Lasting Legacies? Robert Oliver John Lauermann Mega Event Planning

MEGA EVENT PLANNING

Series Editor: Eva Kassens-Noor

FAILED OLYMPIC BIDS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF URBAN SPACE

Series editor Eva Kassens-Noor Michigan State University East Lansing MI, USA Te Mega Event Planning Pivot series will provide a global and cross-disciplinary view into the planning for the world’s largest sporting, religious, cultural, and other transformative mega events. Examples include the Olympic Games, Soccer World Cups, Rugby championships, the Commonwealth Games, the Hajj, the World Youth Day, World Expositions, and parades. Tis series will critically discuss, analyze, and challenge the planning for these events in light of their legacies including the built environment, political structures, socio-economic systems, societal values, personal attitudes, and cultures.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/14808 Robert Oliver · John Lauermann Failed Olympic Bids and the Transformation of Urban Space Lasting Legacies? Robert Oliver John Lauermann Virginia Tech University City University of New York Blacksburg New York VA, USA NY, USA

Mega Event Planning ISBN 978-1-137-59822-6 ISBN 978-1-137-59823-3 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59823-3

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017949191

© Te Editor(s) (if applicable) and Te Author(s) 2017 Te author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identifed as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Tis work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifcally the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microflms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Te use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specifc statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Te publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Te publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional afliations.

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Tis Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by Springer Nature Te registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd. Te registered company address is: Te Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW, United Kingdom Acknowledgments

Te authors appreciate the assistance of Lewis Bellas for his collegiality and critical insight informing several of the arguments presented in this book. Frequent words of encouragement and editorial recommendations ofered by Valerie Tomas, Erik Olson, and Peter Goheen arrived at key moments in the writing process, forcing us to not only be patient, but concise. Over the years, the Olympic Study Centre archives and staf have been invaluable resources. Te research was supported in part by grants from the Olympic Studies Centre and the US National Science Foundation. Te Departments of Geography at Virginia Tech and Texas A&M have likewise supported the research and writing of this project, and we thank our colleagues at these institutions for their support. Finally, we would like to acknowledge the expertise and enthu- siasm of Eva Kassens-Noor and the entire team at Palgrave Macmillan for seeing this project through to fruition.

v Contents

1 Why Bid? Te Logic of Pursuing Sports Mega-Events 1

2 Bidding and Urban Development 27

3 Policy Mobilities and the Bid 49

4 Planning Across Bids 69

5 Post-bid Legacies? 87

6 Post-bid Rescaling 107

7 Anti-bid Politics 129

8 Conclusion: Rethinking the Horizons of Failed Bids 147

Index 153

vii List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Origins of the bid consulting industry Constructed from corporate records, IOC archives, and interviews; reprinted from Lauermann (2014a) 57

ix List of Tables

Table 4.1 International multisport events 75 Table 4.2 High frequency mega-event bidders 77 Table 7.1 Characteristics of recent anti-bid protests 138

xi 1 Why Bid? The Logic of Pursuing Sports Mega-Events

Abstract Tis chapter presents some of the key shifts that have occurred in the Olympic bidding process. An apparent crisis in the lack of bid cities during recent mega-event competitions has prompted the International Olympic Committee to stress that bid cities should be looking to produce a positive urban legacy and to marry Olympic objectives with urban development goals. Yet, as the IOC attempts to be relevant by inviting cities to partake in legacy planning, there is an emerging concern that bid cities are using the bidding process to leverage urban development objectives that are at best only tangentially related to the bid. Tis chapter proposes that we have entered a new era of Olympic bidding that has fundamental implications for the “geography of failure.”

Keywords Legacy planning · Leverage · Olympic Agenda 2020 Candidature process

Tis book evaluates why cities choose to bid for the Olympics, why Olympic bids fail, and whether cities can beneft from failed bids. Mega-event planning is an expensive and risky proposition for cities. In a best case scenario, a city will win its bid and go on to host

© Te Author(s) 2017 1 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann, Failed Olympic Bids and the Transformation of Urban Space, Mega Event Planning, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59823-3_1 2 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann the world’s most-watched event while simultaneously generating urban development legacies. In a worst case scenario, a city will win its bid but go on to experience a “winner’s curse” of cost overruns and poorly planned, under-utilized infrastructure. Tere is a robust debate over the costs and benefts of hosting the Olympics, as scholars and practitioners across a range of disciplines have analyzed the impact of mega-events on urban policy, planning, and practice. However, there is another possibility: many cities bid for the Olympics but go on to see their bids fail. Tis latter group of mega-event planning stories requires us to ask a diferent question: what are the costs and benefts of planning for the Olympics, especially when the plans fail? Te bidding process creates far more losers than winners, by design. Between 1990 and 2016, there were 13 Olympic host cities. During that same period, 67 cities submitted 99 bids to the International Olympic Committee (IOC), and even more cities developed preliminary bids during intra-national competitions to become their country’s ofcial bid city. Te IOC secures the type of Olympics it wants by pitting cities against each other, and thus failure is a core characteristic of mega-event planning. However, despite the fact that failure is a central feature of the process, there is comparatively little research on the urban impacts of all this failed bidding. Our book seeks to expand the geography of mega- event analysis, building from a well-developed literature on Olympic host cities to analyze the urban efects of mega-event planning in unsuccessful bidding cities. We demonstrate that failed Olympic bids can have a signifcant impact on urban planning, policy, and land use—despite, or sometimes even because of, their failure to bring the Games to town. Tis chapter introduces how mega-event planning can generate urban development, as plans are designed to generate legacy impacts and as the planning process is leveraged to achieve development goals. While there is much debate over the success rate of legacy and leveraging approaches, they are widely circulating tropes in urban politics. In Chap. 2, we track how mega-event planners use “framing narratives” about event-led development to catalyze and mobilize political support for their projects. Olympic bids have become a vehicle for promoting a wide range of development ambitions, which may be only tangentially related to the Games. We show that bidding is often a politically 1 Why Bid? The Logic of Pursuing Sports Mega-Events 3 strategic exercise, and the strategy is often shared geographically across cities through the mobility of planning expertise (as we detail in Chap. 3), and temporally as strategic ideas are recycled from one bid project into the next (as we detail in Chap. 4). While individual bidding projects may fail, the political strategies that motivate Olympic bidding live on when failed bids are able to catalyze legacy efects (Chap. 5) or when the strategies are rescaled into smaller but nonetheless ambitious planning projects (Chap. 6). Tis under-the- radar form of planning allows local elites to pursue long-term development strategies during and after a failed Olympic bid. In this way, bidding relies on a “politics of contingency” (Chap. 7) that allows mega- event boosters to contradictorily promote bids as low risk preliminary plans yet high impact plans that can generate urban development even if they fail. However, citizens are increasingly aware of and concerned about the process. As we document in Chap. 7, a growing cohort of anti- bid protest movements has sought to contest not only the Olympics, but the use of failed Olympic bids as development vehicles. Bid failure due to competition is quite diferent from that caused by local opposition movements. Te former ofers the possibility that parts of a bid can be used to generate legacies, while the latter involves a contentious anti-bid campaign focused on blocking the proposals inside the bid.

An Evolving Candidature (or Bid City) Process

A few authors have provided useful summations of the history of the bidding process and outlined key moments that have either encouraged or hindered the number of cities competing for the honor of hosting (Feddersen et al. 2008; Liao and Pitts 2006; McIntosh 2003; Oliver 2014). Consistent among these examinations is the acknowl- edgement that the bidding process shifted from being a relaxed afair prior to World War II, that only generated “variable interest” (Roche 2000) and often required the “infuence of the founders of the modern Olympics” (Feddersen et al. 2008, p. 173), to a much more intense competitive environment in the post-war period (where competitions often attracted more than six bids). Te move away from amateurism, 4 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann the increasing commercial potential of the Olympics Games, and the growing propensity of host cities using the Games to alter their urban environments helped generate interest. Tere was an apparent decline in the number of cities interested in bidding from the late 1970s through the 1980s, a by-product of the political and economic risks exposed by the Munich, Mexico, and Montreal Games (Roche 2000). But the submission of a large number of bids for many of the competitions toward the end of the millennium serves to illustrate that the concerns of the 1970s were short-lived. In fact, according to Canadian IOC member Richard Pound, there was an “embarrassment of riches in terms of the number of possible candidates” (Pound 2004, p. 202) during the last decades of the twentieth century. Some commentators have suggested that the bidding competition has grown to become “almost as intense as the athletic competition itself” (Zimbalist 2015, p. 2). Even a brief glance at the bidding process for the Olympics Games would be enough to realize that it has “evolved into a highly detailed, lengthy, and competitive process” (McIntosh 2000, p. 312).

Two Phases: Applicant to Candidate

Te uptick in the number of bids throughout the 1990s led the IOC to introduce a 2-year, two-phase, bidding process during the 110th IOC Session in Lausanne, Switzerland in 1999. Bid cities were frst labeled applicant cities, and then if their bids were considered competitive they were awarded candidature status. Tis phased approach was adopted to not only reduce the expenditures for those cities not quite prepared to host (IOC 2000; IOC 1999b), but also to eliminate opportunities for “questionable dealings” to materialize (Mason et al. 2006, p. 62). Te interrogation of the bidding process for the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Games exposed a series of improprieties by IOC members and bid team representatives, as the latter bribed the former to vote for the city’s bid. Te behavior of the IOC members (and to a lesser degree bid team members) were characterized as a moral failure and led to the creation of three commissions. Tere was an Ad Hoc 1 Why Bid? The Logic of Pursuing Sports Mega-Events 5

Commission tasked with examining the procedures for allocating the Games, an Ethics Commission charged with developing and regulating a new code of ethics for IOC members, and a third commission charged with examining the “composition, structure, and organization of the IOC” (IOC 1999a, p. 1). In terms of the bidding process, several new rules were introduced including: (a) the restriction of site visits by IOC members to bid cities; (b) the prevention of international lobbying of applicant cities; and (c) the preclusion of the exchange of gifts between bidding cities and IOC members and afliates. After paying an application fee to the IOC and having gained the support of their National Olympic Committee, applicant cities were required to complete the IOC’s “Applicant City Questionnaire.” Tis questionnaire addressed a variety of themes (i.e., government support, general infrastructure, security, venues, accommodation, transport, public support) but applicant cities were encouraged to explain the “motivation behind new build, post-Olympic use and long-term strategies” of infrastructure investment and to identify any opposition to the bid (Masterman 2009, p. 163). A favorable review from an IOC working group report during this stage of the process translated into being short- listed by the IOC’s Executive Board to be a candidate city—a distinction that was accompanied by a second fee. Two factors explain why this phased system—used in the bidding processes for Games between 2008 and 2022—generated discontent. First, the phased system did little to reduce the steadily increasing complexity of the bidding process as the expectations placed on candidate cities, especially during the second phase of the bid process, were considerable. Each city was required to develop a substantive candidature fle, commonly referred to as a bid book, addressing questions detailed in a “Manual for Candidate Cities” and a number of technical manuals, which collectively exceed several thousand pages of dense detail. Te candidate cities were directed to provide guarantees and secure fnancing and to meticulously detail how they planned to conduct the games. In addition, each candidate city was visited by the IOC’s Evaluation Commission who assessed the institutional and infrastructural capacity of the candidate cities, among other measures. A compelling bid book typically required the recruitment of extra-local expertise/service and 6 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann necessitated spending millions of dollars; the average bidding budget during the years of the phased system was $31.6 million, with outli- ers as high as $89 million (for the Tokyo 2020 bid).1 Bids also require the labor of thousands of persons for a staggering number of hours, all while being subjected to intense media scrutiny. After two years of lobbying and vetting, each of the candidate cities were invited to present their plans to the full membership of the IOC, who would, in turn, vote on a winner via secret ballot. Te growing importance of leaving a “lasting legacy” became germane during this period. In particular, the IOC added the following mission statement to the Olympic Charter: “to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries” (IOC Charter 2015, para. 14). Several initiatives in the early part of the millennium proved infuential in generating this amendment. For instance, an International Symposium on Te Legacy of the Olympic Games: 1984–2000 held by the IOC Olympic Museum and Studies Centre and the Olympic Studies Centre of the Autonomous University of Barcelona ofered one of the frst sustained academic eforts dedicated to exploring the evolution of the word “legacy” in relation to the Olympic Movement (Gratton and Preuss 2008; Leopkey and Parent 2012; Oliver 2011). In the edited volume that emerged from the symposium, it was clear that while the use of legacy lacked precision, its replacement with a more specifc term was not in question. It was also evident that Cashman’s worry that “legacy is often assumed to be self-evident, so that there is no need to defne precisely what it is” (Cashman quoted in Gratton and Preuss 2008, p. 1924) was a shared concern. Recommendations from this conference not only led to the alteration of the Olympic Charter but also prompted the IOC to place new demands on prospective host cities through the vehicle of the new tiered Candidature Acceptance Procedure which required potential hosts to clarify “the long-terms benefts for your city/region/country of … Bidding for the Olympic Games (irrespective of the outcome of the bid)” (IOC 2011, p. 55). A second observation regarding the applicant-candidate system is that it was introduced at a time when there had been a sizable increase in the number of bids for the Games. Writing about the bidding process at the beginning of the millennium, IOC member Richard Pound (2004) 1 Why Bid? The Logic of Pursuing Sports Mega-Events 7 opined, “there should probably be no more than two or three cities that become candidates, but this means that the IOC has to be ready to say no, at least for now, to some important countries and this has proven, predictably, to be politically difcult for the IOC” (p. 202–203). Part of the dilemma, as Howell recognizes, is that a vibrant bid competition provides “millions of pounds of publicity for the IOC which doesn’t cost the IOC a penny” and this is why he concludes that it was unlikely that the IOC would seek to restrict the bidding process too much (Howell quoted in Simson and Jennings 1992, pp. 256–257). Booth (2011) arrives at a similar conclusion noting: “[t]he selection of host cities for the Olympic games constitutes the raison d’être of the IOC and a strong pool of candidates is critical for its existence” (p. 381). With the luxury of having a large number of applicant cities, the IOC could reduce the applicant pool and claim that it was a city’s preparedness, not an organizational ego that was governing the process while still reap- ing the benefts of a healthy competition. Yet, when the applicant pool declines, as has been evident since 2001, then the IOC has to question the lack of interest as well as the process that generates the host city (Zimbalist 2015). While there has been no shortage of criticism of the bidding process from the academy and in the popular press, the recent expansion of the Olympic Games to emerging economies (e.g., Brazil, Russia, and China) has altered the tone of the criticism. As McAloon (2015) summarizes, “[i]f one were to single out a point source poisoning the well of public discourse, it was worldwide press reporting through late 2013 and 2014 that the Sochi Winter Games had cost US $51 billion” (p. 5). Te staggering costs combined with heated debates about the ecological mismanagement, sexual discrimination, and human rights records of recent games has had a chilling efect on the number of bids, especially by urban democracies (Horne and Whannel 2012). Even members of prominent National Olympic Committees have expressed concern that they cannot generate the necessary support to promote a bid from their own country. Specifcally, a report examining the bidding for the 2010–2018 Winter Olympic Games by the Austrian Olympic Committee, the German Olympic Sports Confederation, the Swedish Olympic Committee, and the Swiss Olympic Association found that: 8 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

(a) bid budgets have increased while simultaneously becoming more difcult to decipher; (b) the documentation required to illustrate how plans could be operationalized has become increasingly sophisticated and more cumbersome; (c) the results of the evaluation commission do not seem to be refected in the voting behavior of IOC members; and (d) the IOC remains disconnected from the process especially in terms of sharing risk (Austrian Olympic Committee et al. 2014). Te report concluded that not only has it become “increasingly difcult for established sports nations to communicate the Olympic values and the benefts that arise from bidding and hosting,” but the threshold for bidding has been elevated to the point where the opportunity costs are too risky (Austrian Olympic Committee et al. 2014, p. 6). Te submission of only three bids for the 2018 Winter Olympic Games and the with- drawal of four of the six bids for the 2022 Winter Olympic Games help to legitimize the concerns expressed in the report. Te report exposed credibility issues and sketched the general perception of mistrust exer- cised toward the IOC by the media. Moreover, the report cited the vulnerability to the Olympic Movement that accompanies a poor bidding process. If only a portion of the report was accurate, then it was apparent that further amendments to the bidding process were not just war- ranted, but necessary. Tese changes emerged in the form of Olympic Agenda 2020.

Agenda 2020

Olympic Agenda 2020 comprised a reform package that was built from 40,000 public submissions synthesized by 14 working groups over the course of a year.2 Te work culminated in 40 specifc recommendations that provided a new “strategic roadmap” for the Olympic Movement. In simple terms, Agenda 2020 refects the IOC’s recognition of the need to reduce spending, improve transparency, and include sustainability in all facets of the Olympic Games (Boykof 2016; Viehof and Poynter 2015). New language concerning human rights (6th Fundamental Principle of Olympism), a shift in the gender balance of IOC membership, the creation of an Olympic Channel, and other recommendations 1 Why Bid? The Logic of Pursuing Sports Mega-Events 9 sought to increase the credibility of the sport competitions and their governance (IOC 2014). Te roster of the Agenda 2020 working groups made it clear that bidding procedures, sustainability, and legacy were the “sources of immediate concern” and many of the changes proposed by Agenda 2020 must be read as IOC’s attempt to avoid a bidding crisis that manifests with a lack of applicant cities (MacAloon 2016, p. 770). As MacAloon (2016) aptly summarizes, the central purpose of Agenda 2020 was to “improve the relationship between Lausanne and host cities” (p. 776). Several of the recommendations of Agenda 2020 addressed the lingering dilemmas of geographic sites. For example, recommendation 1[3–4] proposed that it might be benefcial to permit events to be held outside of the host city or even host country if the bid city could illustrate that it would generate a more positive sustainable legacy. Te potential for cross-border bids does open the possibility of having regional Games (e.g., a couple or perhaps a collection of Caribbean countries or Gulf States playing host) but also introduces the tricky situation of having to negotiate contracts across parties. Another recommendation (2[2]) stressed the need to maximize the use of existing facilities while simultaneously highlighting that the use of temporary and demountable venues must be critically evaluated. Recommendation 2[4] sought clarifcation on how diferent budgets (organizational versus capital costs) are delineated and how the IOC’s contribution could be better communicated (IOC 2014). When combined, the underlying message from the acceptance of Agenda 2020 is that the IOC recognizes that the bidding process needs to “accommodate diferent solutions to meet Games needs within diferent cities’ contexts” (All About the Candidature Process 2016, para 8). To accommodate this versatility, the applicant phase of the bidding process was replaced with an “Invitation Phase” that would facilitate additional conversations between the IOC and potential bid cities early in the process (Pound 2015). Tis “Invitation Phase” does not require a formal commitment to bid, rather it is designed to stimulate an exchange between potential candidate cities and the IOC. Te IOC refers to the Invitation Phase as comprising a number of dialogues that permits the IOC to ofer a variety of services (e.g., workshops, transfer of knowledge) to aid potential cities in their 10 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann eforts to align their city’s development needs with the requirements of the Games. In his speech at the 127th IOC Session, IOC President Tomas Bach drew attention to the need to ofer bid cities a greater degree of fexibility when generating their vision:

With a new philosophy in the bidding procedure, we are encouraging potential candidate cities to present to us a holistic concept of respect for the environment, feasibility and of development, to leave a lasting legacy. With these far-reaching changes, we respect that there is no “one size fts all solution” for the sustainability of Olympic Games. Host city candidates strive for very diferent development goals and start from very diferent points of development. We embrace this diversity. In fact, this diversity is part of the magic of the Olympic Games. (IOC 2014, pp. 3–4, bold in original)

Of course, consultation with potential candidates before bidding does raise concerns about IOC impartiality, even as it communicates the IOC’s desire to have the Olympic Games leave legacies that are not made in Lausanne (Pound 2015). Following the Invitation Phase, cities put forth by their National Olympic Committee (NOC) ofcially enter into the Olympic Candidature Process. Over the next two years, candidate cities provide three ofcial submissions in a “stage approach.” Each stage requires bid cities to outline various aspects of their bids, ranging from an explana- tion of the general Games vision, concept, and legacy strategy to out- lining the proposed governance structures, to legal and venue funding considerations. Te IOC has stressed that throughout the bid process, cities must focus on developing a concept that (a) meets long-term development and legacy plans for the city and region, (b) illustrates sustainability, and (c) is supported nationally by various stakeholders as well as the general public. Te refnement of the candidate cities’ dossiers is further infuenced by a site visit from an IOC Evaluation Commission, the publication of IOC Evaluation Commission Report, a Candidate City Briefng where bidding cities present their visions to the various International Sports Federations and the IOC membership and address questions concerning the technical merit of the bid. 1 Why Bid? The Logic of Pursuing Sports Mega-Events 11

Te bidding process culminates with a fnal presentation by candidate cities at an IOC Session dedicated to the Host City Election. Here, IOC members vote by secret ballot and elect the host city which then signs the Host City Contract with the IOC.

Expanding Visions of Legacy

As Grix (2014) and others have shown, two key debates have generated an outpouring of academic writing, questioning the role of large-scale sporting events such as the Olympic Games in urban regeneration. Te frst debate revolves around the issue of post-event impacts or legacy. Te second, but related discussion, is concerned with how mega-events are leveraged to facilitate urban policy objectives (Grix 2014; Smith 2012; Tomlinson 2014). Both conversations refect the discursive and real negotiations that emerge from the struggle of urban and extra-local actors to legitimate particular forms of urban transformation. In the case of the Olympic Games, questions concerning leveraging and legacy are also linked to a much older desire to determine the meaning(s) of the Olympic symbol (MacAloon 1981). For example, Oliver (2008) has argued that the Olympics are a powerful symbol because they can simultaneously condense meaning while remaining malleable to the framing eforts of dedicated publics. Recent bid competitions have witnessed the evaluation of bid teams’ legacy visions across a number of categories including “sports concept and legacy (under sports venue criteria), Olympic Village legacy, and the overall project legacy” (Leopkey and Parent 2012, p. 447). Broader eforts to “green the Games” and make them more sustainable have also impelled the IOC to require candidate cities to complete environmental assessments (Short 2008). It is important to note that the IOC’s accentuation of positive legacies is partly driven by the desire to illustrate social and organizational responsibility during a period when governing sport bodies have been accused of opportunism and corruption and criticized for a lack of transparency and accountability (Adebe et al. 2014). Te IOC can now point to their Olympic Games Knowledge Management System (OGKM), Candidate Procedures, 12 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

Ethics Commission, and Guide on Olympic Legacy as examples of oversight and knowledge transfer initiatives designed to help potential local organizing committees determine if they are in a position to submit a competitive bid. Te growing movement to achieve “Legacies Now”3 has also triggered an explosion in the number of stakeholders and infuential actors across the public and private sectors making the Olympic Games legacy “a shared responsibility” (Leopkey and Parent 2012, p. 938). While the International Olympic Committee (IOC) might prefer that the Olympics are thought of as multidimensional, it is important to recognize that it is the ability of the Olympics, borrowing the words of Pierre Coubertin, to “play the chameleon” (Hoberman 1986, p. 2) that makes them an ideal symbol for cities looking to “justify signifcant projects of renewal and regeneration, advertise their status and personal- ity and, thus, attract new inward investment and modernize their economies” (Essex and Chalkley 2004, p. 201). Although Coubertin used the chameleon metaphor to indicate that the Olympics could operate as an apolitical movement, evidence suggests they have been employed to frame a diverse set of socio-spatial objectives (Berg 2008; Black 2010; Bourdieu 1978; Jackson and Haigh 2008). For more than a century, the malleability of the Olympic symbol has allowed bid teams and host cities to consider how the Olympic Games might facilitate the pursuit of a range of humanitarian goals as well as more specifc objectives such as public infrastructure renewal, education, economic development, cultural integration, security, youth and/or community development, the creation of a healthier population and so on. But as the scope and scale of the Olympics has evolved, growing evidence of negative impacts— especially “white elephant” stadium projects (venues that do not beneft the host city and country in the long term)—has caused stakeholders, especially the IOC, to periodically refect on the impacts that the Games have on host cities and nations. In particular, questions have emerged regarding how to conceptualize and measure legacy (Preuss 2007) as well as how to consider the signifcance of the current focus on legacy for bid cities and the Olympic Movement. Although the ambiguity or malleability of the Olympic symbol continues to ensure that “legacy is an essentially contested concept 1 Why Bid? The Logic of Pursuing Sports Mega-Events 13 and practice” (Cashman and Horne 2013, p. 51), there is growing recognition that there has been a move away from considering legacy as “an individual bequest or anything that is left over from an event” (Cashman 2006, p. 15) to broader conceptualizations that support the notion that legacy can be planned, constructed, or designed (Gold and Gold 2009). Preuss (2007, p. 87) nicely captures this new sentiment arguing that legacy now encompasses “all planned and unplanned, positive and negative, intangible and tangible structures created by and for a sport event that remains for a longer time than the event itself.” An analysis of candidature fles and fnal reports submitted by host cities by Leopkey and Parent (2012) identifed the emergence of 13 diferent legacy themes. Tese themes stretched from host cities’ desires to be socially progressive, economically responsible, and environmentally friendly to being cognizant of the power of nostalgia, image, and the opportunities for cultural programming, sport development, planning services, and policy development. But as legacy has become an instrument of expression, it has forced individuals to ask: “what is being done in the name of legacy” (Leopkey and Parent 2012, p. 449)? Here the meshing of the legacy debate with the long-standing efort to determine the meaning of the Olympic symbol is more apparent as particular visions are negotiated and justifed. In addition, the question also provides a nice segue to the growing literature dedicated to illustrating how mega-events are now being leveraged. Several scholars have highlighted key moments in the evolution of the Olympic legacy debate. Some point to the use of word legacy in Melbourne’s 1956 Olympic Games bid proposal as triggering the use of legacy as a means to justify hosting (Leopkey and Parent 2012; McIntosh 2003; Oliver 2011; Torres 2012). Te IOC’s introduction of questionnaires provided to candidate cities pursuing the 1960 Olympics has also been considered an important prompt, as it forced bid teams to consider what their bids sought to accomplish (Oliver 2011). Still others trace the coupling of “Olympic bidding and planning discourse: participation and legacy” to Calgary’s hosting of the 1988 Winter Olympics (Tomlinson 2014, p. 138). For Tomlinson (2014), the Games of Mexico, Munich, Montreal, and Moscow raised a series of fnancial and political considerations that threatened the very existence of the 14 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

Olympic Games. Following the economically successful staging of the Los Angeles Games, Calgary was positioned to perform essential restor- ative work by rekindling and appealing to the aspirations and ideals of Olympism. By focusing on the positive legacies of new sport facilities and promising a legacy fund that would ensure the maintenance of these facilities post-Games, Calgary’s bid team helped make legacy an objective or goal and not simply a result. Crucially, Calgary’s 1988 Olympic efort, in combination with the “surpluses” generated by Los Angeles 1984, served to illustrate that Montreal’s fnancial difculties might be thought of as an anecdote of poor management. An increase in the number of bid cities in the 1990s helps to illustrate a renewed confdence. Te lesson ofered by Calgary was that legacy could be “turned into a rhetorical tool that could be used in an encomium to the Olympic movement and its stated ideals of peace and international understanding” (Tomlinson 2014, p. 139). Regardless of the point of origin, the concern over legacy has emerged as an important guiding concept of sport development and mega-event planning for several decades and the manner that legacy has been employed has gradually assumed a more prominent position in determining the quality and competitiveness of candidature fles. It is also important to recognize that the Olympic bidding process has a strict institutional framework that is outlined by the IOC and given binding legality through the Olympic Charter. Recent structural and governance reforms have typically mimicked shifts in the number of cities seeking to host and are indicative of how an emergent emphasis on legacy has altered the relationship between the IOC and host cities.

