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Review

Patent © thin holes

scènes à faire?

• can exclude competitors • should not exclude competitors • no requirement of copying • copying required

Copyright Remedies

• Injunctive Relief • impounding and disposition of infringing articles • Monetary Relief • actual damages; and or • statutory damages • infringer’s profits • Criminal Prosecution §412 (registration req’d)) • No Electronic Theft (NET) Act • Costs and Attorney Fees • prevailing party (w/i court’s discretion)

1 Injunctive Relief v.

According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. * * * This approach is consistent with our treatment of injunctions under the Copyright Act. Like a patent owner, a copyright holder possesses “the right to exclude others from using his property.” Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); see also id., at 127-128 (“A copyright, like a patent, is at once the equivalent given by the public for benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skill of individuals, and the incentive to further efforts for the same important objects” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Like the Patent Act, the Copyright Act provides that courts “may” grant injunctive relief “on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). And as in our decision today, this Court has consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578, n. 10 (1994)); Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Assn., 209 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1908). eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)

2 We hold today that eBay applies with equal force (a) to preliminary injunctions (b) that are issued for alleged copyright infringement.

Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010)

3 Damages and Profits - §504(b)

Actual Damages Profits

$57 m • $50 – revenue for creating an add- itional pattern

$29 m

Damages and Profits - §504(b)

Actual Damages Profits $229 m

• $50 – revenue for $172 m creating an add- Apportionment itional pattern Sheldon v. MGM

$57m

4 Damages and Profits - §504(b)

Actual Damages Profits

$57 m • $50 – revenue for creating an add- itional pattern $2.35 $29 m

$2 m apportionment .0001176%

Statutory Damages - §504(c)

• per work (all parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one work) • © must be registered prior to infringement (§412)

$750 < court award < $30,000

$200 $150,000 innocent infringement willful infringement

v.

MyMP3.com service 4700 records @ $25,000 per infringement = $118 million settled for $53.8 million

5 When the defendant denies using the plaintiff’s work, or claims that the extent of the use is not infringing, infringement requires proof of: Infringement Analysis 1. Factual Copying 2. Copying as a Legal Matter

of resulting in Actual copying Copyright Substantial protected material similarity

is proved by is identified by which requires consideration of dissecting the substantial plaintiff’s work the type of people direct evidence similarity between into elements to whom the works seem similar an element of the defendant’s work then or by evidence of and a “Golden and Nugget” from the evaluating the plaintiff’s work access protectability of each element the nature of or ? the similarity “Inverse then substantial plus Ratio similarity of the two Rule” filtering out the works as a whole probative similarity and aka unprotected substantial similarity elements the degree of “Sliding scale”: or leaving only which are similarity that the fewer ways what the amounts to there are to fact-finder “substantial” express an idea, striking similarity “Golden Nuggets” considers the greater the when similarity must be evaluating

COMPARISON

Abie’s Irish Rose The Cohens and the Kellys

Protectable Elements Story - Main Idea Plot Outline Subplots General Characters and Scenes Specific Character Elements Text

6 7 Windows 1.0 Apple Mac OS System 1.1 (no overlapping windows)

Licensing Agreement 1. Microsoft may use and sublicense derivative works MEMORANDUM generated by Windows 1.0. 2. Microsoft will develop To: and release Word and Excel Threat to sue for Mac. * * *

1983 1985

8 Windows 2.03 Apple Mac OS System 3.0

COMPLAINT ) v. ) ) ©

1983 1985 1988

9 10 STANDARD FOR DETERMINING ILLICIT COPYING

Apple v. Microsoft (9th Cir. 1994) Virtual Identity

Substantial Similarity

Broad Narrow E.g., artisitic works E.g., predominantly functional works Range of Protectable, Unauthorized Expression

11 12 Data East: Karate Champ Epyx: World Karate Champ

The fifteen features listed by the court “encompass the idea of karate.” These features, which consist of the game procedure, common karate moves, the idea of background scenes, a time element, a referee, computer graphics, and bonus points, result from either constraints inherent in the sport of karate or computer restraints. . . . The lower court erred by not limiting the scope of Data East’s copyright protection to the author’s contribution – the scoreboard and background scenes. In actuality, however, the backgrounds are quite dissimilar and the method of scorekeeping, though similar, is inconsequential. Based upon these two features, a discerning 17.5 year-old boy could not regard the works as substantially similar.

