DOCSLIB.ORG

Skepticism About a Priori Knowledge

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Skepticism About a Priori Knowledge CHAPTER FORTY-SEVEN Skepticism about A Priori Knowledge OTÁ VIO BUENO 1 INTRODUCTION A priori knowledge is, roughly, knowledge that does not depend on experience (except perhaps for whatever experience that may be needed to acquire the relevant concepts). This is a rough formulation since, when analyzing the notion of a priori knowledge, some care is needed to characterize the independence-from-experience condition so that what is taken to be known independently of experience (such as mathematical and logical results) turns out to be known a priori (according to the proposed analysis of a priori knowledge), and what is taken to be known based on experience, and thus is dependent on experience (such as particular physical traits of the world), is not known a priori (according to the relevant account). The challenge is then to secure that the proposed analysis is extensionally adequate. Two questions then emerge: (a) Can we have a priori knowledge? (b) Can we know that—or, at least, determine whether—we have such knowledge? Corresponding to these two questions, there are two forms of skepticism regarding the a priori : (aʹ ) One can provide arguments to the effect that, despite appearances to the contrary, one doesn’t have knowledge of the a priori , such as mathematical claims and claims about the validity of arguments. This is a priori skepticism (see Beebe 2011 ). Alternatively, (bʹ ) one can provide arguments to the effect that conceptual analyses (characterizations, defi nitions) of a priori knowledge (see, for instance, Kitcher 1980 , 2000 ; and, for an account of a priori justifi cation, Casullo 2003 ) are ultimately problematic. This is skepticism about a priori knowledge . And if it is unclear what a priori knowledge ultimately is, it is similarly unclear how we can determine whether we have any such knowledge. In this chapter, I will consider both forms of skepticism regarding the a priori , focusing in particular on skepticism about a priori knowledge. After all, by challenging the very concept of a priori knowledge, it seems to me that this form of skepticism is more basic. Given the centrality of a priori knowledge to so many cognitive endeavors (from mathematics and logic to philosophy), the presence of SSkepticism.indbkepticism.indb 668585 110/24/20170/24/2017 99:37:42:37:42 PPMM 686 SKEPTICISM these forms of skepticism highlights a central issue that needs to be addressed by those who claim to have the corresponding knowledge. 2 A PRIORI SKEPTICISM Most people think they know several mathematical claims, including simple arithmetical results, such as that 71 is the sum of 13 and 58. Most people think they also know whether a given conclusion follows logically from certain premises, such as that q follows logically from p and if p then q . Since such mathematical and logical results are arguably instances of what is known a priori , most people think they have a priori knowledge (although, unless they have some philosophical training, they are unlikely to describe that knowledge in these terms). A priori skepticism challenges such knowledge claims, and any others that are based on a priori considerations ( Beebe 2011 ). The form of the argument for it is the same as the familiar brain-in-a-vat or evil-demon arguments, in which, fi rst, a necessary condition for knowing something about the world is that one knows that one’s experiences are not being generated in a brain-in-a-vat scenario or by an evil demon. Support for this premise is provided by the closure principle, according to which (roughly) one knows what follows logically from things that are already known and that are established on the basis of that knowledge. Second, it turns out that one is unable to know that one is not in such skeptical scenarios. After all, one’s perceptual experiences are insensitive to such scenarios: one would believe that one is experiencing the world even if one weren’t (as the case would be if one were in such skeptical situations). The result is that one doesn’t know anything about the world. The argument for a priori skepticism is entirely analogous. In fact, it is an application of the familiar evil-demon argument to a priori knowledge claims, such as knowing the validity of modus ponens . As James Beebe notes: (P1 ) If I know that modus ponens is correct, then I know that my belief that modus ponens is correct is not based on faux intuitive experiences induced in me by a bumbling evil demon. (P 2 ) I don’t know that my belief that modus ponens is correct is not based on faux intuitive experiences induced in me by a bumbling evil demon. (C) Therefore, I don’t know that modus ponens is correct ( Beebe 2011 : 590; the numbering of the premises and the conclusion