Canadian Military History

Volume 3 Issue 1 Article 2

1994

The Defeat of the 12th SS: 7–10 June 1944

Oliver Haller Phillips Marburg University

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Recommended Citation Haller, Oliver "The Defeat of the 12th SS: 7–10 June 1944." Canadian Military History 3, 1 (1994)

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"While it seems clear the lack of battle experience hampered our formations in , one must remark that, although some of the German divisions were subject to the same disability, it appears to have had a less serious effect on them. The 12th S.S. Panzer , which was responsible for many of our troubles, was formed only in 1943 and had never fought before 7 June 1944. (As we have seen, however, it did contain a high proportion of experienced officers and N .C.Os. It also had the advantage, after the first days of the campaign, of having a commander and a senior staff officer who had special knowledge of the theatre of operations, having exercised there with the 1st S.S. Panzer Division in 1942.) There were other German divisions committed against us in Normandy which had not fought before and which nevertheless gave a good account of themselves. This may have been due in part to the fact that the German formations were on the defensive while ours were attacking, a more difficult role. Nevertheless, one suspects the Germans contrived to get more out oftheir training than we did. Perhaps their attitude towards such matters was less casual than ours." C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, p.277.

The Defeat of the 12th SS 7-10 June 1944

Oliver Haller

n the early hours of 6 June 1944, the first initial hours of the 7 June advance, these I reports of a major Allied operation were were brushed aside as the 7th and 9th transmitted to the 12th SS Hitleljugend Panzer Canadian Infantry Brigades moved forward Division. 1 In anticipation ofthe long-awaited in two separate thrusts, while 8th Brigade Allied invasion of occupied , a company dealt with the remaining German strong­ was sent to investigate the area. 2 Though points in the rear areas. the young soldiers of the division were uncertain of what actually awaited them, the The 9th Brigade's push towards first acts in a conflict that would claim most forced a German reaction to secure of their lives were being performed. However, the staging areas for a co-ordinated move defeat was not on their minds during that against the Allies. The initial German hectic morning-the men of the 12th SS were response was purely defensive. fixed on driving the "little fish" back into the Standartenjuehrer Kurt Meyer intercepted the sea. Canadian advance with a battlegroup composed of his 25th Panzer Grenadier The situation confronting the 12th SS Regiment and 50 PzKpfw IVs from the tank on June 7th was not encouraging. The 716th regiment's second battalion. 3 In the chaotic Bodenstaendig or Static Division, had lost melee that erupted, the Germans managed to two-thirds of its strength and was reduced to blunt and deflect the Canadian advance. isolated points of resistance. During the Though 9th Brigade failed to seize their objectives, they did draw German attention Opposite: "Invasion! The Gennan countenneasures from 7th Brigade which experienced only are in progress!" "moderate resistance," mainly "in the form of

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The embankment provided the Canadians a significant barrier to German armour. In order to advance frontally against the brigade "fortress," the Germans were required to first capture the village of Norrey in order to gain a passage for their tanks across the embankment. The villages themselves, consisting of "stone buildings and narrow thoroughfares," greatly enhanced the defender's resilience. 5 The Brigade was also anchored on its left flank by the Mue River, which was lined with hedges and farm walls. Worse still for the 12th SS, the natural terrain of the area consisted of flat fields and gentle rises interspersed with small wooded areas. The Canadians were able to use the church towers to view enemy movements over a large area.

The inherent advantages offered by terrain were not lost on the Canadians. The 7th Brigade busied itself during the lull in the fighting "to prepare defenses for the counter­ Lieutenant-Colonel F.M. Matheson, attack which was almost sure to come."6 Not Commanding Officer, Regina Rifles only were the troops given a "moment to relax 7 snipers. "4 By noon D+ 1, 7th Brigade had and scrounge something to eat, " but the settled down in anticipation of the expected German assault. The Regina Rifle Regiment established itself astride the Caen- road at Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse. Major StuartTubb, commanding"C" Company, took one look at the approaches to Bretteville and decided to occupy the village of Norrey-en­ Bessin a kilometre to the south. This position would allow the Reginas to dominate the approaches to Bretteville and the railway embankment. Brigadier Harry Foster questioned this decision, but Lieutenant­ Colonel F.M. Matheson, the commanding officer of the Reginas, insisted that Major Tubbs had made the right decision. Foster accepted his judgement.

Directly to the west, between the embankment and the highway, the Royal Winnipeg Rifles occupied Putot-en-Bessin. The Canadian Scottish Regiment took up a reserve position in Secqueville-en-Bessin. The 7th Brigade in crossing the Caen-Bayeux road and seizing the "high ground" in and around Bretteville, posed a formidable obstacle to any German advance along the Mqjor Stuart Tubbs, Commander, main lateral highway in . "C" Company, Regina Rifles

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From left to right: Standartenfiihrer Kurt Meyer, commanderofthe 25thPanzerGrenadier Regiment, Gruppenfiihrer Fritz Witt, commander of 12th SS Panzer Division, Obergruppenfiihrer Sepp Dietrich, commander ofl SS Panzer Corps, Sturmbannfiihrer Hubert Meyer, and Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander-in-ChiefWest.