Data East v. Epyx, 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988)

13 US Code Title 17

C © A L 1. © Work Made for Hire I F O 2. Assignment Agreement? R N I • California Labor Code § 2870 A

14 freelance artist Works Made for Hire 1976 Act Regime

(1) employee (2) independent contractor • agency relationship– multi-factor test: • “specially ordered or commissioned” • Right to control work being performed • within an enumerated category: • Skill required • Source of instrumentalities and tools • contribution to collective work • Location of work • part of motion picture/AV work • Duration of relationship • translation • Right to assign additional projects • supplementary work • Hired party’s discretion • compilation • Method of payment • Role in hiring and paying assistants • test • Regular course of employer’s business • answer material for a test • Payment of employee benefits, taxes • atlas • within scope of employment (note: principally collaborative works) • written agreement signed by both parties expressly stating “work made for hire.”

Employee Confidential Information and Inventions Agreement 2. Ownership of Inventions [a] I agree to communicate to the Company as promptly and fully as practicable all inventions (as defined below) conceived or reduced to practice by me (alone or jointly by others) at any time during employment by the Company. I hereby assign to the Company and/or its nominees all my rights, title and interest in such inventions, and all my rights, title and interest in any patents, copyrights, patent applications or copyright applications based thereon. * * * [b] As used in this Agreement, the term “inventions” includes, but is not limited to, all discoveries, improvements, processes, developments, designs, know-how, data, computer programs and formulae, whether patentable or unpatentable.

15 California Labor Code § 2870

(a) Any provision in an employment agreement which provides that an employee shall assign, or offer to assign, any of his or her rights in an invention to his or her employer shall not apply to an invention that the employee developed entirely on his or her own time without using the employer’s equipment, supplies, facilities, or trade secret information except for those inventions that either: (1) Relate at the time of conception or reduction to practice of the invention to the employer’s business, or actual or demonstrably anticipated research or development of the employer; or (2) Result from any work performed by the employee for the employer.

1 Exhibit CB1

16 Bryant “Jade” Drawings MGA Jade

1 Exhibit CB3

Bryant “Zoe” Drawing MGA Cloe Doll

2 Exhibit CB3

17 Bryant “Lupe” Drawing MGA Yasmin Doll

3 Exhibit CB3

Bryant “Hallidae” Drawing MGA Sasha Doll

4 Exhibit CB3

18 Group Illustration

Bryant Drawing Bratz Packaging

5 Exhibit CB3

Bryant Bratz Drawing Bratz Sculpt 6 Exhibit CB3

19 Infringement Analysis: Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison

LEVELS OF ABSTRACTION Upon any work . . . a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp Story - Main Idea 45 F.2d 119 (2nd Cir. 1930) Plot Outline Subplots General Characters and Scenes Specific Character Elements Text

20 ABSTRACTION Works of Art: Doll

Concepts no protection Sketches

Studies

Drawings • modest protection Models

• robust protection Sculpt w/Face Paint

ABSTRACTION Works of Art: Carter Bryant’s Work on Bratz (prior to MGA engagement)

• sassy, bratty fashion Concepts • multi-racial/ethnic ensemble • big head/ big eyes/big feet/small body

Sketches • rudimentary; not instructional

Studies

Drawings

Models

Sculpt w/Face Paint

21 FILTRATION

• originality • merger • scenes à faire • functional features • inseparable features of useful articles

Protectable Expression

COMPARISON

Protectable Elements

Unprotected Elements Air Brushed Out

22 Bryant Bratz Drawing Bratz Sculpt 6 Exhibit CB3

FILTRATION

• originality • merger • scenes à faire • functional features • inseparable features of useful articles

Protectable Expression

23 FILTRATION

• originality • merger • scenes à faire • functional features • inseparable features of useful articles

Protectable Expression

24 Infringement Analysis

What is the proper role for the jury?

How should a jury be instructed?

What pre-trial process, if any, should the court engage in to frame the jury instructions?

