born in Harran in 1263 and his grandfather was also a representative of Hanbali School. There- fore, he has also a well-designed education for jurisprudence, theology, philosophy, and Sufism in his early Ages (Assef, 2011). In his times, the Islamic world has been hardly experiencing the Mongolian and Crusaders invasions. The Islamic world has differently interpreted the invasions and moreover, some sects of Sufi groups were deviated. The Mardin Fatwa that Ibn Taymiyya gave about these deviations is still effective on the people today. The recruitment of Al Qaida for its new militants is the famous example of the effectiveness of the Mardin Fatwa (Güneş & Avuka, 2010). Additionally, this is also a very interesting example for the literal interpretation of the text without consideration of its mentality behind it.

Ibn al Qayyim was another important scholar for Salafi school although he was not as prominent as Ahmad bin Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya. As a student of Ibn Taymiyya, his ideas and views became very tremendous on the school. He was known as a strong critical researcher in Hanbali school. To secure the justice for the benefit of the Muslim society, he mainly advised to turn the origins of religion and rehabilitation of the society by criticizing the mental stagnation due to the imitation of worship rather than verification of faith (Nursi, 2005). Ibn al Qayyim emphasized that true understanding and good intention are from the greatest of Allah’s favors by which he blesses his slave. Therefore, a slave won’t be bestowed with anything more virtuous or majestic than the two of them. For al-Qayyim, true understanding and good intention are the two legs of Islam, and by them, the slave protects himself from the paths of those with divine anger, corrupted intentions and understandings. In addition, al-Qayyim also stated that by these two legs of Islamic faith, the slave can be among those with divine favor, and on the straight path.

The reflection of al-Qayyim’s thoughts can be found in his strong defense for the visit prohibition of cemeteries. This defense and his opinions on legal school

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resembles with Abd al-Wahhab who was the founder of Wahhabism that can be called the next level of Salafism. Abd al-Wahhab claimed that the visit prohibition is a kind of obstacle to obey the Prophet Mohammad and his companions. Similarly, al-Qayyim thought that legal schools are not necessary to live Islam; indeed, he also claimed that Muslims can apply the rules of Islam more easily without the legal schools (Holtzman, 2003).

Additionally to Hanbal, Taymiyya and Qayyim, Mohammad abd al-Wahhab was another prominent scholar and he has a crucial role for Salafism. He de- veloped a simple but a revolutionary doctrine such as return to original Islam (Sfeir, 2007). The effective tools to understand this doctrine can be found in details. He was born in the Najd region of the Arab peninsula and received education in Hijaz where holy cities of Islam are. He advocated that the sole way of returning to the origins of Islam is rejections of all intermediaries, the saints and other prophetic imams. His bounding political ideas with the belief on the decline of Muslim world have differed his school from the predecessors. He thought that the main reason of the decline was the pernicious foreign innovations (bid’a) including European modernism (Stanley, 2005). This differentiation caused them to be called Wahhabi even though al-Wahhab and his companions continued to call themselves Salafi.

Scholars, philosophers and even statesmen felt to make changes in Islamic life while seeking the regression between the Islamic world and Islamic life. This reaction turned to separate the faith from the governance in many Islamic country like Turkey, Egypt, and Syria. Even though the countries governing by Salafi interpretation of Islam like Saudi Arabia, Salafi creed might have been used as a mobilizing identity and as preventing Islamist view to intervene into the politics against Emir’s hegemony. On the other hand, violent organizations based on Salafi creed were the other effect of the Salafism on the Islamic world. They accept religion not only as a religion or as a way of life but also as an ideology that constitutes the core of their organization. They prefer a violent way of act in the name of Islam underestimating the purist Salafi scholars as the scholars of power.

SALAFI AQIDA

For remembering, it should be noticed that Salafism has its roots from the Arabic term “al-salaf al-salih” which means pious venerable forefathers or the worthy ancestors” (Byman & Gold, 2012). Byu this term, Salafi movements claims that they provide to emphasize the strict commitment of the Proph-

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et Mohammad and his companions. In this strict commitment, the tawhid, oneness of Allah is proclaimed as the core of Salafi doctrine. Mohammed bin Abdulwahhab has also concerned the oneness of Allah in his famous book titled Kitab’ut Tawhid (Abdulwahhab, 2011). According to Salafist explanation of tawhid, the contradictions and threats unexplained in Quran and Hadiths were accepted as bid’a, and in conclusion as unbelief (Kufr). Therefore, the in- tercession of any pious Muslim even of Prophet Mohammed was rejected.

