John V. Parachini

U.S. SENATE RATIFICATION OF THE CWC: LESSONS FOR THE CTBT

by John V. Parachini

John V. Parachini is a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center and a Washington Representative for the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies. He chaired the Poison Gas Task Force, an informal coalition of more than 20 organizations that coordinated public education activities surrounding the U.S. Senate debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention.

he ratification of the Chemi- Senate rejection of the CWC force began that compelled the Tcal Weapons Convention would have significantly dimmed the United States to ratify the accord or (CWC) in April 1997 was the prospects for the Comprehensive suffer the consequences of not be- first major foreign policy debate of Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a future ing an original state party. The po- President Bill Clinton’s second term. START III agreement, and amend- litical and economic costs would While the U.S. Senate’s 74 to 26 ments to the ABM treaty and have been considerable for the approval of the CWC proved that nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties United States if it had failed to be there is a basis for bipartisan coop- for the South Pacific (Rarotonga) an original state party to an interna- eration in the 105th Congress on arms and Africa (Pelindaba). Several of tional agreement that it led other control policy, gaining Senate ap- these completed agreements are not nations to adopt.2 While this clear proval proved extremely difficult. perceived to have as solid creden- deadline was critical to moving the Had the Senate rejected the Conven- tials as the CWC, and others are still U.S. process of ratification, it also tion, however, international arms under negotiation. The reluctance of created a situation that accentuated control efforts might have suffered the Russian Duma to ratify the Open political differences on the role of a devastating blow, given the num- Skies Treaty, START II, and the arms control in America’s foreign ber of other important agreements CWC only complicates the process and defense policy. slated for submission to the Senate in the United States. As the first The hard-fought political battle that do not have the political legacy major, multilateral arms control for Senate approval of the CWC is a 1 that the CWC enjoyed. If the Re- treaty of the post-Cold War era to stark reminder of the tenuous sup- publican-controlled Senate had re- be submitted for U.S. Senate advice port for formal negotiated arms con- jected the CWC, which was and consent, the CWC may have trol agreements in the United States. negotiated over the course of two defined the terms of debate for other The CWC ratification fight revealed Republican presidential administra- arms control measures to be consid- that the Cold War debate about the tions, what chances would arms con- ered in this decade. role and value of arms control is still trol agreements concluded during When the sixty-fifth country rati- a part of the American partisan po- the Clinton administration have fied the CWC in October 1996, an litical landscape. Despite the historic stood? 180-day countdown to entry-into- opportunity of the post-Cold War

62 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 John V. Parachini world, the near collapse of the Rus- entails intrusive inspection provi- concluded on September 3, 1992, sian armed forces, and the percep- sions to be implemented by interna- and it had been opened for signature tion of most Americans that the tional organizations. The conclusion in Paris on January 13, 1993. greatest national security threat is and the implementation of these ac- Former Secretary of State Lawrence terrorism, opposing arms control cords will likely establish patterns Eagleburger had signed the agree- measures remains a litmus test for for other arms control measures. ment on behalf of the United States, 3 many conservatives. In order to assess the prospects for and there was every expectation that The CWC’s credentials led many CTBT ratification by the current this treaty would receive early atten- to believe that it would easily obtain Senate, therefore, it is useful to out- tion by the incoming Clinton admin- Senate approval. The CWC, nego- line why the CWC ratification was istration. More than a year after the tiated during the Reagan administra- such a fractious fight. Similarly, it agreement was signed, Arms Con- tion and concluded during the Bush is important to outline the key ingre- trol and Disarmament Agency administration, had a Republican dients in the CWC victory. After all, (ACDA) Director John D. Holum legacy that historically has been a despite the heated conflict surround- said that he was “convinced that the great asset for arms control agree- ing CWC ratification, it was ap- convention [would] be ratified ments considered by the Senate.4 proved by a 74 to 26 vote, which promptly by the Senate and that it 9 The CWC also enjoyed the support included a majority of the Republi- [would] enter into force in 1995.” of the U.S. chemical industry, the can members of the Senate (29 to While the administration submitted overwhelming majority of the active 26). When comparing the attributes the CWC for Senate consideration and retired military, and all of the of the two accords, however, the on November 23, 1993, the Senate America’s NATO allies and major pluses and minuses do not bode well failed to act on it until after the his- economic trading partners. Further- for Senate approval of the CTBT. toric Republican victory in both more, the United States had already Fortunately, as shown below, not all houses of Congress in the fall 1994 10 committed itself to destroy its factors have the same value. The key mid-term elections. Preoccupied chemical weapons stockpile in 1985. to approval of the CTBT lies in the with domestic policy, the Clinton ad- The CWC required that other coun- Clinton administration’s ability to ministration had failed to pursue tries adopt the same military posture muster the required political energy Senate ratification of the CWC dur- that the U.S. had adopted unilater- to capitalize on the CTBT’s uniquely ing its first two years and thus had ally a decade earlier. And, finally, positive attributes and to counter the lost the advantage of a Democratic chemical weapons are widely similar negative factors that dogged Senate. The cost of this inaction viewed as a heinous weapon with the ratification of the CWC. turned out to be high. very little military value. Opinion A central criticism of President surveys published in 1997 showed DIFFICULTIES FACING Clinton’s foreign policy during his that there was overwhelming public SENATE APPROVAL OF THE first two years in office was that it support, across all demographic CWC lacked focus, consistency, and sus- groups, for arms control treaty mea- tained presidential attention.11 How Despite the many political assets sures banning the production, stock- the Clinton administration managed of the CWC, it faced surprisingly piling, and use of chemical Senate consideration of the CWC in strong opposition in the U.S. Sen- weapons.5 its first term was in many ways para- ate. Even ardent opponents were digmatic of what was wrong with the The next arms control agreement surprised by the amount of interest administration’s foreign policy.12 the Clinton administration intends to in the Senate, and conservative Administration officials responsible submit for Senate consideration is policy circles.8 At least six factors for managing the ratification of the the CTBT.6 Among the host of arms help explain the difficulty the CWC CWC hoped that the treaty would control treaties that require Senate faced in the Senate as well as the move quietly through the hoops of advice and consent, it is the most intensity of opposition to an accord Senate review without much notice. analogous to the CWC.7 Like the that many expected to be speedily In the end, they hoped the CWC CWC, the CTBT is a multilateral approved. treaty that is universal in scope and would be approved by the Senate Negotiations on the CWC had just like the Open Skies Treaty: late

