BRIEF POLICY

EGYPT’S HYBRID REVOLUTION: A BOLDER EU APPROACH Anthony Dworkin, Daniel Korski and Nick Witney

When President Hosni Mubarak was removed from office SUMMARY The success or failure of Egypt’s transition by the Egyptian military on 11 February, it seemed to be to democracy will have huge consequences the consummation of Egypt’s revolution – but it was also for the Middle East and for Europe. If the the starting point for Egypt’s transition to democracy. The country overcomes the obstacles to political success or failure of that process will have huge consequences reform, it would set a powerful example for the region. But although the ruling Military for the region and for Europe. While Tunisia may have lit the Council appears committed to hand over torch of revolution in the Arab world, and while Libya and power, it is governing in an opaque way and Syria may have presented European governments with their has resorted to summary justice to deal with toughest dilemmas so far, it is Egypt that will matter most in protest and criticism. Some liberals also the end. The size of the country’s population and its history worry that the quick timetable for elections will favour the remnants of the old regime and and cultural influence mean that it is the Arab world’s centre the Muslim Brotherhood. The revolution has of gravity. If it stumbles, the region may fall. If, however, it also exacerbated the precarious state of the makes a successful transition to democracy, it would set a country’s economy. powerful example for other Middle Eastern governments. Despite Egypt’s importance, however, the EU has struggled to achieve influence in the country. Despite Egypt’s importance, however, the European Union In March Ashton and Barroso proposed a (EU) has struggled to achieve influence with the country and new policy framework, which is a good start its more than 80 million people. Before the revolution, the but should be strengthened, for example by EU gave Egypt more than 600 million euros over a decade – cancelling Egyptian debt. In the longer term, yet made almost no effort to press for political reform. Then, the EU should take a more political approach and behave more like a regional power. For when protests began in Tahrir Square in January, the EU was example, Europeans should say clearly that slow and hesitant to react. Its first official response, drafted military leaders who resort to summary justice by High Representative Catherine Ashton, seemed outdated to deal with protest and criticism are violating the moment it was released to the world’s media. Europe’s fundamental political rights. EU officials must position was defined by a subsequent joint statement by also be ready to engage with all Egypt’s political groups, including former NDP members and British Prime Minister David Cameron, German Chancellor the Muslim Brotherhood. Europe needs to Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who move beyond fear about migration to see the made clear that Mubarak could not count on European potential for longer-term economic benefits support. In meetings with Egypt’s military leadership, EU for both sides of the Mediterranean. officials have been loath to make unequivocal interventions. 2 ECFR/32 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu EGYPT’S HYBRID REVOLUTION: A BOLDER EU APPROACH – and Egypt in particular – could become a major source of sourcemajor a becomecould particular– in Egypt and – Egypt’s political ferment Europe can – and must – help. European Commissioners have admitted that they were wrong This brief is based on a visit by the authors to Egypt in in Egypt to authors the by visit a on based is brief This The Arab Spring has exposed Europe’s old “neighbourhoodoldEurope’s exposed has Spring Arab The Two months after protests began, the Coalition of Youth of Youth of Coalition the began, protests after months Two It is clearisItthat thecountry faceshuge political, economic and But the Military Council had had their requested breathingrequested their had had CouncilMilitary the But National Democratic Party (NDP). The uncertainty about about uncertainty The (NDP). Party Democratic National Considerableasthese problems are, itisin Europe’s interests in analysts,independent and diplomatsEuropeanactivists, assistance to central and eastern Europe after 1989 – there are and chatting.atmospherereunioncabal.andmorethanThe was goods and servicesgoodsEuropeanandfor firms.Conversely, failure a growth, the challenge for European leaders will be to go from a economic situation amid a plunge in tourism, tightened private favour will fear they which process, the with disillusioned defensive attitude towards its southern neighbours, and Egypt organised Muslim Brotherhood and the remnants of Mubarak’s it but – appropriate now indeed is humility some dealing, order to better understand Egypt’s predicament and needs. and predicament Egypt’s understand better to order over their values, and one European foreign minister was even demonstration. Jeans-clad young activists from across the the across from activists young Jeans-clad demonstration. risksbeingoverdone. Although cannottheEU replicate what migratory pressures with which no border enforcementborderwillno migratory whichpressures with new demonstration was to be on protesting the continuing the protesting on be to was demonstration new revolutionary spectrum moved between the tables, embracing may not be “Europe’s hour”, but it is Egypt’s hour of need. And to help Egypt politically and economically is likely to create tolikely economicallypoliticallyEgyptisand help to to help solve them. Just as Europe benefited from the changes precariousexacerbatingEgypt’s also is processpolitical the country’sthe conservative groupsparticular,and,in well-the to alwaysto prioritise short-terma conception theirofinterests in eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, so it can it so Wall, Berlin the of fall the after Europeeastern in the Groppi café (“Depuis 1891”) to plan Egypt’s next mass mass next Egypt’s plan to 1891”) (“Depuis café Groppi the of elegance deco art faded the in gathered Revolution the realisationparticular,shoresbenefitbothwillinhowa ofto in evidence.numberspeeches,inofa InEuropean leadersand slowing of net exports. spending,bothdroplocalinforeignanda investment, a and a out sketched has military the Althoughchallenges. social SpainwellinPortugalandsodidevenscaleitsthe orit of – sham, and a degree of soul-searching is now both in order and sacked for personifying the old policy. After years of doubleof years policy.Afterpersonifyingold forsacked the space – time now to keep their feet to the fire. The focus of the path towards democracy, many activists have now become now have activists many democracy, towards path human rights violations, notably the use of summary military ae ac 21 t me Eyta ofcas Thi Square Tahrir officials, Egyptian meet to 2011 March late useful things Europe can do to support Egypt’s revolution. This self-serving a largely very as Africa North towards policy” from a closer relationship between Europe and North Africa. benefit from reforms in North Africa. Over time, the region the time,Over Africa. North inreforms frombenefit be able to cope. Therefore, as Europe’sTherefore,economiescope.toreturn as to able be Asem,younga supporter theofMuslim Brotherhood, whose Asthese two scenes illustrate, Egypt –acountry in which for 1  Egypt was described by scholars as a “hybrid regime” that had Egypt’s revolution was undertaken – and continues to to continues and – undertaken was revolution Egypt’s Tunisia, the protesters have retained the momentum and the In too. different is authority transitional the of nature The Tunisia’s revolution are evident, but there are also important It was fundamentally democratic in impulse – the protests the – impulse in democratic fundamentally was It Islamic youth hung out in the trendy Cilantro café. Sondos café. Cilantro trendy the in out hung youth Islamic Brotherhood’s snazzy English language website. and an earlyandanreferendum amendingon theconstitution have Meanwhile, across town in middle-class Heliopolis, wired wired Heliopolis, middle-class in town across Meanwhile, and some of his most notorious confederates. advised, we should check out Ikhwanweb.com, the Muslim the Ikhwanweb.com, out check should we advised, GamalNasser’s 1952couptheIranianor Revolution 1979.of greaterinternal democracy. wantedweIfknow tomore, she elections but no democracy, its revolution has also taken on a country’spre-revolutionarydemocracy.transitionas Justto assumedresponsibilityhassteeringthe and fordrivingseat grouping. conservativehierarchicalandmilitary,interpretationwhose clearlybeenexpressions people’stheofalsohas it but will – differences. In Egypt, there is a much heavier overhang overhang heavier much a is there Egypt, In differences. buzzingis politics–about talkimpossible towas decadesit of “democracy” is inevitably more constrained; a third is is third a constrained; more inevitably is “democracy” of inward-focused, an another activists; pro-democracy of opponents credit it with being the best-organised political political best-organised the being with it credit opponents notleast therole ofthemilitary, with itssummary andoften with the military’s reluctance to prosecute Hosni Mubarak Mubarak Hosni prosecute to reluctance military’s the with with political activity. In particular, Cairo is one vast political movement, which was caught off guard by the protests yet protests the by guard off caught was which movement, mother stood as an independent Brotherhood candidate in candidate Brotherhood independent an as stood mother marketplace, with new parties emerging and new alliances new and emerging parties new with marketplace, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Middle East’s oldest Islamist oldest East’s Middle the Brotherhood, Muslim the tribunals to lock up thousands of demonstrators – contrasted theexplosion debateof within theIslamic movement, which the Muslim Brotherhood is present in both countries, it it countries, both in present is Brotherhood Muslim the in Tunisia or Indonesia, nor was it entirely authoritarian, as in is giving rise to half a dozen splinter groups, and pressure for sidelines. In Egypt, on the other hand, the military is in the in militaryisthe hand,other the onEgypt,sidelines. In hybrid form. hyper-internationalised, Facebook-enabled generation generation Facebook-enabled hyper-internationalised, has greater influence in Egypt, where both adherents and and adherents both where Egypt, in influence greater has underweight military has guaranteed the revolution from the lastyear’s (rigged) National Assembly elections, reflected on local figures in much of the country. Meanwhile, although although Meanwhile, country. the of much in figures local faces dissolution, but its former membersformerdominantremaindissolution,facesits but regime.oldfromtheNDP,Mubarak’sThe political machine, with similarities The day. the by dissolving and forming be controlled – by many different sets of actors: one is a is one actors: of sets different many by – controlled be brutal way of dealing with continuing dissent. features, authoritarian of number a by characterised been 13, Number2,April2002, pp.21-35. Larry JayDiamond,“Thinking aboutHybridRegimes”,JournalofDemocracy 1 The revolution was neither fully democratic, as , Volume stands to gain the most from their achievements. So the key question is whether the revolution’s democratic aspirations Egypt’s constitutional reforms will survive being grafted onto the authoritarian rootstock of military control. The answer will depend to a large extent In what was seen as a crucial test of Egypt’s fledgling on the role of the key actors (the military, the Muslim transition in the wake of Mubarak’s ouster, 40 million Brotherhood and other political parties) and on the economy. citizens (44 percent of the population) went peacefully to the polls on 19 March in a referendum on nine changes to the (suspended) 1971 constitution, which the Military The military Council had proposed as an “interim fix” until a new constitution could be drafted after democratic elections. It Perhaps the most important factor in post-revolutionary was the first genuinely free and fair election in Egypt since Egypt is the military and, in particular, the Military Council, 1952 and the turnout was considered high. which is playing the role of interim president to a weak and changing civilian government. The protesters initially 77 percent of Egyptians voted for