Leveraging Mega-Events

Host cities have long considered how they might utilize the Olympic Games to deliver a variety of positive benefts. What is new is the pri- oritizing of urban transformation(s) over the last few decades, as the economic and political realities of neoliberalism have infuenced the consumptive demands and managerial strategies of cities (Harvey 1989; Hiller 2006; Macleod 2011; Silk 2014). For Gold and Gold (2008), 1 Why Bid? The Logic of Pursuing Sports Mega-Events 15 it was in Rome that the “full potential of the Olympics as an instrument of urban transformation start[ed] to dawn” (p. 304). Te growth of the number of sports represented at the Olympic Games led to the construction of purpose-built sport facilities (e.g., velodromes, swimming halls), while simultaneously triggering the need for a full suite of additional accommodations for participants (e.g., athletes village), support teams, media personnel, and visitors (Alberts 2009). Te signifcant alterations to urban infrastructure helped alter the “signaling impulse” of bid and host cities as the nationalist sentiments of post-war Olympic Games were joined with more specifc urban narratives (Black 2007). It became clear that the Olympics are “not just about sport … they are also about cities” (Hiller 2006, p. 317). Te result, as Hiller (2006) explains, is that “[c]ities can no longer be viewed as merely the container that hosts the Olympics” (p. 108). Following Harvey (2001), Silk (2014) argues that the hosting of sport mega-events “is inextricably bound with a series of processes related to the reconstitution of ‘spectacular urban space’” (p. 50), whereby various neoliberal logics connect the production of symbols to the production of space (Silk 2014; Waitt 2008; Harvey 2001; Zukin 1995). Although the material and symbolic regeneration of urban cent- ers made possible by hosting mega-events has been impressive, the process has also revealed some uncomfortable “truths” (Falcous and Silk 2010, p. 170). Evidence of a “divisive social geography” fueled in part by “geographies of fear” that places security and control above the civil liberties of the urban citizenry is just one example of the negative legacies of hosting (Silk 2014). We will return to the neoliberal politics of space and spectacle in forthcoming chapters, for now, it is enough to recognize that skepticism abounds when attempts are made to develop or impose a form of symbolic consensus through sport development. As noted, the IOC recognizes the problem of “white elephants” and the dilemmas of escalating costs and has responded by encouraging bid cities to broaden their urban objectives. Work emerging from the sport management literature has been particularly instructive in helping expose “an emerging consensus that mega-events cannot be justifed by their impacts alone” (Smith 2014, p. 16). In more detail, Smith (2014) argues, the idea with event leveraging is “to avoid being overly led and 16 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann restricted by the requirements of the event, especially as these are often determined by outside interests that do not have a long-term stake in the host city” (p. 18). Instead, events are used to generate a window of opportunity, to secure seed capital, generate a policy space, or provide some other resource that can be put to work to “deliver outcomes that are not reliant on events themselves” (Smith 2014, p. 21). Te move away from a focus on event impacts illustrates a paradigm shift in Smith’s (2014) estimation, and a growing number of authors now fnd it instructive to view the mega-event as “the opportunity rather than the intervention itself, and leveraging is the intermingling of resources to activate the opportunity aforded by the event” (Misener et al. 2015, p. 138). More specifcally, Chalip (2004) defnes leverage initiatives as “those activities which need to be undertaken around the event itself which seek to maximize the long-term beneft from events” (p. 228). Central to newer models of event leveraging is the stretching of the event horizon to focus not simply on short-term impacts, but on long- term outcomes (Smith 2012). Moreover, by incorporating the “legacy intent”4 of local organizing committees, events are no longer viewed as interventions, rather, leveraging becomes an “organizing principle” (Smith 2014, p. 21). Smith (2014) claims, “It is now common for host cities to adopt projects that deliver positive outcomes in the pre-event period (e.g., employment, skills and training) as well as those that occur during and after the event” (p. 23). Ideally, Smith (2014) argues, a strategic leveraging of an event will refect a bottom-up approach where benefts are distributed more equitably and risks are broadly shared. Te shift in focus from ex-post (impact) to ex ante (leverage) (Chalip 2004, 2006) aligns nicely with the evolving discourse on Olympic legacy. Increasingly, legacy has been treated as a “prospective concept” where “[t]he construction of Olympic legacy, therefore, represents a developmental project which holds both a promise to accomplish something that does not exist and the uncertainty of how this future state is going to be delivered” (Girginov 2011, p. 544). Tis cognitive shift provides the opportunity for the IOC to make further demands on bidding cities, requiring them to “conceive two sets of legacy: one pertaining to the Olympic Games and another pertaining to the bid process” (Torres 2012, p. 16). Torres (2012) argues that it is an unwelcome 1 Why Bid? The Logic of Pursuing Sports Mega-Events 17 situation not simply because it distracts bid cities from their primary objective of securing the Olympic Games, but also because it remains unclear how the IOC could possibly enforce the implementation of legacy promises made by bid teams. More specifcally, Torres (2012) opines that bid committees are ill-positioned to plan legacy projects that remain “Olympically meaningful” in the event of a failed efort and that “the bid process does not need to broaden its scope to the prospect of failure” (p. 18). Although the rise of legacy planning has been applauded by a number of parties, especially those seeking an increased “managerial rationality” of Olympic matters (MacAloon 2008) and those concerned with a return on investment (Leopkey and Parent 2012), the growing concern over “legacy governance” (Girginov 2011; Leopkey and Parent 2012) and the instrumentalization of the bidding process (Torres 2012) have become key conversations in the mega-event literature. Without question, the “attention to legacy has helped to focus cities more on the post-event period and the need to plan for the long term before the event takes place” (Smith 2012, p. 60). But there is also growing evidence of cities using the camoufage of an Olympic bid as a means to achieve urban objectives that are only tangentially linked to sport development (Oliver 2011, 2014). Bid cities increasingly employ sophisticated and evolving logics to leverage the Olympic symbol (Gold and Gold 2008). In addition, guiding documents such as “Olympic Legacy” provided by the IOC, encourages the promotion of a plethora of legacies (sporting, social, environmental, urban, and economic) and recognizes that legacies can be in “tangible and intangible” form (IOC 2012, p. 9). Yet, as the IOC attempts to be relevant by inviting and encouraging cities to place specifc legacies that intertwine with urban development goals, there is an emerging concern that the “actual heritage of the Olympic movement” is being diminished (MacAloon 2008, p. 2067). For example, while not disregarding the positive implications that may result from the implementation of Agenda 2020, MacAloon (2016) asks: “what of Agenda 2020’s direct address to Olympic Movement issues” (p. 776)? MacAloon (2016) notes that while Agenda 2020 refects “a major departure from the IOC’s recent ‘business model’5” (p. 772) because its adoption indicates that “the IOC and 18 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann the bid committees/OCOGs [Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games] are conceived of as partners sharing more full both responsibility and risk” (p. 772), there is a lingering concern that the IOC is not actually “throwing itself into the fray” (p. 779). For MacAloon (2016) if the IOC fails to be political by not defending and enforcing the values of the Olympic movement, then its public image will continue to sufer. What we fnd is that the current legacy discourse (encouraged by the recent reforms to the bidding process) may actually be eroding the “cultural capital that distinguishes Olympic from other international sport and is the general source of value that makes anyone want to bid for the Olympics in the frst place” (MacAloon 2008, pp. 2067–2068). Moreover, MacAloon (2008) argues that as “legacy managers” carve out various projects that fail to address: “how their city will understand, rethink, and rework in a serious and deeply informed way the great themes of the Olympic historical experience,” they have the capacity to diminish the vast symbolic energy of the Olympics (p. 2067). Put simply, the Olympics risk becoming a symbol that is leveraged, not a collection of values to be moved. Meanwhile, recent editions of the Olympic Games continue to illustrate the harm that results from the inequitable production and distribution of selective legacies. Horne (2015) describes selective legacies as those that accommodate the desires of a political or economic elite, distinguishing them from universal legacies which are much more communal, collectivist, and inherently democratic. In terms of leveraging, Smith (2014) has also noted that “[i]n most mega-events, the vast majority of the budget is spent on building venues and staging the event, with wider projects and leverage initiatives allocated a relatively small proportion of funds” (p. 20). Ultimately, attempts to “leverage an elusive, ephemeral or amorphous force” to generate “legacy” remains inherently problematic (Tomlinson 2014, p. 150). It is difcult to pinpoint or extract a legacy efect when Olympic and city development plans become so intertwined (Preuss 2007). Furthermore, as legacy and leverage objectives blur, it is sometimes difcult to determine whether a bid team actually wishes to win the bid competition (Oliver 2014; Torres 2014). Although recent eforts, such as the IOC’s Olympic Games Global Impact seek to ofer a consistent methodology to 1 Why Bid? The Logic of Pursuing Sports Mega-Events 19 evaluate the impacts of the Olympic Games, to date, “nobody has been prepared to commit the research resources required to carry out a scien- tifc study of net legacy benefts” (Gratton and Preuss 2008, p. 1933). As Toohey (2008) summarizes, even if such longitudinal research commitments emerged, “the question of who should consider legacy and take responsibility” (p. 10) remains unresolved.

Conclusion

Refecting on the frst modern Olympiad in Athens 1896, Pierre Coubertin commented, “[i]n Athens, all eforts had been concentrated on the sporting side of the venture in an historical context; there had been no congress, no conference, no sign of any moral or educational purpose” (quoted in Müller 2000, p. 369). Coubertin was concerned that the power of sport had been viewed too narrowly, with politicians remaining indiferent, viewing sport “as quite unimportant, only to be appreciated to a minor degree like any other healthy amuse- ment” (quoted in Müller 2000, p. 394). More than a century later, the relevance and resonance of the Olympic Games and the Olympic Movement continue to be questioned. Although sport is now viewed to be quite important, there remains a disconnection between the manifestation of the Olympic Games as a sporting event and the underlying philosophy of Olympism that speaks to much deeper aspirations. As the pressure has increased on stakeholders to prove that hosting the Games is not a reckless waste of precious capital, the IOC has sought, through reforms such as Agenda 2020, to encourage more cities (especially democratic cities) to re-engage with the Olympic Movement. And yet, the desire to stimulate a robust bidding competition has led the IOC to claim that the revised bidding process will be more fexible and allow cities to strategically blend urban development objectives to their bid vision. While this approach might indeed reinvigorate the bidding process or allow the IOC to “stay relevant” (Clarey 2014), it is not entirely clear that leveraging the Olympic Games to realize city-building, city-branding, and other urban initiatives, will do much to “rema- terialize” the Olympic Movement (MacAloon 2016). Beyond the risk of 20 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann the IOC being viewed as an urban development corporation in disguise, the propensity for bid cities to use the Olympic bid process to not simply develop an urban vision, but as a means to achieve that vision, is heightened. As the following chapters illustrate, the mixing of bid and city development priorities, when fltered through legacy and leverage discussions, now means that the underlying implications of bid failure have been fundamentally altered.

Notes

1. Unless otherwise indicated, throughout this book statements of fact about Olympic bids are based on a content analysis of bidding documents. Tis includes 99 bid books for Summer and Winter Games between 2000 and 2024 (bids date 1990 and 2016), and related published and internal documents produced by the bid corporations. Tese archival records were obtained from a variety of sources including the Olympic Studies Centre in Lausanne, Switzerland; national and municipal archives in bidding cities; or by request from bid corporations or their former staf. 2. Te Agenda 2020 working groups included: (1) Bidding procedure; (2) Sustainability and legacy; (3) Diferentiation of the Olympic Games; (4) Te Olympic program; (5) Olympic Games management; (6) Protecting clean athletes; (7) Te Olympic television channel; (8) Olympism in action including youth strategy; (9) Youth Olympic Games; (10) Culture policy; (11) Good governance and autonomy; (12) Ethics; (13) Strategic review of sponsorship, licensing, and merchandizing; (14) IOC Membership. (IOC, ‘Agenda 2020, 126th IOC Session, 5–6 February 2014’. Lausanne.) 3. A phrase frst introduced by Toronto’s 2008 Olympic bid but entrenched by Vancouver 2010 organizers. 4. Westerbeek (2009) has introduced the term ‘legacy intent’ to indicate that the pursuing the Olympics Games should be part of a deliberate urban development strategy that seeks to create a sporting climate that benefts an applicant or candidate city even in the event that the city fails to be selected by the IOC. 5. MacAloon (2016) characterizes this business model as franchiser/fran- chisee relationship between the IOC and host cities. 1 Why Bid? The Logic of Pursuing Sports Mega-Events 21

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Abstract Tis chapter reviews recent urban studies and urban afairs scholarship on three major event-led development models: mega-events as a temporary catalyst for long-term development, as embedded within an urban regime governance strategy, and as a policy experiment. Te critical question explored in this chapter is: why do certain cities continue to fnd it worthwhile to bid in an increasingly tumultuous urban political environment? We argue that the resilience of bidding politics hinges on the degree to which bids are integrated into longer term local development politics: the cities that are most likely to continue bidding are those which are less concerned with actually hosting the Games, but, instead with to use bidding as part of a more holistic development strategy.

Keywords Bid strategy · Catalyst · Event-led development · Urban governance

Tis chapter assesses the urban politics of bidding, highlighting the rationales that bidders use to promote their projects. An Olympic bid is a unique document because it must harness the favor of the IOC’s

© Te Author(s) 2017 27 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann, Failed Olympic Bids and the Transformation of Urban Space, Mega Event Planning, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59823-3_2 28 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann selection committee while simultaneously catering to a series of local planning concerns. A successful bid “depends on both technical compe- tency and local symbolic diference” (Tolzmann 2014, p. 602). Tolzmann (2014) argues that candidate cities who are unable to develop a compelling “local” message on how they can “bring something new and dif- ferent to the global Olympic vision” (p. 602) will struggle to gain IOC members’ votes. Bid committees not only have to defend why pursuing the Olympic Games is a reasonable proposition but also explain what expected legacies might develop. As noted in the previous chapter, part of the appeal of sports mega-events is that they allow legacy intentions to be recalibrated to accommodate diverse purposes (Tomlinson 2014). Te increased leveraging of sport mega-events has expanded the implications of the bidding process not only for the bidding city but also for the stature of the Olympic Movement and other cities considering or engaged in entrepreneurial urbanism. For many cities bidding for the Olympic Games represents a key episode in their urban development, stimulating negotiation between large institutional interests and the local citizenry that might not otherwise occur. Te results of this negotiation are mixed. At times, competing claims fail to produce an accommodating vision with staying power. It is also possible to view the bidding process as a task-specifc rescaling strategy that has the potential to reorient economic and social policy to the private sector’s “needs” (Hall 2006; Jessop 2002). It is equally plausible to view the Olympic bidding process as a critical component of a “neo-liberal shock doctrine” (Gafney 2015) that results in jurisdictional rescaling, in a manner that abandons “traditional democratic channels of accountability” (Swyngedouw et al. 2002, pp. 560–561). At the same time, many bid cities use the opportunity to develop an “institutionalized multi-scalar collaboration” that allows the city to break through development inertia (Horak 2013). Unfortunately, the legacies of failed Olympic bids have received relatively limited empirical attention, with most of the scholarly attention focused on Olympic “winners.”1 Building on Oliver’s (2011) claim that “studying the pursuit of mega-events (the Olympics) helps inform our understanding of political institutions as well as the creation and rep- resentation of public interest” (p. 783), as well as Lauermann’s (2014) argument that planning for the Olympics can be thought of “both 2 Bidding and Urban Development 29 as a tool for local development and as a market for their own locally produced knowledge and policy commodities” (p. 2639), this chapter explores a number of bid strategies at play in a broad sample of cities. In the discussion that follows, we illustrate three “framing narratives” used by Olympic bidders to describe event-led development should the bid be successful (and even if the city does not actually secure a hosting contract). Tese narratives are used to challenge the perceived ephem- erality of the Olympic Games and failed bids, giving bidders a rationale for their project even though the project is risky. We rely both on secondary evidence and on a comparative analysis of a large number of bid books. Te three narratives include deploying an Olympic bid as (1) a catalyst for long-term development, (2) embedded within a governance strategy, and (3) a form of policy experiment. We recognize that these narratives are not mutually exclusive and bidders may cite multiple rationales (e.g., when there are multiple bids over time) when pursuing a mega-event. We agree with Tomlinson (2014) who notes, “there is no routine formula for the modelling and implementation of legacy” (p. 139). One beneft of exploring these narratives is that it makes clear that “bidding not winning” (Horne and Whannel 2012, p. 9) has become a desirable result for many cities. Ironically, many cities have decided that the Creed of the Olympics: “Te most important thing in the Olympic Games is not to win but to take part …” can be extended to the bidding process with many cities fnding it worthwhile to bid because it is a means to non-Olympic urban development ends. Let us turn to an examination of three key framing narratives that have emerged from the bidding process over the last few decades.

Three Framing Narratives

Temporary “Catalyst”

When bidders reference the catalyst potential of their projects, they describe a temporary project which can be used to initiate long-term development by mobilizing actors, lining up fnancing, and securing regulatory clearances. Tis narrative is often associated with 30 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann entrepreneurial, neoliberal forms of urban governance which rely on municipal real estate speculation as a means to generate growth (Hall 2006; Harvey 1990). As noted in Chap. 1, the emergence of large-scale alterations to the built environment triggered by Olympic investment has been linked to the 1960 Olympics in Rome (Essex and Chalkley 2004; Liao and Pitts 2006; Shoval 2002) and further supported by the shift to post-Fordist, post-industrial, neoliberal, entrepreneurial, and global economics. Today, bidders promoting the catalytic potential of the Olympics often cite the “Barcelona model” of Olympic-led regeneration. In Barcelona, the Olympics were used to restructure, regenerate, and rebrand an industrial corridor along the Mediterranean coast and ushered in a new era of planning in the city. Te result was a rebalanc- ing of the city’s wealth distribution and a refned city image designat- ing Barcelona as a commercial and tourist destination that matched the considerable physical transformation (Degen and García 2012; Smith 2012, Chap. 5). For subsequent Olympic planners, this label has typically referred to the use of a mega-event to catalyze urban development by redirecting investment to particular neighborhoods or spatial planning agendas (Kassens-Noor 2013; Liao and Pitts 2006). Most bids contain some language which asserts that winning the right to host will boost, accelerate, or catalyze urban development. Since the IOC now emphasizes that bid cities must illustrate how the bid (and potentially playing host) fts into a city’s long-term planning strategy, bid cities now regularly provide a statement indicating that the short-term deadlines of the Olympics will accelerate urban regeneration and stimulate regional economic development or as Rio de Janeiro’s 2016 bid put it: “hasten the transformation” (Rio 2016 2009 , p. 19). Te diference between cities concentrating on the catalytic potential of the Games versus other motivations is often a matter of emphasis. Tose cities pursuing the catalyst strategy tend to focus more on how the event can be leveraged to kick-start urban transformation and less on the broader portfolio of development agendas. For example, Annecy 2018 (2010) proposed that its bid would be “a catalyst for the region’s sustainable development” (p. 5) that could “accelerate its move towards sustainable, year-round tourism… to lay new foundations for the relationship 2 Bidding and Urban Development 31 between Man and mountain” (Annecy 2018 2010, p. 17). Annecy 2018 (2010) further declared: “Hosting the Games will enable Annecy to speed up improvements and upgrades to its transport infrastructure, in particular, rail, through the partial doubling of the track between Annecy and Chamonix and the modernisation of the Chambery /Aix-les-Bains / Annecy link” (p. 21). Beyond greater accessibility to the region, the bid proposed that “[t]he Games will act as a catalyst for the development of traditional local industries, ofering new job opportunities, and giving people from disadvantaged backgrounds access to employment” (Annecy 2018 2010, p. 21). Annecy 2018 (2010) also expanded the catalyst narrative by claiming that hosting would be an important “catalyst for raising awareness” (p. 19) about how Alpine resorts could be developed and managed in a more socially and sustainable manner. Te bid itself was said to “bring momentum to the process of rolling out the eco-resort model across numerous winter sports resorts” (Annecy 2018 2010, p. 19). Te series of bids made by Rio de Janeiro are also frequently used to illustrate how an urban master plan can be adjusted to refect the infrastructure needs of the Olympics and how desires to become a mega-event city can prompt a series of urban interventions (Boykof and Mascarenhas 2016; Gafney 2015; Leopkey and Parent 2012). For Gafney (2010), there can be no doubt that “developmental accel- eration” was the key message of Rio’s 2016 bid even if the specifcs of the urban plans were lost in “cryptic phrases” (p. 23). Rio de Janeiro’s Mayor Eduardo Paes repeatedly declared that the city bid for the Games as a means to implement some important infrastructure projects including regeneration of the city’s port area, as well a number of environmental remediation (e.g., cleaning of Guanabara Bay) and transportations projects (e.g., the Transoeste Bus Rapid Transit express corridor). Te spatial improvement of infrastructure was equally prominent in Athens 2004 bid (Yawei 2015, p. 78). Te Ofcial Report of the XXVIII Olympiad: Athens 2004 makes it clear that “[t]he Athens Bid File for the 2004 Olympic Games was an operational plan for an organized intervention in the urban complex of the contemporary capital of the Greek State and its general environs” (ATHOC 2004 2005, p. 74). Te Ofcial Report further adds: 32 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

It was obvious that the Athens Bid File for the 2004 Olympic Games formed an integrated operating plan that incorporated the Major Projects that were already underway from the mid-nineteen nineties. Simultaneously, Athens created the prerequisites for rapid implementation of large-scale interventions, such as the ‘reclamation of the Coastal Front of the City’ along the coast of the Saronic Gulf. (ATHOC 2004 2005, p. 74)

Te opportunity to tackle “Major Projects” was frst introduced during Athens’ failed 1996 bid, which had exposed the city’s struggle to implement comprehensive urban planning in the post-World War II period. Te 1996 bid is said to have “contributed to the fnal formulation of the framework to implement the so-called Major Works,” a list that included reclaiming the city’s seafront, expansion of the metro system, construction of major road axes, renovation of the city’s historic center, and other “major salvation works” (ATHOC 2004 2005, p. 64). Te post-event legacy goals of the catalyst approach reside in the planned changes to the built or physical environment. Bidding is viewed as means to expedite those goals when event planning is “used as a trigger for a wide range of urban improvements” (Essex and Chalkley 1998, pp. 200–201). Winning the bid is the best case scenario for catalyst proponents; while failed bids certainly can act as catalysts (Alberts 2009; Benneworth and Dauncey 2010), a successful bid would presumably yield a larger catalytic impact. In their audit of the urban impacts of the Olympics, Essex and Chalkley (1998) claim that while it may be safer to say that the Olympics “accelerate change rather than initiate it” they maintain that “the scale of the modern Olympics and the sums of money they now generate are such that it is difcult to envisage many of the related urban developments taking place without Olympic resources and the political pressures deriving from a clear deadline and intense interest from the international media” (p. 203). For instance, Rio’s 2016 bid book projected that more than USD$ 13 billion would be dedicated to the land investment budget and Müller (2014) has calculated that the capital costs for Sochi 2014 comprised 90% of the total budget and represented nearly a USD$ 40 billion investment in non-sports-related costs. In contrast, Paris 2012 downplayed the catalytic potential of hosting. Citing the goals of the Olympic Games Study Commission Report 2 Bidding and Urban Development 33 to the 115th IOC Session, Paris 2012 submitted that it was “committed to controlling costs, mastering the complexities of the Games, making optimal use of existing infrastructure, and taking full account of environmental concerns and the need for sustainable development” (Paris 2012 2004, p. 15). Paris 2012 proposed a modest land investment budget, claiming that only USD$ 2.34 billion of additional infrastructure would be required and the bid repeatedly drew attention to the fact that the city was already well equipped with both sport and supporting infrastructure. As we discuss in Chap. 7, the vulnerabilities of the catalyst model have been increasingly exploited by anti-Olympic urban social movements which intentionally mobilize early in the planning process to challenge the normative legitimacy of the bid itself. For example, the messy demise of Boston’s 2024 bid was linked to a lack of public confdence in a catalyst narrative. Although bid organizers repeatedly emphasized the catalyst impact the Games would have on the city’s urban regeneration projects, anti-bid social movements widely publicized the limitations of econometric models which posit a catalyst efect, going so far as to partner with prominent academic economists to critique the catalyst narrative (Lauermann 2016a; Zimbalist 2015, pp. ix-xii).

