II

...... ' .. • . ·' GOVERNMENT POLICY ON THE CREATION OF THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY:

AN IMPACT ASSESSMENT, 1976 - 1996 -.. · -

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" . ., .. . .. · ...... , •.. # . .. .. • • BY .

ABUBAKAR HASSAN AHMED II B.A. (Hons), M.A. .. . (NO. 94428022) . .

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BEING A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF , IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE AWARD OF PH.D IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT ·. OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF ABUJA

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NOVEMBER, 1999

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. . • ABSTRACT

This study is mainly concerned with examination of the role of government's policy on the creation of Abuja as the Federal Capital of . Generally speaking, we examined the philosophy that governed the policy for the development of Abuja. Creating new towns and especially capital cities is not new in history. f n fact, quite a number of countries in the world have had cause to change their capital cities.

Be that as it may, the research had essentially focused at investigating the reaction of the inhabitants t the implementation of the resttlement and compensation pol icy. T nitially, the policy was that the whole of the local population would be resettled outside the territory. With time, this policy was changed, and resettlement became limited to only those areas affected by physical development of the city. On the compensation issue, the exercise was fu ll of fraud, to say the least.

We conducted the research by gathering both primary and secondary data on the variables identified. For example, the evaluation of the resttlement pol icy was worked out through the analysis of some responses that served as indicators of satisfaction or not, through the use structured and unstructured questions.

Our findings revealed that right from the beginning of the programme of the development of the new Fedral Capital Territory, the inhabitants had high expectation and anxieties about the decision to resttle them, and perhaps with adequate compensation. In any case, both those resettled outside the FCT and those within were discontented with the levels of social services provided. In the final analysis, th is study recommends that:

1. concerted efforts should be made by government to pay all outstanding

compensation to the rightful owners;

11. the Aborigines in some cases should be intergrated within the FCT rather than

resttled outside;

111. government should embark on agress1ve housing programmes for civil

servants in the entire Federal Capital Territory.

11 CERTIFICATION

I certify that the materials recorded in this Dissertation resulted from the original research carried out by Abubakar Hassan Ahmed II when he was a student in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of

Abuja, Abuja, and approved for acceptance in partial fulfilment of the requirement of the Ph. D. d ree )e�oCC', Date: ...... /..... tf?: ../ s h. l Date:.!.�. � ./t.:O Head of Depaiirnent Professor Umar M. Birai

Date: ...... External Examiner Dr. H.J. Ohwona Reader, ABU Zaria

Date: ...... Dean of Postgraduate School Professor A. I. Ikeotuonye

Ill DEDICATION

Th is work is dedicated to the memory of my

Late Uncle

Alhaji Magaji Abubakar Ahmed

lV ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First of all, glory, thanks and praises be to Allah, (SWA) who has in many

ways been able to see me through with this work. I want to place on record the

assistance I received from the foundation Vice-Chancellor, Professor fsa B.

Mohammed, and the Registrar, Alhaji Yakubu H. Habi, fo rmer Ag. Vice-Chancellor,

Professor Ahmed T. Sulaiman and indeed the present Vice Chancellor, Dr Gamba

Laraba Abdullahi by offering me the opportunity to undergo the study, while at the same time continuing with my normal work in the University.

I am very grateful to my supervisor, Professor I.E. S. Amd ii, who had been very thorough, meticulous and hard on me to see to the successful completion of this work. His comments, criticisms and advise had been very useful in bringing out this work in its present form . My constant touch with Professor Amdii has ultimately made our relationship blossom from that of teacher-student to brotherly affection.

Equally r obtained valuable contributions on the work from the fo llowing senior members of staff of the Department of Political Science. They are Professor A.A.

Ujo, Professor Umar M. Birai (the HOD), Dr. Inno Ukaej e (the former HOD), Dr. r. l. Uke and Dr. Solomon Ogbu. I am also grateful to Dr. Abdullahi Umar.

I want to acknowledge the moral support and encouragement I received from my father, Alhaj i Hassan Ahmed II mni, the Magajin Garin Nasarawa, my uncle,

Ambassador Mohammed Buba Ahmed, the Turakin Nasarawa, Alhaji Jibrin Ahmed, and indeed my mother, Malama Aishatu Omajegba - Ibrahim.

I will also like to record the encouragement, support and prayers r received from my close fr iends. These are Iyal Salisu Ahmed, Saidu B. Ahmed, Abubakar

v Sadeeq Usman, Shehu Usman Suleiman, Bashir Ibrahim Naguto, Alhaj i Abubakar

Aliyu Maiwada Keffi , and Salihu Na lndo.

Jn the University of Abuja, I benefitted a lot from the wealth of experience of my close friends, who stood by me always, until my dream was realised. These fr iends are Dr. Al iyu Hussaini, Idris 0. Jibrin, Abubakar A. Bafeto, Malam Ayinla

A. Sanni and Yahaya r. Mohammed. Other firends include F.L. Bello, T.L. Ekele,

Y. Esikalem, Abdullahi Musa and Dr. A.A. Idrees.

My thanks also go to my numerous brothers and sisters, who have patiently waited and fervently prayed for me to conclude this study. As for my wife,

Yashuwa, words cannot explain. Simply put, you are most wonderful! I also thank my daughters Ummi and Asama'u.

J imoh Moruf, Joshua Aragi II and Lawrence K. Koshihula who painstakingly produced this work several times over, I am grateful to them.

I wish to state that since human beings are infallible, I whole-heartedly accept responsibility for whatever instances that appear in this work.

AHMED II, ABUBAKAR HASSAN

Gwagwalada, 7th November, 1999

VI LIST OF TABLES

Page

4.1 Garki Health Centre: Altendance by Ailment, Sex and Age, 1988 84 - 4.2 Medical Facilities Allocation ...... 86 - 4.3 Control of Some Diseases ...... 90 - 4.4 Distribution of Primary School Facilities by Area Councils, 1990 92 4.5 Distribution of Secondary Schools by Area Councils, 1990 ....93

5 .1 Land Allocation and Population by District in Phase 1 of the FC1102 - 5.2 Incremental Growth of the FCT, 1981 - 2000 ...... 105 - 5 .3 Principal Types of Dwelling Units and Land Use intensity ... 107 - 5 .4 Yearly Housing Shortage in the FCC (1982 - 1987) ...... 113 5 .5 Details of Completed and On-going Housing Projects in all Districts of the FCT ...... 11 4 5.6 Completed Housing Units in FCC as at 1st January, 1990 ... 116 5.7 On-Going Housing Units in FCC as at 31st January, 1990 ... 117 5.8 Information on Housing in AU Districts (Units Awarded) . . . . 117 5.9 Private Residential Housing Provisions in Phase 1 of the FCC as at

1996 ...... 121 5.10 FHA Houses in FCC by 1996 ...... 125 6. 1 Composition of Refuse from 3 Social Class Areas in the FCT . 135 7 .1 Resettlement Preferences in the FCT, 1980 ...... 165 7.2 Recommended Compensation Rates Applicable in the FCT ...167

Vil LIST OF FIGURES

Integration of Activities of Environmental Protection Departments 23

2 . Structure of Policy Instrument . 34

3. Pol icy Process and Impact ... . 40

4. Number of Patients per day by Area Council in Government Owned

Clinics/Health Centres in 1994 ...... 85

5. Availability of Medical Personnel in the Territory Between Time �

Periods ...... 88

6. The Six Residential Districts in Phase 1 ...... 109 -

VIII TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

1 ABSTRACT ......

CERTIFICATION ...... 111

DEDICATION ...... 1v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...... v

UST OF TABLES ...... v11

UST OF FIGURES ...... viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... ix

CHAPTER ONE ...... 1

1.1 Introduction ...... 1

1.2 Objectives of the Study ...... 3

1.3 Research Problems ...... 3

1.4 Research Propositions ...... 7 1.5 Methodology of Study ...... 7

1.6 Scope of Study ...... 11 1.7 Significance of the Study ...... 11

1.8 Limitations of Study ...... 12

CHAPTER TWO ...... 13

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 13 2. 1 Literature Review ...... 13

2.2 Theoretical Framework ...... 24 2.2.1 Structural Functionalism ...... 26 2.2.2 Policy Instrument Strategy ...... 32

CHAPTER THREE ...... 44 3.1 Factors Responsible for the Relocation of Federal Capital

City ...... 46 3.2 Abuja as a Federal Capital Territory: Historical Process . . . . 54 3.3 The Political and Socio - Economic History of the Indigenes of

Abuja ...... 61

CHAPTER FOUR ...... 65

INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROVISION OF

SOCIAL OVERHEADS ...... 65 4. 1 Infrastructural Development ...... 65

IX 4.2 Provision of Social Facilities ...... 81 4.2 .1 Health Care Facilities 83 4.2 .2 Educational Provision 91

CHAPTER FIVE ...... 98

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS JN HOUSING

D EVELOPM ENT ...... 98

5. 1 Introduction ...... 98

5.2 Housing and the Abuja Master Plan Provisions ...... 100

5.2 .1 Land Allocations and Housing ...... 101 5.2.2 The Population to be housed as envisaged by Master

Plan over Time ...... 103

5.2 .3 Public Housing and Private Initiatives ...... 106

5.3 Visitation into Housing Development in Abuja ...... 108

5.3.1 Residential Districts in Phase I ...... 108

5.3.2 Appraisal Strategy ...... 110

5 .3.3 Achievements in Housing Provision ...... 111 5.3.4 Total Number of Houses Completed Between 1988 and 1996 ...... 11 3 5.3.5 Amendments to the Master Plan with Particular

Reference to Housing Provisions ...... 118

5.3.6 The Functionality of the Residential Districts ...... 119 5.3.7 Private Sector Contribution to Housing Provision in the

Federal Capital City ...... 120

5.4 The Role of the Federal Housing Authority ...... 121

CHAPTER SIX ...... 13 0

ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION POLICY IN THE FCT ...... 130

6. 1 Introduction ...... 130

6.2 Public Policy and Environmental Sanitation ...... 130

6. 3 Abuja Environmental Protection Board ...... 133

6.4 Waste Management and Sanitation ...... 134

6.5 Achievements ...... 136

6.6 Re-aligning Policy Objectives with Implementation ...... 138

CHAPTER SEVEN ...... 141

THE POLITICS OF RESETTLEMENT AND COMPENSATION ...... 141

7. 1 Synopsis ...... 14 1

7. 2 The Evolution of Resettlement Schemes ...... 142

7.3 Early Resettlement Schemes in Africa ...... 144

7.4 Resettlement and the Issues of Housing Families ...... 147 7 .5 The Administrative Problems of Resettlement and

Compensation in Some African Countries ...... 149

x 7.5. l The Volta Resettlement Experience ...... 149

7.5.2 Terna Resettlement Scheme ...... 152

7.5.3 The Kainji Resettlement Scheme ...... 154 7.5 4 The Bakolori Resettlement Programme ...... 159

7.6 Resettlement Problems of the Federal Capital Territory ..... 160 7.7 The Presidential Ad-Hoc Committee on Resettlement of

Displaced Communities of the FCT ...... 163

7.8 Movement of Inhabitants out of the Capital Territory ...... 169 7. 9 Resettlement Centres ...... l 71

CHAPTER EIGHT ...... 173

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ...... 173

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 183

APPENDIX ...... 18 9

Xl CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Introduction

Public choice making or decisions through veritable instruments are usually

by government's wishful thinking or a reaction to societal environmental demands.

Public pol icy per se as it affects establishment of new capital territory has

consequences for shelter provision which go beyond housing.

The idea of creating towns and particularly capital cities is not new. A glance through the pages of history of human settlements shows a repletion of visions and actual construction of new capital cities. The period between the beginning of the

19th century to the present (late 20th century) offers quite a number of experiments.

The United States of America moved its capital to Washington in 1800; Canada designated Ottawa a new capital in 1957; Canberra became the new capital of

Australia in 1913; Brazil moved its capital from Rio de Jeneiro to Brasilia in 1956;

Dodowa replaced Dar-es-salam in 1974 as Tanzania's new capital. Other countries include, Malawi which designated Lilongwe as its new capital city in 1965 thus replacing Blantyre; Pakistan created Islamabad to replace Karachi while Cote d'Ivoire chose Yamousoukoro as its new national administrative centre against Abidjan.

While some of the new capital cities have long been conceived, planned, executed and are already functioning as capitals, others are yet at varying stages of planning or implementation. For instance, Washington, Canberra, Ottawa, New

Delhi, Brasilia and Islamabad have been functioning fu lly as capital cities. On the other hand, new capitals such as Dodowa, Lilongwe and Abuja are being developed and have in part been playing the roles of capital cities.

