CHINESE SOUTHERN DIASPORA STUDIES, VOLUME SEVEN, 2014-15 南方華裔研究雜誌第七卷, 2014-15 Typifying Chineseness along the Sino-Myanmar frontier © 2015 Nicholas Farrelly and Stephanie Olinga-Shannon Introduction This paper is motivated by the need to better understand the diffusion of Chineseness in contemporary Myanmar. This is a topic of profound importance in circumstances where, by some estimates, there are 2.5 million “ethnic” Chinese in the country. Many of these migrants have arrived recently, since the 1980s, yet they are part of a much longer series of migrations, starting millennia ago, that have seen waves of people moving from central Asia, Tibet and China into the region now Known as Myanmar. Their efforts to develop different cultural and political systems have fundamentally blurred the boundaries between those Myanmar residents with Chinese origins, and those without. While the Chinese, as “Tayoke,” are officially classified as one of Myanmar’s populations, albeit not as a “national race”, there are all manner of ways that the boundaries between ethnic affiliations are distorted. Through centuries of contact, collaboration and conflict, a jumble of influences from Yunnan and beyond marKs the Sino-Myanmar borderlands. The position of the “non- Han Chinese” in this contested cultural landscape is especially intriguing. To help explain how different forms of Chineseness jostle for precedence this paper explores an emerging typology of belonging and exclusion. The categories that we emphasise in this typology are Myanmar’s “national races”, the Chinese who assimilate with the national races, and the Kokang. These three groups help to illuminate different engagements between Chinese diasporic and migrant groups, and the societies in which they settle. We propose to explore these peculiar ethnographic situations to present an analytic typology of Chineseness along the Sino-Myanmar frontier. First, there are the many non-Han Chinese who are considered members of Myanmar’s “national races”. Groups such as the Kachin/Jingpo, Shan/Dai and Wa occupy the borderlands where the two countries meet. We explain the character of their “Chineseness”, especially in contexts where they are considered distinctively “Myanmar”. For such non-Han minorities—almost never considered “Chinese” in Myanmar eyes— there are certain advantages: their abilities to speak Chinese languages and navigate Chinese cultures offer economic opportunity. Yet their official status in Myanmar often trumps the stigmatised Han Chinese. For this reason they are the exemplary cases for explaining the mechanisms that determine inclusion along the international border. The status of different “Chinese” cohorts in these contested circumstances has a further layer of complexity especially in those places where they seeK to define themselves as neither Chinese nor Myanmar. Second, at the other extreme of the typology of Chineseness, there are those Han Chinese who, to support their efforts to integrate into Myanmar society, present themselves as members of one of Myanmar’s “national races”, most often as “Shan”. Such efforts to gain legal and social acceptance in Myanmar’s domestic political economy complicates the picture of inter-ethnic and trans-national relations. The challenge is to understand precisely what maKes somebody a member of a non-Han Chinese group, rather than a Han group, or simply a Myanmar one? This “transitional” type helps illustrate the prevailing complications at the heart of the analysis in this paper. The boundaries between Han and Myanmar categorisation are not as neat as the two relevant nation-states would often pretend. What Farrelly & Olinga-Shannon: Typifying Chineseness then of the ways that certain people can mobilise new social affiliations for political and economic purposes? Third, and to provide an even more interesting picture of the Sino-Myanmar frontier, we explain the typology of KoKang, who further challenge our understanding of the designations of the “Chinese” in Myanmar. The KoKang “race” comprises approximately 80 per cent Han Chinese who speak a Yunnanese Mandarin dialect (Wang 2005: 72), with the remainder drawing in other borderlands peoples.1 The KoKang, as a category, appear to be considered “brothers” by other Han Chinese, but their status and identity make them officially separate from all other “Chinese” in Myanmar.2 They are a distinct “national race” in Myanmar’s official classification scheme, even meriting their own borderland “Kokang Self-Administered Zone” under the 2008 Constitution. Such a special designation further complicates the interaction between the Chinese and Myanmar systems of official categorisation and ethnic affinity. How does their status fit the typology of Chineseness along the frontier? To answer these and other questions, this paper offers an account of the different flavours of Chinese identity that are emerging along Myanmar’s frontiers with China. Our typology seeks to muddle the prevailing ethnic identities and distinctions of the borderlands. Still, this typology exists within a broader understanding of Chinese identity