Bratz Pre-Trial Case Management Order

A General Verdict Form

B Special Verdict Form; Jury Makes Ultimate Infringement Decision: The court plans to determine A prior to trial what aspects of the Bratz drawings are not B protectable and set forth those determinations in jury C instructions. The jury will then be asked to make the ultimate D infringement determination. E C Special Verdict Form; Judge Makes Ultimate Infringement Decision: The jury will be asked to resolve only discrete factual issues (such as what is the scope and content of the prior art), leaving to the court the ultimate copyright infringement issue (assuming that owns the drawings in question, do the dolls infringe – i.e., is there substantial similarity of protected expression)?

D Other

25 Pre-Trial Hearing

A Evidentiary Hearing: The court plans to hear percipient and expert witnesses regarding the protectability of the Bratz drawings. A B C D B Non-Evidentiary Hearing: The court plans to E hear argument and will not make any evidentiary findings regarding the protectability of the Bratz drawings.

Injunctive Relief v.

According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. * * * This approach is consistent with our treatment of injunctions under the Copyright Act. Like a patent owner, a copyright holder possesses “the right to exclude others from using his property.” Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); see also id., at 127-128 (“A copyright, like a patent, is at once the equivalent given by the public for benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skill of individuals, and the incentive to further efforts for the same important objects” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Like the Patent Act, the Copyright Act provides that courts “may” grant injunctive relief “on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). And as in our decision today, this Court has consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578, n. 10 (1994)); Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Assn., 209 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1908). eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)

26 A constructive trust is an equitable remedy that compels the transfer of wrongfully held property to its rightful owner. Communist Party of U.S. v. 522 Valencia, Inc., 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 618, 623 (Cal.Ct.App.1995); see also Cal. Civ.Code § 2223 (“One who wrongfully detains a thing is an involuntary trustee thereof, for the benefit of the owner.”). A plaintiff seeking imposition of a constructive trust must show: (1) the existence of a res (property or some interest in property); (2) the right to that res; and (3) the wrongful acquisition or detention of the res by another party who is not entitled to it.

Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc. 616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010)

A.

A constructive trust would be appropriate only if Bryant assigned his ideas for “Bratz” and “Jade” to Mattel in the first place. Whether he did turns on the interpretation of Bryant’s 1999 employment agreement, which provides: “I agree to communicate to the Company as promptly and fully as practicable all inventions (as defined below) conceived or reduced to practice by me (alone or jointly by others) at any time during my employment by the Company. I hereby assign to the Company . . . all my right, title and interest in such inventions, and all my right, title and interest in any patents, copyrights, patent applications or copyright applications based thereon.” (Emphasis added.) The contract specifies that “the term ‘inventions’ includes, but is not limited to, all discoveries, improvements, processes, developments, designs, know-how, data computer programs and formulae, whether patentable or unpatentable.” The district court held that the agreement assigned Bryant’s ideas to Mattel, even though ideas weren’t included on that list or mentioned anywhere else in the contract.

27 B. The very broad constructive trust the district court imposed must be vacated regardless of whether Bryant’s employment agreement assigned his ideas to Mattel. Even assuming that it did, and that MGA therefore misappropriated the names “Bratz” and “Jade,” the value of the trademarks the company eventually acquired for the entire Bratz line was significantly greater because of MGA's own development efforts, marketing and investment. The district court nonetheless transferred MGA's entire Bratz trademark portfolio to Mattel on the ground that the “enhancement of value [of the property held in trust] is given to the beneficiary of the constructive trust.” As a result, Mattel acquired the fruit of MGA’s hard work, and not just the appreciation in value of the ideas Mattel claims it owns.

28 split the baby in two Injunctive Relief

Compensatory Damages

“It is not equitable to transfer this billion dollar brand-the value of which is overwhelmingly the result of MGA’s legitimate efforts-because it may have started with two misappropriated names. The district court’s imposition of a constructive trust forcing MGA to hand over its sweat equity was an abuse of discretion and must be vacated.”

Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc. 616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010)

“America thrives on competition; , the all-, will too.”