1 These background information therefore provide information on countries that

have been involved in constructing new capitals with a view to identifying areas of

achievements and limitations. These discussions can be beneficial to the

understanding of Nigeria in which is currently building the city of Abuja as its

capital .

The building of new capital cities the world over is usually motivated by a

number of factors which may be political, social, economic and strategic in nature.

Details of these would be discussed in the next chapter. One other characteristic feature of most relocated capital cities is that they are shrouded with an aura of controversy. This is in regard to whether or not capitals should be relocated in the first instance, or where they should be sited if they have to relocate at all. The choice of Islamabad, for example, was clouded with controversy (Stephen, A.,

1970: 182); and in Nigeria, the concept of a new capital city was a subject of debate.

Those in favour of the project saw the venture as potentially beneficial in so much as it would serve as a symbol of unity among the diverse ethnic groups in the country.

Against these perceived advantages , others advanced contrary argument that a new capital city was neither socially desirable nor economically rational given the stringent economic reality.

Nevertheless, the importance of Federal Capitals to nations can not be over­ emphasized. In the case of Nigeria, it serves the need to have a befitting Federal

Capital capable of enhancing the government's administrative efficiency and conve111ence. Furthermore, a new and befitting Federal Capital can acquaint the

Nigerian citizenry of the progress of physical development that has been achieved so far. Not the least, the new Federal Capital projects Abuja into national and international focus as a symbol of unity and greatness.

2 Essentially, Federal Capital perform specific functions dealing with political,

economic and social issues as well as other functions particularly as it relates to the

apparatus of the nation's decision making machinery.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study among others are to:-

(a) examine the rationality for the relocation of the seat of government to Abuja.

(b) analyse the impact of relocation policy with particular reference to:-

(i) infrastructural development (ii) social investment (iii) housing development (iv) decision making process and output (v) environmental changes (vi) resettlement and compensation

(c) examine critically the major problematics of creating a new urban conurbation.

1.3 Research Problems

The problem of this research is that there has been no significant relationship between governements' policy programmes and implementation in terms of changes generated in the areas of social , political , economic and environmental sectors in the

FCT. This insignificant relationship between public policy and what obtains in reality fascinated the researcher in this area of study under consideration.

Tn Nigeria today, policies are not often implemented as expected. In most cases, the implementation stages become far below expectation. This is to say that policies are either not executed to its logical conclusion by government that initiates them or that they are abandoned mid-way by such governments. This leads to the

3 general phenomenon that Nigeria's problem is not that of policy making but that of

implementation. However, because the FCT policy has achieved a reasonable degree

of success at least by way of implementation, although twenty years after it was

conceived, it becomes necessary to render a critical study to identify the efficacy of

the pol icy per se.

Given the policy and capital invested, the problem of the research revolves around the question: what kind of impact or result has been produced that differentiate it from Lagos? It was identified in the course of the study that the evolution of the FCT policy necessitated a different scenario from what was obtained in Lagos. The study explored and identified the major causative differences between

Lagos and Abuja. The critical examination of the impact of government'spolicy with regards to the evolution of the FCT as a Federal capital is relevant in order to establish the degree of relationship between policy actions and execution in terms of:

(a) economic plans and inputs in areas of infrastructure;

(b) social needs of the urban population in the areas of housing, environment and transportation;

(c) replications of urban characteristics of Lagos and Abuja; and

(d) the development of Satellite Sterio-types around the city.

The politics of resettlement and compensation of the indigenous peoples of the

FCT no doubt constitute a major problem, given the large capital outlay involved.

This research explored the extent to which the indigenous population had been resettled and compensated given the role of the middlemen in Nigerian pol icy implementation. It has been a case of man's inhumanity against man. To say the least, these people have remained unhappy, even bitter, about various aspects of the exercise. Jn the course of the study, a detailed political economy of the resettlement

4 and compensation will be critically analysed.

Other research problems have been in the areas of roads becoming deplorable, with pot-holes and bridges being water logged, health care delivery system and some public buildings suffering from structural depreciation. fndeed, most roads within the

Federal Capital Territory have become death traps, and the authority seems helpless.

The research investigates the major factors that have given rise to these.

In any large scale resettlement exercise as required at Abuja, shouldn't the question of merging of villages be well attended to for both political and economic considerations rather than religious? f n the FCT, there were over 845 villages to which some services such as schools, hospitals, roads, portable water, electricity and markets could not be provided economically and optimally without merging some of them. The resettlement villages are heterogenous in terms of ethnicity and religion and originated from different local administrative set-ups. It is a well known fact that the problem of village mergers in a situation of multi-ethnic and religious heterogeneity as obtained in the FCT is not easy to handle. For instance, there are three major religious groups in the FCT - Muslims, Christians and traditionalists. In

Abaji district, Muslim communities rejected merger with villages that were mainly

Christians. In the same vein, Rubochi which was mainly Christians did not like to be merged with villages that were mainly muslims.

How wise is it that resettlers were not involved 111 the choice of their resettlement sites? Rather, it is seen that the choice of their resettlement sites were single-handedly manipulated by governmentoffi cials. Furthermore, while conceiving the housing type and design, no input was sought from the resettled population. The enumeration exercise for resettlement was conducted in 1977 and there was no

5 revision of the exercise to ascertain the population of households in determining the

housing types to be built. It is only natural to expect increase in population after a

period of ten (10) years. For example, at Usuma resettlement centre many one-

bedrooms were constructed and during evacuation the units were found to be very

inadequate and families had to convert the sitting rooms into bedrooms, while some

of their belongings had to be kept under trees . Ironically, in the old towns, the

resettlers had facilities for the storage of grains, but this was not taken into

consideration in the new settlements.

Jn the same vein, some transit camps meant to accommodate those villages

requiring immediate evacuation due to the accelerated development of the phase 1

area of the city ware constructed without due consultation with the affected villagers.

Some of these transit camps were constructed at Kwali, Jabi, Rafin dai-dai, Ushafa,

Lugbe and Kubwa. Equally posing a problem is the issue of payment of

cumpeusaLion, which is always sensitive and controversial in resettlement programmes

and in most cases is characterised by fraudulent activities. Furthermore, there may

be the problem of connivance between property assessors and property - owners

resulting in over assessment for compensation. Also, some "ghost" names may be

included for payment of compensations while under payment of cash could be made

during the payment of compensation.

In view of the above discourse certain research questions are necessary. The fol lowing research question are relevant:

1. how can we argue that the infrastructural development smce establishment of the Federal Capital Territory has any close relationship with large quantum capital invested since 1976?

11. what is the relationship between the capital allocated to the development of social overheads and output so far generated over the period?

6 111. in what ways has government policy produced any significant environmental changes since 1976?

1v. why was the pol icy on resettlement changed as from the 1980's?

v. what are the negative roles of governmentoffi cials in the compensation programme?

vi. why was middle men institutionalised in the compensation process?

1.4 Research Propositions

Usually it is assumed that the moment a policy issue was formulated by

Government, implementation was expected to follow almost naturally and

immediately, and that the desired objectives of the policy should be achieved by the

policy makers. However, intensive studies revealed that in most cases, the possibility

of a stop-gap between policy formulation and policy implementation are inevitable.

Arising from this therefore, the following research propositions are advanced:

1. there is still some quantitative shortage of infrastructure and accommodation in Abuja

11. the expansion of social overheads and environmental changes have only received peripheral attention

HI. there is a general discontent among Aborigines who have been resettled as a result of the creation of the new Federal Capital Territory over their social, economic, political and geographical neglect

1v. there are some unresolved issues on the problems of compensation paid to the indigens.

1.5 Methodology of Study

For the accomplishment of this research study, the mam data gathering methods or techniques used were two fold: content analysis and survey research .

A I though variously defined, however, in this research study, content analysis is

7 conceived as a "research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative

description of the manifest content of communication 11 (Selltiz, C., et al, 1977: 170).

To this end, the research would involve a review of existing literature in books,

journals, news magazines, write ups and articles in newspapers, as well as seminar

papers, documents, workshop communique and the decrees.

The main advantage in using content analysis is that the technique 1s non­

reactive or unobtrusive. This unobtrusiveness of the technique is derived from the

fact that the documents are not produced for the benefit of the investigator, and in this

respect, are free from the influence of his theoretical or personal bias 11 (Selltiz, C. ,et

al, 1977:202). Since the technique requires constant application of categories for

including and excluding contents, it allows for unbiased selection of data. In this

wise, the researcher's preferences were not allowed to come into play in the selection

of data for analysis.

The content analysis as a research technique is not without its disadvantages.

However, efforts were made to select reliable and veritable information from

documents. Undoubtedly, the content analysis still remains the most viable data

gathering technique for this research.

Survey research on the other hand is a form of descriptive research that is

aimed at collecting large and small samples from population in order to examine the

distribution, incidence and interaction of a given phenomenon. The survey research

is economical in the sense that a study of representative samples would permit

references from and generalisations to populations that would be too expensive to study as a whole. However, the major demerit is the superficial nature of the study, whereby the focus is on wide coverage rather than on in-depth study. Nevertheless, a survey research utilises tools like questionnaire, interviews and observations which

8 form part of our methodology.

Questionnaire is a device for testing answers to questions by using a form

which the respondents fill themselves. In many respects, questionnaire is similar to

interview. Interview is a technique used for collecting information from others in a

face-to-face contact. It is used when a researcher wants to obtain a reliable and valid

information in the form of verbal responses from respondents in order to confirm or

reject hypothesis. Here, the senior officials of the FCDA as well as their junior

counterparts and the general public were interviewed . Both interview and

questionnaire attempts to get the feelings, beliefs, experiences or activities of

respondents. They also involve formats which can be relatively structured depending

on the situation. The questionnaire and interview questions were designed to avoid

ambiguity from the respondents' observations. Furthermore, the investigator used

direct contact with subjects to provide classification and throw more light on the

purpose and significance of the study to solicit for the cooperation of the respondents.

The respondents are multi-ethnic in nature and a sizeable population are semi-

literates and hence no single language could be effectively used to cover all

respondents especially among the old population. In view of this, enumerators who

speak the local languages were employed to administer the questionnaire and

interviews. The enumerators were given specific training on the management of the

questionnaires regarding the methods used in filling and collecting information

solicited for. Furthermore, the researcher ensured that the enumerators had sufficient

knowledge to comprehend and follow instructions.

Finally, observation is a very important primary tool of scientific research.

It is a direct means of studying overt behaviour of people, and its most important advantage is that it is possible to record behaviour as it happens. For observation to

9 be meaningful, it is to be used to serve a clearly stated research problem; the playing

and the recording system must be related to a research hypothesis; and the records of observation could enhance the checking for validity and reliability.

As such the use of these three methods helped tremendously to strengthen the validity, reliability and predictability of the data used in this research. The primary data collected was mainly on the administration of resettlement policy of the Federal

Capital Territory. The data was analysed for statistical inference using Chi-square test. Be that as it may, research questions were subjected to imperical investigation and the outcome was based on numerical findings.

A number of variables of relevance to the administration of a resettlement pol icy were closely examined and conclusions made. However, in a bid to find clues to the research questions, important variables were chosen and subjected to a test for satisfaction or otherwise. Accordingly, all the subjects were identified as either satisfied or nut satisfied on all these twenty variables.

In the subsequent research questions, responses were compared between those subjects resettled within the Capital Territory as handled by the officials of the FCDA and those resettled outside the Territory within states like Niger and Nassarawa serving resettlement agents. Thus, subjects from Kubwa and Usuma towns within

FCT were put in one group and the other eight resettlement centres in Nasarawa and

Niger were put in one block.

The other research questions were based on secondary data and therefore, a valid approach was adopted in examining the variables under consideration taking into consideration the question of subjectivity.

10 1. 6 Scope of Study

This study wi.11 cover a period of two decades, 1976 - 1996. The year 1976

is chosen in the assumption that the idea of relocation cam into being and 1996 considering the fact that after its twenty years of existence, appreciable efforts may have been made to warrant an in-depth analysis worthy of studying.

Because of the strategic importance which Nigeria holds in the geo-politic of

Africa, Abuja holds relevance for the continent. But ever more irrefutable would be the impact of Abuja at the national scale; the Federal Capital is a national project and the ripples of its effects are clearly a national phenomenon. The Master Plan which forms the basis of our investigation is primarily concerned with developments within the FCT impact studies on the city would be most meaningful to planners at the micro-regional scale where the immediate and critical challenges seem to lie. Finally, it should be noted that the impact of a city could be, and often is multi-dimensional in nature. As th is has been shown in the course of the study, the Abuja Master Plan recognises this factthrough section.

It is impossible for this study to encompass all these complex channels of impact within the available time. The fact that the Master plan form subject of independent investigations are indeed examined as a collectivity in this study.