the constitutional welcomed this role, but tensions have risen as the military reforms, limiting a president to two four-year terms and priority for a return of normal life – not least to stem the removing provisions that effectively restricted candidacy economic bleeding – has collided with the revolutionaries’ to members of the NDP. The changes also scrapped the determination to keep the pot on the boil. The military decades-old emergency laws that enabled President introduced a new law that bans strikes or protests that prevent Mubarak to run a police state. Under the proposed people getting on with their work, and moved to clear Tahrir changes, any new emergency laws would require approval Square of demonstrators in clashes that left two dead and by referendum after six months. The reforms also many wounded. There are many accounts of protesters being restored judicial oversight of elections, a key step towards beaten up or subjected to humiliating treatment including establishing a credible electoral system. women being subjected to “virginity tests”, ostensibly to check whether they are guilty of prostitution. However, a number of illiberal provisions remain. The reforms prevent dual nationals or anyone with a foreign Many of those arrested for crimes such as breaking the parent or married to a foreign citizen from running. Early curfew are put through ad hoc military trials that can last elections will also likely benefit the most organised and as little as three to five minutes and can hand out sentences entrenched political players: the Muslim Brotherhood and ranging from a few months to several years. These tribunals the remnants of the NDP. Liberals had wanted the creation have processed perhaps 5,000 cases, including allegedly of a presidential council to shepherd Egypt through the sentencing 25 juveniles. Nor has it gone unnoticed that transitional period until a new constitution could be despite the replacement of old media bosses (many of drafted, followed by parliamentary and presidential polls. them installed by Gamal Mubarak, the son of the former president), the surge of excited media activity (including such Some aspects of the process were also worrying in their remarkable TV moments as extended interviews with Anwar own right. Voters were asked to mark a green-coloured box Sadat’s newly-released assassin) does not reach as far as any for a “Yes” vote and a black one for a “No” vote, a sign seen breath of criticism of the military. One blogger who violated as pressure to present the former option as more Islamic. this unwritten rule found himself sentenced to three years’ People were also told by their mosques that a “No” vote detention. would risk the status of Islam as the source of Egyptian law (currently Article 2 in the constitution) and even a The military combine heavy-handedness with an opaque and descent into chaos, or that they should vote “Yes” if they unpredictable operating style. The Military Council has made wanted food prices to stay down. Many analysts believe it a stream of announcements by SMS or on Facebook in the was the combined muscle of the Muslim Brotherhood, the middle of the night: for example, dates for parliamentary and army and remnants of the loyalist NDP that won against a presidential elections, replacement of this or that media boss, disorganised liberal bloc. new rules for political party formation, and prohibitions on protests. The Military Council invites experts to give their Perhaps worse, the Military Council went through the advice – on monetary policy, for example – but then closes process to amend nine articles in the constitution, then the doors and makes its decisions. This approach encourages less than two weeks afterwards announced an entire the search for hidden agendas, especially when the military interim constitution by declaration that incorporated makes moves that are unexpected. How, for example, to the nine amendments but contained 53 others – many interpret the sudden promulgation, only 10 days after the reproduced from the old constitution, but others with referendum, of 53 new amendments to the constitution on significant changes. top of the nine that were voted on? And why was the Military Council so selective in its initial choice of regime stalwarts to prosecute, indicting the former interior minister and a clutch of businessmen, but needing to be pushed by renewed demonstrations to go after Mubarak himself, his sons and 3 4 ECFR/32 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu EGYPT’S HYBRID REVOLUTION: A BOLDER EU APPROACH At the same time, the army will also want to maintain its its maintain to want also will army the time, same the At Estimates of the share of GNP it controls vary between 5 between vary controls it GNP of share the of Estimates (see box above) is seen as evidence of this “unholyalliance”,thisevidence of as seen isabove) box(see The biggest uncertainty is whether the military will honour will military the whether is uncertaintybiggest The Islamic Islamic Less extravagantly, many liberal secularists see an unexpected Brotherhood’s concern not to see the article that describes that article the see to not concern Brotherhood’s Nevertheless,it is likely to want to retain some sort of hand – ambition as a return to “business as usual”.“businessEgypt’smilitaryasreturnto a ambitionas the in staying By weak. and poor is it today powerful; and above six storeys has to pay the air force a fee per storeyforper fee forcea airthe pay storeysto abovesixhas also It industry. tourist Sea Red the owns effectively allies, argumentsupply”“securityof percent.Invokingthe 30 and asit was before. As Hisham Ezz Al Arab, one of the country’s andthe remnants ofthe NDP with whom the army has close and the Muslim Brotherhood. The 19 March referendum referendum March 19 The Brotherhood. Muslim the and Military Council’s behaviour. governingandwould muchprefer gettobackmilitaryto life democracy is likely to be one of the most serious medium- serious most the of one be to likely is democracy to downmilitary this Slimming domain. its encroachingon do so because it has no desire to continue to suffer the stresses, electionNovember.in widelyfar,isSoit believed thatwillit own bakeries to Jeep manufacturingJeepmilitaryaidbakeries plants.toUSown early elections, which are expected to benefit the Brotherhood coincidence of conservative interest between the military military the between interest conservative of coincidence of staff, Zakaria Azmi)? In a country used to control, there control, to used country a In Azmi)? Zakaria staff, of willbe adelicate task to accommodate this conception of the with the military’s desire to crack on with transition via via transition with on crack to desire military’s the with military’s role within a democraticmilitary’spopularwithinasystemonrolebased most prominent bankers, notes, 2011 is not 1952. When When 1952. not is 2011 notes, bankers, prominent most minimum changes to the old constitution coinciding with the jeopardised by an early rewrite. And both share an interest in term challenges in the new Egypt. thesort of political and economic weight acceptable in a true rich was Egypt Farouk, King overthrew Officers Free the the military, along with former President Mubarak and his and Mubarak President former with along military, the their nationwide organisations. replicate to time enough have not will groups other as ties, if not on the steering-wheel, then at least on the brake lever. It is a state within a state and an economyeconomy.withinanstateanand state within a a is indignities and eroding prestige inevitably associated with with associated inevitably prestige eroding and indignities itscommitment to hand over to the new civil power after the sovereignty and the rule of law. has financed a fleet of nine executive Gulfstreams and the the and Gulfstreams executive nine of fleet a financed has has been no shortage of conspiracy theories to explain the the explain to theories conspiracy of shortage no been has chiefMubarak’s andEl-Sherif, Parliament,Safwat of house upper the of speaker former the as (such confederates key privileges and perks. One might indeed characterise its its characterise indeed might One perks. and privileges literally owns the skies of Egypt: anyone wanting to build build to wanting anyone Egypt: of skies the owns literally parliamentary election in September and the presidential presidential the and September in election parliamentary background, the military will be able to escape any blame. blame. any escape to able be will military the background, best hospitals in the country. With the Sinai a “security zone”, militariesbelovedof everywhere, everythingruns itits from sharia as the “principal source of legislation” legislation” of source “principal the as “resistance”“occupation”to Hamasbeing– mosttheobvious Azhar, the foremost institution in the Arab world for the study The Muslim Brotherhood 3 2  The second issue on everyone’s agenda is the Muslim Muslim the is agenda everyone’s on issue second The Islamic behaviours and values, and of its provision of charitable Likeeveryone else, theBrotherhood hasbeentaken aback by rteho. ht os t tn fr n wa rl wl it will role what and for stand it does What Brotherhood. Brotherhood,their independence indoubt.) Itis also stronga No one doubts that the Brothers are indeed well-organised,indeed are Brothers the that doubts one No a conservativea societythat ormanypeople hold viewslinein and committed. Committed to what, however, is less clear – clearless however, iscommitted.what, Committedandto arm. At least three other parties have also sprung from the from sprung also have partiesother three least At arm. establishedpoliticalreligiousofis structures;part not it yet gullible West. Yet the Brotherhood is clear that Egypt must Egypt that clear Brotherhoodis the Yet West.gullible even to them. It is hard to pin down the movement: it is Islamic, case).They dismiss allegations tothe contrary asthe creation condemning the killing of Osama bin Laden and reiterating its Brothers the So Alexandria. of University the at elections only 27 percent of Egyptians said they supported “modernizers” consistentlynon-violentdefendsdecades(thoughsix itover of a bogeyman by the old regime to extract support from a from supportextract to regime old the by bogeyman a of on Christians and Sufis, but also in a wave of mosque takeovers onIslamic principles, with what it calls “a strong guarantee of of Sunni theology. Salafists beat Brothers in recent student recent in Brothers beat Salafiststheology. Sunni of hl 5 pret ad hy rfre “Islamists”. preferred they said percent 59 while with those of the Brotherhood. According to the latest Pew poll, which has alarmed even the authorities of the venerable Al venerable the ofauthorities the even alarmed has which right, and debating whether they could or should tack to protect referencetechnicallyTurkey’sitstoas AKP, secular political things may not be so straightforward. the gathering strength of the Salafists, shown not only in attacks theirIslamist base,which might alienate secular liberals and theright of “brother movements” elsewhere to use violence in indeedhave prompted theEgyptian Brotherhood’s statement in Egypt insist that it is authentically democratic and has been ithasestablished theJustice andFreedom party, consciousa social justice”. support“legitimatefor resistance againstforeign occupation suddenlyfind themselves in danger of being outflanked to the services to the deprived. Some even claim that it should be should it that claim even Somedeprived. the to services social movement, in terms both of its promotion of conservative play in Egypt’stransition?inplaydenying Egyptisthatno Thereis percentevensaidtheyapproved al-Qaeda. of Thisshouldbe lead to more splits within their own ranks. Such concerns may understood as a sort of NGO. The spokesmen of the movement fertile electoral ground for the Muslim Brotherhood. However, for any country”, including Afghanistan. be an Islamic state – not a theocracy, but a civil state basedstateciviltheocracy, a abut not Islamic –state an be butdoes not constitute party.a (To comply with electoral law  archive/2011/05/egypts-muslim-brotherhood-sticks-with-bin-laden/238218/. Mobile, 3May2011,available athttp://m.theatlantic.com/international/ Eric Trager,“Egypt’sMuslimBrotherhoodSticks WithBinLaden”, influence-politics-islamic-extremism. available athttp://pewresearch.org/pubs/1874/egypt-protests-democracy-islam- Richard Auxier,“Egypt,DemocracyandIslam”, PewResearchCenter,31January2011, 3

