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The Shape of the Electoral College
No. 20-366 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., Appellants, v. STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL., Appellees. On Appeal From the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE MICHAEL L. ROSIN IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES PETER K. STRIS MICHAEL N. DONOFRIO Counsel of Record BRIDGET C. ASAY ELIZABETH R. BRANNEN STRIS & MAHER LLP 777 S. Figueroa St., Ste. 3850 Los Angeles, CA 90017 (213) 995-6800 [email protected] Counsel for Amicus Curiae TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................... i INTEREST OF AMICUS .................................................. 1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .......................................... 2 ARGUMENT ....................................................................... 4 I. Congress Intended The Apportionment Basis To Include All Persons In Each State, Including Undocumented Persons. ..................... 4 A. The Historical Context: Congress Began to Grapple with Post-Abolition Apportionment. ............................................... 5 B. The Thirty-Ninth Congress Considered—And Rejected—Language That Would Have Limited The Basis of Apportionment To Voters or Citizens. ......... 9 1. Competing Approaches Emerged Early In The Thirty-Ninth Congress. .................................................. 9 2. The Joint Committee On Reconstruction Proposed A Penalty-Based Approach. ..................... 12 3. The House Approved The Joint Committee’s Penalty-Based -
Construction of the Massachusetts Constitution
Construction of the Massachusetts Constitution ROBERT J. TAYLOR J. HI s YEAR marks tbe 200tb anniversary of tbe Massacbu- setts Constitution, the oldest written organic law still in oper- ation anywhere in the world; and, despite its 113 amendments, its basic structure is largely intact. The constitution of the Commonwealth is, of course, more tban just long-lived. It in- fluenced the efforts at constitution-making of otber states, usu- ally on their second try, and it contributed to tbe shaping of tbe United States Constitution. Tbe Massachusetts experience was important in two major respects. It was decided tbat an organic law should have tbe approval of two-tbirds of tbe state's free male inbabitants twenty-one years old and older; and tbat it sbould be drafted by a convention specially called and chosen for tbat sole purpose. To use the words of a scholar as far back as 1914, Massachusetts gave us 'the fully developed convention.'^ Some of tbe provisions of the resulting constitu- tion were original, but tbe framers borrowed heavily as well. Altbough a number of historians have written at length about this constitution, notably Prof. Samuel Eliot Morison in sev- eral essays, none bas discussed its construction in detail.^ This paper in a slightly different form was read at the annual meeting of the American Antiquarian Society on October IS, 1980. ' Andrew C. McLaughlin, 'American History and American Democracy,' American Historical Review 20(January 1915):26*-65. 2 'The Struggle over the Adoption of the Constitution of Massachusetts, 1780," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 50 ( 1916-17 ) : 353-4 W; A History of the Constitution of Massachusetts (Boston, 1917); 'The Formation of the Massachusetts Constitution,' Massachusetts Law Quarterly 40(December 1955):1-17. -
Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
Copyright 2013 by Northwestern University School of Law Printed in U.S.A. Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 107, No. 4 ORIGINALISM AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT Thomas B. Colby ABSTRACT—Originalists have traditionally based the normative case for originalism primarily on principles of popular sovereignty: the Constitution owes its legitimacy as higher law to the fact that it was ratified by the American people through a supermajoritarian process. As such, it must be interpreted according to the original meaning that it had at the time of ratification. To give it another meaning today is to allow judges to enforce a legal rule that was never actually embraced and enacted by the people. Whatever the merits of this argument in general, it faces particular hurdles when applied to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment was a purely partisan measure, drafted and enacted entirely by Republicans in a rump Reconstruction Congress in which the Southern states were denied representation; it would never have made it through Congress had all of the elected Senators and Representatives been permitted to vote. And it was ratified not by the collective assent of the American people, but rather at gunpoint. The Southern states had been placed under military rule, and were forced to ratify the Amendment—which they despised—as a condition of ending military occupation and rejoining the Union. The Amendment can therefore claim no warrant to democratic legitimacy through original popular sovereignty. It was added to the Constitution despite its open failure to obtain the support of the necessary supermajority of the American people. -
Amending the U.S. Constitution by State-Led Convention
AMENDING THE U.S. CONstItutION BY StatE -LED CONVENTION INDIANA’S MODEL LEGIslatION DIstRIbutED BY: INDIANA SENatE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE DAVID LONG AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY STATE‐LED CONVENTION: BACKGROUND INFORMATION U.S. CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE V: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article; and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: Article V of the U.S. Constitution provides two paths for amending the Constitution: Path 1: o Step 1: Two-thirds of both houses of Congress pass a proposed constitutional amendment. This sends the proposed amendment to the states for ratification. o Step 2: Three-fourths of the states (38 states) ratify the proposed amendment, either by their legislatures or special ratifying conventions. Path 2: o Step 1: Two-thirds of state legislatures (34 states) ask for Congress to call “a convention for proposing amendments.” o Step 2: States send delegates to this convention, where they can propose amendments to the Constitution. -
The Constitution of the United States [PDF]
THE CONSTITUTION oftheUnitedStates NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER We the People of the United States, in Order to form a within three Years after the fi rst Meeting of the Congress more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Constitution for the United States of America. Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut fi ve, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland Article.I. six, Virginia ten, North Carolina fi ve, South Carolina fi ve, and Georgia three. SECTION. 1. When vacancies happen in the Representation from any All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Sen- Election to fi ll such Vacancies. ate and House of Representatives. The House of Representatives shall chuse their SECTION. 2. Speaker and other Offi cers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Mem- bers chosen every second Year by the People of the several SECTION. -
John Adams, Political Moderation, and the 1820 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention: a Reappraisal.”