formation's artillery and anti-tank guns were than its sister formation. The Regiment hustled into position. The guns of the 3rd established its headquarters in Cheux, Anti-Tank Regiment commanded the approximately 2 kilometres from Norrey.9 A approaches to both flanks and had a clear potentially dangerous 7 kilometre gap between line of sight over kilometres of flat and open and was filled, and Meyer's terrain. The FOOs (Forward Observation 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment could Officers) of 12th and 13th Field Regiments breathe easier knowing their left flank was were in position as were the machine guns defended. 10 However, the flanks of the division and mortars of the Cameron Highlanders of were by no means secure. On the left, near Ottawa. Audrieu and , the 12th SS Reconnaissance Battalion formed the only The men of the Canadian 7th Brigade obstacle to an Allied flanking attempt by the were first stirred into action by what appeared British 50th (Northumbrian) Division. Panzer­ to be a probing attack by the newly-arrived Lehr Division had not yet linked up with the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. At 2100 12th ss. hours on 7 June, the defenders of Putot "quickly repulsed" a small group of German Early on 8 June, Field Marshal Erwin infantry.8 The brigade could only expect an Rommel, realizing that time was running increase in German effort over the next 24 short, ordered the Seventh Army to throw the hours. The 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, three armoured divisions of the I SS Panzer owing to the greater distance it had to travel Corps at the advancing British and and the general lack of information regarding Canadians. 11 A concerted effort never Allied positions, arrived many hours later occurred. The 21st Panzer Division, brushing

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..:··· ... . .;·••• ...... · . 12 ss -

\

··~;hateau de St. Louis

~ Galmanche

12th SS Attacks on 7th Brigade. Note that this map is oriented as the Canadian soldiers would have viewed the battle, with south at the top of the map. Each thick arrow represents a 12th SS attack and the number indicates the date and time of the attack (ie. 08.0330-8 June, 3:30a.m.).

the right sleeve of the HitleTjugend, had been Despite their inability to concentrate so severely mauled on June 6th that it for a large counterattack against the Canadian mustered only 55 tanks, and could not and British divisions, the Germans were still disengage from combat with 3rd British determined to make preliminary moves for Division. 12 Kurt Meyer's 25th Panzer large-scale offensive operations. The villages Grenadier Regiment had committed its three of Norrey, Putot, and Bretteville, held by the infantry battalions against the Canadians in 7th Brigade, were to be cleared by the 26th the Buron area, and redeployment elsewhere Panzer Grenadier Regiment in order to open was impossible without surrendering Caen. 13 a corridor along the Caen-Bayeux road for the The I SS Panzer Corps could not immediately division's tanks. The three infantry battalions field the resources required for a of the 26th Regiment were ordered to comprehensive push to the sea. overwhelm the Canadians beginning in the early hours of 8 June. 14

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.. D" Company, Regina Rifles at , 8 June 1944

On June 7th, "D" Company Norrey-en-Bessin, beingthe were ready to pounce. of the Reginas was at furthest penetration of Al­ Mohnke then sent large Villeneuve just south of the lied Forces at that time,was numbers of Panzer Grena­ railway line with "B" Com­ to be used as the break-out diers to attack "D" Company pany to the north near Rots. point. They reckoned that in broad daylight. Down to After the Kurt Meyer group Norreywas heavily defended 45 men and two offiers, drove the 9th Brigade out of with little behind it so they myself and Lieutenant Dick Authie, Buron and Gruchy... made a two-pronged attack. Robt;:rts, we all had machine Colonel Matheson recalled The western thrust came guns of one sort or another the two companies to right at us. At least 14 (several German) and were Bretteville early on June 8th tanks sliced between "C" protected in our fortress-like and placed "B" Company on Company at Norrey and "D" position ... the Caen-Bayeux road fac­ Company at Cardonville. I I talked to Colonel ing south-east. He put Ma­ know because I was there Clifford of the 13th Field jor Eric Syme in command (in the dark). The ensuing Regiment who was with Fos­ of "Baker." He asked me to battle was horrendous with ter Matheson and gave him command "Dog" Company the tanks circling our solid coordinates for a 105-mm and to occupy Cardonville stone house and surround­ barrage on the Germans at south-west of Bretteville ing high stone walls. The the farm in front ofour south astride the railway line ... night was lit by the burning wall. It was the best shoot My company was facing a barns at the farm and the that I ever saw in my nine farm just south of the rail­ tanks overran one platoon months of action. The Ger­ way line then occupied by in the orchard behind the mans were caught in open 12th SS Panzer Grenadiers north wall crushing anti­ ground and had to with­ from Mahnke's 26th Regi­ tank guns, carriers and sol­ draw. ment ... diers. The tanks ultimately It is clear now that the left what remained of us at Gordon Brown Germans thought that first light as our Typhoons (Lt-Col. ret'd) April23, 1994