of this argument has been changed; of course, nothing hangs on this). Interestingly, the argument above does not depend on establishing the invalidity of modus ponens . Those who take this form of inference to be valid would insist on the impossibility of demonstrating the inference’s invalidity: on their view, any such attempt would inevitably lead one into a contradiction. Rather, the argument is meant to challenge one’s knowledge that modus ponens is valid (or correct) on the grounds that one’s belief in the validity of this inference could be based on a bumbling evil demon. Whether modus ponens is ultimately valid or not, one cannot know that it is valid. SSkepticism.indbkepticism.indb 668686 110/24/20170/24/2017 99:37:42:37:42 PPMM SKEPTICISM ABOUT A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE 687 There is also a different route to a priori skepticism ( Beebe 2011 : 593–594). It emerges from the consideration of alternative logical and mathematical practices, in which established mathematical and logical truths may not hold. This route surfaces from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work (see Wittgenstein 1956 , as understood by Stroud 1965 ; for a discussion, see Beebe 2011 : 593–594). From the perspective of those who adopt the traditional view regarding logical and mathematical truths—according to which these truths are metaphysically necessary—one may not understand under what conditions mathematical and logical truths would be false. However, one’s inferential and calculation practices, which shape the relevant logical and mathematical results, could differ signifi cantly from the traditional ones. This would generate genuine alternatives to these practices, so that despite the agreement that modus ponens is valid, one would not agree that from p and if p then q , it would follow that q ; one could also follow the rule “adding 2” in such a way that after reaching 1,000, the rule continues as 1,004, 1,008, etc. It is ultimately a contingent fact that we developed the mathematical and logical concepts we currently have. Had the history of our species been different, we could have developed correspondingly different concepts. As Wittgenstein points out: I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize—then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him. ( Wittgenstein 1956 : I 141; quoted in Beebe 2011 : 594) It is possible then, in light of the contingency of the way in which mathematical and logical concepts have been developed, that these concepts could have evolved differently, thus resulting in different logical and mathematical practices (see also Stroud 1965 : 513, and Beebe 2011 : 594). As a result, one doesn’t know the correctness of one’s current mathematical and logical practices. It seems to me that a priori skepticism provides a signifi cant challenge to those who claim to know mathematical and logical results. But the challenge depends on the version of the challenge that is advanced. The second, contingency-based, formulation of this skeptical challenge seems to me more effective. The concern about the fi rst, brain-in-a-vat or evil-genius-based formulation, is that it invites a particular sort of Moorean response. One could easily complain that we have more reason to believe in the truth of the relevant mathematical and logical results than we have to believe in the truth of the second premise, (P2 ), of the argument for a priori skepticism, according to which we don’t know that our relevant logical or mathematical beliefs are not based on experiences induced by an evil demon (or that emerge from a brain-in-a-vat scenario). Of course, as a principled response to skepticism, this move blatantly begs the question, since it assumes that we know precisely those items that the skeptical argument challenges. From this point of view, the response is clearly ineffective. But one can think of it as expressing a particular attitude: one that dismisses the entire skeptical argument as being so general, so SSkepticism.indbkepticism.indb 668787 110/24/20170/24/2017 99:37:42:37:42 PPMM 688 SKEPTICISM detached from the particular mathematical and logical issues under consideration, that it verges on being irrelevant. The response reinforces the point that, due to its generality, there is very little in the fi rst argument for a priori skepticism that engages with the content of logical or mathematical beliefs per se. The fact that the argument is a particular instance of the usual brain-in-a-vat or evil-demon argument clearly illustrates this point.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Beyond Skepticism Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: the Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory Robert Justin Lipkin