Governance Strategy

Bids are also used as part of urban political strategy, by which a temporary project highlights or legitimates the decisions being made by urban leaders. While the language of catalyst is often used in these bids to justify investment spending, the political logic is distinct from the catalyst model: the bid is used to develop institutional capacity regardless of whether it actually provides a catalyst efect in the built environment. Here, we fnd that mega-events can “open up interstitial spaces that allow place entrepreneurs within a community to leverage or change existing institutional arrangements” (Glynn 2008, p. 1118). Smith (2012) has argued that the focus on legacy has begun to consider the importance of social regeneration and the previous “obsession with physical change, image enhancement and economic development has been supplemented with more attention to ‘softer’ outcomes” (p. 60). 34 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

Tis form of “mega-event strategy” (Andranovich et al. 2001, p. 113) is often linked to a rescaling of urban regime politics as bidding provides local projects with a global sense of importance so that “the urban regime incorporates “locally grounded” elites as well as transnational actors” (Surborg et al. 2008, p. 353). At other times, this type of planning is associated with investment by developmental states into their cities. Such “state dirigisme in megaprojects” (Müller 2011) operates on “a diferent kind of calculus of costs and benefts…tied not to a more narrowly economistic or material calculation of projected gains (however illusory these may be in practice), but to a longer-term and more symbolic calculus of repositioning and re-imagining the country” (Black and Peacock 2011, pp. 2271–2272). Tinking about bids as governance strategy shifts the focus from considering not just what the bid is proposing, but involves thinking about who (both individuals and institutions) is doing the bidding and how the bid can leverage “both existing institutional mechanisms, and create new ones, implicating the possibilities for both confguring the feld anew and for reconfguring the existing feld” (Glynn 2008, p. 1118). A failed bid can be “a triggering event” or agent of change that “shapes the confguration (and reconfguration) of a feld of actors within a geographic community” (Glynn 2008, p. 1119). Tese strategies move between local debates over urban policy and sweeping claims about the global signifcance of the bid project, as local leaders justify their agendas with “the production of solutions, explanations, and models that are universalizable” (Lauermann and Davidson 2013, p. 1278). One of the better examples of “governance strategy” is provided by Benneworth and Dauncey (2010) who assess the capacity-building benefts of Lyon’s failed bid for the 1968 Summer Games. Tey argue that the 1968 Olympic bid sought to reinvent Lyon “as a metropolitan anchor outside Paris” (Benneworth and Dauncey 2010, p. 1097) and claim that “[t]he bidding process compelled national elites to look more closely at Lyon and understand what it as a city contributed to French development” (2010, p. 1097). Here we fnd that the catalytic role of the bid had less to do with short-term material infrastructural changes, and is more concerned with generating “symbolic emotional narratives” that could infuence development trajectories in the longer term (Benneworth and Dauncey 2010, p. 1097). For Benneworth and Dauncey (2010), it is reasonable to conclude that “[t]he Olympic bid 2 Bidding and Urban Development 35 became part of a process—and indeed catalysed a change—in the way the Lyon’s and Paris’ key decision makers regarded Lyon” (p. 1096). Capacity building was generated because “[t]he bid allowed various actors to fnd a value in cooperation” and recognize the collective benefts of collaboration (Benneworth and Dauncey 2010, p. 1094). Elsewhere, Alberts (2009, p. 507) has illustrated that while Berlin’s 2000 bid sought to use the Games as a “motor for urban development”, the bid emerged during a period when the city was being radically transformed. Te dismantling of the Berlin Wall had exposed the diversity of planning and development goals between the two halves of the city, and the Olympics represented not only an “opportunity to carry out or speed up urban development projects that might not otherwise bet realized” but also held the potential to “integrate the two halves of the city” (Alberts 2009, p. 509). A successful Berlin bid had the capacity to “heal the physical scars the Berlin Wall had left on the city and help East Berlin to catch up with West Berlin, both economically and in terms of quality of life for its residents” (Alberts 2009, p. 513). Here we fnd that goals of German unifcation coexisted with the desires of a modernized Berlin. But the bid also served to solidify Berlin’s embracement of a “service center strategy” that sought to “capture global investment by marketing the city as a cosmopolitan and business-friendly city” (Strom and Mayer 1998, p. 123). Promoted as a means to escape from the shadow of the 1936 Berlin Olympics organized by the Nazi Regime, Berlin’s 2000 bid emphasized Berlin’s “cos- mopolitanism, cultural diversity and tolerance” (Colomb 2012, p. 94) and provided the occasion for local policymakers to orient and brand a “new” Berlin as a destination for global commerce (Colomb 2012; Strom 2001). Although various models of urban development were “bitterly discussed” both during and after Berlin’s bid, city and House of Representative leaders supported the eforts of public–private partnerships focused on place branding and tourist promotion (Colomb 2012, p. 106). Te bid set in motion a more permanent commitment to the “search for global competitiveness at all costs” (Colomb 2012, p. 106), with the pursuit of iconic projects—witness the redevelopment of Potsdamer Platz and the construction of the Science and Technology Park at Adlershof later in the decade—frmly refecting this new governance strategy. 36 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

A similar logic emerges from Manchester’s unsuccessful bids for the 1992 1996, and 2000 Olympic Games, with the city’s modus operandi refecting the new partnerships, relational politics, and policy mobilities developed during the bid process (Cook and Ward 2011; this volume, Chap. 6). Likewise, Cape Town’s 2004 bid goal of restructuring the apartheid city illustrates a shifting governance logic that can be incorporated during a bid efort (Hiller 2000). Hiller (2000) claims that Cape Town’s bid was signifcant because it “explicitly linked the mega-event to the human development needs of a third-world city” (p. 441). In more detail, Hiller argues that the catalytic efect of an Olympics would have been to “improve the life conditions of the historically disadvantaged” while simultaneously performing “a role in the redesign of the apartheid city whereby old barriers would be eliminated and new link- ages created” (Hiller 2000, p. 441). But unlike the Berlin case example, Hiller (2000) is keen to illustrate that Cape Town’s bid contained “a thinly veiled critique of all that Olympism had become and appealed to global justice as the rationale for awarding the bid to Africa” (p. 442). In doing so, Hiller (2000) argues: “the Cape Town bid provided an entirely new variation of the rationale for utilizing a mega-event for urban development” (p. 442). Tere have been other eforts to utilize an Olympic bid as a means to facilitate reconciliation or reunifcation. For instance, PyeongChang’s 2010 Winter Olympic bid proposed a joint South/North Korea Olympics, but its successful 2018 Winter Olympic bid ofered a much weaker diplomatic commitment in the form of “aid to North Korea” (Merkel and Kim 2011, p. 2376). For Merkel and Kim (2011), PyeongChang’s 2018 efort was a government-led bid that was driven by “ideological and economic motives rather than practical and humanitarian objectives” (p. 2378). Likewise, Istanbul 2020 acknowledged that hosting would “advance critical transport and economic development infrastructure” (Istanbul 2020 2013, p. 23) but its candidature fle stressed how Turkey’s image and reputation would be repositioned:

İstanbul 2020 ofers an opportunity for the frst ever secular Muslim democracy to host the Games and the frst ever city to stage the event on two continents simultaneously. Staging the Games in Turkey will deliver a 2 Bidding and Urban Development 37

timely and powerful catalyst to improve global understanding, inclusiveness and harmony. İstanbul, with a rich mosaic of diversity, layered history and acceptance woven into its very core, is ideally placed to play this role. (Istanbul 2020 2013, p. 20)

Bid failure might be considered less problematic for a bid city pursuing the “governance strategy” model, as “even submitting a bid package…is enough to warrant media exposure and warrant some claim to Olympic symbols to unify disparate stakeholders” (Andranovich et al. 2001, p. 127). Smith (2012) refers to Manchester’s 1996 and 2000 Olympic bids as “phantom events” that city leveraged to promote urban development. For Smith, the “associative” power that can be generated by bidding calls into question the role of failure in mega-event politics, engaging with unsuccessful bids in strategic ways. Similarly, Oliver (2014; 2011) has illustrated that after fve failed attempts (1960, 1964, 1976, 1996, 2008) to secure the Olympic Games, these losing bids have played a key role in the reimaging and regulation of the city’s waterfront land. Toronto’s failed 2008 bid is credited with providing the impetus for a Waterfront Task Force that eventually shifted to a public corporation (i.e., Waterfront Toronto) supported by a tripartite agreement between the City of Toronto, the Province of Ontario, and the Federal government as well as $1.5 billion funding allocation to help guide waterfront renewal (see Chap. 6 for a more thorough discussion of Toronto’s bid eforts). Te legacy goals in this model are more intangible and relate to institutional change, economic impacts, or social outcomes. Several authors have illustrated how mega-events might be thought of as vehicles to exercise “soft power” (Nye 1990), using diplomatic overtures to seek geopolitical infuence (Grix and Houlihan 2014; Scharfenort 2012; Koch 2014) or as part of broader strategies aimed at place branding (Gold and Gold 2008; Zhang and Zhao 2009).

Policy Experiments

Bids can also be conceptualized as policy experiments, in which a temporary project is used to test out a policy agenda at a manageable scale. 38 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

Te purpose of these experiments is to usher in and test out new planning regimes, through pilot projects or small-scale test programs. Tis framing narrative is distinct in that the bidding process is viewed as an experiment (or, perhaps, a series of experiments). Te legacy goals for this model are designed to be scalable beyond the city (Shin 2014; Lauermann 2016a). Tese experiments include agendas as diverse as ecological modernization (Mol 2010; Koch 2014), pro-poor development (Pillay and Bass 2008), industrial upgrading (Scharfenort 2012), or social unity (Shin 2012). In these bids, failure or success are even less relevant. Te purpose of bidding is to demonstrate state capacity or to test policy on a local scale, neither of which is dependent on a hosting contract. In several cities, bid ofcials half-jokingly claim that second place in the bid competition might be the best result because the bid process ofers an opportunity to draft and mobilize diferent policy objectives and garner signifcant media exposure without the burden of having to meet hosting deadlines (Masterman, 2008). Indeed, winning a bid is not necessarily the most desirable outcome because global attention is generated for urban regime agendas through bidding; a bid failure might even insulate leaders from criticism because it allows fexibility to continue projects without the strictures of externally mandated Olympic design specifcations. Of course, leveraging the Olympics by proposing “utilitarian”2 bids poses problems for the Olympic movement (MacAloon 2016; Torres 2012). Te opening pages of Baku’s 2016 applicant fle stressed that “[t]hrough its engagement with the subject of the 2016 Baku bid, the City of Baku and the Republic of Azerbaijan as a whole is gaining invaluable experience …” (Baku 2016 2007, p. 6). Later in the application fle, there is the candid acknowledgment that “[t]he Republic of Azerbaijan is well aware that its current sports infrastructure is lagging behind international standards” and that City of Baku needed to diversify its economic base beyond oil extraction (Baku 2016 2007, p. 10). Te desire to diversify through infrastructure investment was a theme carried to Baku’s 2020 applicant fle. Broadly speaking, Baku’s 2016 and 2020 bids convey a sense that the Olympic project was an experiment in imagining other forms of development. For example, Azad Rahimov 2 Bidding and Urban Development 39

(quoted in Moore 2008), Azerbaijan’s Youth and Sports Minister noted that, “submitting a bid now builds a foundation for a time when Azerbaijan is better known and better positioned to bid again. Tese preparations will give us a lot of experience and we want that. And for a small country like ours it also means fantastic publicity.” Te sentiment is repeated in the 2020 applicant fle, which argues that bid experiments will unleash “the potential to be not only a role model of sustainability within the region, but also to become a leading global city and world class destination, achieved through a visionary masterplan for sustainable development” (Baku 2020 2013, p. 3). Doha’s mega-event bidders have used a similar experimental narrative, linking a narrative about post-oil development planning to their bids for the 2016 and 2020 Games (as well as related mega-event projects like the 2006 Asian Games and the 2022 World Cup). For example, the 2020 applicant fle argues that “Doha will become a regional model for informed modernisation and new development” through investments in sustainability technology and a knowledge economy” (2013, p. 3) and plans for both the 2020 Olympic and the 2022 World Cup link to clean energy initiatives like solar-powered stadiums. Broadly, these experiments refect the ambitions of the Qatari developmental state (Scharfenort 2012; Koch 2014), and the bids directly reference national master plans like the Qatar 2030 National Vision. More specifcally, the national state allocates funding through enclave development projects, “self-contained ‘cities within the city’” (Salama and Wiedmann 2013, p. 84) that are linked to specifc developmental agendas like building a western educational model (i.e., the “Education City” neighborhood) or incubating alternative energy startups (i.e., the “Energy City” research park). Bidders are careful to explain their real estate and event planning initiatives in the language of these developmental state experiments, as a way to secure political support and lobby for national funding (Lauermann 2016b). Tese experimental narratives are often linked to a rescaling of urban policy: using the bid as a way to develop local policy that has transnational political signifcance. For example, a number of recent bids have adopted the experiment narrative when discussing their contributions to global knowledge networks, seeking to cast their cities as a sort of 40 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann laboratory for urban policymaking. Te assumption underlying these bids is that exporting replicable policy tools (design practices, policy templates, etc.) make the bid more competitive in hosting competitions, as local policy initiatives are promoted as best practices for mega-event planning in general. Te experiment model is seen in extensive “policy tourism” by local leaders across Olympic bidding cities (Cook and Ward 2011; González 2011), and in various bidders’ claims that they will provide “a new model for urban sport development” (Chicago 2016 2009, p. 20), a “primary role model of best practice for the Olympic Movement moving forward” (Madrid 2016 2009, p. 17) or “brand- enhancing initiatives to be developed with the IOC…all of which could also be adopted by other future hosts” (Annecy 2018 2010, p. 22). For instance, after the London 2012 Olympic planners published a proposed global standard for environmental management at mega-events, a number of other bidding cities published their own environmental management policy templates as alternatives to the London template (Lauermann 2014, pp. 2647–2649). Bids made on behalf of Madrid are particularly direct in this type of experimental narrative. Across nearly a decade of continuous bidding, Olympic candidature fles evolve from a loose sustainability strategy that applied general principles from the United Nations and IOC to local environmental initiatives (Madrid 2012 2005, p. 27), to promises to deliver “a new urban model that is clean, efcient, and sustainable” (Madrid 2016 2009, p. 17), to a preliminary management model branded with the acronym “SMART” (Madrid 2020 2013a, b). Along the way, the bid planners were slowly building out an Olympic master plan, such that by the time the bidders made their fnal 2020 bid presentation to the IOC, the bid presentation team was able to boast that 80% of the original master plan had been constructed over the course of the bids and thus “Madrid 2020 is not a dream. We have already built it” (quoted in a Madrid 2020 press release, 3 July 2013a, b). While experimental bidding is particularly innovative, experimen- tation can lead to “disassociated governance” (Keil 1998) when urban development and local democracy become uncoupled (Bellas and Oliver 2016; Raco 2013). By articulating bid proposals as experiments— which are by defnition contingent and preliminary—there is a danger 2 Bidding and Urban Development 41 that citizens will overlook the long-term ramifcations of bid planning. While investments may be proposed as merely experimental, subsequent movement on projects can reshape urban policy with little or no public debate (see also our analysis of “politics of contingency” in Chap. 7). In the abovementioned Madrid example, for instance, a surprisingly large amount of investment was pushed through over the course of multiple failed bid experiments. Indeed, the city’s mayor was able to claim in the same fnal presentation to the IOC that “We have adapted the city to the Games, not the Games to the city” (Madrid 2020 press release, 3 July 2013a, b).

Conclusion

It is important to analyze the political narratives used to promote bids. While mega-event planning projects are “temporary” urban policy initiatives, they rarely occur as individual events. Rather, these temporary projects are linked to longer term development agendas through political framing narratives: that the bid can act as a catalyst for development or reform, that it can facilitate part of a political strategy, or that it can act as an experiment for testing governance ideas. Te political logic of a catalyst bid is located within a “framework of post-Fordism, globalization, and the role of spectacle in post-modern societies” (Essex and Chalkley 1998, p. 188) and emphasize return on investment or the ability of a lean fnancing model to generate spillover efects. Bids focused heavily on the catalytic potential are increasingly facing resistance, because they typically struggle to provide politically persuasive links between the bid and broader development agendas. In contrast, bids which seek to facilitate a broader portfolio of governance agendas are likely to be more resilient, in part because they can capital- ize on the relatively low marginal cost of multiple bids (plans are already ongoing for other strategies or experiments). An important factor is the role of the state in the bid. While mega- event planning generally requires signifcant state intervention, some bidders are more willing to acknowledge and take advantage of that intervention or are powerless to prevent such an intrusion (see our 42 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann discussion in Chap. 6). Tere is a clear need to map the broader networks of mega-event projects given that they frequently reveal the translocal nature of urban political coalitions, and their evolving event-led development priorities.

Notes

1. We follow the IOC’s categorization of bid cities as those cities which submit a preliminary applicant fle (and/or in the process of doing so, between their nomination by an NOC and the frst submission). Tis means we include those cities that may have withdrawn their application, but does not include every city that expresses an interest in hosting to the IOC. 2. Te goal of utilitarian bids according to Torres (2012) is “not to obtain the right to host the Olympic Games but rather to use the bidding process as a means to achieve other goals” (p. 10).

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Abstract Tis chapter examines how political strategies and policy knowledge travel across cities bidding for the Olympics. It introduces urban studies scholarship on “policy mobilities”—interurban fows of expertise, knowledge, and models. Tis chapter focuses on the role of the bid consulting industry in facilitating policy mobilities, seen particularly in the mobility of expertise surrounding urban technology, sustainability, and urban architecture and design. Tis chapter argues that policy mobilities are driven by import imperatives (e.g., the need for cities to hire international experts when designing their bids) and by export imperatives (e.g., the desire to legitimate local projects by linking them to globally replicable policy models or templates).

Keywords Networked entrepreneurialism · Intercity policymaking Knowledge transfer · Entrepreneurial city

Introduction

Tis chapter examines the city-to-city mobility of strategies and expertise used to promote Olympic bids. Mega-event planning is supported by global networks of expertise, and much of this expertise is mediated through the bidding process. Te IOC maintains several knowledge management programs, including a standardized set of technical manuals, workshops for bid cities, learning tours between Olympic cities, and technical databases like the Olympic Games Knowledge Management (OGKM) network. Tese are supplemented with extensive city-to-city knowledge transfer networks as ofcials from bid cities pursue “policy tourism” in an efort to repli- cate legacy planning from elsewhere (Cook and Ward 2011; González 2011), and as an “Olympic caravan” (Cashman and Harris 2012) of consultants move from one city to the next advising city ofcials on best practices. Tese knowledge circuits have been critiqued for their top-down tendencies, as they represent “attempts to govern at a distance by forging connections and enrolling a multitude of elements from diferent locations to stage the most complex mega-event on earth” (Müller 2014, p. 323). Such “topological multiplicities of power” (Müller 2014) defy conventional notions of scale and territory in urban politics. Policy expertise does not just touch down in particular places; it is relationally constructed through cooperation across bid and host cities. Tis is a form of urban politics in which mega-events “rather than being some (corporate) global festival of sport…have to be understood through a connected politics of development” (Allen and Cochrane 2014, p. 1613) which is “suggestive of more than a cartography of connections that criss- cross the globe which come together in a particular place” (p. 1617). We argue that urban leaders—including those involved in failed bids— play a larger role in this geography of expertise than commonly assumed. City leaders are not so much “enrolled” in pre-existing systems of expertise as they are actively participating in their construction: we show how these leaders strategically engage with and disengage from policy mobilities to facilitate more localized urban politics. Tis may derive from a 3 Policy Mobilities and the Bid 51 need “to balance the traditional political power of locally-based growth coalitions with the need to respond to extra-territorial actors and coalitions” (Surborg et al. 2008, p. 342). But it also involves a form of “policy boosterism” (McCann 2013) by which knowledge about mega-event planning functions “both as a tool for local development and as a market for their own locally produced knowledge and policy commodities” (Lauermann 2014a, p. 2639). Tis chapter maps the mobilities of mega-event policy knowledge through a discussion of the global bid consulting industry. Tis chapter will also explain the role of city-to-city knowledge transfer in Olympic bid planning and evaluate the urban politics of these mobilities. In addition to playing a central role in mega-event planning, policy mobilities contribute to the legacies of failed Olympic bids. Across the various bid narratives used by contemporary mega-event planners (this volume, Chap. 2), there is a shared use of imported policy knowledge as traveling experts in the global bidding industry support local planning. Importation is one of the drivers of utilitarian bids, as ofcials use the bid to bring in urban expertise to support their local political agendas. Tere is also an export of knowledge through these same channels and a system of value-addition while this knowledge is in transit. Tis chapter demonstrates how the import of policy knowledge is paired with exported expertise from bidding cities. Export possibilities motivate high-frequency bidders and provide a justifcation for repeated investment in bids even when they fail. Tus, city leaders play an important role in the global bidding industry, not only as consumers but also as producers of policy knowledge. In the discussion that follows, we frst review scholarship on policy mobilities and concepts of relevance to mega-event planning (e.g., transportation, translation, and transformation). We then explore mega- event policy mobilities through the lens of import and export, using a discussion of the global bid consulting industry and of city leaders’ use of extrospective policymaking, respectively. Tis is illustrated with evidence from a comparative study of the bid industry, highlighting the mobility of policy knowledge like technology protocols, design guidelines, and management templates. 52 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

Policy Mobilities

Te policy mobilities approach emerged from geography and urban studies scholarship (see reviews in Cook 2015; McCann 2010; Peck and Teodore 2010; Temenos and McCann 2013), linking “policy transfer” approaches in political science (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Evans 2009; Stone 2004) to broader debates over the “mobilities turn” in disciplines like sociology (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013; Ong and Collier 2005; Sheller and Urry 2006). Policy transfer scholarship explores the difusion of policy knowledge across institutions, especially at the national scale. In contrast, policy mobilities scholarship seeks a more geographically nuanced analysis: Te core question is are how policy is made in transit, as it evolves while on the move and as it moves across multiple geographic scales. Tese analysts work from the sense that “policies are not, after all, merely being transferred over space; their form and their efects are transformed by these journeys, which also serve continuously to remake relational connections across an intensely variegated and dynamic socioinstitutional landscape” (Peck 2011, p. 793). A defning aspect of this approach is a thick empirical analysis of how policy moves and evolves along the way. Tis self-described “post- transfer” approach views policymaking “as a multiply scaled, relational and emergent social process” in which “circuits of policy knowledge shape or are shaped by social connections made by actors sometimes at a distance—over email or by reading documents describing policies in other places, or by watching YouTube videos” (McCann and Ward 2012b, p. 328). Methodologically, this entails attention to the mundane and everyday practices of policymakers, local ofcials, consultants, and other traveling experts (e.g., activists, scholars, think tanks, lobbyists). Tis is often described as “follow the policy” (Peck and Teodore 2012), a method that geographically extends case studies to be “sensitive to movement (e.g., transnationalizing policy models, peripatetic modes of expertise) and to those variable experiences of embedding and transformation underway in ‘downstream’ sites of adoption…a distended policy ‘feld’” (p. 24). Tis approach draws primarily on qualitative data, including interviews with the 3 Policy Mobilities and the Bid 53 agents who move policy knowledge (e.g., consultants, traveling experts and activists), ethnographies in the sites which support policy learning (e.g., municipal ofces, conferences and conventions), and analysis of archival and policy documents to track the ways in which policy jumps across scales (especially into and out of the urban level). Tere are several mechanisms for policy mobility; Müller (2015) summarizes them in a three-part framework based on transportation, transformation, and translation. (i) Transportation occurs as policy knowledge moves across cities. It is more than a simple transfer or dif- fusion from point A to point B. Rather, it entails “mobilising diverse elements of humans and non-humans from diferent places to establish relations and assemble a translocal network of knowledge to then form policy” (Müller 2015, p. 195). In the case of mega-events, transportation is facilitated through traveling (e.g., policy tourism by bidders, or site visits by consultants), meetings at geographic hubs in the mega- event planning industry (e.g., clusters of frms in places like Lausanne [Switzerland] or in temporary hubs like trade conferences), and digital interactions over knowledge-sharing platforms (e.g., the IOC’s OGKM network). (ii) Transformation is how policy evolves in transit. It occurs when “knowledge morphs into policy as it is attempted to be ren- dered workable and put into political practice” (Müller 2015, p. 195). Tis is a form of city-to-city policy “emulation” and (McCann 2010; Peck and Teodore 2010), in which local governments imitate policy from elsewhere but the imitation is adapted to local context. In terms of mega-events, transformation is a major task accomplished by traveling experts in the “Olympic caravan” (Cashman and Harris 2012) and when local ofcials emulate models based on perceived success stories. Finally, (iii) translation is a type of mobilization, by which policy knowledge is communicated to diferent audiences and used to spur action. It is “the creation of action, which can be similar to or diferent from original intentions, and the alignments around it that a policy is able to achieve” (Müller 2015, p. 195). As policy moves, it is reconfgured through negotiations between stakeholders and experts, so much so that “mutation” is an inevitable outcome of mobility (Gotham 2014; Peck 2011). Tus, while mega-event cities are required to adopt standardized policy models (Boyle and Haggerty 2009; Eick 2010; Klauser 2011), 54 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann transformations occur because of limits to the capacity of oversight authorities like the IOC (Müller 2014) and because translating agents (e.g., consultants, local ofcials) may promise diferent outcomes to the global sports industry and local stakeholders (Müller 2015). Policy knowledge might be thought of as a “commodity” which is traded across cities, in the form of technical documents, data, patents and trademarks, architectural renderings, design templates, software and code, and the expertise needed to use all of them. Tese commodities make up the raw materials used to make a fnished policy product like an Olympic bid. Tese malleable properties allow value to be added to a policy commodity during all three forms of mobility discussed above. Te commodity is traded during transportation, as materials and expertise are imported and exported across cities. Value is also added through translation (e.g., consultants are hired) and when policy knowledge is transformed for use by local stakeholders (e.g., an out-of-the-box template is customized for use in a bid). Tis is illustrated in the following section with a discussion of the international bidding system and the bid consulting industry that supports it.

Mega-Event Mobilities

Mega-event planning is a highly mobile industry, populated by “Olympic gypsies” (Economist 2010) who migrate between bidding and hosting cities to work as consultants, designers, planners, or project managers (Horne and Manzenreiter 2016; Müller 2014; Silvestre 2013). Tese traveling experts work in parallel to knowledge transfer networks managed by sports federations like the IOC (Kassens-Noor 2013; Lauermann 2014b) and well-established circuits of policy tourism in which bid city ofcials travel to current and past host cities or to perceived planning success stories like Barcelona, London, or Sydney (Cook and Ward 2011; González 2011). Simultaneously, anti-Olympic activists are increasingly mobilizing across cities to contest the industry and circulate policy alternatives (this volume, Chap. 7). 3 Policy Mobilities and the Bid 55

Te global “bid consulting” industry—the industry of technical experts who advise cities on the development of bid proposals—provides a case in point (Lauermann 2014a, 2016). Policy mobilities play an important role in many corners of the mega-event industry and so, of course, there are many possible examples. Te contemporary landscape of mega-event policy mobilities has origins in the IOC’s attempts to professionalize and monetize the Games during the late 1980s and 1990s (Lauermann 2014a, pp. 2643–2647). In 1986, the IOC hired ISL Marketing—a Swiss sports marketing frm—to consolidate control over the Olympic brand in an efort to generate an independent revenue stream. Tis move was motivated by a desire to become less dependent on geopolitically self-interested sponsors, having weathered two tumultuous Games hosted by the USSR (1980) and the USA (1984). It was also enabled by a neoliberalization of urban policy that brought privatized management and corporate sponsorship into the mainstream (Boykof 2014; Horne and Whannel 2012). By 1996, the organization had professionalized its marketing with a joint venture called Meridian Management, and by 2004 it had dissolved Meridian into an internal marketing department within the IOC. Simultaneously, the IOC was consolidating control over television revenue: host city contracts from the 1970s and 1980s gave the IOC a small share of revenue (often 10%) and largely left licensing decisions to local organizing committees. In contrast, by 1994, contracts begin stipulating that the IOC “owns all marketing rights…and directs the global Olympic Marketing strategy” (IOC 1994, p. 94), and today 74% of the IOC’s revenues come from sales of broadcast rights (IOC 2014, p. 112). Tis consolidation required a parallel move to professionalize event planning and urban planning, since developing a brand requires a consistent product. Professionalization hinged on the codifcation and transfer of knowledge from previous host cities to new bidders. In preparation for Sydney 2000, the IOC worked with local organizers to catalogue policy knowledge through a “Transfer of Olympic Knowledge” program; this was rebranded Olympic Games Knowledge Services in a 2002 partnership with Monash University, and that venture was absorbed in 2005 as an IOC program called Olympic Games Knowledge Management (OGKM). Te legacies of these initiatives are 56 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann several knowledge transfer programs managed by the IOC: a formal debriefng process to record lessons learned from host cities, a library of technical manuals, a series of workshops for bidding cities conducted in Lausanne, an “Olympic Observer” program that allows bidders to visit current host cities, a short-lived magazine (OGKM Bulletin, 2006– 2009), and digital platforms like the OGKM extranet. Tese ofcial channels are supplemented with a network of bid consulting frms, many of which can trace their lineage to one of the abovementioned IOC ventures or to staf who worked in previous host cities (Fig. 3.1). Cities like Barcelona (González 2011; Silvestre 2013) and Sydney (Cashman and Harris 2012) have emerged as recognized hubs of expertise, both because they played important roles in formal- izing IOC knowledge transfer programs and because they are perceived as legacy planning success stories. As a result, they are also regular stops on policy tourism circuits as aspiring bidders travel to learn best practices and network with experts in local consultancies and government agencies. To provide a specifc example, this professionalization process—linking eforts to consolidate the Olympic brand to the professionalization of mega-event planning—is seen in the mobilities of technology protocols following the Barcelona 1992 Games. In 1986, the Barcelona Olympics planning corporation published Barcelona Informática y Telecomunicaciones 1992 (BIT’92) (Barcelona Olympic Ofce 1986). Tis was a protocol for designing, fnancing, and implementing urban technology systems to support the Games—the precursor to what today would be termed a “smart city” protocol (Barcelona Olympic Ofce 1993, p. 127). It was the frst time a holistic system-wide protocol was used in an Olympic city and was integral to the broader project of tel- evising the event. BIT’92 has been widely emulated since then. Te software manager for the protocol remains the ofcial urban technologies consultant for Olympic cities (Sema Group, now known as Atos Origins ); the hardware vendor (IBM ) remains a major supplier for smart city technologies. Tis mobility closely followed that of the “Barcelona model” of urban regeneration (Degen and García 2012; González 2011; Monclús 2003). For example, the mobility of technologies was part of a long-standing consulting circuit between Barcelona and Rio 3 Policy Mobilities and the Bid 57

