Regional Power Rivalry and the Failure of the Arab Maghreb Union

- REPORT Regional Power Rivalry and the Failure of the Arab Maghreb Union Yasmina Allouche REPORT Regional Power Rivalry and the Failure of the Arab Maghreb Union Yasmina Allouche Regional Power Rivalry and the Failure of the Arab Maghreb Union © TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WRITTEN BY Yasmina Allouche PUBLISHER TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE JANUARY 2019 TRT WORLD İSTANBUL AHMET ADNAN SAYGUN STREET NO:83 34347 ULUS, BEŞİKTAŞ İSTANBUL / TURKEY TRT WORLD LONDON PORTLAND HOUSE 4 GREAT PORTLAND STREET NO:4 LONDON / UNITED KINGDOM TRT WORLD WASHINGTON D.C. 1819 L STREET NW SUITE 700 20036 WASHINGTON DC www.trtworld.com researchcentre.trtworld.com 4 Regional Power Rivalry and the Failure of the Arab Maghreb Union Introduction he Maghreb, which can five member states and despite the intention be literally translated in of promoting economic growth among its Arabic as a “place of setting members, the AMU has in fact lost more than of the sun” to denote the half of its economic weight in the world with commonly used meaning exports falling to less than 0.5% due to its lack of the “West”, is the term by of integration, the value of which annually has Twhich North Africa is referred to. been estimated at €7.5 billion. The three French-colonised states of Morocco, The large potential of the Maghreb region has Algeria and Tunisia as well as Libya and been lost to continuous political divisions among Mauritania are connected by religion, language state leaders unable to set aside differences or and culture and have a shared population of compromise for the sake of making the project nearly 100 million. The centuries of colonialism of Maghreb integration a success. Instead, the that unite the experiences of the region were process has been constantly derailed and the vital in creating the foundations for the post- treaty’s articles unable to significantly improve independence structuring to be defined by the social, economic and political aspects of the Maghreb integration (Bush and Seddon, 1999). region as intended. Momentum for political integration gathered The last AMU summit that included all members in the 1980’s following a number of meetings took place in 1994 and since then the five between the Maghreb state leaders from the member states have felt it sufficient to simply 1950’s onward. On February 17, 1989, the Arab repeat rhetorical commitments to Maghreb Maghreb Union (AMU) was established and a integration whilst actively investing efforts treaty signed in Marrakech by the five member elsewhere, in turn, disregarding the tenants of states. The aim of the treaty was to advance the agreement. economic integration, strengthen cooperation in foreign and defence policies, work towards The main reason for the failure of the AMU has the progress and prosperity of their societies, been the rivalry and competition between the preserve peace, justice and equality and region’s powerhouses, Algeria and Morocco. achieve free movement of persons and transfer These neighbours have not had a shared border of services, goods and capital (NATO Strategic since 1994 and relations have remained sour Direction, 2018). The treaty also established due to the contested Western Sahara issue. a customs union to be functioning by 1995, a common economic market in 2000, and Though the AMU’s renewal is perceived by subsequently a shared security regime. Algeria and Morocco as a key opportunity to address the security and economic challenges However, since its inception, very little has of the Maghreb, progress will remain stagnant been achieved. Only six of the more than 30 for the region so long as the key players fail to agreements signed have been ratified by all resolve their differences. 5 Regional Power Rivalry and the Failure of the Arab Maghreb Union From Dream to Attempted Reality By the inception of the AMU, a number of events The Tangier meeting in 1958 and the establishment had contributed to the fragmentation of the region of the Permanent Consultative Committee in 1964 in before reconciliation brought forth the quest for Tunis began the process of actualising sentiments of Maghreb unity. North Africa was defined by the follies Maghreb unity through frameworks of coordination of European colonialism marked during the 19th and and economic harmonisation (Mkimer, 2008). In 20th centuries. In order to protect L’Algérie Française June 1985, Morocco’s King Hassan II presented following its invasion in 1830, France invaded Tunisia Morocco’s candidature to the European Commission in 1881 and Morocco in 1912 incorporating these (EC) at the European Summit at Fontainebleau in protectorate states into the French Empire. Libya was France- in the same year the Algerian Minister of invaded in 1911 by Italy and Mauritania, suffering the Foreign Affairs announced Algeria’s commitment to least colonial interest, was part of French West Africa economic integration and the Maghreb union. The forming a strategic connection linking North and Maghreb High Commission and other specialised West Africa. commissions were established during a summit meeting