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Argentina: Corruption Timeline

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Global Integrity - The Center for Public Integrity Page 1 of 3 Argentina: Corruption Timeline Country Home Country Facts Corruption Timeline Corruption Notebook Integrity Assessment Integrity Scorecard May 1989 – Carlos Menem of the Justicialist Party (PJ—Partido Justicialista, also known as the Peronist Party) is elected president, soundly defeating Eduardo Angeloz of the Radical Party (UCR—Unión Cívica Radical) by a margin of 47 percent to 37 percent. Uncertainty concerning the transition sends the Argentine currency plummeting and causes inflation and interest rates to soar. December 1990 – Menem grants a blanket amnesty to military officers and leftist insurgents involved in Argentina's "dirty war" of 1976 to 1983, freeing convicted criminals from prison and preventing prosecution of anyone else for their illicit activities. In coming years, Menem urges former military officers to "not rub salt in old wounds" by discussing the atrocities of the so-called dirty war. January 1991 – Following a public complaint by the U.S. Embassy that an unnamed official had demanded a bribe from an American company, Menem purges a number of ministers and aides, including half of his cabinet. Página 12 eventually publishes a story alleging that Menem's brother-in-law had demanded the bribe. April 1991 – Página 12 breaks a story describing an investigation in Spain that Menem's sister-in-law, who works as his appointments secretary, was under investigation for laundering drug money. September 1991 – Página 12 reports that Italian businessmen gave a US$100,000 Ferrari to Menem at a time they were pursuing a lucrative US$345 million contract to refurbish state airports. December 1993 – Following a month of closed-door negotiations, the Peronist Menem and Radical Party leader Raúl Alfonsín sign a power-sharing agreement whereby their two parties will push forward with a number of constitutional changes. Known as the Olivos Pact after being negotiated at the presidential palace of the same name, Menem and Alfonsín agree to a number of checks on presidential power, a goal of the Radicals, while providing for immediate re-election of a sitting president, a goal of the incumbent Menem. Among other changes are the formation of a special commission to appoint judges, a more limited role in federal control over state affairs, a direct vote of the president and vice president, and a second round of presidential voting if no candidate earns a clear mandate. April 1995 – In the first such statement by a high-level military official, army chief of staff General Martín Balza publicly apologizes for abuses committed during Argentina's "dirty war." Balza's unexpected admission reignites debate about the issue. May 1995 – Armed with a "me or chaos" platform, Menem earns a second term as president by earning 49.6 percent of the popular vote. Shortly thereafter, his Peronist Party earns a majority in both houses of Congress as well as 10 of 14 governorships. September 1996 – Judge Guillermo Tiscornia condemns a "parallel customs service" bringing billions of dollars' worth of illegal merchandise into Argentina. According to the government, about US$10 billion worth of illegal goods entered Buenos Aires alone between 1993 and 1996. The smuggling is estimated to have cost the government US$3 billion in lost tax revenue. November 1996 – Former defense minister Oscar Camilión is indicted for failing to prevent—and subsequently covering up—an illegal arms transfer to Ecuador. At the time of the transfer, Argentina had been mediating a border dispute between Ecuador and Peru. Camilión, who resigned over the controversy the previous July, is the first cabinet member to be indicted during Menem's presidency. January 1997 – Photographer José Luis Cabezas of Noticias magazine is murdered. Multimillionaire Alfredo Yabrán, alleged mafia leader and close friend of Menem, is soon listed by police as the prime suspect. Cabezas had taken what would be the first published photo of the reclusive Yabrán. October 1997 – In legislative elections, Menem's Peronist Party is largely rejected, earning only 36 percent of the vote, losing its majority in the lower house. An opposition Alliance of the Radical Party and FREPASO (Frente País Solidario) united on an anti-corruption platform surges ahead to balance power in Congress. May 1998 – Police in Argentina and neighboring countries stage a weeklong manhunt for Yabrán, charged with orchestrating http://www.publicintegrity.org/ga/country.aspx?cc=ar&act=timeline 12/9/2005 Global Integrity - The Center for Public Integrity Page 2 of 3 the murder of Cabezas. Moments before police arrived to arrest him at his home, Yabrán committed suicide by shooting himself. Media reports circulate that he had been murdered to avoid a criminal trial that would have been politically damaging to Menem, or that the suicide had been faked to avoid arrest. June 1998 – Police arrest former dictator Jorge