Judge

29 PROTECTABLE/UNPROTECTABLE ELEMENTS: DOLL DRAWINGS Protectable Elements Unprotectable Elements

The precise shape, size, and placement of the The resemblance or similarity to human form dolls’ anatomical features (the presence of hair, head, eyes, a nose, mouth, lips, ears, a neck, legs, arms, and a torso), The precise combination of features, like the Exaggerated features, including but not limited combination of a particular hair style, face to an oversized head, oversized almond-shaped paint, make up, and outfit, or precise body eyes, large lips, oversized feet, slim arms, and a proportions. diminished nose Hair style and color Idealized features, such as luscious lips, a slim waist, a small nose, and long limbs Make-up style and color The idea of a young, fashion forward female with an attitude, and the expression traditionally associated with that idea, including but not limited to heavy make up (eye shadow, blush, and eye liner), an “urban” look, defiant poses, defiant gazes, angular eyebrows, trendy clothing, shoes and accessories Precise , clothing and accessories Features shared by a particular race or ethnicity (e.g., skin tone), postures that mimic the human form, and postures that are standard for the effective display of fashionable clothing.

PROTECTABLE AND UNPROTECTABLE ELEMENTS: SCULPTS AND SCULPT SKETCHES Protectable Elements Unprotectable Elements The precise shape, size, and The resemblance or similarity to placement of the dolls’ anatomical human form, anatomy, and features physiology Minute sculptural variations, Exaggerated features, including but including the precise angles at which not limited to an oversized head, the dolls’ anatomical features meet. oversized eyes, large lips, oversized feet, slim arms, a diminished nose, and a long torso Idealized features, such as luscious lips, high cheekbones, almond shaped eyes, a slim waist, a small nose, and long limbs Postures and poses that mimic the human form or are standard for the effective display of fashionable clothing, like arms that protrude outwards so that doll clothes and accessories can be easily removed Features necessary to make a fashion doll capable of mass production

30 SUBJECTIVE “INTRINSIC” TEST As to those works that have survived the objective or “extrinsic” test, you must now compare the works to the copyrighted works from the perspective of an ordinary reasonable observer. Whereas the objective test uses analytic dissection to compare specific elements of the works, this test considers the works as a whole, with a view to their total concept and feel. The standard you must apply in comparing the works as a whole depends upon the copyrighted work at issue. First, when comparing the final production sculpt (TX 17732 and/or TX 17733) to the original sculpt or sculpt drawings, you must determine whether the production sculpts (TX 17732 and/or TX 17733) is virtually identical overall to the original sculpt or sculpt drawings. Second, when comparing any of the four first generation Bratz dolls (TX 12286, TX 17561, TX 17558, TX 17551), and two subsequent generation Bratz dolls (TX 17546, TX 17529) to the Bratz drawings and sketches, you must determine whether the Bratz dolls are substantially similar overall to the original drawings and sketches. If Mattel fails meet the requirements of the subjective or “intrinsic” test as to any of the allegedly infringing works, you must reach a verdict of non-infringement that work. However, if Mattel meets the requirements of the subjective or “intrinsic” test as to a particular work, and in addition meets the objective or “extrinsic” test as to that work, then you must enter a verdict of infringement as to that work.

Trademark v. Tacking

Did Prior Use Achieve Secondary Meaning? Is trademark tacking an issue of law (judge) or fact (jury)? “[W]e have long recognized across a variety of doctrinal contexts that, when the relevant question is how an ordinary person or community would make an assessment, the jury is generally the decisionmaker that ought to provide the fact-intensive answer.” Hana Financial v. Hana Bank, 135 S.Ct. 907 (2015)

31 Trademark v. Tacking

Is trademark tacking an issue of law (judge) or fact (jury)? Application of a test that relies upon an ordinary consumer’s understanding of the impression that a mark conveys falls comfortably within the of a jury. Indeed, we have long recognized across a variety of doctrinal contexts that, when the relevant question is how an ordinary person or community would make an assessment, the jury is generally the decisionmaker that ought to provide the fact-intensive answer. See, e.g., v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995) (recognizing that “ ‘delicate assessments of the inferences a “reasonable [decisionmaker]” would draw ... [are] peculiarly one[s] for the trier of fact’ ” (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976); first alteration in original)); id., at 450, n. 12 (observing that the jury has a “unique competence in applying the ‘reasonable man’ standard”); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104–105 (1974) (emphasizing “the ability of the juror to ascertain the sense of the ‘average person’ ” by drawing upon “his own knowledge of the views of the average person in the community or vicinage from which he comes” and his “knowledge of the propensities of a ‘reasonable’ person”); Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 664 745 (1874) (“It is assumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one man, [and] that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge”). Hana Financial v. Hana Bank, 135 S.Ct. 907, 911 (2015)

