Money Flows, Water Trickles: Decentralized Service Delivery Under Hegemonic Party Rule
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University of California Los Angeles Money Flows, Water Trickles: Decentralized Service Delivery Under Hegemonic Party Rule A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Ruth Denali Carlitz 2016 c Copyright by Ruth Denali Carlitz 2016 Abstract of the Dissertation Money Flows, Water Trickles: Decentralized Service Delivery Under Hegemonic Party Rule by Ruth Denali Carlitz Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Los Angeles, 2016 Professor Miriam A. Golden, Chair This dissertation focuses on Tanzania, a hegemonic party regime where nearly half of the population lacks access to clean and safe drinking water despite massive investments in this sector in recent years. In order to make sense of this disconnect between spending and improved outcomes, I analyze novel data on financial allocations and infrastructure con- struction for water provision, contextualized by public opinion surveys, interviews and focus group discussions conducted during six months of fieldwork. I find that Tanzania's strategy of decentralizing water provision to local governments has largely failed to promote respon- siveness to local needs, due to local capture and politicized misallocation. I demonstrate how politicians have skewed resource distribution in such a way that favors their core supporters at the expense of demonstrably needier constituents. At the same time, citizens have been unable to compel responses to their needs given the lack of credible alternatives to the ruling party, as well as confusion over government responsibility for water provision, low expecta- tions of self-efficacy and collective action, and entrenched gender norms. My study adds to the rich literature on decentralization by illuminating the challenges it can encounter in the context of a hegemonic party regime. By illuminating the role of local politics, my disser- tation also adds to our understanding of how hegemonic party regimes { the most common type of authoritarian rule in the post-World War II period { survive and endure. ii The dissertation of Ruth Denali Carlitz is approved. Stephen K. Commins Jean E. Ensminger Daniel N. Posner Miriam A. Golden, Committee Chair University of California, Los Angeles 2016 iii To Rakesh, for starting me on this journey . and to Philip, for helping me complete it. Mwanzo mateso, mwisho furaha. iv Table of Contents 1 Introduction :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 1 1.1 Motivation . .1 1.2 Decentralization of Water: Promise and Reality . .4 1.2.1 Why Decentralize? . .4 1.2.2 Tanzania's Experience with Decentralization . .7 1.2.3 Water Provision in Tanzania . .9 1.3 Contributions of the Dissertation . 11 1.4 Plan of the Dissertation . 14 2 Tanzania's Aid-Dependent, Hegemonic Party Regime :::::::::::: 16 2.1 Introduction . 16 2.2 Hegemonic Party Politics . 17 2.2.1 The CCM in Power: Five Decades and Counting . 17 2.2.2 Implications for Service Provision . 22 2.3 Foreign Aid Dependence . 24 2.3.1 Tanzania: A Donor Darling . 24 2.3.2 Whose Priorities? . 25 2.4 Domestic Politics of Service Delivery in Tanzania . 31 2.4.1 Populist Policies . 31 2.4.2 Water as a Domestic Policy Priority . 34 2.5 Conclusion . 36 3 Allocation of Financial Resources for Water :::::::::::::::::: 38 3.1 Introduction . 38 v 3.2 Funding Rural Water Provision in Tanzania . 40 3.3 Accounting for Misllocation to Districts . 45 3.3.1 Political Competition and Resource Allocation . 46 3.3.2 Distributive Politics in Hegemonic Party Regimes . 47 3.3.3 Political Representation and Grant Allocations . 49 3.4 Empirical Strategy and Data . 50 3.4.1 Data . 53 3.5 Results . 55 3.5.1 Accounting for Temporal Variation . 58 3.6 Conclusion . 63 3.7 Appendix . 64 3.7.1 Accounting for New Districts . 64 3.7.2 Deviation from Formula . 64 3.7.3 Minister of Water's Home District . 67 4 Value for Money within Districts :::::::::::::::::::::::: 68 4.1 Introduction . 68 4.2 Local Government Budget Process . 69 4.2.1 Budgeting for Water Provision . 72 4.3 Inefficiency and Local Capture . 73 4.4 Accounting for Variation in VFM Across Districts . 75 4.4.1 Hypotheses . 77 4.4.2 Empirical Strategy . 78 4.4.3 Measuring Spending Efficiency . 79 4.4.4 Measuring Allocative Efficiency . 