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 63 John V. Parachini at night before a Congressional re- candidate Steve Forbes, maintains a defining the CWC on their terms. cess and without a word raised in op- unilateralist and isolationist philoso- CWC negotiator Ambassador position. The key difference between phy of the world. According to this Stephen Ledogar, who labored for the two accords is that the Open view, the United States should shun years on the treaty during the Bush Skies Treaty went before a Demo- international obligations comparable administration, commented that the cratic Senate in the fall of 1993. to those assumed by other states charges against the CWC by oppo- Once the Republicans regained con- when they may restrict U.S. freedom nents were “so far from being based- trol of both houses of Congress in of action. Protection of American in-fact that I just don’t know what 1994, for the first time in 40 years, interests is best achieved without the document they (the critics) are dis- a low-profile approach to ratification encumbrances of working with other paraging.”15 Regardless of whose of any treaty became highly unlikely. states in international bodies. Both interpretation was correct, the terms Thus, the first factor that made the wings of the Republican party saw of debate were set by CWC oppo- CWC ratification difficult was the the CWC according to their particu- nents, and its supporters did not re- Clinton administration’s failure to lar world view. In the end, the inter- gain the initiative until spring 1997. give it the political priority required nationalist wing of the party CWC opponents tried, and to a cer- to secure Senate approval. prevailed. tain extent succeeded, in defining The Republican intra-party fight Part of the reason the Republican opposition to the CWC as a litmus 16 on foreign policy in the post-Cold party lacks consensus on foreign test for conservatives. War world was the second factor policy is because the international- The fourth factor troubling the troubling CWC ratification. One ist and moderate foreign policy base CWC was the highly charged parti- leading political commentator sug- of the Republican party is shrinking. san climate in Washington. Some gested that the intra-party fight over Three prominent Senators from this Republicans harbor a visceral dislike the CWC might “decide whether wing of the party—Mark Hatfield for President Clinton, and they are superhawks or moderates dominate from Oregon, Nancy Kassenbaum eager to thwart his policy efforts at the Republican party’s foreign from Kansas, and William Cohen every possible opportunity. Many of policy.”13 Moreover, the commenta- from Maine—retired in 1996. Ad- the Republicans who helped lead the tor added that the CWC debate indi- ditionally, Senators Bob Dole and Republican party back into power cated that the Republicans were “in Alan Simpson, who had records of for the first time in 40 years were danger of reacting to the end of the supporting active U.S. engagement frustrated by the president’s ability Cold War in an extremist way that in world affairs and arms control, to lay claim to their political agenda. mirrors the Democrats after Viet- also left the Senate in 1996. The In addition, they were incensed by nam.” One wing of the Republican political center of the party has the president’s ability to avoid one party is represented by tough- moved decidedly to the right, and the political pitfall after another. They minded internationalists like General intra-party struggle over the CWC were anxious to draw political blood Colin Powell and Senators Richard is a clear indication of this shift. wherever they could, and CWC rati- Lugar and John McCain, who be- Determined opposition from the fication seemed to present a ripe lieve that American leadership in right wing of the Republican party opportunity. Anything that this presi- world affairs is vital to the country was the third major factor working dent put on his political agenda, re- and entails costs that are worth pay- against CWC ratification. Com- gardless of its clear Republican ing. Furthermore, they believe that prised primarily of former mid-level credentials, they were anxious to op- a failure to assume the appropriate Reagan administration appointees pose. leadership role will leave the man- who served in the Department of De- A fifth factor complicating CWC agement of world affairs to other fense, CWC opponents waged an ag- ratification stemmed from the role a states less able or inclined to uphold gressive campaign.14 Convention few key senators played in the treaty the political values and economic opponents swamped the anemic ratification process. All three of the rights the United States deems im- campaign of the Clinton administra- chairs of the Senate committees with portant. The other wing of the party, tion and the supporters of arms con- jurisdiction over national security is- symbolized by people like Senator trol and succeeded initially in sues were opposed to the CWC. Jesse Helms and former presidential

