THE RESETTLEMENT POLICY IN URBAN CENTRES: THE CASE STUDY OF ABUJA

BY

TALLE MUSA SA'EED MASTERS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION NO: 95428091

BEING A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAi, RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF ABUJA, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE AWARD OF A MASTER'S DEGREE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (MPA)

APRIL 1999 CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this project has been presented by Talle Musa Sa'eed and has been approved accordingly.

'°' J oo Supervisor Date I DR. IRO IRO UKE ftJ!i;Pk Head of PROFESSOR UMAR M. BIRARIIZ'.

External Examiner Date DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the following people:

Alhaji Danladi Ismaila - Chief of Karshi

Alhaji Saidu Makaman Karshi - My father

Hajiya Fatima Maichibi Saidu - My mother

Late Alhaji Talle Keffi - My guardian

Late Alhaji Abdulkadir Mamman - My cousin

11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to acknowledge the efforts of all the people who have in one way or the other

contributed to the successful pursuit of this project. However, I would like to first of all, express profound gratitude to the Almighty Allah (SWT) for graciously enabling both my physical and mental condition to undertake the entire programme and the project in particular. Then my sincere appreciation go to my research supervisor, Dr. I.I. Uke who greatly guided and assisted me through, and even on his sick bed! Indeed, may the Almighty God fasten his complete recovery . I also like to thank Mallam Mohammed Haruna Funky,

Mallam Idris 0. Jibrin and Mr. Martins Oloja, former Editor of Abuja Newsday, all of whom assisted me with relevant materials in the cause of the research. Besides, I should want to express my thanks to some of my political friends and associates, namely, Alhaja Basirat Aj iborishe, Princess Vivian Ndigwe Anazodo, Emma Nnabuike, Mallam Usman Abubakar Nda, Alhaji Ibrahim Miringa and Major Abubakar Umar (rtd) . Still others are Alhaji Alhassan Gwagwa, Alhaji Musa Sokodabo, Alhaj i Ahmed Doko, Prince Tanko Abubakar, Alhaji Muhammadu Kuchazi, Alhaji A.A. Abdulkadir, Maj or-General A.B. Mamman (rtd), Hon. (Mrs) Esther Audu, Hon. Khairat A., Senator Hassan Tadanyigbe, Mallam Sabo Keana and Mallam Usman Musa Nasarawa. I will also not forget to acknowledge the supportive roles of my other friends such as Mallam Sabo, Major Ibrahim Ahmadu (rtd), Alhaji Jibrin Wowo, Hajiya Fati Adams, Hajiya Sa'adatu Abdullahi. Similarly, are those of my brother, Abdullahi Saidu, step mother, Gogo Sabuwa Saidu, my two wives, Hajiya Lami Musa and Ramatu Musa, and their children. Finally my thanks go to Joshua Aragi II of the University of Abuja who typed the project.

iii • • '.·.... ''· J ..

ABSTRACT The emergence of Abuja as urban centre today is traceable to the quest for a new capital city for the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Being a new artificial creation, it should be expected that the inhabitants whose land had been acquired for the development of the new capital city be justly compensated and resettled. However, since the promulgation of the enabling Decree that created the new federal capital in 1976, the question of resettlement and compensation to the original inhabitants of the affected areas had remained unresolved. While the initial conception was to relocate all the affected inhabitants elsewhere outside the city this has not been so owing to failure of government to strictly implement the resettlement and compensation programmes. Consequently, the displaced communities are today widely dispersed within Abuja and neighbouring states such as Nasarawa, Kogi, Niger and Kaduna, and are faced with a glaring crisis of identity which tends to call to question the import of the entire Abuja project. Thus being an integral part of the Abuja project, this study has arisen in order to come to terms with the resettlement policy and its implementation.

lV TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

Certification ...... 1 Dedication ...... ii

Acknowledgement ...... 111

Abstract ...... iv Table of Contents ...... v

List of Table ...... Vll CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Background ...... 1

Urbanisation, Abuja and the Resettlement Question ...... 3

Objective of Study ...... 8

Significance of Study ...... 8

Scope and Limitations of the Study ...... 9 Methodology ...... 9 Theoretical Framework ...... 11

Plan of the Study ...... 12

CHAPTER TWO

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ABUJA AS AN URBAN CENTRE ...... 15

Genesis of a New Capital City ...... 16

The Physical Development of Abuja ...... 19

Housing and Office Accommodation ...... 22 Social and Infrastructural Development ...... 26

Distortions of Abuja Masterplan ...... 31

CHAPTER THREE

THE RESETILEMENT OF ABUJA INDIGENES ...... 37

Displacement and Genesis of the Resettlement Policy ...... 37

Resettlement Outside Abuja ...... 41

Resettlement in Niger State ...... 41

Resettlement in Plateau State ...... 45

Resettlement in K wara State ...... 51

Resettlement within Abuja ...... 51

Socio-Economic Consequences of the Resettlement Policy ...... 53

v

_J CHAPTER FOUR

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS OF THE RESETTLEMENT POLICY 59

Policy Shift and Inconsistent Implementation ...... 59 Resettlement and the Status of Abuja ...... 62

The PoliticO-Administrative Quagmire of Abuja ...... 63 Resurgent Native Identity Vs the Bogey of a No Man's Land ...... 66

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

...... 70 Summary of Findings ...... Recommendations ...... 7 4

A Concluding Note ...... 7 5 "

vi J LIST OF TABLES PAGE

I Population of some Nigerian cities, 1972 - 200 AD ...... 5

II. Performance of Housing in Various Districts from August 1985 - 1992 . . . . . 24

Ill. Distribution of House Types ...... 24

IV. House-Holds for Resettlement ...... 38 v. Opinion on Movement out of PCT ...... 39

VI. Movement to New Bwari Resettlement Centre ...... 42

VII. Movement to New Wuse Resettlement Centre ...... 43

VIII. Movement to New Gawun Resettlement Centre ...... 44

IX. Summary of Movement fromACT to Niger State Resettlement Areas ...... 45

X. Movement to New Ukya Resettlement Centre ...... 46

XI. Movement to New Gwargwada Resettlement Centre .. 47

XII. Movement to New Karu Resettlement Centre .. 48

XIII. Movement to New Karshi Resettlement Centre . 49

XIV. Movement to New Gudun Karya Resettlement Centre ...... 50

XV. Summary of Movement from ACT to Plateau Resettlement Areas ...... 51

vii CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The emergence of Abuja as an urban centre today is traceable to the quest for a new

capital city for the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This quest became pronounced and received

government attention in the mid-70s when, the then nation's capital city, Lagos, was

increasingly becoming choked up and thus inconvenient to continue serving the nation in that

capacity. Inter alia, traffic congestion, housing and environmental pollution, poor

topography, etc continued to afflict both the smooth administration of Lagos as the capital

city and the conduct of governmental operations.

In order to deal with this national predicament, the government of General Murtala

Mohammed appointed the Justice Akinola Aguda Committee which subsequently examined the matter and recommended the establishment of a new capital city for Nigeria. Thus,

Abuja as the new Federal Capital of Nigeria was created by Decree No.6 of 1976.

However,, it assumed the status of the nation's capital effectively on December 12, 1991 when the seat of government was relocated from Lagos.

Abuja is located at the geographical centre of the country . It was carved out from

Niger, Plateau and Kwara States and bounded on the North by Kaduna State, on the East and

South-East by Nasarawa State, on the West by Niger and on the South-West by Kogi State.

The city falls within latitude 25° N-90° 20'N and longitude 6°45' and 7°39'. The Federal

Capital Territory occupies an area of about 8,000 square kilometres while the capital city, the seat of the Federal Government occupies an area of about 250 square kilometres. 1

The development of Abuja is planned in four phases. At the moment, the first phase has been virtually completed while the second has been started. Within this context the city has witnessed tremendous growth and development since inception. The rapid development

of Abuja is manifested in various facets, including road and transportation, water supply,

port and telecommunications, electricity, housing, office accommodation, education, health,

agriculture and industries as well as tourism and recreation. Besides, the tempo of

development seems to have been increased following the formal relocation of all federal

government ministries and establishments to the new capital city in October, 1996.

From all appearances, Abuja was conceived to promote national unity in all its

ramifications. For instance, General Murtala Mohammed while announcing his government's

decision to establish Abuja as the new Federal Capital pronounced that:

The area is not within the control of any major ethnic groups in the country. We believe that the new capital created on such virgin land as suggested will be for all Nigerians a symbol of their oneness and unity. The Federal Territory will belong to all Nigerians. 2

It was thus within this context that government took the decision to relocate and resettle all

the indigenous population in their former states of origin or any other places of their choice.

Once again, as announced by General Mohammed:

The few local inhabitants in the area (Abuja) who need to be moved out of the territory for planning purposes will be resettled outside the area in places of their choice at government expense. 3

Although subsequently subjected to changes and shifts, the conception and implementation of the resettlement policy has remained a major fall-out of the development of Abuja as an urban centre. The policy has not only seen to the relocation and resettlement of a considerable number of the original inhabitants of Abuja in their former states of origin but also to the displacement of others within the new federal capital territory who, owing to development catching up with their native settlements or villages, were compelled to leave

..� . ... . their places of abode. v- �l/, ($;� .i�\' · �' �¥..,\· . 1-,\0 2 /,.:'! "/.ii'C: /. , -.;;.'i:,· . -- ·a\ yW,\ . :_ �-v, 1.2 Urbanisation, Abuja and the Resettlement Question

However, it should be noted that prior to the emergence of Abuja as an urban centre ,

Nigeria had witnessed some form of urban development. Indeed it is because of the

astronomical growth and development of urban centres in the country, overtime, that Nigeria

has recently been described as "one of the most urbanised African countries south of the

Sahara".4 The country not only boasts of numerous sprawling cities but also that "some of

Nigeria's urban centres have a history which dates back to antiquity". 5

Prior to the advent of europeans into the African continent since the late 14th century

and the subsequent establishment of colonialism towards the tail end of 19th century, some

ancient cities had existed and developed in Nigeria. These cities had emerged either as

administrative headquarters of powerful empires or city-states or as centres of commerce and

or centres for great religious movement. Among the cities in this category were Ibadan

which was the capital of the old Oyo empire, Benin-city of the old Benin Kingdom, Kano

which was a great trading-cum-commercial centre and Sokoto as both the administrative and

spiritual headquarters of the large Sokoto Caliphate and the Islamic Jihad of the early 18th

century .

However, even with the establishment of formal colonialism by Britain at the turn of

the 20th century these cities had continued to experience phenomenal growth and development. lnfact, some of these ancient cities were buoyed up by the colonial activities.

For instance, while Ibadan became and further developed as a regional capital, places like

Kano further grew as the transit centre for the export of agricultural products, especially groundnut from the Northern part of the country, to Great Britain. In the same vein, Kaduna developed as the capital of the defunct Northern region while the colonial mining and extractive activities largely saw to the growth and expansion of cities like Jos and Enugu. This is not to also forget the coastal cities like Calabar and Lagos, which subsequently

became the first capital of the Nigerian federation, whose rapid expansion and development

could be traced to their easy sea links to the outside world and which led to an over

concentration of colonial activities and population.6

With the attainment of independence in October 1960, the attendant drive for socio­

economic development of the country further increased the tempo of urban development in

Nigeria. This seemed to have been accentuated by the coming up of the so-called 'oil boom' which ensured an astronomical increase in revenue accruing to Nigerian governments over the years. Consequently, apart from cities like Port Harcourt and Warri whose expansion and rapid development in the 1970s through to the present day largely emanate from petroleum activities. The enhanced government revenue boosted housing construction, infrastrutural development and over concentration of population leading to the continued expansion of all the major urban centres.

It is thus a little wonder that in over a period of thirty years (i.e 1952-1982), the population in most major towns is said to have increased five-fold. Lagos, Kano, Port

Harcourt, Maiduguri, Kaduna, Jos and Ilorin, just to mention a few, had over 1000 percent increases over the period. Infact, as could be discerned from Table I below, Ibadan, rose from 625,000 in 1963 to 2.4 million in 1982; Enugu rose from 174,000 in 1963 to 850,000 in 1982; and Lagos rose from less than 1 million in 1963 to over 4 million in 1982. 7

Besides, in terms of actual size, it has been estimated that as of 1995, there were seven cities in Nigeria with over one million people, 18 cities with over 500,000 people; 30 with over 200,00 people; 28 with over 100,000 people; and 5,050 towns with over 20,000 people.8 Table 1: Population of Some Nigerian Cities, 1972-2000 AD, (in Millions)

* * ** ** ** City 1952 1963 1972 1982 % Increase in 2000 30 years ••

Lagos .27 .66 1.57 4.10 1,418 6.90 Ibadan .46 .63 1.48 2.48 518 4.70

Ogbomoso .14 .32 .50 .81 479 1.50 Kano .13 .30 .58 1.50 1,054 2.60 Ile-Ife .11 .13 .20 .32 199 .43 Abeokuta .08 .19 .29 .62 641 1.32

Onitsha .08 .17 .25 .31 309 .73

Oyo .07 .11 .17 .28 293 .45 Port .07 .18 .35 .91 1, 183 2.11 Harcourt

Enugu .06 .17 .33 .85 1,244 1.75 Aba .06 .13 .20 .33 471 .56 Maiduguri .06 .14 .27 .71 1,147 1.48 Zaria .05 .16 .26 .42 678 .68

Benin City .05 .10 .20 .51 846 1.30

Katsina .06 .09 .14 .23 263 .42 Sokoto .05 .09 .18 .46 775 .98 Calabar .05 .08 .15 .39 816 .61 Kaduna .04 .15 .35 .92 1,935 2.14 Ilorin .04 .21 .41 1.10 2,480 2.12

Jos .04 .09 .18 .46 1,076 .84 Minna .02 .03 .09 .20 900 .41

Be that as it may, it is pertinent to note at this juncture that the pattern of urbanisation in Nigeria had tended to concentrate on the rapid physical expansion of the cities. In otherwords, the rapid rate of urban development had not been all-round in that most of the urban centres are:

5 either poorly planned or not planned at all. Factories, markets, shops and houses exist side by side, and there is often no zoning scheme. Roads are inadequate, sanitation is very poor, and electricity and water supplies are inadequate and unreliable. 9

Incidentally though, this is one area in which Abuja can be said to be standing in a

class of its own. Unlike the older urban centres, Abuja has remained a well-planned and

phased-out developing city with all the paraphernalia of all modem urban centres -

impressive road network, good sanitary conditions, water supply, electricity and medical

services, etc. However, this is not to say that Abuja is devoid of its own unique pitfalls one of which is the furore arising from the haphazard and incomplete relocation and resettlement of the original inhabitants.

