Democracy Against: the Antinomies of Politics
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Democracy Against: The Antinomies of Politics Bryan Nelson A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in Social and Political Thought York University Toronto, Ontario April 2017 © Bryan Nelson, 2017 ii Abstract How should democracy be thought? How do we go about organising its concept? On what basis? And to what end? Rather than confine democracy to an ancient political constitution or modern system of government, this dissertation pursues a conception of democracy often concealed by the customary institutional analysis. Written as a sustained appraisal of the often antagonistic encounter between philosophy and politics, as a strategy to reframe democracy an emancipatory, transformative agency of the demos, it is proposed that the topic of democracy be initiated according to what democracy is against. This approach serves to entirely reconsider the question of democracy, engendering a renewed interpretation of what the “power of the people” can mean. Through a series of detailed studies of Jacques Rancière, Claude Lefort and Miguel Abensour, it is argued that democracy invariably appears as a counter or objection to an established social order in which a spectrum of familiar modes of domination are already in place. As the initiation of a unique political controversy and dispute, democracy is presented as an unprecedented challenge to unrestricted and arbitrary rule, concentrations of authority, strategies of inequality and hierarchies of all kinds. It is identified with the forces that seek to expose, contest and transform oppressive and exclusionary iii arrangements and practices from below, from the outside, from a minoritarian positionality. Ultimately seeking more inclusive, participatory and egalitarian institutions and relations, democracy is consequently conceived as the perpetual democratisation of society. After a preliminary reflection on the Hellenistic roots of politics itself, the dissertation undertakes an extensive analysis of what is determined to be democracy’s most general form: its being-against the archê (the underlying principle that divides governor from governed, ruler from ruled). It then proceeds to consider two contemporary theoretical models that uncover the against in more distinguishing terms: Rancière’s democracy against the police and Abensour’s democracy against the State. It concludes that contrary to its long tradition since Plato, philosophy can enhance and embolden an emancipatory politics, as Lefort demonstrates, when it ventures to advance a radical, “savage” conception of democracy organised to critique the here and now. iv Acknowledgements A project such as this cannot be completed in isolation. As Cornelius Castoriadis would remind us, the lesson of democracy is that one cannot be wise alone. I would like to therefore take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to all those who played a role in its realisation. My deepest thanks and admiration to my co-supervisors Dr. Martin Breaugh and Dr. Brian Singer whose invaluable insight, guidance and scrutiny helped shape and enhance this dissertation from its infancy. I would also like to thank my third committee member Dr. Terry Maley for his unique and indispensable perspective on my often still developing ideas. It is difficult to imagine a more ideal and inspiring team to oversee the exploration of such a topic. I am also eternally grateful to my parents, family and friends for their sustained fidelity, encouragement and generosity throughout this long process. Without their support this would not have been possible. Finally, I would like to extend my appreciation to the Social and Political Thought graduate program assistant Judith Hawley for her continual help and assistance in the navigation of this degree. v Table of Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgements iv Table of Contents v Introduction: The trials of thinking against 1 Part One. Dissolution of the archê 1 Towards democracy’s anarchic condition: allegorical origins 22 2 Democracy against the archê 53 Part Two. The use of philosophy 3 To think democracy otherwise: Claude Lefort and “savage” democracy 98 Part Three. Rationalities of democracy’s being-against 4 Model I: democracy against the police (Rancière) 148 5 Model II: democracy against the State (Abensour) 199 Conclusion: “Hic et nunc:” thinking democracy as a critique of the present 260 Bibliography 279 1 Introduction The trials of thinking against Thunder on! Stride on, Democracy! Strike with vengeful stroke! -Walt Whitman Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens is often read as a sustained, undeviating chronicle tracing the punctuated democratisation of Athens by a succession of prominent reformers from Solon to Cleisthenes to Pericles. This reading lends itself to the view that the formal institution of Athenian democracy may largely be attributed to a few exceptional visionaries whose unrivalled status and influence permitted the dramatic transformation of the Athenian political landscape from above. And yet, interwoven with this familiar narrative, fragments of another may be extracted and assembled from Aristotle’s text. This is the narrative of a vibrant, vocal and discontented demos whose persistent, often tumultuous activity played a decisive role both in the creation and preservation of the democratic institutions of their city. Let us consider but a single example. While the profound achievements of the Cleisthenian reforms rightly occupy a pivotal place in Aristotle’s account of the constitutional evolution of the city, the unique series of events that would place 2 Cleisthenes in the position to realise such reforms is far from overlooked in the text. As Aristotle recounts, with the demise of the tyranny of Hippias (510 B.C.E.), a bitter struggle for control of the city would unfold between Isagoras, a notorious Athenian aristocrat and Cleisthenes of the distinguished house of Alcmaeonid. Although Cleisthenes had won great support of the demos, vowing to transfer the seat of government to them, Isagoras’ alliance with Cleomenes soon brought the Spartan king, accompanied by an armed entourage, to Athens to help secure the uncompromised rule of his long time ally. With the backing of Cleomenes, Isagoras successfully forced his rival Cleisthenes into exile, proceeded to dispossess hundreds of prominent Athenian families of their homes and poised to install himself as tyrant, moved to dissolve the citizen’s administrative council (boule) established by Solon himself. However, according to Aristotle, in a moment of remarkable fortitude, the council resisted the assault and the people of Athens, although without a leader or organisational direction, nevertheless assembled in opposition to Isagoras, declaring their unwavering support for the council. The spontaneous revolt forced Isagoras, Cleomenes and his band of Spartan forces to retreat to the Acropolis where they were besieged for two days by the insurgency. On the third day, a truce was negotiated, Isagoras and Cleomenes were permanently expelled and Cleisthenes was summoned to return to the city. Only then did Cleisthenes, remaining true to his commitment to the demos, proceed to introduce his historic reforms that would ultimately come to mark a new era of Athenian democracy. As Aristotle remarks: “The people had taken control of their affairs, and 3 Cleisthenes was their leader and champion of the people [...].”1 While the significance of Cleisthenes’ monumental reforms remains undisputed both historically and politically, the question of how to incorporate such direct emancipatory acts of the demos in a broader theoretical construction of democracy often receives far less consideration. Are examples of such defiance, confrontation and opposition merely illustrative of the revolutionary prelude or “democratic excess” of a properly instituted democratic constitution from which we must ultimately derive its concept, or do such events remain indicative of something essential to the meaning of democracy itself? Echoing this somewhat alternative reading of Aristotle’s Constitution, in a series of writings that aim to reevaluate the legacy of democracy’s often discordant, “fugitive” character, Sheldon Wolin certainly wishes to remind us that beyond the accomplishments of the great reformers, Athenian democracy was considerably shaped by the regular disruptions and interventions of the demos. From recurring class conflicts to disputes over exclusion to campaigns against those with extraordinary influence in the assembly (ecclesia), Wolin maintains that the perpetual democratisation of Athens was the result of a succession of popular uprisings that would repeatedly challenge the limits and conventions of existing institutions and relations. Far from the fixed or settled constitutional form we find in the political philosophy of Plato or Aristotle, Wolin sees the story of Athenian democracy as one of a dynamic and ever evolving 1 Aristotle, The Politics and The Constitution of Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 225. Also see Josiah Ober, “The Athenian Revolution of 508/7 B.C.E.: Violence, Authority, and the Origins of Democracy,” Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece: Cult, Performance, Politics, eds. Carol Dougherty and Leslie Kurke (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 4 political culture that not only culminates in the popular control of its major institutions of government, but also includes those intermittent