The Subtle Ways International Propaganda Shapes Our Politics
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Manufacturing Dissent: The Subtle Ways International Propaganda Shapes Our Politics by Aleksandr Fisher B.A. in History and Political Science, May 2014, Temple University A Dissertation submitted to The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 17, 2020 Dissertation directed by Henry Hale Professor of Political Science The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University cer- tifies that Aleksandr Fisher has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of December 19, 2019. This is the final and approved form of the disserta- tion. Manufacturing Dissent: The Subtle Ways International Propaganda Shapes Our Politics by Aleksandr Fisher Dissertation Research Committee: Henry Hale, Professor of Political Science, Dissertation Director Danny Hayes, Associate Professor of Political Science, Committee Member Michael Miller, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Committee Member ii Abstract of Dissertation Manufacturing Dissent: The Subtle Ways International Propaganda Shapes Our Politics What impact does state-sponsored propaganda have on political behavior? How imper- vious is propaganda to strategies designed to combat it? I demonstrate that international propaganda has limited direct influence on mass public opinion, but the perception that propaganda is effective on ”other” can have independent effects on democratic norms. I evaluate the conditions under which exposure to propaganda makes people more cynical and conspiratorial, exploring undertheorized opinion outcomes in empirical propaganda research. I show that many of our counter-propaganda initiatives, both defensive and of- fensive, fail to have their intended effect and may actually backfire. iii Contents 1 Abstract of Dissertation iii 2 Introduction1 2.1 Goal of Dissertation..............................3 2.2 Overview of Empirical Chapters.......................5 2.3 Contribution..................................9 3 Propaganda in International Politics 13 3.1 Why Study International Propaganda?.................... 20 3.2 Is There a Demand for Foreign Perspectives?................ 23 3.3 Is Exposure to International Propaganda More Frequent Than We Think?. 25 4 Is International Propaganda Effective? 32 4.1 Reconceptualizing Effective Propaganda................... 34 4.2 Undermining Rivals.............................. 36 4.3 Promoting Conspiracies and Cynicism.................... 37 4.4 The Power of Perceptions........................... 39 4.5 Countering Propaganda............................ 41 4.6 Defensive Responses............................. 41 4.7 Offensive Responses............................. 44 4.8 Conclusion.................................. 46 5 Demonizing the Enemy 48 5.1 Introduction.................................. 48 5.2 Research Design............................... 49 5.3 Results..................................... 52 5.4 Conclusion.................................. 61 6 The Conspiratorial and the Cynical 63 6.1 Introduction.................................. 63 6.2 Research Design............................... 64 6.3 Results..................................... 67 6.4 Conclusion.................................. 81 7 Propaganda’s Presumed Influence 82 7.1 Introduction.................................. 82 7.2 Research Design............................... 84 7.3 Results..................................... 85 7.4 Conclusion.................................. 95 iv 8 How to Criticize an Autocrat 97 8.1 Introduction.................................. 97 8.2 Research Design............................... 101 8.3 Results..................................... 106 8.4 Conclusion.................................. 119 9 Conclusion and Implications 123 9.1 Limitations.................................. 125 9.2 Future Research................................ 128 9.3 Final Thoughts................................ 133 10 Appendix A: Demonizing The Enemy 169 10.1 Measures................................... 169 10.2 Survey Sample Characteristics........................ 172 10.3 Balance Test.................................. 173 10.4 Robustness Checks.............................. 174 10.5 Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART)................ 181 11 Appendix B: The Cynical and the Conspiratorial 183 11.1 Placebo Posts................................. 183 11.2 Survey Sample Characteristics........................ 186 11.3 Balance Across Treatments.......................... 188 11.4 Robustness with Manipulation Checks.................... 190 11.5 Interaction Effects............................... 192 12 Appendix C: Propaganda’s Presumed Influence 196 12.1 Survey Questions (Dependent Variables)................... 196 12.2 Balance Test.................................. 198 12.3 Robustness Checks.............................. 198 12.4 Sensitivity Analysis for Mediation Analysis................. 200 12.5 Online Media Regulation........................... 201 12.6 Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART)................ 202 13 Appendix D: How To Criticize an Autocrat 203 13.1 Summary Statistics.............................. 203 13.2 Balance Table................................. 204 13.3 Robustness Checks.............................. 206 13.4 Characteristics of Different Citizens..................... 213 13.5 Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART)................ 214 v List of Figures 1 Participants were asked their levels of favorability toward: Ukraine, Ukrainian foreign policy, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, Russia, Russia’s for- eign policy, and Russian President Vladimir Putin. OLS with no controls. Sample includes individuals who passed reading checks. Figure plots the marginal effects of the treatments on each dependent variable........ 53 2 I obtain the pairwise differences of the mean of favorability toward Ukraine across the levels of the treatments and adjust the p-values and confidence intervals for multiple comparisons using Tukey’s Honest Significant Dif- ference test (HSD)............................... 54 3 I obtain the pairwise differences of the mean of favorability toward Russia across the levels of the treatments and adjust the p-values and confidence intervals for multiple comparisons using Tukey’s Honest Significant Dif- ference test (HSD)............................... 55 4 Participants were asked their levels of support for expanding sanctions on Russia and arming the Ukrainian government. OLS with no controls. Sample includes individuals who passed reading checks. Figure plots the marginal effects of the treatments on each dependent variable........ 56 5 Participants were asked their levels of favorability toward: Ukraine and Russia. OLS with no controls. Sample includes individuals who passed reading checks. Figure plots the marginal effects of the treatments on each dependent variable............................... 57 vi 6 Participants were asked their levels of favorability toward: Ukraine and Russia. OLS with no controls. Sample includes individuals who passed reading checks. Figure plots the marginal effects of the treatments on each dependent variable............................... 59 7 Participants were asked their levels of favorability toward Ukraine. OLS with no controls. Sample includes individuals who passed reading checks. Figure plots the marginal effects of the treatments by attitudes on Russia.. 60 8 Russian Propaganda Treatments....................... 65 9 The figure shows the percentage of respondents who agreed with each state- ment. Logistic regression. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 68 10 Participants were asked to assess the accuracy of the three conspiracies. Logistic regression with controls. Sample includes individuals who passed reading checks. Figure plots the increase in probability of believing each statement. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals......... 70 11 Participants were asked to assess the accuracy of the three conspiracies. Logistic regression with controls. Sample includes individuals who passed reading checks. Figure plots the increase in probability of believing each statement. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals......... 71 12 Participants were asked to assess the accuracy of the three conspiracies. Logistic regression with controls. Sample includes individuals who passed reading checks. Figure plots the increase in probability of believing each statement. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals......... 72 13 Treatment effects on cynicism. OLS with robust standard errors and 95% confidence intervals. N=935.......................... 75 14 Treatment article. Only the source and the intention group are shown the logo....................................... 78 vii 15 Treatment effects on cynicism. OLS with robust standard errors and 95% confidence intervals. N=1,000......................... 79 16 Influence of political cynicism on attitudes toward strong leader. OLS re- gression with full controls and robust standard errors. Dashed lines repre- sent 95% confidence intervals. N=489. Histogram at the bottom shows the percentage of participants with different levels of cynicism.......... 80 17 Effect of treatments on propaganda’s presumed effect on others. Controls included. Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals for estimates. 86 18 Effect of treatments on propaganda’s presumed effect on others. All con- trols included. Results disaggregated by partisans (including