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Texas Uil Lincoln-Douglas Debate Research Series Vol. 19 Spring 2013 No

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Texas Uil Lincoln-Douglas Debate Research Series Vol. 19 Spring 2013 No 1 TEXAS UIL LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE RESEARCH SERIES VOL. 19 SPRING 2013 NO. 2 RESOLVED: IN MATTERS OF JUSTICE, JOHN RAWLS' DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE OUGHT TO BE PREFERRED OVER ROBERT NOZICK'S ENTITLEMENT THEORY. Lincoln Douglas was created as a debate format designed to emphasize questions of value. Effective participation in Lincoln Douglas debate produces familiarity with the great philosophers of the ages. The Spring 2013 UIL Lincoln-Douglas topic offers an exciting opportunity to explore the two leading theories of justice. This topic will give debaters an opportunity to understand how the current political divide in American politics finds its roots in classic philosophical theories. Libertarians, such as Kentucky Senator Rand Paul, and Tea Party candidates such as Minnesota Representative Michele Bachman, argue for lower taxes, less welfare spending, and minimal government. President Obama, along with most Congressional Democrats, argues that wealthy individuals should pay more taxes so that the federal government can continue to support domestic welfare spending. John Stick, professor of law at the University of Southern California Law Center, traces the origin of these current political divisions to the competing philosophies of Rawls and Nozick: The relationship between Rawls and Nozick is not a matter of interest for philosophers only. Although the first burst of discussion that greeted their work in the early 1970s has passed, many of the present legal policy debates between liberals and conservatives over the distribution of wealth, the nature of property rights, and the proper role of government in regulating the market are strongly influenced by Nozick and Rawls. Most contemporary theorists that oppose progressive taxation because it interferes with the functioning of the market rely on Nozick's political arguments. Rawls and Nozick are central to the contemporary debate over welfare rights, the strength of property rights, the interpretation of the takings clause, and general theoretical discussions on the nature of property law. (Northwestern University Law Review, Spring 1987, p 364) Anupam Chandler, professor of law at the University of California at Davis School of Law, also identifies the justice theories of Rawls and Nozick as central to political controversies: “Robert Nozick stands as one of the foremost intellectual antagonists to claims for distributive justice. John Rawls, meanwhile, penned the most important modern political theory justifying an egalitarian society” (U.C. Davis Law Review, March 2007, p. 564). John Rawls’ Difference Principle John Rawls (1921-2002), long-time professor of philosophy at Harvard University, is the author of the classic 1971 work, A Theory of Justice. In the Preface to his book, Rawls explains his intention to provide an alternative to the justice theories of the “great utilitarians,” David Hume, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. He expresses concern that the critics of utilitarian justice have failed to provide a well-developed alternative theory. His intention is to correct this shortcoming: “What I have attempted to do is to generalize and carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional theory of the social contract as represented by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. In this way I hope that the theory can be developed so that it is no longer open to the more obvious objections often thought fatal to it. Moreover this theory seems to offer an alternative systematic account of the tradition. The theory that results is highly Kantian in nature” (p. viii). So what does it mean that Rawls wants to position himself in the Kantian tradition, rather than as a utilitarian philosopher? The German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, believed that justice must be examined deontologically – meaning we must always ask about our duties and moral obligations before looking to the consequences of those acts. This means that “the right must precede the good.” Karen Lebacqz, professor of ethics at the Pacific School of Religion, offers the following explanation in her book, Six Theories of Justice: Traditional notions of justice appear to be flouted by a theory that claims the "right" act is whatever maximizes the good. Individual rights or claims would be overridden by consideration of the "happiness" of others. For example, if the bloodshed of a threatened race riot could be averted by framing and lynching an innocent person, it seems that the utilitarian would have to say it is "right" to do so. long as the "greater good" required it, all individual rights and claims would be ignored. 2 Because of such apparent implications of utilitarian theory, issues of justice have consistently been a stumbling block for utilitarians. (1986, pp. 17-18) Rawls offers what he calls his “two principles of justice:” First: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. (A Theory of Justice, 1971, p. 60) The “Difference Principle” arises from Rawls’ second principle of justice. Before explaining this principle, however, it is essential to recognize that Rawls makes his first principle more important than the second: “These principles are to be arranged in a serial order with the first principle prior to the second. This ordering means that a departure from the institutions of equal liberty required by the first principle cannot be justified by, or compensated for, by greater social and economic advantages. The distribution of wealth and income and the hierarchies of authority, must be consistent with both the liberties of equal citizenship and equality of opportunity” (A Theory of Justice, 1971, p. 61). So if “basic liberties” must be assured before the “Difference Principle” kicks in, what does Rawls mean by “basic liberties?” He offers the following explanation: “The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (the right to vote and be eligible for public office) together with the freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law. These liberties are all required to be equal by the first principle, since citizens of a just society are to have the same basic rights” (A Theory of Justice, 1971, p. 61). After these basic liberties have been assured, inequalities (or differences) in things such as income or property can be just so long as the inequalities work to “everyone’s advantage.” Consider the following example: workers could reason that everyone working at their factory should receive the same income at $15 per hour. Suppose we discover that we could hire a person with expert skill in supervision at $30 per hour. By hiring such a person, factory output improves such that everyone else in the factory can now earn $20 per hour. Would factory workers insist on retaining equality of income at $15 per hour, or would they accept the income difference that seems to work to everyone’s advantage? For Rawls, the question is always whether the difference is of benefit to the “least advantaged.” Why is he not equally concerned about the welfare of those at the top of the income scale? Well, an income difference obviously works to the advantage of those at the top of the scale. If we want to know whether the difference works to “everyone’s advantage,” our attention must turn to the impact of the difference on the least advantaged. Rawls believes that a properly functioning free market system can “lift all boats.” But it will do so only if proper attention is given to equalizing opportunity for all. John Schaar, professor of philosophy at the University of California at Santa Cruz, offers the following explanation of the “Difference Principle:” The Difference Principle asserts that inequalities are justifiable only if they are to the advantage of the worst-off representative man or group. We are to agree to consider the unequal distribution of talents and abilities among a population as a general social resource which can be arranged to work to the advantage of all, rather than as a source of strength for some and weakness for others. No one is to benefit from the contingencies of nature or social position "except in ways that redound to the well-being of others". In the conception of justice as fairness, people in effect agree to share one another's fate. Reciprocity and mutual benefit must prevail over considerations of social efficiency and technocratic values. (John Rawls’ Theory of Social Justice, 1980, p. 170) How does Rawls know that his theory of justice is the correct one? His answer is a theoretical device that he calls “the veil of ignorance” in the “original position:” The idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just. The aim is to use the notion of pure procedural justice as a basis of theory. Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage. Now in order to do this I assume that the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance. They do not know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations. It is assumed, then, that the parties do not know certain kinds of particular 3 facts. First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, and strength, and the like.
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