At 0330 hours, under the cover of Sturmbannjuehrer Bernhard Krause's darkness, three companies ofthe 26th Panzer battalion had no intention of achieving Grenadier Regiment's 1st Battalion moved surprise even though the attack was not north from their staging areas at Cheux. The supported by artillery. Battalion hoped to envelop the Regina Rifle Regiment in Norrey by striking from two To the Reginas left, the German 1st and directions. The 1st and 3rd Companies 3rd Companies passed through St. Manvieu pressed forward to the right of Norrey, while and crossed the Mue River. The Reginas the 2nd Company moved to the left of the reacted with a torrent of small arms fire village. The German movements had not supported by artillery. The advancing escaped Canadian attention. The Reginas HitleTjugend threw themselves to the ground, reported several armoured personnel carriers suffering casualties, and a spray of machine­ churning their way towards Norrey and the gun fire struck down a company commander. embankment. 15 It appears that The assault was temporarily suspended, and

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the two companies dug deep into the soil. The 12th SS fared better on the Canadian right. The 2nd Company managed to move quickly past Norrey and charge across the embankment. However, the failure of the other two formations forced the extended 2nd Company to withdraw and entrench itself behind the embankment and within Cardonville - a group of houses near the edge of Bretteville. 16

The Regina Rifle War Diary described the assault as a minor "counter-attack."17 In fact, the Reginas had easily repulsed an enemy battalion hoping to force a breakthrough in a poorly executed operation. The assault had been undertaken without artillery support even though no efforts were made to surprise the entrenched opponents. Hubert Meyer insists that this serious failure was due to Canadian radio interference which prevented the forward observer from communicating

Left: A forward outpost of the Regina Rifles in Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse, 8-10 June 1944. (Photo by D.I. Grant, NAC PA 129042) Below: A young trooper from the 12th SS.

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with his battery. 18 Without the suppressing We were offered a glimpse of the most effect of artillery, the Hitlerjugend were quite horrific face of war. The enemy had vulnerable to Canadian fire. The 1st Battalion systematically hacked an element of the Panzer-Lehr Division to pieces with heavy was continuously pounded by Canadian artillery. Beside the obliterated vehicles artillery throughout the attack, and the and weapons lay the pieces of our pinned-down German companies waited out Comrades. Others hung from the trees. It the storm in forced silence. The assault cost commanded a dreadful silence.22 the battalion approximately twenty-five casualties, while the Canadians suffered In fact, the reconnaissance detachment could minimal losses. 19 That the Regina Rifle only watch as Audrieu and a nearby chateau Regiment was unaware of the full extent of were reduced to rubble by naval artillery. The the attack's scale is a testament to their troops were forced back about a kilometre to success. The Hitlerjugend had failed in their Cristot to construct a new defensive position. 23 first push. Artillery alone had forced the outcome.

The second attempt at a breakthrough The one reverse the Canadians suffered came after dawn. To the immediate left of on 8 June was caused by the 2nd Battalion's Krause's formation, the 2nd Battalion, assault against the unprotected flank of the commanded by Sturmbannfuehrer Siebken, 7th Brigade. At 0630 hours, Siebken's massed had methodically advanced to its starting companies rushed the 1. 5 kilometre distance point around le Mesnil-Patry. Again highlighting the confusion present within the between le Mesnil-Patry and their objective of 24 12th SS, the battalion delayed its assault for Putot. Canadian radio interference was three hours owing to an order demanding overcome and German artillery and mortars careful progress forward. 20 It did not attack saturated the village with high-explosives in conjunction with the 1st Battalion as before the Hitlerjugend stormed across a planned. Neither did the Regiment's 3rd railway bridge in front of the Royal Winnipeg Battalion. Rifles' "A" Company. 25 The Canadians resisted the initial assault, and the concentrated Bren Commanded by Sturmbannfuehrer Erich and rifle fire "swept the enemy infantry away Olboeter, the 3rd Battalion along with the like a scythe to hay."26 Despite their losses, 12th SS Reconnaissance Detachment or the young men of the 2nd Battalion "came on Aujklaerungsabteilung, were ordered to seize inexorably, taking little evasive action despite the villages to the immediate left of the 2nd the heavy fire that greeted them. "27 The Royal 21 Battalion in order to secure their flank. As Winnipeg Rifles remained steadfast. Finally the Canadian 7th Brigade had not extended sickened by their losses, the Hitlerjugend itself as far as Brouay, the German objective, retreated to regroup. Hubert Meyer, the Olboeter's troops seized the village without interference. The area was the responsibility official historian of the 12th SS, records that of the British 50th Division, which had not the 2nd Battalion now understood the extent yet advanced as far as the Canadians. The of the Canadian defensive preparations. 28 Not Reconnaissance Detachment established easily daunted, Siebken's troops prepared a itself in Audrieu linking up with forward second assault. elements of Panzer Lehr. Positioned on the embankment, the Germans posed a threat to Prior to their next advance, the Germans the axis between the British and Canadian shelled Putot extensively. The bombardment, divisions. which included air-bursting "88" shells, inflicted heavy casualties on the Canadian However, British gunfire systematically defenders. 29 Oddly enough, snipers, thought pounded the Germans until they withdrew. Oberscharfuehrer Hans-Georg Kesslar of the to be from the 716th Infantry Division, "came 3rd Battalion described the frightening results to life in the buildings throughout the town of the bombardment on an element of the and made it difficult to move in the whole Panzer-Lehr Division: battalion area. "30 Beginning at 0930 hours,