The Historical Journal of Massachusetts “John Adams, Political Moderation, and the 1820 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention: A Reappraisal.” Author: Arthur Scherr Source: Historical Journal of Massachusetts, Volume 46, No. 1, Winter 2018, pp. 114-159. Published by: Institute for Massachusetts Studies and Westfield State University You may use content in this archive for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the Historical Journal of Massachusetts regarding any further use of this work: [email protected] Funding for digitization of issues was provided through a generous grant from MassHumanities. Some digitized versions of the articles have been reformatted from their original, published appearance. When citing, please give the original print source (volume/number/date) but add "retrieved from HJM's online archive at http://www.westfield.ma.edu/historical-journal/. 114 Historical Journal of Massachusetts • Winter 2018 John Adams Portrait by Gilbert Stuart, c. 1815 115 John Adams, Political Moderation, and the 1820 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention: A Reappraisal ARTHUR SCHERR Editor's Introduction: The history of religious freedom in Massachusetts is long and contentious. In 1833, Massachusetts was the last state in the nation to “disestablish” taxation and state support for churches.1 What, if any, impact did John Adams have on this process of liberalization? What were Adams’ views on religious freedom and how did they change over time? In this intriguing article Dr. Arthur Scherr traces the evolution, or lack thereof, in Adams’ views on religious freedom from the writing of the original 1780 Massachusetts Constitution to its revision in 1820. He carefully examines contradictory primary and secondary sources and seeks to set the record straight, arguing that there are many unsupported myths and misconceptions about Adams’ role at the 1820 convention. -
The Federal Constitution and Massachusetts Ratification : A
, 11l""t,... \e ,--.· ', Ir \" ,:> � c.'�. ,., Go'.l[f"r•r•r-,,y 'i!i • h,. I. ,...,,"'P�r"'T'" ""J> \S'o ·� � C ..., ,' l v'I THE FEDERAL CONSTlTUTlON \\j\'\ .. '-1',. ANV /JASSACHUSETTS RATlFlCATlON \\r,-,\\5v -------------------------------------- . > .i . JUN 9 � 1988 V) \'\..J•, ''"'•• . ,-· �. J ,,.._..)i.�v\,\ ·::- (;J)''J -�·. '-,;I\ . � '" - V'-'� -- - V) A TEACHING KIT PREPAREV BY � -r THE COIJMOMVEALTH M,(SEUM ANV THE /JASSACHUSETTS ARCHIVES AT COLUM.BIA POINf ]') � ' I � Re6outee Matetial6 6ot Edueatot6 and {I · -f\ 066ieial& 6ot the Bieentennial 06 the v-1 U.S. Con&titution, with an empha6i& on Ma&&aehu&ett6 Rati6ieation, eontaining: -- *Ma66aehu6ett& Timeline *Atehival Voeument6 on Ma&&aehu&ett& Rati6ieation Convention 1. Govetnot Haneoek'6 Me&6age. �����4Y:t4���� 2. Genetal Coutt Re6olve& te C.U-- · .....1. *. Choo6ing Velegate& 6ot I\) Rati6ieation Convention. 0- 0) 3. Town6 &end Velegate Name&. 0) C 4. Li6t 06 Velegate& by County. CJ) 0 CJ> c.u-- l> S. Haneoek Eleeted Pte6ident. --..J s:: 6. Lettet 6tom Elbtidge Getty. � _:r 7. Chatge6 06 Velegate Btibety. --..J C/)::0 . ' & & • o- 8 Hane oe k Pt op o 6e d Amen dme nt CX) - -j � 9. Final Vote on Con&titution --- and Ptopo6ed Amenwnent6. Published by the --..J-=--- * *Clue6 to Loeal Hi&toty Officeof the Massachusetts Secretary of State *Teaehing Matetial6 Michaelj, Connolly, Secretary 9/17/87 < COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS !f1Rl!j OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONSTITUTtON Michael J. Connolly, Secretary The Commonwealth Museum and the Massachusetts Columbia Point RATIFICATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION MASSACHUSETTS TIME LINE 1778 Constitution establishing the "State of �assachusetts Bay" is overwhelmingly rejected by the voters, in part because it lacks a bill of rights. -
Open PDF File, 134.33 KB, for Paintings