Fair Use Who is the relevant perspective for evaluating fair use? Is the inquiry objective or subjective? The original artist (foreseeable uses) The appropriation artist The audience for the original work The audience for the appropriation work Who if any is the role for the jury? Resolve factual disputes Weigh the factors At what stage is fair use ripe for resolution? Summary Judgment Trial

32 V. John Doe

Motion to Quash 1. Improper Joinder 2. Undue Burden N.D. Cal. 3. Lack of Personal On the Cheap ) Jurisdiction v. ) st Does 1-5,011 ) 4. 1 A Right to Anonymity

© Infringement

If we do proceed to trial, our client will demand the maximum statutory damages . . . up to $150,000 [per work]

33 Number of Direct Infringement Suits Per Year 200

150

100

50

Number of Suits Filed 0 2009 2010 2011 2012 Year

Number of New Alleged Doe Defendants by Year

100,00

70,096 50,000

38,088 25,000 11,919

2009 2010 2011 2012

34 Figure 3: Percentage of John Doe Law Suits by Circuit, 2001-03, 2004-06, 2007-09, 2010-12, 2013

Source: Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study (2014)

Figure 4: Percentage of John Doe Law Suits in Selected Districts, 2010 to 2013

Source: Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study (2014)

35 Table 1: Top 20 Copyright John Doe Plaintiffs 2001–2013 By total number of defendants

Cases Fewest Most Total Percentage Litigant Filed defendants defendants defendants of total Patrick Collins, Inc 224 1 3757 11460 12.2% 56 1 3577 8288 8.8% , Inc 17 1 1768 7502 8.0% Braun 9 1 7098 7106 7.6% Digital Sin, Inc 19 1 5698 6476 6.9% Malibu Media, LLC 1367 1 81 5938 6.3% Discount Video Center, Inc 3 1 5041 5071 5.4% On The Cheap, LLC 1 5011 5011 5011 5.3% West Coast Productions 24 1 2010 4761 5.1% Productions, Inc 2 2099 2099 4198 4.5% SBO Pictures 13 1 3036 3637 3.9% Zero Tolerance Entertainment 6 1 2943 3128 3.3% Openminded Solutions, Inc 17 1 2925 2979 3.2% , LLC 7 1 1568 2977 3.2% Contra Piracy 1 2919 2919 2919 3.1% Hard Drive Productions, Inc 57 1 1000 2853 3.0% Media Products, Inc 24 1 1257 2550 2.7% Tcyk, LLC 119 1 131 2528 2.7% Combat Zone 35 1 1037 2165 2.3% Arista Records 301 1 143 2123 2.3% Total 2302 93670 100%

By total number of defendants * Only Contra Piracy and Arista Records are not related to . The 297 Arista Records suits were filed between 2004 and 2008.

Source: Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study (2014)

Figure 5: John Doe Copyright Lawsuits 2010–2013 -- Selected Districts

Source: Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study (2014)

36 Figure 7: Average Number of Doe Defendants per Suit 2001 – 2013

Source: Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study (2014)

Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1 through 10 2012 WL 5382304 (C.D.Cal. Jun. 27, 2012) (Otis Wright II)

The economics of pornographic copyright lawsuits

The Court is familiar with lawsuits like this one. These lawsuits run a common theme: plaintiff owns a copyright to a pornographic movie; plaintiff sues numerous John Does in a single action for using BitTorrent to pirate the movie; plaintiff subpoenas the ISPs to obtain the identities of these Does; if successful, plaintiff will send out demand letters to the Does; because of embarrassment, many Does will send back a nuisance-value check to the plaintiff. The cost to the plaintiff: a single filing fee, a bit of discovery, and stamps. The rewards: potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars. Rarely do these cases reach the merits.