1 . 7 Significance of the Study

Studies of this nature is important because political, economic social and environmental factors are considered as conglomerate when siting a new capital. The outcome of this study it is believed will be useful to analysis and policy makers in the area of economic, social and political discourse. This study involve population and health issues and this means that demographers, health specialist and anthropologist would find the analysis relevant as new data could be fascinating.

11 From a national dimension, the findings of the study would surely assist policy

makers when structuring tools to implement government plans. The various gaps and

contradictions identified could surely guide government. The study also open up

plethoras of opportunities to revisit its pol icy with a view to overhauling some

aspects.

Inevitably the local population, particularly the indigens of Abuja would find

this study useful as could expose them to the understanding of the negative and

positive aspects of the outcome of policy particularly as it affects resettlements ,

compensation and land ownership.

This study would surely provide opportunities to researchers to cover other

areas not considered part of this study. This study would surely open up other

researchable areas as a result of this study for further research.

1.8 Limitations of Study

It is true that a research work of this nature cannot be devoid of some

limitations. The limitations have to do with the disadvantages of the method of data

gathering adopted for the research, i.e questionnaire, interview and observations as

methods, respondent bias, and reliability of data may constitute a problem. However, the information from secondary sources and hard data from documents helped especially from related literature and other sources to limit the shortcomings of the study.

12 CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2. l Literature Review

Generally speaking, many authors have defined policy by providing different approaches. But in generic terms a pol icy can be defined as an action taken or not taken at all by state officials or private institutions. In effect, a pol icy is a statement of intension, rules, framework or guidelines. In some respects, it is defined as line of action or choice-making. More precisely, Presthus (1975) defines policy as;

a definite course or method of action selected among alternatives and in the light given conditions to guide and usually determine present and future decisions.

The notion of public policy is largely limited to government action or organised courses of action planned to achieve given objectives. In Fredriech 's

(1940) opinion, public policy is a proposed course of action of the government or its agencies. Public policy is thus conceived as the official statement by government outlining or determining the plan of action or what the government intends to do over a stretch of a period. It is important to stress that a public policy is a product of public authority, governmental process and its activity. Public choices which encompass all sectors of the economy also have bandwagon effects on the private sector since the apparatus is employed, it does provide a framework within which all actors of the economy, including the private must operate.

For Bauer and George (1968), public policy is perceived as a decision with some ramifications and long term perspective requiring most information and contemplation. Here, an effort is made to distinguish policies from decisions that are

13 either tactical or, where the issues are either less complex or trivial , political. rn

Sharkarsky (1970), we are told that "public pol icy refers to important activities of

government", and in Richard Rose (1968) the view is taken that every pol icy is a

"long series of more or less related activities rather than single, discrete decision"

.._ Sometimes, however, the stress is on outcome of decision making process.

Charles Lindblom (1959) takes this view when he sees policy as the "outcome of decision making processes set in motion to existing stimuli or challenges". Similarly,

Yezekial Drior's (1973) view of policy is "the direct output of public pol icy making".

In the course of this discussion, decision-making is to be used inter-changeably with policy making. Decision making involves choosing between alternative courses of action. Ideally, such choice occurs after careful study of all possible consequences have been evaluated. On a wider public administration level, decision making involves choosing between alternativecourses of action on crucial issues of political, social and economic nature affecting the wider community, such as where to site a new Federal Capital , a new Federal government establishment, when to review a wage formula, which country to trade with, what proportion of public resources should be assigned to education of women, disabled and so 011.

Despite these definitions, we can accept and adopt a working definition of public policy provided because such a definition is encompassing enough. One good example is that of Jenkins (1978) who conceived a policy as "a set of inter-related decisions by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where such decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve." In other words, public policy is any set of explicit or implicit objectives and accompanying set of strategies,

14 instruments, goals and tactics designed by authoritative structures or bodies to del imit

the scope and content of a public problem and guidelines for resolving the problem.

Defined as such, public policy is to be taken as a purposive course of action

designed to achieve given objectives with respect to any matter of public concern such

as poverty, unemployment, education, relocation of capital city etc. The word

"Purposive" here is intend to signify that every policy is del iberated and goal­ oriented, and not haphazard, random nor chance to decision.

In the case of our study area, the building of new capital cities is usually motivated by a number of factors which may be political , social , economic or strategic in nature. For example, the choice of Washington D.C. as the Federal

Capital of the United States of America arose from the deep sectional cleavages between the former thirteen Southern and Northern states of the East Coast. As

Hanson and Ross (1979) indicated before the American Civil War, Washington was very small and unimportant. The economic function of the city relies much on the activities of the Federal government. That is, government remains the largest employer of labour and virtually serves as the City's "basic industry". Like

Washington D. C., Abuja is the political capital with Federal Governmentas the major employer of labour. Most economic activities are directly stimulated by government actions.

The reasons for the relocation of the national capital of Brazil from Rio-de

Jeneiro to Brassilia are similar to those of changing Nigeria's national capital. fn

Brazil, there was the issue of vast hinterland and the desire to move west leaving the saturated coast to the interior. However, Mello (1973) advanced four reasons for the change of Brazil's Federal capital:-

15 (i) the balanced development of the country through the conquest of the vast interior;

(ii) strategic considerations from the view point of national security;

(iii) the disturbance of the national government by the local problems of the old capital; and

(iv) search for a better and more temperate climate.

The quest for balanced development was accorded highest priority because it was believed that by moving the national capital from the coast to the heart of the country, government power would radiate in a more balanced way, and thus development would be brought evenly to most parts of the country. In addition, by so doing, the advantage of the three great basins - the Amazon, the Prata, and the Sao

Francisco, would be greatly utilized by moving the national capital to the central

Plateau where the three basins have their origins. The argument in favour of internal and external security in moving the capital was very strong initially but gradually lost substance due to the fact that modern war fare depend on the sophistication of the military.

The third argument, i.e. the problems associated with the old capital such as failure or lack of public services, shortages of basic food commodities, traffic congestion, industrial unrest were far beyond the control of national government.

The issue of climatic conditions at Rio-de-Jeneiro was viewed seriously because of the region's tropical climate for most part of the year. This type of climate caused discomfort and irritation thus reducing the rate of production. This is in contrast to the mild annual temperature of the new site which has an average of 20 degrees centigrade, with a humidity of 76 percent in winter.

16 The capital of the British India Empire was changed from Calcutta to Delhi

111 191 1. The change was effected by British rule in India. The historical

consideration which led originally to the establishment of the capital in Calcutta, a

maritime city, had disappeared with the consolidation of British power throughout the

country and also with the extensive growth of railway network. According to Singhri

(1973), Calcutta was considered as ill-adopted because it was distant and difficult to

reach from the rest of J ndia.

A site selection committee was constituted by the British authorities to come

up with a site for a separate capital. Before its choice as the new capital city, Delhi was the headquarters of a division in the Province of Punjab. Delhi ranked as one of the most ancient and historic cities in India. The definition of New Delhi which was the core of the capital, has undergone changes from time to time.

The development of Islamabad as the new capital of Pakistan can be traced to the Political see - saw of India as a nation. Muhammed Swaleh (1973) has stated that in 1947 two separate constituent assemblies were formed to frame the constitution of two new states, Pakistan and India. The creation of the two states was done in a haste and especially in the establishment of Pakistan's government and the choice of its capital.

There was no adequate discussion among the Muslim League leaders on the choice of Karachi as the new capital and perhaps the only reason available at that time was that Karachi was the birth place of the fo under of the new state, Muhammed Ali

Jinnah. However, this choice was temporary as the matter received greater attention at a later time.

17 At the beginning there was no serious challenge on the choice of Karachi, but

later several people hinted that being a Provincial Capital and the main centre of

commerce and industry and for strategic and climatic reasons, Karachi was not indeed

for the country's capital. [n another development the people of Sind were opposed

to the separation of Karachi from their province. For instance, the Legislative

Assembly of the Province and the Council of Sind Provincial Muslim League had

passed resolutions opposing the resolution. It was emphasised that there was no

instance of a Federal government taking over a Provincial capital without due

consultation and the consent of the people or the legislature of the province. It was further argued that, if a new capital were to be provided for the Sind Province, why

should the Federal government not make a new capital for itself? Furthermore, some people believed that the continuance of Provincial jurisdiction over Karachi would subject the central government to Provincial control.

Therefore, in an attempt to build a new capital, a site selection committee was appointed in 1957 to consider whether Karachi was suitable as a capital in terms of location, climate, availability of adequate water supply and food, communication and defence. In the event that Karachi was found not suitable, the committee was to recommend another site for the new capital. The selection committee unanimously recommended a place near Rawalpindi, as the site forthe new capital. Jn June, 1959 the central governmentaccepted the recommendation to build the new Federal Capital which was later named Islamabad. It seems that the procedure adopted in choosing the capital of Islamabad is very much akin to the one adopted in choosing Abuja as the new Federal Capital of Nigeria.

18 Similarly, it was the rivalry between the coastal cities of Sydney and

Melbourne that occasioned the found ing of Camberra. More importantly, Camberra

was a compromise between the six colonies that united to form the Commonwealth

of Australia on 1st January, 190 1 (Jingle, F., 1975:150). The need to reach a

compromise between the provinces of Ontario and Quebec which experienced deep

cleavages led to the selection of Ottawa as the capital city of Canada. The variety of

motives for relocating capital cities include the need to attain better regional balance

as in the case of Dodoma in Tanzania (UNCHS 1985); or just the desire of a

President "to transform his birthplace to a new capital city" (Moffi, K., 1984:106)

as the case appears to be in the Cote d' Ivoire. Of course, the points have to be

stressed that relocation of capitals are virtually informed by multi-fariousfactors and

not necessarily a single motive as assumed elsewhere.

From the foregoing discussion, it is quite clear that there are commonalities

of reasons why these cities like Islamabad, Dodoma, etc were established. And as

Bauer and Green have argued, there can be no total relationship between pol icy

formulation and implementation. Breese arguing in the same direction insists that

the evolution of Dodoma like the case of Islamabad and Brasilia were borne out of huridness. And this explains why there were gaps particularly at the implementation stage. This is dominant in the case of Dodoma in Tanzania and Brasilia in Brazil, where the gap between policy decision and the implementation of those cities increased tremendously to the extent that half way the development of the resources were not available to executive the projects. Breese therefore insisted that the development of cities in developing countries hardly experience any equilibrium.

19 The basis for the creation of capital cities is hinged on the fact that social

overheads should be provided in the areas of health, educational facilities, recreation

etc m order to give the city a good look on the principles of basic needs as argued

by Bello Imam. Except for Ottawa and to some extent Brasilia, most of the newly created capital cities as argued by Stewart hardly met to solve the poverty and the basic needs of such urban centres. A cursory look at the case of Dodoma confirmed the case that a larger part of the town hardly had water supply and the educational system highly deficient. And investment in social overhead is a precondition for stability as we find in developing economies

Furthermore, Heady has argued that the issue of "perfect market ideas of fa irness. balance and diversity" imposes on social policy the tax of ensuring no single group ends up in an excessively privileged position. the major contention of government 111 the creation of new capital cities is based on the premise "that government should intervene in housing sector in order to ensure decent basic standards of housing for lower income facilities. Social democratic equity require assistance to house the poor particularly household too poor to afford decent accommodation without paying an excessive proportion of their income to it".

But as it is common, most new capital in developing economies hardly care for social democratic equity in terms of distribution of social facilities. Ottawa and

Camberra do not have this experience, but one wonders as Breese has argued why should there be gaps and problematic in the new cities of the developing economies.

One of the basic needs of strategy as Streeten and Burki have argued is to

111crease and redistribute production and infrastructure in order to eradicate deprivation that arises from lack of basic goods and services. Furthermore, Salau

20 argued that there is the need for direct provision by government of essential

infrastructure in order to stabilise and provide all the necessary framework for the

city to take off.

Writing on housing in developing economies, Heady maintains that most

cities I ike Dodoma, Brasilia and Islamabad had fairly adequate infrastructure such as roads culverts, water, light etc which were the prerequisite. Heady also

maintained that as the city expanded especially Islamabad and Brasilia, the

infrastructure become overstretched, moreso that the governments in these cities lacked adequate funds to consolidate these infrastructures. These were in contract to the cities of Camberra and Ottawa which are developed economies as argued by

Burns and Grebler.

Generally, the sector that consumes a lot of money in the development of cities is in the area of housing development. This is moreso in the no income low income, middle income and high income brackets, who constitute the bedrock of the civil service. Evidence are abound in many write ups that the governments in those countries which created new capital cities invested substantially in the development of housing in those cities for example in case of Camberra and Ottawa government budgetary allocations to housing when the capital were under construction were quite enormous given the fact that the quality of urban development was higher than what obtained in say Dodoma, Brasilia and Islamabad.