in Zeralda in Algeria in June 1988 and a year The splitting of homogeneous ethnic groups into later the AMU was signed into existence by King British and French camps provoked the rise of new Hassan II (Morocco), Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (Tunisia), national identities and circumvented possibilities of Chadli Bendjedid (Algeira), Muammar Gaddafi (Libya) sovereignty through ethnic solidarity (Miles, 2015). and Maaouya Ould Sid’ahmed Taya (Mauritania) The borders that defined North and West Africa were (Treaty establishing the Arab Maghreb Union, 1989). set up as defence lines reflecting a history marked by military conflicts and diplomatic compromises The 1987 reconciliation of Tunisia and Libya and the instead of boundary lines formed through the course re-establishment of diplomatic relations between of natural history. All the boundaries in North Africa Algeria and Morocco in 1988 set the conditions that were French colonial creations that lacked knowledge made progression to the AMU possible (Taylor, 1993). of the terrain and the tribal structures within them. The AMU represented a medium that would prioritise They acted as administrative divisions which in the hopes of leaders, businessmen and citizens turn would provoke delimitation, demarcation, that may have felt side-lined by the Arab League, irredentism and territorial claims, which the nations representative of 300 million, and the African Union, promised each other would be resolved in brotherly representing over one billion. Initially, five observatory fashion post-independence. However, the primacy sub-committees were created to look at the pros and of national independence was the esteemed goal cons of Maghreb unification: economy, education, for national policy-makers over conflicting values of finances and customs, culture and information, social, development and unity (Zartman, 1965). human and security issues and institutions. The Sand War1 between Algeria and Morocco in 1963 Morocco and Algeria would lead on the economic until the state border agreement of 1973- ratified by committee, security would fall under Tunisia and Morocco only in 1989-; the dispute over Mauritania Libya would preside over institutions which required and Morocco’s recognition in 1969; territorial disputes consolidating the differing standpoints of the AMU between Tunisia and Algeria until 1970; and the Gulf members. The framework of the AMU was modelled of Gabès issue between Libya and Tunisia until 1988, on similar economic integration platforms like the highlighted the fragmentation of the region and the League of Arab States (LAS) and the European vital importance of integration (Busquets, 2014). Economic Community (EEC) that the AMU could implement as an example of successful regional unity. 1 In September 1963, a year after Algeria’s independence, a border conflict resulted in war over portions of Algeria’s provinces of Tindouf and Bechar which Morocco claimed to be a part of its territories. The absence of a delineation between Morocco and Algeria following Algeria’s independence resulted in the conflict. 6 Regional Power Rivalry and the Failure of the Arab Maghreb Union Neo-liberal political scientists like Joseph Nye, The 19 articles in the treaty discuss the union’s classify regional integration as the basis upon which organisation, defence and security, the final provisions the AMU was modelled, centred on governmental and stipulated goals. Of the 38 agreements signed in policies designed to remove or reduce barriers for the AMU’s treaty, 21 are economic in line with the goal the mutual exchange of services, goods and people of creating a trade hub in the region that would excel (Palmer, 1993). domestically as well as internationally (El-Maghur, 2011). The Presidential Council would consist of the five heads of state as the primary decision makers in the Regional integration would help increase domestic institution. A consultative assembly in Algiers was and foreign investment, global competitiveness, established, a Maghreb Bank for Investment and promote the region’s public goods and prevent Foreign Trade (BMICE) in Tunis, a regional judicial conflict (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004). authority in Nouakchott, a General Secretariat in However despite its best intentions, the AMU has Rabat and a Maghreb University and academy in failed to actualise substantial change or indeed Tripoli (El-Maghur, 2011). honour its commitment of Maghreb unity. The AMU was primarily viewed as an economic The organisation has remained dormant since its strategy that would capitalise on the region’s assets last summit held in 1994 in Tunisia and little of the and relaunch the Maghreb as a trade hub, drawing treaty’s principles have been honoured. The shakeup from its position between the Mediterranean and of the region following the Arab Spring in 2011 had Atlantic and utilising the vast reserves of oil, gas, the potential to redevelop the AMU as a platform by water and uranium of the Maghreb to revolutionise which frustrated citizens might be able to see some the region’s economy (Hudson, 1991).

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