The federal courts are not cogs in a plaintiff's copyright-enforcement business model. The Court will not idly watch what is essentially an extortion scheme, for a case that plaintiff has no intention of bringing to trial. By requiring Malibu to file separate lawsuits for each of the Doe Defendants, Malibu will have to expend additional resources to obtain a nuisance-value settlement—making this type of litigation less profitable. If Malibu desires to vindicate its copyright rights, it must do it the old-fashioned way and earn it.

37 Joinder Rule 20. Permissive Joinder of Parties (a) Persons Who May Join or Be Joined. * * * (2) Defendants. Persons—as well as a vessel, cargo, or other property subject to admiralty process in rem—may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.

I didn’t know I was stealing or distributing it. I thought I was like listening to MTV on the internet.

38 1976 Act § 106 Exclusive rights in copyrighted works Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; * * * (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or otherHmm – transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease,what or constitutes lending; * * * “distribution”?

The $64 Billion Dollar Question: Why Did Congress Use “Exclusive Right . . . to Distribute”?

Is it related to/broader than/narrower than “right to vend” and “right to publish”?

Copyright owner must prove “actual Uploading is a form of distribution distribution” to a third party in order to • distribution encompasses “publication” prevail – i.e., not merely that someone • Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of LDS, “uploaded” a file to a share folder 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1997) (a library distributes when it places an unauthorized • the downloader must be someone copy in its collection) other than an authorized investigator • US adopted “making available” right through ratification of treaties

And if not; then downloading by a forensic investigator proves distribution

And if that’s not enough, then circumstantial evidence suffices

39 Statutory Damages

Split of Judicial Authority

Proof of Actual No Proof of Actual Distribution Required Distribution Required

Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., Supp. 2d 1210, 1218 (D. Minn. 2008) 239 F.3d. 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001) London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1-27, Universal City Studios Prods. LLP v. 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 169 (D. Mass. 2008) Bigwood, 441 F. Supp. 2d 185, 190 (D. Me. 2006) Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 278, 282 (D. Conn. 2008) Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 (N.D. Tex. 2006) Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981 (D. Ariz. 2008) Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Payne, Perfect 10, Inc. v. .com, Inc., 2006 WL 2844415, at *3 (W.D. Tex. 508 F.3d 1146, 1162 (9th Cir. 2007) July 17, 2006)

Other Interpretations

Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (distribution = publication)

40 The $64 Billion Dollar Question: Why Did Congress Use “Exclusive Right . . . to Distribute”?

Is it related to/broader than/narrower than “right to vend” and “right to publish”?

Copyright owner must prove “actual Uploading is a form of distribution distribution” to a third party in order to • distribution encompasses “publication” prevail – i.e., not merely that someone • Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of LDS, “uploaded” a file to a share folder 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1997) (a library distributes when it places an unauthorized • the downloader must be someone Go Back to First Principlescopy in its collection) other than an authorized investigator • legislative history• US adopted “making available” right through ratification of treaties

And if not; then downloading by a forensic investigator proves distribution

And if that’s not enough, then circumstantial evidence suffices

Act of May 31, 1790 1909 Act § 6 [A]ny person or persons who shall print or publish § 1 Any person entitled any manuscript, without the thereto . . . shall have the consent and approbation of exclusive right: the author or proprietor (a) To print reprint, publish, thereof . . . shall be liable . . . copy, and vend the copyrighted work;

No requirement to prove No requirement to prove “actual distribution” “actual distribution”

1790 1909

41 Rights protected and “fair use.” – In general, the report proposes to retain the exclusive rights given to copyright owners under the present law – to make and publish copies, to make new versions, to give public performances, and to make recordings.

1961

2. SUMMARY OF PRESENT RIGHTS

(a) All categories of copyrighted works are protected against the making and publication of copies.

3. ANALYSIS OF PRESENT RIGHTS a. The right to make and publish copies Section 1(a) of the present law provides for the exclusive right of the copyright owner to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work. These various terms are redundant. Printing and reprinting are modes of copying, and vending is a mode of publishing. As to vending, it is well settled that when publication has been authorized, the right to vend pertains only to the initial sale of a copy; the purchaser of the copy is then free to resell or otherwise dispose of it. On the other hand, when publication is not authorized, any vending of a copy is an infringement of the right to publish. In substance, as several courts have observed, the right embraced in the repetitive terms of section 1(a) is the twofold right to make and to publish copies. This right is the historic basis of copyright and pertains to all categories of copyrighted works. The copying embraced in this right is a broad concept.