    Cornell Law Review Volume 75 Article 2 Issue 4 May 1990 Beyond Skepticism Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory Robert Justin Lipkin Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Robert Justin Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory , 75 Cornell L. Rev. 810 (1990) Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol75/iss4/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BEYOND SKEPTICISM, FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE NEW FUZZINESS: THE ROLE OF WIDE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN LEGAL THEORY Robert Justin Liphint TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .............................................. 812 I. FOUNDATIONALISM AND SKEPTICISM ..................... 816 A. The Problem of Skepticism ........................ 816 B. Skepticism and Nihilism ........................... 819 1. Theoretical and PracticalSkepticism ................ 820 2. Subjectivism and Relativism ....................... 821 3. Epistemic and Conceptual Skepticism ................ 821 4. Radical Skepticism ............................... 822 C. Modified Skepticism ............................... 824 II. NEW FOUNDATIONALISM
    [Show full text]
  • Defense of Reductionism About Testimonial Justification of Beliefs
    Page 1 Forthcoming in Noûs A Defense of Reductionism about Testimonial Justification of Beliefs TOMOJI SHOGENJI Rhode Island College Abstract This paper defends reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs against two influential arguments. One is the empirical argument to the effect that the reductionist justification of our trust in testimony is either circular since it relies on testimonial evidence or else there is scarce evidence in support of our trust in testimony. The other is the transcendental argument to the effect that trust in testimony is a prerequisite for the very existence of testimonial evidence since without the presumption of people’s truthfulness we cannot interpret their utterances as testimony with propositional contents. This paper contends that the epistemic subject can interpret utterances as testimony with propositional contents without presupposing the credibility of testimony, and that evidence available to the normal epistemic subject can justify her trust in testimony. I. Introduction There has recently been a considerable interest in anti-reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs, according to which we cannot justify our trust in testimony by perceptual and memorial evidence.1 The reason for the interest is not the enticement of skepticism. Recent anti-reductionists hold that we are prima facie justified in trusting testimony simply because it is testimony. This means that there is a presumption in favor of testimony that it is credible unless contrary evidence is available. I will use the term “anti-reductionism” to refer to this non-skeptical version of anti-reductionism about testimonial justification. The more traditional position is reductionism, of which the most prominent advocate is David Hume.
    [Show full text]
  • Following the Argument Where It Leads
    Following The Argument Where It Leads Thomas Kelly Princeton University [email protected] Abstract: Throughout the history of western philosophy, the Socratic injunction to ‘follow the argument where it leads’ has exerted a powerful attraction. But what is it, exactly, to follow the argument where it leads? I explore this intellectual ideal and offer a modest proposal as to how we should understand it. On my proposal, following the argument where it leaves involves a kind of modalized reasonableness. I then consider the relationship between the ideal and common sense or 'Moorean' responses to revisionary philosophical theorizing. 1. Introduction Bertrand Russell devoted the thirteenth chapter of his History of Western Philosophy to the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. He concluded his discussion with a rather unflattering assessment: There is little of the true philosophic spirit in Aquinas. He does not, like the Platonic Socrates, set out to follow wherever the argument may lead. He is not engaged in an inquiry, the result of which it is impossible to know in advance. Before he begins to philosophize, he already knows the truth; it is declared in the Catholic faith. If he can find apparently rational arguments for some parts of the faith, so much the better: If he cannot, he need only fall back on revelation. The finding of arguments for a conclusion given in advance is not philosophy, but special pleading. I cannot, therefore, feel that he deserves to be put on a level with the best philosophers either of Greece or of modern times (1945: 463). The extent to which this is a fair assessment of Aquinas is controversial.1 My purpose in what follows, however, is not to defend Aquinas; nor is it to substantiate the charges that Russell brings against him.