Shirk is the crucial point for the differences between Salafism and other denominations of Islam. It means polytheism which is strictly banned and accepted as an unforgiveable sin by Islam in various verses. For instance, Allah says in al-Nahl/51 that “Do not establish two Gods : He is the only One Allah, worth worshipping : then fear Me (and Me alone)”. In the name of standing against shirk, the salafi aqida demolishes the graves, rejects saints, has adversary to Sufism. In more details, additionally to its commonly rejection of imitation in religion with other four law schools, Salafi schools also rejects rationalism like Ahmad bin Hanbal. This is the breaking point of ahl al Ray and ahl al Hadith particularly. Therefore, qıyas and ijma which all four law schools of Islam apply are unacceptable for Salafism in decisions about life. Rather, they consider the literal meaning of Quean and Hadith by avoiding any analysis or contextual meaning. The view of only one explanation of sacred texts causes them to forbid Islamic pluralism (Wiktorowics, 2006).

Forbidding the pluralism can explain the Salafist attitude to exclude other sects of Islam naming as tekfir. Moreover, the other sects of Islam are even de- served to exclude from Islam because of their tendency to contextual meaning rather than literal meaning. By demonstrating the verses steering the Muslims not to be divided like, Salafists blame other four law schools for their different understanding of the same verses. On the other hand, the self-isolation of Salafism from other sects of Islam seems in a contradiction with its own pro- claim on the unity of Islam, paradoxically.

The Salafi acceptance about themselves as the saved sect (al-firqa al-najiyya) and the victorious group (al-taifa al-mansura) is the basic reason of the intolerance of other sects about Salafi creed (Meijer, 2009). On the other hand, Salafists claim that other sects, as a consequence of this intolerance, try to find the verses and hadiths supporting their arguments to show themselves as rightful and victorious, rather than believing in Islam and praying to Allah to be a part of the saved sect. Additionally, Salafists practice takfir more frequently than any other Muslim sects. The intolerance of other sects and the

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adversary of Salafists against them must be understood from this perspective (Güler, 2013).

Additionally, the principles of loyalty and disavowal (al-wala wa al-bara) have the strengthening role for Salafists’ enmity to other sects. Salafists believe that only God deserves to be loyal due to their claim to be the pure and intact version of Islam. Therefore, Salafists agree that the rest from God must be de- fied and disavowed for the protection of the purity. As a result, they set up the boundaries between themselves and other sects even by sectarianism. On the other hand, many Sunni scholars accepted the concept ‘al-wala’ wa-l bara’ of Salafism as a harmful bid’a because they argued that even Ahmad bin Hanbal didn!t use this concept in his own workings. The inventor of this term was Ibn Taymiyya in order to isolate and prevent Muslism from other faith and practic- es of his time and conditions. However, this term and concept has embedded into the Salafi discourse and is frequently described as the part of the basis of Islam (Wagemakers, 2009).

SALAFISM AND SALAFISTS

The CRS reported that ‘Salafism is not a unified movements, there is no single Salafi sect’ (CRS Report). On the other hand, Salafi interpretations of Islam is considered as an alternative for a number of Muslims seeking a religious renewal against the modernist challenges. In addition, the extensiveness of Salafism especially in the Western Europe and the US is very remarkable (Duderija, 2014).

Salafism occurred as a result of the need for the essence of Islam. From this perspective, analysts on Salafism must be aware of the requirements of today world by focusing on the sociopsychology of Muslims. Additionally, the Salafi movement has become a reaction to the modernism with the aim of purification of Islam. However, the Salafi interpretation on the sources of Islam and its attitude towards other sects of Islam is problematic. Therefore, the Salafist movement is very open to manipulation and misunderstandings especially re- garding to its lack of political and sociological mentality.

The modern interpretations of Salafism tend to be extreme ways like terrorism or pacifism which are more compatible with the modern world. Moreover, this type of Islamic movement is more preferable for the Western political actors. For instance, Western powers have invaded Islamic countries like Afghanistan and Iraq by blaming Salafist movements as terrorist groups. In the non-invad-

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ed countries, they have also blamed the Islamic community for the increase in violence in that countries. However, the purist type of Salafism based on Hanbali school isn’t useful for the western powers to blame Islamic community for the instability in the world politics.