1961

42 4. RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) Subject to certain limitations to be discussed below, the statute should continue to accord to copyright owners the exclusive rights to exploit their works by (1) making and publishing copies * * *

1961

§ 5. EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS COMPRISED IN COPYRIGHT. Subject to the provisions of sections 6 through 19, copyright under this title shall consist cumulatively of the following exclusive rights: (a) The right to copy or record. * * * (b) The right to distribute copies and sound recordings. Copyright shall include the exclusive right to sell or otherwise transfer ownership of, rent, lease, or lend one or more copies or sound recordings of the work. * * *

1961 1964

43 Abraham L. Kaminstein, Chairman (Register of Copyrights)

Edward A. Sargoy, American Bar Association

Abe A. Goldman, Copyright Office

1961 1964

Subsection (b), I believe, would cover everything that’s covered in section 1(a) of the present law by reference to Abe A. Goldman, Copyright Office the terms “publish” and “vend”-- broadened, I would say, to avoid any The draft purports to follow the broad questions broadenedas to whether “publish” or recommendation of the Register’s “vend” is used in such a narrow sense Report: that the rights recognized in that there might be forms of section 1 of the present statute be distribution not covered. I think the retained in substance * * * draft covers virtually all forms of distribution. Note the specific reference to “rent, lease, or lend * * * copies or sound recordings.”

1961 1964

44 Abraham L. Kaminstein, Chairman (Register of Copyrights). Might I suggest that we * * * devote a few more minutes to (b) * * * Edward A. Sargoy, American Bar Association I am heartily in accord with the omission of the use of the words “published” or “publication.” I think that the use of the words “publication” or “published,” in hundreds of common law and statutory cases, dissertations, and otherwise, has made the terms archaic today in the light of our recent technological progress. Reference to such materials where the word derived its meaning from conditions existing in the 18th, 19th, and early part of the 20th century, will only lead to confusion. I think it is an excellent idea to use the word “distribute” and, just as the draft here has done, have “distribute” expressly include the right “to sell,” (which is strictly one of the rights of publication), “or otherwise transfer ownership of, rent, lease, or lend one or more copies or sound recordings of the work.”

1961 1964

A. BASIC APPROACH OF THE BILL

[O]f the many problems dealt with in the bill, those covered by the exclusive rights sections are most affected by advancing technology in all fields of communications, including a number of future developments that can only be speculated about.

Obviously no one can foresee accurately and in detail the evolving patterns in the ways author's works will reach the public 10, 20, or 50 years from now. Lacking that kind of foresight, the bill should, we believe, adopt a general approach aimed at providing compensation to the author for future as well as present uses of his work that materially affect the value of his copyright.

1956 1961 19641965

45 A real danger to be guarded against is that of confining the scope of an author's rights on the basis of the present technology so that, as the years go by, his copyright loses much of its value because of unforeseen technical advances. For these reasons, we believe that the author’s rights should be stated in the statute in broad terms, and that the specific limitations on them should not go any further than is shown to be necessary in the public interest.

It has already become clear, however, that the unrestrained use of photocopying, recording, and other devices for the reproduction of authors' works, going far beyond the recognized limits of “fair use,” may severely curtail the copyright owner's market for copies of his work. Likewise, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the transmission of works by nonprofit broadcasting, linked computers, and other new media of communication, may soon be among the most important means of disseminating them, and will be capable of reaching vast audiences. Even when these new media are not operated for profit, they may be expected to displace the demand for authors’ works by other users from whom copyright owners derive compensation. Reasonable adjustments between the legitimate interests of copyright owners and those of certain nonprofit users are no doubt necessary, but we believe the day is past when any particular use of works should be exempted for the sole reason that it is “not for profit.” 1956 1961 19641965

.. Albums Sales A real danger to be guarded againstper iscapita/annum that of confining the scope of an author's rights on the basis of the present technology so that, as the years go by, his copyright loses much of its value because of unforeseen technical advances.

Note: Singles are converted to album equivalents at 14:1 Source: Stan Liebowitz (based on RIAA data)

46 e. Public Distribution Clause (3) of section 106(a) would give the copyright owner the exclusive right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.” The language of this clause is virtually identical with that in the definition of "publication" in section 101, but for the sake of clarity we have restated the concept here.