As Goldsmith has argued most cities in the developing economies as in the case of Dodoma, Brasilia and Islamabad had many beautiful modern cities in the centre and other classified zones. He succinctly states that in the case of Dodarna and

Brasilia ghettoes as squatter developments become the major feature as the cities

21 grew arterially which in fact meant that there hardly was a close relationship between what the countries intended and what was tenable.

Morris while writing on the African cities also comment that the effect of family and social change makes its impossible for the urban planners to provide houses that can cope with the African exigencies. The governments in Tanzania and

Brasilia (though in Latin America) had the control over family and social ideas and this explains why the housing feature that were dominant in Dar-es-salam also appear in Dodoma and what appear in Rio-de-Jenairo also surface in Brasilia whether this feature will appear in the case of Abuja is yet to be seen-in our analysis.

The issue of environmental care is one of the major push factors why new cities have to develop. And the need of environmental framework and sustenance is usually perceived in all governments establishing new cities. This diagram provides a paradigm.

22 Fig: 1.

Cabinet ice islative Committee on Off sing and Environment ------

· .. , . .Urban Development Board ·

rainage and Ref use Up-Grading and L Department r Air Po llution Rehabilitation --'--· �- --· -- : Control Departmen Department ·

Road Construction and Maintenance Department

• 4 - - .. • • • .. • •• • • • •

Environmental Education Department Factories amd Companies ·

Inhabitant

Source: Beranek, E. and Blawnsteiner, C.f:'I. �quipments for Basic Urban Needs and the Third '. World" in Laton.te, Pierra et al (eds) The Environment of Human Setllements: Human Well Being in Cities. Vol. II Perganon Press Ltd 1976, p.272.

23 The above figure fits in very clearly in the case of Camberra and Ottawa in terms of policy outline and execution as Salau has mentioned.

To some extent Dodoma, Islamabad and Brasilia fits 111 terms of those structural arrangement for the sustenance of the environment . But subsequently pol itization corruption and maladministration as well as the pressure of extended fam ily system and the effects of Structural Adjustment Programmes tended to destroy the ideas especially in the African areas, the issue of environmental maintenance especially in the undeveloped countries where the technologies are inadequate, culture of maintenance stilI poor and the issue of population increase still constitute hazard, the strains which have occurred in Dodoma are inevitable.

Such environmental hazards occurred in most areas where people were resettled without adequate planning especially in the case of Brasilia where some families were resettled in attendsandas or latifundias. Noh only were they ignored but also to rate of compensation where people migrate on their own was insignificant. This is a manifestation of underdevelopment of the indigenous population where new capitals are located especially in Africa and Latin America.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The theory of decision and public policy provides the background of this study. In essence therefore, the work operate generally from the perspective of the public policy analysis approach. Efforts have been made to sensitise and synchronize the structural functional approach and policy instrument in this study.Since the structural approach to analysis gives us the altitude to examine issues from the angle of intra-relationship between parts, inter-connection of functions and in-depth analysis

24 of roles, we therefore depended heavily on the structuralist pattern of analysis to the understanding of how policy instrument is operated . Here. the FCT ministry is the structure given specific function to develop the FCT. But this can not be done unless there is a policy instrument. .

The successful implementation of pub I ic pol icy in a developing country I ike ours is dependable upon certain variables. These include policy objectives, pol icy resources, inter-organisational communication, characteristics of the implementing agencies, implementators and the sustenance of the policy thereafter.

According to Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) "policy implementation encompasses those actions by Public and Private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions. Th is includes the transformation of decisions into operational terms as well as efforts to achieve some changes existing in a particular policy. Williams (1972) states it clearly that:

in its most general form , an inquiry about implementation... seeks to determine whether an organisation can bring together men and material in cohesive organisational unit and motivate them in such a way as to carry out the organisation's stated objective.

Be that as it may, it is important to note that the implementation phase does not start until goals and objectives have been established by prior policy decisions.

In other words, implementation takes place only after legislation has been passed and funds com mitted or after a judicial ruling.

Wildarsky (1973) argues that:

after all, the world is fu ll of policy proposals that are aborted. You cannot finish what you haven't started. Lack of implementation should not refer to failure to get going but to inability to follow through.

25 It is no wonder therefore that when faced with an unsuccessful programme,

many observers attribute its fa ilure to insufficient planning or the inadequacy of the

programme itself. However, this attribution is usually unjustified. Rather, the failure

may be due to a gap that exists between the intention and statements of public

officials (policy), on the one hand and the delivery of public services (performance)

on the other hand. Dolbeare I. and Hammord (197 1) have successfully argued that:

Very little may really be decided by the words of a dec.ision or a statute; the enunciation of such national policy may be just the beginning of the decisive process of determining what will happen to show, and understanding this further stage is essential to a full understanding of policies.

Hence, the study of policy implementation gives one an insight into a new

understanding of how the system succeeds or fails in translating general policy

objectives into concrete and meaningful public services.

2.2.1 Structural Functionalism

Structural functionalism as a paradigm has been discussed extensively by

Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell (1966). Almond and Powell begin by defining

the political systems in structural functional terms. In this view, every system consist

of structures which are pattern of inter-related roles, some of which are composite,

self-regulatory and capable of being transformed. In their first formulation, Almond

and Powell (1960) delineate seven functions of the political system. In the second

formulation these functions are grouped under three functional categories to which was added a classification of types of functioning and structures appropriate for each

of the functions. Both the typology of styles and the typology of structures build on the pattern variables. First introduced is the Parsonian version; manifest, latent,

26 specificity, diffuseness, particularism, universal ism, affectivity-affective, neutrality,

instrumentally value orientedness, ascription, achievement (qual ity performance) and

self-orientation, collectivity-orientation, except that these were relieved of their nature

as dilemmas and given the nature and character of continuation. The other elements

of the model are similar to Easton's comprising a milieu, inputs, conversion­

structures/processes, outputs and the feedback mechanism.

For the analyst using this model, policy analysis consist 111 an effect to

describe the undercurrent of human behavioral patterns and processes with a base in

an environment or milieu from which emerges the inputs of the given system. The

inputs are then funnelled into the "conversion" centre the institutionalised structures

and processes for "converting" demand and support into outputs. Thereafter the

feedback mechanism is put to work and through a process of political communication

the linkage between input and output is established. In this sense the model is not

much different from Eastons. As Easton's model , it is assumed that the environment

consists of all these phenomena such as visible objectives in the natural and physical

conditions of life, including the climate, vegetation, flora and fauna, etc. It

encompasses, as well, the complexes of social patterns, political and other bodies,

interest groups, policy making bodies, political parties, associations, the economic, cultural, psychological, spiritual and other sub-systems etc. In fact, it has to be seen

in terms of a "milieu" in which human moods, habits, artifacts and other behavioral

influences interact with geographical and biological systems to form an ecological

niche. Following Talcott Parsons, Almond and Powell recognise this complex of

interactions, but in so far as they are interested in all of these, it is in relation to the demand and supply imperative which demands an environment as a base for the

27 categorical functions, namely; system maintenance and adaptation-conversions and capabilities (Almond G.A., and Powell, G. B., 1966:60-64).

The system maintenance and adaptation structures are expected to perform the categoric function of socialisation and recruitment of socialisation which the authors refer to the process by which the political role actors or policy makers are given and they take fo rmal induction into the political culture of their political system. Through it the appropriate attitudes and orientations toward the community, the regime and the authorities, are instilled. This is the variable that underlies and gives meaning to political activity from a subjective point of view and its serves to ensure in the governed (or those affected by public policies) the appropriate cognitive, affective orientations towards a government and its policies, where political socialisation and political recruitment takes over. It is at the other end of the pole in that it refers to the structures, processes and functions by which the learned roles or perceptions or attitudes or orientations are both internalised and filled. The prescriptive dimension of this category can hardly be over-emphasised, namely that the authorities must have taken these twin processes seriously and to exploit their advantage if the long term survival and persistence of the system or the short term success of policies in the face of pressures for change are to be assured (Almond, G.A. & Powell, G.B. 1966:65).

Conversion structures perform the functions of transforming inputs of demand and support from the environment into authoritative values. Included in these structures are those through which the;

(a) environment makes demands requmng public policy initiation and formulation or interest articulation;

(b) articulated demands are combined into manageable policy alternative choices or courses of action, i.e. interest aggregation;

28 (c) alternatives chosen are processed into regulations or policies binding on all and sundry (rule making);

(d) regulations are applied or policies are implemented in exercises of domination and control or enforcement of compliance (rule applications);

(e) individual cases of the application of regulations or policies are interpreted or regulated (rule adjudications); and

(f) these various activities and processes of domination and compliance are communicated, and both the authorities and the community learn of the impacts of given policies and take further measures to adjust to the impacts, etc. (communication and the feedback process). Almond and Powell considered the need to build into their model the concept

of "capabilities " as heuristic device that would allow the analyst to classify and

compare systems more effectively and to deal more directly with the problem of

political change (development). In the context of public analysts, however, the

concept makes more sense when viewed from the point of its prescriptive dimension

(Almond G.A., & Powell, G.B., 1966:70) .

Structural functional ism, as adopted by Almond, suffers from the difficulties

from which an analysis picked up from one discipline and applied to the other is

likely to suffer. Concepts applied at one level of abstraction in one discipline, and

in a particular context are I ikely to get distorted if they are transplanted to another.

Almond has borrowed most of the terminology of his approach from Talcott Parsons,

but does not apply it the same way. Whereas Parsons and the sociologists are

interested in systems, Almond talks of functions without referring to a system in

which functions have a meaning. Second, Almond's definition of a political system as "that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies which performs the functions of integration and adaption by means of the employment or threat of employment of more or less legitimate compulsions" (Varma, S. P.,1975:246).

29 Third. when we come to a statement of the characteristics of a political

system, we find that they all belong to the Western political system, mainly to the

American political system! Next, the seven-variable list of categories of functions

also has its shortcomings. Between various interest groups mentioned, it becomes

difficult to draw a boundary between the political and non-political. It is not clear

as to why the interest-aggregation is the non-work particularly of political parties and

not of other organisations. Finally, Almond has not attached enough importance to

the output functions, and has failed to emphasise the importance of the feedback

process in aggravating, or minimising, the challenges to the existence, or even the

survival, of the pol itical system.

System theory and structural-functional analysis in particular, are concerned

with the contributions of institutions to the stability and persistence of the system.

If that is the case, then the capability variable introduced in the model simply draws

attention of the political authorities to the need to make those pol icies that would

effective! y:

(a) accumulate resources (extractive capability)

(b) compel obedience and compliance (regulative capability)

(c) dispense rewards forobedience and compliance (distributive capability)

(d) symbolically strengthen position of the state vis-a-vis other competing social forces (symbolic capability) ; and

(e) assure monopoly of domination through appropriate policies or effective rule (responsive capability).

Interpreted in this way, we begin to see that what lies behind these

"capabilities" and how they are linked with one another is an all pervasive element, namely; the desire to consolidate power based on what Max Weber had called

30 "Zweckrational " and "Westrational " action. The political authorities are "capable" or powerful and can assure their monopoly of domination if only they are in a position to appraise the resources of the environment of their system and to analyse those resources into channels try to regulate the whole system for the good of the few. Yet the impacts of their extractive and regulative policies must be made less directful by the ability to dispense rewards through distributive policies that deal with pub I ic goods both material and ideological, both positive and negative, even as the aura of efficiency and competence is exhibited as the game of exploiting, dominating and oppressing is inexorably played out. That more than summarises the import of the "capabilities " function that describes or prescribes how best the political system of market societies may assure the conditions for stability and persistence of their social orders (Max Weber, 1946:78).

31 Used in policy analysis, the capability function of the model ties up with the

other functional categories as a crucial means by which to evaluate the responsibilities

discharged by governments. Much of the discussion of the processes of interest

articulation, interest aggregation, socialization, recruitment, communication, rule

making, rule application, etc is to the effect that those in whose hands the power of

the state resides must make policies taking into consideration the capability ties of the

pol icy process, how it is constituted or determined and how it may be controlled, how pol itical roles are defined and differentiated, how they are distributed in the social structure, and how all of this reality may be used in the direction desired.

In the final analysis, the really crucial issue addressed in the discussion of capab ilities is a question of strategies and tactics of control over the political process.

In this task the extractive and regulative powers of the state may function well to maintain the social order and implement to coercive goals yet over the long run, both control and domination will also depend on policies that are of all distributive, symbolic, and responsive. It must be stressed that the efficacy of function performed by a structure is determined by the character of the pol icy instrument. If the structure has all the variables as we identify in the following discussion, it may perform its function creditably but where the structure is found weak, there bound to be a gap between what the structure like FCT does and what is expected.