Salafist groups are called tree groups and exclude the other Muslim groups in contrast to the call of Ibn Taymiyya for the unity of Islam. Whereas purist Salafists are very related to the apolitical stance and the purification of the religion, the West advertised Jihadist Salafists as a terrorist and their tendency to communal violence reinforce the inclination of the West. The last group as an example of Salafism was polico-Salafism and their remarkable role in the coup against Muslim Brothers wasn’t beneficial or sensible for Egypt (Lacroix, 2013). Moreover, their relations with Saudi Arabia has generated very big questions and prejudices in the Islamic world towards Salafi movement.

CONCLUSION

By the literal meaning, Salafism must involve all Muslim communities in order to follow the Quran and Sunnah. However, the exclusion of other sects of Islam from the religion emerges as the main character of the modern Salafi groups. The prominent figures of Salafism give very important information on the transition of Salafi groups from the unity of Islam to the exclusion of sects of Islam. Indeed, their stance against others and demand for purification is remarkable and compatible with their situation. Salafism can claim that it only aims to follow the Prophet Mohammed, but it has also a historical evolvement like other denominations of Islam. The deny of this fact is very similar to reading Qur’an without reasoning.

Differentiation and diversification in Salafist creed seem to be certain with regard to its historical background. The politicization of Salafist groups based on differentiation and diversification didn’t have good results for their political consciousness, on the other hand. Despite the difference between its origins and contemporary versions, the intention of Salafism seems to keep the same as the other denominations of Islam. Therefore, Salafism deserves to be understood and analyzed.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Wiktorowicz, Q. (2006). Anatomy of the Salafi Movement. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, 207-239. Retrieved from: http://www.cerium.ca/ IMG/pdf/WIKTOROWICZ_2006_Anatomy_of_the_Salafi_Movement.pdf (Accession Date 11 Januray 2014).

Ahmad b. Hanbal. 2014. In Encyclopedia of Islam. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/top- ic/485603/Qatar/93432/History (Accession Date 12.01.2014)

Hajar, I. (1989). Fath al-Bari Sahrh Sahih al-Bukhari, 13 vols. Beirut: Dar al-kutub al- ilmiyyah, 10, 165-6.

Assef, Q. (2011, April 17). Ibn Taymiyya: “sufi or not sufi” Retrieved From http://ifpo.hypotheses.org/1673 (Accession Date 12.01.2014)

Nursi, S. & Özdemir, S. (2005). Mektubat. Yeni Asya Neşriyat.

Livnat Holtzman, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya Retrieved From https://www.academia.edu/1057824/Ibn_Qayyim_al-Jawziyya (Accession Date: 12.01.2014)

Sfeir, A. 2007. Les Islamismes d’hier et a aujourd’hui. Paris. Lignes de Reperes.

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, M. (2011, 26 December) Kitaab At-Tawheed. Transl. Sameh Strauch. International Islamic Publishing House.

Meijer, R. (2009). Global Salafism: Islam’s new religious movement. London: Hurst & Co.

Guler, F. (2013). Politization of the Egyptian Salafis. İstanbul Şehir University

Wagemakers, J. (2009). The Transformation of a Radical Concept: Al-Wala’ wa-l- Bara’ in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement ed. by Roel Meijer, (London/ New York: Hurst & Co./Columbia University Press), pp. 81-106

Stanley, T. (2005). Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism. Terrorism Monitor, 3(14), 8-10.

Byman, D. & Gold, Z. (2012) “The Salafi Awakening”, The National Interest, Jul/Aug 2012 (120): 27-37 Retrieved From: https://nationalinterest. org/article/the-salafi-awakening-7068 [Accessed: 11 January 2014]

Blanchard, C. M. (2007, January). The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya. Library of Congress Washington Dc Congressional Research Service.

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Duderija, A. (2013). Neo-Traditional Salafis in the West: Agents of (Self)- Ex- clusion. Samina Yasmeen, Muslims in the West and Social Exclusion, Ashgate.