1956 1961 19641965

1976 Act § 101 Definitions

“Publication” is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of itself constitute publication.

1956 1961 1964 1976

47 1976 Act

No changes to §106

Statutory definition of “publication” expanded to include “offer to distribute copies for purposes of further distribution.”

Battle over Cable TV and Juke Boxes

1956 1961 19641965 1976

1976 Copyright Act § 106 Exclusive rights in copyrighted works Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; * * * (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; * * *

A 106(3) encompasses placing © work in share folder B Definition of “publication” includes “offer to distribute” C Downloading by forensic investigator establishes liability D Circumstantial evidence of downloading sufficient E No liability unless proof that file was downloaded

48 1976 Copyright Act § 106 Exclusive rights in copyrighted works Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; * * * (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; * * *

A Legislative History Is Determinative B Legislative History Is Pertinent, Permissible, and Useful C Legislative History Is Irrelevant D Legislative History May Not be Considered E

The appellees argue merely listing the work in the libraries’ catalog information system does not violate Diversey’s distribution right. They say Diversey must (but has failed to) allege the libraries actually distributed an unauthorized copy to a member of the public. They cite Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F.Supp.2d 976 (D.Ariz.2008) to suggest “‘§ 106(3) is not violated unless the defendant has actually distributed an unauthorized copy of the work to a member of the public.’”

Diversey Dissertation

Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1202 n.7(10th Cir. 2013)

49 Howell does reflect some dissensus, particularly among district courts, about the applicability of Hotaling’s holding to cases of Internet file-sharing. We need not delve into the file-sharing issue today. Hotaling, like this case, involves a public library making “the work available to the borrowing or browsing public.” Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 203. A patron could “visit the library and use the work.” See id. This is the essence of a violation of the copyright owner’s exclusive right to distribute his work via lending. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) (noting § 106(3) gives the copyright owner “the right to control the first public distribution ... of his work” (quotation omitted)); Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 1, 52–66 (2011) (analyzing the legislative history regarding the distribution right and concluding the requirement of actual distribution of an unauthorized copy is unwarranted).

Diversey Dissertation

Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1202 n.7(10th Cir. 2013)

Joinder Rule 20. Permissive Joinder of Parties (a) Persons Who May Join or Be Joined. * * * (2) Defendants. Persons—as well as a vessel, cargo, or other property subject to admiralty process in rem—may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.

50 No Laches Defense

Petrella v. MGM

Screenplay by Frank Petrella 1998 Raging Bull To: MGM Exploitation of Raging Bull (e.g., video) infringes my ©. Paula Petrella Stewart v. Abend Assignment (1990) © and Petrella ) renewal rights v. ) ) Raging Bull MGM © infringement Renewal Raging Bull

Paula Petrella

1963 19761980 1981 1990 1998 2009

51 U.S. Copyright Act 17 U.S.C. § 507 Limitations on Actions (b) Civil Actions.— No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.

“in face of a statute of limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot be invoked to bar legal relief.” “It is hardly incumbent on copyright owners . . . to challenge each and every actionable infringement. And there is nothing untoward about waiting to see whether an infringer’s exploitation undercuts the value of the copyrighted work, has no effect on the original work, or even complements it.” Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 134 S.Ct. 1962 (2014)

“in extraordinary circumstances, laches may, at the very outset of the litigation, curtail the relief equitably awarded. For example”

• where owners of a copyrighted architectural design, although aware of an allegedly infringing housing project, delayed suit until the project was substantially constructed and partially occupied, an order mandating destruction of the project would not be tolerable. See Chirco v. Crosswinds Communities, Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 236 (4th Cir. 2007).

• Nor, in the face of an unexplained delay in commencing suit, would it be equitable to order “total destruction” of a book already printed, packed, and shipped. See New Era Publications Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584–585 (2nd Cir. 1989).

52 Deluge of stale claims?

D Oregon Origina ity? Jacob ) Rentmeeester ) vs. ) 2015 ) ) )

© 1984 Jacobus © Infringement

License Agreement 1985

I hereby license the work to Nike for use in North American markets for two years.

Fee: $15,000. Jacobus Rentmeester

53