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Downloads/Doc/Kaspersky-Security-Bulletin-2012.Pdf 23 HACKTIVISTEN Abschlussbericht Bundeskriminalamt Kriminalistisches Institut Forschungs- und Beratungsstelle Cybercrime KI 16 [email protected] Inhalt Abbildungsverzeichnis ................................................................................................................................ III Zusammenfassung ......................................................................................................................................... IV 1. Einleitung ....................................................................................................................................................... 1 2. Projekt ............................................................................................................................................................. 3 2.1 Hintergrund und Projektziele .................................................................................................. 3 2.2 Projektteile und Methoden ....................................................................................................... 4 2.2.1 Angemessenheit der Methode am Forschungsgegenstand ....................................... 4 2.2.2 Hellfeld-Beforschung ........................................................................................................ 6 2.2.3 Dunkelfeld-Beforschung ................................................................................................ 12 3. Begriffliche Abgrenzung ........................................................................................................................ 18 3.1 Hacktivismus vs. Hacking ....................................................................................................... 18 3.2 Cyberterrorismus ..................................................................................................................... 20 3.3 Internetaktivismus .................................................................................................................. 20 3.4 Cyberkriegsführung ................................................................................................................ 22 3.5 Cyberkriminelle jenseits von politischen oder sozialen Motiven ..................................... 23 4.1 Szene .......................................................................................................................................... 24 4.2 Vorgehensweise ........................................................................................................................ 30 4.2.1 Infrastruktur .................................................................................................................... 30 4.2.2 Modi operandi .................................................................................................................. 39 4.3 Tätertypologie .......................................................................................................................... 48 4.3.1 Einzeltäter oder Gruppierungen .................................................................................. 48 4.3.2 Soziodemographische und -ökonomische Tätermerkmale .................................... 50 4.3.3 Motive und Zielrichtungen ............................................................................................. 55 4.4 Tatfolgen ................................................................................................................................... 60 4.4.1 Geschädigte ....................................................................................................................... 60 4.4.2 Schäden .............................................................................................................................. 68 4.4.3 Maßnahmen auf Angriffe ............................................................................................... 73 4.5 Zusammenfassung und Zusammenhänge ........................................................................... 78 5. Erweiterte Betrachtung ......................................................................................................................... 88 5.1 Rechtliche Einordnung ............................................................................................................ 88 5.1.1 Demonstrationsfreiheit – straflose Formen ............................................................... 88 5.1.2 Strafrechtliche Relevanz ................................................................................................ 92 5.2 Erfassung von Hacktivismus .................................................................................................. 93 5.3 Dunkelfeld ................................................................................................................................. 94 5.4 Kriminogene Faktoren ............................................................................................................ 96 7. Literaturverzeichnis.............................................................................................................................. 102 II Abbildungsverzeichnis Abbildung 1: In der Sekundäranalyse ausgewertete Quellen ............................................................. 08 Abbildung 2: Analytische Definition im Anschreiben ....................................................................... 10 Abbildung 3: Zulieferung aus den Bundesländern ............................................................................. 10 Abbildung 4: Zulieferungen der Staatsanwaltschaften ...................................................................... 11 Abbildung 5: Zulieferung der Polizeien ............................................................................................. 11 Abbildung 6: Von Anonymous genutzte Grafik ................................................................................ 26 Abbildung 7: Vorgehensweisen. (Held, W.V. (2012)) ...................................................................... 44 Abbildung 8: Darstellung der Vorgehensweise bei 78 Fällen ............................................................ 45 Abbildung 9: Modi Operandi – Betroffenheit im Rahmen der Online-Befragung ............................ 46 Abbildung 10: Darstellung des angewendeten Straftatbestands bei 78 Fällen .................................. 47 Abbildung 11: Vom Täter hinterlassene Bekennung zur Tat ............................................................. 48 Abbildung 12: Hacktivistische Gruppierungen mit Fallzahl .............................................................. 49 Abbildung 13: Altersverteilung bei 37 Beschuldigten ....................................................................... 51 Abbildung 14: Geschlechterverteilung bei 37 Beschuldigten ............................................................ 52 Abbildung 15: Staatsangehörigkeit bei 37 Beschuldigten ................................................................. 53 Abbildung 16: Bildungsstatus bei 37 Beschuldigten ......................................................................... 54 Abbildung 17: Beschäftigungsstatus bei 37 Beschuldigten ............................................................... 55 Abbildung 18: Motivlage in 78 Fällen ............................................................................................... 59 Abbildung 19: Politischer Tathintergrund in 78 Fällen ..................................................................... 59 Abbildung 20: Hacktivistische Zielrichtungen. (Held, W.V. (2012)) ................................................ 60 Abbildung 21: Geschädigte in 78 Fällen ............................................................................................ 64 Abbildung 22: Gefährdungseinschätzung Hacktivismus ................................................................... 65 Abbildung 23: Gefährdungseinschätzung Hacktivismus nach Unternehmensgrößen ....................... 65 Abbildung 24: Hacktivistische Angriffe ............................................................................................ 66 Abbildung 25: Tatsächliche Betroffenheit Hacktivismus nach Unternehmensgrößen ...................... 66 Abbildung 26: Tatsächliche Betroffenheit Hacktivismus nach Branche ........................................... 67 Abbildung 27: Hacktivistische Angriffe und Nutzung sozialer Medien ........................................... 68 Abbildung 28: Schaden in 17 Fällen; 61 Fälle ohne Angaben ........................................................... 70 Abbildung 29: Angriffsfolgen Hacktivismus ..................................................................................... 71 Abbildung 30: Hacktivismus – finanzielle Schäden .......................................................................... 71 Abbildung 31: Art der finanziellen Schäden durch hacktivistische Angriffe .................................... 72 Abbildung 32: Reaktionen und Maßnahmen auf Schäden ................................................................. 74 Abbildung 33: Warum wurde keine Anzeige erstattet? ..................................................................... 75 Abbildung 34: Ermittlungen nach hacktivistischen Angriff? ............................................................ 76 Abbildung 35: Kooperationen mit Verbänden oder Behörden .......................................................... 76 Abbildung 36: Kooperationen aufgrund hacktivistischer Angriffe nach Unternehmensgrößen ........ 77 Abbildung 37: Vorgehensweise bezogen auf Geschädigte in 78 Fällen ...........................................
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