2.2.2 Policy Instrument Strategy

In order to achieve the objectives of any policy decision, the structuring of a policy instrument as mentioned above is important. A policy instrument constitutes largely a set of ways and means considered when putting a given pol icy into practice. rt can also be conceived as the vehicle through in charge of formulating and

32 implementing policies actualise their capacity to influence decisions initiated and taken

by others.

In other words, it is within the structure of a formal policy instrument that

decisions can real ly be strengthened and substance upheld. A policy instrument as

shown in the figure 2 has been invariably defined to constitute the set of ways and

means used in concretising a given policy (Sagasti, F., and Araoz, A., 1975:16).

Once a policy decision has been initiated, the instrument of power I ies in its

legality, very often determined and controlled by the actor or decision maker. The structuring of a policy instrument is by no means an end, but the very means to an end itself. What matters in this context is the organisational structure or institutions and methodology for translating the pol icy statement at high level into reality.

In fact, such a policy statement can only be Iegitime if it is given a legal interpretation, agreement to it and incongruities removed. The legal device goes one step beyond a policy by stipulating obligations, rights, rewards and penalties associated with its being obeyed. In short, the legal device no doubt, helps to legitimise the policy and ensure compliance.

[t is only when a policy has a legal backing that one can refer to the question of organisational structure. Organisational structure is that institution given the responsibility to implement a policy. Generally, a policy may be executed by one or more institutions and where such is the case, it is referred to as the "hardware" aspect of the organisational structure.

33 Structure of policy instrument

Fig: 2 Policy · Statements by high level ,_____ .,. officials, paraslalals or other agencies

Laws, devices, regulations,by-laws and formal agreements

Individual institutions and Instru111c11t Policy .. Organizational structure organizations, procedures and methodologies employed

... perafi�mal Actual working mechm1isms L------..,------_.;:ii:--. " Mechanisms .,,..that functionalize. l11e policy inslrwnent

Effects Cons�qu,ences

. ·'· cc: Sagasti, f.(1976) Science And TechnologyPolic y Instrument In Less Developed Countries, IDRC, P. 17

· .. ..··

'' f�,� •...: ' . 'r _.,., � ·• A policy instrument is also effective if the operational mechanisms have been

adequately organised to make the instrument adaptable and adjust to peculiar needs

of the environment. Once the operational mechanisms of a policy instrument is found

to be faulty, it implies that either the organisational structure is weak or the policy

decision itself has not been properly pruned (Jones, G., 1972:8).

Finally, the utility of policy instrument is better adjudged by the impact or net

effect it produces as a consequence. If a particular pol icy is unable to achieve its objectives, there may be factors responsible for this. It may be that the original

inertia is faulty, or political actors are incapable, or the instruments set are deficient, or the mechanism to translate policy action into reality are significantly under­ developed or unable to translate policy theoretical point of view to reality (Araoz, A.,

1972:25).

The process of policy begins with awareness that a problem exists, requiring solutions by authoritative means. rt proceeds through the setting of goals and performance standards, design of programmes or strategies, implementation of programmes or strategies and evaluation of programme outcomes. A simple format shows the process as a sequential pattern of action involving policy generation, formulation and implementation and policy performance and evaluation. i) Agenda Setting: For the avoidance of doubt, let us emphasise that pub! ic policy is about public problems or what we have referred to as policy demands.

These differ from private problems in that the latter are problems that can be resolved without making another not immediately affected , whereas the public problems tend to have consequences on others or are at least perceived to create needs to the extent that relief is sought, e.g. environmental pollution, urban renewal or highway

35 construction.

Agenda setting therefore start with the public those who are affected by the

indirect consequences of transaction and deem it necessary to have those consequences

authoritatively determined. A problem becomes public once a group of concerned

bodies organise to seek governmental intervention. It remains a problem without a

public if it lacks the support of such intervention. Hence issue of Abuja has support.

Problem can get to government in various ways through pressure group

activities, public opinion, lobbying, representation, demonstration effect, acts of God

(natural disasler or vasititudes) and informal influences of friends, confidents, etc

whether these are noticed and accepted by the authorities for policy will depend on

a number of factors including the events themselves, the groups articulating the

problem, their access to the authorities and the policy process. The consistent

demand by Nigerians for a new capital informed governments decision.

The event or problem must be public in some sense. The larger the number

of people affected and the greater the intensity of the effect on them, the greater the

I ikelihood of the issue being perceived as one for a policy decision. Such perception

is important as it conditions the definition of the problem.

Group characteristics are also important, many a problem e.g. that of rural

poverty has been perceived as a social malady for which relief is soughl, yet without

a public emerging to press for that relief the problem has remained with us (as the poor remain unorganised). The extent of organisation, its structure, leadership

resources and access as well as the intensity with which they make demands on the authorities all have a bearing on agenda setting.

36 Sometimes access is provided by representation in the policy making organs.

The issue is not just having one of a kind in a pol icy position, rather it is more that

of getting those in position to emphasise those affected. And this in turn might

depend on the policy process, the structure, responsiveness and dynamism of agencies

involved. Much depends on the political access and resources of the body with a

problem. The manner in which it capitalises on its access will have a bearing on

whether or not the issue becomes a case for policy adoption.

(ii) Pol icy Implementation: Once a policy has been adopted the next stage becomes its implementation, the process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions net to achieve them "or" the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain as to obtain the desired result (Pressman, J.C., and Wildavsky, A., 1979:81).

A policy implementation through activities directed at translating goals and objectives into the reality of what was designed.

This is perhaps the most difficult aspect of policy for its hinges on a number of considerations. First, there has to be an institutional base capable of interpreting the intention of the policy into acceptable physical programmes as intended in this case of FCT. Second, there have to be resources in terms of men, money and materials as well as the appropriate expertise for putting the programmes into effect.

This has been fashioned through budgets and NNPC source.

Even when these conditions have been met problems still abound to be surmounted. The social and political context is one such problem area. Resources have to be the right type and available at the appropriate time and in the proper mix, political leadership must be supportive both in terms of sustaining the spirit of the policy and in terms of assuring the institutional capability and performance without

37 which implementation remains seriously constrained, and target group resistance must

be broken or accommodated.

Doing all these and achieving intended results is not easy and it reveals

implementation as the stage in the policy process when earlier plans, preparations,

designs or analysis are tested forvalidation or alteration. Often the intentions behind

the policy are not always realised, making Thomas Eliot's assertion that "between the

idea and the reality ...the motion and the act. ..the conception and the creation ...the

emotion and the response fa lls the shadow" ring true of public policy. The task of

public policy analysis is to explain such implementation gap. Most analysts identify

three factors that cast dark shadows on policy implementation. These are the

resource base, the institutional base and the social base. This is useful because by

this study, we can be able to make policy on FCT with what is achieved.

The resource base addresses issues of resource mobilisation distribution of

benefits and costs, application of control and role allocation. :fhe institutional base

refers to the instrumental kinds of power (coercive, remunerative and normative)

available to those who would implement policy as well as the socio-cultural elements

that can facilitate or constrain implementation. The social base addresses issues of

the class structure (sometimes mediated as the ethnic structure) that helps to determine policy contact and policy outcome. [t does matter whether it is the bourgeoise or the proletariat who are in the critical position to implement policy. It also matters whether policy is being implemented by a rich or depressed economy. What is the exact situation as a result of the interaction of these factors can be discovered when policies are monitored and evaluated (Van Hornand Yan Meter, 1975 :445-448).

(iii) Feedback and Policy Evaluation: Feedback and evaluation are critical aspects

38 of the policy process. Feedback first occurs when the issue, strategies and impacts

(consequent upon policy content output and outcomes) have been known, evaluation

on the other hand occur at any stage of the pol icy process. The way people in Abuja

responds can point out clearly the extent to which government's policy on Abuja has been achieved.

Underlying both feedback and evaluation is monitoring, the process by which necessary information is obtained to assess the overall programme or pol icy impact and outcomes respectively. A policy is monitored to determine the extent to which its programmes are being successfully implemented through the assessment of impacts and strategies. Through it, signals to management about real or potential dangers are highlighted. The monitoring unit would need to collect, record and measure data of relevance as an aid to further decision making how those on the receiving side react to the policy outcomes thus is feedback into the process. By comparing intended outcomes of policy and actual achievements, the authorities as may then revise strategy, review entire policy or reformulate the policy or even terminate it (Soyede,

A., 1988:30-34).

Policy results which are often the subject of evaluation are either output or outcome. By output we mean all those things actually effected in the course of achieving, policy objectives. They are intentions concretised by way of resources appropriated, institutions created, programmes executed as aspects of a given policy.

They are the observable indices of the policy and can sometimes be quantified.

39 .r.;;;,::�(t�1

Fig: 3 POLICY GENERATION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION POLICY PERFORMANCES

� '".> .. Efficiency Human Resources Implementation And Characteristics Agencies Of Effectiveness -Individuals Various Levels -Groups Efficacy -Values -Perceptions Implementation Activity Optimum -Culture Performances

Environmental Resources · • :·;,,...... :..: .·.;� ..!-".:"°i"' ·• -· :. .. - < .7;:. Physical Resources And l Characteristics '

--·

.., Assessment FEED BACK Monitoring Evaluation Approval - -�E�:�: . ImpacrO��Enyiron1nent

.- . -.,,_,,-e, , ·� ' Source: Anderson, J.�. niij)z���lic Poli v Makin New Yor�, P. 145 - . - '\ . � . � ...� > .g -. �' ...�-� ?--·o;...,-"'-.

,, if.a Policy outcomes on the other hand are the impacts of the outputs. They are

the manifest or latest consequences that flow from the action or inactions of

government authorities over a given issue. They may take the form of intended

improvements in the I ives and well being of the people or the unintended pangs of

hardship. It is part of policy evaluation to determine the changes induced by a given

policy. The totality of evaluation of all aspects of the policy process is the subject

matter of pub I ic analysis.

Finally of course, no policy can be implemented without an instrument. The

various facets of policy instrument government interference, organisational

arrangement, law, operational mechanisms and the bandwagon effects applies to

Abuja as a structure. The functional relationship between these changes mentioned and the efficacy of the FCT administration as it affects the execution of projects since

1976 to date remains the tacit object of this study.

However, urban administration is usually control led by owners of state power to the detriment of the satellites who live in unplanned settlements. The marxian conception of equity in the area of housing argues that "resources be distributed from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs" (Heady, B.,

1978:62). But a policy maker in the area of housing can hardly take a decision that would allow distributive justice. What this perception opposes is the continued existence of inequalities often perpetrated by the lopsided economic plans to the neglect of the larger majority needing the houses. Equality in the view of this perception is not achievable because the state apparatus is controlled by the powerful class who careless about the slum situation where the low income group live in a dependent economy like Nigeria.

41 Seemingly, Abuja as an urban conurbation is a structure that has been

established to perform social, economic, political , infrastructural . cultural and

environmental function. Unequivocally, any city that performs these multi-

dimensional functions can be said to operate with Gabriel Almond's structural

functionalism to some extent.

Undoubtedly the theoretical framework, i.e. structural functionalism and

structural policy functionalism are related and relevant to the study. For instance,

structures exist to perform particular fu nctions. Structures can not perform unless structure are expected to do is to operate as instruments or tools to translate objectives

into realities. [n this direction, minor institutions like FCDA, Area Councils and parastatals were established to provide infrastructures, social overheads, resettle and compensate the population moved.

Second, various types of demand/support and stress as inputs have been generated from the people of FCT. Undoubtedly the structures to some extent have reacted to implement decisions as outputs. In integrating interest in terms of policies of articulation and aggregation, some policies in FCT have been found to be discriminatory particularly in housing distribution, resettlement, compensation and environmental sanitation. Against this backdrop, the kind of impact expected have not been have not been produced. This implies that to some extent, the structures and policy instrument have not been operated satisfactory to the extent that it has not produced adequate effects and hence the substandard situation in FCT in may respects.

Further more the type of policy instruments evolved depends on the nature demands and reactions emerging from the environment. ff a structure is adequately

42 prepared , it can fu nctionalise adopting the operation mechanism to achieve its objects.

Thirdly, the relationship between input and output is better seen in terms of how the policy instrument have been manipulated to produce a desired result. This is done through policy feedback loop. The support stress which Almonds talk about depends on the efficacy of the instrument and how the policy actors operate.

Having synchronized the two paradigms, it has become evident that these framework are relevant to the study in question.

43 CHAPTER THREE

ABUJA AS AN URBAN CONURBATION: A HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS

Lagos, the erstwhile capital of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, has ever since

grown phenomenally as a result of the influx of people seeking for government

employment and the dependants of those who were already employed. In retrospect, at the time of the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria

in 1914, Lagos seemed to provide other unique features which made it more suitable for the seat of government at that particular time. Thereafter, it continued to be better developed than other towns and cities within the country.