With the creation of the new Federal Capital Territory of Abuja in 1976, and the subsequent policy measures taken and implemented, it would be expected that in no time

Abuja would emerge as a true "No man's land", in accordance with the dreams of its founding fathers and the aspirations of the citizenry. However, it would seem that twenty- three years after its creation and nine years after the formal and effective relocation of the seat of government from Lagos, Abuja is still grappling with the question of status and politico-administrative structure. For instance, till today questions are being asked as to whether Abuja is truly a "No man's land" or whether there are no original owners of Abuja.

In the same vein, there is no consensus on how the new Federal Capital Territory should be governed, whether as a mayoralty or as a state, and also whether by election or appointment.

Indeed, as the prevailing scenario has been captured by a newsmagazine, The Source:

The founding fathers of Abuja talked of a unity centre, which the Road Safety copy writers reflect in the new National Vehicle Licensing Scheme as Centre of Unity. But the absence of a legal authority and indeed a decree that would have defined both the administrative and political status of Abuja has made the issue of who fills Abuja's quota quite controversial in the circumstances. . . . since 1980 when physical development began, no FCT Minister has seriously addressed the issue. The founding fathers feel Abuja is a no man's land, which therefore belongs to every Nigerian. And Nigerians are made to believe in this connection that the compensated natives who should have been relocated outside the territory should not lay claim to anything in the land. But unfortunately the facts on the ground today do not support the notion of a "neutral 11 capital or a "virgin land", as the natives are claiming that their land has been 11 disvirgined" . 10

Talking of the claims being proffered by the natives, its would thus not be out of place to

hear from the horse's mouth. In a 1994 submission to the defunct National Constitutional

Conference the "original inhabitants " of Abuja surmised their case as follows:

The prevailing non-clear legislative, administrative and political direction in Abuja has consequently led to the situation where the F.C. T. in some respects is administered as a state while in some, it is treated as a Ministry or a Federal Government Parastatal. This development has placed Abuja in a confused constitutional position and with the consequences of depriving the inhabitants of the Territory their fundamental rights and a clear Territorial political direction. 11

Behind the on-going furore is, undoubtedly, the continuous presence of large number of the original inhabitants in Abuja. In virtually all the six area councils of the Federal

Capital Territory there are pockets of the original inhabitants, with varying degrees of concentration. Apart from calling to question, the original conception of Abuja as a no man's land, the conspicuous presence of the territory's original inhabitants and their seeming crisis of identity are a reflection of the systemic and generalised inconsistencies and contradictions in policy formulation and implementation in Nigeria. Nowhere is this manifested more eloquently than by the so-called resettlement of the original inhabitants which was conceived and implemented as an integral part of the Abuja project.

7 Hence, if there is any subject or issue in need of intellectual investigation on the

Abuja project, at this time of increasing consolidation of the new capital city, it is the

resettlement policy. Thus this research arises to critically examine the resettlement policy

in Abuja, with a view to coming to grips with the progress recorded, problems encountered,

mistakes made and the necessary amendments required for the unfettered actualization of the

national dream.

1.3 Objectives of Study

This research project is aimed at:

1. Establishing the desirability and practicality of the resettlement policy as an integral part of the Abuja project;

2. Offering insight into policy 'shifts' and the dilemma of Abuja as a 'no man's land;

3. Establishing the relationship between the current plight of the Abuja indigenes and the resettlement question; and

4. Providing a rationalisation for an effective resolution of the resettlement question as a sine qua non towards the fu ll realisation of the Abuja dream.

1.4 Significance of the Study

The significance of this study lies mainly in its exposing and drawing attention to a

major drawback or shortcoming of the Abuja project, namely, the haphazard and incomplete

relocation and resettlement of all the original inhabitants of the new federal capital territory.

For this reason, it will be beneficial to formulators and implementors of the Abuja policy in

particular and all urban and regional planners in general. Similarly, students of urban planning and development will find the study useful as it may be considered an important addition to their existing literature in particular, and to public administration in general.

Besides, the study will also serve to provide additional opening as well as stimulate further research interest on Abuja as it continues to develop as a modern urban centre.

8 1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study

Being an integral and on-going part of the Abuja project, the research project will

tackle the resettlement question right from inception of the national project. Hence the

research project will cover the period, 1976-1998. In doing so, we shall be able to

thoroughly examine the resettlement policy in both its two major facets that is, the initial

resettlement of the indigenes to their former states of origin and, the subsequent resettlement

of others within Abuja.

Being a fu ll time political activist and with the on-going transition programme fully on course, the greatest constraint that one faces is inadequacy of time to devote to the research project. In fact, between commencement and the anticipated time of completion of the project, several elections were lined up and being leader of one of the political parties in the Federal Capital Territory, I was hampered by the little time available to me for the research project. Besides, heing an original inhabitant of Abuja, I anticipate having difficulty in obtaining relevant documents from government officials and agencies who may entertain fear regarding my motive for undertaking the research on this rather "delicate" and

"unresolved" issue. However, despite these limitations, I endeavoured to do my best in the circumstances.

1.6 Methodology

In the execution of this research study the main method of gathering data used is content analysis. Although variously defined, however, in this research study content analysis is seen as a "research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" .12 To this end, because there is an existing literature, including government publications and special reports on Abuja, the research endeavoured to study all available published materials and unpublished memos on

· "" · ' ·� ' ·<4 . . ..

�F··�ll... . < zrya3�� 1 · :: �A �-· a. _/�. Abuja in general and on the resettlement policy in particular.

The main advantage in using content analysis is that the technique is non-reactive or

unobtrusive. This unobtrusiveness of the technique is derived from the premise that the

documents are not produced in the first instance for the benefit of the investigator, and in this

respect, are "free from the influence of his theoretical or personal bias".13 Again, since the

technique requires the constant application of categories for including and excluding contents,

it allows for unbiased selection of data. In this sense, the researcher's preferences were not

allowed to come into play in the selection of data for analysis.

The content analysis as a research technique is not without its disadvantages, though.

The first has to do with the issue of the data base. In most cases, some relevant documents

such as newspapers and newsmagazines might be missing or not available, hence one cannot

analyse them. And even where they are available the researcher may be constrained to use

them by factors like inadequate time and resources.

Another major limitation of content analysis is related to the reliability of the

documents themselves. This is as determined among others by the apparent motivation for

a publication, that is, whether a publication is a piece of propaganda or authentic literature;

the writer's reputation for reliable scholarship and his access to relevant materials; and the

period of publication as it informs the objective of the publication. Thus, in this instance,

since the haphazard and non-complete resettlement drive has continued to generate hues and

cries in the territory and beyond, it is apparent that the reliability of most recent publications on Abuja especially in the newspapers and newsmagazines will tend to be questionable.

However, despite these shortcomings the content analysis still remains the most viable data gathering technique for this research, and efforts were thus made to select reliable and veritable information from available documents. 1.7 Theoretical Framework

This research is based basically on the marxist political economy approach. The

approach is generally defined in terms of historical and or dialectical materialism. The

historical aspect deals with causation and laws of historical development while materialism

concerns with objective determinants of social events and processes. And the dialectical

signifies the "interaction of opposites in the dynamics of social development, for example,

class contradictions and interactions between base and superstructure in a social formation" . 14

In this study, the marxist political economy approach is adopted for a number of

reasons. First, by being historical, the approach encourages the rejection of any situation

or social phenomenon as given or fixed, rather one will be compelled to trace and establish

the historical process behind the phenomenon under study. In otherwords, by encouragaging

the perception of social phenomena in the context of their development the approach allows

a researcher to look at the past in order to understand the present and project into the

future.15

Secondly, as the marxist method encourages dialectical thinking through which it is

strongly assumed that conflict and contradiction are the main vehicles of change and progress, it is more suitable for the study of social issues in such African transitional societies as Nigeria which are undergoing a process of tremendous socioeconomic and political transformation.

Furthermore, as this approach emphasises the relatedness of social phenomena it is better suited as a tool forthe study of society. Being interdisciplinary the marxist approach treats society in a 'holistic' single social entity fashion rather than through a delineation and treatment of the various aspects of social life, namely, politics, economic, anthropology, culture, etc as separate and independent entities. This indeed is in accordance with the

11 reality of social life or human activity which is itself "basically sociological or at least

interdisciplinary" . 16

1 . 8 Plan of the Study

Chapter one:

Introduction

1.1 Background

1.2 Urbanisation, Abuja and the Resettlement Question

1.3 Objectives of Study

1.4 Significance of the Study

1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study

1.6 Methodology

1.7 Theoretical Framework

1. 8 Plan of the Study

Chapter Two:

The Development of Abuja as an Urban Centre

2.1 Genesis of a New Capital City

2.2 The Physical Development of Abuja

2. 3 Housing and Office Accommodation

2.4 Social and Infrastructural Development

2.5 Distortions of Abuja Masterplan

Chapter Three:

The Resettlement of Abuja Indigenes

3.1 Displacement and Genesis of the Resettlement Policy

3.2 Resettlement outside Abuja

12 3 .2.1 Resettlement in Niger state

3. 2. 2 Resettlement in Plateau state

3.2.3 Resettlement in Kwara state

3. 3 Socioeconomic consequences of the Resettlement policy

Chapter Four:

The Administrative Problems of the Resettlement Policy

4.1 Policy shift and Inconsistent Implementation

4.2 Resettlement and the status of Abuja

4.3 The Politico-Administrative Quagmire

4.4 Resurgent Native Identity verses the Bogey of A No Man's Land.

Chapter Five:

Conclusion

5 .1 Summary of Findings

5. 2 A Concluding Note

5. 3 Recommendations

13 References

1. MFCT, Know The Capi tal ABUJA, Ministry of Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, 1993, P.2.

2. ABUJA 1985 to 1992 Achievements of The Ministry of Federal Capi tal Territory, Efua Media Associates Ltd, Lagos, 1992, p.7.

3. Ibid.

4. Onibokun, A. & Faniran, A., Urban Research in Nigeria, IFRA and COSSAD, 1995, Ibadan, P. 1

5. Ibid.

6. Olusola, A., ABUJA Nigeria's New Capital,Concept Inc. Nigeria Limited, 1993, p.1

7. Onibokun, A. & Faniran, A., Op. Cit, P.6

8. Ibida, p.5

9. Sada, P.O. & Oguntoyinbo, J.S. (ed.), Urbanisation Processes and Problems in Nigeria, University Press, Ibadan, 1981, P. III.

10. "Probing Abuja" in The Source. Vol.1, No.1, April 14, 1997, p.9.

11. Mamman, A.B. et al, "The status, Political and Administrative Structure of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja", A Memorandum to the National Constitutional Conference Abuja, 1994, p.5.

12. Selltiz, A., et al, Research Methods in Social Relations. Methuen, London, 1977, p.335.

13. Ibid, p.330

14. Beckman, B., "Political Science and Political Economy" in Political Science in Africa - A Critical Review, Barongo, Y. Zed Press, London, 1983, pp. 106 - 107.

15. Ake, C., A Political Economy of Africa, Longman, Essex, 1981, p.6.

16. Onimode, B., An Introduction to Marxist Political Economy, Zed Press, London, 1985, p.44.

· ,,..�·· ·· · ··· .... P" ...)i� :.:..,,. "' •1 ,...... '; �... . .-.

14 CHAPTER TWO

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ABUJA AS AN URBAN CENTRE

Placed within the context of general course of human history, urbanisation or the

phenomenon of urban centres was a major concomitant development to the emergence of

capitalism in the world in general and western Europe in particular. Following the Industrial

Revolution in Great Britain which ushered in the capitalist era, human society witnessed

tremendous socio-economic transformation consequent upon the advances in technology and

means of production. Among the major developments occasioned by capitalism was the

massive population movement from the interior areas to places with heavy concentration of

industrial, commercial and other socio-economic activities.

With the fu rther development of capitalism into its monopoly stage, namely:

imperialism characterised among other things by heavy concentration and centralisation of capital, the merger between bank and industrial capital, export of capital and the territorial division of the world amongst the world capitalist powers, 1 the development of urban centres was accelerated first in western Europe, and later in other parts of the globe including the third world. For the latter case, most of the urban centres are a colonial creation or their development has been boosted by colonialism.