64 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 John V. Parachini

Senator Helms, Senator Richard some believe that national security hard-pressed to vote for it in 1996. Shelby, and Senator Strom issues are not solved by crass politi- They could not hand the president a Thurmond, the chairs of the Foreign cal deals, it is naive to believe oth- political victory while their party’s Relations, Intelligence, and Armed erwise. Finding the right political presidential candidate lagged behind Service committees respectively, package to meet both the president’s in the presidential contest. But free control the hearing schedule, the list and the majority leader’s interests of election-year politics, Republican of witnesses, and committee busi- inevitably took time. Additionally, senators were better able to consider ness. Their opposition, particularly part of Majority Leader Lott’s di- the CWC on its merits. Senator Helms’s, was a major ob- lemma was when to indicate his Another major factor was the stacle to Senate consideration of the views on the CWC. By waiting un- Clinton administration’s new foreign CWC. As chairman of the commit- til the last day of debate on the CWC, policy team’s commitment to push- tee with primary jurisdiction for the majority leader kept many of his ing the CWC. The previous team treaty matters, Helms was able to loyal followers in the undecided col- simply did not make the required ef- bottle up the treaty in his committee umn up until the last moment. The fort to ensure Senate approval. Dur- for several months. In the end, longer Lott kept his views private, ing the 104th Congress, ACDA Helms released the treaty from the the more the partisan debate over the Director John Holum was the most floor after he extracted a commit- treaty continued, and the higher the senior administration official who ment from the Clinton administra- political price the Clinton adminis- consistently championed the CWC. tion to consolidate three foreign tration needed to pay for its even- Shortly after the failed attempt at policy agencies within the State De- tual passage. Senate ratification in September partment, a bureaucratic reorganiza- 1996, some executive branch offi- tion measure that Helms had been KEY FACTORS LEADING TO cials began discussing in interagency seeking since the previous session SENATE APPROVAL OF THE meetings the possibility of the presi- of Congress. The CWC experience CWC dent recalling the Senate into spe- showed how even a single key sena- Several factors help explain the cial session to consider the CWC.17 tor can stall Senate consideration of difference between the near defeat Not since the 1860s had a president a treaty. The CTBT will probably of the CWC in September 1996 and called a lame duck Congress back face similar hurdles. the 74 to 26 vote in favor of the CWC into session. While everyone seemed How Senator Lott managed Sen- in April 1997. Some of these fac- to think this plan would not succeed, ate consideration of the CWC was tors are unique to the CWC ratifica- it did underscore the urgency of find- the sixth factor hampering Senate tion debate. Others are more generic. ing a way to obtain Senate approval consideration of the CWC. While All of them are noteworthy for the of the CWC before it entered into Lott’s support for the accord was CTBT and other arms control mea- force in spring 1997. A game plan crucial to its eventual passage, he sures requiring Senate review and for ratification was drawn up by mid- managed the Senate process such approval. level administration officials for re- that he would be protected from the view at a deputy secretary-level In the spring of 1997, free of the wrath of the right wing in the Sen- meeting. The meeting was resched- encumbrances of the 1996 re-elec- ate Republican caucus. In the end, uled four times before it was finally tion campaign, the Clinton adminis- Lott was the lone member of the ma- convened.18 Approval of this plan tration once again sought Senate jority leadership to vote for the in mid-December 1996 launched an advice and consent regarding the CWC. Giving the right wing greater impressive executive branch-wide CWC. Without the vicissitudes of say in the process inevitably added campaign for CWC ratification. election-year politics, the adminis- to the conflict in the Senate over With its back against the wall, the tration was able to establish a pro- CWC. Clinton administration proved, once cess of negotiation with Lott and again, that it could mount an inten- The majority leader and the presi- other key senators on CWC ratifica- sive effort to achieve an important dent are always negotiating over a tion. Several Republican senators, policy goal. broad array of issues, and the CWC who eventually voted to approve the became one of those issues. While CWC in 1997, would have been Secretary of State Madeleine

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 65 John V. Parachini

Albright indicated shortly after her by Republicans and promoted by a try into force date as a clear dead- confirmation—during appearances Republican secretary of defense in line helped force the Clinton admin- on television talk shows, in a state- a Democratic administration. State- istration, the Senate, and ment before the Senate Foreign Re- ments by administration officials and nongovernmental supporters of the lations Committee, and in newspaper many former executive branch offi- CWC to move the issue to the front editorials—that Senate approval of cials who had served in Republican of the national political agenda. the CWC was one of her two top leg- administrations helped establish the Another factor favoring the CWC 19 islative priorities. She traveled to CWC as a bipartisan treaty. Secre- was support from the military. Such Texas to appear at former Secretary tary of Defense William Cohen, support was essential to countering of State James R. Baker’s Institute whose appointment itself demon- the charge that the CWC would en- for Public Policy, where he endorsed strated the Clinton team’s commit- danger troops in the field and the CWC. She also paid a call on ment to bipartisanship, regularly weaken American chemical and bio- 20 former President Bush; greeting the promoted the CWC during his ap- logical defenses. The Clinton admin- press after their meeting, Bush stated pearances on talk shows and in edi- istration was determined not to let 22 his support for the CWC. Albright torials. The support of these key CWC opponents cast its support for then traveled to Wingate, North Republicans was essential to por- the treaty as yet another sign of how Carolina, to appear at Wingate Uni- traying the CWC as a measure truly Democrats are weak on defense. The versity with Senator Helms and to in the national interest and beyond two White House events held to deliver the annual Jesse Helms Lec- partisanship. promote the CWC featured military ture. In her remarks, she held her The existence of a clear deadline support for the CWC prominently.23 ground on policy priorities, such as was another factor that helped secure With a letter signed by 17 former ratification of the CWC, but she also U.S. ratification of the CWC. When senior military commanders, includ- went to great lengths to establish a the sixty-fifth country ratified the ing several chairmen of the Joint cordial and respectful relationship CWC in October 1996, a six-month Chiefs of Staff, the White House 21 with Helms. By all accounts, the countdown began for entry- into- successfully fended off charges that interpersonal dynamic between force. Countries that did not ratify the CWC would harm the country’s Albright and Helms was unique and the CWC before the entry-into- force national security.24 much more constructive than that date would be subjected to economic with any other Clinton administra- The campaign for CWC ratifica- penalties. Moreover, failure for the tion involved a much more aggres- tion official. Hence, Albright not United States—which had led the only uttered the words that the CWC sive push for the accord’s approval international community through the by constituency groups than had was a priority, she spent precious CWC negotiations— to become an time and energy traveling the coun- been undertaken in the past.25 While original state party of the CWC CWC opponents waged an effective try soliciting the public support of risked damaging American leader- other major figures. These efforts campaign against the CWC in 1996, ship in other international fora. For their vigorous opposition in 1997 made a significant difference in the President Clinton, CWC ratification public campaign for the treaty. was outgunned by an active lobby- was the first major foreign policy ing effort by convention support- Another key ingredient to CWC test of his second term. Failure to ers.26 The chemical industry, guided approval was portraying treaty rati- get the Senate to approve the CWC by its Washington-based trade asso- fication as a test of bipartisanship. would have adverse implications for ciation— the Chemical Manufactur- When the voters returned both Presi- the political health of the president’s ers Association—waged a major dent Clinton and the Republicans in second term in office. The costs to campaign in support of the conven- Congress to power, many interpreted the United States and President Clin- tion.27 Given the potential impact of this as a call for bipartisan govern- ton of not entering the CWC as an the CWC inspection regime and the ment. The CWC was the perfect for- original party were considerable. historical case of chemical industry eign policy issue for the Clinton Avoiding the disastrous political opposition to the 1925 Geneva “Pro- administration to promote as an ex- consequences and economic penal- tocol for the Prohibition of Use in ample of its commitment to biparti- ties motivated all parties concerned War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or sanship. Here was a treaty negotiated to take action. Thus, having the en-