Rafael Videla in connection with the abduction of five babies during his regime, which stretched from 1976 to 1981. Videla had previously been sentenced to life imprisonment in 1987 for various human rights violations, but was later pardoned by Menem in 1990. In November, fellow former military ruler Emilio Massera is arrested for two kidnappings orchestrated during his reign. An estimated 200 to 400 babies were stolen from their detained mothers and given to loyalist military and police families during the dirty war. August 1998 – Four days after being questioned concerning Argentina's illegal arms transfer to Ecuador, a retired navy captain is found dead from a gunshot to the head. October 1998 – Marcelo Cattáneo, the brother of a former Menem aide who is a key witness in a bribery scandal, is found hanging from a rope in an abandoned shack in Buenos Aires. Though the death is ruled a suicide by police and a judge soon closes an investigation into the matter, doubts surface as investigators leak more details to the public. Among the revelations is the fact that a newspaper clipping concerning the scandal had been found in his mouth. The scandal, under investigation in multiple countries, involved alleged bribes totaling US$21 million from IBM to state-run Banco de la Nación in order to obtain a US$250 million contract from the Argentine government. October 1999 – Fernando de la Rúa, a Radical Party member representing the opposition Alliance, ends 10 years of Peronist control by winning 48 percent of the presidential vote and defeating Peronist Eduardo Duhalde. The election leaves Argentina politically fractured, with an Alliance president to counter a Peronist Congress as well as 14 of 24 governorships. August 2000 – Vice President Carlos Álvarez demands a federal investigation to examine allegations raised by an Argentine newspaper that the government bribed senators to vote for a labor reform act in April. The law had passed congress in May as a means to revive the economy. Eleven senators are accused of receiving some US$5 million in bribes in exchange for their votes. October 2000 – Álvarez resigns, citing a lack of support from de la Rúa to investigate the bribery charges. His resignation all but ends the inquiry, which remains dormant until new evidence surfaces in December 2003. June 2001 – In a 600-page indictment charging him with authorizing illegal arms shipments to Croatia and Ecuador, Menem is ordered to remain under house arrest pending an investigation. The 6,500 tons of weapons, scheduled for sale to Panama and Venezuela for US$100 million, were eventually rerouted to Croatia, which was subject to a United Nations arms embargo, and Ecuador, which was then in a border dispute with Peru that was being mediated by Argentina. Had he been convicted, Menem would have faced 5 to 10 years in prison. March 2001 – Minister of the Economy José Luis Machinea resigns. After Defense Minister Ricardo López Murphy is appointed as a replacement, FREPASO, a coalition partner, resigns its positions in the executive branch to protest his newly proposed policies, which would have slashed over US$2 billion in state education funds. Three days later, Murphy resigns due to pressure from FREPASO, the Radical Party, and state universities. October 2001 – Swiss authorities freeze two accounts linked to Menem pending an investigation into money laundering. One account, opened in the name of his former wife and daughter during the mid-1980s, before Menem was president, holds about US$600,000. A second account, controlled by Menem's former personal secretary and opened while Menem was president, is said to hold about US$6 million. November 2001 – Menem is released from house arrest after being cleared by the Supreme Court of the charges related to Argentina's illegal arms transfers to Croatia and Ecuador. December 2001 – The IMF recommends a tough austerity program for Argentina before releasing needed loans. After two days of bloody rioting and protests against his administration, President de la Rúa resigns two years before his term expires. In the 10 days thereafter, Argentina sees four presidents assume power, with Senator Eduardo Duhalde finally assuming control on New Year's Eve after being appointed president by the legislature. January 2002 – After devaluing the peso and freezing bank deposits, thereby triggering a recession, Argentina defaults on its US$141 billion foreign debt, the largest single-nation default in history. February 2002 – Some 20 bankers are ordered to remain in Argentina during an investigation into illegal money transfers. April 2002 – Former minister of the economy Domingo Cavallo is arrested in connection with shipping arms to Croatia and Ecuador in the 1990s. At issue were 6,500 tons of weapons, worth US$100 million, that had been shipped despite international http://www.publicintegrity.org/ga/country.aspx?cc=ar&act=timeline 12/9/2005 Global Integrity - The Center for Public Integrity Page 3 of 3 embargoes to Croatia and Ecuador.
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