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Volume VIII, Issue 10 March 11, 2010 VOLUME VIII, ISSUE 10 u MARCH 11, 2010 IN THIS ISSUE: BRIEFS...................................................................................................................................1 DRONE ATTACKS: PAKISTan’s POLICY AND THE TRIBESMEn’s PERSPECTIVE By Farhat Taj..........................................................................................................................3 KURDISH COUNTERTERRORISM GROUP WORKS TO PREVENT TERRORISM IN KURDISTAN AND IRAQ A By Wladimir van Wilgenburg................................................................................................4 Lahur Talabani KASHMIR’s mILITANTS MAY DERAIL INDIA-PAKISTAN NEGOTIATIONS By Arif Jamal.........................................................................................................................6 Terrorism Monitor is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation. The Terrorism Monitor is WILL XINJIang’s tuRKISTANI ISLAMIC PARTY SURVIVE THE DRONE MISSILE designed to be read by policy- DEATH OF ITS LEADER? makers and other specialists By Andrew McGregor...........................................................................................................7 yet be accessible to the general public. The opinions expressed within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily SOMALIA’S HIZB AL-ISLAM PLEDGES TO RETAKE TERRITORY LOST reflect those of The Jamestown TO AL-SHABAAB RIVALS Foundation. Senior Hizb al-Islam commander Shaykh Ahmad Madobe has declared that Hizb al-Islam is preparing plans to expel rival Islamist militia al-Shabaab Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of this or any from territories in the Juba region of south Somalia (AllPuntland.com, March Jamestown publication is strictly 1; Shabelle Media Network, March 1). The lands were seized by al-Shabaab prohibited by law. during an offensive against former ally Hizb al-Islam in the last few months. Led by Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys, Hizb al-Islam leaders have been regrouping across the Kenyan border and are no doubt planning to take advantage of the long-delayed government offensive against al-Shabaab. Shaykh Ahmad Madobe warned that stern measures would be taken against anyone found working with al-Shabaab. Besides the projected counter-attack in the Juba region, the Hizb al-Islam commander also said that his movement would begin hunting down al-Shabaab leaders in Mogadishu (Shabelle Media Network, March 1). For comments or questions about our publications, please send an Shaykh Ahmad Madobe is a former senior member of the Islamist Ras Kamboni email to [email protected], or Brigade, one of four Islamist militias that gathered together under the Hizb al- contact us at: Islam umbrella in January, 2009. When Ras Kamboni leader Shaykh Hassan 1111 16th St. NW, Suite #320 Abdullah Hirsi al-Turki crossed over to al-Shabaab in early February, Shaykh Washington, DC • 20036 Tel: (202) 483-8888 Ahmad Madobe remained with Hizb al-Islam (al-Qimmah, February 1; see Fax: (202) 483-8337 Terrorism Monitor, February 4). Copyright ©2009 TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE TERRORISM MONITOR, VISIT http://www.jamestown.org TerrorismMonitor Volume VIII u Issue 10 u March 11, 2010 Though Shaykh Ahmad Madobe had pledged to hunt 14). Saitoti told the Israeli Minister, “The jihad is taking down Shabaab leaders in Mogadishu, al-Shabaab over Somalia and threatening to take over Kenya and assassins may have struck first when pistol-wielding all of Africa. No one is more experienced than you in gunmen killed a senior Hizb al-Islam military fighting internal terror.” Israeli officials brought up the commander in a Mogadishu market on March 9. Barre problem of African migrants and refugees attempting Ali Barre, also a prominent Ras Kamboni member, was to enter Israel through the Sinai, bringing this response a strong opponent of Hassan al-Turki’s decision to join from the Kenyan Interior Minister: “Help us fight al- al-Shabaab (Mareeg, March 9; AFP, March 9). Qaeda and we’ll help you with the infiltrators. We have vast knowledge in the subject” (Y-Net News, After nearly being driven out of Mogadishu last year by a February 11; Arutz Sheva, February 11; Somaliland combined Hizb al-Islam/al-Shabaab offensive, Somalia’s Press, February 12; Israel Today, February 14). The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is enjoying the Israeli government was also reported to have said that it rift growing between its Islamist opponents as it plans is ready to hold consultations on forming a joint force its long-delayed counter-offensive (AllPuntland.com, with Kenya to guard the northern Kenyan border with February 23). According to TFG Minister of State for Somalia and prevent the entry of extremists (Shabelle Defense Yusuf Muhammad Si’ad “Indha Adde”, “We