66 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 John V. Parachini

Other Gases, and of Bacteriological tee standing to move the CWC for- ate conditions. Finally, the agreed Methods of Warfare,” industry sup- ward. conditions enabled Senator Lott to 28 port for the CWC was important. Another major factor facilitating allow the right wing of the Republi- These industry efforts were comple- Senate consideration of the CWC can caucus to express its opposition mented by vigorous media and was a series of political bargains the to the treaty and yet still ensure that grassroots campaigns waged by a Clinton administration concluded the Senate disposed of its duties in range of nongovernmental groups, an orderly fashion. with Senators Lott and Helms.30 including arms control advocates, These bargains included acceptance While all sides would deny that scientists, religious denominations, of conditions to the Senate resolu- the CWC moved forward through environmentalists, business leaders, tion of ratification, a commitment to the Senate briar patch because of and many former government offi- integrate independent foreign policy political accommodations the Clin- 29 cials and members of Congress. agencies into the State Department, ton administration made with Sena- The collective impact of this non- and a willingness to submit other tors Helms and Lott, there is little governmental effort underscored the arms control measures the Senate doubt that they were essential.33 popular support the CWC enjoyed felt it had the right to review. In mid- Senator Helms had been advocating and raised the political downside for February 1997, Senator Biden sent the consolidation of the U.S. Agency senators who might vote against it. President Clinton a confidential for International Development, the Leadership change on the Senate memo advising that he needed to U.S. Information Agency, and the Foreign Relations Committee was provide Senators Lott and Helms ACDA ever since he became the another major factor leading to Sen- with some quid pro quo.31 Undoubt- chairman of the Foreign Relations ate approval of the CWC. Senator edly, both sides factored these po- Committee in 1995. Rebuffed by the Richard Lugar (Republican-Indiana) litical agreements on arms control Clinton administration during the was practically a one-man band for matters into a broader political 104th Congress on State Department the CWC in the months leading up puzzle that included unrelated issues reorganization, Helms pressed his to Senate consideration in 1996. high on their respective political case with Secretary Albright and Senator Lugar was widely regarded agendas. Securing Senate advice and others throughout the CWC negotia- as the senator most knowledgeable consent inevitably involves this type tions during the 105th Congress. on the CWC, but he needed to be of bargaining process. Given the difficulty agencies would supported by others in his party as The 28 agreed conditions added have in getting adequate funding and well as Democratic proponents. Af- to the CWC and the process of their new appointees confirmed, the Clin- ter the 1996 election, Senator Joseph negotiation were essential to the suc- ton administration finally brokered Biden (Democrat-Delaware) became cessful conclusion of the CWC for a consolidation arrangement that sat- 34 the ranking minority member on the several reasons.32 First, the found- isfied Senator Helms. Senator committee. Biden brought two assets ing fathers gave the Senate the role Helms then allowed the CWC to to the treaty’s management that had of providing advice as well as con- move from the Senate Foreign been lacking before. First, he as- sent on treaties. The Senate’s advice Relations Committee to the floor of sembled a new and highly skilled is generally cast in the form of con- the Senate for debate and a vote. staff to support his committee work. ditions that outline its understand- The last factors essential to the Second, Biden proved an effective ing of certain provisions of the treaty. CWC’s eventual approval by the interlocutor with Senator Helms. Second, Senate Republican votes Senate were endorsements from Biden negotiated with Helms in a were easier to get if senators could Senator Lott and former Senator fashion that respected Helms’s role point to how they had improved the Dole. These endorsements created a as chairman of the committee. The U.S. understanding of its treaty com- political climate in which many un- personal chemistry between the two mitments through these conditions. decided Republican senators felt men worked well. Biden’s question- This allowed senators to say that they could support the CWC. Treaty ing and interrogation skills were while they hesitated to support the opponents felt they had the votes to demonstrated during the floor de- CWC in 1996, they could support the defeat the CWC the week before the bate. Finally, there was a Democratic accord in 1997 because of the Sen- vote.35 Even CWC supporters felt champion with appropriate commit-