Fig. 3.1 Origins of the bid consulting industry Constructed from corporate records, IOC archives, and interviews; reprinted from Lauermann (2014a) de Janeiro through ventures like Tecnologias Urbanas Barcelona SA and Rio-Barcelona Consultores (Silvestre 2013). Tis circuit moved policy knowledge to support several mega-events and failed bids in Rio (the 2007 Pan American Games, and bids for the 2008, 2012, and 2016 Olympics); technology consulting was an important platform for moving a broader assemblage of policy knowledge between the two cities. Te professionalization process required not only the transfer of knowledge, but also an enforcement mechanism to ensure policy implementation. Te bidding process provided the latter, harnessing inter- urban competition to ensure that bidders conform to IOC planning standards. As the IOC’s frst director of marketing put it,

What the IOC has learned from its experience working with host cities is the importance of maintaining strict brand discipline. Tis means 58 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

negotiating and fnalising many of the arrangements in advance of the host city being chosen. Te danger, otherwise, is that the local politics get in the way. A city that is one of several on a short list is altogether easier to deal with than the same city once it is confrmed as the next Olympic Host. (Payne 2006, p. 191)

Tis discipline through bidding—“strict brand discipline” imposed “before local politics get in the way”—certainly increased pressure on bid cities. But this imperative to conform to technical standards was not only a coercive imposition on cities by the IOC. It also created opportunities to contribute back into the policy knowledge network by developing new ideas or techniques which could be replicated in future host cities. One prominent bid consulting frm notes, for instance, that

Hosting events has also become a professionalised business where hosts are no longer expected to simply deliver on the technical demands of the event; they are expected to develop the sport further and improve the event so that it is a better product ready to be passed on to the next host. (TSE Consulting 2010, p. 9)

Policy mobilities operate on both import and export motivations. Te import model is one in which knowledge from elsewhere is brought into cities, as local bid coalitions hire globally mobile experts in order to design a competitive and technically compliant bid. Te demand for imported expertise is motivated by local governments’ desire to emulate success stories from elsewhere, by technical directives issued by various sports federations and the IOC, and by consultants who persuade local bid corporations to purchase their services. Import is a necessary prerequisite for bidding, in order to meet technical specifcations and navigate the arcane landscape of Olympic policy and procedure. Import forces are seen in the mobility of urban design guidelines. Tis policy commodity has long been associated with eforts to consolidate and monetize the Olympic brand, as part of a broader aesthetic efort to “brand the whole city ‘Olympic’” (Payne 2006, p. 190). In the early 1990s, the IOC developed a design manual called “Look of the Games” which codifed aesthetic guidelines for competition venues and 3 Policy Mobilities and the Bid 59 the surrounding city. Tey include aesthetic guidelines for “clean venues” like using camera-friendly colors and lighting, or removing commercial symbols from uniforms, equipment, and competition spaces. Tey also include rules for the urban landscape like banning protests around the venues, limiting billboards, and policing local use of trademarked terms and symbols (e.g., to prevent street vendors and local shops from selling unsanctioned merchandise). Te design standards are intended to construct a “controlled and balanced host city commercial environment,” most importantly to prevent what the IOC terms “ambush marketing,” unlicensed commercial activity that takes place near the Olympic sites (e.g., street vendors) or which uses trademarked words or visuals (IOC 2005). Tese guidelines are carefully enforced because they are central to the IOC’s revenue stream, the majority of which is derived from television. It is part of an attempt to “brand the whole city ‘Olympic’” (Payne 2006, p. 190) by temporarily transforming large portions of urban territory into a visually commodifed, tele- vised space. Tus, this knowledge is directly imported to cities—bidders access it as part of their $250,000 application fee (IOC 2015, p. 13)— but experts are consulted to customize the guidelines to provide some basic variations on an individual bid’s aesthetic theme. However, not all engagements with policy mobilities are coercive. Bidders also adopt export-oriented motivations thereby turning mobilities into political and economic opportunities. Bids are also an opportunity to engage in “extrospective” urban politics, in which “cities must actively—and responsively—scan the horizon for investment and promotion opportunities, monitoring ‘competitors’ and emulating ‘best practice’, lest they be left behind in [the] intensifying competitive struggle for the kinds of resources (public and private) that neoliberalism has made (more) mobile” (Peck and Tickell 2002, p. 394). In this sense, planning can be an opportunity for “policy boosterism” (McCann 2013), by which local leaders design and export policy knowledge “to boost the policies’ reputation among geographically extensive policy making communities; to enhance the professional reputations of those policy actors who were involved in developing the policies; and to bur- nish the image of the city where the policy was developed” (p. 9). 60 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

Export motivations are seen in bidders’ attempts to design replicable technical standards; environmental management systems (EMS) standards are a prominent example (Lauermann 2014a, pp. 2648–2650). An EMS is a framework for managing environmental footprints across a system, like a project or an institution. Most Olympic bids have employed one since the mid-1990s, often using a generic EMS standard—ISO 14001 (ISO 1996)—or adapting local environmental laws for the bid. Tis changed during the bidding for the 2012 Games, when a number of bidders proposed to develop an EMS framework specifcally for mega-events. Bidders in Leipzig, London, Madrid, Moscow, New York City, and Paris all proposed designing an adaptation of ISO 14001 which would be replicable in future bid cities. Tis addition of a globally useful policy model was considered part of the proposed legacy. London ultimately won the bid, and the organizers eventually delivered ISO 20121 (ISO 2012), an EMS template designed specifcally for event management. Since then, other bidders have adopted the standard but a number have also proposed alternatives to enhance or replace it, like Madrid’s SMART management system or Doha’s Global/ Qatar Sustainability Assessment System. Tese attempts to export replicable policies may open future consulting opportunities, not unlike how Sydney 2000’s early experiments with sustainability launched an industry of consultants (Cashman and Harris 2012). But even if the bid is unsuccessful, extrospective promotion of policy beyond the city is a way to generate global attention for local programs. By linking their projects to globally signifcant problems, urban leaders can “go global” to push through local policy agendas (Beal and Pinson 2014; Ponzini and Rossi 2010). Across these examples, value is added when knowledge moves. Tat movement is driven both by import motivations and by export motivations: Cities need to bring in expertise in order to construct competitive bids, but bids are also an opportunity for extrospective policymaking. Müller’s (2015) framework—transportation, transformation, translation—provides a helpful way to summarize. Transportation (of ideas, skills, documents, technologies, fles, data) is necessary in order to realize the value of the commodity. It is a core function of knowledge transfer circuits (e.g., the OGKM network, client email lists) and their 3 Policy Mobilities and the Bid 61 institutional gatekeepers (e.g., program ofcers in sports federations). It is a basic prerequisite for the commodifcation of mega-event policy knowledge. Transformation adds value by adapting policy knowledge to local contexts. Tat value might be added by traveling experts or by the local members of a bidding coalition, especially urban planners, architects, and real estate developers. And fnally, translation is part of the “sales pitch” for policy commodities, adding value by making the case for a policy to be emulated. Tis value is added by traveling experts, especially consultants. It also occurs during policy tourism through site visits, workshops, and conferences, valorizing certain geographic refer- ents as sources of expertise and best practice (e.g., Barcelona, London, Sydney). Importantly, transformation and translation do not only occur at the fnal import destination (the bidding city). Rather, this is multi-sited work that occurs in various bidding industry hubs (e.g., many consul- tancy headquarters are located in Switzerland to be near the sports federations), in sites of transit (conferences, and of course the mega-events themselves), and digital spaces. Tis multi-sited production changes the nature of urban politics in bidding cities, shifting urban politics to a more “topological” form (Müller 2014). Tese political strategies “dissolve the tension between inside and outside” of the city (Allen and Cochrane 2014, p. 1610) as policy is relationally constructed across territories and in circulation. Yet these topological urban politics are not simply free foating: Tey are urban, grounded in specifc neighborhoods, and backed by local elites who are tied to particular jurisdic- tions. Tus, mega-events “have to be understood through a connected politics of development that locates them in place, and always has quite distinct and localized features” (p. 1617). Tis means, furthermore, that city leaders play an active role in policy mobilities: Tey are importing knowledge and emulating success stories from elsewhere, often in response to the disciplining pressure of inter-urban competition. But they are also actively scanning the horizon for international opportunities—through “networked entrepreneurialism,” (Lauermann 2014a) “transnationalized growth machines,” (Surborg et al. 2008) “diplomatic entrepreneurship,” (Acuto 2013) or “policy boosterism” (McCann 2013)—both to link global media attention to their local 62 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann political agendas and to build potential markets for their own policy commodities.

Conclusion

Policy mobilities play a central role in mega-event planning, especially in the bidding system. Policies knowledge moves through several city- to-city circuits: Te IOC runs several knowledge management programs including a debriefng program to document knowledge from past hosts, workshops for bid cities, learning tours between Olympic cities, and digital platforms like the Olympic Games Knowledge Management extranet. Tese ofcial channels parallel several major policy tourism circuits, with destinations like Barcelona (González 2011), Sydney (Cashman and Harris 2012), and London (Grabher and Tiel 2015; Müller 2015) perceived as sources of authoritative knowledge about planning best practices. Knowledge also moves because it is transported by traveling experts, an “Olympic caravan” (Cashman and Harris 2012) of “Olympic gypsies” (Economist 2010) moving from one city to the next translating knowledge for local audiences and transforming policies to ft those needs. Te knowledge that moves across bidding cities—technical documents, data, patents and trademarks, architectural renderings, design templates, software and code, and the expertise needed to use them—might be thought of as a “policy commodity” that is imported and exported across the mega-events planning industry. We have argued that while import is more commonly researched, export also plays a major role in shaping the bidding system. Local leaders are not so much “enrolled” in systems of mobile policy as they are actively participating in their construction. Te result is an “extrospective” form of urban policymaking that designs and plans with export in mind (McCann 2013) and a “topological” form of urban politics that draws on global connections and media attention while remaining rooted in the concerns of the city (Allen and Cochrane 2014; Müller 2014). In addition to playing a central role in mega-event planning, policy mobilities can contribute to the legacies of failed Olympic bids. Bidding is an opportunity to import knowledge and expertise, which 3 Policy Mobilities and the Bid 63 can be applied after a bid fails (e.g., hiring a “world class” architect to design iconic structures) or leveraged to launch subsequent bidding projects (e.g., as seen in long-term consulting networks between Barcelona and Rio de Janeiro). Bidding is also an opportunity to identify export markets for locally designed policy commodities. Export would, obvi- ously, be most successful if the city were to actually host a Games and fully develop its policy commodity. But given the large degree of policy recycling that occurs in many bidding cities (this volume, Chap. 4), the maintenance of international networks may prove useful even if export is uncertain.

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Abstract Tis chapter analyzes the connections which form across multiple bids, and in particular how plans from one bid get recycled into others as part of long-term development strategies. Tis chapter frames bid planning as a project, and examines scholarship on project- based learning to assess how learning occurs within and across bids in the same city. One high frequency bidder is used as a case study: bids emerging from Doha (Qatar) illustrate these themes as bid coalitions there regularly pursue mega-events not necessarily to win the hosting contracts, but to link bidding to local real estate projects and national developmental agendas.

Keywords Project-based learning · Development logic · Bid lifecycle Recursive planning

Introduction

Mega-events are by defnition temporary exercises. Bids are short-term projects that operate for a few years while the bid corporation designs and promotes its plan, and the odds of moving forward with that

© Te Author(s) 2017 69 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann, Failed Olympic Bids and the Transformation of Urban Space, Mega Event Planning, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59823-3_4 70 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann plan are slim. Even if a bid succeeds, event planning is also on a fxed term lifecycle. Indeed, the very idea of legacy is premised on tempo- rariness: investment in a temporary project is justifed by promises to produce durable long-term legacy for the host city. Yet this temporari- ness requires critical scrutiny. Tere is a growing consensus that, while certainly temporary, Olympic bids also are embedded in long-term development agendas (as we discuss in Chap. 2), are interlinked with ongoing policymaking initiatives (as we discuss in Chap. 3), and exhibit continuities with other past and future mega-events (as we discuss in Chap. 6). Many cities bid multiple times for the Olympics and for other mega-events, refning plans along the way. In fact, it is rare for a city to win its bid on the very frst attempt, and cities are often encouraged to build their event hosting portfolio (and inventory of sports facilities) before launching an Olympic bid. Tese multiple bids are certainly not reinventing new plans for each iteration. Rather, mega-event planning can occur while “planning across” mega-event plans: linking ideas from one bid into others, gradually redefning planning goals across these projects. Planning across bids is often a form of recursive planning. Tere is a linear component to cross-bid planning in the sense that ideas are recycled—sometimes literally copied and pasted—from one bid to the next. Yet planning across bids is also an iterative process. Durable planning outcomes—the legacies of failed bids—are shaped through iterations of temporary projects, either bidding and hosting other mega-events or planning for non-sport mega-projects. Te choice of which projects are recycled and how they evolve along the way is shaped by the ways in which bids are embedded in both long-term development agendas and in other past/future planning projects. Along the way, both the mega-event plan and the broader urban development agenda evolve through recursive iterations of bidding. Te implication is that some bids are never meant to be won in the frst place. Bidding has multiple functions: winning a hosting contract is the most obvious, but bids also have more utilitarian functions like bolstering the careers of individual politicians, lobbying for infrastructure funding, marketing real estate projects, promoting longer term 4 Planning Across Bids 71 development agendas. Tere is much to be learned by analyzing what happens in between failed bids, as the “planning across” provides evidence of bidders’ longer term motivations. Tracking which projects get recycled across bids—or pursued in the time between bids—reveals the non-Olympic objectives which motivate stakeholders to join a bidding coalition. It is commonly assumed that the legacy of failed bids is an afterthought, a consolation prize secured when the “real” objective (winning the bid) is unobtainable or a recoupment of lost investment when planning ideas are salvaged after a bid failure. However, as we demonstrate in this chapter, for at least some bidders, the legacies of failed bids are the intended outcomes. At very least, these post-failure legacies are routinely in the making as bidders plans evolve both during bids and across them. Tis chapter begins with a review of scholarship on projects and project-based learning as it relates to mega-events, emphasizing how learning occurs within and between temporary projects. We then further develop our argument about recursive planning across bids, exploring it through the experiences of “high frequency” bidders, cities that bid repeatedly for the Olympics and other mega-events. Recursive planning is explored in empirical detail through a case study of one such high frequency bidder, Doha (Qatar). We then conclude this chapter by evaluating how planning across bids might become more accountable, transparent, and efcient.

Recycling Plans

Te use of “temporary” projects to facilitate “durable” urban legacies is widely documented, especially on themes like mega-projects (Altshuler and Luberof 2003; Flyvbjerg 2008; Orueta and Fainstein 2008), the practices of urban project delivery (Raco 2014; Van Der Veen and Korthals Altes 2012), and the fexible use of public space (Bishop and Williams 2012; Haydn and Temel 2006). Projects are regularly used in urban governance, as plans are designed and implemented through discrete interventions. Tese projects might take the form of a pilot 72 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann program, a planning experiment, a temporary policy initiative, a fnancial instrument (e.g., tax increment fnancing), or a limited life institution. Te common characteristics that defne them as “projects” is that they create a set of temporary institutions which work on a clearly defned timetable and which have discrete identifable outcomes. Tus, they have a diferent function than managerial institutions which provide ongoing services (e.g., a public works department performs projects but exists independently of any one of them) or governing institutions that oversee urban afairs in a more general way (e.g., a mayor’s administration is temporary but has a broader and loosely defned set of objectives). Institutional learning is a core legacy of these temporary interventions into urban governance. A large literature in economic geography and management studies has examined the role of projects as learning environments (see reviews in Bakker 2010; Turner et al. 2011). Tese environments are temporary organizational forms that glean knowledge from existing “communities of practice” (Amin and Roberts 2008; Wenger et al. 2002), provide a spatial-temporal context for knowledge production through “project ecologies” (Grabher 2004; Grabher and Ibert 2010), and facilitate learning following from the project even after the project has been concluded. Learning also occurs through “temporary clusters” (Bathelt and Schuldt 2008; Maskell et al. 2006; Power and Jansson 2008), events like trade fairs or conventions that temporarily bring frms, experts, and entrepreneurs into local proximity thereby encouraging the generation of new knowledge (Bathelt and Cohendet 2014). Te temporary initiatives in mega-event planning include bidding, event organization, and the delivery of land investment projects. Tese initiatives exhibit two broad types of durable legacy. Te frst durable legacy is material impacts on the urban landscape as construction plans are pursued across multiple bids (a point we pick up again in Chap. 5). Tese are quite clear in cities that win some hosting rights while bidding unsuccessfully for others. But more broadly, failed bids can catalyze material legacies when bidding secures zoning clearances, mobilizes 4 Planning Across Bids 73 funding, or builds long-term coalitions in support of land investment projects (this volume, Chap. 5). Some commonly cited examples of this post-bid land investment are sport venues in Berlin (Alberts 2009), housing in Istanbul (Bilsel and Zelef 2011), a variety of post-industrial redevelopments in New York (Moss 2011), and a waterfront complex in Toronto (Oliver 2011). A second durable legacy is that bidding and organizing committees often provide the same type of learning environment seen in project ecologies or temporary clusters. Bidding can, even when unsuccessful, be a governance capacity building exercise (Benneworth and Dauncey 2010) especially when there is institutional continuity across multiple bids (Torres 2012) or when the bid mobilizes broader civic involvement (Heisey 2009). Cross-project learning can be a form of durable legacy, as professionals and institutions involved in one bid carry their expertise to others. For example, a number of bidding coalitions have used lessons learned from failed Olympic bids to bid for and host smaller multisport events like Asian, Commonwealth, Pan American, or World Student games (as we discuss in Chap. 6). Te extent of these impacts is debatable. Van Dijk and Weitkamp (2013) challenge the idea that failed bids can produce material legacy. Drawing on a study of Chicago’s failed 2016 bid, they conclude that while bids may have an intangible persuasive efect “empirical data on eventual physical change to a city is hard to fnd…expectations from persuasive plans must not be overrated” (p. 112). Given the prepon- derance of evidence on post-bid legacies in other cities, this conclusion may be the result of a small sample (only one bid in one city). But the broader lesson is well taken: it is difcult to draw direct connections between temporary projects like bids and material change in urban space, since bids often refect ongoing spatial agendas. Tese difculties are compounded further in the case of failed bids, which add a layer of uncertainty into analysis. Similar debates circulate the learning efect hypothesis. Using a sur- vey of learning among consultants at the London 2012, Sochi 2014, and Rio 2016 Olympics, Müller and Stewart (2016) fnd “there is weak 74 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann evidence that temporary geographical proximity per se predicts interper- sonal learning,” although the combination of geographical and organizational proximity can facilitate informal learning interactions (p. 386). Grabher and Tiel (2015) fnd a stronger learning efect among project managers at the London 2012 Games, but this varies across diferent “trajectories” of learning with much of the learning embodied in the professionals rather than the organizations they work for. Te lesson, again, is simply that post-bid impacts exist but signifcant questions remain about their quantitative impact and the complex set of causali- ties shared with parallel urban governance initiatives. Planning across is a recursive learning process. Plans are recycled as cities bid multiple times. Bids are costly urban design and planning projects, and thus the marginal cost of a repeat bid decreases signifcantly if previous plans can be reused. Yet smart bidders recognize that previous bid failures may be caused (at least in part) by faws in previous bid plans. Tey also recognize that bids must keep up as a city’s development goals evolve over time. Tus, there are limits to recycling, and the plans evolve along the way. Tis evolution is directly linked to learning which occurs across projects. Cross-project learning is seen in the ways in which framing narratives are refned over time (see Chap. 2), bidding ambitions are rescaled into other mega-event project (see Chap. 6), and in the evolving composition and leadership of bid coalitions.

High Frequency Bidding

By one recent estimate, there are as many as 150 cities planning for mega-events, producing a diverse range of legacy types linked to hosting, bidding, and planning to bid (Kassens-Noor et al. 2015). In addition to Summer and Winter Olympics, there are a number of similar international events that use host cities (rather than national hosting geographies like those seen in the World Cup), host a similar multisport program (with similar venue requirements), and allocate hosting rights through a bidding competition (Table 4.1). Tese include a number of regional multisport events hosted by continental Olympic associa- tions and by non-Olympic sports federations (e.g., the Commonwealth 4 Planning Across Bids 75

Table 4.1 International multisport events Event Franchise holder Frequency Trans-continental multisport events Commonwealth Games Commonwealth Games Quadrennial, since 1930 Federation Francophone Games Comité international des Quadrennial, since 1989 jeux de la Francophonie Gay Games Federation of Gay Games Quadrennial, since 1982 Olympic & Paralympic International Olympic Biannual, alternating Games Committee between Summer and Winter versions, since 1896 Pan Arab Games Union of Arab National Quadrennial, since 1953 Olympic Committees Universiade International University Biannual, alternating Sports Federation between Summer and Winter versions, since 1959 World Games International World Quadrennial, since 1981 Games Association Youth Olympic Games International Olympic Biannual, alternating Committee between Summer and Winter versions, since 2010

Regional multisport events All Africa Games Association of National Quadrennial, since 1965 Olympic Committees of Africa, Association of African Sports Confederations Arctic Winter Games Arctic Winter Games Biannual, since 1970 Council Asian Games Olympic Council of Asia Quadrennial, since 1951 Central American and Central American and Quadrennial, since 1926 Caribbean Games Caribbean Sports Organization East Asian Games Olympic Council of Asia Quadrennial, since 1993 European Games European Olympic Quadrennial, since 2015 Committees Games of the Small European Olympic Biannual, since 1985 States of Europe Committees Indian Ocean Island International Olympic Irregular, 9 editions since Games Committee 1979 (continued) 76 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

Table 4.1 (continued)

Regional multisport events Mediterranean Games International Committee Quadrennial, since 1951 of Mediterranean Games Pacifc Games Pacifc Games Council Quadrennial, since 1963 Pan American Games Pan American Sports Quadrennial, since 1951 Organization South American Games South American Sports Quadrennial, since 1978 Organization South Asian Games South Asian Sports Irregular, 13 editions Council, Olympic since 1984 Council of Asia Southeast Asian Games Southeast Asian Games Biannual, since 1959 Federation, Olympic Council of Asia Multisport events with an urban hosting structure and a formal bidding process

Games Federation franchises events for member states of the British Commonwealth). Te Olympic regional event system has multiple nested scales of gradually smaller international multisport events; for example, the Olympic Council of Asian franchises the Asian Games, but its subsidiaries also franchise smaller events like the East, West, Southeast, and South Asian Games. Likewise, there are dozens of single-sport international events franchised by the relevant federations, and a number of non-sport mega-events like World’s Fairs or European Capital of Culture events. While multiple bidding is common (especially when an Olympic project is recycled into a non-Olympic project, or vice versa), planning across bids is most directly seen in “high frequency bidders” (Lauermann 2016, pp. 1886–1889). Tese are defned as bidding coalitions that have bid on and/or hosted three or more mega-events in the span of a decade. Continuity across these coalitions is defned when a shared group of stakeholders have helped fund the bidding coalitions, have guaranteed fnancial shortfalls for the future event, or have backed large real estate investments. For parsimony, we limit this to coalitions involved in the type of multisport mega-events identifed in Table 4.1 because they involve similar venue requirements and bidding procedures. Since 1990, we identify 15 such coalitions (Table 4.2). 4 Planning Across Bids 77

Table 4.2 High frequency mega-event bidders Bidding Olympic bids Related international multi- coalition sport events Baku 2016, 2020 2013 Summer Universiade, 2015 European Games*, 2017 Islamic Solidarity Games* Bangkok 2008 1998 Asian Games*, 2007 Summer Universiade, 2010 Summer Youth Olympics Beijing 2000, 2008*, 2022 2001 Summer Universiade* Brasilia 2000 2017 and 2019* Summer Universiade (Brazil also hosted the 2016 World Cup) Doha 2016, 2020 2006 Asian Games*, 2011 Pan Arab Games* (Qatar is also hosting 2022 World Cup) Guadalajara 2003 and 2011* Pan American Games, 2014 and 2018 Summer Youth Olympics Harbin 2010 2009 Winter Universiade*, 2012 Winter Youth Olympics Istanbul 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2020 (prominent role in Turkish 2010/2016 European Football Cup bids) Jaca/Huesca 2002, 2010, 2014 Madrid 2012, 2016, 2020 Manchester 1996, 2000 2002 Commonwealth Games* PyeongChang 2010, 2014, 2018* 2014 Asian Games (Incheon)* Rio de Janeiro 2004, 2012, 2016 2006 Pan American Games* (Brazil also hosted the 2016 World Cup) Torino 2006* 2007 Winter Universiade*, 2010 Summer Youth Olympics Toronto 1996, 2008 2010 Commonwealth Games (Hamilton), 2015 Pan American Games* Bids date 1991–2015 *won the bid/secured the hosting contract 78 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

While each bid is a unique project, repeated bidding is time consuming and costly. Plans for real estate projects inside the bids are often recycled—sometimes literally copying and pasting designs—from one bid to the next. For example, a number of Olympic bids copy and paste visual products like maps and architectural designs from one to the next (e.g., the PyeongChang 2018 bid recycled the graphics used in the 2014 Olympic village plans). A number of repeat bidders focus on the same land investment sites over the course of their bids: Istanbul’s fve bids all focus on a public housing development, Toronto’s bids repeatedly return to a waterfront site, and Doha’s bids regularly incor- porate a “Sports City” suburban enclave on the western edge of the city. Many high frequency bidders use Olympic bidding as the basis for other events—for example, Manchester’s failed 1996 and 2000 bid plans were adapted for a 2007 Commonwealth Games plan (Cochrane et al. 1996; Cook and Ward 2011), while Toronto’s long history of Olympic bidding informed planning for the 2015 Pan American Games (Bellas and Oliver 2016). Bids by high frequency bidders tend to be embedded in long-term development agendas and institutions. Tey are often sponsored, fnanced, and/or planned by institutions that transcend any single event or bid: a national Olympic committee, a national or municipal government agency (often a ministry of sports or culture at the national level, or an urban development agency at the municipal level), or a special purpose development institution (e.g., Istanbul’s bid coalition has received an independent funding stream through a national lottery, since 1992). Tey are often linked to larger land investment agendas (e.g., infrastructure investment programs), listing these investments on the bid balance sheet even though the projects are planned and funded through non-Olympic agencies. Tese elements are illustrated prominently in Doha’s mega-event bidding history. After hosting the 2006 Asian Games and a warm-up West Asian Games in 2005, authorities in Doha (Qatar’s capital and primate city) have emerged as some of the most prominent high frequency bidders. Groups in the city hosted the 2011 Pan Arab Games, bid unsuccessfully for the 2016 and 2020 Summer Olympics, provided support for Qatar’s successful 2022 World Cup bid, and have bid for and hosted numerous single-sport international competitions (e.g., the 2015 World 4 Planning Across Bids 79

Handball Championship, the 2015 and 2023 FINA Swimming World Cups, and annual Qatar Open tennis events). Doha’s bids make international headlines because they are particularly ambitious and well funded: the 2020 Olympic bid, for instance, dwarfed its competition by promising $58.76 billion of land investment, $42 billion more than its nearest competitor. Doha’s bidders achieve those large budgets by linking their projects to nationally funded infrastructure investment programs. Te bids and events have been linked to national development programs including the National Development Strategy 2011–2016, the National Master Plan 2032, the National Vision 2030, the Sports Venue Master Plan, and the Transport Master Plan. Tese programs refect the Qatari state’s attempts to diversify the national economy beyond oil (Scharfenort 2012; Ulrichsen 2011), using its sovereign wealth fund to invest in infrastructure domestically and internationally (Haberly 2011). Te National Vision (General Secretariat for Development Planning 2008) summarizes this post-oil development planning, envisioning a “diver- sifed economy that gradually reduces its dependence on hydrocarbon industries” (p. 29) by expanding its scope along the energy value chain (beyond extraction into research and services) and building a knowledge economy. Urban land investment is a major avenue for the developmental state to achieve these goals, by “establishing and funding publically owned real estate companies, which are in turn tasked with carrying forward multiple projects of modernity as defned by the state” (Kamrava 2013, p. 148). Te resulting building boom has been criticized for questionable labor practices, as a predominantly expatriate labor force is employed to construct facilities—including sports venues—under unsafe working conditions and a visa system that gives employers intru- sive control over their employees’ living arrangements and ability to leave the country (Human Rights Watch 2012; Millward 2016). Geographically, the result is a series of enclave neighborhoods: “self- contained cities within the city” (Salama and Wiedmann 2013, p. 84) that are constructed as master planned communities by state-owned enterprises or private sector ventures closely afliated to the state (e.g., through hereditary ties to the royal family). Trough the construction of “glass refrigerators in the desert” (Koch 2014), these enclaves link 80 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann iconic architecture and cutting-edge urban technologies to geopolitical and nation-building ambitions, by providing geographic hubs to anchor international markets and professional communities. Tus, “Sports City” (recently rebranded as the Aspire Zone) converted the main 2006 Asian Games complex into a sports tourism district. Te owners of the zone constructed schools and sports facilities for training (often expatriate) elite athletes, while operating several “sport for development” programs to requite these athletes from the Global South. Likewise, the Qatar Foundation (a fund managed by the royal family) developed “Education City.” Tis is an enclave for the satellite campuses of western universities like Georgetown, Texas A&M, and University College London. And enclave projects like “Energy City” and the Qatar Science and Technology Park are master-planned campuses aimed at incubating alternative energy industries by providing a base for research and development startups. While these enclaves—and the various mega-event bids linked to them—are all connected to the developmental state’s central strategies, they are institutionally separate entities. Tis means that a good deal of competition occurs among the enclaves as site owners compete for land use rights and national funding. Te result is a chaotic form of land use change, what one local planner described as “organic growth” by which “there’s one set of plans in each place; there’s random stadiums and sports plans…so all these things are happening, again, organically, with no master plan even though there is a masterplan.”1 Tus, some bids may not be motivated by the ambition to win the bid, but rather by local political agendas. Mega-event bidding is one way to gain an edge in this intra-urban competition, by drawing international attention to and building political relationships around the enclave. Since the bids are often linked to specifc, competing enclave development projects (Sports City in the Asian Games bid, the Lusail master planned suburb in the 2020 Olympic bid, etc.), a signifcant amount of land investment occurs in between mega-event bids. Tere is also institutional learning in between projects, as the same core group of state agencies, state-owned enterprises, private real estate frms, and expatriate consultants are involved in both enclave planning and bid planning. Yet it is difcult to parse the extent of the bidding catalyst efect 4 Planning Across Bids 81 in this context. While investment regularly occurs after a bid failure, that investment was often planned to occur regardless of the bid result. If anything, Doha’s high frequency bidding is a symptom of ongoing urban development rather than a cause of it. Bids are a way to show- case the agendas and achievements of a well-funded developmental state, and for state-owned real estate companies and private sector elites to lobby for funding from that developmental state. Likewise, the bids become more competitive with budgets that are padded by sometimes on marginally related land investment budgets.