    [Show full text]
  • The Problem of Induction
    The Problem of Induction Gilbert Harman Department of Philosophy, Princeton University Sanjeev R. Kulkarni Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University July 19, 2005 The Problem The problem of induction is sometimes motivated via a comparison between rules of induction and rules of deduction. Valid deductive rules are necessarily truth preserving, while inductive rules are not. So, for example, one valid deductive rule might be this: (D) From premises of the form “All F are G” and “a is F ,” the corresponding conclusion of the form “a is G” follows. The rule (D) is illustrated in the following depressing argument: (DA) All people are mortal. I am a person. So, I am mortal. The rule here is “valid” in the sense that there is no possible way in which premises satisfying the rule can be true without the corresponding conclusion also being true. A possible inductive rule might be this: (I) From premises of the form “Many many F s are known to be G,” “There are no known cases of F s that are not G,” and “a is F ,” the corresponding conclusion can be inferred of the form “a is G.” The rule (I) might be illustrated in the following “inductive argument.” (IA) Many many people are known to have been moral. There are no known cases of people who are not mortal. I am a person. So, I am mortal. 1 The rule (I) is not valid in the way that the deductive rule (D) is valid. The “premises” of the inductive inference (IA) could be true even though its “con- clusion” is not true.
    [Show full text]
  • “Forms of Philosophical Skepticism”
    “Forms of Philosophical Skepticism” James Conant Handout of Quotations, Examples, and Other Things I. Russell and the Nomads 1. Bertrand Russell’s Table Any statement as to what it is that our immediate experiences make us know is very likely to be wrong. It seems to me that I am now sitting in a chair, at a table of a certain shape, on which I see sheets of paper with writing or print…. All this seems to be so evident as to be hardly worth stating, except in answer to a man who doubts whether I know anything. Yet all this may be reasonably doubted, and all of it requires much careful discussion before we can be sure that we have stated it in a form that is wholly true. To make our difficulties plain, let us concentrate attention on the table. To the eye it is oblong, brown and shiny, to the touch it is smooth and cool and hard; when I tap it, it gives out a wooden sound…. [Then Russell proceeds to consider each of these qualities of the table.] The shape of the table is no better. … [T]he 'real' shape is not what we see; it is something inferred from what we see. And what we see is constantly changing in shape as we, move about the room; so that here again the senses seem not to give us the truth about the table itself, but only about the appearance of the table. … Thus it becomes evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the same as what we immediately experience by sight or touch or hearing.
    [Show full text]
  • Contextualist Responses to Skepticism
    Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy 6-27-2007 Contextualist Responses to Skepticism Luanne Gutherie Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Gutherie, Luanne, "Contextualist Responses to Skepticism." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2007. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/22 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CONTEXTUALIST RESPONSES TO SKEPTICISM by LUANNE GUTHERIE Under the Direction of Stephen Jacobson ABSTRACT External world skeptics argue that we have no knowledge of the external world. Contextualist theories of knowledge attempt to address the skeptical problem by maintaining that arguments for skepticism are effective only in certain contexts in which the standards for knowledge are so high that we cannot reach them. In ordinary contexts, however, the standards for knowledge fall back down to reachable levels and we again are able to have knowledge of the external world. In order to address the objection that contextualists confuse the standards for knowledge with the standards for warranted assertion, Keith DeRose appeals to the knowledge account of warranted assertion to argue that if one is warranted in asserting p, one also knows p. A skeptic, however, can maintain a context-invariant view of the knowledge account of assertion, in which case such an account would not provide my help to contextualism.
    [Show full text]
  • Two Varieties of Skepticism
    1 2 3 4 Two Varieties of Skepticism 5 6 James Conant 7 8 This paper distinguishes two varieties of skepticism and the varieties of 9 philosophical response those skepticisms have engendered. The aim of 10 the exercise is to furnish a perspicuous overview of some of the dialec- 11 tical relations that obtain across some of the range of problems that phi- 12 losophers have called (and continue to call) “skeptical”. I will argue that 13 such an overview affords a number of forms of philosophical insight.1 14 15 16 I. Cartesian and Kantian Varieties of Skepticism – A First Pass 17 at the Distinction 18 19 I will call the two varieties of skepticism in question Cartesian skepticism 20 and Kantian skepticism respectively.2 (These labels are admittedly conten- 21 tious.3 Nothing of substance hangs on my employing these rather than 22 23 1 The taxonomy is meant to serve as a descriptive tool for distinguishing various 24 sorts of philosophical standpoint. It is constructed in as philosophically neutral a 25 fashion as possible. The distinctions presented below upon which it rests are 26 ones that can be deployed by philosophers of very different persuasions regard- 27 less of their collateral philosophical commitments. A philosopher could make use of these distinctions to argue for any of a number of very different conclu- 28 sions. Some of the more specific philosophical claims that I myself express sym- 29 pathy for in the latter part of this part (e.g., regarding how these varieties of 30 skepticism are related to one another) do, however, turn on collateral philo- 31 sophical commitments.