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 67 John V. Parachini that there were 15 to 20 undecided the CWC experience, arms control away from the ratification challenge. Republican senators prior to Sena- supporters are now looking to mea- The administration also seems inter- tor Dole’s endorsement.36 Dole, sures that would keep the arms con- ested in using the CTBT as an issue who had crippled the trol process alive, but avoid a rather in the 1998 mid-term election.43 administration’s attempt to gain torturous review by the U.S. Sen- During the second term of a presi- Senate ratification in 1996 with an ate.39 Some senior Congressional dency, the party that controls the eleventh hour letter to Senate Ma- advisors stated that their senators White House generally loses some jority Leader Lott saying he had res- were not likely to be leaders again seats in the Congress. However, de- ervations about the CWC, appeared on an accord like the CTBT.40 cades of polling data suggest that a with President Clinton and a host of However, some executive branch nuclear test ban remains extremely 44 military leaders to endorse the treaty. officials have drawn a different con- popular with the American people. Dole felt that the 28 conditions ad- clusion from the CWC experience. The administration is gambling on equately addressed his concerns. Before an international conference the prospect the 18 Senate Demo- While he recognized that the CWC of nonproliferation and arms control crats and 16 Senate Republicans up was not perfect, he thought that experts, Deputy National Security for re-election will find it hard to op- “there [were] adequate safeguards to Advisor James Steinberg stated that pose a treaty that was first proposed 37 protect American interests.” In his the Clinton administration plans to by Republican President floor statement, Senator Lott cited a submit the CTBT to the Senate and Eisenhower. letter from President Clinton and call for hearings and a vote by While the diplomatic rationale for argued that the president had made 1998.41 Senior foreign policy advi- pushing ahead is clear, the political an “ironclad commitment” to with- sors in the Clinton administration strategy is daring. The administra- draw from the CWC if its provisions seem to interpret the CWC as a tion and its arms control allies in inadvertently resulted in the prolif- “training experience” for how to Congress and the nongovernmental eration of chemical weapons.38 manage the 105th Senate’s consider- communities are much better pre- Numerous Republican senators in- ation of a controversial arms control pared for a treaty fight. However, the dicated that they would remain un- agreement—and win. Furthermore, Clinton administration will need to decided until Majority Leader Lott they recognize that American lead- wage the campaign without the as- indicated how he would vote on the ership on the test ban is critical to sistance of an independent ACDA. CWC. The combination of the getting other countries to ratify the The first opportunity to judge the ef- former and the current majority lead- agreement before the entry-into- fects of folding ACDA into the State ers endorsing the CWC in the days force date in September 1998. By Department may be during the before the Senate vote sent a strong moving ahead with Senate review of CTBT ratification campaign. signal to undecided Republican the CTBT, the United States is also senators that it was important for the continuing to make progress towards SIMILARITIES AND country that the Senate approve the its Article VI obligations under the DIFFERENCES OF SENATE CWC and that it was politically safe Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of CONSIDERATION OF THE for Republicans to do so. Nuclear Weapons.42 The Clinton ad- CWC AND CTBT ministration also recognizes that Re- The CTBT’s negative similarities LESSONS OF SENATE publican control of the Senate is and differences seem to suggest that CONSIDERATION OF THE liable to increase after the 1998 elec- securing Senate approval of the CWC FOR THE CTBT tions. Thus, the best chance for CTBT will be more difficult than the President Clinton to secure Senate In the immediate aftermath of the approval process for the CWC. approval of the one major arms con- CWC ratification debate, few execu- However, not all aspects of the two trol agreement negotiated during his tive branch officials, Congressional accords are equal in value. At the administration may be during the staff, or nongovernmental support- moment, the following four negative 105th Congress. ers of arms control could imagine factors and three positive factors are waging another fight for Senate ap- These are good reasons for the probably most important for evalu- proval of an arms control treaty any Clinton administration not to shy ating the prospects of the CTBT in time in the near future. In light of

68 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 John V. Parachini

the 105th Senate. might be brought into force. One im- CTBT. With each passing day, Presi- First, the CTBT does not have any plication of this international legal dent Clinton and his political advi- recent Republican legacy of support. treaty limbo is that the Senate may sors assess their policy agenda with The Bush administration opposed not perceive a firm deadline for rati- an eye to the president’s place in his- Congressional calls for a cessation fication. On the contrary, Senate tory. NATO expansion and the of testing, and the 1996 Republican opponents of the accord will likely CTBT make for an impressive for- Party Platform actually stated its charge that they cannot render their eign policy record for the first presi- opposition to a test ban. Thus, the advice and consent on the treaty un- dent whose entire term occurred in Clinton administration will have til they know whether or not it will the post-Cold War era. considerable difficulty establishing ever be brought into force. Second, nuclear issues, in general, the bipartisan credentials of the Finally, chemical industry support and a ban on underground nuclear CTBT and finding Republicans will- was an important advantage for the explosions, in particular, are widely ing to take the lead in the Senate. CWC. There is no analogue to that understood by the media and the Determined Senate Republican support for the CTBT. The CWC public. Decades of concern about the was the first major arms control prospect of nuclear war should make opposition can be expected.45 The Senate majority leader, leaders of the agreement to affect a large portion the key issues pertaining to the test Senate Republican Caucus, and the of American civilian industry. The ban easier to conceptualize and com- three key committee chairmen who reach of this treaty did generate con- municate. The CWC covers a cat- have important jurisdiction over the cern about international intrusion egory of weaponry that has not CTBT, all have voting records op- into America domestic affairs and received as much attention over the posed to a cessation of nuclear test- possible harmful effects on U.S. years as nuclear weapons. The me- 47 ing. Senator Jon Kyl (Republican- business. However, when chemical dia, members of Congress, and the Arizona), who led the opposition to industry lobbyists visited Senators to public are more familiar with the po- the CWC, has already commenced urge their support for the CWC, few litical dimensions of nuclear weap- his anti-CTBT campaign by attach- Senators could dismiss them with- ons and their control. The test ban ing a “sense of the Senate” resolu- out considering the political costs. itself has been the subject of exten- tion to the fiscal year 1998 defense There are no obvious domestic con- sive public education and lobbying bill.46 Even the voting records of stituencies that have either the po- campaigns for many years. The Clin- Republican champions of the CWC, litical power or the economic stake ton administration and its support- such as Senators McCain and Lugar, in the outcome of CTBT ratification. ers will be able to build upon this indicate that they have not supported While the factors weighing base during the ratification debate. a cessation of nuclear testing on four against CTBT ratification are sig- The CTBT will have very little different Senate votes in the 1990s. nificant, the factors in favor of Sen- impact on American domestic life. A clear entry-into-force deadline ate approval are also considerable. The CWC was vulnerable to criti- was a critical factor forcing the Clin- First, the Clinton administration cism from opponents, who argued ton administration and the Senate to seems ready to wage a vigorous cam- that its inspection regime would al- address the CWC. The CTBT does paign for its ratification right from low foreign inspectors into the not have a clear entry-into-force date the start. Whenever the president United States who might steal con- with penalties for countries that do pushes hard for a foreign policy is- fidential business information or not enter the regime as original state sue, the Senate usually gives its con- collect valuable intelligence for hos- parties. The CTBT requires 44 des- sent. Since the CTBT was part of tile countries. Furthermore, despite ignated nuclear capable countries, the president’s 1992 campaign plat- chemical industry support for the including such non-signatories as In- form and the agreement was negoti- CWC, treaty opponents argued that dia, Pakistan, and North Korea, to ated during his administration, there it would fetter a wide range of busi- ratify the accord by September 1998. is every reason to believe that the nesses with unnecessary regula- 48 A failure to achieve this goal trig- high-level involvement that proved tions. The CTBT does not raise gers a conference of the ratifying critical to winning CWC approval similar concerns. countries to determine how the treaty will also be brought to bear on the Finally, the CTBT, like the CWC,