Conclusion

Planning across bids is, almost by defnition, difcult to track empirically. Yet there is ample evidence of “planning across” in a number of cities, as bidders recycle plans and maintain coalitions across multiple mega-event projects. Tis is a form of recursive planning, in which bid projects are embedded in both long-term urban agendas and in past mega-event projects. Te result is an iteration between these two concepts, as both the urban agenda and the mega-event plans evolve in tan- dem as the latter are recycled and redesigned. Tis recursion refects the mechanisms of project-based learning. Mega-event planning provides a temporary spatial and institutional environment for actors to learn, perhaps as a “project ecology” (Grabher 2004) or a “temporary cluster” (Bathelt and Cohendet 2014). Since the mega-event industry is a relatively small one and bidding coalitions often overlap with other local growth coalitions, these same actors can facilitate cross-bid learning through their professional networks. Cross-project learning and cross-bid planning are seen especially in “high frequency bidders,” mega-event planning coalitions that repeatedly bid for the Olympics and other mega-events in a short span of years. Planning across bids has a linear element, in the sense that plans are recycled from one bid to the next, sometimes by literally copying and pasting images and text from one bid to the next. But plans are also regularly evolving as they are recycled and recursively redesigned. For example, in one high frequency bidder—Doha, Qatar—bidding 82 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann is linked to the competing agendas of a number of land investors, all of whom individually pursue post-bid failure investment within a broadly shared urban development agenda (defned by the national developmental state) but also seek to redefne that agenda through the investment. Te implication is that when a city bids, there are multiple and potentially contradictory agendas at play in addition to actually winning the bid. In fact, for some bidders, winning may be a secondary concern as the project is leveraged for some longer term agenda or as bidders’ priorities evolve over multiple mega-event projects. Bidding has more mundane functions like bolstering politicians’ careers, lobbying for land investment funding, or marketing real estate projects. Tese functions may continue after a bid fails (as we discuss in Chap. 5) and their occurrence in between bids may reveal the “true” motivations of a bid coalition, as distinct from the bidding narratives (Chap. 2) which that coalition uses to justify bid investment. One of the most common ways to engage in this planning across is to rescale the ambitions of the coalition (Chap. 6), pursuing the same general development agenda but applying it to less ambitious and more feasible planning projects in support of other non-Olympic mega-events. Te challenge, then, is to bring “planning across” into local frame- works for good governance. Tere is a robust tradition of protesting the urban impacts of Olympic investment, and urban social movements increasingly mobilize early in the bidding stages to challenge Olympic impacts while they are still in planning (see Chap. 7). Tese opposition movements—and a growing cohort of likeminded local ofcials and taxpayers—raise procedural questions about how the Games are planned (e.g., around accountability and transparency) and more existential questions about the priorities contained within bids and the opportunity costs of those investment plans (e.g., demanding participation in bid planning). Te latter group of anti-bid activists have successfully defeated a number of bids. But planning across presents challenges for negotiating existential questions like whether the city should host an event at all or the opportunity costs of projects proposed in the bid. Bidding is a clearly defned project that can be contested and refned. Planning in between bids is a more difuse process, as a set of individual 4 Planning Across Bids 83 special interests pursuing post-failure projects or lobbying to shape the agenda of future bids. Much discontent with mega-event planning is discontent with existential questions over the value and equity of specifc land investments (the gentrifcation of a neighborhood, the displacement of pre-existing land uses, etc.). Planning in between bids often continues forward with these same investments, even if mega- event ambitions have been thwarted through more procedural contestations. Tus, while there is a clear mechanism to contest elite capture of a bid, it is harder to contest the recycling of elite projects across bids.

Note

1. Interview with the author, Doha, May 2014.

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Abstract Te central question of this chapter is: What happens in the aftermath of bid failure? Trough illustrating how particular Olympic bids mobilize narratives of the future and lay the planning and policy groundwork necessary to make future development possible, we illustrate that even unsuccessful bids can be critical agents of change. An exploration of the failed bid projects of New York, Chicago, and Istanbul, demonstrates that even failed Olympic bids have the potential to trigger or reformulate a host of urban policies, processes, and practices, and can be employed as rhetorical tools designed to infuence/project/imprint an image/identity.

Keywords Bid horizon · Symbolic manipulation · State-initiated transformation · Neoliberal reordering

Te IOC’s announcement of a host city brings an abrupt end to the formal bidding process. For some bid teams, it is not just the fnal result but also the relative standings that need to be comprehended. For example, it is reported that for Toronto’s bid boosters, “it came as a shock to lose to Beijing by such a wide margin” (Booth et al. 2001, p. 26). Elsewhere,

© Te Author(s) 2017 87 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann, Failed Olympic Bids and the Transformation of Urban Space, Mega Event Planning, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59823-3_5 88 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann the failure of Paris in the 2012 bid competition “occasioned a massive crise de conscience for the bureaucratic mind in that status-conscious country” (Ross 2009, p. 97). Having been the frst of four cities eliminated during the 2016 selection process, Chicago’s inability to capture more than a “pathetic 19 percent” of the available votes was emphasized in various media outlets (Berkes 2009, para 19) and has been called a “humiliating civic debacle” (Bennett et al. 2013, p. 7). In an editorial headlined, “Stand Proud, Chicago” the Chicago Tribune ofered these consoling words to those dismayed by Rio de Janeiro’s triumph over the Windy City: “Te soul of a city is revealed not only in its shin- ing moments of victory, but in how it handles adversity.” (Chicago Tribune Editorial Board 2009, para 7). In other locations, the pursuit of the “ultimate accolade” (Gold and Gold 2007, p. 320) has demanded critical civic retrospection even before the fnal vote was tabulated: “[i]n the psychological history of Toronto, has there ever been a process as dis- concerting and pathetic as the attempt to attract the 2008 Olympic Games? Win or lose, we should admit that this project has said noth- ing good about us, our values, or the spirit of our city” (Fulford 2001, p. F1). While proponents of failed eforts ponder the “why” and “what ifs” of the loss, it is not unusual to fnd civic and state leaders stressing the need to seize upon the focus and sense of urgency that the Olympic bid provided. Te IOC encourages cities to submit bids that develop legacy goals that align with broader urban development objectives. Tis chapter draws motivation from van Djik and Weitkamp’s (2014, p. 112) observation that “mega-events represent strong comprehensive stories about potential futures.” We submit that Olympic bids have the potential to trigger or reformulate urban policies, processes, and practices—most notably changes in zoning, real estate purchase and assembly, fnancing for social housing, alterations to transportation infrastructure, and the rise of community awareness/activism. Tey can be employed as rhetorical tools designed to infuence/project/imprint an image/identity. Even if a particular bid illustrates very little in terms of post-bid legacy, it may still prove helpful when examining the various motivations/strategies/ infuences employed by bid teams and the series of relationships that are 5 Post-bid Legacies? 89 required for candidacy (including temporal relationships as discussed in Chaps. 3 and 4 of this volume). Our interest in this chapter is not to establish cause and efect between bid failure and post-failure legacy. Efects of a bid are difcult to isolate because bid teams often align their Olympic spatial plans to already existing city plans (van Djik and Weitkamp 2014; Preuss 2007). Rather, we seek to illustrate how the bidding process has been woven (or not) into the larger development agendas of a few cities that have experience post-failure legacies. We use case studies from American cities (New York and Chicago) to examine the process when it is led by the private sector and municipal government. We use a case study from Istanbul to examine the process when it is led by a national state with ample public funding. In all three instances, we show the post-failure legacy process can be productive but can also shut of public debate as it occurs outside conventional planning protocols.

New York City 2012

In 2011, Mitchell Moss, director of New York University’s Rudin Center for Transportation Policy and Management, released a thought- provoking report entitled How New York City Won Te Olympics. More than six years removed from the failure of New York City’s bid for the 2012 Olympics, the report ofered much more than the typical bid post-mortem claiming that despite failing to secure the Games, New York City’s bid had infuenced the reshaping of the city. Te report argues that the bid’s focus on redeveloping seven areas of the city that were comparatively underdeveloped (i.e., Far West Side of Manhattan, Brooklyn’s East River Waterfront, Long Island City in Queen’s, the Flushing Section of Queen’s, Harlem, the South Bronx, and Downtown Brooklyn) resulted in a comprehensive development plan that would continue to shape New York’s growth post-bid. By incorporating projects that had been previously contemplated but never implemented and relying on the pressure of the fxed Olympic bid timetable, Moss (2011) claims that the bid helped “push forward the legal and technical review and approval of these projects on an accelerated schedule” (p. 11). 90 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

Te report also claimed that New York’s bid was unlike other failed eforts because the city “has achieved virtually all of the key elements of the NYC2012 Plan without having to hold the Games” (Moss 2011, p. 70). For Jay Kriegel, Deputy Director of the NYC 2012 bid corporation, “No other Olympic bid has ever been designed that way” (Kriegel 2011, para 6). Te report credits the bid process for helping trigger the creation of a middle income housing project in Queen’s, the extension of the No. 7 subway line, ferry service on the East River, new sports stadiums (e.g., Citi Field, Yankee Stadium, Barclays Center arena), numerous new parks, and other projects. NYC 2012’s master plan concept—the ‘Olympic X’—proposed to locate the Games along two intersecting axes running through the heart of the city. It was a plan that NYC’s 2012 bid book argued “united New Yorkers in defning a shared vision for the city’s long-term development” (NYC2012 2004, p. 23). It was no secret that New York’s bid was about real estate development and particularly the desire to redevelop the far west side of Manhattan (Lenskyj 2008; Marcuse 2014). Yet, for some commentators, the proposal to host the Games in the heart of New York went “against all political and planning rationality” given that the bor- ough of Manhattan had made no efort to win a world-scale event since a failed attempt to land a World’s Fair in 1892 (Ross 2009, p. 86). Te bid was also criticized for representing a particular iteration of neoliberal urbanism that consolidates elite class power through the implementation of a style of corporate urban governance promoted by “ex-CEO” Mayor Michael Bloomberg (Brash 2011). Julian Brash (2011) has use- fully charted how NYC2012 was a critical component of comprehensive rebranding strategy generated by an alliance between the city’s business elite and the ofce of the Mayor. He notes that the particular mix of class, governance, and urban imaginary mobilized during the bid process was consistent with the “deeply political” nature of Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s administration. In particular, he argues that the bid should be read as just one example of “an efort on the part of a specifc social grouping to bring urban governance and the physical shape of the city into accord with its interests and desires and, more than this, to assert the right and benefcence of its rule” (Brash 2011, p. 3). Brash (2011, p. 53) pinpoints the appointment of Daniel Doctorof, a private equity 5 Post-bid Legacies? 91 investor and founder and leader of the New York’s bid, to Deputy Mayor for Economic Development and Rebuilding (the city’s main development ofcial) as representing a “watershed in New York City’s class politics” because it marked the entrance of a transnational capitalist class (TCC) into city governance. Notwithstanding the confict of interest concerns raised over the dual role performed by Doctorof (Ross 2009), there was an increasing alignment of the Olympic bid’s plans with those of a controversial redevelopment scheme for the Hudson Yards, a 26-acre tract of land in western Manhattan that had been notoriously difcult to develop. Bid and city ofcials hoped that by combining the Olympic vision to the site’s development agenda, political opposition would be abated through harnessing the power of the olympic symbol in order to carve “spaces of political-economic exception” (Boykof 2014, p. 11) thereby allowing “the powerful to press through policies on their wish lists that they wouldn’t dream of putting forward during normal political times” (Boykof 2014, p. 11). However, when NYC2012’s proposed to locate the main Olympic stadium over the Hudson rail yards, they ignited a bitter process that revealed, as Ross (2009, p. 90) has put it: “a clear disjunct between the regional and the global scale of interurban politics.” Put simply, New York City’s Olympic bid exposed the vulnerability of the city’s municipal authority to the power residing in the state senate. Despite years of planning, the proposed West Side Stadium failed to secure the support of the State of New York’s Public Authorities Control Board, a result that Ross (2009) labels as the “worst defeat of the frst Bloomberg administration” (p. 84). And yet, Charles Bagli (2011) writing in Te New York Times argues that the defeat might actually represent one of Mayor Bloomberg’s “most enduring legacies” (para 12) because although the stadium was lost, the core vision to redevelop Manhattan’s far west side into a high-end ofce district was retained. Tis is important because although many of the particular details of the Hudson Yards plan were rejected, the managerial aspects (including land use changes, fnancing plans, and zoning mechanisms) were not discredited and were put to use in the post-bid period. Most notably, the bidding exercise was used to support a series of municipal redevelopment corporations tied to the bid’s major development sites: Queens 92 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

West Development Corporation took over redevelopment at the athlete village site, Atlantic Yards Project was tasked with fnishing a basketball arena and mixed-used development in Brooklyn, and the bid corporation helped to found the Hudson Yards Coalition, a group which successfully lobbied the city to become the Hudson Yards Development Corporation after the bid failed (Lauermann 2016; Moss 2011). While it is reasonable to conclude that the opposition and defeat of the stadium plan for the Hudson Yards contributed to New York City’s poor showing in the bid competition (Rutenberg 2005), the bidding process was instrumental in afrming that a neoliberal competitive city logic—guided by the desires of the city’s managerial corporate class— would prevail (Brash 2011). Fast-forward to 2016 and we fnd that the Hudson Yards area had become “the largest private real-estate development in United States history and the test ground for the world’s most ambitious experiment in ‘smart city’ urbanism” (Mattern 2016, para 1). Te fallout from the failed stadium project was not simply limited to the Hudson Yards. Since IOC regulations make it clear that the provision of an Olympic stadium is a prerequisite for bid cities, bid ofcials were forced to negotiate a new location in an expedited manner. In an ironic twist of the politics of stadium development in New York City, the bid team’s failure to gain support for a West Side Stadium ultimately resulted in massive public subsidies being provided for the construction of three new sport complexes across the city (Citi Field in Queens, Yankee Stadium in the Bronx, Barclay’s Center in Brooklyn) (Ross 2009; Gayer et al. 2016). Although the degree of infuence that the Olympic bid had on these negotiations remains a subject of debate, the fnancing scheme of using payments in lieu of taxes and the willingness of the local state to use the power of eminent domain to facilitate sport development were defning features of the bid.

Chicago 2016

In contrast to the impact credited to New York City’s bid, van Dijk and Weitkamp’s (2014) case study of Chicago’s 2016 Olympic bid demonstrates that both the “subtle reframing efects” (p. 116) and more overt 5 Post-bid Legacies? 93 spatial consequences of Chicago’s Olympic plan were marginal with “very few lasting efects.” (p. 126). Van Dijk and Weitkamp (2014, p. 127) propose that the absence of a more apparent spatial legacy of the bid was linked to the notion that the bid plan was deliberately designed to “not leave any physical legacy,” a strategy they claim while efcient, could also be read as “demotivating.” In comparison with most bids, Chicago 2016’s bid proposed very little in the way of capital spending to support the Games; large infrastructure expenses were limited to a temporary Olympic Stadium to be built in a public park (Washington Park) and an Olympic Village. Te heavy reliance on existing venues and public parks/spaces to accommodate most of the required facilities meant that land acquisition was not a defning feature of Chicago’s bid (Bennett et al. 2013). It was a deliberate design that sought to protect the local taxpayers from potential cost overruns and Chicago’s Mayor, Richard M. Daley, frequently claimed that it was essential to protect public money. Te Report Of Te 2016 IOC Evaluation Commission highlights that Chicago’s concept was in line with the understanding that bidding cities should “build a new venue only if there is a legacy need” while also noting that Chicago’s Games plan “would mean greater fnancial responsibility for the OCOG which would be required to fnance and deliver a signifcant part of the project” (IOC 2009, p. 10). Instead of sponsoring a discourse of development, Chicago’s bid was promoted as being socially responsible (Chicago 2016 2009). But, ofering a bid that was “practical” also meant that the plan lacked “persuasive power” (van Dijk and Weitkamp 2014, p. 128). Tis does not mean that an anti-bid sentiment was absent in Chicago, rather it implies that the leadership cohort failed to convince a diverse constituency that the Olympic plan represented a collective efort. Bennett and colleagues’ (2013) examination of the “lessons learned” (p. 365) from Chicago’s bid nicely illustrates how the bid efort failed to translate into an exercise in social learning. Tese authors had frst expressed concern over what they defned as an “opaque and ad hoc” planning process for the 2016 Olympic Games in a working report in 2008 (Bennett et al. 2008, p. 14). Writing several years later, they continued to fnd little evidence to support the notion that Chicago’s 94 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann business and civic elite learned from this “humiliating civic debacle” (Bennett et al. 2013, p. 370). Despite having “devoted countless hours of time, having mobilized the millions necessary to mount a respectable Olympic bid, and having elicited various statutory mandates,” (p. 370) Bennett et al. (2013) illustrate that Chicago’s bid experience failed to generate “civic retrospection” (p. 375). Most problematic for the investigators was their fnding that the community consultation process for Chicago’s bid was handled poorly: “visually impressive, one-sided presentations by Olympic spokespersons generated resistance among public forum attend- ees insisting on dialogue and attention to particular neighborhood matters; this resistance to early consultation eforts led to increasingly polished, visually impressive, one-sided presentations by Olympic spokespersons. Te remedy, such as it was, exacerbated the original malady.” Te result was that the Olympic bid became just another policy debate that was “drained of political content” (Bennett et al. 2013, p. 377). Mowatt and Travis (2015) reach a similar conclusion documenting the frustration that existed among community-based organizations who struggled to engage in meaningful public consultation with the bid team about proposed alterations to their communities. While not necessarily opposed to the Olympics, many community groups were dismayed by the inability of the bid team to identify how issues of gentrifcation, displacement, and discrimination would be mitigated (Mowatt and Travis 2015). Concern over the lack of details extended to the proposed plan to convert Washington Park temporarily, as community members noted that there are varying degrees of impermanence. Bid ofcials were reminded by local landscape architects that they were not converting a blighted area into a park, but rather they were actually reconfguring a park designed by Frederick Law Olmsted into what might very well amount to a poorer version of the original (Gardiner and Hollencamp 2009). For Mowatt and Travis (2015, p. 261), such calls for clarifcation went largely unheeded, and they conclude: “the provision of information was never proactive, forthcoming, or democratic from Chicago 2016 or the Mayor’s Ofce, which highlights a lack of desire to have an active and engaged citizenry.” Te legacy here might best be read as a missed opportunity to nurture community engagement. 5 Post-bid Legacies? 95

Beyond the obvious dilemmas of Chicago 2016 public consultation process, hindsight permits us the luxury of recognizing other damaging legacies of the bid efort. For example, even though the bid team took care to limit public exposure by limiting land acquisition, a pricey legacy for taxpayers still emerged because the City of Chicago purchased the property for the Olympic Village in advance of the host city decision. Te idea was to convert the land to housing in the post-Games period and to recoup the initial purchase cost. But, with an economic recession of 2008 coming on the heels of the failed bid efort, post- bid development of the Olympic Village site proved complicated, and Chicago now faces interest payments on what was already an expensive purchase. Beyond land politics, the City of Chicago also negotiated expensive and lengthy union contracts to ensure labor peace during the Games (Bergen and St. Clair 2016). Tese union contracts limited the city’s ability to reduce labor costs during the subsequent lean years of the recession. Other initiatives of the bid such as a youth sports organization funded by the bid—World Sport Chicago—can be read more positively. Leopkey and Parent (2012, pp. 937–938) refer to this initiative as a “living legacy” that admirably “continues to help support and promote Olympic and Paralympic sport among the youth of the city despite the fact they were not awarded the Games.” But it should be noted that this legacy group has struggled to meet delivery targets serving only a frac- tion of 10,000 youths it was designed to accommodate (Bergen and St. Clair 2016). Another efort, Te 2016 Olympics Fund for Chicago Neighborhoods, was generated from the philanthropic commitment of a number of the city’s foundations (i.e., MacArthur Foundation, Te Chicago Community Trust, McCormick Tribune Foundation, Polk Bros. Foundation, Te Boeing Company, Wiebold Foundation, Joyce Foundation). Te fund was designed to assist those neighborhoods located near the proposed Olympics venues to take advantage of the projected economic activity generated by Olympics through job training and business development initiatives. Despite missing out on the Olympics, the legacy of this fund continues to spawn praise: “Te 96 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

2016 Fund for Chicago Neighborhoods used $2 million left over from the bid to attract $18 million in federal matching funds to help the unemployed in hard-hit communities such as Englewood, Lawndale, Washington Park and Woodlawn (in-kind contributions total another $2 million” (Pletz 2010, para 2). Borrowing Bennett and colleagues’ (2013, p. 369) phrase, we fnd that both New York’s 2012 bid and Chicago’s 2016 arrive at a similar “decision-making cul-de-sac” in the sense that both bids resulted in foreclosure of public debate. Notwithstanding the fact that New York City’s plan for a West Side Stadium generated considerable public resistance, the end result was the implementation of an urban policy agenda that adheres to a neoliberal competitive city logic that alters the terms and tenure of political debate.

Istanbul 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2020

In his investigation of the prospects of a Muslim city hosting the Olympics, Kasim Randeree (2011) suggests that Istanbul, Turkey likely represents the most promising option for the IOC. With fve failed attempts to land the Games (2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2020), Istanbul’s record of failure is certainly remarkable. While a few other cities can match Istanbul’s number of bids, the condensed period of time that frames Istanbul’s fve eforts is unique. Not unlike New York City’s interest in using an Olympic bid to trigger real estate development, Istanbul’s dedication is linked to the desire of the national housing authority (TOKI) to remake Turkey’s built environment. Te politics of housing, and in particular the construction of a new suburban residen- tial district has fgured prominently in the series of bids emerging from Istanbul. As the following paragraphs illustrate, what makes Istanbul’s bids diferent from New York City’s efort (and those emerging from other North American and European bids) is the degree of national state involvement. Istanbul frst explored the idea of hosting the Olympic Games during the mid-1930s when French planner Henri Prost supervised the city’s planning, but the frst ofcial Olympic bid did not emerge until 5 Post-bid Legacies? 97 the end of the last millennium (Bilsel and Zelef 2011). Coinciding with the city’s rapid population growth and the new “economic potential and power” of the Turkish state (Polo 2015, p. 11), the bids showed that the city did not sufer from a poverty of ambition. While not deny- ing the infuence of a growing neoliberal reordering of Turkey’s urban environment, Pentilfallo (2010) argues that it is difcult to summarize Istanbul’s motivations for hosting the Olympics as a manifestation of urban entrepreneurialism akin to bids made by democratic Western cities like New York and Chicago. Focusing on Istanbul’s 2008 bid specifcally, Pentifllo suggests that it is more appropriate to view the efort as refecting a complex mix of internationalist impulses as well as global city aspirations, or what she refers to as a hybridized bid. Pentifllo (2010, p. 385) also questions whether Istanbul’s high frequency bidding approach may be part of a larger mega-event strategy, such as “springboarding” (this volume, Chap. 6) where uncompetitive bids are supported as “a means of fur- thering their chances to host later.” Pentifllo’s assessment echoes that of Tomlinson (2010) who reminds us that we need to be careful not to over-apply the “city-based perspective” (p. 140)—especially when examining bids that emerge from developing, and/or authoritarian countries. As illustrated in Chap. 2, cities employ diferent bid logics and sometimes “[c]ountries are prepared to pay more for prestige than cities are prepared to risk for profts,” and consequently, the logic of Olympic bids frequently shift scales (Tomlinson 2010, p. 149). Tree factors help to clarify the unique legacy of bidding in Istanbul:

European Union Ambitions

For Jean-François Polo (2012), Turkey’s interest in sport development cannot be divorced from its bid for European Union membership. Since the IOC requires that bid cities outline their suitability across a host of metrics, Turkey has used it bids “to achieve the European recognition that European politics refuses to grant it” (Polo 2012, p. 77). Even though Istanbul’s early eforts exposed a lack of hosting experience and inadequate sports infrastructure, they were a means to articulate 98 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

Istanbul’s (and Turkey’s) profle and prestige and its growing economic power (Polo 2015). Te bids also became an important planning tool in the ongoing redevelopment of the city with the development of urban infrastructure and an increased stock of sport facilities “considered piv- otal by the municipality” (Bilsel and Zelef 2011, p. 627). Meanwhile, subsequent bids were also designed to highlight the youthfulness of Turkey and bidding eforts were a “means of building national sporting infrastructure” (Polo 2012, p. 78). In many respects, the bids have served to indicate the increasing “accessibility” of Istanbul and Turkey, both in terms of infrastructure development and cross-cultural identity formation, while highlighting the distinctiveness of a city and country that straddles both the East and the West. As noted in Chap. 2, Istanbul’s 2020 bid encouraged the IOC to imagine the benefts that would result from hosting the Games in a secular Muslim democracy, claiming that “[s]taging the Games in Turkey will deliver a timely and powerful catalyst to improve global understanding, inclusiveness and harmony” (Istanbul 2020 2013, p. 20). Although Turkey’s use of sports diplomacy has not resulted in being selected by the IOC, or EU membership, it has infuenced urban policymaking.