Media Network, February 14). are aware of the conflict that has emerged between Hizb al-Islam and al-Shabaab and we are very happy to hear Somalia’s al-Shabaab movement has threatened about it. They subject the civilian population to a lot of repeatedly to attack northern Kenya, most recently suffering and the government will take advantage of this on February 10, when Shaykh Husayn Abdi Gedi important opportunity” (All Puntland.com, February announced plans to strike at troops belonging to 23). Indha Adde was a leading member of Hizb al-Islam Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) who before he defected to the TFG in May 2009. are completing military training from Kenyan instructors in northeast Kenya (Radio Gaalkacyo, February 10, Rumors persist in Mogadishu that the TFG will enter Puntland Post, February 6). into an alliance with Hizb al-Islam to destroy their mutual enemy, al-Shabaab. The scenario is far from The talks with Kenya appear to be part of a growing impossible in Somalia’s highly fluid political atmosphere Israeli interest in the Horn of Africa. In early February, and would reunite the two former Islamic Courts Union the spokesman of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (ICU) co-chairmen, President Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Yigal Palmor, told Somali media that Israel was ready Ahmad and Hizb al-Islam leader Shaykh Hassan Dahir to recognize the breakaway territory of Somaliland as Aweys, in a common military effort against the ICU’s an independent nation (Golis News, February 11). If former militia, al-Shabaab. Israel proceeds, it would be the first nation in the world to recognize Somaliland since its split from the rest of Shaykh Hasan Dahir Aweys has lately been trying Somalia in 1991. International recognition is almost an to distance his group’s Islamist ideology from al- obsession in Somaliland, a territory that is unable to Shabaab’s, while at the same time urging al-Shabaab to receive foreign aid, military equipment or development stop escalating disputes between Islamist movements in assistance without it. The elected government in Somalia (Garowe Online, February 28). Hargeisa would be sure to show its appreciation to any nation that broke the two-decade old diplomatic KENYA TURNS TO ISRAEL FOR MILITARY freeze-out. The Israeli declaration came on the heels ASSISTANCE AGAINST GLOBAL JIHAD of a statement by the deputy leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula that the movement intends to As it gradually becomes drawn into the war in cooperate with Somali militants to place both sides of neighboring Somalia, Kenya has begun looking for the narrow Bab al-Mandab strait at the southern end new sources of security assistance beyond traditional of the Red Sea “under the protection of Islam” (al- partners like Great Britain and the United States. On Malahim Establishment for Media Production, February February 11, Kenya’s Minister of Internal Security, 8; see also Terrorism Monitor, February 19). German- George Saitoti, met with his Israeli counterpart Yitzhaq made Israeli Dolphin class submarines believed to be Aharonovich in Jerusalem to request Israeli military equipped with nuclear-armed cruise missiles carried assistance in countering radical Islamists who are out naval exercises in the Red Sea in June 2009 after threatening Kenya (Shabelle Media Network, February passing through Egypt’s Suez Canal (Haaretz, July 5). 2 TerrorismMonitor Volume VIII u Issue 10 u March 11, 2010 A few weeks later, two Israeli warships passed through Because of the sensitive nature of the inquiry, the the Suez Canal into the Red Sea (AFP, July 14). These researcher had to meet each student separately. None excursions were widely interpreted as a warning to Iran. of the students agreed to a tape-recorded interview, but all allowed the researcher to make written notes during The Somali press has cited unconfirmed reports that the interview. The students’ freedom of expression is Israeli troops may establish a military outpost in the drastically limited by the ongoing targeted killings in Somaliland port of Berbera to guard the approaches to FATA, in which hundreds of tribal leaders, teachers, the Red Sea (Shabelle Media Network, February 14). students, doctors and other people who publicly spoke Berbera’s small naval port is a Cold War legacy, built against the Taliban and al-Qaeda have been assassinated, by the Soviets in 1969. Shifting alliances led to U.S. often along with their family members. [1] use of the port by 1980 and a U.S. upgrade of facilities in 1985. Since then, the port has become dilapidated All respondents were unanimous on the fact that the but still continues to provide a major source of foreign Taliban have completely taken over FATA, especially currency for the Somaliland government. Berbera also North and South Waziristan,
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