Lacroix, S. (2013). Entretien avec Stéphane Lacroix sur le coup d’Etat en Egypte Retrieved From http://www.uni-t.fr/entretien-avec-stephane- lacroix-sur-le-coup-detat-en-egypte/ (Accession Date 14 January 2014)

82 CAGRI KOSAK MARMARA UNIVERSITY, EMAIL: [email protected] PhD STUDENT

Submission Date: 14.04.2021 Review Date: 20.05.2021 Acceptance Date: 31.05.2021 Publication Date: 17.07.2021 JISPOL Structure: Book-Review JISPOL Discipline: International Relations Special Field: American Foreign Policy

Vol.1 No.1 E-ISSN: 2791-7525 DOI: 10.2021/jispol.v1i1.7

BOOK INFORMATION

The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy

Stephen M. Walt

Farrar, Straus & Giroux Publishing, 2018, 384 pages (Hardcover), $28, ISBN: 0374280037 journal of ıslamıc polıtıcs vol. 1 no. 1

In The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy, Stephen M. Walt, who is a professor of international affairs at Harvard University, makes a critical review of the United States foreign policy from the start of post-Cold War era until the book was published in October 2018. Walt is one of the pioneers of Neo-Realist approach in the field of international relations theory and questions liberal hegemony strategy throughout his work, especially focusing on the current situation in the US politics.

The author defines the US liberal hegemony in the world politics after the Cold War as “filled with visible failures and devoid of major accomplishments (p. 7)”, but this is a highly debated claim; especially considering the mainstream premises, in accordance with the political, economic and cultural trends of the world. Furthermore, he goes forward and explains failures of the US foreign policy elaborately by giving examples, missed opportunities as we have seen in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, self-inflicted wounds such as Iraq and -Af ghanistan wars, political acts like premeditated, authorized tortures, massive electronic surveillance or support to brutal authoritarian regimes, which all backfired.

In order to explain the nature of this problematic and insistent strategy, Walt reviews the foreign policy making process and handles with it in a systematic perspective, but not underestimating the Presidents’ role on this subject. From this perspective, Walt looks with a skeptical eye at important parts of this community and tries to prescribe the wound of liberal hegemony, by caring about the US primacy in world politics, rather than rest of the world. The analysis of this community and their role on foreign policy was explained illuminatingly. These parts were followed by the interpretation of “illiberal hegemony” and Walt’s recommendation at last.

Chapter one takes us to post-Cold War era after 1991, when the Soviets collapsed and “the United States found itself in a position of global primacy un- seen since the Roman Empire (p. 24).” This was also where the film of liberal hegemony was started, different visions, perspectives and strategies were brought to the agenda in order to shape not only the US foreign policy, but also creating a new world order. After the threat of red scare of the Soviets, spreading the US core values like individual liberty, free elections, and open markets across the world would be a vindication, but also establishing a liberal hegemony across the globe became the utmost goal for the US. However, the responsibility of the task was such a great burden on the US, so that it failed in many ways in terms of strategic partnership, international terror or

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even liberal democracy, according to the author. By considering the dismal record of the US foreign policy, Walt seeks the main reason of the failures of liberal hegemony strategy that lately paved the way of Donald Trump’s “popu- list backlash.” After the assessment of flawed foreign policy after the Cold War, the author concludes the main consistency is a long string of failures, rather than liberal norms and set of institutes in the wake of different presidents, so he identifies the very roots of this missionary and misguided strategy, which is the foreign policy elites.

Chapter two discusses how come the US ambitious attempt to shape regional and world politics ended up unsuccessfully, despite costly efforts for decades. The author takes liberal hegemony in his hands and reviews fundamental reasons behind the failure of the strategy. After making a critical interpretation of the prominent terms and theories of liberal hegemony, he demonstrates the practical deficits of the strategy in terms of preserving U.S. primacy, expanding the U.S. sphere of influence, promoting liberal norms of democracy and human rights. For the failure of liberal hegemony, Walt concludes that the attempt to create a new world order leaned on fragile foundations, problematic relationship between the states and societies and exaggeration of the Amer- ican power, and then it caused deepening of the crises like in Afghanistan. On the other hand, easing tensions in Bosnia, the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan or the relations with China were accepted as successful examples. However, the author underlines that these cases are the outcomes of deviation from liberal hegemony strategy, not implementing of it. The author later states the following take clearly: “When the United States abandoned liberal hegemony and adopted a more realistic and flexible approach, its ability to achieve specific foreign policy goals increased significantly (p.67).”

Chapter three investigates the aforementioned ambitious foreign policy by focusing on the actors who influence the decision-making process of the US foreign policy. Making of the US foreign policy strategy is a result of competitive forces, rather than a president’s vision, is a normal being of a democratic country with formal separation of powers and freedom of speech. On the other hand, the flourishing of the foreign policy community, during the US’ ascen- dance to the leadership of the unipolar world, caused the US commitment to the failed strategy of liberal hegemony after the Cold War. The author identifies this notorious foreign policy community as “individuals and organizations that actively engage on a regular basis with issues of international affairs (p. 73)” that includes state institutions, think tanks, interest groups and lobbies, the media, and academia. The members of the foreign policy community are

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tightly knit, mutually supportive to each other and they are professional insid- ers of the high politics, since they are expected to shape the ambitious global agenda of the US foreign policy. Otherwise, a more restrained foreign policy would give the entire foreign policy community less to do in terms of importance, employment or funding.