that must first be clarified. The key terms can be considered to be Huaren (華人), Huaqiao (華僑) and Zhongguoren ( 中國人). All are based on concepts of loyalty, home and identity. In this paper, ethnic Chinese or Huaren refers to Chinese persons who have settled abroad, acquired citizenship status in their new country, and who do not intend to return to China.3 For them, their new country is their “home” (Suryadinata 2007: 1). Overseas Chinese or Huaqiao refers to Chinese who are living outside China but intend to return to China, even if they never do. Chinese or Zhongguuoren is used for Chinese citizens who temporarily live and worK abroad but have no strong connection to their new location.4 The terms Huaqiao and Zhongguoren imply loyalty to China, while the term Huaren implies loyalty to the host country. The term Huaqiaohuaren (華僑華人) is often used to encompass all Chinese who have settled abroad. When speaKing to Chinese in Myanmar, our informants are almost always quicK to assert whether they identify as Huaqiao, Huaren or Zhongguoren. Such specificity can be disrupted, however, in the Sino-Myanmar frontier’s zone of interchange. We are therefore cautious about the definitiveness claimed by any of this paper’s “Han” and “non-Han” Chinese responses. As we undertooK the field research related to this study it became clear that there are very significant, and un-studied, populations of Chinese peoples, in surprising configurations of cultural, economic and political orientation, across Myanmar’s borderlands. To adequately account for all of their variations will require further investigation and a more thorough effort to explain the ways that China and Myanmar have interacted, not only over the past quarter century, but in the millennia before. To begin explaining these circumstances we offer an overview of the Chinese nestled among the 1 There are claims that up to 95 percent of the population of Kokang are Han Chinese but such claims are difficult to confirm from available data. 2 Confusingly, the other ethnic groups that maKe up the “KoKang race” include Shan, Palung, Wa, Miao and Lisu. Exactly how this category has been constructed is not entirely clear, although its omnibus character points to the variety of ways that ethnic affiliations can be constructed in the Sino-Myanmar borderlands. The grouping of “Kachin” could be conceived as similarly wide-ranging, bringing together a wide range of social and linguistic attributes. For more details on the Kachin case of ethnic group formation see Mandy Sadan (2013). 3 Many Chinese in Myanmar consider themselves Huaren even if they have not obtained Myanmar citizenship. As this paper discusses, it is difficult for Chinese to legally obtain Myanmar citizenship, even when their families have lived in the country for generations. 4 With Chinese investment and trade booming in Myanmar, there are many zhongguoren visiting, temporarily living and worKing in Myanmar, most notably in resource extraction, transportation and trade. 76 CHINESE SOUTHERN DIASPORA STUDIES, VOLUME SEVEN, 2015 南方華裔研究雜誌第七卷, 2015 fixed ethnic categories of contemporary Myanmar. There are few more politically or socially sensitive topics in the country today. I. Chinese among Myanmar’s “national races” The Myanmar Government recognises 135 official “national races” (Taiyintha) in the Myanmar population.5 Members of these “races” can obtain full citizenship, providing the predictable rights such a status entails.6 Some national races are also entitled to special representation in the upper house of parliament, the Amyotha Hluttaw. Many of Myanmar’s state governments, such as Kachin State and RaKhine State, have special ministerial positions for “national race” representatives. Other “races” such as the Chinese, Indians and Rohingya are excluded from the formal status of the “national races” although these groups can sometimes fit into miscellaneous categorisations. It is possible, for instance, to have national identity documentation that references a “Chinese” race, often in combination with a “race” such as Bamar or Shan. On its side of the border, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) also classifies the population according to 56 official “ethnic groups” (minzu 民族).7 Eight groups can be found on both lists, although the ethnography determining the shape of these groups is not entirely consistent. This overlap and incommensurability is determined by the jumbled borderlands that China and Myanmar share, and by the different paths that local ethnography has taKen.8 Both lists are designed to include and exclude, and to elevate the status of certain ethnic identities above others. It is useful to examine five groups that are represented, officially, in both of the national classification systems to explain the mechanisms of ethnic classification. The Shan are the largest minority in Myanmar, a “national race” and the custodians of the Shan State, and are known as the Dai (傣族) in China.9 On Myanmar’s list, the Kachin ethnic group is broken into sub-groups, one of which is the Jinghpaw who are Known in China as Jingpo(景頗族).