The Atlantic 2 Twenty Twenty No one can put a good figure on the size of the electoral Against them will be ranged an array of old and new left- support for the Justice and Freedom Party, though to allay liberal and secular parties, many arising out of the protest others’ fears it has declared that it will contest only a minority movements that spearheaded the revolutions. For these of parliamentary seats and will not field a presidential parties, the referendum campaign was a wake-up call candidate. But it would surprise no-one if Abdel-Monem Abu that showed how out of touch they are with politics at the El-Fotouh, the General Secretary of the Arab Doctors Union grassroots. In response, fledgling political movements and a prominent reformist Brother, resigned in order to have begun to explore new ways of doing politics in Egypt run. It is no wonder, then, that many Tahrir Square activists based on broad coalitions, and to concentrate on building accuse the Brotherhood of ambiguity while stopping short of democratic consciousness in Egyptian society. One activist, describing it as a danger to democracy. The Brotherhood’s the former Democratic Front revolutionary leader Shadi al- influence on Egypt’s transition will certainly be powerful – Ghazali Harb, is launching a new political movement aimed after all, the centre of gravity of this populous, substantially at building democratic awareness in Egypt from the bottom illiterate and conservative country is probably much closer to up. He says the parliamentary vote in September cannot be its offer than to that of the secular metropolitan elite. a “party” election for centre-left and secular groups but must be fought as a united front, with party competition deferred until the next vote in five years’ time. Other political parties Such left-liberal groups espouse a vision of politics that The former headquarters of the NDP overlooking Tahrir is closest in Egypt to that held in Europe, but they are Square is now a blackened shell and Egypt’s Supreme unanimous in rejecting any direct support from outside Administrative Court ordered on 16 April that the party be that could be portrayed as interference in Egyptian political dissolved. But most participants in Egyptian politics believe affairs. Instead, liberal forces in Egypt talk of the importance that former NDP members will remain a significant force for of politically-neutral support aimed at building up political years to come. With over a million members under the old society and institutions: offering impartial advice on party regime, the NDP dominated Egyptian political life. Before its development, experiences of reforming security services, dissolution, party members elected Talaat Sadat, the nephew transitional justice, election monitoring and the media. State- of the party’s founder and a trenchant critic of the NDP before run and independent television are particularly important the revolution, as their new leader in place of former President in light of Egypt’s high illiteracy rate, and their shift in tone Mubarak. The new leader promptly announced that he was since the revolution is seen as superficial at best: many renaming the NDP the “New National Party” and purging the proprietors, news editors and channel heads remain the group’s ranks of unpopular and corrupt officials. Though the same as before and a culture of genuine independence and NDP has appealed its dissolution, it seems likely than some impartial investigation has hardly begun to develop. As the kind of NDP-affiliated parties will emerge. In addition, many below figures show, the trend has for a long time pointed in former members are likely to stand as independents. Since the wrong direction. many of them retain prominent positions in Egyptian rural society, with the resources to mobilise their supporters and get them to the polls, they are likely to do quite well in the forthcoming elections.

However, it is not clear whether they would really represent a counter-revolutionary bloc. In the past, the NDP was a complex entity, within which large numbers of independent candidates regularly competed against officially endorsed candidates and often outpolled them. The NDP has been described as not so much a true political party bound together by a coherent ideology and structure, but rather “a very large group of people seeking to hitch their individual wagons to the president’s star”.4 Most Egyptian analysts believe these former apparatchiks share a political outlook that is broadly conservative but will otherwise gravitate to wherever political power seems to be concentrated as the best way to gain government money and services for their districts.

4 Michele Dunne and Amr Hamzawy, “Will NDP Independents Win the Elections Again?”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3 November 2010, available at http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2010/11/03/will-ndp-independents- win-the-elections-again. 5 6 ECFR/32 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu EGYPT’S HYBRID REVOLUTION: A BOLDER EU APPROACH – millennia, some would say – of suppression, 84 million million 84 suppression, of – say would some millennia, – “decapitated”. Yet other activists balance these fears against fears these balanceactivists other Yet“decapitated”. All this may appear daunting. One leader of the Tahrir Tahrir the of leader One daunting. appear may this All Another observer pointed out that the discomfort of urban of discomfort the that out pointed observer Another 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Egypt’s Decline in Press Freedom Figure 1 Egyptians are suddenly starting to get acquaintedeachgetwithsuddenly Egyptiansstarting areto There is another, more fundamental, point: after decades decades after point: fundamental, more another, is There They face a huge outreach challenge in the months before before months the in challenge outreach huge a face They Bahgat, director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, as they drag on, threaten to undermine their livelihoods. livelihoods. their undermine to threaten on, drag they as Centre, “are rediscovering Egyptian society in all its diversity”. come, if their own vision of a democratic,asecular countryisvisionof owntheir ifcome, elites at the sight of Salafists “emerging from their caves” had other. Islam Lotfy, a revolutionary leader from the youth youth the from leader revolutionary a Lotfy, Islam other. wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, invoked the image of of image the invoked Brotherhood, Muslim the of wing believe not does but faces Egypt challenges the recognises much of the rest of the country, for which the protestswerethewhichcountry, forthe ofrest the ofmuch to prevail. “Egyptians”, notes Dina Shehata of the al-Ahramtheprevail.“Egyptians”, Shehataofto Dina notes temporal world. Liberal secularists have learned that the the that learned have secularists Liberal world. temporal other.each also butworld outside the just not timefirst the the sidetracked: be to likely is democracy to transition the generated.Hossamhas engagement itpublic of process the the magnitude of what the revolution has already achieved and shared assumptions of Cairo’s middle classes mean little in little mean classesmiddle Cairo’s ofassumptions shared largely about economic not political conditions and now, now, and conditions political not economic about largely prisonersemergingblinkinglight,seeing theclearlyintofor process of debating and drafting a new constitution will itself September’s parliamentary elections, not to say for years to yearsfor saySeptember’s parliamentaryto elections,not been has says, he revolution, the clear: is protests Square faith required, or allowed, any sort of engagement with the withengagement of sort any allowed, or required,faith be a transformative process for society, he argues. been mitigated by watching them argue as to whether theirwhether to as argue themwatching by mitigated been Source: Reporters Without Borders, Press Freedom Index