Turkish Law no. 3796

Like many bid cities, Istanbul’s bids have been guided by a public–private institution. What makes Istanbul’s situation diferent is the power and funding provisions assigned to the Olympic Games Preparation and Organisation Council in the national budget. Te enactment of a national Turkish Olympic Law (No. 3796) in 1992 has resulted in the channeling of a percentage of Turkish lottery profts, horse-rac- ing receipts, the Greater Istanbul Municipality budget, among other sources, to developing Olympic sports and bidding for the games (Alkan 2004). Te law designates the National Olympic Committee, central government, and Greater Municipality of Istanbul as the main parties of the bid process, but intriguingly compels Istanbul to bid for the Olympic Games until it is successful. It is an extraordinary piece of legislation that essentially gives Turkey a permanent Istanbul Olympic 5 Post-bid Legacies? 99

Bid Committee (IOBC) (Polo 2015). Te law extends power to the IOBC as it provides “exemption from taxes on all income and expenses and instructs all public and government institutions, directorates and municipalities to prioritize any IOBC requests related to Olympic preparation and organization.” (Alkan 2004, p. 58). In Alkan’s (2004) estimation, it is an arrangement that is deeply fawed for two reasons. First, he notes that the IOBC has been granted too much authority in determining the future of Istanbul having been “empowered to make demands from all kinds of public institutions without having to consult them” (p. 59). Te second point of contention that Alkan raises is the stipulation “by law to build all necessary Olympic infrastructure before Istanbul is awarded the Games” (Alkan 2004, p. 59). Te end result he argues is that “Turkish Olympic Law takes the already non-democratic structure of the Olympic Bidding process to a higher level by institu- tionalizing the Bidding Committee’s unaccountability to the residents, neighborhood organizations, municipalities and service providers of Istanbul for decisions afecting the future of the city” (Alkan 2004, p. 59).

Istanbul’s Master Plan

Te implications of the Turkish Olympic Law and the power of IOBC are represented by the very presence of the Atatürk Olympic Stadium. It might seem odd to have an Olympic stadium in a city that has never hosted the Olympics, but the stadium was built partly as a response to IOC’s criticism of Istanbul’s lack of preparedness during the city’s 2000 bid efort. Completed in 2002 and located 20 km from the city center on state-owned land, the 80,000 person stadium has been criticized for being developed in isolation, and for failing to adhere to development strategy that could be identifed within the framework of a master plan (Bilsel and Zelef 2011). At the same time, the completion of signature projects such as the stadium and other supporting infrastructure projects (e.g., transportation investments) when put in the context of serial bidding, means that Istanbul can legitimately claim a commitment to “overall national and municipal infrastructure enhancement in each 100 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann successive bid book” (Adebe el al. 2014, p. 55). Te venues that have been built in preparation for the Olympics have allowed Istanbul to host a number of other international sports events (e.g., 2010 World Basketball Cup 2020 UEFA Championship). For Adebe et al. (2014, p. 59), “Istanbul has used the Olympic process not only to create a unifed development vision for the city but also to achieve that vision.” Twenty years removed from being told that Istanbul 2000 bid lacked the adequate infrastructure to support the Olympics Games, Istanbul’s 2020 bid was complimented by the IOC’s 2020 Evaluation Commission who noted that the bid’s legacy planning was “well thought out and fully aligned with long-term government strategies” (Istanbul 2020 2013, p. 10). Istanbul’s 2020 bid chief, Hasan Arat, nicely captured the apparent transformation: “Tis time Turkey is serious about hosting the Games, this time we are ready. Turkey bid four times as an emerging nation, this time Turkey is bidding as an emerged nation” (Arat quoted in Riach 2013, para 4). And yet, the 2020 bid was tarnished by a series of regional and domestic political issues and by a massive $19.2 billion infrastructure budget. Looking beyond the selection process, it is difcult to ignore the mounting criticism extended toward those urban projects that have been declared Olympic related in Istanbul’s bid eforts. Te reconfguration of Istanbul’s urban space in the “New Turkey” has become deeply controversial. Te international ambitions of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the political agenda of the ruling Development and Justice Party AKP have been the targets of increased scrutiny, with many commentators suggesting that grand ambitions like the 2020 Olympics, Turkey’s 2023 Vision, and an assortment of other infrastructural mega- projects are the result of a “a specifc liaison of neoliberalism, author- itarianism and political Islam” that is leading to divisive development (Mehmet 2015, p. 153). Government-sponsored construction projects (airports, tunnels, bridges) designed to make Istanbul a global city have become the subjects of political protest. Te rise of anti-Erdogan sentiment along with claims that the “Turkish State [is] exhibiting Ottoman tendencies rather than European aspirations” have revealed deepening internal divisions about Turkey’s political direction (Lovering and Türkmen 2011, p. 84). For many, the Erdoğan government exemplifes 5 Post-bid Legacies? 101 state interventionism and state entrepreneurialism with imposed alterations leading to fragmented urban planning and haphazard growth that threatens Istanbul’s fragile ecology and often results in massive evictions of poor people (Tasan-Kok 2015). Commentators are also keen to point out that Istanbul continues to perform poorly in measures of human and social capital among other indicators of social development and that the country’s provision of democratic rights is lagging (Yigitcanlar and Bulu 2015). Istanbul’s 2020 bid slogan “Bridge Together” was both a play on the city’s geographic location and historic link between two continents, civilizations, faiths, and cultures. Drawing on the Olympic values of friendship, excellence, and respect, Istanbul’s 2024 bid promoted a “New Turkey” with its youthful audience and sizable market to the Olympic brand and to the rest of the world. For a large number of people, however, the 2024 bid was anything but a unifying force, reveal- ing a polarized Turkey and an urban planning agenda that not only remains jurisdictionally blurred, but one that continues to propose projects that pose signifcant threats to Istanbul’s urban environment and heritage, while magnifying the challenges of the city and country’s diverse social groups. Te implications of Istanbul hosting the Olympics were reported by Boycott Istanbul 2020, a coalition of activists, architects, and planners who scrutinized the claims of Istanbul’s candidature fle and exposed how the Olympics were being used as a tool to advance mega transportation projects that were not only inconsistent with the principles of the Olympics (sustainability, environmentally sound) but failed to encompass even the most basic considerations of environmental and social impact. Tis “anti-bid” movement (this volume, Chap. 7) also drew attention to the government’s systematic repression of the media and its willingness to use violence to extinguish protests. Te eighteen-page report emphatically stated that Olympics were an excuse to develop without constraint, and claimed that if Istanbul were selected to host, a legacy of increased displacement, disenfranchisement, inse- curity, and unsustainable development would be the result (Boycott Istanbul 2020 2013). Te tensions of a hybridized bid are not easily reconciled. When the politics of local development become wrapped up in a national agenda 102 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann and vice versa, striking a balance between lofty desires and more prosaic considerations is difcult to achieve. Every time that a mega project is initiated, there is a risk that what is being replaced is more valuable than what is being built. Te Olympic bids emerging from Istanbul have privileged a form of state-initiated urban transformation that has not only altered the city’s competitive outlook, but also threatens its social integrity. Te ongoing desire to attract foreign investment and convey an international orientation has resulted in the construction of new consumptive spaces that while potentially aiding economic growth, risk deepening the divide among Istanbul’s citizenry.

Conclusion

We began this chapter noting that the IOC’s selection of a host city brings an end to the formal bidding cycle. However, given that the IOC is now encouraging bid cities to align Olympic plans with urban development plans, the implications of being told “not this time” now has the potential to reverberate in a variety of new manners. Te three case examples explored in this chapter illustrate that the Olympic symbol continues to be a powerful symbol whose production and framing is not a politically neutral exercise. Borrowing the words of Walter Lippmann (1977 [1922]), we fnd that the Olympic symbol, like many important public symbols, can be “both a mechanism of solidarity, and mechanism of exploitation” (p. 151). It is now well understood that the transformations to urban space caused by hosting the Olympic Games have often resulted in a process of public disenfranchisement and of increased privatization of decision-making. Te case studies selected in this chapter serve to illustrate that the bidding process can be similarly charged, with the capacity to mask/empower specifc interests. By mobilizing narratives of the future and laying the groundwork to make development possible during the bidding process, unsuccessful bids remain critical agents of change in the shaping of urban space, politics, and policymaking in the post-bid period. 5 Post-bid Legacies? 103

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Abstract Tis chapter theorizes three “rescaling” strategies that occur when a city “fails” to succeed during mega-event bidding: (1) political rescaling; (2) event rescaling; and (3) bid rescaling. Employing the use of three case examples, this chapter illustrates how the bidding processes in Toronto, Manchester and Paris necessitate rethinking how bids for the Olympic Games can shift the logic of public and private governance in a city/region and become handmaidens to the interests of the state in the restructuring of a city’s mode of governance. Te wider impacts that bidding can have on democratic processes and urban politics in the post-bid period is the critical subject matter of this chapter.

Keywords Governance restructuring · Sport portfolios · Bid models Multi-scalar collaboration · Public disenfranchisement

As outlined in the previous chapters, the proliferation of repeat, “high frequency” bidding has illustrated the continued desire by cities to

Tis chapter was written with the assistance of Lewis Bellas.

© Te Author(s) 2017 107 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann, Failed Olympic Bids and the Transformation of Urban Space, Mega Event Planning, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59823-3_6 108 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann leverage the potential of the Olympic Games. Te bidding process can signifcantly infuence the logic and transformation of bidding cities. We have argued that there is the need to recalibrate attitudes regarding the nuances of Olympic bidding, framing the bid phase as part of relational process, rather than perceiving it as a temporary entity singularly committed to securing the right to host the Olympic Games. Tis chapter shifts the discussion to the various “rescaling” strategies that occur when a city is unable to secure the right to host the Olympic Games. We have already explored how plans and projects are recycled across bids (Chap. 4). In this chapter, we seek to add to the discussion by illustrating how three forms of “rescaling” contribute to the transformation of bid cities in the post-bid period: political rescaling involves a renego- tiation of leadership in bidding coalitions, event rescaling involves shifting focus away from Olympics to smaller mega-events, and bid rescaling involves increasing the scale and scope of a bid plan to make it more competitive. It is important to acknowledge that these forms of rescaling are not by distinction separate theoretical entities but often trans- duce spatially through intertwined processes and interconnected forms.

Rescaling

Political Rescaling

“Political rescaling” can be observed through a multitude of diferent lenses. First, upon failure, the nature of bid partnerships are often systematically recalibrated through a range of dynamic public–private logics. Bid formations often transform and shift between public–private, public–public, and fully private bid formations. Often these formations are shaped by the degree of “democratic” legitimacy and fnancing that a bid team is able to muster, and at times public involvement is actually cloaked with the “expert” capacity of private sector involvement. As will be shown in the Toronto case example below, it is becoming more common for bids to be led by an “institutionalized multi-scalar collaboration” (Horak 2013, p. 321; Bellas and Oliver 2016). A second 6 Post-bid Rescaling 109 example of political rescaling in the post-failure aftermath can see a recalibration of democratic and public commitment to the bid process, regardless of public or private involvement. Bid committees often in the aftermath of failure and racked with “bid fatigue” apply the logic of “why bother” seeking democratic legitimacy or public support when they may not even win the right to host the games (Bellas and Oliver 2016). Te mantra of “win the bid and ask questions later” dominates such narratives. Trough harnessing the political fexibility of “what matters is what works” (Raco 2013, p. 39), consensus is often produced or inferred throughout bid processes without being contested or legiti- mated (Raco 2014). Tis consensus can also extend toward facilitating and nurturing wider regimes of governance restructuring. A regime of high frequency bidding can transform or facilitate wider economic and social restructuring of cities by harnessing the planning scale and entrepreneurial imagery of the Olympic model to reconfgure urban space.

Event Rescaling

“Event rescaling” emerges when those cities that are denied Olympic hosting contracts shift their attention to other “second order” or lower order sporting events, either to alter ambitions or as a strategic ploy to maintain wider bidding regimes (Black 2008, 2016). Cities seek to host less prestigious events in order to gain hosting experience which can then be leveraged in a subsequent Olympic bid. Most vividly, following Rio de Janeiro’s failure to secure the 2004 Olympic Games, attention shifted to the 2007 Pan American Games in order to catapult both Rio and Brazil to FIFA World Cup (2014) and Olympic (2016) success (Black 2008). While second and lower order events demonstrate both similarities and disparities with frst-order events, what is critical to understand is how “high frequency bidders” (this volume, Chap. 4) often seek to leverage a “Portfolio of Events” (Chalip 2014) as part of a wider relational process (Black 2016). For example, ofcials in Mexico vowed to mount an Olympic bid after hosting the 2011 Pan American Games in Guadalajara, but following an unsuccessful attempt to land the 2018 Summer Youth Olympics, the ambition was deferred. 110 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

Meanwhile, the winner of the 2018 Summer Youth Olympics, Buenos Aires, Argentina has indicated that it might use the event as spring- board for a 2028 or 2032 Olympic bid. Other prominent cities adopt- ing this “event rescaling” strategy include the cities of Delhi (Baviskar 2014), Manchester (Cochrane et al. 1996, 2002), and Toronto (Bellas and Oliver 2016) as well as various cities in South Africa (Hiller 2000). It is important to note how the processes of event rescaling often result in cities and bid committees systematically shifting focus from securing an event to then seeking to bid and secure the next one. Tis can often interfere with the dual processes of critical accountability (Black 2008) and cross/inter-bid learning (Lauermann 2014).

Bid Rescaling

Bid rescaling is seen when failed bidders “ante-up,” as the size, scope, and scale of bidding commitments escalate within the context of increased bid complexity and inter-urban competition to host the Olympic Games (Gafney 2013). Te escalation of modern Olympic bidding is captured succinctly within the post-bid aftermath, as cities “raise the stakes” (Gold and Gold 2007, p. 6) as they compete for a highly speculative prize (Jessop and Sum 2000). As Cochrane et al. (2002, pp. 106–107) summarize:

Cities are consequently induced to engage in Olympic boosterism, to pledge higher and higher levels of local fnancial support, servicing and infrastructure provision, to trade concessions with the IOC (for example, concerning TV rights, merchandising or promises of subsidised places to athletes, and ofcials from poorer countries), and to lavish more and more generous gifts on junketing IOC delegates, simply in order to stay in the Olympic competition.

While some of these forms of bid rescaling have been curtailed by new IOC regulations, bid cities continue to make lofty promises. One of the potential impacts of the recently implemented Agenda 2020 reforms is to see the natural competitive ethos of modern Olympic bidding 6 Post-bid Rescaling 111 constrained in order to manage the contradictions between non-democratic and democratic bidders. Yet, the proliferation of non-democratic nations harnessing their competitive advantages, particularly in regards to economic resources and political hegemony, means that lavish mega- event plans proposing dramatic alterations to urban and regional land- scapes are still being produced and rewarded (examples include Beijing 2008, Sochi 2014, Russia 2018 (FIFA World Cup) and Qatar 2022 (FIFA World Cup)). What follows are three key case examples that illustrate the various forms of rescaling evident in the bid cities of Toronto, Manchester, and Paris. While these cities demonstrate wider implications of Olympic bidding practice, it is important to recognize that each is set within its own specifc local and national contexts.

Toronto

After a series of failed Olympic bids (most recently 1996 and 2008), Toronto rescaled its ambitions to second-order events such as the 2015 Pan American Games and the 2015 World Exposition (Bellas and Oliver, 2016; Oliver 2011, 2014, 2017). However, unlike the earlier privately driven (yet publically funded) Olympic eforts, the bid model adopted for the 2015 Pan American Games was a public model, mani- fested through the Province of Ontario’s interest and investment (Bellas and Oliver 2016). By taking charge of the Pan American Games, the Province of Ontario was not only exercising its constitutional authority, but its willingness to engage in task-specifc rescaling. As Horak (2013, p. 315) explains, task-specifc rescaling “involves shifts in the scalar exercise of authority that address individual policy problems without a wholesale institutionalized transfer of jurisdiction.” Unlike, jurisdictional rescaling, task-specifc rescaling “involves a sharing, rather than a transfer of governing authority” (Horak 2013, p. 315). Te beneft of this approach is that it “can allow for a mobilization of resources and authority that may be difcult or impossible to achieve at one scale alone” (Horak 2013, p. 325). Te drawback, as Horak (2013, p. 325) cogently explains, is that “they are typically only weakly 112 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann institutionalized (if at all), and because they involve the simultaneous exercise of authority at multiple governing scales, they require a sustained multi-scalar alignment of governing priorities.” Te constitutional and jurisdictional power of municipal governments in Canada is limited and as a result bidding for large-scale sporting events necessitates the support of senior levels of government. Toronto’s 1996 Olympic bid efort is often remembered for the criticism generated by a local activist group called Bread Not Circuses, and for having exposed the “divergent ambitions” of the public and private sectors in the city (Kidd 1992, p. 155). Te apparent rift between the bid team and the city’s left-leaning city council centered on the question of whether or not it was prudent to be exposing public sector money to the desires of fnance capital and real estate development interests when the city was struggling to provide afordable housing and other public services to its constituents (Kidd 1992; Lenskyj 1992; Olds 1996; Oliver 2014; Rutheiser 1996). Te 1996 bid team was also accused of ignoring the concerns of the local community, and focusing too much efort on trying to secure votes of IOC members. Te absence of a bid vision that balanced economic growth objectives with social and human capital needs prompted Toronto’s liberal-minded urban political class (and left-leaning city council) to demand that the bid team accept the terms of a “Toronto Olympic Commitment” (Kidd 1992; Olds 1996; Oliver 2011). As Kidd (1992) explains, the Toronto Olympic Commitment sought to ensure that the Games project did not aban- don socially democratic values (i.e., afordable housing, gender equity, afordable recreation for all). Te emergence of the Toronto Olympic Commitment was a tes- tament to the strength of Toronto’s political economy during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the public debates that characterized Toronto’s 1996 bid efort confrmed the city’s “fondness for contestation and argument” (Kidd 1992, p. 155) while illustrating the power residing in “a well-entrenched middle class that had grown accustomed to participating in discussions that might afect their local geographies…” (Oliver 2017, pp. 3–4). Te selection of a popular former mayor who was known for ability to build consensus to lead Toronto’s 2008 bid efort illustrates that the need to difuse local political tension was a 6 Post-bid Rescaling 113 lesson that had been gained for the 1996 efort. Nevertheless, the public–private model of the 2008 bid ultimately entrusted a private entity, TO-Bid, to build the candidature fle (Oliver 2011). In addition, the Province of Ontario, while supportive, made it clear that the City of Toronto should not attempt to use the Olympics as a means to acquire costly capital projects that were only marginally related to the bid. Te “struggle to ensure that the Olympics did not over-expose Toronto’s tax- paying public led to the formation of an agreement with the Ontario government to hold the latter responsible for cost overruns” (Oliver 2011, pp. 781). Te end result Oliver (2017) concludes, was that Toronto’s 2008 bid books were produced by a process that incorporated very little community consultation, and adhered to whims of a public–private governance model that “partitioned power in a manner that privileged private actors (i.e., TO-Bid), catered to the demands of non-state actors (i.e., International Olympic Committee, Canadian Olympic Committee) and relied on guarantees that could only be provided senior levels of government” (p. 5). Te 2008 bid was further depoliticized by an imposed amalgamation of upper-tier Metro Toronto and the city’s six lower-tier municipalities, which smoothed the city’s political fault lines. Te amalgamation process has been summarized as “a response to a number of political and ideological issues, including a desire to subur- banize Toronto politics, reduce the scope of government in social service provision, and to make the city government more responsive to business infuence” (Joy and Vogel 2015, p. 40). Or as Keil and Boudreau (2005, p. 51) explain, amalgamation was a municipal restructuring instrument used to erode the “liberal-progressive political regime that had existed in the downtown core” thereby opening a political space for new actors to assert the combined logic of both rollout and rollback neoliberalism. In Kipfer and Keil’s (2002) estimation, Toronto’s 2008 bid contributed to a process that was removing politics from the city’s planning process. One of the legacies of Toronto’s 2008 Olympic bid was the establishment of a waterfront redevelopment agency that was supported by a tripartite agreement between the City of Toronto, the Province of Ontario, and the federal government to invest more than a billion dollars in waterfront development (Oliver 2011, 2014). However, there 114 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann has been an ongoing struggle to have this tri-level policy coordination equate to something more than piecemeal revitalization (Bellas and Oliver 2016; Eidelman 2013; Horak 2013). In many respects, the 2008 bid did generate a serious conversation about waterfront development in Toronto. What the bid lacked was a compelling vision and commitment to create an Olympic concept that was premised on something more than an opportunity to redevelop the city’s waterfront (Oliver 2011). For example, the rather tenuous commitment to sport investment was questioned by members of the IOC and served to weaken Toronto’s package (Oliver 2014; Pitre et al. 2005). Also evident, was the continuing reluctance of various government partners to make funding commitments during the bidding process that they would be responsible for should Toronto fail to be chosen as host (Oliver 2014). After two Olympic failures, Toronto engaged in “event rescaling” as attention was shifted to a smaller order event, the 2015 Pan American Games. Intriguingly, the managerial model of the 2015 Pan American Games deviated from the public–private confgurations of the 1996 and 2008 Olympic bids, as the bid was funded and led by the provin- cial government (Bellas and Oliver 2016). Although the Province of Ontario’s desire to use the 2015 Pan American Games to create a powerful sport legacy in Southern Ontario and to fulfll a commitment to developing Toronto’s waterfront, was consistent with the vision of the Olympic bids, the provincially led bid team operated as if their public management of the bid automatically conferred local democratic integrity and support (Bellas and Oliver 2016). Te result was a heavy focus on facility and games management questions but very little attention was steered toward public outreach and engagement and long-term social equity planning. In addition, the involvement of the Province of Ontario also meant that regional politics fgured prominently in the bid and resulted in venues being distributed or renovated across a number of communities to avoid casting the impression that Toronto was being unduly privileged. As such, the 2015 Pan American Games refected a particular blend of political, event, and bid rescaling that led to a task- oriented multi-scalar collaboration that got the job done, but at some risk (Horak 2013, p. 321). Specifcally, there is the real possibility that the rescaling efort that made the 2015 Pan American Games project 6 Post-bid Rescaling 115 possible, will now upset not only the city’s “long-range policy goals” (i.e., waterfront development), but also “the manner in which those goals are pursued” (Bellas and Oliver 2016, p. 12). Te partitioning of power evident during the 2015 Pan American Games is just one example of the detrimental efects of state rescaling to local democracy (Bellas and Oliver 2016; Oliver 2017).

Manchester

Manchester in the late 1960–1980s was a city sufering the efects of large-scale economic restructuring through deindustrialization and demunicipalization. In particular, Deas and Ward (2002, p. 119) have defned the decade of the 1980s as one of “metropolitan deconstruc- tion” that left “a tangled web of task-specifc, locally-focused and loosely co-ordinated agencies.” In the following decades, a series of new “developments imbued Mancunian Metropolitanism with a renewed impetus” (Deas and Ward 2002, p. 119) and transformed the city through the model of the New Urban Politics based on neoliberal post-industrial entrepreneurialism, focused strategies of city-center and urban regeneration and rebranding, and the utilization of public–private partnerships in order to remake Manchester as a “go getting” competitive city of pro-business and consumer culture. Trough this period, Manchester discursively dropped its slogan that made a rhetorical commitment to “Defending jobs, improving services” and somewhat reluctantly embraced the politics of trickle down “Making it happen” (Cochrane et al. 2002, p. 102). For Cochrane et al. (2002), it was Manchester’s pursuit of mega- event development and particularly the prospect of staging the Olympic Games that best illustrates the “dramatic shift in the means and ends of urban politics” (p. 95) in the city. Manchester sought to secure the Olympic prize three times; in 1992, where the city lost the national candidacy race to the city of Birmingham; in 1996, when the bid reached the international phase but lost to Atlanta; and in 2000 when the city failed where Sydney succeeded. Tese three bids, along with the awarding of 2002 Commonwealth Games to the city, were critical to 116 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann the “transformation of decision making structures and governance systems… what key “players” in the city would refer to as the olympic process” (Cochrane et al. 2002, p. 95). Two observations help to explain the signifcance of the Olympic process to the redevelopment and redefning of Manchester. First, Manchester beneftted through mobilizing and nurturing escalating political and elite buy-in at both the local and national scale for the Olympic project. When Birmingham’s 1992 Olympic bid failed at the IOC’s selection phase, fnishing ffth with only a handful of votes, the rationale provided for the poor showing was that Birmingham’s bid committee had been overly compromised of local actors. Unable to muster political engagement and support from the national government for another attempt, Birmingham was replaced by Manchester which aggressively advertised its economic motives and the desire to combine sport development and urban regeneration. Drawing attention to Manchester’s increased private sector leadership, the rise of powerful Urban Development Corporations, and the promotion of a vision of a Los Angeles style “private enterprise Games” (Hill 1992), Manchester’s bid promoters pitched their bid as an investment platform. As Law (1994) summarizes, “Manchester was clever to stress that the bid was an exercise in urban regeneration and that for a small investment now, Olympic gold would be obtained to pay for further regeneration” (p. 225). Tis approach allowed for the assemblage of elite “movers and shakers” in coordination with local city bureaucrats and councilors to “energize a tired and complacent local policy,” while simultaneously attracting support from the national government (Cochrane et al. 2002, p. 101). Te convergence of interests refected the emerging sentiment in UK politics that the public sector needed to be more entrepreneurial and that the private sector could be valuable partners as cities embraced the notion that they needed to sell themselves internationally (Cook and Ward 2011). Manchester’s bid for the millennium games was particularly impactful not simply because it resulted in the provision of extra funds from the government that went toward the purchase of land and the construction of new facilities (National Cycling Centre, arena at Victoria Station), but because it “forced the leaders of Manchester to think about the future of the city” (Law 1994, p. 229). 6 Post-bid Rescaling 117

More specifcally, the bid helped usher in a shift in attitude among city council toward entrepreneurial development and aided “city leaders to identify their development goals, work together in public-private partnerships and become more pro-active” (Law 1994, p. 230). Or as Cochrane et al. (2002) conclude: “Te partnership process that the Olympics so clearly symbolized has led to a major reimagining of local governance. As subsequent experience has confrmed, this approach to entrepreneurial urban governance has efectively been normalized in Manchester” (p. 115). Second, with the reorientation of urban governance, the Olympic bidding regime both oversaw and catalyzed a systematic recalibration and ‘blurring’ of the roles of the public and private sectors. Te Olympic bids represented a radical shift in local politics (Cochrane et al. 1996, 2002; Hill 1994). Tis second observation of the implications of Olympic process in Manchester is more obvious when we consider how “rhetorics of regeneration” (Cochrane et al. 2002, p. 108) were accompanied by a decade long “state of exception” that saw the city glide from bid to bid not only without opportunity for critical engagement with the general bidding ethos, but a silencing of ‘dissensus’ or ‘antagonism’ in favor of a consensual mode of politics (Boykof 2013, 2014; Moufe 2000; Rancière 2004; Swyngedouw 2009, 2011; Wilson and Swyngedouw 2014). While claiming to be seeking to leverage “new money” from the central government, the bid teams were actually looking to “lever money raised by the public sector into the private sector” (Cochrane et al. 2002, p. 113). Te alterations to local governance supported by political rescaling were further entrenched by considerable event rescaling. For example, failed attempts to land the Olympic Games did not deter Manchester from seeking other events such as the City of Drama 1994 (part of the British Arts Council’s Arts 2000), the Global Forum 1994 (a follow-up to the Rio Earth Summit), and most signifcantly the 2002 Commonwealth Games (Law 1994). For Deas and Ward (2002), we can read all of these initiatives as being wrapped up in the logic espoused by an Olympic process “which was held to have raised the city’s profle, to have facilitated the development of new institutional alliances and to have reinforced the boosterish orientation of economic 118 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann development policy” (p. 127). Te pursuit and staging of all of these events served to solidify the entrepreneurial logic taking root across the city (Cochrane et al. 1996; Peck and Ward 2002; Quilley 1999) and elsewhere (e.g., see Raco’s (2012) evaluation of London 2012 Olympic bid). Troughout the Olympic process, the interests of the public and private sectors became entwined. As such, far from being an overtly conspicuous transformation, the alterations to local politics in Manchester can be symbolized much more discursively as a process of “manufacturing consent” (Cochrane et al. 2002; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Lenskyj 2000, 2012), where private elites now “operate in a wider system of regulatory capitalism in which states and major corporations act in each other’s interests” (Raco 2012, p. 458). Raco (2012) claims that what emerges is a logic of management through “a ‘government of shepherds’ [local politicians transferring power and capital to private actors] focused on ‘resolving the problem [i.e., arresting Manchester’s economic decline and reorienting urban entrepreneurial governance posited through Olympic bids] but at the cost of eliminating politics” (p. 458).