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the Panzer Grenadiers resumed the attack equipment to repulse a determined assault with a now more cautious advance around supported by armour. The Germans had the Canadian strong points in Putot. By found it difficult to move anti-tank weaponry midday, the Hitlerjugend had crossed the into Putot, owing to the interference of embankment and overrun the village - Canadian artillery, and shortages of infantry enveloping "A," "B" and "C" Companies. 31 anti-tank weaponry.38 The Hitlerjugend Exhausted and short of ammunition, the withdrew from Putot in the face of the formations attempted to break out using the Canadian attack, and streamed towards the cover of a thick smoke-screen in order to link embankment. Though the village was in up with the still intact "D" Company.32 Only Canadian hands by 2130 hours, the chaotic a few soldiers managed to escape the battle continued to rage on its perimeter, as encirclement, while the remainder "acquitted small groups of men stumbled through the themselves like Napoleon's Guard at descending darkness. Captain P.F. Ramsey, Waterloo. "33 With heavy losses on both sides, second-in-command of "B" Company, the Hitlerjugend had seized Putot. Canadian Scottish Regiment, described the battlefield as a: Third Canadian Division responded quickly. Four regiments of artillery were ... Hornet's Nest. No other term is quite brought to bear on Putot, and the soldiers of so descriptive of that hot spot. Mortaring the 2nd Battalion were sent scurrying for was still going on in strength and all the cover.34 The 12th SS withstood the heavy cacophony of the full dress infantry battle barrage, however, and it became painfully with artillery and tank support filled the obvious that a counterattack was necessary still evening air. The distinctive Burrp of to regain the village. the German Machine Guns punctuated the staccato of the Bren. Over all was a fog Brigadier Harry Foster made quick of dust and smoke. 39 preparations for the assault. At 1700 hours, a battlegroup was formed using the brigade's The Canadian counterattack succeeded . reserve battalion, the Canadian Scottish and forced Siebken's 2nd Battalion to Regiment, reinforced by two squadrons from withdraw south of the embankment in order the 6th Armoured Regiment and elements of to regroup. 40 The Canadian Scottish dug-in the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG). and consolidated, while the badly mauled The attack would be supported by the 12th Royal Winnipeg Rifles withdrew to the rearY and 13th Field Artillery Regiments. The Putot had been retaken, and the brigade formation was to advance with two companies fortress was once again secure. in the lead, two in reserve, with the squadrons of tanks covering the flanks. 35 The battlegrou p The advance of the Hitlerjugend's 2nd proceeded quickly towards their collection Battalion had yielded nothing. Hubert Meyer point at la Bergerie Farm woods, and states that German losses amounted to 19 assembled for action. It was hoped that the dead, 58 wounded and 21 missing- the 6th counterattack would begin at around 2030 Company being effectively halved. 42 These hours. statistics are almost certainly too low. 43 On the other hand, the Canadian Scottish Managing to meet the deadline, "D" and suffered 125 casualties, while the Winnipeg "C" Companies moved in behind a creeping Rifles incurred 256.44 The fighting for Putot barrage of exceptional force. 36 Mirroring the had taken on a First World War dimension - previous defenders of Putot, the dazed and heavy attrition for limited gains. The 1st and exhausted Hitlerjugend manned their 2nd Battalions of the 26th Panzer Grenadier automatic weapons and sprayed the Regiment had failed to dislodge the Canadian advancing battlegroup with machine-gun fire 7th Brigade from their defensive position, -killing two officers outright in the charge. 37 and the proposed route of advance to the sea Yet, the Panzer Grenadiers lacked the remained shut.

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Panther knocked out by Reginas using PlATs and grenades in Bretteville on the night of 8 June. (Photo by F.L. Dubervill. NAC PA 130149) From the tower of the imposing Abbey the 7th Brigade in Norrey and trap them Ardennes, Kurt Meyer had monitored the against the Caen-Bayeux highway. Meyer dismal progress ofMoehnke's regiment during decided it was his turn to seize the staging its fruitless attempts to clear the 7th Brigade areas for the drive to the sea. off of the Caen-Bayeux road. The Standartenfuehrer was still concerned, The Canadians anticipated a German however, with the movement of Canadian 9th move along the Caen-Bayeux highway. The Brigade into the region. Any concerted Regina Rifles had reported groups of tanks effort south through Rots threatened to divide advancing on their positions as early as 1220 the two Panzer Grenadier Regiments, and hours and again at 1700 hours. The War eliminate any planned offensive.45 After Diaries record that both assaults were further analysis, Meyer correctly discerned repulsed.48 Though Hubert Meyer maintains that the enemy concentration was defensive that the HWeTjugend had not conducted in nature. Since the 9th Brigade had been armoured operations that early in the day, held in front of Carpiquet and Caen, and both suggesting that the Canadians had simply Canadians and Germans were well erred, it is evident that 3rd Division was entrenched, Meyer decided to turn his assuming the next blow would fall in the area attention west- "I came to the conclusion to of Bretteville. 49 help my division on my regiment's left flank with a thrust towards Bayeux."46 Not only Meyer's plan required the armour of would such a move aid the hard-pressed 1st Max Wuensche's 12th SS Panzer Regiment­ Battalion near Norrey, but it would close the whose tanks were still assembling near four-mile gap between the two Panzer Franqueville. 50 The plan called for the seizure Grenadier Regiments. 47 The assault also of Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse prior to the promised to outflank the forward elements of advance towards Bayeux. 51 Why Meyer