19.6percent theofpopulation Egyptof lives below thelower The economy 5  GDP Per Capita in North Africa – 2009 Figure 2 2011showthecountry’s total external debt$35atbillion, its Even before the revolution, Egypt’s economic problems problems economic Egypt’s revolution, the before Even (see box below). According to the World Food Programme, Food World the to According below). box (see alone,foreigndebtclimbed percent,7 slippagepartlytodue even as the totalthedebtevenfigureas fluctuated. has GDPtermsofIn organisations currently top $10.5 billion, a figure that has has that figure a billion, $10.5 top currently organisations of the Egyptian pound. Loans from international and regional risen almost without interruption for the last half-decade half-decade last the for interruption without almost risen early for Egypt of BankCentral the fromFigures dire. were highest level in more than five years. Between 2009 and 2010 per capita, Egypt has lagged compared to its neighbours neighbours its to compared lagged has Egypt capita, per poverty line. Source: World Bank Morocco Algeria World FoodProgramme website,http://www.wfp.org/countries/egypt. Tunisia Egypt Libya

101 5

2270 2281 2000 GDP PerCapitanotadjustedforinflationatcurrentprices 110 3792 4029 4000 127 128 133 6000 143 143 146 146 8000 9714 10000 127 143 146 146 The revolution has exacerbated this precarious economic Figure 3 situation. In Egypt, as in Tunisia, the tourist trade has dried Egypt’s Deepening Sense of Corruption up and output been disrupted. The fact that people do not yet 2010 98 know how far the post-revolutionary reckoning will go has led many businesspeople to keep their heads down. Occupancy 2009 111 rates for hotels countrywide were at 10-20 percent in March, 2008 115 a blow to an industry which accounts for an estimated fifth 2007 105 of total current account proceeds. On top of this, sustained labour strikes and sit-ins have dented production levels in 2006 70

Egypt’s factories and in some cases pushed wages higher. 2005 70 The new government is creating a million new (non-) jobs 2004 77 in the state sector and granting most of the tourist industry a tax holiday. As a result, the budget deficit is growing, the 2003 70 currency is under pressure and the country’s credit rating is 2002 62 on the slide. Egypt’s economic prospects are likely to remain 2001 54 weak for the near future. Egypt’s Corruption Perceptions Ranking Globally The debt is a particularly pressing issue. Every year $1 billion goes to the EU to pay annual debt service – interest plus Source: Transparency International, 2010 instalment – and $350 million is paid to the US. Because of the long history of debt to foreigners, this is a political issue as well as an economic one. For Egypt’s history of debt has been Yet the prevailing inclination, for such experts as Ahmed Galal fraught. From 1867 to 1875, Egypt’s national debt went from of the Economic Research Forum and banker Hisham Ezz, £3 million to £100 million. To quote the economist Sebastian is to see these as manageable transitional problems. Egypt, Mallaby: “What followed was a lesson in how quickly debt they argue, is basically a rich country: no-one starved while can compromise a nation’s sovereignty.”6 In 1875, Isma’il the population grew and the regime siphoned off billions. Pasha sold Egypt’s stake in the Suez company to Britain for Sun, antiquities, the Red Sea coast, the Suez Canal, some a pittance, but it did not help Egypt, which defaulted on its oil and gas and, above all, the waters of the Nile constitute debt a year later and was forced to accept the appointment a good hand of natural resources. The “Desert Development of foreign debt commissioners to monitor the country’s Corridor” project of geologist Farouk El-Baz – which would finances, and eventually the inclusion of British and French provide a parallel strip of new transport links, communities, ministers in the Khedive’s cabinet. In 1882, a British military agriculture and industry in the desert to the west of the Nile intervention sealed Egypt’s fate as a colony in all but name. – is much discussed. Risks are acknowledged, including the possibility of a political backlash against the private sector In the short to medium term, Egypt faces obvious as the full scale of the old regime’s depredations is revealed. macroeconomic difficulties, and – as well as pressing for The low levels of education and vocational training are the return of Mubarak’s overseas assets – will look to the acknowledged as important economic drags. But the more international community for debt forgiveness, or at least general disposition seems to be to focus on the hope that, concessionary interest rates on new or renewed borrowing. in the medium term, democracy will usher in accelerated With 25 percent of the state budget going on energy and food growth à la Turque as the dead hand of state control is lifted. subsidies, and memories of bread riots in 2007/8 still fresh, Egypt’s finances are particularly vulnerable to international commodity price spikes.

Nor has a marked deterioration over the last few years in the perceived levels of corruption helped economic confidence:

6 Sebastian Mallaby, “You Are What You Owe”, Time, 1 May 2011, available at http:// www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2067967,00.html#ixzz1LNtzll1k. 7 8 ECFR/32 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu EGYPT’S HYBRID REVOLUTION: A BOLDER EU APPROACH “but take out the picture”. In practice this means Egypt means thispractice In picture”.the out take “but Egypt in the Middle East Egyptians have more than enough to think about with about think to enough than more have Egyptians Egypt would keep the frame of its relations with Israel withrelations its of frame the keep would Egypt Foreign Minister al-Arabi has said he hopes to open a “new Theireastern borderdifferent, is however. Egyptians are The first effect of this shift in attitude has now become now hasattitude in shiftthis of effectfirst The Israelimission, the angry crowd demanded that Egypt cut US in Egypt will fall”. Hamas, the new government is also in touch with Syriawithtouch in governmentalsonew is Hamas,the a Pan-Arab defence agreement.” would I Egypt,President of as Gaza, inIsrael by attack as part and parcel of the abuse of their dignity against dignity their of abuse the of parcel and part as alltiestheJewishto stateand stopsupplying Israel with apparent, with the interim Egyptian government apparently acrossEgypt’s political spectrum. Mohammed ElBaradei and Hezbollah. areas, Egypt’s policy will be decidedly cooler. The blockade andPalestine likelyishand gohand toinbroaderwith a Crucially, the support for a tougher Israel policy exists policy Israel tougher a for support the Crucially, embassy to be removed. opentheRafah crossing andexamine ways toimplement – Israel with signed it accords peace the to committed of involvement:of thefate Egyptianof migrant workers has eventsLibyalikeeveryoneofin else,little thereissense on the Israeli embassy in Cairo. Gathered at the gates of the ofsubsidised gas toIsrael isbeing questioned. pushA for of Gaza seems certain to be relaxed – and continued supply observerwasinno doubt that “the weight androle ofthe whichthey revolted. And, while the original protests were world not to feel the old regime’s subservience to US foreign natural gas. They also wanted the Israeli flag flying atop the willcooperate withIsrael matterson mutualof interest – re-positioningof Egypt. While Hosni Mubarak positioned theirown revolution. Though they follow the TV coverage toousedthinkingto themselvesof leadersas theofArab theMilitary Council’s early assurance that Egypt remains told the told theinternationalisation theofMiddle EastPeace Process internally focused, the early April demonstrators marched statetelevision, Foreign Minister Nabil al-Arabi reiterated is expected; as well as mediating between Fatah and and Fatah between mediating as well as expected; is thatpredicted diplomat Arelations. warm have should hasnowmuscled intelligence services aside. But, inother himself as the main regional rival to Iran’s leadership, Iran’s to rival regional main the as himself policy and over-ready participation in the blockade of Gaza playing a key role in bringing about the new reconciliation page” with all countries,Iran.includingall with page” for example,for securitythe Sinai,theofwhere militarythe been the main preoccupation. betweenFatah and Hamas. In an interview with Egyptian butaddedthat theydidnotmean that thetwocountries Al Watan Al newspaper: “In the case of a future a of case the “In newspaper: 7 A new approach to Israel 8 One seasonedOne Algeria or Hamas); and that a glance at Syria or Libya was Libya or Syria at glance a that and Hamas); or Algeria Europe’s response 9  8  7  Europe, particularly the European Parliament. The European “Action EU/Egypt 2007 The glorious. been not has Egypt The European diplomatic community has been better and and better been has community diplomatic European The with relations pre-revolutionary in record European The Therebetterbeenhavemoments since.joint2010June The Israel was fundamental to Middle East stability; that the the that stability; East Middle to fundamental was Israel Responding to events on the Mediterranean’s southern southern Mediterranean’s the on events to Responding Barroso and High Representative Catherine Ashton jointly jointly Ashton Catherine Representative High and Barroso Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the with Prosperity Shared and Democracy for Partnership Policy (ENP), was a particular low point. Meant to embody to Meant point. lowparticular a was (ENP), Policy Neighbourhood European the under agreed jointly Plan”, Nicolas Sarkozy’s ill-fated Union for the Mediterranean, it it Mediterranean, the for Union ill-fated Sarkozy’s Nicolas violations and its president, Jerzy Buzek, has been quick offquickpresident,violations beenitsBuzek,hasJerzy and Mubarak regime, and proportionately encouraged democrats. (think commodity dangerous a was Brotherhood Muslim no outcome shabby this in states member by acquiescence amounted to a surrender by EU bureaucrats, who just wanted declaration by all EU ambassadors in Cairo condemning condemning Cairo in ambassadors EU all by declaration enough to suggest that Mubarak’s regime could be worse. the Mubarak give to willingness some reflected also doubt for assistance that or this you trade (“We’ll conditionality of developing trans-Mediterranean relations in a way that that way a in relations trans-Mediterranean developing of wiselyfocuses the “partnership” proposal on the countries of rights defender, the outcome was “an offence, an insult”. The more progress on issues like human rights”), it in practice practice in it rights”), human like issues on progress more thesouthern Mediterranean littoral. Itthus offers prospecta to the wider “regional dimension”, and to French PresidentFrench to dimension”,and“regional wider the to the United States, with its $1.3 billion annual military aid and turnedviolent.haveEgyptOverall,events in when mark the the incensed blogger Egyptian an of custody in death the to prepared negotiators Egyptian to ticked, box the get to is seen more as a disappointment than a betrayal, but only but betrayal, a than disappointment a as more seen is some of the post-revolution statements emanating from from emanating statements post-revolution the of some strategicrelationship, whichhascounted. Europe’s pastrole have not been much on the Egyptian radar screen. It has been however, Europeans – whether individual states or Brussels – proposed on 8 March a new policy framework, entitled “A “A entitled framework, policy new a March 8 on proposed Manuel José President Commission – exposed thus policy Europeanfailuresimplicitly,leastofthe atto and, littoral – legislature has consistently condemned Egypt’s human rights humanEgyptian leading one of words the Inhardball. play Southern Mediterranean”. because not much was expected in the first place. before the revolution; and Egyptian analysts have liked liked have analysts Egyptian and revolution; the before bolder than their peers in Tunisia in talking to the opposition with peace Egypt’s that basis the on – doubt the of benefit concern-israel-new-egypt-emerges. Chronicle, 7April2011,availableathttp://www.thejc.com/news/world-news/47577/ Quoted inAnshelPfeffer,“ConcernforIsrael asnewEgyptemerges”, euromed/docs/com2011_200_en.pdf. Committee oftheRegions”, 8March2011,availableathttp://eeas.europa.eu/ Parliament, theCouncil,EuropeanEconomic andSocialCommittee,the Security Policy,“JointCommunicationtothe EuropeanCouncil,the European Commission,HighRepresentative oftheUnionforForeignAffairsand 5 April2011,availableathttp://www.rferl.org/content/egypt_iran_ties/3547635.html. “Minister: EgyptReadyFor‘NewPage’With Iran”, 9 Though the document tips its hat Radio FreeEurope/RadioLiberty The Jewish , will not immediately be jeopardised, like the EU’s previous A bolder approach efforts to develop a “southern neighbourhood policy”, by getting caught in the mangle of the Arab/Israel dispute. The Ashton/Barroso proposals are a good start in terms of targeting those areas where Europeans could and now The new proposal’s central thrust is the need for the EU to should do more to respond to the historic events across the exercise conditionality properly in the future (“more for Mediterranean. Mobility (i.e. easier travel to Europe), better more”); and it proposes the simple but important proviso that access to European markets and financial help certainly hit entry to the partnership should depend on a “commitment the mark. But the implicit offers are cautious in the extreme to adequately monitored, free and fair elections”. The main – and this in a document that has not yet been watered down areas where reforming North African states may look for help by the member states and the European Parliament, as will can be summarised as “mobility, markets, and money”. In surely happen in response to European political and sectional particular, it proposes: pressures. The EU should take a much bolder approach in four areas: mobility, market access, money, and democracy • A Differentiated, Incentive-based Approach. In and institution building. the future, European aid and trade should be made available to North African states on the basis of real progress on democracy and human rights. The proposal Mobility says that “a commitment to adequately monitored, free and fair elections should be the entry qualification for Cautious visa liberalisation for certain categories of visitor the Partnership”. is proposed, in exchange for major efforts by the North African states to curb illegal migration. Any Arab reading • Democracy and Institution-Building. Various forms of the concluding sentence on this topic (“In the long-term, enhanced support to civil society. provided that visa facilitation and readmission agreements are effectively implemented, gradual steps towards visa • Mobility. The prospect of easier travel to the EU, in liberalisation for individual partner countries could be particular for students, researchers and businesspeople, considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the in exchange for tougher action by North African states overall relationship with the partner country concerned to control illegal immigration, better law enforcement and provided that conditions for well-managed and secure cooperation, and better arrangements for the return of mobility are in place.”) will understand that Europe does illegal immigrants. not plan to throw open its doors. As suggested in an earlier ECFR brief on Tunisia, immediate steps should be taken to • Economic Development. An extra 1 billion euros of ease travel and study by halving the cost of European visas.10 European Investment Bank (EIB) funding by the end of The EU should also think creatively about student exchange 2013, hopefully with a matching contribution from the initiatives such as joint campuses, or the opportunity for European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Egyptian students to spend a year in European universities (EBRD). and vice versa (a “Dido” programme, modelled on the successful European Erasmus programme). • Trade and Investment. Better access to European markets, including for agricultural and fisheries products, leading ultimately to Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade, subject to North African states achieving “regulatory convergence” in areas such as competition policy and phytosanitary standards.

• Enhanced Sectoral Cooperation in energy, education, tourism, rural development, transport, and electronic communications technologies.

• EU Financial Assistance. Starting with Tunisia and Egypt, the EU bilateral assistance programmes (worth respectively 240 and 445 million euros for 2011-2013) will be “screened and refocused”. EU macrofinancial assistance (loans to governments) will also be available to back up International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending.

10 Susi Dennison, Anthony Dworkin, Nicu Popescu and Nick Witney, “After the Revolution: Europe and the transition in Tunisia”, ECFR Policy Brief, March 2011, available at http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/a_regional_model_another_chance_ for_the_eu_in_tunisia. 9 10 ECFR/32 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu EGYPT’S HYBRID REVOLUTION: A BOLDER EU APPROACH Egypt’s Trading Partners – 2010 Figure 4

Market access Egypt and other North African states – not to mention its own This is the area where Europe has potentially most to offer to most potentially has Europe where area the is This Reflection Group created by the European Council in 2009. Barroso proposal rightly calls for accelerated conclusion conclusion accelerated for calls rightly proposal Barroso – produce to able is Egypt if works only access market But and Morocco; Egypt now needs similar treatment. And the And treatment. similar needs now Egypt Morocco; and agreements,liberalisation trade certain of approval EU and Ashton/ The enough. not is this But products. agricultural services and products – Europe into export to allowed and a study on “EU-North African Trade 2020”, akin to the the to akin 2020”, Trade African “EU-North on study a and businesspeople from Europe and North Africa to produce Mediterranean. that To address the full range recall of obstacles to trade, measures” phytosanitary and “sanitary and duties and quotas for Egyptian industrial products and some consumers.Egypt’sfarimportantmostbyEurope is trading repeated references in the proposal to such dull-sounding dull-sounding such to proposal the in references repeated Tunisia with products fisheries and agricultural on notably matters as “conformity assessment” of industrial products products industrial of assessment” “conformity as matters that benefit its own economy as well as Europe’s. The EU EU The Europe’s. as well as economy own its benefit that theshouldEU consider funding taskaforce policymakersof the across trade to barriers non-tariff major remain there has already granted a complete dismantling of customs customs of dismantling complete a granted already has partner. Note: These figures are for 2008, apart from Direct Investment in Stocks, which is for 2009 Source: EU, DG Trade

