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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Cristina Bicchieri is Professor of Philosophy and Social and Decision Sciences at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh. She works on rational choice, game theory, and the nature and dynamics of social norms. Her paper on norms is a short version of a chapter in her new book The Grammar of Society. John Broome is Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews. He works on the value of life, incommensurable values and the nature of reason­ ing. His publications include Weighing Goods and Ethics Out of Economics. Edward F. McCiennen is Regents Scholar in Moral and Social Philosophy, and Co-Director of the Interdisciplinary Program in Institutional Theory and History, at Bowling Green State University. He works in the areas of decision and game theory, practical reason, and social and political philosophy. His numerous publications include Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations (1990) and "Pragmatic Rationality and Rules" (1997). Julian Nida-Riimelin is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Gottingen. He works primarily on practical rationality, ethics and political philosophy. Among his publications on practical rationality are his books Kritik des Konsequentialismus (1993) and Economic Rationality and Practical Reason (1997). He is co-editor of the book series Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy (mentis, Paderborn) and Scientia Nova (Oldenbourg, Munich). Presently, he serves as head of the cultural administration of the capital of Bavaria. Martin Rechenauer was research assistant for philosophy at Bielefeld Uni­ versity and now teaches philosophy at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat Munich. His current research focuses on the rational foundation of ethics and the theory of rationality. He has published on philosophy of mind and on practical and theoretical rationality. Thomas Schmidt is working at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Gottingen. He works on ethics, political philosophy and the philosophical foundations and applications of decision and game theory. His publications include an introduction to decision theory and a monograph on contractarian­ ism and rational choice. J. Nida-Riimelin and W. Spohn (eds.), Rationality, Rules, and Structure, 209-210. © 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. 210 LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Brian Skyrms is UCI Distinguished Professor of Social Science at the University of California, Irvine. He works on inductive logic, adaptive dynamics and evolutionary game theory, and is the author of Evolution of the Social Contract (1996) and The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation (1990). Michael Slote is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Maryland, College Park. He works primarily in virtue ethics, and a much expanded version of his paper on rationality here is included as a chapter in Morals from Motives, a book he is just finishing. Wolfgang Spohn is professor for philosophy at the University of Konstanz. He works on theoretical philosophy (philosophical logic, epistemology, philoso­ phy of science, philosophy of mind and of language, ontology, metaphysics) and on practical rationality. He is managing editor of the journal Erkenntnis and director of the DFG research group "Logic in Philosophy". Robert Sugden is Leverhulme Research Professor at the University of East Anglia, Norwich. His research uses a combination of theoretical, experimental and philosophical methods to investigate issues in the areas of welfare economics, social choice, choice under uncertainty, the foundations of decision and game theory, and the evolution of social conventions. Thomas Voss is Professor of Sociology at the University of Leipzig, Germany. His research interests include rational choice theory, organization studies and economic sociology. He has published a book (in German) and several papers on game theoretical explanations of social norms. Among his recent papers is "Game theoretical perspectives on the emergence of social norms". Reinhard Zintl is professor of political science at the University of Bamberg, Germany, works on problems of constitutional political economy, and has, among other things, published "Der homo oeconomicus: Ausnahmeerschei­ nung in jeder Situation oder Jedermann in Ausnahmesituationen?", "Social Relationships and Economic Theories of Clubs". INDEX OF NAMES Abelson, R. 171 Diggs, B. J. 32n Hollis, M. 127n Adams, R. 193n Dion, D. 82n Romans, G. C. 52, 59 Aqvist, L. 203 Horowitz, J. 175 Aumann, R. 76, 82n Eells, E. 75 Hume, D. 104, 107, 115, Austin, J. L. 2, 15n Elias, N. 157, 182n 127n, 199 Avermaet, E. van 179 Ellickson, R. C. 51, 52, 56 Axelrod, R. 50, 51, 55, 57, Elster, J. 50, 70, lOOn, 127n, Jeffrey, R. C. 69, 78, 82n 63n, 75, 82n, 146n 168 Jones, E. 182n Estes, W. K. 172 Bacharach, M. 146n Kahneman, D. 175-176, 183n Bartlett, F. C. I 71 Feldman, M. W. 77 Kallgren, C. 165-168, 173, Baurmann, M. 46n Fishburn, P.C. 82n 183n Becker, G. S. 70, 127n Fiske, S. T. 171 Kant, I. 196-198 Benoit, J.