However, it should be noted at this juncture that the development of urban centres did not follow the same pattern. In otherwords, despite being product of the same historical process, it would appear there are two major patterns of contemporary urban growth and development. First, there are cities or urban centres whose development followed the national course of history such as the result of the concentration of industrial, commercial, educational, political or other socioeconomic activities. Secondly, and on the other hand are urban centres which are literally artificial creation of governments for the purpose of political

15 and administrative convenience. By a way of example, most urban centres in Europe and

all the older ones in Nigeria belong to the first category of urban centres while, cities like

Brasilia in Brazil and Abuja in Nigeria are typical examples of artificially created urban

centres.

Thus, in this chapter, attempt is made to trace the genesis, conception and

development of Abuja as an urban centre right from its conception to date. In doing so and

being a unique experience in urban development, attention shall be focused on the pattern and

rate, as well as the problems associated with the growth and development of this Nigeria's

young but fastest growing capital city.

2.1 Genesis of A New Capital City

The idea to relocate Nigeria's federal capital city was generated almost on the

attainment of national independence. According to Alhaji Shehu Shagari, Nigeria's Executive

President in the Second Republic:

The debate on the need to relocate Nigeria's capital to a new site in the hinterland started soon after the country gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960. Some of us who have lived and worked in Lagos for many years came to realise that sooner or later a solution must be found to the ever growing congestion in the city which was expanding by leaps and bounds far beyond the conception of planners and administrators. 1

However, the idea of changing the country's capital did not gain currency and much

acceptance among the generality of Nigerians until in the mid 1970s towards the end of

General Gowon's reign. At that time, Lagos was seen as more commercial than administrative in outlook, and coupled with its dual role as the Federal and Lagos state capitals as well as the major seaport and industrial centre of Nigeria, it was increasingly becoming clear that economic and social life were being threatened to a "virtual standstill "2 in the city. In otherwords:

16 As the increased tempo of economic activities and the migration of people into the city was not matched by a corresponding improvements in the level of provision of urban infrastructural facilities and services, Lagos city was overburdened and its facilities were over-stretched to breaking point. The result manifested itself largely in over-crowding, traffic congestion, shortage of residential housing, growth of slums and high cost of living, among others. 3

In addition, as the nation's capital city, Lagos had certain disadvantages or shortcomings

which necessitated its being considered for change. Among others the disadvantages included

the strains on the small land of Lagos occasioned by its being a dual capital, inadequacy of

land for expansion, vulnerability to sea-launched attacks, inadequacy of physical resource

base such as for generation and supply of local building materials, etc; inadequate

infrastructure, poor topography, overpopulation and a predominantly Yoruba population. 4

Thus, with the above problems and shortcomings, it was inevitable and a question of time that the continued role of Lagos as the nation's capital would be reviewed and disposed of. The time came with the emergence of General Murtala Mohammed as Nigeria's head of state in July 1975 when he immediately set in motion the machinery culminating in the conception of a new capital for the country. In his very maiden national broadcast, General

Mohammed had emphasised the government's commitment to resolve once and for all the

Lagos question as the nation's capital.

Accordingly, he subsequently set up, on August 9, 1975, a Committee to examine the national issue. The committee on the location of the federal capital which had Justice

Akinola Aguda as Chairman and Chief E.E. Nsefik as Secretary, was given the following terms of reference. 6

(a) To examine the dual role of Lagos as the Federal and State capital, and advise on the desirability or otherwise of Lagos retaining that role.

17 (b) In the event of the committee finding that Lagos is unsuitable for such role, to recommend which of the two governments (Federal or state) should move to a new capital.

(C) in the event of the committee finding that the Federal Capital should move out of Lagos, to recommend suitable alternative locations having regard to the need for easy accessibility to and from every part of the Federation.

(d) To examine all other relevant factors which will assist the Federal Military Government in arriving at the right decision.

(e) To submit its recommendations to the Federal Military Government not later than 31st December, 1975.

In carrying out its assignment, the Committee sought and received memoranda from members

of the public and experts, visited overseas countries with similar problems, visited and held

discussions in all states, made extensive tour of Lagos by both road and water, as well as

went by road through parts of some states (Kogi, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa states) that

now share border with the new Federal Capital Territory. 7 At the end of the work, the I

Committee submitted its report to government on December 20, 1975. The report, which was accepted by government, discountenanced Lagos' continued role as a dual capital and recommended that the nation's capital should be moved out of Lagos to a federal territory in central part of the country. 8

In selecting the new capital, the Committee worked out and used certain criteria for which the chosen site satisfied. These were: centrality , good and tolerable climate, land availability, and use; adequate water supply, low population density, physical planning convenience, security, multi-access possibility, available power resources, drainage, good soil type and ethnic accord. 9 In consequence, therefore:

...a territory carved out of Niger, old Kwara and Plateau state was found and designated as the new federal Capital Territory .

\ . The PCT, as it is popularly known, is accessible from all states: � \_ of the Federation, and is logistically placed to frustrate sudden \�� � ,,_ tJ foreign aggression. It is also sparsely populated; is watered by '.+: � ....-"', .� 18 the rivers Gurara and Usuma, is a malaria free zone, and conveniently covers a land mass of 8,000 square kilometre.10

The government's decision to relocate the Federal Capital was announced by General

Mohammed in a national broadcast on February 3, 1976. Two days later, on February 5,

1976, Decree No.6 of 1976 was enacted to give legal backing to the decision and formally

gave birth to the new capital. 11

2.2 The Physical Development of Abuja

When the new federal capital territory was announced in February, 1976, the

government also simultaneously wrested the ownership, control and governance of the land,

as well as established a Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) via the enabling

Decree. The Authority 's responsibility was to plan, design and develop the Territory. In

specific detail terms this entails:

The choice of a site for the location of the capital city within the new capital territory; the preparation of a masterplan for the capital city and land-use with respect to town and country planning within the rest of the capital territory; the provision of municipal services within the capital territory; the establishment of infrastructural services in accordance with the masterplan and coordination of the activities of all ministries, departments and agencies of government of the federation within the capital territory. 12

To this end, the Federal Capital Development Authority in June 1977, commissioned the

International Planning Associates (I.P.A) of the United States of America which produced a masterplan that was subsequently approved for the new capital city. 13 The plan defined the scope of work to be carried out in development of the city and territory which included; Thus, based on the masterplan, the development of the territory is planned in four phases.

Phase I is expected to accommodate 23,000 people, while phases 2,3 and 4 are expected to

provide for 5 85,000; 640, 000 and 1.1 million people respectively. This would add up to a

total of projected 3 .1 million people by the time of full development of the territory

originally targeted for the year, 2,000. 15

It is worthy of note that the first phase had already been developed while development of the second phase is underway. The development of the first phase which commenced since the time of Obasanjo involved the development of the Federal Capital City (FCC),

Abuja, 11 a crescent shaped city 11 16 covering approximately 250km (3 percent of the total land area of the territory). The city of Abuja has been developed and divided into five maj or districts, namely:

I. Garki District

II. Wuse District

III. Central Area

IV. Asokoro District

V. Maitama District

The Garki district otherwise known as the Accelerated district was the first to be developed. The establishment of its basic infrastructure such as roads, water, drainage system, electricity supply and street lighting was among the first projects executed by the

Shagari government. 17 This was to be followed by similar development of Wuse district and subsequently the other districts of Central Area, Asokoro and Maitama by various successive regimes. In the same vein, the development was extended to the area development councils and satellite towns such as Bwari, Gwagwalada, Karu, Karshi, Kuje and Abaji, among others. However, it is important to note that in the Federal Capital city, of the five districts,

four have been developed as essentially residential districts. These are Garki, Wuse,

Asokoro and Maitama. As of today, in terms of residential structure, every District is made

up of neighbourhoods. For each neighbourhood there is a centre that provides auxiliary

services such as a clinic, primary schools, community hall, postal agency, cornershop, etc

for the residents. Garki has the highest number of neighbourhoods, while Asokoro has the

least. Again at the District level, facilities such as health centre, post office, police station

and fire service etc are provided at the District Centre. 18

On the other hand, the Central Area or City Centre is designated the centre of

government activities . It is said to consist of what has been called the "three arm zone" 19

(the executive, legislative and judiciary) as manifested in the presence of the Aso Rock

Presidential Villa, National Assembly Complex and the Supreme Court Complex; the Federal

Secretariat buildings, state government liaison offices, cultural and religious institutions as well as the Central Business District (CBD), etc. Infact, in the Central Area, as of today,

there are so many structures belonging to several government, commercial and private business organisations that have sprung up or are being at their finishing stages of development.

Be that as it may, with the completion of development of Phase I, the physical development of Phase II of the federal capital territory has conunenced and it is marked by the opening up of places like the Kado District. It should be noted even in passing, that while the initial physical development of Abuja right from Obasanjo time through to earlier part of Babangida's reign, the government through the FCDA was the sole developer.

However, as from 1989 when, following the implementation of a wide range of market reforms in the national economy the government began to reduce its involvement especially

21 in the area of residential housing while increasingly involving the private sector developers.

So, it should be expected that in subsequent development of the remaining phases of the

capital territory, the government will restrict itself to provision of basic infrastructure while

allowing the private sector have a greater influence in the physical development of the new

federal capital territory.

2.3 Housing And Office Accommodation

An important aspect of the development of Abuja has been the development of

residential and office accommodation. Development in this regard was initiated by the

Federal Military Government of General Obasanjo shortly before handing over power to

Shagari, when it awarded contract for the construction of housing units on the accelerated

or Garki district. However, it was during Shagari' s period that construction work proper was

earnestly started.

Thus, as of July 1982, a total of 4,400 residential units were awarded for construction

out of which 2,500 were completed before the overthrow of Shagari in 1983. These houses effectively accommodated about 22,000 persons on the basis of eight persons per household.

The houses included not only those in phase 7 of the capital city proper but other parts of the capital territory, such as Karu, Nyanyan, integrated workers settlement and Gwagwalada, among others.18 In the Wuse district, a number of 2,000 housing units had also been completed by 1983, 19 in addition to the completion and usage of the Presidential Guest

(Akinola Aguda) House by President Shagari whenever he was in Abuja for official functions. 20

Regarding office accommodation, the Shagari regime built eight storey office blocks in Area I, Garki, by 1983. It similarly initiated other blocks of offices in Garki and Wuse districts. 21 These could not be completed before the overthrow of the regime. The successor Buhari regime subsequently decided to place emphasis on the completion of basic

infrastructure while at the same time "clearing the contract mess by taking inventory of contracts the then Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCT)" under Shagari left.

Hence the pace of housing development was slowed down between December 1983 and

August 1985 when the Buhari regime was ousted in a place coup led by General Ibrahim B.

Babangida.

Indeed, although there was considerable development of housing and office accommodation during Shagari's time, it was marked by unprecedented mismanagement and misappropriation of public funds by both contractors and government officials involved in the Abuja project. It was therefore not surprising that the late Mamman Vatsa who was

Abuja's Minister at this period, did not initiate any new projects. Instead, he concentrated on sanitising the national project through personnel auditing and contract verification, leaving behind in the process, a lot a money. 22

Accordingly, with the coming of the Babangida Administration, the development of housing and office accommodation was once more accelerated. This followed renewed government strong investment on housing which subsequently made it the highest owner of housing units in Abuja. For instance, between 1985 and 1992, in addition to completion of abandoned houses in Garki, Asokoro and Maitama, the Ministry forFederal Capital Territory through the FCDA had built a total of 18, 191 housing units of different types as per Tables

II and III below. 23 The process of housing development was further accelerated following the formal relocation

23 Table II. Table III

Performance of Housing in Various Distribution by Housing Types Districts from August 1985-1992

District No. of House Type Number Housing Unit Completed Garki 4106 1-room units 6687 .

Wuse 2942. 2-room units 1904

1-bed room units 2240 Asokoro 568' 3-bed room units 2261

Maitama 178 • 4-bed_room units 1242

Nyanya 6923 5-bed room units 39

6-bed room units 13 ( Karu 1129

�

Kuhwa 181 Resettlement

2164 Low Cost

Total 18,191 Total 18191

of the seat of government from Lagos to Abuja in December, 1991. As a result, 1,500

housing units were completed in Kubwa while at Karu 251 housing units were acquired by

the FCDA from the federal Housing Authority. The Federal Housing Authority also

constructed 1320 low income houses in Kubwa, 482 luxury flats in Maitama and 126 luxury

flats of 23 and 4 bed rooms at Asokoro. Besides, 374 housing units popularly known as the

O.A.U. villages were built at Garki, Wuse, Asokoro and Maitama. This is in additio� to

7 residential houses for Ministers in Asokoro and 6 other in Maitama districts.24

24 Within the same period, one of the three Federal Secretariat complexes in the city

centre had been completed, commissioned and occupied. This was alongside the National

Centre for Women Development and nineteen prototype office blocks which now houses

various Federal Ministries and Parastatals including those of works and housing in Garki and

Foreign Affairs in Wuse. There are also the Radio House which houses the Federal Ministry

of Information, the Supreme Court complexes, the Nigerian Television Authority

headquarters and several other buildings which have either been completed and occupied or

are at advanced stages of completion. In addition, there are some special projects which

were executed within the period. These included the three modern barracks, International

Conference Centre and the ECOW AS Secretariat, etc. Apart from government, the private

sector is not left behind as various office complexes as those belonging to the UAC,

Leventis, Triple Heritage Communications, Total Petroleum Nigeria Plc, among others are

completely developed or underway. 25

Thus, on the whole, it can be inferred from the foregoing that the FCDA had

constructed over 30,000 housing units. And these have been complemented by a number of

private developers such as Imani Mortgage Finance, Impresit and government agencies like

the Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), National

Universities Commission (NUC), fo rmer National Electoral Commission (NEC) which had been able to build over 4,00026 housing units prior to October 1996 when all the Federal

Ministries and parastatals were asked to move to Abuja. Indeed, with all of them now concentrated in Abuja, the pace of housing development has increased tremendously with all and sundry striving to meet its own housing needs, in order to beat the ever escalating cost of renting houses. The same applies to acquisition of office accommodation which always grows in tandem with the housing needs of all organisations, both public and private.