Paris

Paris has already hosted the Olympics twice (1900, 1924) but has been seeking to add a third occasion for the last couple of decades. After narrowly losing the 1992 Games to Barcelona, Paris submitted bids for the 2008, 2012, and 2024 editions of the Games. Te city is no stranger to entertaining international or European championships having hosted more than 40 events since the beginning of the millennium (it also hosted the World Cup fnals in 1998). Paris’s sustained Olympic efort has exposed key spatial relationships, as the three failed bids articulated diferent spatial plans. As Strohmayer (2013) identifes, Parisian bid ofcials have had to negotiate how to physically integrate Olympic infrastructure into a crowded metropolis while simultaneously considering the potential planning implications that might result from building in the urban center versus the suburbs. Te partial fulfllment of bid promises also means that new bids are forced to target new sites 6 Post-bid Rescaling 119 to locate Olympic infrastructure. For example, the proposed site for the Olympic Village in the 2012’s bid (Les Batignolles in northwest Paris), was converted into an urban park (Parc Martin Luther King) and is slowly being transformed into a new urban neighborhood, augmented by the French government’s decision to locate the new “Palais de la Justice” on the site. Paris’s bids refect the struggle to develop a coherent political structure and governance strategy for the Ile-de-France region. Often referred to colloquially as “mille feuille” (in reference to the multiple thin layers of pastry that often characterize French cuisine), governance in France is fraught with tension and partisanship as layers of local public administration have gained autonomy (Enright 2013, 2016). In the capital region, institutional accretion further complicates the relations among communities located beyond the périphérique—the motorway that rings the capital city and separates the suburbs from the center. Hampered by political leadership espousing divergent ideologies—confict between “red belt” and more right-wing municipalities—attempts at intermunicipal cooperation are routinely frustrated (Albecker and Fol 2014). Although decentralization reforms during the 1980s gave local municipalities increased autonomy, they also stimulated an intensifca- tion of territorial competition, as communities pursued entrepreneurial urban agendas that often centered around “projects” as a means to govern (Savini 2012). In addition, the long-standing desire to challenge London as the predominant metropolis in the European Union means that Paris remains rooted to the politics of metropolization (Ancien 2005). Te already combustible mix of over-institutionalization of governance and the logic of competition, is further exacerbated by the political divide between the state and region, as well as the socially het- erogeneous composition of the banlieue (Négrier 2005; Savini 2012). At times, localized growth objectives have blurred with regional and national growth agendas. For example, the Stade de France, built for the 1998 World Cup, is cited as having provided a “revelatory barom- eter of shifting urban development strategies and actors in the Parisian basin” (Lewis 2012, p. 320). Te decentralization of planning power across the region made it more likely for local ofcials in Saint-Denis 120 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann to entertain the prospect of having the stadium located in their com- mune. As Lewis (2012) explains, the mayor of Saint-Denis, Patrick Braouezec, saw the stadium as an opportunity to “extract signifcant assistance from the state” (p. 326) and “as a way to force the national government to “nudge” eforts to attract economic investment to Saint-Denis and nearby communes like Aubervilliers and Saint-Ouen” (p. 326). Te stadium project was accompanied by a sizable investment in public transportation and resulted in the area subsequently becoming a magnet for private real estate investment, with Albecker and Fol (2014) reporting that “some 480 additional companies opened on the territory of Plaine Communes” (p. 89) between 1999 and 2004. At the same time, the French state’s desire to rekindle Paris’s relationship with the Olympic movement and the fact that Paris does not have a surplus of available urban space to locate new Olympic-related facilities, does help to explain the apparent acquiescence to particular suburban demands (Lewis 2012; Strohmayer 2013). So, while it is possible to view the building of the Stade de France as evidence illustrating the “power of suburbs to push back against both the state and Paris,” (Lewis 2012, p. 328) it is equally important to consider how the project can be read as indicative of state-enhanced capitalism. Enright (2016) has illustrated how metropolitan governance restructuring in Paris has been entwined with “grand projects” that serve as mechanisms of consensus and refect a form of state productivism. For example, the emergence of the Grand Pari(s) initiative, the urban development project launched in 2007 by former President Nicoloas Sarkozy to combat what was perceived to be a growing image problem of a capital city struggling with economic stagnation and civic unrest/crisis (witness the French riots of 2005), illustrates that the state remains willing to engage in spatial planning (Enright 2016). According to Hayes (2012, p. 185), the hosting of the World Cup in 1998 allowed France to present a new identity of multi-racial integration to an international audience. It was a feeting moment of perceived harmony that quickly dissipated when Paris’s 2012 bid was rejected by the IOC. As Hayes (2012, p. 185) explains, the IOC’s decision seemed to “confrm the subsequent sense of drift” and “déclinisme” that mani- fested during the early years of the millennium. To be certain, it was a 6 Post-bid Rescaling 121 real crisis for France to have lost the 2012 bid to London, and Hayes (2012) stresses that “the failure of the bid was experienced as a signifcant national political event” (p. 184) magnifed by the fact that Paris lost to London. When combined with French riots of 2005, and the defeat of the French European Constitution referendum in 2005, there was a growing sense that Paris (and France) was reeling. Te Grand Paris initiative emerged as a project to reassert the state’s commitment to urban reform based on strategic investment in the capital region. As Enright (2014) explains: “Grand Paris responds to a political mandate to address French and Parisian identities eroding under globalization and under conditions of postcolonial life, a social mandate to address inequalities between the historic city core and the peripheral suburbs, and an economic mandate to increase regional productivity” (p. 382). President Sarkozy championed administrative reform and a broad program of redevelopment emphasizing a polycentric pattern of innovation hubs connected by a new public transportation infrastructure (e.g., the Grand Paris Express) and supported by new institutions of metropolitan governance (Enright 2013, 2014). Te underlying goal was to address the regional inequalities that exist between the city’s arrondissements and the banlieue, while boosting Paris’s overall economic competitiveness. To facilitate development, a new public development agency, the Société de Grand Paris (SGP), was created. Overseen by three Ministries, the SGP has the power to acquire land and dictate land use, especially as they relate to urban projects linked to Paris’s transportation network and particularly the Grand Paris Express (a ring route around Paris). Although the replacement of Sarkozy with François Hollande in 2012 introduced doubt about the future of the Grand Paris project, the establishment of the Métropole du Grand Paris (Greater Paris Metropolitan Authority) in January 2016 and the frequent reference to the Grand Paris initiative in Paris’s 2024 bid book does indicate that the project continues to have traction. For the purpose of this chapter, it is helpful to recognize that the Stade de France has been used to anchor a regional development vision for both the 2012 and 2024 Olympic bids and that the 2024 candidature fle frequently refers to the “Grand Paris” initiative. 122 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

Put diferently, we fnd that a former project (stadium development for the World Cup), has been leveraged by current projects (Grand Paris/2024 Olympic bid), to communicate the desirability of a future mega project (the 2024 Olympic Games) to help alleviate geographic and social disparity. Te thorough blending of various rescaling strategies is evident in the language ofered in the Paris 2024 promotional material. For instance, Paris’s 2024 bid documents explicitly state that building the Olympic Village in Seine-Saint-Denis can help “bridge the education, health and wealth gaps between central Paris and some of its suburbs” (Paris 2024 2015, p. 15). A careful reading of the 2024 candidature fle reveals that many of the proposed construction projects are designed to connect central Paris to the communities lying beyond the Boulevard Périphérique or serve as new legacy venues (e.g., Aquatics Centre, Media Village, Olympic and Paralympic Village) intended to revitalize suburban neighborhoods. Te bid document also conveys how the Olympics would not only contribute to the city and region’s competitiveness, but would also help unify the city and create a more “inclusive future” (Paris 2024 2015, p. 15). From this perspective, Paris 2024 is presented as a part of larger development strategy designed to rebalance territorial dynamics at the regional scale while serving as a project that illustrates collective support among various political authorities. But the convergence of the bid and the Grand Paris objective also reasserts a political topography based on state planning and policy and through “rescaling the territoriality of the state from a national level to an urban-regional level” (Enright 2012, p. 222). Or, as Ancien (2005) summarizes, despite the devolution of powers, the central state continues to direct local and regional development, in a “neo-statist” fashion.1 While it is too early to tell if the shift toward a more polycentric Paris built on catering to the needs of the global economy can actually be socially and politically accommodating, Enright’s (2012) observation that Grand Paris has worked to depoliticize the city hints of the continued instability of the governing arrangement and power asymmetries in Paris and the Ile-de-France region. Specifcally, Enright (2013) submits that “[w]e must see the project, then, less of a blueprint to be implemented and carried out, but doing work on its own. Tat is, to legitimate the central state, to create an image of Grand Paris where one did 6 Post-bid Rescaling 123 not before exist, to engineer public support for the global city and to provide a theoretical and representational basis for new metropolitan policies” (p. 398). Te same criticisms can be applied to the 2024 Olympic bid. We might also take note of Hayes’s (2012) remark that, if France is truly seeking to use the Olympic Games to “re-balance historical spatial and social inequalities,” then “there are other cities in France that might be more deserving recipients of Olympic investment” (p. 189).

Conclusion

Searle (2008) suggests that it is difcult to imagine how the state could be fully “rolled back” during the Olympic bidding and hosting process given the increasing scale of the event and the competitive nature of the bid process. Te three case examples examined in this chapter lend credence to this observation illustrating that the complex blend of neo-statism and neo-corporatization evident in mobilizing particular bids, requires a careful examination of bid topology (Allen and Cochrane 2014). We concur with Allen and Cochrane’s (2014) observation that “[t]he spatial politics involved on such occasions points to a more active entangled political process; that is, to attempts to mobilize both material and ideological resources drawn in from outside to redefne the ‘local,’ but also in the process redefning how the Games may be conceived” (p. 1615). What we have sought to ofer in this chapter is a means to think about how diferent forms of rescaling have been leveraged to support the “changing political geographies of the state in performing and regulating urban redevelopment” (Ward 2003, p. 117). Of particular concern is how various rescalings have served to erode the distinctions between bids that are governed by public–public or public–private partnerships (Bellas and Oliver 2016). What concerns us is that there appear to be few discrepancies in the modalities of urban governance no matter which bid model is activated. Of particular concern is how the bids in Toronto, Paris, and Manchester have steadily become disjointed from “the realm of contentious democratic politics” (Davidson and Iverson 2015, 546). If bids can emerge in the absence of a meaningful conversation about the implications for long-term social 124 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann equity planning and without a genuine conversation on how the legacies of the games should be defned, then the various forms of rescaling discussed in this chapter have the capacity to contribute to a disconcert- ing form of urban entrepreneurialism built on public disenfranchisement.

Note

1. Broadly summarized, Neo-statism refers to “a transition from state control to regulated competition, where the state guides national strategy rather than plans top-down; it involves public-private partnerships under state guidance, amongst other features” (Ancien 2005, p. 233).

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Abstract Tis chapter evaluates the decline of bidding candidate cities, due to a lack of interest in democratic polities and anti-bid protest campaigns. Protest campaigns are efectively contesting the ‘politics of contingency’ often used by bid boosters—in which the contingent nature of a bid and bid failure is used to pursue projects outside the scope of normal planning procedures. Tey are also capitalizing on a changing political economic relationship between the IOC and bid city governments, as the latter cancel their bids rather than take on the risks and costs expected by the former.

Keywords Politics of contingency · Disruptive debate · Anti-bid campaigns · Urban politics

Introduction

Te Olympic bidding system is in the midst of a profound political transformation. For much of the 1990s and 2000s, the bidding process was structured to encourage inter-urban competition and thereby

© Te Author(s) 2017 129 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann, Failed Olympic Bids and the Transformation of Urban Space, Mega Event Planning, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59823-3_7 130 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann minimize the impact of local politics on the Games product. In fact, one of the architects of the IOC’s contemporary business model went so far as to suggest that the bid process provides a means of circumventing the democratic process:

Te danger, otherwise, is that the local politics get in the way. A city that is one of several on a short list is altogether easier to deal with than the same city once it is confrmed as the next Olympic Host. (Payne 2006, p. 191)

A large critical literature on the urban politics of mega-event planning has confrmed this general process, in which the pressure to out- bid competitor cities takes precedence over participation (see reviews in Andranovich and Burbank 2011; Boykof 2014b; Burbank et al. 2002; Hall 2006; Zimbalist 2015a). But the political transformation described in this chapter is precisely that of local politics getting in the way. Tis transformation is seen in the global growth of “anti-bid” protest campaigns in a number of cities, campaigns which build on deeper tensions in the political economic relationship between host cities and the IOC. Teir efect is seen in the decline in applicants in recent bidding cycles. From 2014 to 2016, anti- bid protest movements successfully blocked bids in nine cities. Tis left the only two candidate cities for the 2022 Winter Games: Almaty, the capital of authoritarian Kazakhstan, and Beijing, a city with a temper- ate climate and minimal winter sports infrastructure. Several widely publicized bid withdrawals in the 2024 Summer Games competition (Boston, Budapest, Hamburg, and Rome) likewise raised existential questions about why so many democratic polities rejected the Games. As a result, this transformation has also seen reforms like the IOC’s Olympic Agenda 2020 strategic plan, which seeks to reframe bidding in a less competitive manner and to lower the overall cost of a bid (IOC 2014). Tis transformation surely refects growing public discontent with negative Olympic legacies (see summaries of these discontents in Boykof 2014b; Perelman 2012; Zimbalist 2015a; Zirin 2014). We argue that it also refects the increasingly proactive strategy of anti-bid 7 Anti-bid Politics 131 activists. Historically, Olympic activism has been relatively reactive: using the Games as a platform for protesting other issues, or respond- ing to the impacts of an Olympic project after that project is already underway. Tis political strategy derives from the ad hoc nature of many anti-Olympic coalitions: what Boykof (2014a, p. 26) terms a “moment of movements” in which pre-existing activist groups rally temporarily around the Olympics. In contrast, contemporary anti-bid activists have adopted a more proactive stance by intervening while bids are still developing. Tese activist movements mobilize early in the planning process; they contest the bid process on issues like accountability, participation, and transparency, while also asking more disruptive questions about whether bids appropriate vehicles for public decision-making. As urban protest campaigns, they mobilize around issues of local concern and focus on normative questions about urban futures and the right to the city. Tis is a form of urban politics which contests a “politics of contingency” used by bidders, a circuitous process in deliberation is avoided during the bid because bid plans are contingent on winning, but then deliberation is displaced after bids win because the bid plans have been contractually agreed upon with the IOC. Anti-bid organizing has two implications for urban politics. First, these movements have disrupted the international bidding system. Tey successfully derailed seven bids in two years, and in the process popularized demands for transparency and participation in Olympic bidding. Second, these movements have been able to intervene in normative debates over the opportunity costs of a mega-event, challenging well-established narratives about legacy and leveraging (this volume, Chap. 1). Tey resist calls to engage in incremental debates over how legacy can be enhanced or how a bid can be leveraged. Tey are, rather, more radically challenging the very notion that cities should pursue the Games at all. Tis chapter provides an overview of Olympic protest movements, and introduces the concept of anti-bid activism. It examines the changing political economic relationship between the IOC and city governments, as the latter hesitate to subsidize the Games either because of pressure by local opposition movements, or because they already have 132 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann plans to leverage bids as part of longer term planning agendas (this volume, Chap. 4). We evaluate the implications of anti-bid politics for the long-term viability of existing mega-event planning models (this volume, Chap. 2); in particular, bid opposition presents challenges for catalyst narratives of urban development. We conclude by diagnosing the underlying discontents which motivate anti-bid politics. Most notably, bid-stage contestation hinges on a politics of contingency in which bid planners have historically exploited the contingency of their projects to circumvent participatory planning procedures.

Protest and the Olympics

Like the Olympics, Olympic protests are often high profle media events. Like bids, they are often ephemeral and thus difcult to com- pare empirically. As a result, anecdotal stories of protest abound but relatively little comparative research exists on Olympic protests (but note studies like Boykof 2014a; Cottrell and Nelson 2011; Lenskyj 2008; Timms 2017). Even less has been written about the form of anti-bid politics which caused a disruption in the 2022 and 2024 host city election cycles. However, Horne and Whannel (2016, Chap. 9) argue that the origins of modern Olympic politics developed between the 1960s and the end of the 1980s based on three trends: “the emergence of boycotts and political theatre” seen in events like American athletes’ display of “black power” salutes at the 1968 Games, or boycotts inspired by Cold War geopolitics and the anti-apartheid movement; “the growth of national and place promotion as a form of reputation politics” in which host governments carefully cultivate (and sometimes repress) political debate in order to present a boosterish façade; and “the growth of the Olympics as an economic investment opportunity, as neoliberalism increasingly became the ‘common sense’ of international political economy,” so that protest of the Olympics often parallels protest of neoliberal urbanism more broadly. Mega-event temporality uniquely infuences the nature of protest: as temporary events, the Olympics create an “opportunity structure” 7 Anti-bid Politics 133 for a variety of actors to gather (Cottrell and Nelson 2011). Tey act as a temporary platform around which a “moment of movements” can form such that “[d]uring the Olympics moment, extant activist groups come together using the Olympics as their fght-back focal point…their eforts are often fltered through tactical and strategic hubs, the coming-together points of loose networks that share a fve-ring bête noire.” (Boykof 2014a, p. 26). In this way, activists can leverage the media attention provided by the Games: “activists can utilise or hijack for their own purposes a platform that has already been created (at great cost) by others” (Timms 2012, p. 355). Tey might also use the Games as a platform to protest ancillary issues like the practices of corporate sponsors (e.g., a Greenwash Gold campaign during London 2012 protested the environmental records of sponsors like Dow Chemical) or the conduct of countries involved (e.g., Tibetan nationalist protests during Beijing 2008 or First Nations’ rights protests during Vancouver 2010). Given this rather opportunistic and reactionary organizing strategy, Olympic protest campaigns have historically focused on using the Olympics as a platform to protest something else, rather than to protest the Games themselves. But a diferent type of activism has emerged in campaigns that monitor and protest the “Olympic industry” directly (Boykof 2014a; Lenskyj 2008; Perelman 2012). Tese anti-Olympic protest coalitions may focus on the impacts of mega-event investment on a host city (e.g., highlighting its link to gentrifcation and displacement of vulnerable populations) or on broader concerns in sport governance (e.g., documented corruption and cronyism in global sport). Transnational activist networks like Counter Olympics Network and Games Monitor and a cohort of journalists (e.g., Jennings 1996; Zirin 2014) focus their eforts on critiquing corruption and cronyism in the Olympic movement. Critical scholars also play an important role in this coalition, through scholar-activism and by providing research-based evidence used in these campaigns ((Boykof 2014b; Flyvbjerg and Stewart 2012; Zimbalist 2015a) are particularly widely cited studies among these activists). Tis form of anti-Olympic critique is concerned with two broad political debates. 134 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

Te frst anti-Olympic theme critiques the Games for being problematic periods in urban politics, “states of exception” (Agamben 2005) in which typical norms and rule of law are suspended. Boykof (2014b) describes this as “celebration capitalism,” a celebratory version of Naomi Klein’s (2007) darker notion of “disaster capitalism.” In both, political states of exception are leveraged to push through economic reforms that would be difcult to achieve under regular conditions. Tus, the

Olympics become an alibi for forging spaces of political-economic exception where authoritarian tendencies can more freely express themselves… Te state of exception opens space for opportunism whereby the powerful can press through policies on their wish lists that they wouldn’t dream of putting forward during normal political times. (Boykof 2014b, p. 11)

In this interpretation, the Olympics can be used to relax the normal rule of law: to allow monopolies for sponsors (Louw 2012), heightened levels of security (Boyle and Haggerty 2009; Giulianotti and Klauser 2011), or displacement of marginalized communities (CHORE 2007). Like mega- events themselves, these temporary states of exception can produce lasting legacies as they redistribute public funds, gentrify neighborhoods, or catalyze shifts in urban policy (e.g., bids in New York and Chicago were used to introduce tax increment fnancing systems in both cities). A second anti-Olympics theme is concerned with the economic development model promoted by Games organizers. Typically described in terms like “legacy” or “catalyst,” this is a trickle down model which posits that public investment in a mega-event owned and primarily operated by corporate interests can be justifed by its multiplier efects in the local economy. Public—usually municipal—investment in Games infrastructure and venues promised a return in the form of local economic growth: additional jobs, higher tourism revenues, and increased land values. Tis model has been widely critiqued on methodological grounds for under-estimating costs (Flyvbjerg and Stewart 2012) and over-estimating local economic benefts (Baade and Matheson 2016), in efect disguising what amounts to a public subsidy for Games organizers (Zimbalist 2015a). 7 Anti-bid Politics 135

Contesting the Bid

Anti-bid campaigns take place at the local scale, mobilizing at the early stages of bidding to contest the use of bids as policymaking instru- ments. Anti-bid activists have focus on contesting the legitimacy of the bid itself, starting in earnest with bids for the 2022 Winter Games (taking place 2014–2015). Tis is a type of activism that mobilizes early in the planning process, and seeks not just to protest the impacts of Olympic planning but to argue against pursuing the Games at all. Tis is a reaction to a politics of contingency often seen in mega-event planning. Bid proposals are necessarily speculative plans because they are contingent on winning the bid. At the early stages, public participation can be minimized because the plan is contingent. But if bids are successful, they quickly become contractually binding documents (they are the basis for contracts between the IOC and the host city). At this stage, a “delivery imperative” takes hold, precluding public participation as

[r]esponsibility for policy has been handed over to project managers, with the delivery of the Games converted into a technical programme of action adhering to specifcations and decisions outlined in the contractual phase of the development, and therefore subject primarily to technical challenges and adaptations, rather than signifcant policy objections. (Raco 2014, p. 191)

Tus, there is a very quick turnaround from abstract ideas to concrete commitments, with little time for participation during the transition from abstract to concrete:

Since the foundation of the plan is laid in the bid phase, there is always a tendency for urban residents to see the exercise as only hypothetical and, therefore, not to take it seriously. When citizens do take it seriously, it can be countered that this is only an early plan. But the problems is that, when and if the bid is successful, something conceived by others as only a conceptual idea takes on a life of its own as the plan. (Hiller 2000, p. 193, original emphasis) 136 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

Yet this lack of participation can not only be blamed on disengaged citizens. Bid planners leverage these temporal gaps, proposing bold ideas in the bid while ofoading the risks onto future generations of planners and ofcials. In this way,

[t]hose who promised economic and other advantages from hosting become basically unaccountable…in the short run the games’ boosters can appeal to the promise of long-run legacy benefts, while in the long run the boosters can appeal to the expectation of still longer-run benefts down the road. By this time the politicians who originally appropriated public funds to fnance the games may be long gone. (Zimbalist 2015a, p. 55)

Tis politics of contingency displaces democratic participation in the planning process, losing it in a timing gap between when decisions are made (when the bid is written), when impacts are felt (later, after contracts have already been signed), and when participation can be integrated into the process. Some contingency—and some displacement of public participation—is inevitable when planning a complex project like a mega-event. But it is no coincidence that anti-bid activists have achieved political success by repeatedly raising concerns over accountability, transparency, and (a lack of) public participation in the bidding process. In many cities, the bidding process resembles a form of marketing, in which the bid corporation designs a product internally and then uses a public relations campaign to ‘sell’ the idea to local stakeholders. In the 20 years preceding the recent wave of anti-bid movements, there were 81 bids formally submitted to the IOC (bids for Games between 2000 and 2020, before disruptions in the 2022 and 2024 bid cycles). Only 12 were subjected to formal referendums and 56 of those bids claimed to have no knowledge of any local opposition at all (Lauermann 2016b). Bidders’ claims like “no important political or public fgures oppose,” (London 2012) “no opposition,” (Rio 2016) “no signifcant political or social movements have voiced opposition,” (Chicago 2016) or “no major movement against” (Tokyo 2020) seem to strategically ignore the movements that did exist, or at very least to dismiss them as not signifcant.1 7 Anti-bid Politics 137

Tis history of minimal public debate created a space for anti-bid social movements, which capitalized on a growing public awareness of cost overruns and problematic legacies like white elephants. Tese activists tend to organize locally, either as a joint campaign by extant groups or as discrete urban social movements. Tere are some historical examples of this type of protest; a widely cited case is Denver voters’ decision to reject the 1976 Winter Games after the city had already won its bid (Boykof 2014a, pp. 22–24). More recently, the “Anti- Olympia-Komitee” organized a campaign against a Berlin 2000 bid (Colomb 2012, Chap. 4), voters in Berne rejected a 2010 bid referendum (Hiller and Wanner 2011), the “Bread not Circuses” movement challenged Toronto’s bids for the 1996 and 2008 Games (Lenskyj 2008), and movements in Paris challenged 2008 and 2012 bids (Issert and Lunzenfchter 2006). Anti-bid activism became a widespread phe- nomenon during the 2022 and 2024 Olympic bidding cycles. In these two cycles alone, Davos/St Moritz, Hamburg, and Munich rejected bids through referendums while governments in Boston, Krakow, Oslo, Rome, and Stockholm withdrew their support for bids in response to local opposition (Table 7.1). Tese activists share a set of organizing techniques, often learned from their previous experience as local political operatives: protesting as early as possible in the planning process, building alliances with experts who question bid accounting, launching social media campaigns to infuence mainstream media narratives, and using public records requests to troll for bid corporation scandals (Lauermann and Vogelpohl, 2017). Tese anti-bid protests also share concerns over two political themes. First, these campaigns directly contest the politics of contingency by calling for transparency in bid budgeting and accountability in the commitment of public funds. Second, these campaigns ask fundamentally disruptive questions about Olympic opportunity costs, and about whether cities should pursue the Games at all. In this way, they reject the post-political tendencies seen in more technical and incremental debates over legacy and leveraging. Tese themes were seen in the campaign against Boston’s bid for the 2024 Olympics (Lauermann 2016a). Te bidders framed their project 138 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