    [Show full text]
  • How Not to Argue from Science to Skepticism
    international journal for the study of skepticism 4 (2014) 21-35 brill.com/skep How not to Argue from Science to Skepticism Stephen Maitzen Acadia University [email protected] Abstract For at least several decades, and arguably since the time of Descartes, it has been fash- ionable to offer scientific or quasi-scientific arguments for skepticism about human knowledge. I critique five attempts to argue for skeptical conclusions from the findings of science and scientifically informed common sense. Keywords skepticism – knowledge – science – appearance – eliminativism – underdetermina- tion – veil of perception 1 Introduction For at least several decades, and arguably since the time of Descartes, it has been fashionable to offer scientific or quasi-scientific arguments for skepti- cism about human knowledge. Indeed, when W. V. Quine describes this kind of skeptical program, he makes skepticism out to be as old as science itself, and science as old as common sense itself: Scepticism is an offshoot of science. The basis for scepticism is the aware- ness of illusion, the discovery that we must not always believe our eyes. … The sceptic’s example of the seemingly bent stick owes its force to our knowledge that sticks do not bend by immersion; and his examples of mirages, after-images, dreams, and the rest are similarly parasitic upon positive science, however primitive. … [S]ceptical doubts are scientific doubts. Quine 1975: 67–8 © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/22105700-03031081 <UN> 22 Maitzen In what follows, I critique five attempts to argue for skeptical conclusions from the findings of science and common sense.1 In my view, all five attempts fail.
    [Show full text]
  • Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume's Argument
    PSYCHOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND SKEPTICISM 1 IN HUME'S ARGUMENT ABOUT INDUCTION Do we yet understand Hume's project in his main argument about induction in Treatise I.iii.6? Is the argument skeptical? Is it even so much as epistemological, skeptical or otherwise? Or is it merely psychological? Although the literature has made much progress on these questions, we have not reached a full understanding of Hume's position. I hope to fill in some missing pieces of the interpretive puzzle. 1. THE SKEPTICAL INTERPRETATION OF I.iii.6 According to the skeptical interpretation of I.iii.6, the section advances the problem of 2 induction, in the fashion of Russell in the Problems of Philosophy. This interpretation, which held 3 sway for decades in the middle of the twentieth century, has its attractions. It is philosophically interesting. Also, it coheres with the Beattie-Reid tradition of interpretation, on which Hume is utterly destructive, an arch-skeptic with respect to causal necessity, the causal principle (that every new existence, or new modification of existence, has a cause), the external world, the substantial self, 4 and so forth. Finally, the skeptical interpretation, unsurprisingly, has some basis in the text. Section I.iii.6 does supply key premises of the skeptical problem: first, inductive inference presupposes that nature is uniform (T 88-89); second, there is no demonstrative argument to show that nature is uniform (T 89); and third, no probable argument could show that nature is uniform, without begging the question (T 89-90). Hume would also seem to draw the argument's conclusion, that there is no justification whatsoever for belief in the uniformity principle and hence for inductive inference: he writes in I.iii.