25 2.4 Social and Infrastructural Development

The development of infrastructural facilities and social services has also remained an

integral part of the evolution and growth of Abuja as the nation's new capital city. Infact,

the development of Abuja as a whole was started from the infrastructural level. This is

because, as was noted earlier in section 2.2, one of the very first contracts awarded by the

Shagari government was for the infrastructural work - roads, water, drainage, sewage

system, electricity supply, etc - of the Garki district. Indeed, as the initial infrastructural

work done by President Shagari has been recorded by a source:

By 1982, the arterial road known as the Festival road linking the North ring road I with the district, collector roads joining the streets to the arterial road and tertiary roads were completed. Electricity supply and distribution system within the district through overhead line as against the underground call network was adopted as a temporary measure of power distribution. Within this period the street lighting of all the major streets in the district were accomplished, while the water distribution network was also put in place with Jabi Dam as the source of water supply. Other infrastructural services such as telecommunication ducting and sewage collection levies were initiated and almost completed. 27

From the Garki district subsequent efforts were made by various successive governments to

continue with the social and infrastructural development in Wuse and the other districts of

the capital city as well as in the area councils and the satellite towns. Thus as of present

overall level of development, in terms of road and transportation, the Federal Capital

Territory is accessible from all parts of the country by land via the Benin-Lokoja road,

Jos/Makurdi-Keffi road, Kaduna-Suleja road and the Bida/Minna-Suleja road. Within the

city itself various grades of roads, viz, Express ways, Park-ways, Arterials and collectors,

with separate pedestrian walkways have been constructed. In fact, Abuja presently boast of the best intra-city road network in the whole country.

26 There are also regional roads connecting the city to satellite towns such as Bwari,

Gwagwalada, Abaj i, Kuje and Nyanya.28 To facilitatetransporta tion, the Abuja Urban Mass

Transit Company was established, and in conjunction with other state transport companies

and private transporters, operate both intra and outer city services. However, it is

noteworthy that the lack of a permanent, and indeed the incessant change of Motor parks in

the capital city has often rendered the transportation system chaotic much to the discomfort

of passengers and transporters. Besides, Abuja is also reached by air through the Nnamdi

Azikiwe International Airport.

Regarding water supply, the two existing dams - Jabi Dam commissioned in 1982 and

Lower Usuma Dam in 1987 - have been built to supply water to the city and its environs.

The Jabi Dam has a reserviour capacity of 6 million cubic metres of raw water and treats 350 cubic metre per hour while the Lower Usuma Dam has a reserviour capacity of 120 million cubic metres of raw water and treats 5,000 cubic metre per hour. The two dams currently meet the water needs of the inhabitants of the city. For those outside the city, it is expected that River Gurara will later be harnessed for hydro-electricity and to augment raw water supply to the Usuman dam reserviour, so as to meet the territory's anticipated 3.1 million population. 29

In the meantime, the population outside the city are making do with water supplied from wells and boreholes either erected by the local area councils, the defunct Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) or the Water Board which is saddled with the responsibility of water resources management throughout the territory. The Board has three treatment plants at Usuma, Gwagwalada and Kubwa but it has been unable to functionalise the Giri water works it built for the use of members of the University of Abuja

Community.

27 In the area of telecommunication, except for places like Gwagwalada which

sometimes proves difficult to communicate, Abuja as a whole is the easiest place to reach by

telephone from all parts of the country and abroad. The facilities already put in place for

the purpose include, Automatic Digital system, Inward Direct Dialling facility (IDD), and

a total of 21,000 telephone lines available out of which 7,000 were allocated by 1993.

Similarly, there are 3 General Post Offices, 9 Postal Department Offices and 8 Postal

Agencies in both the city Neighbourhoods and Area Councils.30

With regards to electricity supply and distribution, the FCDA in conjunction with or through NEPA has connected the city to the national grid. The same with all the Area

Councils headquarters and towns like Karu, Nyanya and Rubochi. However, in recent times, just like in most parts of the country, electricity supply has been somewhat irregular and epileptic with the attendant damages to user's electrical fittings and appliances.

Furthermore, the educational service has also been developed to meet the needs of inhabitants of the tertiary. As at now, the educational facilities in Abuja include, about 250 primary schools, 35 secondary schools (both junior and senior), 1 Teacher Training College now transformed into a College of Education, 2 Federal Government Colleges, 1 Federal

Technical College, a School of Nursing and Midwifery, a Federal University and several

Nursery and primary schools provided by private individuals and organisations to complement goverrunent efforts. 32

Health care facilities have also been developed in the territory. These include, the

500 bed Gwagwalada Specialist Hospital, 120 bed Garki Hospital, 120 bed Wuse Hospital,

50 bed Karshi and Rubochi Hospitals respectively. Still others are the Gwarimpa, Kubwa,

Nyanya and Abaji hospitals respectively, as well as about 80 health centres, clinics and dispensaries being managed by the area councils. This is in addition to the exclusive Aso

28 Clinic which serves the State House, and the numerous private health centres/hospitals,

clinics and pharmaceutical stores operating in the territory. 33 The major snag, however, in

regard to health services is incessant lack of essential and relatively high cost and facilities

for some clinical drugs in the government hospitals including the Gwagwalada Specialist

Hospital. This has often exposed patients to the exploitative machinations of the private

medical practitioners and patent traders. Even the intervention by the Petroleum (Special)

Trust Fund (PTF) in the territory's health sector has not gone a long way to redress this

problem. Hence, like other parts of the country, the cost of medical care in the federal

capital territory still remains as high.

Closely related to the above, is the efforts to enhance foodproduction in the territory through development of agriculture. Blessed with fertile lands, the climate and soil composition of the territory permit the cultivation of most Nigerian staple food crops like yams, cassava, Guinea corn, maize, millet and vegetables, among others. Hence although the Abuja Agricultural Development Project (ADP) is established to offer extension services to farmers in the areas of fertilizer supply, agro-chemicals, fish fingerlings, vetenary drugs, improved seeds and modern farming techniques, not much impact of the project is being fe lt by the inhabitants.

lnfact, while fertilizer has particularly remained out of reach to farmers, the cost of these food crops has continued to soar. In the same vein, the Multi-Purpose Home

Economics Centre established in Gwagwalada by the PCT Commission for Women is most noted for production and sale of bread than the training of rural women for self­ empowerment, for which it is primarily established. However, regarding meat consumption, modern abattoirs have been built in Garki, Kubwa, Karn, Gwagwalada and Abaj i while slaughter slabs are also made available in other parts of the territory. 34

29 Last but not the least, development has been recorded in the commerce and tourism

sector. The movement of Central Bank headquarters to Abuja and presence of numerous

commercial banks, insurance and broker firms, as well as mortgage finance companies have

enhanced commerce in the territory. For the same reason, a number of shopping complexes

and plazas have been established in the city neighbourhoods and the central area district while

modern markets are at Wuse and Zuba. This is in addition to local markets in the area

councils. Besides, in order to provide for the convenience of tourist and visitors to Abuja

as well as to meet the recreational needs of residents, some facilities have been provided.

These include, the three five-star hotels (Nicon Noga, Sheraton and Abuja Sofitel), two three­

star hotels (Agura and Ibro), various guest houses and numerous other hotels which operate

in the city. There are also the IBB Golf Course and the Jabi Holiday Resort. 35

However, apart from being elitist in conception and therefore their high cost which renders them inaccessible to ordinary residents of the territory, the recreational facilities have greatly contributed to making Abuja an expensive city to live in. Thus the generality of the people are finding it difficult to live their social life in the city, preferring instead to go out to neighbouring towns as Keffi in Nasarawa state for their weekend and other relaxations.

This is seemed to have been compounded by the non-existence of other social amenities such as cinemas, night clubs and sports stadia, etc. It is therefore not surprising that at weekends the capital city is rendered almost desolate with droves of people having to leave for their various places of recreation elsewhere.

A fi nal drawback in this sector, is the little or no industrial development recorded in the territory. Although Gwagwalada is designated the industrial zone of Abuja, not much has been achieved in this regard, except for the superficial presence of the Nigerian Bottling

Company and the almost moribund NIIMA manufacturing company.

30 2.5 Distortions of Abuja Masterplan

From the preceding sections, it is glaring that much achievement has been recorded

in the development of Abuja since conception of the national project over two decades ago.

However, it is important to stress at this juncture that the process has not been as straight as

it is planned. In otherwords, some major aspects of the developmental process has not been

executed according to the dictates of the masterplan approved for the progressive

development of the new capital city in 1978.

Although according to the International Planning Associates (IPA), the designers, the

masterplan:

is designed to provide long-term guidance for the orderly implementation of the new capital city as such, the plan is more than land-use maps, since it provide a general framework for development within which planning for various systems and sectors can continue. 36

Therefore, it is a document that clearly prescribes the patterns, controls of land use, future construction and modifications of facilities and modes of physical development to embark upon in building the federal capital. Still, as good and beautiful the masterplan may have been, it appears to have been bastardised at the final and crucial stage of implementation overtime by especially the military regimes. And the various distortions of the masterplan have been carried out for no genuine reason other than political expediency .

The distortion of the masterplan began with the very seat of government, the State

House which is variously called Aso Rock or Aso Presidential Villa. The masterplan, and as mentioned earlier, the Phase I of the city's physical development contains a beautiful concept called the 'Three-Arm Zone', which implies the building of the three arms of government - the National Assembly, the Presidential and Supreme Court Complexes - in one zone. Then there was to be a State House Annex for visiting Heads of State near the

31 Presidential Complex. In compliance with the masterplan the Shagari regime begun

construction of the Presidential Complex. The project was at an advanced stage when the

regime was overthrown in 1983, and the Babangida regime later abandoned it and

constructed a new State House on the site of the State House Annexe. So, the Aso Rock or

Aso Presidential Villa "is a product of deviation from the masterplan", and it is today outside

the three-arm zone concept".37 In consequence, whenever the original presidential complex

is completed as recently promised by the FCT Minister, it will now serve as an annexe38

other than what it was originally prescribed to be by the masterplan.

Another distortion to the masterplan occurs with the building of various emergency

special projects in areas designated for some projects. In this category are all the five

military barracks - Sani Abacha barracks, Yakubu Gowon barracks, Aguiyi Ironsi

Cantonment and Fort Obasanjo and Fort Babangida - along the northern outer expressway

are said not to be in the Abuja masterplan. That only Plant Nursery, fashioned after the

beautiful Washington Mall, was planned. Thus, the Plant Nursery is now relegated to a

small portion near the State House (Aso) Clinic, which itself is new to the masterplan. 39·

Similarly, the Family Support Hospital along the Nnamdi Azikiwe ring road-airport

road axis is another gigantic emergency project not envisaged by the masterplan. In a recent

study of the masterplan vis-a-vis the project, a weekly newsmagazine, The Source has

revealed that the FSP hospital seems to have displaced the Health Referral system in the

District system. That the masterplan prescribes clinics at the level of neighbourhoods, which

should refer cases to district health centres. And District Health Centres are supposed to refer cases to the City Hospital, which will in turn refer its cases to the Gwagwalada

Specialist Hospital. So, with the siting of the FSP hospital, which is not in the masterplan,

32 "the city hospital in the masterplan approved in 1978 may have been lost to the FSP

project" . 40

Furthermore, the informal employment area for tailors, mechanics, vulcanizers and

others has also been abandoned. It is the place where Africa Continental Bank (ACB) and

the New Nigeria Bank are built near the Berger Junction in Wuse district. That is why there

is no informal employment zone in Abuja today. In fact, in the Apo Village where

mechanics are given a place, there is no provision for it in the masterplan. Rather the

present mechanics' village in Apo is said to be "on the alignment of the outer southern

expressway, which is supposed to . . . complement the completed northern expressway to

mark and set out the northern and southern boundaries of the city " .41 Nonetheless, that both

the northern outer expressway has not been completed and the southern outer expressway has

remained unconstructed, and consequent upon which the plots meant for them have been

taken over by sundry projects and residential houses, further demonstrates the great extent

to which the Abuja masterplan and indeed its physical development has been distorted.

Unsurprisingly and lastly, the process has further been facilitated by other

development as the exigency of the 1991 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Conference and the comershops syndrome. The former which caused the building of residential quarters in plots meant for other things had subsequently engendered the allocation of spaces and plots in Garki, Wuse, Maitama and Asokoro for other uses than for the non-residential neighbourhood or district facilities such as "cultural centres, cinema houses, libraries" which they were originally reserved for in the masterplan.