Chapter four explains the most prominent skill of the foreign policy community: selling a failing foreign policy. The author argues that the foreign policy community convinces the US citizens and administration to pursue an inter- ventionist and ambitious agenda by the US is in charge to secure the world’s threats, exaggerating the benefits and concealing the costs of liberal hegemony. Moreover, according to the author, this community transformed into a sector for the time being and distorted the facts to justify their ideas, focused their self-interests rather than the nation’s. In addition, these were made in a professional way by using various apparatus like academia, media or famous institutions.

Chapter five evaluates the aftermath of liberal hegemony after Donald Trump’s ascension to the White House in 2016. The author agrees with Trump’s harsh criticism on liberal hegemony to some extent, but acknowledges Trump’s presidency as a result of this failure rather than a success. Accordingly, the people constituting this policy caused a series of intricate problems from Somalia to Afghanistan and Iraq, Libya to Yemen and must be accounted for what they did for decades. So, Trump came up with an idea that foreign policy elites must be disregarded from the policy making process, since the failure of exporting democracy and nation-building efforts caused “considerable cost but with scant success (p. 133)” mainly to the US and then for the rest of the world.

,Chapter six assesses Trump’s presidency from the perspective of his dealing with the liberal hegemony. After the years of conducting the same failed strategy, he promised “shake the rust off American foreign policy” but he demonstrated how not to fix it, according to the author. At the end of the day, “Trump ended up embracing the worst features of liberal hegemony—overreliance on military force, disinterest in diplomacy, and a tendency toward unilateral- ism—while turning his back on its positive aspirations, such as support for human rights and the preservation of an open, rules-based world economy (p. 157)” Trump’s intended to shake up the status quo, his appointments to the top foreign policy posts went to outsiders who are controversial, unexpe- rienced, transient figures such as Rex Tillerson, James Mattis, and Michael Flynn. Trump’s assertive talks to NATO alliance, Russia or China turned out

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to be the same manner like his predecessors. While looking at Trump’s way of “ignorant, chaotic and inept management”, also excluding the benefits and virtues of liberal hegemony, the author asserts that Trump accelerated the decline of the US primacy in world politics rather than “making America great again”. On the other side, it might be a bit late to make a total judgment about Trump era from now on.

In the concluding chapter, the author turns back, makes a reassessment of the US foreign policy puts forward a series of ideas to repair them. Along with the criticism to the recent past of the reality, the author presents us “a better way” with offshore-balancing strategy. According to this alternative, a few areas of the globe are of vital importance to US security or prosperity, focusing on these regions and cooperation with local hegemons are required, taking les- sons from the history and conducting diplomacy in a sensible way needed to be done. Nevertheless, making a rooted reform is obviously hard by challenging foreign policy elites, promoting peace, reassuring respect to the military and taming imperial ambitions. The author prescribes a restrained foreign policy to the US, instead of pretending to make the world safer, richer and democracy fortified place in line with liberal hegemony, which “destabilized key regions of the world, wasted thousands of lives and trillions of dollars in failed wars and conflicts” for decades.

It is worth to claim that the strength of this study is its level of analysis. Walt is capable of interpreting the US policy by retracing to the roots of its actors, theory and reality. The author’s approach in this book is consistent with his former studies especially Taming American Power in 2005 and The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy in 2006. The assumptions and assertions of this book might be considered as exaggerated for those who are advocates of the liberal hegemony or the US superiority. However, the correctness of Walt’s ideas will be clearly understood in the long term. This book makes an excellent read not only for political scientists, but also for all who wants to understand the tra- jectory of the US and world politics in an intellectual way.

All in all, the book skillfully handles with liberal hegemony as a grand strategy for the US. While depicting the US liberal hegemony, Walt considers it as an ambitious and failed grand strategy, focuses on the defects of the past quarter century and tries to prove that the US primacy is on the decline. The story of liberal hegemony was told by making a long list of failures and broken promises in an analytical way. Therefore, it provides deeper evaluation and critics to the recent past of the US foreign policy and world politics, along with the

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advices to fix it. It might be accepted as a significant contribution to the literature in terms of the US foreign policy and world politics.

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