81 vi 4.4.5 Independent Variables for Analysis of Variation in VFM . 84 4.4.6 Correlates of Spending Efficiency . 86 4.4.7 Correlates of Allocative Efficiency . 88 4.5 Local Politics and Infrastructure Allocation . 90 4.5.1 Hypotheses . 90 4.5.2 Empirical Strategy . 93 4.5.3 Ward-Level Data . 94 4.5.4 Politicized Allocation of Infrastructure Within Districts . 97 4.6 Conclusion . 102 4.7 Appendix . 105 5 Need 6= Demand ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 106 5.1 Water Provision in Tanzania: A Failure of Government Accountability . 106 5.2 Do Tanzanians Care About Improving Access to Clean Water? . 108 5.3 Access to Clean Water and the \Long Route" to Accountability . 111 5.4 Do Citizens Know Who is Responsible for Water Provision? . 115 5.5 Access to Clean Water and the \Short Route" to Accountability . 120 5.5.1 Mobile Phone Monitoring of Service Provision . 121 5.5.2 Beyond Monitoring: Non-Electoral Citizen Action to Promote Im- proved Access to Clean Water . 123 5.6 Constraints on Citizen Action to Promote Improved Access to Clean Water . 126 5.6.1 Gender . 127 5.6.2 Expectations about Efficacy . 128 5.6.3 Expectations about Collective Action . 129 5.6.4 Costs of Taking Action . 130 vii 5.6.5 Regression Analysis . 132 5.7 Relaxing the Constraints . 137 5.7.1 Initiatives to Promote \Social Accountability" . 137 5.7.2 Promoting Accountable Water Provision in Tanzania . 140 5.8 Conclusion . 144 5.9 Appendix . 146 6 The Tanzanian Water Sector in Context :::::::::::::::::::: 149 6.1 Main Findings of the Dissertation . 149 6.1.1 Hegemonic Party Politics . 151 6.1.2 Decentralized Provision . 152 6.1.3 Foreign Aid Intensity . 153 6.2 Implications for Comparative Research . 154 6.2.1 Spending Efficiency Across Countries . 154 6.2.2 Subnational Variation in Public Goods Distribution . 156 6.3 Conclusion . 158 viii List of Figures 1.1 Spending on Water vs. Access . .2 2.1 Sectoral Commitments and Disbursements by Donors to Tanzania, 1990-2012 27 2.2 Yearly GBS Commitments and Disbursements by Donors to Tanzania, 1990- 2010 ........................................ 29 3.1 Expenditure on WSDP Components, FY2007-FY2013 . 42 3.2 Actual Allocations as a Proportion of Ideal Formula Allocations, 2009{2012 . 44 3.3 Change in District Support for CCM MPs and Turnout, 2005-2010 . 62 4.1 WSDP Flow of Funds . 73 4.2 Spending vs. Construction by Districts, 2007-2013 . 76 4.3 Kernel Density Estimate of Efficiency of Spending on Water . 80 4.4 Targeting of Water Infrastructure in Moshi District . 82 4.5 Kernel Density Estimate of Allocative Efficiency . 84 4.6 Change in Ward-level Turnout, 2005{2010 . 98 4.7 Coefficient Plot, Proportionate Change in Ward-Level Water Point Coverage 101 5.1 Signboard for Water Project in Sengerema District . 119 ix List of Tables 1.1 Studies of Central vs. Local Targeting of the Poor . 12 3.1 WSDP Components: Budget, Releases and Expenditure, FY2007-FY2013 . 41 3.2 Formula Allocating Water Budget to Districts . 51 3.3 Summary Statistics (District-Level Variables) . 55 3.4 DV = Log of Actual Allocation to District, 2007-2013 (Pooled Model) . 57 3.5 Log of Actual Allocation to Districts as a Function of Allocation in Previous Year, 2007-2013 . 58 3.6 DV = Log of Total Actual Allocation to District, 2007-2013 (Between Model) 60 3.7 Extractive Technology Classification { PIM and WPM Data . 65 3.8 Minister of Water's Home District, 2006-2015 . 67 4.1 Predicted Effects on Efficiency . 78 4.2 Summary Statistics, District-Level Variables . 85 4.3 Linear Regression Analysis of District-Level Spending Efficiency, FY2007/08- FY2012/13 . 87 4.4 Linear Regression Analysis of District-Level Allocative Efficiency, FY2007/08- FY2012/13 . 89 4.5 Summary Statistics (Ward-Level Variables) . 96 4.6 DV = Number of Water Points Built (Negative Binomial Regression with Ward Fixed Effects) . 97 4.7 DV = Dummy Indicating Whether Water Point Construction Occurred (Logit Regression with Ward Fixed Effects) . 99 4.8 DV = Proportionate Change in Ward-Level Water Point Coverage . 100 4.9 Unit Costs for Capital Investment in New Water Systems . 105 x 5.1 Access to Clean Water and Support for the Ruling Party (Differences Regression)113 5.2 Perceived Responsibility for Maintaining Water Point Functionality (AIID) . 116 5.3 Correlates of Action Taking (AIID Survey) Results in Odds-Ratios . 135 5.4 Fieldwork Inventory . 147 6.1 Percentage of Population with Access.