In the same respect, the indiscriminate building of cornershops has literally "turned

Abuja into a huge shopping complex city". Because of this development, every available space including even green areas in the city where residents used to relax have been

33 allocated. Indeed, apart from the dangers of "electricity blackout, broken sewage pipes and flooded highways" especially during the raining season, which the allocation of all green areas and flood planes in various districts for residential purposes poses, 42 the beauty of this well-though-out-city may in the long run be spoilt as a result of the congestion of buildings and other sundry structures not in consonance with the masterplan.

This, therefore, is really one area that goverrunent must hasten to redress before it is too late. The building of the new capital city must go apace with the masterplan. This is not to say that the plan is perfect or cannot be subject to modifications, but such must be anchored on genuine reasons that transcend political expediency which seems also to have been at the root of the unsettled resettlement of the original Abuja indigenes with the attendant brouhaha.

34 References

1. Shagari, S. "Foreword" in Olusola, A. , ABuja : Nigeria's New Capital, Concept Inc. Nigeria Limited, 1993, p.x.

2. Ibid, p.2

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid, pp. 19-28

5. Other members of the Committee were late Dr. Tai Solarin, Col. Monsignor Pedro Martins, Professor O.K. Ogan, Alhaji Muhammed Musa Isma, Dr. Ajato Gandonu and Chief Owen Feibai.

6. Olusola, Op. Cit., p.34

7. Ibid, PP. 34-35.

8. Abuja 1985 to 1992 Achievements of the Ministry of Federal Capital Territory. Efua Media Associates Ltd, Lagos, 1992, p.7.

9. Ibid. and Olusola, Op. Cit., pp 35-45

10. Abuja 1985 .... Op. Cit., p.9

11. Olusola, Op.Cit. , pp.42-48

12. "Probing Abuja" in The Source. Vol.1, No.1, April 14, 1997, p.12.

13. Olusola, Op. Cit. , p.5

14. Ibid, p.6

15. Abuja 1985 ..., Op. Cit., p.14

16. Ibid, p. 17

17. Ibid.

18. Olusola, Op .Cit. , pp 104-105.

19. Ibid, p.101

20. Ibid, p.110.

21. Ibid, p.105

35 22. "Probing Abuja ... ", Op. Cit., p.14

23 Abuja 1985 ..., Op. Cit., p.33

24. Ibid, pp.34-35.

25. Know The Capital Abuja, Ministry of Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, 1993, p.5.

26. Ibid, p.4

27. Olusola, Op. Cit., pp. 99-100

28. Know The Capital . .., Op. Cit., p.2

29. Ibid. and Abuja 1985 ..., Op. Cit., pp.29-30

30. Abuja 1985 ... , Op. Cit., p.31

31. Know The Capi tal ..., pp. 3-4

32. Ibid, p.5-6

33. Ibid, p.6

34. Ibid, pp. 6-7

35. Ibid, pp. 8-9

36. Abuja 1985 ... , Op. Cit., p.14

37. "Probing Abuja ... ", Op. Cit. , p.17.

38. Ibid

39. Ibid

40. Ibid

41. Ibid

42. Ibid

36 CHAPTER THREE

THE RESETTLEMENT OF ABUJA INDIGENES

In the conception and implementation of Abuja project, the resettlement of the original

inhabitants of the new federal capital territory has been central. Conceived and expected to

be a "no man's land " it was obvious and decided that the making of Abuja would involve the

displacement and relocation of the indigenous population. Accordingly, the then Federal

Military Government and the successor civilian regime of Alhaji Shehu Shagari in

conjunction with the three states - Niger, Kwara and Plateau - from which the federal capital was carved out, worked out modalities and carried out the resettlement exercise. In doing so, and over time, there appeared to be two approaches adopted by successive governments:

First, the relocation of the original inhabitants to their former states of origin and secondly, the relocation of others within the new federal capital territory.

This chapter therefore attempts to analyse the resettlement of Abuja indigenes from the two perspectives, tracing and discussing both their origins and concrete manifestations.

This is followed by a discussion of the socio-economic consequences that attended the exercise.

3 .1 Displacement and Genesis of the Resettlement Policy

The aborigines or original inhabitants of Abuja could be said to have been displaced immediately after formal announcement of Abuja as the nation's capital and the subsequent promulgation of the Federal Capital Territory Decree 6 of 1976. Displacement in this context entails not the immediate physical eviction of persons, but in the legal sense of wresting from the inhabitants the rights to and ownership of their ancestral lands and the entire territory making up the new capital, and its transfer to the Federal Government. In otherwords, it is the "loss of state citizenship by the indigenes"1 of Abuja who also bore the

37 disruption of their socio-political set up. In consequence of this development, there arose

the issue of resettlement which eventually became an integral part of the framework of plan

implementation required to attain the desired new capital city . 2

The term resettlement in this context refers to:

the process by which persons or group of persons displaced either by war, national disaster, physical development such as constrnction of dam or political decisions such as in the case of Abuja capital territory, are resettled in another location different from their ancestral homes. 3

Thus, based on this stand, the then Federal Government came up with the policy to relocate

and resettle all the indigenous population in their former states of origin or any other place

of their choice. In accordance with this policy guidelines some money was advanced to the

three states involved to "purchase equipments, clear resettlement sites and conduct the

necessary surveys".5 The amounts of money advanced to Niger, Plateau and K wara states

were :N4 million, :N1. 3 million and :N1 million6 respectively, though the latter was later

returned to the Federal Government following the eventual non-relocation of Kwara state

indigenes. In the same vein, the total number of households that needed resettlement

according to the census carried out in 1977 were determined at 24, 683. Table IV below

gives a breakdown of the households per each state .

Table IV

House-Holds for Resettlement

State House-Hold Number Niger 18,017 Plateau 5,033 Kwara 1,633

Total 24,683

38 However, following a subsequent comprehensive population survey of the federal

capital territory, commissioned by government and carried out by Consultants from the

University of Ibadan, it was revealed that "to compensate, evacuate and resettle all the

inhabitants outside Abuja would require more than two billion naira".8 This huge amount

of money frightened the Obasanjo regime, and consequently the policy was reviewed

culminating in limiting the resettlement of inhabitants in only "those areas needed for city

development and other priority areas," while those who also opted to leave were to "be given

Federal Assistance. "9

With this development, especially the option now given inhabitants to either leave or remain in the fe deral capital territory, the matter subsequently took a new dimension during the Second Republic, when the states of Niger, Plateau and Kwara demanded and insisted that their citizens should be evacuated out of the territory. In response, the Federal

Government set up in 1968, a Presidential Ad-hoc Committee which conducted an opinion survey and determined the number of households opting to be moved out of the territory and be resettled in their former states of origin. 10 The outcome of the committee resettlement survey is as per table V.11

Table V: Opinion on Movement out of FCT

SINO STATE TOTAL MOVEMENT STAY-IN NO OF NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS OPINION HOUSEHOLD

1. Niger 18,937 2,467 16,292 168

2. Plateau 5,707 2,838 2,664 99

3. Kwara 1,690 7 1,693 30

Total 26,328 5,312 20,609 297

39 It could be discerned from the table that out of the total number of 26,328 households only

5,312 opted to move out while 20,609 chose to stay in and 297 undecided. The decision of

the greater majority to remain in the territory at this point in time was said to have been

influenced on the one hand by the undue politicisation of the exercise by the National Party

of Nigeria - controlled federal government which allegedly encouraged its supporters to

remain in Abuja while particularly insisting that the supporters of Nigerian Peoples Party

(NPP) in Plateau state should relocate. This was said to have "outraged most of the

inhabitants who had earlier relocated to return to their original habitat in Abuja" .12 On the

other hand, most of the inhabitants were also discouraged and returned because of the corrupt

disbursement of compensation money by resettlement officers in the territory and the local

state officials in collusion with traditional rulers. 13

However, of much importance at this juncture is not only the outcome of the resettlement survey but the ambivalent circumstances leading to it. From the initial singular approach of compulsory relocation and resettlement of the Abuja indigenes in their former states of origin there had now emerged a dual or two-pronged approach which simultaneously allows formere shifting of positions or relocation within the federal capital territory for those who desired and encouragement of evacuation from the territory of those who also desired.

Indeed, the choice of the greater majority to remain in the territory and the policy shift which gave rise to it would have a greater influence on long term politics of the overall development of the new federal capital territory. This will be treated later in chapter four.

Meanwhile, we now focus our attention on the resettlement exercise proper.

3.2 Resettlement Outside Abuja

As mentioned earlier, the initial policy of government was to relocate all the indigenous population outside the territory, preferably in their former states of origin.

40 Towards this end, some money was advanced by the federal government to the three states

to undertake the preliminary work of the exercise which commenced in 1977178. However,

it is clear from available records that in carrying out the exercise, the states were not handed

any clearly defined guidelines "as to the type of resettlement to be adopted. "14 Infact, each

state was allowed free hand to determine its priorities and course of action, hence the modes

of resettlement adopted by the states varied according to their policies. And for its own part,

the FCDA was only to pay compensation to them for immovable assets which the affected

persons left behind.

Thus for a meaningful grasp and proper understanding of the exercise, the

resettlement patterns of the three states will be treated separately.

3.2.1 Resettlement in Niger State

In order to relocate its indigenes in the federal capital territory the Niger state government opted for physical construction of houses and other ancillary facilities in its various resettlement centres. To this end, the resettlement committee in the state acquired, cleared and laid out large parcels of land at different locations within the Suleja and Lapai local government areas. The three main locations were named New Bwari, New Wuse and

New Gawun resettlement centres respectively. The idea was to relocate the people in their former local government areas for "political harmony and unity. 11 15 For instance, in New

Wuse all small villages in the former Wuse District of the capital territory, were grouped together to form an urban complex. This was similarly repeated at Gawun and Bwari

Districts.

The rationale for the seeming collectivisation of the villages is to make them more

"viable for provision of facilities and services. 11 However, as it will be shown later, this line of reasoning did not take account of the loss of individual village identities which this process

41 fostered, as the bigger villages tend to absorb the smaller ones.

Be that as it may, an account of the actual movement of resettlers out of Abuja to

Niger state has been provided by a 1988 report of a Joint Verification Committee on

Resettlement and Compensation set up by the FCDA. 16 The report revealed the movement

of people to the various resettlement centres17 in Niger as per tables VI, VII, VIII and VIX

below.

Table VI: Movement to New Bwari Resettlement Centre

NO VILLAGE NO. VERIFIED NO. STILL NO. MOVED % MOVED IN ACT OUT OUT

1 Bwari 103 - 103 100

2 Shishipe 69 - 69 100

3 Panda 60 32 28 47

4 Kaima 41 - 41 100

5 Kuduru 47 8 39 83

6 Barangoni 35 13 22 62.9

7 Zuma 2 - 2 100 Bisa 8 32 - 32 100 Galuwyi 9 15 - 15 100 lgu 10 9 - 9 100 Pananike

TOTAL 413 53 360 87.2

From table VI it could be seen that with a total percentage moved out at 87. 2 percent resettlers in Bwari Resettlement Centre had actually moved out of the Territory. However, none of the resettlers was fully compensated.

42 Table VII: Movement to New Wuse Resettlement Centre

NO VILLAGE NO. NO. STILL NO. % MOVED VERIFIED IN ACT MOVED OUT OUT

1 Wuse/ Asokoro 599 - 599 100

2 Karon Majigi 25 - 25 100

3 Daki Biyu 12 - 12 100

4 Kurunduma 14 7 7 50

5 Katampe I, II & 40 - 40 100 II

6 Tungan Jaba 14 - 14 100

7 Kaimadna 14 - 14 100

TOTAL 718 7 711 99

With a figure of 99 percent moved out, the table shows that in the whole

Wuse/ Asokoro Resettlement Area all those who desired were fully resettled at new Wuse except those in Kurunduma village where only 90 % moved out. It should be further noted that this group of villages formerly occupied the phase I and other priority areas of the

Federal Capital City; hence they were the first to be evacuated and resettled outside the territory.

43 Table VIII: Movement to New Gawun Resettlement Centre

NO. VILLAGE TOTAL STILL IN NO. % MOVED VERIFIED ACT MOVED OUT OUT

1 Gawun 419 - 419 100

2 Yelwa 10 10 - 0

3 Ky au 5 - 5 100

4 Dagun 7 6 1 14.3

5 Gu ti 6 6 - 0

6 Suita 17 - 17 100

7 Fuka 17 7 10 58.8

8 Domi 29 - 29 100

9 Tando I 125 91 34 27.2

10 Tando IT 30 30 - 0

11 Tungan 38 - 38 100 Agora

12 Gaskiya 59 - 59 100

13 Kitikpa 47 13 34 72.3 TOTAL 809 163 646 79.9

From the table, the villages of New Gawun, Kyau, Suita, Tungan Agora and Gasakpa had 100% moved out. While the villages of Yelwa, Guti and Tando II showed zero percent moved out. This shows that these villages are within the Federal Capital Territory. In summary, the people of the former Gawun District recorded 79.9% moved out of the Abuja

Capital Territory.