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thought that he could easily breach the south, but other tanks were ignited by the Canadian defenses, considering the accurate artillery fire. 59 difficulties of the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, is difficult to understand. In Tanks from the 4th Panzer Company comparison to the previous battles, the forces then attempted to churn their way into the allocated to Meyer's grandiose operation were eastern edge of Bretteville, but anti-tank fire strangely small. The Kampjgruppe consisted destroyed the command tank, and the infantry of the 15th Kradschuetz or Motorcycle dismounted to storm forward on foot. 60 The Company, two companies of the 1st Panzer Germans were taken aback by the ferocity of Detachment, and a battery of self-propelled the Canadian response. "We were surprised artillery. 52 The three motorized infantry by heavy anti-tank weapons."61 Due to the battalions of the 25th Panzer Grenadier intense small arms fire, the small numbers of Regiment were fully committed against the infantry could not press the attack and went Canadian 9th Brigade, and Meyer had to to ground. The Kampjgruppe had shattered force a company of engineers into the line to the Reginas' outer defenses- "several carriers free up the 15th Motorcycle Company for the were knocked out and their position assault. 53 Only when the preparations were overrun,"62 but before assaulting Bretteville completed did Meyer inform the divisional itself, the German armour shelled the village commander of his decision and he then went at a distance of about 300 yards. This to sleep. 54 Meyer had decided to delay the continued for approximately half an hour attack until dusk to avoid the hazards of air before the Panthers again ventured forward. attack. At midnight, two German tanks approached the Regina headquarters. The Canadians At approximately 2200 hours, the swarmed the advancing armour. One Panther Kampfgruppe began to roll down the Caen­ was dispatched with multiple PlAT hits and a Bayeux road towards Bretteville. The few "necklace of 75 grenades," and the other infantrymen designated for the mission quickly withdrew after firing "like a child in a hopped onto the Panthers, and Meyer fulfilled tantrum."63 Without sufficient infantry his promise to the 15th Motorcycle Company support, the 12th SS armour circled the by leading them into their first battle. 55 The village helplessly, and the fires they ignited group quickly by-passed the unoccupied with their 75-mm guns merely created more village of le Bourg and crossed the Mue River light for the Canadians to shoot by - "The on an intact bridge. Under the cover of whole sky was aglow with gun fire, blazing twilight, the German armour advanced to buildings and the dazzling of the Canadian within a few hundred meters of Bretteville Parachute flares, which illuminated the before the Canadians opened fire. The PANZERS for the defenders' anti-tank guns Panthers halted. 56 and blinded the German crews."64 It was difficult for the combatants to understand The torrent of Regina machine-gun fire what was happening in the chaotic battle. At was well aimed, and the commander of the one point, a confused German officer rode his 15th Motorcycle Company was struck in the Volkswagen down the main street, stomach - "he fell down to the road to the "dismounted and gazed around for a few edge ofthe ditch."57 Meyer's motorcycle then seconds until a PlAT gunner let fly a bomb took a direct hit which instantly killed the which hit him directly."65 As late as 0445 driver and set the Standartenjuehrerablaze. 58 hours, the Hitlerjugend were putting in Meyer's men extinguished the fire, and the "determined attacks."66 But without undaunted commander led the wildly-firing additional infantry there was little hope of Panthers onto the objective. The six-pounders success. of the 3rd Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment, supporting "A" Company of the Regina Rifles Late in the assault, Meyer and Wuensche with a single troop, claimed six tanks knocked­ had attempted to reach the 1st Battalion of out in the first charge. The Hitlerjugend the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, in order attempted to shift the attack towards the to collect infantry to support the tanks, but

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Sherman Firefly 17-pounder (Photo by Ken Belt NAC PA 131391)

they were driven off by the heavy anti-tank the tanks and get flank shots in individual fire. 67 Moreover, the 1st Battalion was pinned vehicles. Denuded of their infantry, the down by the single company in Norrey and Panthers were helpless. The most startling they remained in their fox-holes. Reluctantly, fact was Meyer's insistence on remaining in Meyer ordered the withdrawal back to Rots.68 the Bretteville area for the rest of the night The Canadians had again repulsed a German when success was plainly impossible. The attack. Altogether, the casualties of Meyer's Standartenfuehrer's actions might be Kampfgruppe totalled 152 with 43 dead. 69 considered those of a confused and desperate According to the Germans, at least six man. With no one was exercising command Panthers were destroyed, though the and control, confusion reigned. Canadians claimed twelve. The improvised assault had been repulsed, and the Canadian Throughout the assault on Bretteville, "fortress" inNarrey- Putot-Bretteville remained the 12th SS Panzer Regiment's 3rd Company intact. sat idle in Authie. This formation was the last to arrive in the staging area near Franqueville The 12th SS had attempted to seize a and was unable to participate in the first defended position without sufficient infantry attack on Bretteville. Kurt Meyer, who had support. Meyer himself realized this as the intercepted the formation on a motorcycle, fundamental reason for failure, though he had initially ordered the Panthers to support was quick to cite the strength of the Canadian the 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment north of position. 70 However, it should have been Caen. Though the 3rd Company crews heard plain to a man of his experience that infantry the noise of a fierce battle to the southwest, have inherent advantages over armour in they were not aware a major operation was close-quarter combat; they are able to swarm being conducted. 71