It is important to note that a significant feature of Decree No. 14 of 1967 was that it added a sub-section to Section 2 of the 1963 Constitution by which Lagos was made the seat of the Federal Government. In essence, soon after the promulgation of this decree, Lagos began to assume and indeed played a dual role as the seat of both the Lagos State and Federal Government. This development further exercabated in the rate of migration of population into Lagos.

Added to this was the economic development of Lagos as regards its role as the commercial and financial capital of the country as well as the growth of industry which accounted for the rapid growth of population in years preceding the Second

World War. As a matter of fact, consequent upon these activities, many industries started springing up in Lagos. As such many companies found it more suitable locating their plants very close to the port, hence this led to an unprecedented increase in the number of industries which can now be found in the lkeja industrial estates and other areas within Lagos . The siting of industries in Lagos was largely due to the dependence of local industries on foreign raw materials which were

44 brought in by sea, hence it was obviously more economical to locate in the port city rather than in the hinterland. Another major factor which influenced the location of

many industries 111 the Lagos area was the large market provided by numerous customers. In fac t, most of the finished products of these industries are easily sold within Lagos.

The proliferation of major industries in Lagos meant employment opportunities abound in Lagos. Most people seeking white collar jobs viewed Lagos as the place where employment opportunities were greatest. This distraction persisted for a long time and added greatly to the problem of overcrowding in Lagos. By 1945, immediately after the end of the Second World War, many expatriates were attracted to the developing countries because of the devastation and uncertainty in Europe.

Subsequently their numbers increased greatly. This is as a result of those who came seeking employment in what they termed a relatively new setting or to take up technical jobs in Nigeria on secondment from their home governments or companies.

Th is movement of people further enhanced the development and growth of Lagos because most of these expatriates were living in the capital city (Olusola, A.,

1993: 15).

Lagos, especially in the 1960s witnessed an unprecedented boom in trade.

This situation was further compounded seven years later with the outbreak of the

Civil War in the country. At that time, Port Harcourt and Calabar ports were mostly out of use for exports and imports because of military activities since they were located in what was regarded as the war zone. This means that Lagos virtually became the only import and export point for Nigeria. By the end of the Civil War in 1970, most Easterners migrated in large numbers either to trade or seek

45 employment in the capital city. The influx was so high that the already chaotic

situation in Lagos was worsened.

3. 1 Factors Responsible for the Relocation of Federal Capital City

Consequent upon the upsurge in the growth of Lagos, over-population, shortage of residential houses, growth of slums among other social vices, became

imminent. For example, in 1991, the population of Lagos was estimated to be over five million, thus making it the most populated town in Nigeria. Closely associated with over-population of Lagos was the shortage of residential housing. The majority of the population of Lagos lived in sub-standard housing units, while some I ived in make-shift buildings. Hundreds of thousands of people had no place to live at all.

The housing shortage was so chronic in Lagos that it led to a situation where it was estimated that more than ten people lived in a room. The sight of people sleeping under bridges and the open places became a source of anxiety and embarrassment to the government at the time. As a result, the government came out with various measures and policies to ease the housing problems in Lagos. This included the building of housing estates like the FESTAC Village, Satellite town and so on, the construction of low cost houses for low income earners, the establishment of mortgage banks and granting housing loans.

The governmentequally took further measures by reclaiming land in swampy areas which was used for building houses. private firms and individuals were also encouraged to invest in real estate to ease the housing problems. A few people's response to the government calls yielded the growth of Gbagada Estate, Ogba

Housing Estate, Palmgroove Estate and others, albeit these were not sufficient and proved ineffective.

46 Another major problem which emanated from th is constraint of the shortage

of residential housing was the growth of slums within the capital city of Lagos. The

most visible of these slums were Maroko, Ajegunle, Oka Oba. ft should be stated

that these slums were a persistent source of embarrassment to the Federal

Government. As such, efforts made by government to wipe out these slums were

often seen as being too harsh by Nigerians and were always resisted by their

inhabitants (Olusola, A., 1993 : 17).

There was also the problem of sanitation. Undoubtedly, the poor

environmental condition in Lagos was very sordid. Environmental basic needs

include good health facilities, drinkable water, good drainage, adequate sewage and

refuse disposal system and absence of total environmental pollution. Anything that

reduces socio-economic productivity of man in his environment is anti-environment.

Generally, environmental pollution can be caused by different agents. For the

purpose of this study, four such types are identified. First, water pollution can bring

about environmental hazards through untreated industrial waste and contamination

from oil spillage. Floods had in the past caused pollution and destroyed lives. This

is more common in the coastal towns and industrial centres, such as Lagos. Second,

air pollution through dust, burnings and releases from automobiles constitute the

prime cause of smog (Samuelson, A., 1970:792). Third and most dangerous one is

land pollution. Here the domestic garbage I ittered indiscriminately in the urban

centres are greatest pollutants "often worsened by poor drainage, congestion of roads

characterised by bad geometry and pot holes" (Yinusa, M., 1982: 149). Garbage

cleared in Lagos metropolitan between 1979- 1982 was 1,660,904 tonnes (Amdii,

r. E.S., 1993:265). It should be noted that these garbages were collected ir like . . --.. -. -;,1 ! �.., /\ ,__· y ('.;\::... .� '""'!(.,.'"" .r:<.'7 : .,,�· . .. . ·�'< ' � :· � � '

uncollected in the areas mentioned. Largely of course, it does not include the

untouched ones in Maroko, Isale Eko, Idiroko, Ajegunle, Oshodi, among other slums

in Lagos.

In short, most streets in Lagos were always .littered with sol id wastes. This

was due in large measure to the lack of adequate planning and a poor drainage system as certain parts of the city suffer from perennial floods. For several months of the year especially during the season of heavy rainfall, it was almost impossible for pedestrians to walk along some of the major streets without removing their shoes and fo lding up their trousers and skirts as water in the streets is always knee-deep. In some cases, it is even difficult for cars to make use of some of the major thoroughfares for the same reasons . Apart from the fact that these conditions attracted negative publicity to the country, they did not in any way enhance the efficient administration of the country.

The traffic congestion in Lagos was also one of the greatest threats to the old capital. The traffic congestion had reached alarming proportions by the 1970s. This traffic congestion impeded movement and hence the smooth transaction of business and government activities. It could take two hours to drive from Ikeja to Lagos, a distance of a little over ten kilometres, whilst sometimes took the same time or more to move between government offices in Lagos Island. People working in Lagos

Island who lived on the Mainland spent several hours in the traffic to get to work while after closing at 3.30 pm some of the workers did not get home until 8.00 pm or much later. The number of man-hours being lost in Lagos as a result of the traffic situation and the economic cost of such congestion led to government to attempt to

48 solve the problems, or at least ameliorate them, by a programme of constructing more

intra-city roads which later proved to be virtually ineffective. Other steps taken by

government at the time included the construction of Carter bridge, the construction

of the first and second phases of the Third Mainland bridge to I ink Lagos city with

the Mainland, the introduction of even and odd number system in the centre and the

building of several fly-overs and so on. It should be mentioned that the cost of all

these infrastructures ran into thousands of millions of naira and notwithstanding these

measures, the traffic problems of Lagos continued to worsen by the day (Olusola, A.,

1993: 18-19).

The other obvious problems of Lagos was high rate of social vices including delinquency, drug abuse, prostitution and corruption. This menace was imposed on the city by the over-crowding which prevailed in Lagos and the large number of unemployed persons who had a lot of time on their hands. Added to this were the gangs of criminals attracted to Lagos by the prospects of loot.

Having identified some of the problems inherent in Lagos, the issues of the suitability of Lagos as the Federal Capital of Nigeria are invariably brought into focus. These have thus become what can be termed by experts as the disadvantages of Lagos, which are being discussed below:

1. The Dual Role of Lagos

The role of Lagos as the capital of both the Federal and Lagos State governments imposed a tremendous strain on the small land mass of the city and this led often to conflicts between the two. This can be viewed in one of the memoranda submitted to the Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital of Nigeria during its inquiry by the Lagos State government.

49 The memoranda observed that so long as the responsibility for Lagos was

shared by the Federal and Lagos state governments, there was bound to be continued

conflicts between the two. Even in some cases where there was a legal demarcation

as between functions of the two governments, this did not obviate the occurrence of

conflicts. As a result of th is, the capacity of Lagos to play a dual role as referred to

above diminished considerably (Olusola, A., 1993:21). In practically all the countries

of the world which have some fo rm of federal constitution, the administration of the

federal capital is usually the exclusive responsibility of the Federal Government. It

may however be argued that by proper administration, these conflicts can be totally eliminated. But this is however not realistic and can be viewed as a sheer misplaced optimism, particularly where a country is committed to a federal fo rm of government.

IL Inadequacy of Land Space

The total land space in Lagos was estimated to be twenty-seven square miles .

And this fact had since been recognised as a major disadvantage of Lagos. Indeed, it is within this limited land area that most of the senior officials are accommodated , most federal ministries and embassies were located and so on. Added to this, the nature of the Lagos terrain coupled with its numerous lagoons and creeks, made land a rather scarce commodity. Even though land can be reclaimed , this is often done at enormous cost to the state, as was the case with the National Arts Theatre in lgamu. This lack of "elbow" room for expansion made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to plan Lagos as a capital for the federation (Olusola, A., 1993:22).

111. Security

The coastal location of Lagos as a federal capital created a problem in terms of security. Indeed, with the reality of the current world politics and the present level

50 of Nigeria's economic activities and the interest shown by various governments in

controlling our economy, coupled with the ever increasing strong place petroleum is

occupying in today's world politics and also the greater role Nigeria is playing in the

affairs of Africa and the entire black race, the possibility of armed intervention by

foreign powers cannot be ruled out altogether. It is a known fact that there has been

talk of military intervention in the affairs of the smaller oil rich countries by some

major powers in order to safeguard the economic interests of the developed world.

Under these circumstances, it is only sensible to take every precautionary measure

against such an eventuality. This was the case against Lagos based on its

vulnerability to a sea-launched invasion.

1v. Inadequacy of Infrastructure

Because of the shortage of land in Lagos , which is heavily urbanised, it is

difficult to plan a road system within it that can completely obviate the intolerable

traffic congestion on the roads. In addition, there is no doubt that the existing

telecommunication infrastructures have proved inadequate to sustain the daily rising

needs of both a federal capital as well as a state capital . Even though it can be argued this situation may be remedied, it will however be at an enormous cost to the state.

Furthermore, sewage disposal services have been another important

infrastructures that are inadequate. As at the early 1990s, only a small part of Lagos, that is occupied by highly placed individuals, Victoria Island, that has anything of the sort that bear semblance to a modern sewage system. For Lagos to be a capital city befitting the country, a modernsewage system is of absolute necessity. In any case,

it would be extremely expensive to overhaul the Lagos sewage system.

51 v. Population Dynamics

It is a fact that Lagos and its outlaying areas are compelled to cater for far

more people than 1t can convemently accommodate. rn a developing country like

Nigeria, it is extremely difficult to control to any reasonable extent the influx of

people in the capital, most especially when it is assumed by everyone that

employment opportunities abound. Usually job seekers come into Lagos in their

hundreds because the federal government is the largest employer of labour in the

country. In addition, Lagos as a major, if not the most important, commercial and

industrial centre of the country is where people believe that they can relatively secure

employment without much pains. This phenomenon has increased the number of those who come to Lagos which has invariably led to more pressures on the available lean social services in the city. In short, there is no doubt that Lagos has ceased to be capable of catering adequately for the needs of its teeming population.

v1. Ethnicity Pattern of Lagos

True to it, Lagos is within an area traditionally belonging to one of the major ethnic groups namely, the Yoruba. And Lagos remains essentially a Yoruba city with an Oba and traditional chiefs and also with a predominantly Yoruba culture. It is the opinion of many that the circumstances of Nigeria today demand that its city should not be situated within a city of the type of Lagos with a strong connection with one of the major ethnic groups. This is because Nigeria is a federation consisting of large number of ethnic and language groups with different and divergent cultures and trad itions.

52 With these problems and disadvantages highlighted in the preceding pages, it

became obvious that Lagos could no longer cope as the federal capital for Nigeria.

Thus the creation of a new capital became the only obvious alternative. Hence, the

idea of a new capital city for Nigeria was evolved and conceived, and thus became

a policy issue.

A method of planning and feedback was used' in the pol icy of relocating the

Federal Capital Territory from Lagos to Abuja. Arising from this, a number of

conflicts among the agencies responsible for implementing the policy emerged. These

conflicts adversely affected the realisation of the objectives of the policy, availability

of resources became crucial from the success of the pol icy. Implementation had to

be modified a number of times as a result of lack of resources.