44 3. 2. 2 Resettlement in Plateau State

In the former Plateau State the government established a Committee for the

Resettlement of Displaced persons (C.R.D.P) for the purpose. The committee identified,

cleared and laid out parcels of land for resettlement of Plateau indigenes from the capital

territory. In the earmarked resettlement centres, viz, New Karu, New Karshi, New Ukya,

New Gudun Karya and New Gwargwada, plots of land were allocated to individual household

heads "to develop according to his or her capacity. "18

Still because of lack of a well defined resettlement goals and objectives as was

relatively the case in Niger state, the programme in Plateau was not well coordinated. In

fact, in many of the resettlement centres, most of the houses are scattered and further

separated by undeveloped plots as if they are not part of a whole. This is besides the poor

selection of resettlement sites as some like Gwargwada in Gadabuke district and Madalla in

Toto district are always incessible especially during rainy season. 19

Nevertheless, the movement of resettlers from Abuja to Plateau state is shown by

tables X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XV below.20

Table IX: Summary of Movement from AcT to Nige r State Resettlement Areas.

NO RESETTLEMENT NO. NO. NO. % MOVED CENTRES VERIFIED STILL IN MOVED OUT ACT OUT

1 Bwari Centre 413 53 360 87 .2

2 Wuse Centre 711 7 704 99.0

3 Gawun Centre 811 163 648 79.9

TOTAL 1,935 223 1,712 88.5

Table X: Movement To New Uk.ya Resettlement Centre � > 45 Table X: Movement To New Ukya Resettlement Centre

NO VILLAGE NO. NO. STILL NO. % MOVED VERIFIED IN ACT MOVED OUT OUT

1 Ukya sabo 258 15 243 92.2

2 Atako 6 - 6 100

3 Yewuye 115 - 115 100

4 Zakutu 102 - 102 100

5 Madall a 37 - 37 100

6 Takpe 2 - 2 100

7 Ahinza 71 55 16 22.5

8 Ore 19 - 19 100

9 Sungaba 25 2 23 92

10 Tika Offa 8 - 8 100

11 Dereguma 1 - 1 100

TOTAL 644 72 572 88.8

In Ukya Resettlement Area the Committee verified that most of the villages had moved out of Abuja Capital Territory . However, the village of Ahinza has only 22.5 percent moved out.

46 Table XI: Movement To New Gwar1ma da Resettlement Centre.

NO VILLAGE NO. NO. STILL NO. 3 MOVED VERIFIED IN ACT MOVED OUT OUT

1 Gwargwada 226 - 226 100

2 Gwambe 118 - 118 100

3 Pesu 28 - 28 100

4 Tika 30 1 29 96.7

5 Robochi Bassa 110 - 110 100

6 Gaiwa 27 - 27 100

7 Huni Sabo and 66 - 66 100 Huni gade

8 Tashara 61 18 43 70.5

9 Rubochi Gwari 133 - 133 100

10 Ubwa Yango 16 - 16 100

11 Zagabutu 49 1 48 98

12 Kulla 182 - 182 100

13 Rubatu 61 - 61 100

14 Kiri 19 10 9 47.4

15 Kutumba 9 - 9 100

16 Guba Gwari 66 65 1 1.5

17 Gwamfa 14 - 14 100

18 Mono 5 - 5 100

TOTAL 1220 95 1125 91.3

47 In Gwargwada Resettlement Area a total of 1220 people were verified and out of this

number 1125 moved out and this Represented 91.33 moved out. However, only one person

moved out from Guba Gwari Village.

Table XII: Movement to New Karu Resettlement Centre

NO VILLAGE NO. NO. STILL NO. 3 MOVED VERIFIED IN ACT MOVED OUT OUT

1 Karu 512 58 454 88.7

2 Nyanya 201 14 187 93

3 Jikoyi 19 1 18 94.7

4 Kurudu 37 18 19 51.4

5 Gbagarape 16 16 - 0

TOTAL 785 107 678 86.4

From the table, it could be discerned that there is no village with complete movement out of Abuja Capital Territory . The village of Kurudu showed about 503 move-out while no movement from Gbagarape village. Altogether about 86. 4 3 of the population in the Karu

Resettlement Area have moved out of the territory.

48 Table XIII: Movement to New Karshi Resettlement Centre

NO VILLAGE NO. NO. STILL NO. 3 MOVED VERIFIED IN ACT MOVED OUT OUT

1 Karshi 257 - 257 100

2 Kuffai 17 - 17 100

3 Orozo Sariya 4 - 4 100

4 Pasali Orogo 13 - 13 100

5 Atapi Orozo 9 - 9 100

6 Lokoja Orozo 14 - 14 100

7 Sagyiya Orozo 1 - 1 100

8 Orozo 5 - 5 100

9 Gugugu 4 - 4 100

10 Kwoe 2 - 2 100

11 Lokotiye 11 - 11 100

TOTAL 337 - 337 100

It is apparent from the table that in the Karshi Resettlement Area all those verified have moved out of Abuja Capital Territory.

49 Table XIV: Movement to New Gudun Karya Resettlement Centre

NO VILLAGE NO. NO. NO. % MOVED VERIFIED STILL IN MOVED OUT ACT OUT

1 Gudun Karya 125 92 33 26.4

2 Kujekwa 12 8 4 33.3

3 Bug a 70 68 2 2.9

4 Odun Kassa 41 - 41 100

5 Odun Adoga 5 - 5 100

6 Karmo Tukura 28 - 28 100

7 Karmo Rumadu 24 - 24 100

8 Karmo Gangi 34 7 27 79

9 Bida 64 - 64 100

TOTAL 403 175 228 56.6

The table shows that Gudun Karya Resettlement Area recorded the lowest percent age of movement out of ACT. However, there is 100 % movement in the villages of odun Kassa,

Odun Adoga, Karmo Tukura and Karmo Rumadu.

50 Table XV: Summary of Movement from ACT to Plateau Resettlement Areas

NO RESETTLEMEN NO. NO. STILL NO. % MOVED TAREA VERIFIED IN ACT MOVED OUT OUT

1 Ukya 644 72 572 88.8

2 Gwargwada 1,087 95 992 91.3

3 Karu 785 107 678 86.4

4 Karshi 337 - 337 100

5 Gudun Karya 403 175 228 56.6 TOTAL 3,256 449 2,807 86.2

3.2.3 Resettlement in Kwara State

In the case of Kwara state, there was no recorded movement of people from the capital territory to any part of the state. This was because nobody from the former Abaji district decided to move out of the territory . As such, the question of "enumeration, payments of compensation to individuals and the movement to Kwara state did not arise. "21

3.3 Resettlement Within Abuja

The implementation of the second component of the resettlement policy in Abuja involves the relocation of indigenes and other displaced persons who have been caught up by the exigencies of development within the federal capital territory. Those involved here are people who have opted to remain in the capital territory and their resettlement was "to be in the form of planned housing alternative farmlands and other basic infrastructure. "22

Towards this end, a Resettlement Task Force was set up in 1983 and empowered to draw proposals and realistic development plans in "appropriate locations within the federal capital territory"23 and to implement resettlement of the affected persons. Prior to this time,

51 the resettlement activities was being handled by the Federal Capital Territory Administration

(F. C. T. A.), a sectional unit of the FCDA, and was limited to monetary compensation to

displaced persons. The FCTA thus did not carry out any form of physical development

before it was dissolved.

However, the Resettlement Task Force on its inauguration in November 1983, was

charged with the following responsibilities:24

i) Assessing the worth of crops and economic trees to be affected by development of the territory

ii) Payment of compensation due to affected villagers

iii) Selection of sites, preparation and implementation of development plans for affected villages.

iv Overseeing the implementation of plans prepared.

v) Arranging and supervising the movement of the villagers into their new locations .

The Resettlement Task Force had already established resettlement centres at Usuma,

Kubwa and Dutse. Of these, the first resettlement scheme, the Usuma Town Resettlement

was commissioned in 1986 to resettle about 1,200 persons displaced from three villages:

Payi, Jigo and Kwabara at the site of Lower Usuma Dam. The Usuma resettlement town is

said to consist of 186 housing units ranging from 1 to 3 bed rooms with infrastructural facilities and services like schools, roads,, sewage, health clinic and water, etc.25

The second scheme was the Kubwa resettlement consisting of 500 housing units with networks and parking facilities, drainage, culverts, bridges, water supply and 625 KVA generator for electricity supply provided. The total population of the resettlement centre is about 10,000 persons from displaced villages located in the phase I and II of the capital city's planned development. 26

52 In addition, there are other executed, earmarked or on-going resettlement schemes by

the resettlement task force. These include: the Kuje resettlement scheme to accommodate

displaced persons and aborigines by development of various projects in phase II of Federal

Capital City; the Giri resettlement scheme to accommodate 26 villages on the University of

Abuja site; the Karu resettlement scheme to accommodate two hamlets located within Federal

Housing Authority housing estate there; and the Ushafa scheme to resettle inhabitants of old

Ushafa village because of proximity to the lower course of Rvier Usuma.27

However, it should be noted that apart from the resettlement task force, the Municipal

Area Council has in 1996, also undertaken the resettlement of villages like Lubge that have

been displaced by expansion of the Airport dual carriage way. In this instance, the Council

under the leadership of Jacob Ayuba Ngbako allocated plots to the affected persons. The

modality adopted was that those who had three houses were given six plots for them to sell

three in order to develop the remaining three .28 For this category of people, however, the

proceeds from this deal could hardly cope with the high cost of building, thus it would seem

that the option of constructing housing units as adopted by the resettlement task force would

have been better.

Be that as it may, the resettlement of displaced persons within the capital territory will

certainly be a continuous exercise, as more development take place attended by continuous

opening up of the entire territory.

3 .4 Socio-Economic Consequences of the Resettlement Policy

In a recent study, a student of the Abuja phenomenon had made a general observation that,

any attempt to resettle a large group of people or indigenous community in a different location is often very cumbersome. This is mainly because of the forces of inertia and behavioural factors on the part of the individuals concerned which has to do

53 with natural, emotional and economic attachment to their place of origin . The people are usually worried about a possible loss of identity and also about the uncertainties as regards their socio-economic expectations in their new house 29

Indeed, the Abuja resettlement policy which involves the uprooting of the indigenes from their original habitat and their relocation in other places both within and outside the federal capital territory has generated its own socio-economic effects on the affected population. Some of the effects are general and apply to all the indigenes while some are specific to certain areas. Among others these included the disruption of their existing social system, loss of farmlands and loss or gain of infrastructural facilities and services.

To start with, the resettlement policy as implemented in Abuja has destabilised the existing social system of the heterogeneous indigenous population. Indeed, the mere act of displacement of the people is disruptive enough, but the way some of them were resettled, like in Niger state where various small (rural) villages were grouped together to form an urban complex, simply led to a loss of "individual village identities "30 among the people.

Not only that, their rural setting simply disappeared under the weight of this

"collectivization" of villages into urban complexes as provided for by the layouts produced by the state government. The same situation also obtains in old Plateau state where the

"various layouts are semi-urban in nature and virtually removed all the rural characteristics of the people. "31

What this process of forced urbanisation amounts to, is not only the destruction of the existing social and indeed political (as loss of individual village identities is naturally followed by disappearance of political/power structure) system but a kind of de-linkage of the people from their historical past. One is not saying that urbanisation is not good or desirable, but that such process must take into cognisance, and reflect the peculiarities and contextual milieu it is being fostered. After all, in the implementation of the Abuja project

54 itself, efforts have not, been spared in ensuring that the new capital reflect the peculiarities

and aspirations of Nigeria as a nation. That this has not been the case with Abuja indigenes

is therefore a reflection of the destabilisation of their social system by the resettlement

exercise.

Another socio-economic consequence of the resettlement policy is the loss of

farmlands by some of the Abuja indigenes, particularly those of Niger state origin. It is an

established fact that in most of the resettlement centres, namely, Bwari, Gawun and Wuse

"there were no farmlands to complement the planned villages. "32 So, the people live in

Niger state and farm in the capital territory apart from the time and money being expended

in commuting which could have been expended in other profitable ventures, the resettled people have found it difficult to retain their former farmlands in Abuja because of the hostility and non-cooperation of their brethren who opted to remain in the capital territory.

Furthermore, although the resettlement centres are supposed to be urban complexes, in the case of Niger state, even New Wuse "which is meant to be a showcase of resettlement"33 , not to talk of the others, lacks infrastructural facilities and social services such as Health Clinics, Post Office, Fire Station, etc. More than that, for other resettlers like those of New Rubochi in Gadabuke district of old Plateau state, their case is really pathetic, in that while they left in their old settlement in Abuja facilities such as primary and secondary schools, clinics and police stations, "there is not even a permanent primary school in the new settlement. "34 Therefore, it can be said that for most of these people their resettlement had not generated any meaningful improvement in their socio-economic well being.

However, on the other hand, most of the people who remained and were resettled within the new federal capital territory it could be said that the exercise has generated for

55 them an exposure to and usage of modern infrastructural facilities and social services like

modern houses, schools, roads, sewage, electricity , health clinics and improved water supply,

etc. In addition, their seeming lost social identity is gradually being returned to them by

recent developments such as the restoration or creation, coronation and institutionalisation

of the traditional chiefdoms and a Council of Chiefs in the territory especially by the former

Minister Lt-General J. T. Useni.

Apart from those who remained in the territory, there are also others who resettled

in their former states of origin like New Karn which, not only became a local government

council of its own but has as a result, been experiencing tremendous socio-economic

development in all ramifications. In addition to having a Second Class Chief and contributing one commissioner and three Directors-General in the new 13-local government

Nasarawa state at the moment, people of New Karn also derive enormous socio-economic development for being a gateway to the nation's capital city. So, it is clear that the lot of the Karn people could not have been better.

