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2015 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program Report

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2015 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program Report Executive Office of the President Office of National Drug Control Policy High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program 2015 Report to Congress TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary. 1 I. HIDTA Program Background Information. 1 II. Assessment of Law Enforcement Intelligence Sharing in the HIDTA Program. 2 III. Assessment of Drug Enforcement Task Forces in HIDTAs. 2 IV. Evaluation of the HIDTA Program. 3 Individual HIDTA Reports. 20 Appalachia. 23 Atlanta/Carolinas . 28 Central Florida. 32 Central Valley California . 36 Chicago . 40 Gulf Coast . 44 Hawaii . 49 Houston . 54 Lake County . 58 Los Angeles . 61 Michigan. 66 Midwest . 71 Nevada . 77 New England . 80 New York/New Jersey. 84 North Florida . 88 Northern California . 92 Northwest . 98 Ohio . 103 Oregon . 109 Philadelphia/Camden . 113 Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands . 117 Rocky Mountain . 121 South Florida . 125 SWB - Arizona Region . 129 SWB - California Region . 134 SWB - New Mexico Region . 138 SWB - South Texas Region . 143 SWB - West Texas Region . 147 Texoma. 150 Washington/Baltimore . 155 Wisconsin . 159 National HIDTA Assistance Center. 163 HIDTA Program Highlights . 164 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Pursuant to the requirements of Section 301 of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Reauthorization Act of 2006, Public Law 109-469, ONDCP is providing Congress with this report on the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program. This document presents a national overview of the HIDTA program, including an evaluation of each HIDTA, and addresses the following three Congressional reporting requirements in one cohesive and coordinated report: 1. Assessment of Law Enforcement Intelligence Sharing in the HIDTA Program – as required under Section 707(m), P.L. 109-469; 2. Assessment of Drug Enforcement Task Forces in HIDTAs – as required under Section 707(l)(1) P.L. 109-469; and 3. Evaluation of the HIDTA Program – as required under Section 707(k)(2), P.L. 109- 469. This Executive Summary presents a brief overview of each of the three sections responding to the reporting requirements mentioned above. 1. HIDTA Program Background Information A central component of the National Drug Control Strategy, the HIDTA program coordinates and assists Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies in each HIDTA- designated region to address regional drug threats with the purpose of reducing drug trafficking and drug production in the United States. The HIDTA program includes 28 regional HIDTAs in 48 states, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. The Southwest Border (SWB) HIDTA comprises five regions (Arizona, California, New Mexico, South Texas, and West Texas), each of which operates in many respects as a separate entity but in partnership with the other four. Each HIDTA is directed and guided by an Executive Board composed, in most cases, of an equal number of regional Federal and non-Federal (state, local, and tribal) law enforcement leaders. Where it is impractical for an Executive Board to consist of equal numbers of representatives of Federal agencies and state, local, and tribal agencies, a system of proxy votes or weighted votes must be used to achieve the voting balance required by the National HIDTA Program Policy and Budget Guidance and the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006. A central feature of the HIDTA program is the discretion granted to the Executive Boards to design and implement initiatives that confront the specific drug trafficking threats in each HIDTA region. This flexibility ensures that each HIDTA Executive Board can tailor its strategy and initiatives to local conditions and respond more quickly to region-specific threats. In 2013, the most recent year for which complete data are available, HIDTA reports indicate there were 737 initiatives in the 28 HIDTAs distributed among the following categories: intelligence, enforcement, interdiction, prosecution, support, prevention, treatment, and management. These initiatives were staffed by approximately 7,400 Federal agents and criminal and intelligence analysts; 15,700 state, local, and tribal officers and criminal and intelligence analysts; and other representatives, including U.S. Attorneys, District Attorneys, and drug prevention specialists. 1 2. Assessment of Law Enforcement Intelligence Sharing in the HIDTA Program This section presents an assessment of law enforcement intelligence systems providing support to and participating in the various HIDTAs. It outlines the formal processes of the HIDTA program to assess law enforcement intelligence and information sharing, including policy and budget guidance; processes for sharing Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement information; and measures needed to achieve effective sharing of information. Each HIDTA capitalizes on the combined resources of the Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement communities. This section describes existing and planned law enforcement intelligence systems supported by each HIDTA or used by task forces receiving funding under the program. It explains the extent to which the agencies participating in each HIDTA share law enforcement intelligence information to determine current drug trafficking threats and design appropriate enforcement strategies to address the threats. This section also outlines the basic requirements and objectives of intelligence and information sharing in the HIDTA program, including facilitating event1 and case/subject/target2 deconfliction and providing analytical support to ongoing investigations. Further, it describes how continuing interagency cooperation among ONDCP, the Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies enhances dialogue to expand intelligence resources and capabilities. Finally, this section articulates the measures needed to further improve effective sharing of drug trafficking and drug production information and law enforcement intelligence among Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies participating in a HIDTA and between such agencies outside the HIDTA. 3. Assessment of Drug Enforcement Task Forces in HIDTAs HIDTAs provide a coordination umbrella for Federal, state, local, and tribal drug law enforcement and act as neutral centers to manage, deconflict, analyze, and report on drug enforcement activities in their respective regions. This section of the report describes how the HIDTA program promotes and facilitates cooperation and collaboration among law enforcement agencies of various jurisdictions to share resources and information for the purpose of reducing drug trafficking, production, transportation, and use in the United States. HIDTA task forces coordinate and collaborate with other drug enforcement task forces through a variety of methods. To ensure coordination, every HIDTA requires its task forces—and strongly encourages non-participating agency task forces—to deconflict targets and subjects under investigation. Deconfliction is a guiding principle of the HIDTA program that helps prevent investigations from overlapping and ensures officer safety in the field. 1 Event deconfliction is the process of determining whether multiple law enforcement agencies are conducting an enforcement action (e.g., serving a search warrant, conducting an undercover operation, surveillance, or other high-risk activity) in close proximity to one another during a specified time period. When certain elements are matched, it is referred to as a positive hit. The process includes notifying each agency of the conflict. 2Case/subject/target deconfliction is the process of determining when multiple law enforcement agencies are investigating the same person, place, or thing. Elements of an investigation are compared and the number of matches is reported as a positive hit to verify the deconfliction. The deconfliction process includes notifying each agency of the potential conflict. 2 4. Evaluation of the HIDTA Program This section presents a succinct description of each HIDTA, its responses to the Congressional reporting requirements, and an evaluation of its performance. This section further describes the measurements used to evaluate the performance of each HIDTA in achieving the two goals established by the HIDTA program to: 1. Disrupt the market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting drug trafficking (DTOs) and/or money laundering organizations (MLOs); and 2. Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives. It concludes with a description of the HIDTA program’s accomplishments as the sum of achievements of individual HIDTA initiatives and a presentation of program-wide initiatives, including discretionary projects, performance and financial audits, and new county designations. For a more comprehensive look at an individual HIDTA’s performance in addressing specific drug threats, ONDCP upon request can provide an Annual Report, Strategy, or Threat Assessment on any specific HIDTA. 3 I. HIDTA PROGRAM BACKGROUND INFORMATION Purpose The purpose of the HIDTA program, as defined by its authorizing statute, Section 707 of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998, as amended, is to reduce drug trafficking and drug production in the United States by: 1) Facilitating cooperation among Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to share information and implement coordinated enforcement activities; 2) Enhancing law enforcement intelligence sharing among Federal, state, local, and tribal
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