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At around 0900 hours on the morning As the Panthers approached the village, of 9 June, the 3rd Company was replaced in not yet facing any enemy fire, Luedemann the line by a detachment of PzKpfw IVs, ordered the company to swing left. The five allowing the company to rumble through Rots tanks of the 3rd section hugging the rail towards la Villeneuve on the Caen-Bayeux embankment were forced to speed past the highway. When the company reached the 2nd section in order to keep a solid line of junction, the crews received their first orders tanks facing N orrey. The four tanks of the 1st to assault Norrey. Together with an infantry section had by this point slowed to form a attack from the 1st Battalion of the 26th reserve. Although the order to swing left, Panzer Grenadier Regiment south of the presenting the Panther's thicker frontal village, the Panthers were ordered to Norrey armour to the Canadian defenders in Norrey, with the support of a small number of infantry was an understandable action, it had from the 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. consequences that the HitleTjugend had not The assault would depend once more on anticipated. surprise, as the 12th SS could provide no artillery support. 72 Nine Sherman tanks including several "Fireflys" equipped with the 17 -pounder, were Hubert Meyer states that no one knows being moved towards the front to reinforce who developed the plan for the assault. The the Reginas' position in Norrey. As the tanks, commander of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment from the Elgin Regiment, were making a detour had been wounded, and was consequently in front of the village when they spotted the being attended to at a field hospital. In all advancing Panthers. Catastrophically for the probability, the scheme was once again 3rd Panzer Company, the swing to the left, devised by Standartenjuehrer Kurt Meyer, though protecting them from the 6-pounders who was being pressured to seize the staging in Norrey, exposed their flanks to the areas for a German offensive. The villages Shermans at not more than 1000 metres controlled by the 7th Brigade were still distance. The Canadian tanks deployed in a considered vital starting-points for the plan straight line and opened fire. 76 A "Firefly" to work.73 The Panthers were ordered to commanded by Lieu tenant Henry hit the tank launch their assault at 1300 hours when the nearest the rail-line first. Adolf Morawetz Tactical Air Forces, still based in Britain, thought he had struck a mine; "after a dull would be absent. bang and shaking, as if the tracks had been ripped off, the tank came to a standstill. "77 From la Villeneuve, the 3rd Company After another bang, the ammunition for the crossed the rail embankment through an MG-42 ignited and the Panther burst into underpass, turned right and deployed for flames. Before Morawetz desperately battle. The 12 Panthers fanned out in a single attempted to open the hatch he had just line at a right-angle to the embankment. A closed, he looked through his periscope and few minutes past 1230 hours, the company watched as the neighbouring Panther began the attack on Norrey - across open exploded- throwing the turret into the air. and flat terrain covered by wheatfields. 74 The Morawetz survived, but his tank and crew company was led by Hauptmann Luedemann, had been destroyed. Six other Panthers were as the commander, Oberststurmfuehrer von quickly dispatched in the next four minutes. Ribbentrop, had been wounded earlier. The survivors, including the badly burned crews who had bailed out of their destroyed Though von Ribbentrop merely watched tanks, fled back towards the underpass. The from the rear area along with Max Wuensche, infantry were forced to join the men of the 2nd he had recommended that the company drive Company under the bridge, as an artillery at high speeds in a broad front- only stopping barrage began to pound the area inflicting to fire their 75-mm guns. Luedemann followed heavy casualties. The converging attack of Ribbentrop's advice, and the infantry were the 1st Battalion of the 25th Panzer Grenadiers left far behind. 75 never materialized. The assault was a complete and total failure. 78

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The anti-tank weapons around Bretteville were so powerful that outflanking movements to the north and south were thwarted. The surprising employment of parachute magnesium flares blinded the Panthers and lighted clear targets for the enemy anti-tank guns. Our opponents were especially strong on the defensive, and they did not allow themselves to be surprised. They fought ferociously and bravely. 80