Thus, to all intents and purposes, the resettlement policy has remained a bag of mixed blessings to the original inhabitants of Abuja. While some of the people have witnessed destabilisation and insignificant improvement of their socio-economic well being others have fared better.

56 References

1. Federal Capital Developm ent Authority Joint Repo rt on Resettlement and Compensation. Vol.1, 1988.

2. Olusola, A., Abuja Nigeria's New Capital, Concept Inc. Nigeria Limited, 1993, p.67.

3. Federal Capital..., Op.Cit., p.9

4. Abuja 1985 to 1992 Achievements of the Ministry of Federal Capital Territory, Efua Media Associates Limited, Lagos, 1992, p.7

5. Federal Capital..., Op.Cit., p.9

6. Ibid, p.4

7. Ibid, p.9

8. See, Ibid, p.4 and "Probing Abuja" in The Source, Vol.1 No. 1, April 14, 1997, p.9

9. Ibid

10. Ibid

11. Ibid, p.5

12. "Probing Abuja ... ", Op.Cit. , p.9

13. Ibida, pp9.10

14. Federal Capital. . ., Op. Cit. , p.9

15. Ibid, p.10

16. See. Federal Capital Developm ent Authority Joint Repo rt on Resettlement and Compensation, Vol. l, 1988, Passiom

17. Ibid, pp.13-15 and 19

18. Ibid, pp. 10 - 11

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid, pp.16-17

21. Ibid, p.20

57 22. Olusola, Op.Cit., p.68

23. Ibid, p.69

24. Ibid.

25. Abuja 1985 .... Op.Cit., p.73

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid, p.72

28. "Probing Abuja ... , Op.Cit. , p.11

29. Olusola, Op.Cit., p.68

30. Federal Capital. .., Op.Cit. , p.10

31. Ibid, p.11

32. Ibid, p.10

33. Ibid

34. Ibid, p.11

58 CHAPTER FOUR

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS OF THE RESETTLEMENT POLICY

It is indisputable that there can be no policy that is fool-proof. Being a human

contrivance, any policy whether on social, economic or political matter will always have or

generate its own problems either at the level of conception, implementation or consequence.

However, these three levels of policy engineering are directly interrelated. The overall

success of a policy in terms of desired result for instance is hinged on faithful implementation

as informed by its conception. Equally, any distortion or shift at the level of implementation

will both reverse the original conception and generate unpalatable consequence or outcome.

In this context, the Abuja resettlement policy is not an exception. A fine conception

at origin, the subsequent implementation of the policy was to generate some problems that

would greatly impact on the contemporary politics of the entire Abuja Project. Hence, this chapter will analyse these problems for a fu ller understanding of the resettlement saga, nay the entire Abuja project.

4.1 Policy Shift and Inconsistent Implementation

It may not amount to an exaggeration or out of place to say that the Abuj a resettlement policy had been a victim of the typical inconsistency in policy formulation and implementation in Nigeria. It has always been the case in this country that policies conceived and implementated by past regimes are often reversed, distorted or even scrapped by successor regimes.

In respect of the Abuja resettlement policy, as has been noted earlier, when General

Murtala Mohammed pronounced Abuja as the nation's new federal capital, he made it abundantly clear that government would evacuate and resettle all the territory's original inhabitants in their former states of origin or places of their choice. This is in order to

59 render the territory a-no-man's-land, that is, a wholly federal government-controlled terrain

that is free from the control of any particular ethnic group( s) . 1 However, barely ten days

after announcing the government's decision to relocate the federal capital from Lagos to

Abuja, General Mohammed was assassinated.

Although the successor regime of General Olusegun Obasanjo did not reverse or scrap

the Abuja project, and indeed even proceeded with its actualisation through immediate

drawing up and approval of a masterplan, and the setting of necessary administrative

machinery for its execution in place. The resettlement policy did subsequently suffer a

somersault. Instead of the compulsory evacuation and resettlement of the Abuja indigenes

decreed by General Mohammed, the Obasanjo regime adopted what has been described as

112 11a live-where-you-are, unless-the-land-is needed stance. This followed the outcome of a

survey by a team of consultants from the University of Ibadan commissioned by the regime,

that about two billion N aira would be needed to implement the evacuation and resettlement

project. Thus as 110basanjo shrank from the political project",3 the resettlement of the

indigenes outside Abuja became a matter of choice.

Not only that, the regime went a step further with a thinly veiled discouragement of

the indigenes frommoving outside the capital territory. This was by a July 13, 1978 circular

to the then Military Administrators of Niger, Plateau and Kwara states via the then Minister

of Special Duties in-charge of the FCDA, Mr. Aj ose Adeogun which state that:

Those who are not affected by the first phase of the resettlement but wish to move out of the territory may do so, but such people will have no claims on the FCDA as they are not being forced to leave.4

Implicit in this policy statement thus , is that the inhabitants "who are not desirous to moving out of the carved out territory will be deemed to be indigenes of the territory and ... their welfare will ... be taken care of by the activities of the new territory . 115

60 Again to fu rther compound this policy shift, the Shagari-led federal government in

the Second Republic, unduly policised the resettlement exercise by open encouragement to

its National Party of Nigeria (NPN) supporters to remain in the capital territory while

demanding those of rival parties like the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) in Plateau state to

move out. This, coupled with the alleged misappropriation and mismanagement of

compensation money by government officials and local leaders involved in the resettlement

exercise had either compelled some who had earlier relocated to retreat or altogether

discouraged others from evacuating from the capital territory.

In a similar fashion, the resettlement of Abuja indigenes and other displaced persons

within the federal capital territory has not been consistent as some villages like those in Giri

and Ido, Sanka and Kasuwan Murtala along the Airport road have not yet been relocated.

In fact, in the particular case of Giri, the delay in resettling the people may likely generate

problem or even conflict in future whenever the University authorities decide to develop the

vast permanent site.

Thus on the whole and as things stand today, it is apparent that the resettlement

business has remained unfinished. Not only that, but in particular, the:

reversal and changes of policy implementation in the development and growth of the Federal Capital have today tended to contradict the aims and objectives of creating Abuja as spelt out in the provisions of Decree 6 of 1976.7

In other words, while Decree 6 of 1976 vests ownership of the lands in the territory to the Federal Government, "the customary right of occupancy of the original inhabitants have not been extinguished and the people have not been adequately compensated and resettled according to law. "8

61 4.2 Resettlement and the Status of Abuja

There is no doubt that the shift and inconsistency which characterised the

implementation of the resettlement policy has been accompanied by a non-resolution of the

status of Abuja. Since inception and at various times, a clear and final legal or constitutional

status of Abuja has not been resolved, not even with the provisions entrenched in the 1979

and 1989 constitution. For instance, in the 1979 constitution, Section 263 provides that:

The provisions of this constitution shall apply to the Federal Capital Territory as if it were one of the States of the Federation. 9

As a result of the controversy that this section of the constitution generated bordering

on its interpretation as to whether Abuja represent another state of the Federation or not, the

section was deleted from abrogated 1989 constitution. In its place, the provisions of the

untested 1989 constitution confers on Abuja, a mayoralty status . According to Section 315:

A Mayoralty comprising four Area Councils shall be created for the Federal Capital Territory, Abuj a and the administrative and political structure thereof shall be as provided by the Act of the National Assembly.10

Although the interpretation of the status of Abuja here is clear and unambiguous, the

1989 constitution still failed to define the Mayoralty and the modality for its

operationalisation. That is whether the Mayor of Abuj a was to be democratically elected or

to be appointed by the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It seems largely for this constitutional

lacuna that the Babangida Administration set up the Justice Mamman Nasir Panel on the

future administration of the Federal Capital Territory. 11 However, both the report and white paper of the Panel have not yet been released by government.

Besides, even prior to enactment and promulgation of the untested 1989 constitution, the Federal Military Government of the time had enacted Decree 12 of 1985, which conferred on the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory the powers of a state Military

62 Governor. By this decree, Abuja was conferred a state status, and was being treated as

such. 12 It is in the same fashion that the territory has continued to be administered. This

much has been confirmed by the immediate past Minister, Lt. General J.T. Useni when he

was reported as saying, thus:

We are operating as a state but we are not a state. It is like Africa map without Madagascar. There are 36 states and Abuja. Not 37 states. We are careful about creating status so that (some) indigenes will not claim their state. The draft constitution will clear everything. 13

Be that as it may, while we await the all-important 'learance' by the 1995 or any new draft constitution, it is clear from the foregoing that, the various attempts at determining the status of Abuja have been informed by, and in tum unable to, resolve the contradictions t between on the one hand, the original conception of Abuja as a-no-man's-land and the reality of unresettled indigenes who are increasingly claiming their rights in the territory, on the other. However, as things stand today, the issues of the status and mode of governance of

Abuja have been left for the incoming civilian administration to tackle and resolve.

4.3 The Politico-Administrative Quagmire of Abuja

The prevailing confusion surrounding the constitutional status of Abuja has rendered the federal capital territory vulnerable to political governance based on expediency. This is by the way in which successive regimes always administer the capital territory from expediency, either as a State, a Ministry or as a federal government parastatal.

When the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) was created in 1976, it was envisaged to be governed by an Executive Secretary . According to Decree No.6 of

1976, Similarly, the Authority was expected to be an autonomous body charged with the

sole responsibility of physical development of the capital city . Towards this end, the first

ever Executive Secretary of the Authority , the late Imeh Ebong from Akwa Ibom, was

appointed and operated from 1976 to 1978.

However, following the creation of a Ministry for the Federal Capital Territory in

1979, "the statutory role and ... autonomy of the FCDA have been usurped by successive

Ministers since 1980. "15 This was not only because the Ministry's responsibilities "are a

poor plagiarism of the functions of the FCDA", 16 but also because of the subsequent merger and acquisition of the latter as a parastatal of the Ministry. Thus, with this development, there marked a change from the administration of the federal capital territory through the

FCDA as a public corporation, to its administration as a Ministry with both a Minister and a Permanent Secretary (1979-1988) or Director-General (1988-1997) as the case may be.

Even at that, because of the presence of large number of unresettled indigenes, it necessitated the creation of Development Areas and later Area Councils within the territory, which has fostered a state administrative structure on Abuja. Under this dispensation, the territory is categorised among the existing states of the federation whether in terms of allocation of fiscal resources or appointments by the fe deral government, where Abuja also has its own a quota just like any other state. At the same time, the Development Areas and now Area Councils are recognised and treated as local government councils within the territory. They similarly share the same constitutional status, role, benefits and are counted together with the other local government councils in states of the federation. To buttress this point further, both the territory's Area Councils and local government councils in the states receives their subventions directly from the federal government and their respective

64 administrations are either appointed or elected at the same time, by the same means and

enjoy the same tenure of office.

Still, notwithstanding being operated as a state, in the unclearly defined Abuja's

peculiar political and administrative system, "members of executive council are addressed

as Directors not Commissioners as in the states. "17 Although some of the Directors can be

said to exercise more powers and control more funds than state Commissioners, their

appointments by an incumbent Minister must not necessarily include the original inhabitants.

And this applies to all other appointments within the territory as conscious efforts are often

made to reflect the federal charater, 18 though as of now, because of close proximity, relative

early movement to and settlement in Abuja, civil servants from the neighbouring Niger,

Kaduna, kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa and Plateau states have tended to dominate the federal capital service.

However, the irony of the situation is that whenever it comes to election of persons into positions of authority either within or to represent the territory, the indigenes have always enjoyed the upper hand. By being firmly on ground coupled with their numerical superiority, the indigenes always cart a greater share of the elective positions. For instance, the four pioneer deputy mayors of the then four Area Councils who were sacked in 1994- -

Jacob Ayuba Ngbako (Municipal), Isa Egah Dobi (Gwagwalada) , Abubakar Ibrahim (Abaji), and Etsu Lanto (Kuje) - were original inhabitants. Similarly, about 98 % of their councillors were natives.

In addition, the only Senator who represented the federal capital territory - Hassan

Tadanyigbe - and four members who filled the FCT quota in the House of Representatives during the failed third republic, were indigenes. And thereafter, the three elected representatives of Abuja - Major-General A.B. Mamman (rtd) (Abaji), Barrister A.B. Iyakwo

65 (Kuje) and Jacob Ayuba Ngbako (Municipal) - and the only nominated member, Alhaj i

Mohammed Kuchazi, at the defunct National Constitutional Conference, were all natives of

Abuja. This is not to talk of the cancelled Abacha transition programme where the natives

were in firm control of five out of the six Area Councils. Again, even under the just­

concluded transition programme of the General Abdulsalami Abubakar administration the

natives have once more established their firm control of all the six Area Councils save for

the National Assembly which the Senatorial seat was won by a non-indigene, Hajia Khairat

Abdulrazak.

Perhaps what has so far prevented the Abuja original inhabitants from assuming total

political-cum-administrative control of the capital territory at any given time has been the

failure to organise an election into the office of Mayor, or by whatever name it is called.

To that regard, the recurrent question as to who owns the land (Abuja), the Federal Republic of Nigeria or the natives may still be pertinent and desirous of being looked into.

4.4 Resurgent Native Identity Vs the Bogey of a No Man's Land

It has been established right from the beginning of this study that Abuj a had been conceived to be a-n-man's-land. This beautiful concept was given legal backing by Decree

6 or 1976 and was expected to be actualised via the compulsory evacuation and resettlement of this indigenes. However, the haphazard and inconsistent implementation of the resettlement policy has resulted in the presence of a large number of the Abuja original inhabitants.