Massachusetts State House Art and Artifact Collections Paintings SUBJECT ARTIST LOCATION ~A John G. B. Adams Darius Cobb Room 27 Samuel Adams Walter G. Page Governor’s Council Chamber Frank Allen John C. Johansen Floor 3 Corridor Oliver Ames Charles A. Whipple Floor 3 Corridor John Andrew Darius Cobb Governor’s Council Chamber Esther Andrews Jacob Binder Room 189 Edmund Andros Frederick E. Wallace Floor 2 Corridor John Avery John Sanborn Room 116 ~B Gaspar Bacon Jacob Binder Senate Reading Room Nathaniel Banks Daniel Strain Floor 3 Corridor John L. Bates William W. Churchill Floor 3 Corridor Jonathan Belcher Frederick E. Wallace Floor 2 Corridor Richard Bellingham Agnes E. Fletcher Floor 2 Corridor Josiah Benton Walter G. Page Storage Francis Bernard Giovanni B. Troccoli Floor 2 Corridor Thomas Birmingham George Nick Senate Reading Room George Boutwell Frederic P. Vinton Floor 3 Corridor James Bowdoin Edmund C. Tarbell Floor 3 Corridor John Brackett Walter G. Page Floor 3 Corridor Robert Bradford Elmer W. Greene Floor 3 Corridor Simon Bradstreet Unknown artist Floor 2 Corridor George Briggs Walter M. Brackett Floor 3 Corridor Massachusetts State House Art Collection: Inventory of Paintings by Subject John Brooks Jacob Wagner Floor 3 Corridor William M. Bulger Warren and Lucia Prosperi Senate Reading Room Alexander Bullock Horace R. Burdick Floor 3 Corridor Anson Burlingame Unknown artist Room 272 William Burnet John Watson Floor 2 Corridor Benjamin F. Butler Walter Gilman Page Floor 3 Corridor ~C Argeo Paul Cellucci Ronald Sherr Lt. Governor’s Office Henry Childs Moses Wight Room 373 William Claflin James Harvey Young Floor 3 Corridor John Clifford Benoni Irwin Floor 3 Corridor David Cobb Edgar Parker Room 222 Charles C. -
Constitution of the United States of America, As Amended
110TH CONGRESS DOCUMENT " ! 1st Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES No. 110–50 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA As Amended Unratified Amendments Analytical Index E PL UR UM IB N U U S PRESENTED BY MR. BRADY OF PENNSYLVANIA July 25, 2007 • Ordered to be printed UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 2007 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-001 [ISBN 978–0–16–079091–1] VerDate Aug 31 2005 11:11 Dec 10, 2007 Jkt 036932 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5229 Sfmt 5229 E:\HR\OC\36932.XXX 36932 cprice-sewell on PROD1PC72 with HEARING E:\seals\congress.#15 House Doc. 110–50 The printing of the revised version of The Constitution of the United States of America As Amended (Document Size) is hereby ordered pursuant to H. Con. Res. 190 as passed on July 25, 2007, 110th Congress, 1st Session. This document was compiled at the di- rection of Chairman Robert A. Brady of the Joint Committee on Printing, and printed by the U.S. Government Printing Office. (ii) VerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Dec 10, 2007 Jkt 036932 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 7601 Sfmt 7601 E:\HR\OC\932.CC 932 cprice-sewell on PROD1PC72 with HEARING CONTENTS Historical Note ......................................................................................................... v Text of the Constitution .......................................................................................... 1 Amendments -
The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: a Defense
The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense John 0. McGinnist and Michael B. Rappaporttt INTRODUCTION On the first day of the 104th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted a rule that requires a three-fifths majority of those voting to pass an increase in income tax rates.' This three-fifths rule had been publicized during the 1994 congressional elections as part of the House Republicans' Contract with America. In a recent Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, seventeen well-known law professors assert that the rule is unconstitutional.3 They argue that requiring a legislative supermajority to enact bills conflicts with the intent of the Framers. They also contend that the rule conflicts with the Constitution's text, because they believe that the Constitution's specific supermajority requirements, such as the requirement for approval of treaties, indicate that simple majority voting is required for the passage of ordinary legislation.4 t Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School. tt Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. The authors would like to thank Larry Alexander, Akhil Amar, Carl Auerbach, Jay Bybee, David Gray Carlson, Lawrence Cunningham, Neal Devins, John Harrison, Michael Herz, Arthur Jacobson, Gary Lawson, Nelson Lund, Erela Katz Rappaport, Paul Shupack, Stewart Sterk, Eugene Volokh, and Fred Zacharias for their comments and assistance. 