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 69 John V. Parachini enjoys overwhelming public sup- licitous of Senate advice and to pro- lab support for ratification will be port. High public support for the vide political accommodations on critical. CTBT will help keep the White the CTBT and other issues in order As President Clinton said when he House focused on the political ben- to bring key Republicans on board. signed the CTBT, the test ban is “the efits of pursuing its ratification. Finding powerful constituencies longest-sought, hardest-fought prize Similarly, during a mid-term elec- to play the role that military leaders in arms control history.”53 If he is tion, it will be difficult for Republi- and the chemical industry did dur- successful in securing Senate ratifi- can senators running for re-election ing CWC ratification will not be cation, it could be one of the hall- to explain their opposition to a test easy in the case of CTBT. Military marks of his presidency and mark an ban and their eagerness to resume and national security agency support important step forward for interna- testing. Of the 16 Republican sena- for the CTBT is softer than it was tional arms control. tors running for reelection, 10 of for the CWC. The nuclear weapons them voted against the CWC. Add- labs are the closest analogous con- ing opposition to yet another popu- stituency to the chemical industry lar arms control measure may give and military leaders. When former 1 For a good, short summary of the pending arms their Democratic opponents a way control measures requiring U.S. Senate advice and Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary consent see, Carla Anne Robbins, “Senate Battle of defining a clear difference be- took the unprecedented step of sup- on Arms Control Is Still Far From Over,” The Wall tween candidates. Street Journal, May 6, 1997, p. A24. porting the cessation of underground 2 For a summary of the political and economic nuclear tests, she balanced this dra- costs the United States would incur if it failed to CONCLUSION matic decision with endorsement of join the CWC as an original state party see, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Rela- The Clinton administration can a Science-Based Stockpile Steward- tions, Statement by Secretary of State Madeleine expect a tough political struggle with ship Program. Both measures were K. Albright before the Senate Foreign Relations recommended to the secretary by the Committee in support of the Chemical Weapons nearly all arms control agreements Convention, 105th Cong., April 8, 1997, pp. 3-4. that it submits for Senate advice and JASON group, a government tech- 3 Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate consent. Thus, Senate ratification of nical advisory panel.49 In order to Foreign Relations committee articulated the con- servative Republican view of arms control at the the CTBT demands that the admin- maintain “a robust and reliable U.S. Conservative Political Action Conference: “As we istration develop a ratification cam- nuclear deterrent” without under- enter the 21st century, America will be confronted paign plan and that it allocate the ground nuclear tests, the Department by terrorist regimes armed to the teeth with chemi- cal and biological and perhaps even nuclear weap- political resources essential for suc- of Energy has begun a multi-billion ons.... The United States must develop a clear cess. dollar Stockpile Stewardship and policy to deter these rogue regimes from ever us- Management Program (SSMP).50 ing these weapons against Americans. This will To overcome the anticipated re- require sending a message of clear resolve to our The program has generated opposi- sistance to the CTBT from the right enemies, confronting proliferation nations, and tion from both arms control support- building the necessary defenses—yes, including wing of the Republican party, the ers and those critical of the Clinton national missile defense—to protect Americans administration will need Senate from the threat of these weapons. But instead of administration’s arms control policy, taking these steps, the Administration is turning champions from the internationalist in general, and the CTBT, in particu- to the panacea of arms control.” Remarks by wing of the party. Republicans who Senator Jesse Helms before the Conservative Po- lar.51 Some arms control advocates led the CWC fight will probably not litical Action Conference, Washington, D.C., argue that the SSMP violates the March 8, 1997. For a description of the current take a leadership role on the CTBT. spirit of the CTBT and will allow state of the Russian military see Michael Specter, New Republican leaders will need “Yeltsin’s Plan to Cut Military Touches a Nerve,” the labs to continue developing to be enlisted in the cause. Once The New York Times, July 28, 1997, p. 1A. For nuclear weapons by other means.52 polls that demonstrate low public fear of major again, Majority Leader Lott’s dispo- Historically, the labs have been the threats to national security other than terrorism, sition toward the CTBT is important. see John Parachini, “Public Not Fearful of Nuclear strongest opponents of a cessation Missile Attack,” The Polling Report 12, June 17, The overall political context will of nuclear testing. But given their in- 1996, p. 1. See also, Pew Research Center poll influence negotiations between the cited in the National Journal, “Opinion Outlook: creasing role in the implementation president and the majority leader Views on National Security,” April 20, 1996, p. of arms control and the billions of 902; and National Journal, “Opinion Outlook: during Senate consideration of the dollars flowing to them for the Views on the American Scene,” May 18, 1996, test ban significantly. The adminis- p. 1122; see also CNN-Time Magazine poll cited SSMP, they have good reasons to tration should be prepared to be so- in, National Journal, “Opinion Outlook: Views support the CTBT. Enlisting active on the American Scene,” May 24, 1997, p. 1060.

