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THE STATE of INTERNET SHUTDOWNS AROUND the WORLD the 2018 #KEEPITON REPORT the #Keepiton Campaign Unites and Organizes the Global Effort to End Internet Shutdowns

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01 THE #KEEPITON REPORT 2018 THE STATE OF INTERNET SHUTDOWNS AROUND THE WORLD THE 2018 #KEEPITON REPORT The #KeepItOn campaign unites and organizes the global effort to end internet shutdowns. The coalition is growing rapidly, and so far 191 organizations from 68 countries around the world, ranging from research centers to rights and advocacy groups, detection networks, foundations, and media organizations, have joined the movement. This report is a publication of Access Now for the #KeepItOn coalition and was written by Berhan Taye with the collaboration of Access Now’s team. The author would like to specially thank Peter Micek, Melody Patry, Donna Wentworth, Gustaf Björksten, Akash Singh, and Sage Cheng for their contributions. Overview The 2018 internet shutdown trends “When the shooting and looting happened in Jijiga, we wanted to get more information about what was happening, we wanted to share with the world that we have been victims. We were not able do that The number of internet Official justifications vs. because they cut off the internet. We couldn’t leave our house, we can hear gun shots and people shutdowns worldwide actual causes of internet screaming. We had to call people in Addis Ababa 600 km away to find out what was happening in our city.” is on the rise shutdowns in 2018 — Anonymous, Ethiopia, April 2018 196 Official Actual 106 Political Instability 75 196 Public Safety Documented shutdowns in 2018 Protest 2016 2017 2018 25 National Security Communal Countries Violence Most affected regions More people are Fake News/ Other Hate Speech pushing back Elections Asia 191 68 Unknown Information Control Exam Cheating #KeepItOn countries School Exams Sabotage/ Africa coalition members worldwide Third-party Action Unknown * Data from the Shutdown Tracker Optimization Project (STOP) 2016-2018 Table of Contents 1. Introduction: internet shutdowns in 2018 2 1.1 What is an internet shutdown? 2 2. Governments continue to normalize shutdowns 3 2.1 Governments rarely acknowledge shutdowns 3 2.2 When they do, they use umbrella terms to justify shutdowns despite details and nuances of what actually happened 3 2.3 Increased shutdowns to “fight ‘fake news,’ hate speech, and related violence” 6 3. Governments continue using shutdown as a measure in critical events 6 3.1 Elections 6 3.2 Protests 7 3.3 Cheating during school exams 7 4. Who from the government orders shutdowns? Who’s affected? 8 4.1 Shutdown orders and scope 8 4.2 Grounds for shutdowns 10 5. Anatomy of shutdowns 11 5.1 Bandwidth throttling 11 5.2 Broadband internet shutdowns 12 5.3 Mobile internet shutdowns 12 5.4 “Internet blackouts” or blanket internet shutdowns 13 5.5 Mobile phone call and text message network shutdowns 13 5.6 Service-specific (platform) shutdown 13 6. Human rights violations during shutdowns? 13 7. Challenging shutdowns from global governmental and industry bodies 14 8. Challenging shutdowns on legal grounds 15 9. Circumventing and measuring shutdowns in 2018 15 THE STATE OF INTERNET SHUTDOWNS AROUND THE WORLD 2 3 THE #KEEPITON REPORT 2018 1.1 passed a series of important resolutions[5] to of expression. At the same time, members of the 1. Introduction: condemn shutdowns and caution states against global #KeepitOn coalition have been working What is an internet shutdown? imposing them. together to help internet shutdowns victims gather An internet shutdown can be defined as an Shutdowns are Notably, in a variety of cases, technical evidence in 2018 “intentional disruption of internet or electronic ordered under a of shutdowns and communications, rendering them inaccessible or variety of state governments never publicly in some cases, effectively unusable, for a specific population or structures. Typically, In 2018, the global #KeepItOn coalition [1] acknowledge that they are also helping them within a location, often to exert control over the the orders come from to circumvent the documented more than 196[2] internet shutdowns [3] flow of information.” They include blocks of authorities in local around the world. Just as it has been since 2015, responsible for a shutdown. shutdowns. social media platforms, and are also referred to as governments, state/ India was responsible for the majority: 67% of “blackouts,” “kill switches,” or “network disruptions.” the world’s documented shutdowns took place in regional governments, the judiciary, and executive Importantly, the community that dedicates its bodies of governments. The entity that orders a invaluable time to fighting shutdowns continues India in 2018, with 134 incidents. The remaining In Access Now’s work documenting shutdowns 33% took place in a diverse range of countries: shutdown can impact the scope and effect of the to grow and diversify. There are now civil society in 2018 and in this report, we identify the key shutdown. The geographic reach of a shutdown coalition members from more than 68 countries Algeria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, trends that defined shutdowns and show the Democratic