The indigenous population were at the initial stages of development of the federal capital territory concerned with wresting favourable tidings in terms of adequate compensation money and good resettlement centres from the authorities. But with time and having seen that the government could not muster enough courage to execute the entire

66 resettlement project to its logical conclusion, those indigenes who remained in the territory

began to turn their attention within, to see what they can make of the prevailing situation.

However, instead of satisfaction with the perceived rapid growth and development of the

territory the natives seems to be aghast and uncomfortable. As a representative group of the natives has put it more sharply, thus:

Administration of the territory has created serious political problems resulting into series of acts of discrimination against the original inhabitants. We are inclined to hold that we are being treated as slaves in colony conquered by sheer use of force. Our right of self­ determination has been taken away because we are stateless and lacking in political direction. 20

If we may ask, what is the source of their grouse? It is none other than the ghost of provisions of Decree 6 of 1976 in the face of their non-relocation and resettlement outside the territory. Again let us hear from the horses' mouth:

Government ought to have abrogated Decree no .6 of 1976 in view of the apparent modification of the conception of Abuja and shift in policy implementation as originally planned. In our view Decree No.6 of 1976 is no longer relevant in so far as the original inhabitants are still allowed to remain in the territory and not compensated.21

This is not only a denunciation of the legal basis and character of development of the entire Abuja project in the light of existing realities, but also of an attempt by natives to assert their identity. In the latter case, they have particularly been working assiduously to give it concrete expressions through a number of ways. First, is by their apparent domination of the territory's political scene. As was noted earlier, the natives have been calling the shots in the territory's political terrain. Except for now that the Senatorial seat is occupied by a non-native, the natives always dominate and manage political parties, and cart almost all the elective offices in the territory . Indeed, it is largely for this

67 reason that the natives have been stridently clamouring for the institution of elective

mayoralty "with political, administrative structure of a typical state in Nigeria. "22

Secondly, is the insistence and filling of the territory's quota as provided for by the

prevailing Federal Character policy. For instance, Alhaji Mohammed Kuchazi, a native and

former nominated representative of the territory at the defunct National Constitutional

Conference now also represents Abuja on the Federal Character Commission. In the same

vein, Alhaj i Musa Salihu, a native from Abaji and former Resident Electoral Commissioner

for Delta state, filled the fe deral capital territory 's quota on the defunct National Electoral

Commission of Nigeria (NECON). Besides, speculations are rife that whenever the Federal

Character Commission finishes its assignment, a definite government position will be taken

to the effect that the natives should be filling Abuja's quota in all federal establishments,

including schools. 23

Incidentally, it seems that the natives are being aided wittingly or unwittingly by government in the process of asserting their identity . Recent developments in the affairs of the territory such as the establishment of the federal capital territory council of chiefs, coronation and installation of various local chiefs, including in Garki village at the very heart of the federal capital city, could not have come at a better time for the natives. In fact, if anything, this has further strengthened the basis for calling into question and negation of the original conception of Abuja as a no man's land, by the natives. In otherwords, the official position on paper may be that Abuja is a no man's land but the reality on ground belies this notion, and increasingly point to the existing original inhabitants as at least, 'part-owners' of the land in conjunction with the Federal Republic of Nigeria. To that regard, the hard reality of the matter may not be far from rendering thruthful the contention that "between

Lagos, said to be dominated by Yoruba, and Abuja, there is little or no difference. "24

68 References

1. See full text of General Mohammed's national broadcast on February 3, 1976, in Abuja 1985 to 1992 Achievements of the Ministryof Federal Capi tal Territory, p. 7.

2. "Probing Abuja" in The Source, Vol. l No. 1, April 14, 1997, p.9

3. Ibid.

4. A.B. Mamman, et al, "The Status, Political and Administrative Structure of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja", a memorandum to the National Constitutional Conference Abuja, 1994, p.2

5. Ibid

6. On this Point, see, "Probing Abuja ..." Op.Cit, pp9-10; and Federal Capital Developm ent Authority Joint Repo rt on Resettlement and Compensation, Vol. I, 1988, p.4

7. Mamman, et al, Op.Cit., p.1

8. Ibida., p.5

9. In Ibid. , p.3

10. In Ibid., p.5

11. Ibid., p.6

12. Ibid., p.4

13. "Probing Abuja ...", Op.Cit. , p.11

14. In Ibid., p.12

15. Ibid

16. Ibid

17. Ibid., p.9

18. Witness, for instance, how only one out of the four former appointed Chairman of the Area Councils Caretaker Committees only one (Abaji) was an indigene, and only one (Education) of the present crop of MFCT Directors is an indigene.

19. "Probing Abuja", Op. Cit., p. 10

69 20. Mamman, et al, Op.Cit., p.3

21. Ibid., p.4

22. Ibid., p.7

23. "Probing Abuja . .. ", Op.Cit., p.10

24. Ibid

70 CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

In the preceding sections attempt has been made to analyse various aspects of the topic under study which is the Abuja resettlement policy . This chapter thus sums up the research study. In doing so, a summary of findings made on the resettlement policy is provided which is followed by our recommendations. The concluding note finally end the work.

5 .1 Summary of Findings

5 .1.1 The emergence of Abuja as an urban centre today is traceable to the desire and general consensus on the need to relocate the nation's capital from Lagos to a more central and conducive place in the hinterland. Because of its numerous problems such as overpopulation, traffic congestion, land constraint, environment pollution, poor topography, security vulnerability and its unsatisfactory dual role as Federal and Lagos State Capital, it was felt that Lagos was no longer desirable and politically expedient to continue as the nation's capital city. The need for a change became more pronounced in the early 70s and by mid-70s, the Murtala Administration set in motion the machinery which culminated in the carving out of a new federal capital territory named Abuja via Decree No.6 of 1976.

5 .1.2 Unlike the older Nigerian cities and as of today, Abuja is a well-planned and phased out city with all the paraphanelia of modern cities. Infact, Abuja had witnessed tremendous development as manifested in various facets, including lands development, road and transportation, water supply, port and telecommunications, electricity, housing, office accommodation, education, health, good sanitary conditions, and to a lesser extent agriculture and industries, as well as tourism and recreation. The process had been further facilitated first, by the formal relocation of the seat of government from Lagos in December, 1991 and

71 later by the subsequent relocation of all Ministries and Extra-Ministerial Departments in

October, 1996.

5.1.2 However, in the course of the development of Abuja, several distortions have been

visited on its masterplan which is supposed to guide and control the process. This is

manifested by the building of several structures on spaces originally meant for other

purposes, and the incessant changing of locations of vital structures. A typical case in point

is the very seat of government where the present Presidential Villa is now on the site

originally meant for an Annexe and vice versa.

5.1.4 At inception, Abuja was conceived to be a no man's land. That is, it was established

to promote national unity . Hence, the government immediately displaced the original

inhabitant of the territory via the instrumentality of Decree No.6 of 1976. This,

simultaneously necessitated the resettlement of the affected persons. The initial government

policy was to evacuate and resettle all the Abuja natives in their former states of origin or

any other place of their choice. After commencement of the resettlement, and owing to a

fear of the anticipated colossal amount (N2 billion) needed forthe entire exercise, the policy

was subsequently reversed by government, making it optional for the affected persons to decide on whether to move out or remain in the federal capital territory.

5.1.5 In carrying out the resettlement of their indigenes, these states were not handed any definite policy guidelines by the federal government. Accordingly the states adopted different patterns based on their policies. Niger state opted for the physical construction of houses and associated facilities for the resettlers at various resettlement centres, while the Plateau state allocated plots of land to heads of house holds to develop according individual capacity. In all, from available records, a total number of 1,712, (88.5%) of verified persons were resettled in Niger state and 2,807 (86.2 %) in Plateau state. However, in the old Kwara state

72 there is no recorded movement of people from the former Abaj i district to any part of the

state. lnfact, the compensation money given to the state was returned to coffers of the

federal government.

5 .1.6 The resettlement of displaced persons within the federal capital territory involves the

construction of alternative housing units, allocation of alternative farmlands and provision of

infrastructural facilities by the Resettlement Task Force, to the affected persons. Already , displaced persons have been resettled in Kubwa, Usuma and Dutse resettlement centres while other persons still in locations like Giri and the other villages along the Airport road will also be resettled whenever development eventually catches up with their native abodes.

5 .1.7 The resettlement exercise has generated for most of the Abuja indigenes, a destabilisation of their existing socio-political system, loss of farmlands and infrastructural facilities and services. On the other hand, it has also improved the socio-economic lot of others, both within and outside the territory, through exposure to and usage of modern houses and infrastructural facilities and services, as well as a renewed recognition of their social system marked by the recent institutionalisation of a council of chiefs, particularly in the federal capital territory. So, the resettlement exercise is a bag of mixed blessings to the lot of the affected persons.

5 .1.8 Because of the colossal amount of money to be involved in the evacuation and resettlement of Abuja indigenes, the Obasanjo regime shrank from the political project, and made it optional to the indigenes. This policy shift and inconsistent implementation was further aggravated by the undue politicisation of the resettlement exercise by politicians of the Second Republic, and the misappropriation and mismanagement of compensation money by government officials and local leaders involved in the scheme.

73 5.1.9 In consequence, the presence of large number of the original inhabitants in the territory has informed the failure to resolve to date, the actual status of Abuja. Over time,

Abuja has been variously accorded the status of or operated as a state, as well as a mayoralty by both legal enactments and modus op erandi of successive governments. In otherwords, the non-resolution of the status of Abuja is a function of the contradiction between the original conception of Abuja as a no man's land and the reality of extant natives left behind by the resettlement policy.

5.1.10 Accordingly, the federal capital has remained in a political and administrative quandary. This is in the sense in which, first, Abuja since inception had been governed from expediency, either as a federal government parastatal, a state or a Ministry, by successive governments. Secondly, in terms of appointment into the federal capital territory's service, it is made open to all Nigerians, while when it comes to political contest to offices, the natives have always dominated the show by carting away the greater maj ority of the elective seats.

5.1.11 The continued domination of the fe deral capital territory's political scene by the natives, their filling of Abuja quota in federal establishments and associated matters, as well as the recent renewed recognition and formal installations of their various local chiefs by the governing authorities, have strengthened the basis for calling to question, and negation of the original conception of Abuja as a-no-man's-land.

5.3 Recommendations

Based on the foregoing and in order to realise the ambition of the founding furthers and aspirations of Nigerians for a capital city that will promote national unity, the fo llowing steps are proffered:

74 1. To make the Abuja project more meaningful for their sacrifice, the states affected by the creation of Abuja should make continuous efforts to improve the socio-economic lot of their indigenes who have resettled from the fe deral capital territory. In particular, the Niger state government should as a matter of urgency provide "adequate farmlands and introduce the practice of cooperative farming " 1 in the resettlement centres. For its own part, the Nasarawa state should provide the resettlement centres with adequate infrastructural facilities and services, such as accessible roads, primary and secondary schools, clinics, etc.

There should be immediate resettlement of all the remaining Abuja aborigines to appropriate and permanent locations within the territory. This is in order to finally bury to rest, the ghost of fear and uncertainty that is hanging on their neck and to prevent their consolidation in present locations, to forestall any possibility of future conflict with the natives.

3. The federal capital territory should be run as mayoralty. The institution of mayoralty should be by election and the mayor is to be elected by all people resident in Abuja. Other elective positions down the level should also be open to all.

However, since the natives are stateless, they should continue to fill the Abuja quota in all matters, including appointments, schooling etc. This is in order to put them at par with other residents of the territory who may be enjoying benefits from both their home states and the federal capital territory.

5. On the whole, there should be an early return to civil-democratic rule in the country. This will help do away with the military-induced distortions of the masterplan and governance of the territory based on expediency. This is the moreso that the Shagari administration was not known to have introduced any distortion on the masterplan.

5.2 A Concluding Note

From the foregoing discourse, it is evident that Abuja as an urban centre, had been a product of clear thinking and profound fo resight. The conception of it as a truly Nigerian national capital, not dominated by any group, religious or ethnic, cannot be faulted.

Similarly, the tremendous well-planned and phased out course of its development cannot but be a source of pride to all Nigerians. Indeed, Abuja is a beautiful city and a worthy capital for Nigeria in all ramifications.

75 However, as it has been established in the course of this study, no any human effort

can lay claim to being perfect or fool-proof. In the case of Abuja, this study has

demonstrated how the resettlement policy, itself a fine conception at formulation, had

suffered some pitfalls at the level of implementation. This, resulted in making Abuja a

paradox of sort, particularly in the contradiction between its original conception as a no

man's land and the extant agitated natives claiming their rights.

Still, the apparent predicament is not intractable and does not diminish the importance of the worthy national effort. What may be needed is to further consolidate Abuja as a national urban centre by taking some further measures, as recommended in this study, particularly pertaining to the outcome of the resettlement policy.

76 References

1. Federal Capital Developm ent Authority Joint Repo rt on Resettlement and

Compensation, Vol.I, 1988, p.39.

77 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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AmdiI, l.E.S., "A review of military government's housing policy between 1975-79" in Nigeria Journal of Political Science, Vol.4 Nos.I & IL 1985, pp.148-171

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Amdii, 1.E.S., Analysis of Government Housing Policy in Nigeria, ABU Press, Zaria, 1993.

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78