mathematical induction and explanation | 681 implausible first premiss, (J). On the other, it fails because Roache hasn’t provided reasons to think cohabitants know their survival is guaranteed. I conclude that her argument does not show cohabitants are unlike the rest of us in their concern for survival.5 Hannam University Daejeon, South Korea
[email protected] Downloaded from References Hawley, K. 2008. Persistence and determination. Philosophy 83 (Suppl 62), 197–212. Langford, S. 2007. How to defend the cohabitation theory. The Philosophical Quarterly 57: 212–24. Lewis, D. 1983. Postscripts to ‘Survival and identity’. Philosophical Papers Volume I: analysis.oxfordjournals.org 73–77. McGrath, M. 2007. Four-dimensionalism and the puzzles of coincidence. In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3, ed. Dean Zimmerman, 143–76. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mills, E. 1993. Dividing without reducing: bodily fission and personal identity. Mind 102: 31–51. Noonan, H. 1989. Personal Identity. London: Routledge. Perry, J. 1972. Can the self divide? Journal of Philosophy 73: 463–88. at Swarthmore College Library on April 11, 2011 Roache, R. 2009. Fission, cohabitation and the concern for future survival. Analysis 70: 256–63. Sider, T. 2001. Four Dimensionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wasserman, R. 2002. The standard objection to the standard account. Philosophical Studies 111: 197–216. 5 Many thanks to the editor for helpful comments. Mathematical induction and explanation ALAN BAKER Marc Lange (2009) sets out to offer a ‘neat argument that proofs by math- ematical induction are generally not explanatory’, and to do so without appealing to any ‘controversial premisses’ (2009: 203). The issue of the ex- planatory status of inductive proofs is an interesting one, and one about which – as Lange points out – there are sharply diverging views in the phil- osophy of mathematics literature.