31% Others Turkey 5% Arabia Saudi 5% 7% China 31% EU27 9% US As described above, Egypt’s public finances will inevitably will finances public Egypt’s above, described As A group of Tahrir Square activists are thereforeactivistslaunchingSquareTahrirarea of group A 13-14 percent 13-14 Democracy and institution building 12  11 Money Egyptians fear being painted as western stooges and are are and stooges western as painted being fear Egyptians The Ashton/Barroso proposal also talks of increased help help increased of talks also proposal Ashton/Barroso The Unfortunately, however, the Ashton/Barroso proposal proposal Ashton/Barroso the however, Unfortunately, Here,proposalthemakeavailablebillion to extra 1eurosan Nouriel Roubini expects the consumer prices index to be at be to indexpricesconsumer theexpects RoubiniNouriel a similar sum from the EBRD (assuming that body agrees body that (assuming EBRD the from sum similar a a benchmarked process for democratic reform would be an be would reformdemocratic for processbenchmarked a assistance. It is hard to envisage IMF assistance being provided a Europeana Endowment forDemocracy thatcould operate in years would be asking to be unseated. grassrootscancellingcampaignataimedEgypt’s debts, huge deteriorate this year, as the direct and indirect costs of the of costs indirect and direct the as year, this deteriorate governmental vehicle between the UN, the EU, and private and EU, the UN, the betweengovernmentalvehicle clearly has an interest in ensuring that liberal forces – political exchange for a long-term programme to address subsidies and governmentthat moved tocutsubsidies inthenext couple of envisagesEuropean help being offered only insupport of IMF ofEIB funding by the end of 2013 (a 20 percent increase) and destroying those in need of help – may be to set up a quasi- a up set to be may – help of needdestroying inthose revolution take their toll, inflation worsens (economist (economist worsens inflation toll, their take revolution which could hamper growth. EU governments should give should governments EU growth. hamper could which on notably subsidies, state slash to requirement a without to extend its lending to North Africa) will be welcomenews be Africa)willNorth lendingto itsextend to therefore very sensitive of support to NGOs and political political and NGOs to support of sensitive very therefore this a fair hearing. Cancelling the debt that Egypt owes in owes Egypt that debt the Cancelling hearing. fair a this the marketsincreasesthe (Standard Poor’sloweredandEgypt’s the EU’s southern and eastern neighbourhoods, as recentlyneighbourhoods, aseastern and southernEU’s the those who want it. A good way of doing this would be to create avoiding but supportive, be to wanting – conundrum this in Egypt. So too will the offer of macroeconomicassistance.of offer the will too So Egypt. in influence the transition from authoritarianism, even if they will in these areas. This will need careful handling in Egypt; Egypt; in handling careful need will This areas. these in for lever a moderatesand the forsupport of importantsign in February). struggleto win the forthcoming elections. One way to address spending. But, in Egypt’s post-revolutionary situation, any situation, post-revolutionary Egypt’s in But, spending. parties,NGOs andthink-tanks develop– their capacities and partiesfromEuropean governments andtheEU.YetEurope post-election reforms. petrol and bread, which account for some 25 percent of public long-termforeigncurrency sovereign ratingBB tofromBB+ proposed by Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski. foundations and corporations prepared to offer support to support offer to prepared corporations and foundations  February 2011,availableatrelooney.info/0_NS4053_1568.pdf. Macro OutlookRemainsProblematic”,Strategy Flash,RoubiniGlobalEconomics,14 Natalia Gurushina,AyahElSaidandRachel Ziemba,“Egypt:‘Underweight’as annual-bronislaw-geremek-lecture-john-mccain-and-radoslaw-sikorski. Atlantic Council,1March 2011,availableathttp://www.acus.org/event/second- John McCainandRadekSikorski,SecondAnnual BronislawGeremekLecture,the 11 ), and the cost of government borrowing on borrowing government of cost the and ), 12 It will, of course, be for Egyptians to determine what help they need and from whom. But the litany of post-revolutionary The US in Egypt issues is becoming increasingly familiar: establishment of a free media; transitional justice; security sector reform; and A key final element of developing and implementing an development of political parties, think-tanks and civil society effective foreign policy towards post-revolutionary Egypt in its broadest sense, with a strong emphasis on the need will be EU cooperation with the US. Obama’s skilful to start holding governments to account. Many European repositioning of the US, first in his June 2009 speech in institutions – newspapers and broadcasters, universities, Cairo, and subsequently his decision to tell Mubarak to go, trade unions, archives – could usefully offer twinning has limited the damage done by the revolution to America’s arrangements. predominant position in Egypt. Links with the Egyptian military will remain strong (as long as Congress continues A key final element of developing and implementing an to vote the aid), and Egyptians know that the US role in effective foreign policy towards post-revolutionary Egypt will the search for a wider Middle East peace is indispensable. be EU cooperation with the US. Obama’s skilful repositioning But there is no doubt that the “new Egypt” will be readier of the US, first in his June 2009 speech in Cairo, and to assert its independence of US foreign policy, and in subsequently his decision to tell Mubarak to go, has limited particular to take a tougher line on Israel/Palestine. On the damage done by the revolution to America’s predominant this issue, it may find European views and policies closer position in Egypt. Links with the Egyptian military will to its taste. These shifts open up the prospect of the EU remain strong (as long as Congress continues to vote for and US playing usefully complementary roles in Egypt: the aid), and Egyptians know that the US role in the search both supporting the transition to a genuine democracy; for a wider Middle East peace is indispensable. But there is the US holding the hand of the Egyptian military; and no doubt that the “new Egypt” will be readier to assert its the EU working with the new democratic government independence of US foreign policy, and in particular to take a on issues which the US will not touch, but which the US tougher line on Israel/Palestine. There, it may find European administration may tacitly recognise as crucial, such as views and policies closer to its taste. efforts to tame Hamas.

These shifts open up the prospect of the EU and the US playing usefully complementary roles in Egypt: both supporting the transition to a genuine democracy; the US holding the hand of the Egyptian military; and the EU working with the new sensitive to outside criticism; they took considerable pains to democratic government on issues which the US will not touch, defend themselves against cases brought before the African but which the US administration may tacitly recognise as Union Court of Human Rights in Gabon. Indeed, while crucial, such as efforts to tame Hamas. Egyptians see themselves as the Arab world’s leaders and can therefore take a dismissive view of the Arab League, they tend to be more concerned for their reputation in the African Less technocracy, more politics Union (AU). The EU should push the interim government to invite a European election-monitoring team, perhaps in In the short term, the EU should strengthen the Ashton/ association with the AU, to cover this autumn’s elections. Barroso proposals in the way described above. In the longer term, however, both the Brussels institutions and member In Egypt, the military and security authorities have been key states also need to keep in mind that an important root of power-brokers for 60 years; remain so today; and will continue European failures in North Africa in the past has been its to be so, albeit, one hopes, in much circumscribed fashion, for excessively bureaucratic and insufficiently political approach. years to come. Across the piece, European understanding of, Europeans therefore need to think more clearly about the and links, to the military have been exposed as inadequate. extent and nature of the leverage they should be able to In the EU’s case, the very idea of developing such relations exercise, and the size of the stakes that should encourage has seemed distasteful. But if the EU truly wants to play the them to do so. The access of post-revolutionary humility that sort of international role of which it talks, then one small but has led European leaders to defer to those who have made useful step in the right direction would be the appointment, the revolutions makes a welcome change, but now risks being in Cairo as elsewhere in the region, of a defence and security overdone. Europeans should be prepared not just to listen, adviser in the European delegation. but also to transmit – and preferably in ways more pointed than the usual statements couched in bureaucratic language The EU should immediately seize the opportunity of the and tiresomely focused on Europeans’ own emotional states: expected reopening of the Rafah border crossing from Egypt “encouraged”, “disappointed”, “dismayed” and so on. into Gaza to revive its Common Security and Defence Policy border assistance mission there – thus simultaneously For example, when the military resorts to summary tribunals, providing itself with new links to the Egyptian military, and Europeans should be prepared to tell them in clear terms that positioning itself to play a role as the Israel/Palestine logjam they are offending against basic principles of human rights, begins to shift under the impact of the Egyptian revolution, and tarnishing their reputations. Even the old regime was starting with the Fatah/Hamas reconciliation. 11 12 ECFR/32 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu EGYPT’S HYBRID REVOLUTION: A BOLDER EU APPROACH – or they can roll up their sleeves and get involved in the the in involved get and sleeves their up roll can they or – A more political response by Europe to the Arab awakeningArab the toEurope politicalresponsebymore A As Jean Pisani-Ferry of the Bruegel think-tank has pointed has think-tankBruegel the of Pisani-Ferry Jean As What is needed is not so much European altruism as European 13 EU wouldEUlike seerelationsto between thetwoshores the of Egypt,asserting its own vision of how it would like to see the Inshort, Europe needs tobehave morelike regionala power Later in the year, when the parliamentary elections have taken Helping Egypt will, however,Helpingbenefitwill,EgyptEurope.alsoMoreover, and the Parliament – must be ready to get inside the Egyptian another series of technocratic diktats, which EU policies often ticketssuchreturnedthosementioned,on ofas againmany awayfrom China and India. Inshort, North Africa could give Mediterranean evolve. and less like a big NGO in its dealings with post-revolutionary canofficials Europeanthem. before than elections the after gifts, and Egypt and its neighbours as the perpetual supplicant. do better than the new, shallow-rooted, “modern” parties. But, draft the new constitution – may happen as much or more or much as happen may – constitution new the draft expected to deliver for his (or, occasionally, her) constituency did in the 1980s and eastern Europe did in the 1990s. of Egypt, voters will opt for the local heavyweight who can be outsourcinglabour-intensivemostthemodel in segmentsof needs Europe too, services for but goods for only “Not out: resemble.Egypt could overtime allow European firms cutto newpolity develop andbehave. takenbeTo seriously thatin will probably be using them as flags of convenience. In much which in part explains its bounce-back in global markets. While work for you to deal with”. one as but, effort;require will Thisprocesses. political new outcome benign a for hoping piously sidelines the on wait mind-set underlying much of European thinking about the about thinking European of much underlying mind-set mustinvolveeventualthe articulation thevisionhow ofa of more offer to seen be to have will Europe however, mode, crucial other many among determine will which – making jobsby keeping production sites competitive and creates jobs that former NDP members and the Muslim Brotherhood will than a set of technocratic incentives with strings attached. attached. strings with incentives technocratic of set a than this model entails job losses in the North, it also preserves also it North, the in losses job entails model this the value chain, as Germany has done with great success – and adoptionan theoffar so has promoteit thanmore muchto theEUan economic edge, just asSpain, Portugal and Greece imagination. Indeed, it is time to shake off the paternalisticthe offshake to time isimagination. itIndeed, issues the composition of the constituent committee that will coalition-formingrealtheassembly. deal-newSo andthe in interlocutor told us, “a democratic Egypt will be much harder shipping times and transport costs by moving their production political process. As mentioned above, it would be a fair betfair a bepoliticalwouldmentioned process.above,itAs ExternalinstitutionsServiceActionnotablytheEUplace, – South, where the EU sees itself as the munificent bearer of bearermunificent the as itself sees EU the where South, framing future cooperation as a joint endeavour that will help both parties is likely to be met with more enthusiasm than enthusiasm more with met be to likely is parties both by paving the way for development of the South.” the of development for way the paving by  spring-echoes-of-1989/. at http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/507-arab- Jean Pisani-Ferry,“Arabspring:Echoesof1989”, Bruegel,22March2011,available 13 In sum, sum, In Europe needs to replace the defensive,arms-lengthposturethereplace to needsEurope That sort of message – of a “NAFTA-like” vision for the the for vision “NAFTA-like” a of – message of sort That a hard sell in a Europe that is only slowly recovering from recovering slowly only is that Europe a in sell hard a mare nostrum economically complementary societies on both shores of of shores both on societies complementary economically export competitiveness for tomorrow, not to mentionEurope’s securing becreating actually will it jobs, today’s exporting outsourcing economic roles to North Africa may look like like look may Africa North to roles economic outsourcing though that and littoral, southern the of economies the of which,over time, should lead toprosperous, democratic and easiestwhomisitstartdirectionto layout ato– march aof – politicians European for time is It markets. export new recession, with low growth and high unemployment, and and unemployment, high and growth low with recession, Egypt with Africa, North and Europe between relationship will eventually need. with a declared readiness in due time to embrace them in the to find ways to plant the indigestible truths – that the only the that – truthsindigestible the plant to ways find to sureanswer to uncontrolled immigration is the development sort of intimate and interdependent relationship that both that relationship interdependent and intimate of sort Mediterraneanthe neighboursacross its todisplayed has it populist alarm over immigration. But it is the job of politicians playing the role of Mexico to Europe’s America – is of course beginning with those in the north of the continent, for for continent, the of north the in those with beginning . About the authors Acknowledgements