Republic Congo, Ethiopia, Indonesia, could extend beyond a country’s borders, or be working to keep the internet on, all across the globe. nature and official rationales for shutdowns in as localized as a few cellular towers on a protest Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mali, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, the year. Perpetrators of internet shutdowns Philippines, and Russia. route. Some countries have legislation that historically use similar justifications for ordering facilitates and legitimizes shutdowns, while others shutdowns, but these justifications rarely match issue arbitrary orders that are not necessarily 2. Governments 2018 number of internet shutdowns by country what observers can conclude is the real grounded in or supported by law. motivation. This year the official rationales have continue to normalize included combating “fake news” (properly called In ordering shutdowns, government authorities disinformation and misinformation), hate speech, shutdowns 12 employ a range of tactics to support specific goals and related violence, securing public safety and in a particular context. A government might use national security, precautionary measures, and bandwidth throttling to slow internet access, or 2.1 134 Pakistan preventing cheating during exams, among others. alternate between shutting down mobile internet Governments rarely acknowledge 7 and cutting broadband service internet together, shutdowns 6 Whether they are ordered in Ethiopia, Chad, or it may block specific apps and services, such as 7 Venezuela, or India, and whether they are justified social media or messaging services. Notably, in Out of the more than 200 incidents of Yemen Ethiopia as a measure to fight “fake news” and hate a veriety of cases, governments never publicly shutdowns reported in 2018, only 77 were 5 India Iraq speech or to stop cheating during exams, the acknowledge that they are responsible for a acknowledged by the government or entities facts remain the same: internet shutdowns violate Bangladesh 3 2 shutdown. That shifts the burden of proof to that ordered the shutdowns. human rights, put people in danger, and harm the 2 Mali the victims, making it harder to push back or DR Congo economy. Internet shutdowns curtail freedom 2 Chad seek redress for harm done. That is all the more 2.2 Russia 1 2 of expression, cut access to information, and can troubling because there appears to be a correlation 1 Algeria Philippines inhibit people from assembling and associating When they do, they use umbrella 1 Indonesia between suspension of the internet and human 1 Cameroon 1 peacefully, online and off. In addition, during Côte d'Ivoire rights violations that take place in the dark. terms to justify shutdowns 1 Nicaragua shutdowns, many victims are unable to reach their 1 Kazakhstan 1 families, get accurate information to stay safe, or despite details and nuances of Nigeria 1 The good news is that the increased global 1 SouthKorea SriLanka reach emergency services. Shutdowns disrupt spotlight on internet shutdowns appears to what actually happened SierraLeone 1 businesses, schools, and ordinary lives, often 1 Sudan making an impact. Even though there were [4] When governments shut down the internet, 1 Syria exacting a significant financial cost . The United more documented shutdowns in 2018 than we Togo 1 Nations and other intergovernmental bodies have whether through a memo, directive, or just a phone Turkey recorded in previous years, there were also call, authorities will sometimes provide the public [1] #Keepiton, Access Now, 2019, https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/ more documented court challenges to stop with some form of public rationale or justification. them. Public interest lawyers, activists, ordinary [2] The number of shutdowns in 2018 is estimated to be more than 196. This number indicates only the incidents we The most common justifications cited in 2018, as have been able to verify and confirm through our partners on the ground and via the media. It is highly likely that the citizens, and civil society groups have been forcing shown below: public safety, “fake news” (which as number of shutdowns is much higher than what we have documented. telcos, communications regulators, and others we have noted, is properly called disinformation [3] This definition was developed at RightsCon Brussels in 2016 in collaboration with a diverse set of stakeholders including to defend network disruptions in court, asserting or misinformation) or hate speech and related technologists, policy makers, activists, and others. Read more: https://www.accessnow.org/no-internet-shutdowns-lets-keepiton/ the rights to access to information and freedom violence, national security, and school exams. [4] West, D. Internet shutdowns cost countries $2.4 billion last year, Brookings, 2016. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2016/10/intenet-shutdowns-v-3.pdf [5] See page 14. THE STATE OF INTERNET SHUTDOWNS AROUND THE WORLD 4 5 THE #KEEPITON REPORT 2018 Observation can reveal more information for region in India), elections, during communal violence, It is rare for government justifications to match the whether online or off.
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