Certain perspectives of policy evaluation are useful in our analysis of the

relocation of the Federal Capital Territory from Lagos to Abuja. Elements of

management, politics and legality are contained in the substantive policy on relocation of the Federal Cap ital Territory. The framework is designed around the impact of relocation. The relocation was done with the aim of eliminating the problems associated with Lagos as the Federal Capital Territory. The problem here is how has the relocation exercise improved the standard of living of the people or adversely affected their living standard.

Also associated with the problem is that of urbanisation. The dominant demographic trend in most developing countries is rapid urban population growth.

The urban development in developing countries is growing more than twice as fast as in industrialised countries. The population growth in Abuja is of more intensity than the average city in a developing country. The intension of the government is to

53 move in millions of people with in a few years. Unknown to the government is the

movement of another millions of people around the city's periphery. These people

move in on their own in search of jobs and other attractions that the new Federal

Capital could offer.

Related to the urbanisation of Abuja is the lopsided nature of growth of the

city. Abuja was designed as a city of white collar middle class workers. The

original inhabitants of the area were to be resettled outside the Federal Capital

Territory. The government was to cater for the housing, public transportation and

other infrastructural needs of the residents. By the time the governmentwas going

on, another private development was going on. This was the development of slums

and ghettos which provided makeshift fetation of the development of most urban cities

in developing countries. Towns like Nyanya, Suleja and Gwagwalada are the replicas of Ajegunle, Mushin and Ikorodu in Lagos.

3.2 Abuja as a Federal Capital Territory: Historical Process

By the late 1960s and early 1970s inadequate infrastructural facilities with problems of rapid urbanisation made the issue of the status of Lagos a dominant factor in policy agenda in Nigeria. While the argument of Lagos in the fifties was highly political and centred on the North and East wanting neutral Lagos, a wish that was counter to the demand of the West; the argument in the seventies was on the suitability of Lagos as Federal Capital. This new trend which cut across the ethnic and sectional setting, and was largely divorced of the sentiments and parochialism that characterised the previous discussion, was on how to have a befitting national capital.

The issue for consideration in the 1970s was either to retain Lagos as the

Federal Capital or re-locate the Federal Capital from Lagos. fn 1971 General

54 Yakubu Gowan in a speech at the convocation ceremony of Ahmadu Bello University,

Zaria, conceded to the entire nation the need to find a solution to the problems of

Lagos as the nation's capital, and challenged the citizenry to come out with a workable alternative. [t is argued that he was about taking a major pol icy pronouncement on the issue just before he was overthrown in July 1975.

Being conscious of the political nature of the issue, late General Murtala

Muhammad who succeeded General Gowon, on assumption of office in his first broadcast to the nation addressed the crisis confronting Lagos in its role as the nation's capital. He then emphasised his administration's commitment to resolving the problem. Accordingly, on the 9th August, 1975 , under the distinguished chairmanship of the Honourable Mr. Justice T.A. Aguda, a panel was set up. Other members of the panel included Dr. Tai Solarin, Alhaji Mohammed Musa Isma, Dr.

Ajato Gandonu, Col. Monsignor Pedro Martins, Chief Owen Fiebai and Professor

O.K. Ogan.

The terms of reference of the panel were as follows:-

i) to examine the dual role of Lagos as a Federal Capital and State Capital, and advise on the desirability of Lagos retaining that role;

ii) in the event of the committee finding that Lagos is unsuitable for such a role, to recommend which of the two Governments (Federal and State) should move to a new capital;

iii) in the event that the Committee finding that the Federal Capital should move out of Lagos to recommend suitable alternative location, having regard to the need for easy accessibility to and from every part of the federation;

iv) to examine all other relevant factors which will assist the Federal Military Government in arriving at the right decision; and

v) submit its recommendation to the Federal Government not later than December 31st 1975.

55 The panel began its work with a call to the general public to submit their

memoranda. They specifically requested some people that were considered to have

relevant expert knowledge and corporate bodies to submit memoranda. The panel

also visited few countries overseas which had similar problems. On their return, they

visited all the state capitals where they held discussions with their officials.

Additionally, the members of the panel undertook an extensive tour of Lagos both by

road and by water. Finally, they went by road from Benin to Lokoja through Auchi,

from Jos to Old Abuja (now Suleja), southwards to Kotonkarfe, southeastwards to

Keffi, then back through Izom to Minna and through Zungeru and Tegina to Kaduna.

After this sojourn, the panel came to the conclusion that it was most

undesirable that Lagos should continue to retain its dual role. Further, they contend

that a large area of land should be created as the Federal Capital Territory while the

Federal Government should be free to site the capital city within that territory after

taking expert advice on the issue. In electing the new federal capital the panel set

down certain criteria to guide it in determining the very crucial point as to the exact

geographical location that was considered suitable. The criteria were centrality,

health and climate, land availability, water supply, multi-access possibilities, security,

existence of building material locally, low population density, drainage, soil, physical

planning convenience, ethnic accord, majority opinion, life-less city, symbol of unity and the cost factor.

We shall now briefly discuss these criteria one by one. The issue of centrality

had been specifically mentioned in regard to the need for easy accessibility to and from every part of the country. Thus this issue occupied an important place in the

I ist of criteria used by the panel. Further, the panel ruled out any location which was

56 far too removed from the centre of the country. It is important to note therefore that

this factor has been a major influence in most countries of the world over that have

considered relocating their capital cities.

Another important factor that influenced the location of the new federal capital

by the panel was the health factor which cannot be divorced from the climatic

conditions. It is true that climatic condition of any area can determine not only the

physical well-being of individuals but can also determine the productivity of workers.

This is because hot areas are more hazardous to health and thus affect the productivity

of workers. In this regard therefore, the panel considered the debilitating effect of

health and climate on human well-being which in turn would be reflected in the

productivity potentials of the population that was likely to live in the capital city and

accorded it an important place in deciding on the issue of which area to relocate the

capital.

ln the same vein, the panel was of the view that a new location should have '

an abundant supply of usable land for all the functions that would be necessary in the

city. They further contend that an ideal location would be one which had not

undergone an advanced stage of development. In this regard and in order to meet

with the capital city's land requirements and to provide a guarantee against future

land shortage, the panel observed that as much as 8,000 square kilometres should be

designated as the Federal Capital Territory. Thus, within the territory the capital

could be built at the most suitable site on the basis of an intense study of the

designated territory by planning and other experts. Th is was because it was fe lt that what was required was not only a city, town or district, but a territory large enough to accommodate all the country's needs in the foreseeable future.

57 Adequate water supply was considered as another factor of importance in

selecting a location for the Federal Capital. It was felt that this was more desirable,

but what was perhaps more important to them was the possibility for purifying and

de! ivering of the required water of the right quaI ity and sufficient quantity for the

efficient fu nctioning of the capital territory. Thus meeting the domestic, industrial

and environmental needs of the territory.

Security is yet another factor. It was generally believed that the further inland

a capital was sited away from the coast or international frontiers, the greater the

chances of defending the nation's administrative nerve centre. As a matter of fact,

the capital stood out as a political power house of the highest order and therefore of

great strategic importance since it contained the key personnel and apparatus of the

nation's decision making machinery, it was a place worthy to be defended at all costs.

As for low population density, the panel attempted to avoid heavily populated

or closely settled areas. Rather they favoured an area of sparse or declining

population where the indigenes were few enough to be conveniently resettled. It was

their opinion that an ideal area to be developed as the new capital should be a low

density rural area where the problems and cost of resettling the existing residents

would be minimal .

The availability of, or proximity to, all forms of power resources was

considered a positive factor, which will further guarantee low costs in relocating the

new cap ital. Similarly, an area of good drainage was considered as an obvious advantage.

58 Under the factor of physical planning convenience, it was believed that as

much as possible, the capital territory should represent a clean slate in a well endowed landscape upon which planners of the capital city could achieve the best results at the least possible cost.

Equally important was the fact that a new capital created on virgin land where every Nigerian could feel assured that he or she had an equal opportunity and right to live there with others without any fear of domination of any kind would serve as a symbol of unity. It was further stated that such a capital that was regarded as belonging to all Nigerians would be regarded as a symbol of the nation's greatness.

This panel after completing their duties submitted their report to the Federal

Government on 20th December, 1975, thereby beating the dead I ine set for them to accomplish their task.

The governmentconsidering the thoroughness of the report accepted the entire report. By 3rd February 1976, the Head of State, General Murtala R. Mohammed in a broadcast to the nation, announced the government's decision to relocate the

Federal Capital in accordance to the Panel's report. Two days after the broadcast, precisely on 5th February, 1976, Decree No. 6 of 1976 was enacted and cited as the

Federal Capital Act, to give legal backing to the government's decision. Hence a new capital, Abuja, was born.

The FCT refers to all that land located between latitudes 8°25' and 9°25 ' north of the Equator and longitude 6°45 ' and 7°45' east of Greenwich. In detail, its boundaries are defined in the Federal Capital Territory Decree (No.6 of 1976) as fo llows:

59 Starting from the village called Izom on 7°E longitude and 9°15'N latitude, project a straight line westwards to a point just north of Letu on the Kemi River; then project a line along 6"471/iE southwards passing close to the villages called Semasu, Zui and Bassa down to a place a little west of Abaji in , thence project line along parallel 8°271hN latitude to Ahinza Village 7°6'E (on the Kadama River); then a project straight line to Buga village on 8°30'N latitude and 7°20'E longitude, thence draw a line northwards joining the villages of Odu, Karshi and Karn. From Karu the I ine should proceed along the boundary between the North-west and Benue Plateau States as far as Karu; then the line should proceed along the boundary between North Central and North Western states up to a point just north of Bwari village; thence the line goes straight to Zuba village and then straight to Izom.

lt should be noted that four state creation exercises had been embarked upon

since the twelve-state structure of 1967. The area covers some 8,000 square

kilometres. It is more than twice the extent of Lagos State (3,535 sq.km) and about

two-thirds that of former f mo state (13,032 sq.km). Lying close to the centre of the

country, the Territory is situated wholly within the region generally referred to as the

"Middle Belt". The FCT as it is today was carved out of the former Kwara, Plateau

and Niger States. The nascent city of Abuja was conceived as symbol of national

unity and progress. It was to be a land of equal opportunity to all Nigerians irrespective of tribes or religions. And because of its central location, Abuja enjoys accessibility not only from all major cities in Africa, but also in a place adjudged to be of equidistance to all parts of the country.

Abuja since inception in 1976 continued to grow steadily and progressively.

Abuja fully assumed the status of a federal capital of Nigeria on 12th December 1991 during the regime of General Ibrahim B. Babangida. This was the day the seat of government finally moved from Lagos to Abuja. This was not without pomp and

60 r--- - ..

pageantry. Today Abuja is confronted with so many social realities which calls for

the attention of policy makers who occupy according to C. Wright (1980) the command post.

3.3 The Political and Socio - Economic History of the lndigenes of Abuja

In terms of ethnic configuration, the federal territory was the original home of the Gbagyi (873), the Koro (7 3), the Gwandara (43) and the Bassa Komo and other ethnic groups (2 3) (Thomas-Emeagwali 1989). Demographically, the inhabitants of the federal territory numbered about 308,000 accord ing to the 1978 federal survey by the nation's office of statistics and planning. The figure has however appreciated greatly with the eventual movement of the seat of government from Lagos to Abuja. The 1991 national census revealed that the population of the

FCT stood at 378,671.

The population was organised into a large number of sleepy villages, all small and compact. The population size of the settlement varied from two (2) to about

4,000. Only five villages had a population of more than 2,000. More than half of the population belonged to the non-productive economic strata, namely children (43 3) and the over 56 year-olds (103). About 84 3 of the working population were farmers, the other 163 being traders, civil servants and handicrafts workers, etc.

(Aina, T.A. and Salau, A. T., 1992:50).

The area of the FCT produced no exportable crops and was therefore in the backwater of the colonial and post-colonial economy of the country, passed by the main north-south transport arteries, especially the railway lines to the east and west.

Thus the area attracted a very low level of social infrastructure, such as roads,

61 portable water supplies, health facilities and educational institutions. Equally, the

level of commercial activity was very low, most economic production being

subsistence.

Because of the numerical strength, emphasis would be based on the Gbagyi.

Conforming with the school of thought that is gaining ground, the Gbagyi, originally called Gwari or Payi, migrated from the Zaria Emirate, specifically from Birnin

Gwari, setting in Marrjida, close to Kagarko in the Jere area of Kaduna State. They moved onwards to Aso and late Naikpeda and finally Tsaunin Garki, very close to the present day Garki village where they finally settled due to intervention of white missionaries, who were able to convince them that there was no danger on the flat plains anymore. Hence, the large number of Gbagyi in the entire present Federal

Capital Territory.