Table 7.1 Characteristics of recent anti-bid protests Bid project Anti-bid campaigns Themes of bid critique Boston 2024 No Boston Olympics, No Transparency; use of Boston 2024 public funds; government guarantees on project risk; history of cost overrun in other mega-projects Budapest 2024 ‘Momentum’ campaign, Importance of holding a Együtt (Together) party, referendum; opportunity signature campaign for a costs of hosting referendum Davos/St Moritz 2022 Referendum results Ability of a small city to against the bid host the event; cost concerns; environmental concerns Hamburg 2024 NOlympia Hamburg, Right Transparency; lack of to the City alliance, federal funding; history Green Party, referendum of cost overrun in other results against the bid mega-projects Krakow 2024 Krakow Against the Transparency; budget that Games, signature cam- favoured sports venues paign for a referendum over other infrastructure; bribery scandal Munich 2018 NOlympia Munich, Environmental concerns; Referendum results diffculties secur- against the bid ing fnancing; traffc problems Oslo 2022 Minority coalition in Government guarantees parliament on project risk Rome 2024 Five Star Movement; Use of public funds Radicali Italiani party; Virginia Raggi mayoral campaign Stockholm 2022 Minimal, but polls show Use of public funds weak interest in the bid, and city council withdrew support Sources English language newspapers, mega-event industry trade journals, press releases from cities, bid corporations, and activist groups as “a catalyst for growth and advancement” (Boston 2024 2015, p. 33) based on densifying and upgrading land values in several “growth cor- ridors” running through economically depressed neighborhoods. 7 Anti-bid Politics 139

Originally viewed as a frontrunner on the international circuit, the bid lost public support over a series of transparency scandals and a tightly organized anti-bid campaign. Tis led the mayor to cancel the bid a few weeks before the city was to have ofcially applied to the IOC’s bidding process. Te protest was led by two groups: No Boston Olympics was founded by self-described “establishment” fgures concerned with the opportunity costs of hosting, while No Boston 2024 was a collection of activists from the city’s progressive scene who mobilized around a more diverse set of concerns mostly related to transparency and a lack of participation in bid planning. Parallel protests were led by a range of sympathetic stakeholders, most notably opposition parties in local government including United Independent Party and anti-tax conserva- tive lawmakers, and a handful of critical journalists in local media. Te campaign framed its critique around three themes: (i) transparency in bid planning and budgeting, especially given the risk of cost overruns; (ii) accountability for use of public funds and public land, and as well as for the broader public assumption of risk should the city choose to sign the IOC’s host city guarantee contract; and (iii) the opportunity costs of hosting, as Olympic spending crowds out investment in transportation, housing, and public education. Tus, procedural debates over bid transparency and accountability were linked to a more fundamental challenge, contesting the idea that an Olympics is necessary to upgrade an aging subway, build afordable housing, or invest in public schools (themes that were prominent in both the bid legacy narrative and a simultaneous public debate over the city’s 2030 master plan). Similar themes emerged in the anti-bid campaign in Hamburg. Te city also launched a bid for the 2024 Summer Games, proposing it as a “catalyst for sustainable social development” (Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg 2015, p. 82) which would spur investment in its HafenCity project, a conversion of the municipal port into a mixed use waterfront neighborhood. Te bid was narrowly defeated in a referendum, surprising even the anti-bid campaigners.2 Te anti-bid activists were loosely organized around a NOlympia Hamburg campaign, a coalition built from extant groups like the local right to the city movement and factions within the Green party. Tis campaign used many of the same messaging strategies employed by Boston activists a few months 140 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann before: not only highlighting the potential for future cost overruns and the assumptions made in the bid’s accounting, but also arguing that the city had more pressing matters at hand (namely, an infux of refugees in 2015). As in Boston, a key accomplishment for these activists was that “we established the ‘no’”: the idea that Olympic debate could move beyond incremental questions about legacy and leveraging to a more disruptive debate over whether to bid at all.3 Collectively, anti-bid campaigns disrupted the international bidding system, raising existential questions about whether the Olympics are compatible with urban democracies. However, questions remain about the potential for these anti-bid movements to scale up: they have emerged in a number of cities, and there is a certain degree of knowledge sharing between them. Boston activists, for instance, bor- rowed information and tools from No Games Chicago activists (e.g., graphic design templates for posters) and went on to advise NOlympia Hamburg activists (e.g., by speaking at an anti-bid conference).4 Anti- Olympic activists like Games Monitor have become go-to media contacts for interviews and information clearinghouses for anti-bid activists in a number of cities.5 But anti-bid activism is a distinctly local form of politics, and thus organizing and messaging tactics from one city may not translate to others (Timms 2017). Bidding standards are likewise always under revision and so lessons learned about Olympic technical standards in one bidding cycle may be outdated by the next bidding cycle. Tus, it is important to distinguish between anti-bid campaigns— which are grounded in local urban politics—and anti-Olympic politics in general—which is focused on the global sports industry. In particular, they have difering objectives with regard to protest outcomes. While anti-bid movements experienced an unprecedented string of political victories in the form of bid cancelations, stopping a bid outright is not necessarily the only or optimal outcome for these activists. Some cities may vote to host the Games even knowing the costs–beneft calculations are not in their favor, if voters sufciently value intangible benefts like community pride or global media attention. And some bid protesters could be persuaded to accept a bid if it is planned in a participatory fashion and ofers a suf- fciently convincing urban development rationale. Tus, the largest impact 7 Anti-bid Politics 141 of anti-bid politics may not be in lobbying for outright cancellations but in their ability to demand concessions from bid planners. Two strategies stand out: First, these movements have successfully lobbied for transparency in the bidding process. For example, activists have used public records requests to expose politically damaging documents. Games Monitor secured and published previously embargoed host city contract documents in advance of the London 2012 Games, while Boston activists used a request to uncover discrepancies between what the bid corporation told the public and what it promised the US Olympic Committee (Lauermann 2016a). Leaks like these create potentially fatal scandals for bid corporations, creating pressure for more transparency in future bids. Second, anti-bid activism involved broader demands for accountability in bidding: calling for bidders to provide realistic cost projections and economic impact assessments, often citing studies on cost overrun (Flyvbjerg and Stewart 2012) and the limitations of the economic impact models commonly used by bidders (Baade and Matheson 2016; Zimbalist 2015a). Boston activists, for instance, allied with academic experts to deconstruct legacy and cost claims made by the bidders (e.g., Zimbalist 2015b), while Hamburg’s anti-bid movement gained steam after a government auditor released a report questioning the bid accounting (Rechnungshof 2015).

Conclusion

Tis chapter has reviewed three forms of Olympic protest: (i) Tere is a long history of activists using the Olympics as a platform for protesting other issues, ranging from social justice in athletes’ home countries to geopolitical tensions between national participants (Cottrell and Nelson 2011; Horne and Whannel 2016). (ii) Tere are anti-Olympic activists who criticize the International Olympic industry, protesting either its impact on host cities (Boykof 2014a; Zirin 2014) or systemic faws in sports governance (Jennings 1996; Lenskyj 2008). (iii) Tere is a growing cohort of anti-bid movements which protest within the context of their local urban politics, contesting the use of bids and bid corporations for 142 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann public decision-making. Tese forms of protest are not mutually exclusive, and cooperation and knowledge sharing are common across campaigns (especially between anti-Olympic and anti-bid strains of activism). Te growth of anti-bid campaigns is disrupting Olympic urban politics. Tese campaigns successfully derailed nine bids in the span of three years (2014–2016), creating a critical shortage of candidate cities in for the IOC. Anti-bid activists are re-writing the rules of Olympic protest by proactively organizing early in the bidding process, in an efort to prevent the “politics of contingency” which has so often allowed bidders to promise future costs and benefts with minimal long- run accountability. Tey are also voicing disruptive political questions that challenge the very premise of narratives about mega-event legacy or leveraging (this volume, Chap. 1). Narratives about mega-event “catalyst” are particularly vulnerable, as they are most closely associated with politics of contingency. Te catalyst efect has been widely documented (Benneworth and Dauncey 2010; Essex and Chalkley 1998; Rose and Spiegel 2010; Smith 2012), but there is an open debate over whether it is the most efective way to achieve urban policy objectives. By questioning opportunity costs and contesting the bid itself, anti-bid activists challenge the underlying necessity of Olympic catalysts: If the city wants better infrastructure, better housing, or better sports facilities, why go through the elaborate exercise of planning a mega-event? Why not simply build those things directly? Tese challenges hold the potential to disrupt mega-event planning more fundamentally, since they could apply to legacy and leveraging narratives as well. Te long-term efect of this disruption strategy remains to be seen. In the short run, anti-bid movements have secured a series of bid cancelations; allowing more bids to be deliberated through referendums may further increase the cancelation rate. But we have demonstrated, much of Olympic-themed planning occurs in the interstices of bidding projects: as plans are recycled over multiple bids (this volume, Chap. 4) and as city leaders rescale their ambitions into other mega-event projects (this volume, Chap. 6). Many of these decisions take place in between bids or in the transitions from one project to another, increasing the possibility for politics of contingency. No one referendum or “moment of movements” (Boykof 2014a) can, on its own, address the challenges 7 Anti-bid Politics 143 in these long-term planning pathways. Furthermore, good participatory planning is both an outcome and a process (Arnstein 1969), such that “[d]emocratic governance requires something more than a ‘thumbs up’ and ‘thumbs down’ to public intervention on any given issue” (Friedmann 2000, p. 469). Te legacy of anti-bid movements will not be found just in one anti-bid campaign, and one referendum will not defnitely resolve debates over the plans discussed in a bid. Te opportunity, rather, is to challenge the special interest groups in urban politics who use mega-events as a way to lobby for favors and funding. As localized and proactive urban political movements the anti-bid protests are well positioned to launch these longer term contestations in the city.

Notes

1. Olympic candidature fles obtained from Olympic Studies Centre archives (multiple years, multiple cities). 2. Author interviews with anti-bid activists in Hamburg (January 2016). 3. Author interview with NOlympia Hamburg activists (January 2016). 4. Author interviews with anti-bid activists in Boston (July 2015) and Chicago (August 2015). 5. Author interviews with anti-Olympic activists in London (July 2015). Note also Boykof (2014a: Chap. 5).

References

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Benneworth, P., & Dauncey, H. (2010). International urban festivals as a catalyst for governance capacity building. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 28(6), 1083–1100. Boston 2024. (2015). Boston 2024’s Bid 2.0. Boston 2024 bid to the US Olympic Committee to host the 2024 Summer Olympics and Paralympic Games. Boston, MA: Boston 2024, Inc. Boykof, J. (2014a). Activism and the Olympics: Dissent at the Games in Vancouver and London. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Boykof, J. (2014b). Celebration capitalism and the Olympic games. London: Routledge. Boyle, P., & Haggerty, K. D. (2009). Spectacular security: Mega-events and the security complex. International Political Sociology, 3(3), 257–274. Burbank, M. J., Andranovich, G., & Heying, C. H. (2002). Mega-events, urban development, and public policy. Review of Policy Research, 19, 179–202. CHORE. (2007). Fair play for housing rights: Mega-events, Olympic games and housing rights: Opportunities for the Olympic movement and others. Geneva: Center on Housing Rights and Evictions. Colomb, C. (2012). Staging the New Berlin: Place marketing and the politics of urban reinvention post-1989. London: Routledge. Cottrell, M. P., & Nelson, T. (2011). Not just the Games? Power, protest and politics at the Olympics. European Journal of International Relations, 17, 729–753. Essex, S., & Chalkley, B. (1998). Olympic Games: Catalyst of urban change. Leisure Studies, 17(3), 187–206. Flyvbjerg, B., & Stewart, A. (2012, June 2012). Olympic proportions: Cost and cost overrun at the Olympics 1960–2012 (Saïd Business School Working Papers, pp. 1–23). Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg. (2015). Olympische und Paralympische Spiele 2024 in Hamburg. Germany: Hamburg. Friedmann, J. (2000). Te good city: In defense of utopian thinking. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24(2), 460–472. Giulianotti, R., & Klauser, F. (2011). Introduction: Security and surveillance at sport mega events. Urban Studies, 48(15), 3157–3168. Hall, C. M. (2006). Urban entrepreneurship, corporate interests and sports mega-events: Te thin policies of competitiveness within the hard outcomes of neoliberalism. Te Sociological Review, 54(s2), 59–70. 7 Anti-bid Politics 145

Hiller, H. H. (2000). Toward an urban sociology of megaevents. Research in Urban Sociology, 5, 181–205. Hiller, H. H., & Wanner, R. A. (2011). Public opinion in Host Olympic Cities: Te case of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Games. Sociology, 45(5), 883–899. Horne, J., & Whannel, G. (2016). Understanding the Olympics. New York, NY: Routledge. IOC. (2014). Olympic Agenda 2020: Recommendations. Lausanne: International Olympic Committee. Issert, P., & Lunzenfchter, A. (2006). Malheureux aux jeux: pourquoi, depuis vingt ans, Paris ne parvient pas à obtenir l’organisation des jeux olympiques d’été. Issy-les-Moulineaux: Prolongations. Jennings, A. (1996). Te lords of the rings: Power money and drugs in the Modern Olympics. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. Klein, N. (2007). Te shock doctrine: Te rise of disaster capitalism. New York, NY: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt. Lauermann, J. (2016a). Boston’s Olympic bid and the evolving urban politics of event-led development. Urban Geography, 37(2), 313–321. Lauermann, J. (2016b). Politics as early as possible: Democratizing Olympics by contesting Olympic bids. In: C. Colomb & J. Novy (Eds.), Protest and resistance in the tourist city (pp. 210–226). London: Routledge. Lauermann, J., & Vogelpohl, A. (2017) Fragile growth coalitiosn or power- fult contestations? Cancelled Olympic bids in Boston and Hamburg. Environment & Planning A. doi: 10.1177/0308518X17711447 Lenskyj, H. (2008). Olympic industry resistance: Challenging Olympic power and propaganda. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Louw, A. (2012). Ambush marketing and the mega-event monopoly: How laws are abused to protect commercial rights to sporting events. Te Hague: TMC Asser Press. Payne, M. (2006). Olympic turnaround: How the Olympic Games stepped back from the brink of extinction to become the world’s best known brand. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Perelman, M. (2012). Barbaric sport: A global plague. London: Verso. Raco, M. (2014). Delivering fagship projects in an era of regulatory capitalism: State-led privatization and the London Olympics 2012. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 38(1), 176–197. Rechnungshof. (2015). Olympische und Paralympische Spiele in Hamburg. Vereinbarkeit mit einer nachhaltigen Finanzwirtschaft. Retrieved from 146 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

http://www.hamburg.de/weitere-veroeffentlichungen/4595950/ beratende-aeusserung-2015-olympia/. Rose, A., & Spiegel, M. (2010). Te Olympic trade efect. Finance & Development, 47(1), 12–13. Smith, A. (2012). Events and urban regeneration: Te strategic use of events to revitalise cities. London: Routledge. Timms, J. (2012). Te Olympics as a platform for protest: A case study of the London 2012 ‘ethical’ Games and the Play Fair campaign for workers’ rights. Leisure Studies, 31(3), 355–372. Timms, J. (2017). Te relay of mega-event activism: Why campaign gains do not travel well. In N. B. Salazar, C. Timmerman, J. Wets, et al. (Eds.), Mega-event Mobilities: A Critical Analysis. London: Routledge. Zimbalist, A. (2015a). Circus maximus: Te economic gamble behind hosting the Olympics and the World Cup. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Zimbalist, A. (2015b, March 20). Olympics numbers don’t add up. Boston Globe. Retrieved from https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/03/20/ olympics-numbers-don-add/BqrAaenp4tKK3Q7ASU5OrJ/story.html. Zirin, D. (2014). Brazil’s dance with the devil: Te World Cup, the Olympics, and the fght for democracy. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books. 8 Conclusion: Rethinking the Horizons of Failed Bids

Abstract Te process through which mega-event planning and bid logics evolve and are justifed has much to tell us about how urban space is produced in the modern city. Tis concluding chapter emphasizes the need to shift the emphasis of political debate away from the bid itself, to focus instead on the long-term policy making strategies that motivate bidding behind the scenes. By extending the horizons of bid failure, there is the opportunity to gain critical insight into the formation of urban policy, planning, and practice. Tis chapter reiterates several important lessons learned for cities considering whether or not to bid for the Games, and illustrates that cities have become adept at leveraging the mega-event bidding process for particular purposes.

Keywords Strategic policymaking · Event horizons · Mega-event motivations

Te preceding chapters of this book have illustrated that there is a need to rethink the ‘geography of failure’ associated with Olympic bids. We have argued that bid failure due to competition is quite diferent than bid failure caused by local opposition and have shown that Olympic

© Te Author(s) 2017 147 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann, Failed Olympic Bids and the Transformation of Urban Space, Mega Event Planning, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59823-3_8 148 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann bids have become an important vehicle to promote (and achieve) a host of ambitions that are often only tangentially related to securing the Olympic Games. It is becoming increasingly clear that bid cities now recognize that bid process must be leveraged. With expenditures amounting to billions of dollars if the bid is successful and tens of millions if it is not, going after the Olympic Games requires a commitment far greater than that required for a new ofce block, stadium, festive marketplace, entertainment complex, or a downtown park. But, an Olympic bid also necessitates a claim to urban space and raises questions concerning a city’s image and infrastructure, and prompts a conversation on what a city hopes to achieve by hosting. As Oliver (2011) has argued,

Bidding for the Olympic Games is a time when local policy-making is infuenced by extralocal forces, when image creation goes into high gear, and when the connection of ordinary citizens to the city-building process can be scrutinized. It is a time when land use can be contested and when particular representations of urban space strive for legitimacy (pp. 767–768).

We have shown that the bidding process can be used to facilitate strategic policymaking, often aligning urban development planning to trans- nationally mobile policy models and/or connecting bids to national development planning. We have also illustrated that recent bids have revealed conficting geographies of democracy, giving rise to new forms of anti-bid activism (Chap. 7) that challenge the ‘politics of contingency’ that is frequently used to bypass “traditional democratic channels of accountability” (Swyngedouw et al. 2002, pp. 560–561) or leads to “a process of detachment between decision making and the political process” (Raco 2012, p. 191). By exposing the frailty of the catalytic potential residing in Olympic development, and by illustrating how legacy conversations must acknowledge legacies of social and spatial injus- tice, anti-bid activists can be credited with: (a) bringing a halt to several bids; (b) triggering concessions from bid planners; and (c) prompting a more critical examination of the urban politics of mega-events. Te work being performed by anti-bid activists and the recent decline in the number of bid cities (especially for the Winter Olympic Games) is refected in the recommendations appearing in Agenda 2020 and 8 Conclusion: Rethinking the Horizons of Failed Bids 149 particularly the attempt by the IOC to reduce the costs and diversify the risks of hosting. Te IOC’s attempt to rekindle interest among a diversity of cities across the globe to bid for the Olympic Games involves a risky emphasis on tying ‘lasting legacies’ to the planning priorities of individual cities. At stake, whether bid cities will seek to use the Games (and their bids) to promote the diverse values of Olympism, or whether emphasis will continue to be placed on spearheading alterations to the urban environment through project development and policy mobility. Te awarding of the 2022 Winter Olympic Games to Beijing, China over Almaty, Kazakhstan’s more cost friendly bid, serves to indicate that an early embracement of the spirit of Agenda 2020 by a bid team might lead to disappointment. We have illustrated that amid new IOC reforms to the bidding process and more focused public scrutiny, bid eforts are frequently being ‘rescaled’ in the post-bid period (Chap. 6). It is not uncommon for various stakeholders to claim that the momentum of the bid should be seized and that particular projects must proceed in the aftermath of failure. We have argued that the desire to resist inertia is particularly sali- ent in bid eforts that have adopted an experimental narrative or are embedded within a governance strategy seeking to develop or secure institutional capacity. We feel that broad statements such as the declara- tion that Madrid has been adapted to meet the Games, or when cities pass laws and build (and label) stadium in advance of being awarded the games (i.e., Istanbul’s Atatürk Olympic Stadium and Turkish Law No. 3796), signal much more than a new Olympic bidding era and warrant further interrogation. As transformational infrastructure projects are aligned to bids, especially by cities engaged in serial bidding, it has become difcult to disentangle whether development was designed to support a future Olympic bid or the result of a previous efort. Unfortunately, when projects proposed during the bid are pursued in the post-bid period, not only do they tend to lose context but are frequently embarked upon without further public scrutiny, deliberation, or legitimation. Tis lack of clarity is especially poignant when considering that bid teams often struggle to separate the costs associated with operating the Olympic Games and the capital investments that are needed to host (OCOG versus non-OCOG budgets). So, while Paris 150 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann

2024 can boast that 95% of its proposed 2024 Olympic Games venues are already built or designed to be temporary installations, less certain is how much of this construction is actually contributing to societal development, and whether the everyday life of current residents has beneftted from the completion of specifc projects that have been used to communicate that the bid city is ready to be an Olympic city. In other examples, we demonstrated that bidding for the Olympic Games has resulted in the reorientation of priorities, and particularly the realignment of development strategies to refect economic neoliberalization. In some cases, this has been accompanied by municipal restructuring and disempowerment of local authorities. In other cases, important alterations to local planning code (i.e., the rescripting or removal of zoning ordinances), and the allocation of public subsidies were triggered by the bid efort. We found that even in those cities, such as Chicago 2016, where the results of bidding might be considered rather negligible, the notion that very little social learning occurred during the bidding process remains an instructive fnding. When dealt with in concert, we fnd that Olympics bids have much to tell us about the performance of our political institutions (Oliver 2011). Based on this analysis, there are several important lessons learned for cities considering whether or not to bid for the Games. First, cities should identify potential legacies of a bid at the beginning of the process. We have demonstrated that bidders often do this informally; we recommend simply that any post-bid legacies are identifed early and are subjected to the same political debate that the bid receives. Second, cities considering a bid should leverage the bidding process in a self-interested way. Tere is a high likelihood that the IOC will reject the city’s bid, and that the bid failure efectively represents wasted resources. To minimize the waste, scarce city resources are best spent by planning a bid that prioritizes how the Games can ft the needs of the city, not the other way around. Finally, there is a need for critics, activists, and planners alike to carefully assess who is promoting the bid and why they are engaging in boosterism. Tere is a need to shift the emphasis of political debate away from the bid itself, to focus instead on the long-term policymaking strategies that motivate bidding behind the scenes. 8 Conclusion: Rethinking the Horizons of Failed Bids 151

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A C Agenda 2020 8, 9, 17, 19, 20, 110, Candidate Phase 4 130, 148, 149 Candidature fees 4 Annecy Olympic Games Bids 30, Candidature Questionnaire 3 31, 40 Capacity building 35, 73 Anti-Olympic protests 130, 143 Cape Town Olympic Games bid 36 Applicant cities 4, 5, 7, 9 Chicago Olympic Games bid 134, Applicant phase 9 150 Atatürk Olympic Stadium 99, 149 Commonwealth Games 74, 78, 115, Athens Organising Committee for 117 the Olympic Games (ATHOC) 31, 32 D Austrian Olympic Committee 7, 8 Deindustrialization 115 Delhi 110 B Delivery imperative 135 Baku Olympic Games bids 38 Disenfranchisement 101, 102, 124 Barcelona Model 30, 54, 57 Displacement 83, 94, 101, 133, 134, Berlin Olympic Games bids 35, 138 136 Bloomberg, Michael 90 Doctorof, Daniel 90 Boston Olympic Games bid 33, 138 Doha Olympic Games bids 39, 78, Buenos Aires 110 79

© Te Editor(s) (if applicable) and Te Author(s) 2017 153 R. Oliver and J. Lauermann, Failed Olympic Bids and the Transformation of Urban Space, Mega Event Planning, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59823-3 154 Index

E Istanbul Olympic Bid Committee Enclave development projects 39, 80 (IOBC) 98, 99 Entrepreneurialism 62, 97, 101, 115, Istanbul Olympic Games bids 124 98–100 Event portfolios 30, 70, 109 Ex-post versus ex ante 16 K Knowledge transfer 12, 50, 51, 55, F 56, 61 FIFA 109, 111 Framing narrative 38 L Learning efect 73, 74 G Legacy 2, 3, 6, 9–14, 16–20, 28, Governance 29, 32, 33, 37, 38, 50, 56, multi-scalar 112 60, 70–74, 88, 89, 93–95, 97, Grand Paris Project 121 100, 101, 114, 122, 131, 134, Greater Municipality of Istanbul 98 136, 138–143, 148 Leveraging 2, 11, 14–16, 18, 19, 28, H 38, 131, 138, 140, 142 Lyon 1968 Summer Games bid 34 High frequency bidding 74, 81, 97, 109 Human rights objections 36 M Hybridized bid 97, 101 Madrid Olympic Games bids 40 Manchester model 36 I Manchester Olympic Games bids 36, 37 Image development 13, 33 International Olympic Committee (IOC) 2, 4–20, 27, 28, 30, N 33, 40–42, 50, 53–59, 62, 87, National Olympic Committee 88, 92, 93, 96–100, 102, 110, (NOC) 5, 10, 42, 98 112–114, 116, 120, 130, 131, Neoliberalism 14, 60, 100, 113, 132 135, 136, 139, 142, 148–150 New York City Olympic Games bid International Sports Federations 10 91, 92 Invitation Phase 9, 10 IOC Evaluation Commission 5, 10, 93, 100 Index 155

O R Olympic Games Knowledge Real estate 30, 39, 61, 70, 76, Management System (OGKM) 78–82, 88, 90, 96, 112, 120 11, 50, 53, 56, 61 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 100 Olympic Movement 6, 8, 12, 14, Referendum campaign 136, 138, 17–19, 28, 38, 40, 120, 133 139, 142, 143 Opposition, to Olympics 5, 82, 91 Rescaling 28, 34, 39, 108–111, 114, Organizing Committee for the 115, 117, 122–124 Olympic Games (OCOG) 18, Return on Investment (ROI) 17, 41 93, 149 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games bid 30, 31, 58, 63, 88, 109 Rome 1960 Summer Olympic P Games 30 Pan American Games 58, 78, 109, 111, 114, 115 Paris Olympic Games bids 118–120, S 122 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics 4 Phantom event 37 Selective legacies 18 Policy boosterism 51, 60, 62 Sochi 7, 32, 73, 111 Policy experiment 29 Social impacts 101 Policy knowledge 51–54, 56, 58, 60, Social learning 93, 150 61 Stadium development 92, 122 Policy tourism 40, 50, 53, 55, 56, Stage approach to bidding 10 61, 62 State dirigisme 34 Politics of contingency 3, 41, 131, 132, State of exception 117, 134 135, 136, 138, 142, 143, 148 State intervention 41 Post-industrial cities 30, 73, 115 Sydney 55, 56, 60–62, 115 Pound, Richard 4, 6 Symbolism 117, 118 Private sector 28, 79, 81, 89, 108, 116, 117 T Privatization 102 Technology protocols 51, 56 Prost, Henri 96 Tokyo Olympic Games bids 6 Protests, protestors 59, 101, 132, Toronto Olympic Games bids 78, 133, 138, 139 87, 111–113, 138 Public management 114 Transfer of Knowledge (TOK) 9, 56, PyeongChang Olympic Games bids 58 36, 78 Turkish Olympic Law 98, 99 156 Index

U W Urban development corporation 20 West Side Stadium, New York City Urban regime 34, 38 91, 92, 96 Utilitarian bids 42, 51 White elephant 12