1. See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EFFECTIVE FOR ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS (Jan. 4, 1995) [hereinafter RULES] (House Rule XXI(5)(c)); see also id. House Rule XXI(5)(d) (barring retroactive tax increases). 2. The rule publicized in the Contract with America was actually broader than the one the House enacted. -
Accounts Committee, 70. 186 Adams. Abigail, 56 Adams, Frank, 196
Index Accounts Committee, 70. 186 Appropriations. Committee on (House) Adams. Abigail, 56 appointment to the, 321 Adams, Frank, 196 chairman also on Rules, 2 I I,2 13 Adams, Henry, 4 I, 174 chairman on Democratic steering Adams, John, 41,47, 248 committee, 277, 359 Chairmen Stevens, Garfield, and Adams, John Quincy, 90, 95, 106, 110- Randall, 170, 185, 190, 210 111 created, 144, 167. 168, 169, 172. 177, Advertisements, fS3, I95 184, 220 Agriculture. See also Sugar. duties on estimates government expenditures, 170 Jeffersonians identified with, 3 1, 86 exclusive assignment to the, 2 16, 32 1 prices, 229. 232, 261, 266, 303 importance of the, 358 tariffs favoring, 232, 261 within the Joint Budget Committee, 274 Agriculture Department, 303 loses some jurisdiction, 2 10 Aid to Families with Dependent Children members on Budget, 353 (AFDC). 344-345 members on Joint Study Committee on Aldrich, Nelson W., 228, 232. 241, 245, Budget Control, 352 247 privileged in reporting bills, 185 Allen, Leo. 3 I3 staff of the. 322-323 Allison, William B., 24 I Appropriations, Committee on (Senate), 274, 352 Altmeyer, Arthur J., 291-292 American Medical Association (AMA), Archer, William, 378, 381 Army, Ci.S. Spe also War Department 310, 343, 345 appropriation bills amended, 136-137, American Newspaper Publishers 137, 139-140 Association, 256 appropriation increases, 127, 253 American Party, 134 Civil War appropriations, 160, 167 American Political Science Association, Continental Army supplies, I7 273 individual appropriation bills for the. American System, 108 102 Ames, Fisher, 35. 45 mobilization of the Union Army, 174 Anderson, H. W., 303 Arthur, Chester A,, 175, 206, 208 Assay omces, 105, 166 Andrew, John, 235 Astor, John Jacob, 120 Andrews, Mary. -
Pocket Veto ‑ General” of the White House Records Office: Legislation Case Files at the Gerald R
The original documents are located in Box 1, folder “Pocket Veto ‑ General” of the White House Records Office: Legislation Case Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Copyright Notice The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Exact duplicates within this folder were not digitized. Digitized from Box 1 of the White House Records Office Legislation Case Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library 1/30/76 Mr. Jones: FYI and retentiono Original was sent to Mr. Schmults today for appropriate handling. Katie ®ffin' of tqr .Attomry <Grnrral llht.s~ingtnn, D.<!:. 20~30 January 29, 1976 The President The White House Washington, D. C. Dear Mr. President: The Department of Justice is presently involved in a case which raises the question whether a President may lawfully use . a pocket veto during intra-session an6 inter-session adjournments of Congress. That case, Kennedy v. Jones, is now pending in the District Court for the District of Columbia and concerns two bills uhich were pocket vetoed, the first by President Nixon during the sine die adjournment of the 1st Session of the 93rd Congress, which lastea-19 days, and the other by you during a 32-day intra-session recess taken by both Houses of the 93rd Congress.