70 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 John V. Parachini

4 See Michael Krepon and Dan Caldwell, eds., Security-Minded Leaders Emerge,” Decision cal and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation The Politics of Treaty Ratification (New York: Brief, No. 97-D58, April 25, 1997. Project, (August 24, 1997) (http:// St. Martin’s Press, 1991). 17 Author’s conversation with executive branch www.stimson.org/). 5 See Robert Burns, “Poll Backs Chemical Weap- official, October 7, 1997. 30 Senator Trent Lott summarized in his floor state- ons Ban,” Associated Press, February 28, 1997 18 Author’s conversation with executive branch ment the accommodations that were important to (http://www.washingtonpost.com). Associated official, June 18, 1997. approval of the CWC. Congressional Record, Press, “Embattled chemical arms pact supported 19 Madeleine K. Albright, “Blueprint for a Bipar- 105th Cong., 1st sess., April 24, 1997, pp. S3596- in poll,” The Dallas Morning News, March 1, tisan Foreign Policy,” The New York Times, Janu- S3603. 1997, p. 12A. See also John V. Parachini, “Broad- ary 26, 1997, p. 13. 31 Roy Gutman, “Praise for Passage/Chemical based Support for Chemical Weapons Ban,” The 20 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokes- weapons treaty is shared political victory,” New Polling Report 13, March 10, 1997, p. 2. man, February 8, 1997, “Remarks of Former Presi- York Newsday, (April 28, 1997) (http:// 6 Statement of James Steinberg at Carnegie En- dent George Bush and Secretary of State www.newsday.com/). dowment for International Peace, Washington, Madeleine K. Albright.” 32 Congressional Record, 105th Cong., 1st sess., D.C., June 9, 1997. 21 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokes- April 24, 1997, pp. S3486-S3492. 7 Robbins, “Senate Battle on Arms Control Is Still man, March 25, 1997, “Remarks by Secretary of 33 President Clinton explicitly stated that there Far From Over,” p. A24. State Madeleine K. Albright: ‘American Leader was no linkage. White House, Office of the Press 8 Author’s discussion with leading CWC oppo- for the 21st Century: Doing What’s Right and Secretary, April 18, 1997, “Remarks by the Presi- nent, April 23, 1997. Smart for America’s Future.’” dent in Press Availability,” (August 24, 1997) 9 John D. Holum, “The Clinton Administration 22 William S. Cohen, “Ratify the Chemical Weap- (http://library.whitehouse.gov/ and the Chemical Weapons Convention: Need for ons Treaty,” The Washington Post, April 6, 1997, Retrieve.cgi?dbtype=text&id=8162&query). Early Ratification,” in Brad Roberts, ed., Ratify- p. C7. 34 Carroll J. Doherty, “President, in Nod to Helms, ing the Chemical Weapons Convention (The Cen- 23 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Plans to Merge Agencies,” Congressional Quar- ter for Strategic and International Studies, April 4, 1997, “Remarks by President Bill Clin- terly 55, April 19, 1997. Thomas W. Lippman Washington, D.C. 1994), p. 1. ton at Chemical Weapons Convention Event”; see and Peter Baker, “Bipartisanship, but at a Price: 10 The White House, Office of the Press Secre- also, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Trades Foreign Policy Concessions for tary, President Clinton letter to the Senate of the April 23, 1997, “Remarks by the President on the GOP Support of Treaty,” The Washington Post, United States, November 23, 1993. Chemical Weapons Convention.” April 25, 1997, p. A1. 11 Paul Wolfowitz, “Clinton’s First Year,” For- 24 Letter to the Honorable William J. Clinton 35 Author’s conversation with noted treaty oppo- eign Affairs 73 (January/February 1994); and Bob signed by 17 retired military officers, April 3, nent, June 5, 1997. Dole, “Shaping America’s Global Future,” For- 1997. (August 24, 1997) (http://www.acda.gov/ 36 David Culp of Plutonium Challenge, one of eign Policy 98 (Spring 1995). promine1.htm#3) the best arms control vote counters in Washing- 12 Amy Smithson, “Dateline Washington: Clin- 25 See John Parachini, “NGOs: Force Multipliers ton, calculated that the day before the vote there ton Fumbles the CWC,” Foreign Policy 99 (Sum- in the CWC Ratification Debate,” in The Battle were five undeclared Republican senators lean- mer 1995). to Obtain U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weap- ing toward the CWC and 15 who were undecided. 13 Morton M. Kondracke, “Chemical Warfare Vote ons Convention, by Michael Krepon, Amy E. 37 “Statement of Bob Dole on the Chemical Weap- Is Key Test for Lott and GOP,” Roll Call, April Smithson, John Parachini, Occasional Paper No. ons Convention,”Congressional Record, 105th 21, 1997, p. 8. 35, The Henry L. Stimson Center, July 1997, pp. Cong., 1st sess., April 23, 1997, p. S3501. 14 An example of the onslaught of conservative 35-57. 38 Congressional Record, 105th Cong., 1st sess., attack on the CWC was a spate of editorials and 26 The Center for Security Policy and the Heri- April 24, 1997, p. S3603. opinion columns in the days immediately preced- tage Foundation were the primary organizations 39 George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander, “The ing Senate consideration of the CWC in Septem- leading the opposition to the CWC. See an ex- Duma-Senate Logjam on Arms Control: What ber, 1996. For example, see, George Will, “A tensive set of “Decision Briefs” and press releases Can Be Done If It Continues?” The Nonprolif- Feel-Good Treaty,” The Washington Post, Sep- opposing the CWC on their respective web sites: eration Review 5 (Fall 1997). Seeking alterna- tember 8, 1996, p. C6; Lally Wehmouth, (August 24, 1997) (http:// tives to congressional oversight when the arms “...Chemical Weapons Fraud,” The Washington www.security-policy.org/), and (August 24, 1997) control process is unstable is not a new. For a Post, September 12, 1996, p. 7; Jesse Helms, (http://www.heritage.org/). piece that articulated a similar view more than a “Why This Chemical Weapons Treaty is Badly 27 Like other big industry trade associations, the decade earlier see Kenneth L. Adelman, “Arms Flawed,” USA Today, September 12, 1996, p. Chemical Manufacturers Associations (CMA) is Control With and Without Agreements,” Foreign 15A. Another example of the aggressive campaign an influential player on Capitol Hill. CMA Affairs 63 (Winter 1984/85), pp. 240-263. waged by CWC opponents is the number of “De- worked very hard on the CWC and periodically 40 Author’s conversation with senior advisor to a cision Briefs” the Center for National Security had to clarify its authority as the representative U.S. Senator, June 20, 1997. faxed out opposing it. The Center distributed of over 90 percent of the U.S. chemical industry. 41 Statement of James Steinberg at Carnegie En- eight “Decision Briefs” on the CWC prior to Sep- See Letter to Senator Trent Lott from Frederick dowment for International Peace, Washington, tember 12, 1996. By comparison, the efforts of L. Weber et al., Congressional Record, 105th D.C., June 9, 1997. the Clinton administration and nongovernmental Cong., 1st sess., April 23, 1997, p. S3511. See 42 Article VI states of the Treaty states: “Each of organizations pushing ratification were anemic. also Frederick L. Weber, “Chemical Arms Treaty the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue ne- 15 Wendy Lubetkin, “Ledogar: Ratification of Won’t Hurt U.S. Industry,” The Wall Street Jour- gotiations in good faith on effective measures re- Chemical Weapons Treaty Essential: CWC ne- nal, March 26, 1997, p. 19. lating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an gotiator calls anti-treaty arguments appalling,” 28 For an interesting discussion of the domestic early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a USIA, (April 14, 1997) (gopher:// opposition to the Geneva Protocol see Rodney J. treaty on general and complete disarmament un- 198.80.36.82:70/0R18267047-18269595-range / McElroy, “The Geneva Protocol of 1925,” in The der strict and effective international control.” archives/1997/pdq.97). Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification, ed- Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: 16 Rich Lowry, “Dole Redux,” National Review, ited by Michael Krepon and Dan Caldwell (New Texts and Histories of Negotiations (Washington, July 16, 1997 (http://www.townhall.com/ York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991). D.C.: United States Arms Control and Disarma- nationalreview/feature/feature.html). See also, 29 For a comprehensive list of supporters and op- ment Agency, 1998), p. 93. For a discussion of The Center for Security Policy, “Vote on C.W.C. ponents of the CWC see “The U.S. Debate Over what the U.S. must do to meet its Article VI obli- Proves Defining Moment: Lott Fails Test, New the CWC: Supporters and Opponents, ” Chemi- gations see: George Bunn, “The NPT And Op-