    [Show full text]
  • Empiricism and Skepticism: an Overview of Hume Philosophy
    Journal of Interdisciplinary Cycle Research ISSN NO: 0022-1945 Empiricism and Skepticism: An Overview of Hume Philosophy Sandeep Sharma Lecturer in Philosophy Government Degree College, Akhnoor [email protected] ABSTRACT The present paper has attempted to give insight about Hume philosophical ideas about empiricism and skepticism. It is because of the metaphysical as well as the epistemological uncertainty, which developed due to giving undue importance to innate principles accepted by modern rationalist; utmost importance is started given to the experience. But, what happens when experience itself push you in the field of skepticism. Empiricist believes that reason is not sufficient to explore the nature of ultimate reality. Therefore, Empiricism as an epistemological school develops in reaction to rationalism. Their primary aim was to take philosophy at zenith, as they accepting empiricism as a scientific approach as well as philosophical techniques to philosophizing. Empiricism came into existence with Locke, who survives with Berkeley and culminates in the writing of Hume. It is Hume who gave us the world view of empiricism as a system of philosophical enquiry, by limiting everything to experience which he has tried well to show how everything’s end up in skepticism. Focusing on this piece of writing the present paper has put light on the empiricism as a tool of philosophical inquiry and also its limitation which Hume has focused upon. Volume XII, Issue VI, June/2020 Page No:104 Journal of Interdisciplinary Cycle Research ISSN NO: 0022-1945 KEYWORDS: Empiricism, Skepticism, Knowledge, Causation, Impression, Ideas, Relation, Experience INTRODUCTION The epistemological turn in modern western philosophy attained a new height with the introduction of Locke’s work ‘The Essay Concerning Human Understanding’, where he explains the foundational doctrines of the empiricist school of philosophy.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Skepticism and Beyond
    Skepticism and Beyond Skepticism and beyond: A primer on Stroud’s later epistemology In Sképsis VII.14: 76-99. October 2016 Jason Bridges University of Chicago 1. Understanding the skeptical challenge A. The initial reflections in Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy purport to reveal that we are incapable of acquiring knowledge of the world around us. How is such an extraordinarily sweeping, and devastating, result supposed to be reached? Whatever we make of the details, the general strategy, at least, seems straightforward. In the course of his reflections, Descartes raises a question that we might express as follows, “How is it possible for us to have knowledge, by means of the senses, of things located outside us?” He then brings to bear an array of related considerations on this question, and on their basis arrives at an answer that can be put as follows: “Sorry to say, but it’s not in fact possible for us to have any knowledge, by means of the senses, of things located outside us.” The assessment, then, seems to be reached in an eminently familiar way: by argument. If we don’t like the assessment, it falls to us to find some error in the arguments for it. Central to Barry Stroud’s approach to skepticism is a suspicion of this straightforward accounting of the skeptic’s progress. Certainly it appears as if the skeptic raises a general question about our capacity for knowledge, and then argues toward a negative answer to that question. But are things as they appear? 1 Skepticism and Beyond B.
    [Show full text]
  • Pragmatism As American Exceptionalism
    University of New Orleans ScholarWorks@UNO Senior Honors Theses Undergraduate Showcase 5-2012 Pragmatism as American Exceptionalism Philip L. Wells University of New Orleans Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uno.edu/honors_theses Recommended Citation Wells, Philip L., "Pragmatism as American Exceptionalism" (2012). Senior Honors Theses. 23. https://scholarworks.uno.edu/honors_theses/23 This Honors Thesis-Unrestricted is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by ScholarWorks@UNO with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Honors Thesis-Unrestricted in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the work itself. This Honors Thesis-Unrestricted has been accepted for inclusion in Senior Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. For more information, please contact [email protected]. PRAGMATISM AS AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM An Honors Thesis Presented to the Department of Philosophy of the University of New Orleans In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts, with University Honors and Honors in Philosophy by Philip L. Wells May 2012 Table of Contents 1. Abstract.....................................................................................iii 2. Introduction................................................................................1 3. Pragmatism the Philosophy........................................................4 4. Peirce and James........................................................................6 5. Dewey's Politics and Experimental Philosophy.......................11 6. Kuhn's Description of Science Applied to Philosophy............13 7. Quine's Web of Belief..............................................................14 8.
    [Show full text]