-P. 63n Forsythe, R. 175 Kavka, G. 82n, I OOn Bicchieri, C. 76, 182n Fraassen, B. C. van 72, 82n Kern, L. 15n Binmore, K. 59, 76, 103, 105, Frank, R. H. 60, 63, 119 Kirchgiissner, G. 46n 124-126, 127n, 128n, 146n Frey, B. 175 Kliemt, H. 46n Blau, P. M. 52 Friedman, J. W. 55 Knetsch, J. 175-176, 183n Boettger, R. 173 Fudenberg, D. 32n, 55, 56, Kreps, D. M. 77, 82n Bomze, I. 149 63n Krishna, V. 63n Bonet, I. 175 Fukuyama, F. 63n Kuran, T. 46n Boyd, R. 59 Kusser, A. 82n Bratman, M. 88-89, lOOn, Gauthier, D. 63, 99, 193n 205-206 Geanakoplos, J. 128n LaPiere, R. T. 160-161 Broome, J. I 0-11, 15n, 99n, Geiger, T. 51, 52 Latane, B. 162-163, 170 lOOn, 197 Gellner, E. 46n Levi, M. 46n Bryan, J. H. 127n Gibbard, A. 82n Lewis, D. 81, 104-105, 107- Buchanan, J. M. 46n Glymour, C. 82n 112, 114, 116, 119, 122, Gowans, C. W. 15n 124, 127n Calvert, R. L. 32n Greif, A. 56, 62 Lindenberg, S. 46n Camerer, C. 178 Guth, W. 183n Locke, J. 35-38, 40, 45, 46n Campbell, R. 82n Cialdini, R. B. 127n, 165- Hammond, P. 32n, 69, 73, Mackie, G. 182n 168, 173, 183n lOOn Makinson, D. 203 Coleman, J. S. 46n, 49, 51, Hardin, R. 61 Mansbridge, J. 127n 52-54, 59, 61, 62 Hargreaves Heap, S. P. 146n Mariotti, M. 125 Congleton, R. 57 Harper, W. L. 82n Maskin, E. 55, 56, 63n Cooter, R. 46n Harsanyi, J. C. 51, 56 Maynard Smith, J. 118 Hart, H. L. A. 35 McCabe, K. 174 Damme, E. van 63n, 82n Hechter, M. 56 McCain, R. A. 70 Darley, J. M. 162-163, 170 Heckathorn, D. D. 53, 54, 62 McClennen, E. F. 3, 6, 15n, Davis, L. H. 75-76, 134 Hirshleifer, D. 57, 63n 17n, 32n, 70, 73-74 , 82n, Dawes, R. 161 Hobbes, T. 35-38, 42, 45 95-98, lOOn DeFleur, M. L. 161, 164 Hoffman, E. 174 Meek, C. 82n 211 212 INDEX OF NAMES Messick, D. I 79 Roth, A. 174 Test, M. A. 127n Milgrom, P. 82n Rubinstein, A. 63n, 82n Tetlock, P. E. 173 Miinch, R. 63n Runciman, W. 169 Thaler, R. 175-176, 178, Murphy, K. M. 70 183n Sandel, M. 1. 46n Thomas, E. A. C. 77 Nida-Riimelin, J. 15n, 146n Savage, L. 1. 69, 78, 86, 89, Tilly, C. 46n Nisbett, R. 163, 182n lOOn Tirole, 1. 3 2n North, D. 46n, 56 Savin, N. 175 Tocqueville, A. de 46n Nozick, R. 82n Schank, R. I 71 Tullock, G. 46n, 57 Schelling, T. C. 46n, 54, 56 Okuno-Fujiwara, M. 174 Schlaifer, R. 82n Ullmann-Margalit, E. 52, 53, Oliver, P. 53 Schmittberger, R. 183n 127n Olson, M. 53 Schussler, R. 57 Opp, K.-D. 52 Schwarze, B. 183n Vallentyne, P. 10, 15n Osborne, M. 63n, 82n Searle, J. 15n Vanberg, V. 46n, 57 Ostrom, E. 51, 57 Sefton, M. 175 Varoufakis, Y. 146n Selten, R. 54, 77 Verbeek, B. 116, 127n Parsons, T. 50-51, 63n Sen, A. K. I, 6, 15n, 26, 32n, Voss, T. 51, 54, 56, 57, 63, Pearce, D. 128n 137, 146n 63n Peleg, B. 69, 73 Sentis, K. 179 Pettit, P. 76, 127n Shapiro, S. 32n Warner, L. G. 161, 164 Phlips, L. 57 Simmel, G. 158, 182n Watkins, 1. W. N. 146n Pollak, R. A. 69, 73 Skyrms, B. 118, 127n, 147 Weber, M. 50, 51 Pommerehne, W. 46n Smith, A. 116-117 Weesie, 1. 62 Popitz, H. 51, 52 Smith, M. 87 Weibull, 1. 149 Prasnikar, V. 174 Smith, V. 174 Weingast, B. R. 46n Pratt, J. W. 82n Sobel, 1. H. 82n Wicker, A. W. 160-161, 182n Putnam, R. D. 112 Sorensen, R. A. 75 Williams, B. 137, 146n, 193n Sowden, L. 82n Williamson, 0. E. 58 Raiffa, H. 82n Spohn,W. 68, 76, 82n Wilson, R. 77, 82n Rasmusen, E. 57, 63n Stacchetti, E. 128n Wilson, T. 163, 182n Raub, W. 51, 56, 62. 63 Strotz, R. H. 69, 73, 82n Rawls, J. 32n Sugden, R. 76, 105,112,115, Yaari, M. E. 69, 73 Reno, R. 165-168, 173, 183n 118, 125, 127n, 128n Young, H. P. 56 Richerson, P. J. 59 Roberts, P. J. 82n Tajfel, H. 180-181, 183n Zamir, S. 174 Rosch, E. I 72 Taylor, M. 46n, 52, 55, 56, 61 Zintl, R. 46n Ross, L. 170 Taylor, S. E. 171 SUBJECT INDEX adaptive dynamics 147-151 entropy, relative 14 7-150 agent-based theory of rationality 186-192, 193n equilibria (Nash and others), 51, 54-61, 76-77, aggression 118-119 82n, 133; correlated equilibrium 82n; anger 113-114 equilibrium in evolutionary game 148-150; autarkic choice 22-23, 29, 72 mutual-benefit equilibrium I 09-111; Nash equilibrium 108-111, 120-123; normative backward induction (argument) 76-79 expectations equilibrium 122-124 bootstrapping 91, 93, 205-205 evolutionary game theory 75, 147-151 categories 171, 180-181 fairness 169, 176, 177, 178-181 causal vs.
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