On the other hand, the Canadians were less than impressed with German offensive capabilities, though they did not question their enemy's spirit. Brigadier Harry Foster, commander of 7th Brigade, pointed out that the 12th SS did not attempt to take advantage of the open flanks of the Regina Rifles, and the "enemy flung himself straight against the strongest points and utterly failed to exploit the undoubted weakness of his opponent's position."81 Even C.P. Stacey argues that the Hitlerjugend assaults "leave the impression The face of defeat: a panzer-grenadier from the 12th of rather hasty and ineffective improvisation. SS captured by the Canadians. The attacks were pressed with courage and determination but with no particular The gallant stand of the 7th Brigade skill . . . the operations seem to have been against Hitlerjugend impressed two thoughts locally conceived and control on the divisional on the mind of the German commanders. level was ineffective."82 The disjointed timing First, since the 12th SS was unable to throw of the assaults, with Kurt Meyer's the Canadians off the Caen-Bayeux highway, Kampjgruppe advancing on Bretteville hours the planned drive to the sea was considered after the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment hopeless. General Geyrvon Schweppenburg, had been repulsed from Putot and Norrey, commander of the recently activated Panzer suggests that the regiments were not Group West, visited Kurt Meyer at the Abbaye communicating effectively, if at all. That Ardenne on 9 June to evaluate the progress of Meyer and Wuensche were forced to drive the Hitlerjugend. On hearing the towards the 1st Battalion, in order to scrape Standartenfuehrer's report, von up support for their failing assault, was Schweppenburg uttered a sardonic reply - indicative of a general lack of communication, "My dear Meyer, the war can only now be won command and control. Clearly, the through political means."79 The command Hitlerjugend efforts were not those of an structure in disarray, the Germans and the exceptional division. 12th SS were now firmly on the defensive. The battles also highlight the problems A second thought was impressed on the of offensive action in Normandy. The fields minds of the officers and men of the 12th SS. around Caen were relatively open and the The Canadian 3rd Division was considered a notorious "bocage" lay to the Canadian right. formation of exceptional skill, and the artillery The battle area seemed to furnish ideal tank which they commanded inspired nothing short country owing to its apparent lack of of fear. Allied high explosives had time and significant obstacles, but it also provided again inflicted severe wounds on the ideal conditions for anti-tank gunners. The Hitlerjugend. Hubert Meyer summarized this German Panthers paid a heavy price for feeling: movement out of dug-in defenses.

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It is evident that the 12th SS was not NOTES capable of conducting successful offensive operations against prepared positions in Normandy. Artillery and anti-tankguns were l. A sentry alerted the 12th SS Hitleljugend the key to victory, and the Allies possessed Panzer Division as early as 0230 hours on D-Day. See large numbers ofthese effective weapons. All Hubert Meyer, Kriegsgeschichte der 12 SS-Panzer­ of the German assaults were checked and division "Hitleljugend" (Osnabrueck: Murrin Verlag defeated in detail. The GbmH, 1987) p.52 and NAC RG 238, Records of had won a decisive victory. Proceedings, Trial of Kurt Meyer, p.526. 2. The Company began its move as early as 0400 hours. Meyer, p.53. This study has shown the need for re­ 3. Craig Luther. Blood and Honour: The History of the evaluating the traditional arguments about 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitler Youth," 1943-1945 the military effectiveness of 12th SS and 3rd (San Jose, California: R. James Bender Publications, Canadian Infantry Divisions. If the true 1987) p.l29. 4. Rginald H. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Nonnandy nature of the Normandy campaign is to be Canadian War Museum Publication No.l9. (Ottawa: understood the historian must avoid a MacMillan, 1984) pp.30-3l. simplistic approach. The strengths and 5. Luther, p.l53. weaknesses of specific military operations 6. Roy, p.229. must be evaluated without relying on broad 7. NAC RG 24, Vol.l4,46l. War Diary (WD). 12th Field Regiment, 7-10 June 1944. generalizations. Only then can the myths be 8. Eric Wells, Little Black Devils: A History of the Royal swept away. The initial Normandy battles Winnipeg Rifles (Winnipeg: Foye Publishing, 1983) were significantly influenced by the p.l50. relationship of heavy weaponry to terrain, as 9. Meyer, p.88. well as by command and control problems. It 10. Ibid. 11. Luther, p.l50. became evident that offensive operations had 12. Ibid. become dangerous undertakings - a reality 13. Ibid. that would plague the Allies for the remainder 14. Due primarily to the embankment, the 12th SS divi­ of the Normandy campaign, and give rise to sional commander decided on a frontal assault using the myth of German military superiority. If infantry. (Meyer, p.92) The Canadian War Diaries are misleading in repeatedly recording visual contact only the initial battles were to be considered, with German tanks- "At 0858 enemy tanks were a German army official historian might seen at 963703. 8 tanks were seen at 9220 and conclude, in words borrowed from C.P. reported to Bde HQ. At 1220 enemy tanks reported Stacey:83 advancing along road to our HQ. At 1100 hours, "D" Coy reported enemy tanks in considerable strength 1000 yards to their front." (NAC RG 24, Vol.l5,198, While it seems clear that lack of battle WD. TheReginaRifleRegiment, 7-lOJune 1944.) The experience hampered the German forma­ Panthers and PzKpfur IVs would not enter the melee tions in Normandy one must remark that until the evening of 8 June. The best explanation for although some of the Allied divisions were this error is that in the chaos of battle the Canadians subject to the same disability it appears to confused armoured personnel carriers (Panzers­ have had a less serious effect on them. The paehwagen) and self-propelled guns with tanks. 3rd Canadian Division which was responsi­ 15. NAC RG 24, Vol.l5, 198, WD, The Regina Rifle ble for many of our troubles was formed in Regiment (RR). 7-10 June 1944. 1940 but had never fought before 6 June 16. Meyer, p.92. 1944. Moreover it did not contain a high 17. NAC RG 24, Vol.l5,198, WD, RR, 7-lOJune 1944. proportion of experienced officers and NCOs. 18. Meyer, p.92. There were also other Allied Divisions in 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid., p.93. Normandy which had not fought before and 21. Ibid., p.95. which nevertheless gave a very good ac­ 22. Translation of: "Hier bot sich uns das schrecklichste count of themselves. This may have been Bild des Krieges. Der Feind hatte eine Einheit der due to the fact that heavy reverses were Panzer-Lehr Division mit schweren Waffen regelrecht suffered when Allied divisions were on the zerhackt. auseinandergerissene Schuetzpanzer­ defensive when ours were attacking, a more wagen undAusruestungen daneben lagen Koerperteilen, difficult role. Nevertheless one suspects der gefallenen Kameraden oder hingen in dem that the Allies contrived to get more out of Baeumen. Es herschte grausame Stille." Ibid., p.95. their training than we did ... 23. Ibid., p.98.

