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Achieving Keyless Cdns with Conclaves Achieving Keyless CDNs with Conclaves Stephen Herwig, University of Maryland; Christina Garman, Purdue University; Dave Levin, University of Maryland https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/herwig This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium. August 12–14, 2020 978-1-939133-17-5 Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX. ARTIFACT EVALUATED Achieving Keyless CDNs with Conclaves PASSED Stephen Herwig Christina Garman Dave Levin University of Maryland Purdue University University of Maryland Abstract tamper with all of their customers, including virtually all of the world’s major banks, online shops, and many government Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) serve a large and in- sites. creasing portion of today’s web content. Beyond caching, The messy relationship between HTTPS and CDNs is CDNs provide their customers with a variety of services, in- made all the more challenging by the fact that CDNs today cluding protection against DDoS and targeted attacks. As the do far more than merely host the bulk of the web’s content. web shifts from HTTP to HTTPS, CDNs continue to provide They also use web application firewalls (WAFs) to analyze such services by also assuming control of their customers’ clients’ requests for evidence of targeted attacks like SQL private keys, thereby breaking a fundamental security princi- injection or cross-site scripting, and filter them before up- ple: private keys must only be known by their owner. loading to their customers [8]. CDN customers benefit from We present the design and implementation of Phoenix, the this service because it scrubs attack traffic far from their own first truly “keyless CDN”. Phoenix uses secure enclaves (in networks. And yet, running a WAF on a CDN requires the particular Intel SGX) to host web content, store sensitive key CDN to have access to the website’s unencrypted traffic. material, apply web application firewalls, and more on oth- There have been recent advances to address aspects of this erwise untrusted machines. To support scalability and multi- problem, most notably Cloudflare’s Keyless SSL [9], which tenancy, Phoenix is built around a new architectural primitive is a protocol that allows CDN customers to maintain sole which we call conclaves: containers of enclaves. Conclaves ownership of their private keys. However, even with Key- make it straightforward to deploy multi-process, scalable, less SSL, the CDN learns all session keys, yielding little ad- legacy applications. We also develop a filesystem to extend ditional assurance against eavesdropping or impersonation. the enclave’s security guarantees to untrusted storage. In its The ideal solution would allow for all requisite processing strongest configuration, Phoenix reduces the knowledge of and functionality to be performed on encrypted data, so that the edge server to that of a traditional on-path HTTPS adver- the CDN operator is neither responsible for holding the keys sary. We evaluate the performance of Phoenix with a series nor able to see any of the data through it. However, even of micro- and macro-benchmarks. the state of the art in this area [10–16] is much too ineffi- cient to be utilized at the scale and performance that would 1 Introduction be expected of a CDN. In this paper, we introduce the design and implementa- Content delivery networks (CDNs), like Akamai [1] and tion of Phoenix, the first truly “Keyless CDN”. Phoenix uses Cloudflare [2], play a critical role in making today’s web trusted execution environments (TEEs, in particular Intel fast, resilient, and secure. CDNs deploy servers around the SGX enclaves) to perform all of the quintessential tasks of to- world, on which they host their customers’ websites. Be- day’s CDNs—hosting web servers, applying web application cause the web’s performance is largely determined by la- firewalls, performing certificate management, and more—all tency [3], many websites rely on the fact that CDNs have on otherwise untrusted machines. proximal servers to nearly all users on the web to ensure low- Critical to the performance of any CDN is the ability to distance and therefore low-latency connections. support multiple concurrent web servers and multiple ten- While CDNs have grown more popular, so too has the ants (customers). Unfortunately, no existing software in- movement towards an HTTPS-everywhere web. The major- frastructures built off of SGX have been able to support ity of all websites are offered via HTTPS, and with the ad- multi-process, multi-tenant applications. We introduce a new vent of free HTTPS certificate issuance [4], this number has general-purpose architectural primitive we call conclaves: grown increasingly quickly [5]. containers of enclaves. Conclaves facilitate the deployment, Unfortunately, HTTPS and CDNs are, in some sense, configuration, and dynamic scaling-up and -down of sophis- pathologically incompatible. To accept TLS connections, ticated legacy (unmodified) applications. CDN servers store their customers’ secret keys—in many cases, the CDN actually generates the keys on behalf of their Contributions We make the following contributions: customers [6, 7]. As a result, CDNs are imbued with a huge • We present the first truly “keyless CDN,” which we call amount of trust: they could impersonate, eavesdrop on, or Phoenix. Phoenix performs all of the quintessential tasks USENIX Association 29th USENIX Security Symposium 735 of today’s CDNs, without requiring CDNs to gain access Edge-network services like CDNs therefore derive much to sensitive key material, and without having to change of their utility from the fact that they have servers close legacy web applications. to most clients. To this end, CDNs deploy their own data • To realize our design, we introduce a new architectural centers, and deploy servers within other organizations’ net- primitive called conclaves, which creates a microkernel works, such as college campuses, ISPs, or companies. In- out of secure enclaves. Conclaves offer the abstraction deed, today’s CDNs have so many points of presence (PoPs) of a “container of enclaves,” thereby making it straight- that they often are within the same network as the clients vis- forward to deploy multi-process, scalable, legacy applica- iting their sites. To support such proximity without an inor- tions within a dynamic number of enclaves. dinate number of machines, CDNs rely on the ability to host multiple tenants (customers) on their web servers at a time. • We present a detailed design and implementation of Phoenix, and evaluate it on Intel SGX hardware. Our re- Manage customers’ keys: As the web moves towards sults indicate that conclaves scale to support multi-tenant HTTPS-everywhere [5], customers increasingly rely on deployments with modest overhead (∼2–3× for many con- CDNs to store their HTTPS certificates and the correspond- figurations). ing secret keys, so that they can accept TLS connections while maintaining low latency to clients. Roadmap We describe the essential features of today’s How they achieve this: CDNs manage their customers’ keys CDNs and distill a set of goals and threat models in x2. We in a variety of ways: sometimes by having their customers review related work in x3. We present the design of con- upload their secret keys, but typically by simply generat- claves and of Phoenix in x4, and their implementation in x5. ing keys and obtaining certificates on their customers’ be- We present our evaluation in x6 and conclude in x7. half [6, 7]. Many CDNs combine multiple customers onto single “cruiseliner certificates” under the same key pair— 2 Problem and Goals these customers are not allowed to access their own private keys, as that would allow them to impersonate any other cus- We distill down the fundamental features of today’s CDNs, tomer’s website on the same cruiseliner certificate [6]. A re- discuss the inherent security challenges, and formulate the cent protocol, Keyless SSL [9], has been proposed to address goals and threat models that guide the rest of this paper. this; we describe this in more detail in x3. 2.1 Content Delivery Networks Absorb DDoS traffic: CDNs protect their customers by filtering DDoS traffic, keeping it from reaching their cus- CDNs are third-party services that host their customers’ web- tomers’ networks. sites (and other data). Virtually all of the most popular How they achieve this: CDNs leverage economies of scale websites (and a very long tail of unpopular websites) use to obtain an incredible amount of bandwidth and computing one or more CDNs to help reliably host their content [6]. resources. Their customers’ networks block most inbound Historically, CDNs have been thought of as a massive web traffic, except from the CDN. Thus, attackers must overcome cache [17], but today’s CDNs play a critical role in achieving these huge resources in order to impact a customer’s website. the performance and security that the web relies on [8]. We identify four key roles that fundamentally define to- Filter targeted attacks: An often overlooked but critical day’s CDNs, and their enabling technologies: feature [8] of today’s CDNs is the ability to filter out (non- DDoS) attack traffic, such as SQL injection and cross-site Low latency to clients: The primary driving feature of scripting attacks. CDNs is their ability to offer low page-load times for clients visiting their customers’ websites. How they achieve this: Unlike with DDoS traffic, the primary challenge behind protecting against targeted attacks is detect- How they achieve this: CDNs achieve low latencies via a ing them. CDNs achieve this by running web-application massive, global network of multi-tenant edge servers. Edge firewalls (WAFs), such as ModSecurity [18]. WAFs ana- servers act primarily as reverse proxy web servers for the lyze the plaintext HTTP messages, and compare the mes- CDN’s customers: to handle client requests, edge servers re- sages against a set of rules (often expressed as regular expres- trieve content from the customers’ origin servers, and cache sions [19]) that indicate an attack.
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