Anthony Dworkin is a senior policy fellow at the European The authors would like to thank Emma Bonino, Imma Vitelli, Council on Foreign Relations, working in the area of Sabrina Gasparrini, Daniel Levy, Bassma Kodmani, Minna democracy, human rights and the rule of law. He is also a Jarvenpaa, Dominic Asquith, Marc Franco and Anthony senior adviser and former executive director of the Crimes of Richter for providing insights and help in opening doors. The War Project, a non-governmental organisation that promotes draft of the brief benefited greatly from Hans Kundnani’s understanding of international humanitarian law. He was editing, for which we are grateful. co-editor of Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know (Norton, rev. ed. 2007). He is a contributing editor of the British magazine Prospect, and is a member of the Terrorism/ Counter-Terrorism Advisory Committee of Human Rights Watch. His publications for ECFR include Beyond the “War on Terror”: Towards a new transatlantic framework for counterterrorism (2009) and Towards an EU human rights strategy for a post-Western world (with Susi Dennison, 2010).

Nick Witney joined the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) from the European Defence Agency, which he was responsible for setting up in 2004, and then ran as its first Chief Executive. His earlier career was divided between the UK diplomatic service and the UK Ministry of Defence. As a diplomat, he learned Arabic in Lebanon and Jordan, and served in Baghdad and then Washington. Nick’s publications for ECFR include Re-Energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy (2008) and Towards a Post-American Europe: A Power Audit of EU-US Relations (with Jeremy Shapiro, 2009).

Daniel Korski is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He was previously an adviser to the British International Development Secretary; deputy head of the UK’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit; an adviser to the Afghan Minister for Counter-narcotics; and head of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Basra, Iraq. He has also worked in Yemen on Security Sector Reform; as a political adviser to Paddy Ashdown, former high representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina; on secondment to the US State Department; and as a policy adviser to the UK House of Commons defence select committee.

13 14 ECFR/32 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu EGYPT’S HYBRID REVOLUTION: A BOLDER EU APPROACH www.ecfr.eu individuals or institutions. with other organisations but does not make grants to Stiftung Mercator and Steven Heinz. ECFR works in partnership Communitas Foundation, the Italian UniCredit group, the Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior), the Bulgarian Spanish foundation FRIDE (La Fundación para las Relaciones ECFR is backed by the Soros Foundations Network, the • • • that define its activities: ECFR has developed a strategy with three distinctive elements values-based European foreign policy. across Europe on the development of coherent, effective and objective is to conduct research and promote informed debate first pan-European think-tank. Launched in October 2007, its The ABOUT ECFR Ahtisaari, Joschka Fischer and Mabel van Oranje. within their own countries. The Council is chaired by Martti and feedback on policy ideas and help with ECFR’s activities thematic task forces, members provide ECFR staff with advice meets once a year as a full body. Through geographical and from the EU’s member states and candidate countries - which politicians, decision makers, thinkers and business people distinguished Council of over one hundred Members - A pan-European Council. media outlets. of ECFR’ gatherings in EU capitals and outreach to strategic policy reports, private meetings and public debates, ‘friends focus. ECFR’s activities include primary research, publication of its objectives through innovative projects with a pan-European researchers and practitioners from all over Europe to advance ECFR has brought together a team of distinguished A distinctive research and policy development process. communications. offices are platforms for research, debate, advocacy and ECFR plans to open offices in Warsaw and Brussels. Our Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, Rome and Sofia. In the future ECFR, uniquely among European think-tanks, has offices in A physical presence in the main EU member states. European Council on Foreign Relations ECFR has brought together a (ECFR) is the GmbH Roland BergerStrategyConsultants Chairman, Founder andHonorary Roland Berger (Germany) former PrimeMinister Governor, NationalBankofPoland; Marek Belka (Poland) Deputy Director, ElPaís Lluís Bassets (Spain) MP; formerForeignMinister Dora Bakoyannis (Greece) President oftheEuropeanConvention Former PrimeMinisterandvice Giuliano Amato (Italy) President Management Initiative;former Chairman oftheBoard,Crisis Martti Ahtisaari (Finland) Party spokesperson fortheSocialDemocratic Committeeandforeignpolicy Affairs Deputy ChairmanoftheForeign Urban Ahlin (Sweden) and ChairmanofBavarianNordicA/S President andCEO,A.J.AamundA/S Asger Aamund (Denmark) countries. candidate and states member EU the from figures cultural and activists leaders, business intellectuals, public ministers, and parliamentarians former and current commissioners, European presidents, ministers, prime former are Relations Foreign on Council European the of members Among Journalist Director ofMelakInvestments/ Ipek Cem Taha (Turkey) California Catalunya andUniversityofSouthern Professor, UniversitatOberta de Manuel Castells (Spain) Cooperation Minister forInternationalDevelopment Gunilla Carlsson (Sweden) former PrimeMinister President oftheEuropeanParliament; Jerzy Buzek (Poland) and CentralEurope Chairman of the Institute for the Danube Erhrad Busek (Austria) Writer andacademic Ian Buruma (The Netherlands) Minister (Taoiseach) Ambassador totheUSA;formerPrime Former EuropeanCommission John Bruton (Ireland) Commissioner Vice PresidentoftheSenate;formerEU Emma Bonino (Italy) President ofVenture EquityBulgariaLtd Founder, CommunitasFoundationand Svetoslav Bojilov (Bulgaria) Lewiatan Confederation ofPrivateEmployers- Economist. PresidentofthePolish Henryka Bochniarz (Poland) Foreign Minister Carl Bildt (Sweden) Council; formerPrimeMinister Chairman, PrimeMinister’s Economic Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland) Politica Internazionale) President, ISPI(IstitutopergliStudidi Boris Bianchieri (Italy) Reconstruction andDevelopment Chief Economist,EuropeanBankfor Erik Berglöf (Sweden) Parliament formerMemberofEuropean office; (Confindustria)-Brussels Industry Director, ConfederationofItalian Gianfranco Dell’Alba (Italy) former PrimeMinister Member ofEuropeanParliament; Jean-Luc Dehaene (Belgium) Poet andCulturalCritic Aleš Debeljak (Slovenia) Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (Turkey) Commission Vice PresidentoftheEuropean President, FriendsofEurope;former Etienne Davignon (Belgium) Aspen InstituteItalia Director GeneralInternationalActivities, Marta Dassù (Italy) Minister andForeign Progressive Studies;formerPrime President, FoundationforEuropean President, ItalianieuropeiFoundation; Massimo D’Alema (Italy) Action Service Counsellor oftheEuropeanExternal Robert Cooper (United Kingdom) Member ofEuropeanParliament Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Germany) former StateSecretary Ambassador totheUnitedKingdom; Nicola Clase (Sweden) of EastAnglia;formerHomeSecretary Visiting ProfessorofPolitics,University Charles Clarke (United Kingdom) Economics Emeritus Professor, LondonSchoolof (United Kingdom) Anthony Giddens International Relations(IPRI) Chairman ofthePortugueseInstitute Carlos Gaspar (Portugal) University Professor ofEuropeanStudies,Oxford (United Kingdom) Timothy Garton Ash Foreign Minister Speaker oftheParliament;former Jaime Gama (Portugal) Minister forClimateandEnergy Lykke Friis (Denmark) Investment Bank Business Leader;formerCEOCarnegie Karin Forseke (Sweden/USA) Chancellor Former ForeignMinisterandvice- Joschka Fischer (Germany) Foreign Minister President, ChamberofDeputies;former Gianfranco Fini (Italy) Policy Representative forForeignandSecurity European Commission/EUHigh Adviser totheVicePresidentof Steven Everts (The Netherlands) former ForeignMinister Chairman, BalticDevelopmentForum; Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Denmark) Former FinanceMinister Hans Eichel (Germany) Member ofEuropeanParliament Andrew Duff (United Kingdom) President, DEMOSHungary Tibor Dessewffy (Hungary) Economy andDevelopment Vice-President andDirectorofGlobal Kemal Dervis (Turkey) (Bratislava) Marshall FundoftheUnitedStates Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Pavol Demeš (Slovakia)