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24. Ibid. 70. Luther, p.168. 25. NAC RG 24, Vol.15,233, WD, The Royal Winnipeg 71. Meyer, pp.105-106. Rifles Regiment (RWR). 7-10 June 1944. 72. Ibid .. p.l06. 26. Wells, p.157. 73. Ibid .. p.l05. 27. Luther, p.157. 74. Ibid., p.106. 28. Meyer, p.93. 75. Ibid., and Georges Bernage, Les Canadiens Face A La 29. Wells, p.15l. Hit[eljugend: 7-11 Juin 1944 (Heimdal, 1991) p.65. 30. NAC RG 24, Vol.l5,233, WD, RWR, 7-10 June 1944. 76. Though the issue of how the Panthers were destroyed 31. Luther, p.15l. so quickly is still mysterious, the presence of the 32. Stacey, p.135. "Fireflies" goes far to explaining the German debacle. 33. Wells, p.52. Bernage, pp.66-67. 34. NAC RG 24, Vol.l5,233, WD, RWR, 7-10 June 1944. 77. Translation from:" ... als nach einem dumpfen 35. Roy, p.233. Knall und einem Schaukeln, als ob die Kette abgerrisen 36. Ibid. waere, der Magen zum stehen kam." Meyer, p.106. 37. NAC RG 24, Vol.15,036, WD, The Canadian Scottish 78. Ibid. pp.l05-106. Regiment (CSR), 7-10 June 1944. 79. Luther, p.170. 38. Meyer, p.94. 80. Translation from: "Die Panzerabwehr rund urn das 39. NAC RG 24, Vol.l5,036, WD, CSR, 7-10 June 1944. Dorf[Bretteville] war so stark, dass Umgehungsversuche 40. Luther, p.157. der Panzer im Sueden und im Norden vereitelt werden 41. Ibid. konnten. Der ueberraschende Einsatz von Leuchtfall 42. Meyer, p.95. schirmen mit grellem Magnesium licht blendete die 43. Considering the fact that the 1st Battalion's casual Panther und beleutete sie klar fuer die feindliche PAK. ties were listed as 25, for an action that was both Dieser Gegnerwar in der Abwehr besonders stark und much shorter in duration and subdued in intensity, it liess sich nicht ueberrumpeln. Er kaempfte hart und is doubtful that the Germans suffered only less than tapfer." Meyer, p.104. four times that total in Putot. Second, that the 81. Stacey, p.137. Canadians suffered almost four times the German 82. Ibid. total, even when allowing for the fact that the 83. Adapted from Stacey, p.277. Winnipeg Rifle Regiment was overrun, is difficult to understand. The intensity of Canadian artillery. their use of tanks against an infantry short in anti­ tank weapons, and the nature of the terrain makes Meyer's estimates seem slightly off. 44. Stacey, p.136. Oliver Haller, a graduate of Wilfrid 45. NAC RG 238, Records of Proceedings, p.586. 46. Ibid., p.586. Laurier University, is currently pursuing 47. Luther, p.162. advanced studies at Phillips Marburg 48. NAC RG24, Vol.l5,198, WD, RR, 7-10June 1944. University in Germany. This essay is 49. Meyer, p.100. based on his Laurier B.A. thesis. 50. Records of Proceedings, p.594. 51. Luther, p.162. 52. Meyer, p.100. 53. Records of Proceedings, p.587. 54. Ibid., p.594. 55. Meyer, p.100. 56. Ibid. 57. Records of Proceedings, p.595. 58. Ibid. 59. Stan Medland, unpublished account of the 3rd Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment, p.9. 60. Meyer, p.100. 61. Translation of: "Wir wurden von einem heftigen PAK-Feuer ueberascht, der Ortsrand shein von einer grossen Anzahl Panzerabwehrkanonen besetzt." Meyer, p.100. 62. NAC RG 24, Vol.l5,198, WD, RR, 7-10 June 1944. 63. Ibid. 64. Medland, p.9. 65. Ibid. 66. NAC RG 24, Vol.l5,198, WD. RWR, 7-10June 1944. 67. Meyer, p.102. 68. Ibid., p.105. 69. Ibid., p.103.

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