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 71 John V. Parachini tions For Its Extension in 1995,” The Nonprolif- eration Review 1 (Winter 1994). 43 Author’s conversation with senior Clinton ad- ministration officials, July 1, 1997. 44 For a set of polls on the test ban see: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, “Public Opinion Polls,” (August 1997) (http://www.clw.org/pub/ clw/coalition/ctbhist.htm). 45 A leading opponent of the CWC told the au- thor that Senator Jon Kyl, who led the opposition to the CWC, has indicated that he intends to op- pose the CTBT “ten times harder than he opposed the CWC.” 46 Congressional Record, 105th Cong. 1st sess., p. S6923. 47 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, James Schlesinger, Chemical Weapons Convention, April 8, 1997, pp. 4-5. 48 Strong support of the chemical industry for the CWC was critical because the accord potentially affects many companies. Industry representatives frequently had to rebut charges to the contrary. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Frederick L. Weber, President and Chief Executive Officer, Chemical Manufacturers As- sociation, Chemical Weapons Convention, April 15, 1997. 49 Jason Group, “Science-Based Stockpile Stew- ardship,” November 1994 (JSR-94-345). 50 The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Defense Programs, May 1995 (August 24, 1997) (http://www.dp.doe.gov/scibaste.htm). 51 For a good exchange on the Clinton administration’s Stockpile Stewardship Manage- ment and Program see: “The Clinton administra- tion and Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship: Erosion by Design,” by Floyd D. Spence, Chairman, House National Security Committee, October 30, 1996; and, Tom Zamora Collina, “The Test Ban and Stockpile Stewardship: A Response to Chair- man Spence,” (Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dan- gers, June 1997). 52 Christopher E. Paine and Matthew G. McKinzie, “End Run: The U.S. Government’s Plan for Designing Nuclear Weapons and Simu- lating Nuclear Explosions under the Comprehen- sive Test Ban Treaty,” An Interim Report on the Department of Energy Stockpile Stewardship & Management Program (Washington, D.C.: Natu- ral Resources Defense Council, August 1997). See also, Hisham Zerriffi and Arjun Mkhijani, “The Stewardship Smokescreen,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 52 (September/October 1995) (http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1996/so96/ so96makhijani.html). 53 Office of the Press Secretary, September 24, 1996, “Remarks By The President In Address To The 51st General Assembly of the United Nations.”

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