Teresa Patricio Gouveia Caio Koch-Weser (Germany) Cem Özdemir (Germany) Rory Stewart (United Kingdom) (Portugal) Vice Chairman, Deutsche Bank Group; Leader, Bündnis90/Die Grünen Member of Parliament Trustee to the Board of the Calouste former State Secretary (Green Party) Gulbenkian Foundation; former Dominique Strauss-Kahn Foreign Minister Rem Koolhaas (The Netherlands) Ana Palacio (Spain) (France) Architect and urbanist; Professor at the Former Foreign Minister; former Senior Managing Director, International Heather Grabbe Graduate School of Design, Harvard President and General Counsel of the Monetary Fund; former Finance (United Kingdom) University World Bank Group Minister Executive Director, Open Society Ivan Krastev (Bulgaria) Simon Panek (Czech Republic) Alexander Stubb (Finland) Institute – Brussels Chair of Board, Centre for Liberal Chairman, People in Need Foundation Foreign Minister Strategies Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Chris Patten (United Kingdom) Michael Stürmer (Germany) Director of the Centre on International Aleksander Kwasniewski Chancellor of Oxford University and Chief Correspondent, Die Welt Conflict Resolution, Columbia (Poland) co-chair of the International Crisis University (New York); Senior Fellow, Former President of Poland Group; former EU Commissioner Ion Sturza (Romania) Brookings Institution; former Under- President, GreenLight Invest.; former Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Mart Laar (Estonia) Diana Pinto (France) Prime Minister of the Republic of Operations at the UN Operations at MP; former Prime Minister Historian and author Moldova the UN Miroslav Lajcˇák (Slovakia) Jean Pisani-Ferry (France) Helle Thorning Schmidt Fernando Andresen Guimarães Managing Director for Russia, Eastern Director, Bruegel and Professor at Universite Paris-Dauphine (Denmark) (Portugal) Neighbourhood & Western Balkans, Leader of the Social Democratic Party Advisor, Multilateral Relations, European External Action Service; Ruprecht Polenz (Germany) European External Action Service (EEAS) former Foreign Minister MP and Chairman of the Bundestag Teija Tiilikainen (Finland) Foreign Affairs Committee Director at the Finnish Institute for Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg Pascal Lamy (France) International relations (Germany) Honorary President, Notre Europe and Lydie Polfer (Luxembourg) Former Defence Minister Director-General of WTO; former EU MP; former Foreign Minister Loukas Tsoukalis (Greece) Commissioner Professor, University of Athens and István Gyarmati (Hungary) Andrew Puddephatt President, ELIAMEP President and CEO, International Mark Leonard (United Kingdom) Director, European Council on Foreign (United Kingdom) Erkki Tuomioja (Finland) Centre for Democratic Transition Relations Director, Global Partners & Associated MP; former Foreign Minister Ltd. Hans Hækkerup (Denmark) Juan Fernando López Aguilar Daniel Valtchev (Bulgaria) Chairman, Defence Commission; Vesna Pusic´ (Croatia) Former deputy PM and Minister of former Defence Minister (Spain) Member of European Parliament; MP, President of the National Education former Minister of Justice Committee for Monitoring the EU Vaclav Havel (Czech Republic) Accession Negotiations and Professor Vaira Vike- Freiberga (Latvia) Former President Adam Lury (United Kingdom) of Sociology, University of Zagreb Former President Steven Heinz (Austria) CEO, Menemsha Ltd George Robertson Antonio Vitorino (Portugal) Co-Founder & Co-Chairman, Lawyer; former EU Commissioner Lansdowne Partners Ltd David Miliband (United Kingdom) (United Kingdom) Former Secretary General of NATO Annette Heuser (Germany) Andre Wilkens (Germany) MP, Former Secretary of State for Albert Rohan (Austria) Director for International Relations, Executive Director, Bertelsmann Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Stiftung Mercator Foundation Washington DC Former Secretary General for Foreign Alain Minc (France) Affairs Shirley Williams Diego Hidalgo (Spain) Head of AM Conseil; former chairman, Co-founder of Spanish newspaper Le Monde Dariusz Rosati (Poland) (United Kingdom) El País; President, FRIDE Former Foreign Minister Professor Emeritus, Kennedy School Nickolay Mladenov (Bulgaria) of Government; former Leader of the Jaap de Hoop Scheffer Adam D. Rotfeld (Poland) Liberal Democrats in the House of Foreign Minister; former Defence Former Foreign Minister; Co-Chairman (The Netherlands) Minister; former Member of European Lords Parliament of Polish-Russian Group on Difficult Former NATO Secretary General Matters, Commissioner of Euro- Carlos Alonso Zaldívar (Spain) Danuta Hübner (Poland) Dominique Moisi (France) Atlantic Security Initiative Ambassador to Brazil Politician, former EU Commissioner Senior Adviser, IFRI Daniel Sachs (Sweden) and professor of economics and CEO, Proventus since 2009 Member of the European Pierre Moscovici (France) Parliament and Chair of the Regional MP; former Minister for European Stefano Sannino (Italy) Development Committee. Affairs Deputy Director General for Enlargement, European Commission Michiel van Hulten Nils Muiznieks (Latvia) Director, Advanced Social and Political (The Netherlands) Pierre Schori (Sweden) Former Member of European Research Institute, University of Latvia Chair of Olof Palme Memorial Fund; Parliament Hildegard Müller (Germany) former Director General, FRIDE; former SRSG to Cote d´Ivoire Anna Ibrisagic (Sweden) Chairwoman, BDEW Bundesverband Member of European Parliament der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft Wolfgang Schüssel (Austria) MP; former Chancellor Jaakko Iloniemi (Finland) Wolfgang Münchau (Germany) Former Ambassador and former President, Eurointelligence ASBL Karel Schwarzenberg Executive Director, Crisis Management Kalypso Nicolaïdis (Greece/ (Czech Republic) Initiative France) Foreign Minister Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany) Professor of International Relations, Giuseppe Scognamiglio (Italy) Chairman, Munich Security University of Oxford Head of Institutional and International Conference; Global Head of Relations, UniCredit Government Affairs Allianz SE Daithi O’Ceallaigh (Ireland) Director-General, Institute of Narcís Serra (Spain) Lionel Jospin (France) International and European Affairs Chair of CIDOB Foundation; former Former Prime Minister Christine Ockrent (Belgium) Vice President of the Spanish Government Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom) CEO, Audiovisuel Extérieur de la Professor, London School of Economics France Radosław Sikorski (Poland) Foreign Minister Sylvie Kauffmann (France) Andrzej Olechowski (Poland) Executive Editor of Le Monde Former Foreign Minister Aleksander Smolar (Poland) Dick Oosting (The Netherlands) Chairman of the Board, Stefan Batory Glenys Kinnock Foundation (United Kingdom) CEO, European Council on Foreign Former Member of European Relations; former Europe Director, Javier Solana (Spain) Parliament; Shadow Lords Amnesty International Former EU High Representative for the Spokesperson on International Mabel van Oranje Common Foreign and Security Policy & Development Secretary-General of the Council of the (The Netherlands) EU; former Secretary General of NATO Olli Kivinen (Finland) CEO, the Elders Writer and columnist George Soros (Hungary/USA) Marcelino Oreja Aguirre (Spain) Founder and Chairman, Open Society Member of the Board, Fomento de Gerald Knaus (Austria) Institute Chairman of the European Stability Construcciones y Contratas; former EU Initiative and Carr Center Fellow Commissioner Goran Stefanovski (Macedonia) Playwright and Academic 15 [email protected] 35 OldQueenStreet,London,SW1H9JA,UnitedKingdom Published bytheEuropeanCouncilonForeignRelations(ECFR), ISBN: 978-1-906538-31-6 © ECFRMay2011. its authors. 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