John V. Parachini U.S. SENATE RATIFICATION OF THE CWC: LESSONS FOR THE CTBT by John V. Parachini John V. Parachini is a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center and a Washington Representative for the Monterey Institutes Center for Nonproliferation Studies. He chaired the Poison Gas Task Force, an informal coalition of more than 20 organizations that coordinated public education activities surrounding the U.S. Senate debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention. he ratification of the Chemi- Senate rejection of the CWC force began that compelled the Tcal Weapons Convention would have significantly dimmed the United States to ratify the accord or (CWC) in April 1997 was the prospects for the Comprehensive suffer the consequences of not be- first major foreign policy debate of Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a future ing an original state party. The po- President Bill Clintons second term. START III agreement, and amend- litical and economic costs would While the U.S. Senates 74 to 26 ments to the ABM treaty and have been considerable for the approval of the CWC proved that nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties United States if it had failed to be there is a basis for bipartisan coop- for the South Pacific (Rarotonga) an original state party to an interna- eration in the 105th Congress on arms and Africa (Pelindaba). Several of tional agreement that it led other control policy, gaining Senate ap- these completed agreements are not nations to adopt.2 While this clear proval proved extremely difficult. perceived to have as solid creden- deadline was critical to moving the Had the Senate rejected the Conven- tials as the CWC, and others are still U.S. process of ratification, it also tion, however, international arms under negotiation. The reluctance of created a situation that accentuated control efforts might have suffered the Russian Duma to ratify the Open political differences on the role of a devastating blow, given the num- Skies Treaty, START II, and the arms control in Americas foreign ber of other important agreements CWC only complicates the process and defense policy. slated for submission to the Senate in the United States. As the first The hard-fought political battle that do not have the political legacy major, multilateral arms control for Senate approval of the CWC is a 1 that the CWC enjoyed. If the Re- treaty of the post-Cold War era to stark reminder of the tenuous sup- publican-controlled Senate had re- be submitted for U.S. Senate advice port for formal negotiated arms con- jected the CWC, which was and consent, the CWC may have trol agreements in the United States. negotiated over the course of two defined the terms of debate for other The CWC ratification fight revealed Republican presidential administra- arms control measures to be consid- that the Cold War debate about the tions, what chances would arms con- ered in this decade. role and value of arms control is still trol agreements concluded during When the sixty-fifth country rati- a part of the American partisan po- the Clinton administration have fied the CWC in October 1996, an litical landscape. Despite the historic stood? 180-day countdown to entry-into- opportunity of the post-Cold War 62 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 John V. Parachini world, the near collapse of the Rus- entails intrusive inspection provi- concluded on September 3, 1992, sian armed forces, and the percep- sions to be implemented by interna- and it had been opened for signature tion of most Americans that the tional organizations. The conclusion in Paris on January 13, 1993. greatest national security threat is and the implementation of these ac- Former Secretary of State Lawrence terrorism, opposing arms control cords will likely establish patterns Eagleburger had signed the agree- measures remains a litmus test for for other arms control measures. ment on behalf of the United States, 3 many conservatives. In order to assess the prospects for and there was every expectation that The CWCs credentials led many CTBT ratification by the current this treaty would receive early atten- to believe that it would easily obtain Senate, therefore, it is useful to out- tion by the incoming Clinton admin- Senate approval. The CWC, nego- line why the CWC ratification was istration. More than a year after the tiated during the Reagan administra- such a fractious fight. Similarly, it agreement was signed, Arms Con- tion and concluded during the Bush is important to outline the key ingre- trol and Disarmament Agency administration, had a Republican dients in the CWC victory. After all, (ACDA) Director John D. Holum legacy that historically has been a despite the heated conflict surround- said that he was convinced that the great asset for arms control agree- ing CWC ratification, it was ap- convention [would] be ratified ments considered by the Senate.4 proved by a 74 to 26 vote, which promptly by the Senate and that it 9 The CWC also enjoyed the support included a majority of the Republi- [would] enter into force in 1995. of the U.S. chemical industry, the can members of the Senate (29 to While the administration submitted overwhelming majority of the active 26). When comparing the attributes the CWC for Senate consideration and retired military, and all of the of the two accords, however, the on November 23, 1993, the Senate Americas NATO allies and major pluses and minuses do not bode well failed to act on it until after the his- economic trading partners. Further- for Senate approval of the CTBT. toric Republican victory in both more, the United States had already Fortunately, as shown below, not all houses of Congress in the fall 1994 10 committed itself to destroy its factors have the same value. The key mid-term elections. Preoccupied chemical weapons stockpile in 1985. to approval of the CTBT lies in the with domestic policy, the Clinton ad- The CWC required that other coun- Clinton administrations ability to ministration had failed to pursue tries adopt the same military posture muster the required political energy Senate ratification of the CWC dur- that the U.S. had adopted unilater- to capitalize on the CTBTs uniquely ing its first two years and thus had ally a decade earlier. And, finally, positive attributes and to counter the lost the advantage of a Democratic chemical weapons are widely similar negative factors that dogged Senate. The cost of this inaction viewed as a heinous weapon with the ratification of the CWC. turned out to be high. very little military value. Opinion A central criticism of President surveys published in 1997 showed DIFFICULTIES FACING Clintons foreign policy during his that there was overwhelming public SENATE APPROVAL OF THE first two years in office was that it support, across all demographic CWC lacked focus, consistency, and sus- groups, for arms control treaty mea- tained presidential attention.11 How Despite the many political assets sures banning the production, stock- the Clinton administration managed of the CWC, it faced surprisingly piling, and use of chemical Senate consideration of the CWC in strong opposition in the U.S. Sen- weapons.5 its first term was in many ways para- ate. Even ardent opponents were digmatic of what was wrong with the The next arms control agreement surprised by the amount of interest administrations foreign policy.12 the Clinton administration intends to in the Senate, and conservative Administration officials responsible submit for Senate consideration is policy circles.8 At least six factors for managing the ratification of the the CTBT.6 Among the host of arms help explain the difficulty the CWC CWC hoped that the treaty would control treaties that require Senate faced in the Senate as well as the move quietly through the hoops of advice and consent, it is the most intensity of opposition to an accord Senate review without much notice. analogous to the CWC.7 Like the that many expected to be speedily In the end, they hoped the CWC CWC, the CTBT is a multilateral approved. treaty that is universal in scope and would be approved by the Senate Negotiations on the CWC had just like the Open Skies Treaty: late The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 63 John V. Parachini at night before a Congressional re- candidate Steve Forbes, maintains a defining the CWC on their terms. cess and without a word raised in op- unilateralist and isolationist philoso- CWC negotiator Ambassador position. The key difference between phy of the world. According to this Stephen Ledogar, who labored for the two accords is that the Open view, the United States should shun years on the treaty during the Bush Skies Treaty went before a Demo- international obligations comparable administration, commented that the cratic Senate in the fall of 1993. to those assumed by other states charges against the CWC by oppo- Once the Republicans regained con- when they may restrict U.S. freedom nents were so far from being based- trol of both houses of Congress in of action. Protection of American in-fact that I just dont know what 1994, for the first time in 40 years, interests is best achieved without the document they (the critics) are dis- a low-profile approach to ratification encumbrances of working with other paraging.15 Regardless of whose of any treaty became highly unlikely. states in international bodies. Both interpretation was correct, the terms Thus, the first factor that made the wings of the Republican party saw of debate were set by CWC oppo- CWC ratification difficult was the the CWC according to their particu- nents, and its supporters did not re- Clinton administrations failure to lar world view.