The Gbagyi society, I ike all other societies in Nigeria, have their culture - the sum total of socially standardised ways of life. Their world is that which exists wherever people are, that is, man - centred. Socially, in Gbayi spiritual communalism, there is a collectively acknowledged hierarchic! order based on age, responsibility and service to the people. Thus age, wisdom accomplishment and responsibility are very important variables.

In political terms, the council of chiefs are responsible forchoosing their king or chief on behalf of the people in accordance with collective principles of ethics and morality - established through taboos. Religiously, the Gbagyi believe that the universe was created by God, "Shekwo". They speak of "Shekwo" as "He who was there in the beginning". Because this is a created universe, it is therefore a religious universe and to live in it is also a religious experience.

62 The Gbagyi believe that the hills and rivers are the abodes of the spirits, but

one particular hill is marked out as the abode of "Shekwo". This hill is called

Wubape (their ancestral shrine) and it is situated to the west of Garki village. They

worship "Shekwo" directly on this hill. They make sacrifices and offerings to Him.

They pour libations and say incantations on this hill. They offer sacrifices and thanksgiving for good harvest and health, for protection against evil forces misfortunes and bad ones and also in appeasing Him for all wrongs done in the society. They use rams, goats, cocks and hens for the sacrifices . Though most of the Gbagyi are traditionalists, a quite number have embraced the foreign religions of

Christianity and Islam.

The mainstay of the Gbagyi economy and indeed other ethnic groups in the

Federal Capital Territory has been agriculture. An important element in farming among these people is land. One very important feature of the areas that now fall within the Federal Capital Territory is that while the population is relatively sparse, the land is for most part plentiful. f n other words, there is a low man to land ratio in this area. This to some extent permits the extensive use of fallow farming system.

On the whole, the Gbagyi people cultivate a piece of land for about fourto five years, and then leave it to fallow for about three to eight years . Normally, new farmlands are cleared by cutting down bush and shrub and burning. Some of the farmers interviewed claimed to have practised the rotation of crops on the same piece of farmland for years. Farming among the Gbagyi is generally labour - intensive. The land is farmed almost exclusively by hand using human labour. There is not much evidence of mechanical or animal power being used in farming among these people.

Of course, some farmers interviewed claimed to have access to some modern farming

63 technology like tractors, improved seedlings and fe rtilisers, but all these are at great

pains and at very high costs.

As we have stated, farming among these people is labour intervive, and much of the work involved therein is carried out manually, making use of simple farm tools akin in many respects to those that could be seen around many African communities, whose cultures have not been much affected by the influx of western technology into this part of the globe. Therefore, the major farm tools or implements found among these people include; Ada (cutlass); Aze (small axe) ; Azukwo (hoe); Sakatona (a sickle for harvesting); Magye (digging stick for uprooting new yams); Agbediyi (sack for carrying yams); and Akarepi (locally made matchets). The crops grow by these people include yams, beans, , sugar cane, banana, guinea corn, pepper, melon, millet, , sweet potatoes, , and fruits like mangoes, oranges, and vegetables like spinach and okra.

Other forms of occupation among these people are rated secondary and even substandard. They are at best pastimes. For instance, hunting (fazo) is generally embarked during dry seasons only when the people have very little to do on the farm.

Occupations like dyeying, and weaving also have some little prominence. Another worthy feature of the Federal Capital Territory is the history of pot-making. This has had a long history of adaptation and resistance to climatic changes. The inhabitants also produce textile materials, employing their own traditional chemistry.

64 CHAPTER FOUR

INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROVISION OF SOCIAL OVERHEADS

The prov is ion of infrastructural facilities such as roads, water supply,

drainage, sewage system, electricity and so on recorded tremendous achievements

under the various regimes, right from General 0. Obasanjo to President Ibrahim

Babangida. For convenience sake, such infrastructural developments would be

viewed from the performance of each regime.

4.1 Infrastructural Development

Accordingly, during the regime of President , although these

infrastructural developments were limited to Garki (accelerated district), Wuse and to some extent the Central district, some of these facilities were however extended to the area development councils and satellite towns such as Karu and Gwagwalada.

As a result of the phasing out of the city development areas and the subsequent division of the Federal Capital Area into districts, the accelerated district, now known as Garki was the first to be developed. As a matter of fact, the contract for its infrastructural work, including road network, water supply, drainage, sewage system, electricity supply and street lighting was one of the first contracts to be awarded by

Alhaji Shehu Shagari. By 1982, the arterial road known as festival road linking the

North ring road I with the district, collector roads joining the streets to be arterial road and tertiary roads which are mainly access ways to service plots and residential areas were completed. Electricity supply and distribution system within the district through overhead line was against the underground cable network was adopted as a temporary measure of power distribution. Within this period, the street lighting of

65 all the major streets in the district were accomplished, while the water distribution

network was also put in place with Jabi dam as the source of water supply.

Other infrastructural services such as telecommunications and sewage

collection lines were initiated and completed. About three thousand five hundred

(3,500) housing units of diffe rent categories were also commenced; some of these

were completed, while others were at various stages of completion before the

departure of President Shehu Shagari (Olusola, A., 1993 : 100). In fact, in 1982,

some of those houses that were completed were occupied by members of the FCDA

and other firms handling projects in the new capital.

Wuse district was the second district to be developed in the new cap ital. It was given equal priority with Garki. The main roads, the street and tertiary road

networks to the service plots and residential areas were fu lly developed by 1983. The design of the permanent distribution network for electricity was commissioned. By

1983, part of the district was being supplied by NEPA, while other parts were being supplied by generator sets through temporary power lines. It was however hoped that by the time the underground cable network will be completed , the overhead lines would be dismantled and the whole district would be supplied with electricity from

NEPA.

The water supply report was extended to Wuse from Garki with the same source of water supply. Contracts for the construction of over two thousand housing units in the district were awarded. Most of the houses had been fully completed by

1983.

The Central District is in the heart of the city. It is designated the centre of governmental activities and the seat of the three arms of the government; the

66 executive, the legislative and the judiciary. The district for this special reason

mentioned has been developed along with the two residential districts of Garki and

Wuse. Some infrastructural facilities such as roads were put in place, while major

contracts of big projects located in the districts were awarded. Some of these projects

included the presidential palace complex and the national assembly complex.

The major components of the primary network of roads were embarked upon

by President Shehu Shagari. These comprised the outer and northern express ways,

the outer and inner southern express ways which encompass the two development

wings of the city area and provide the main roads to the new capital city. The

northern and southern parkways bisect the northern and southern development wings.

The airport express way links the airport and the central area. Ring roads i, ii and

iii connect the two development wings and also define the limits of successive

development phases of the city. Within the central area is a system of boulevards and

perpendicular streets which divide the area into small development plots. The central

area connector connects the central area and the outer express ways (Olusola, A.,

1993: 102).

The master plan for Abuja contains a proposal for the network of regional roads. These regional roads comprise express ways most of which as planned will ultimately become free ways. The outer northern express way forms part of this network of regional roads. This express way commences on the A-2 (Lokoja­

Kaduna) road and terminates near Asokoro at the junction with the outer southern express way and A-234 road to Keffi giving a length of 40km. (FCDA, 1988).

Indeed, the outer northern express way will have a dual main carriage-way with three lanes in each direction and additional two lane service carriage way to ring

67 road I I. The first phase of the construction programme involved the provision of two

lanes of the main carriage-way in each direction with bridges and culverts constructed

to three lane standard. This contract which was awarded in 1980 was soon completed

by 1982.

Ring road I (i.e. inner ring) constitutes part of the regional roads. It is one of

the express ways which connects the other side of the two development wings of the

city. As earlier defined, it limit successive development phases of the city. Ring

road I commenced at kilometre 33 of the outer northern express way and terminated

at the outer southern express way near the junction at A-234 road to Keffi and the

outer southern express way. The total length of the road is 20.4km. Ring road I was

designed to have ten lanes ultimately and it will consist of dual three lane main

carriage-way on each side. The contract for this road which was awarded to Messrs

Strabag (Nig) Ltd in 1980 at a cost of =N=8.9 million was completed in 1982

(Olusola, A., 1993: 103).

The Abuja airport express way planned to link to Abuja International Airport

(now named after Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe) to the new capital city stretches between the

existing A-2 (Lokoja-Kaduna road) and Ring road I. The expressway is designed for

two lane central ceremonial carriage-way and two lane main carriage way on either

side of central carriage way. The first phase of th is road project was undertaken by

Messrs Dumez (Nig) Ltd. (FCDA, 1988). The contract was awarded in 1980 at a

cost of =N=21 million over a construction period of 18 months, and it involved a thirty-seven kilometres of two lane carriage way plus seven kilometre of special roads to the Abuja airport. This project has since been completed. (Olusola, A.,

1993: 103).

68 Furthermore, as provided in the regional development plan, a series of satellite

towns are to be developed to supplement the FCT. Gwagwalada and Karu are such

towns. Gwagwalada in particular is planned to serve as the centre for absorbing

surplus immigrants to the FCT. It was to serve also as the centre for small, medium

and large scale industries to supply the FCT with some of the industrial goods which

are not produced in the capital city itself. Gwagwalada town is planned for an

ultimate population of 150,000 people over a land area of 1600 hectares. The

contract for the construction of civil infrastructure for the first phase was awarded to

Messrs Rotech (Nig) Ltd in 1982 at a cost of = N = 34 . 3 million with a completion

period of 36 months. By the end of the Shagari era, the project was at 40%

completion.

Like Gwagwalada, the Karu road project was awarded in mid 1983 to Messrs

Setraco (Nig) Ltd at a cost of =N=4.4 million with a completion period of six

months. This project was commenced but was not completed under the Shagari's government (FCDA, 1988).

Shagari 's governmentalso did a lot in terms of the provision of housing. l n accordance with the set target for the first phase of movement to Abuja which was

initiated in 1982 and expected to stretch to 1986, a total of 25,000 dwelling units for accommodating a total of 150,000 inhabitants expected to be in residence within the city were to be made available by the end of 1986. This number was projected on the basis of a house-hold size of eight persons per residence. As of July 1982, a total of 4,400 residential units have been awarded for construction. About 2,500 were certified to have been completed and can therefore accommodate about 22,000 persons on the basis of eight persons per household. The remaining houses were in

69 different stages of completion. These houses included not only those in the phase r

of the city proper but also parts of the territory such as Karu, Nyanya, integrated

workers settlement, Gwagwalada and others (Olusola, A., 1993: 104).

When the Shagari government decided to commence the movement of the seat

of the federal government from Lagos to Abuja in 1982, it was evident that

permanent offices for the federal government ministries were desirable. ft was

therefore decided that eight four storey office blocks be constructed to be used as

temporary facilities. The eight blocks were built and completed in the Garki district

area. Each block provide a total of 68, 182m2 of office floor space, in addition to

other blocks of offices were also initiated at Garki and Wuse.

The Jabi dam is one of the major sources of water supply in operation in the

city. The project involved construction of a dam (to store water) and its associated

water treatment plant. It also included the main pipe line and storage tanks. The earth dam is located within the Phase II area of the new city new ring road II on the

river Jabi. Originally, it was designed to serve a population of 100,000 people but this could not be expanded with the introduction of complementary water treatment facilities to serve up to 300,000 people. It has a storage capacity of six million cubic metres of water with production capacity of 360 cubic metres of treated water per hour. The dam serves Garki, Wuse and the various workers' camps. rt was officially commissioned in June 1982 by Alhaji Shehu Shagari.

The Lower Usuma dam is designed to cater for the ultimate water needs of the city. In 1980, Messrs Spiebatignolles (Nig) Ltd was contracted to construct the dam and its associated work, which include trunk pipe lines of varying diameters, two numbers of reinforced concrete each and the treatment plant of initial capacity of

70 50001113 per hour. It was supposed to have a total storage capacity of one hundred

million cubic metres of water (Olusola, A., 1993 : 106). The project was expected to

be completed by 1983, but this was not realised.

In the area of waste disposal , a contract was awarded to Messrs Paullosa (Nig)

Ltd in 1981 for the construction of the Interceptor Sewer lines schedule II and III for

the whole of Phase I area of the city. Construction has gone a long way since the

award of the contract but it is yet to be completed at the present time. The contract

in respect of the interceptor sewer I which takes the sewage from the city to the

sewage treatment plant was also awarded and it is being executed. The construction

of the pilot starter sewage treatment plant which is to cater for the city's estimated population of about 30,000 people was also awarded in 1981. The project has since attained about 403 completion. Because of the problems encountered in its execution, septic tank and soakaways have been provided on a temporary basis to completed houses both in Garki and Wuse in order to make them habitable (Olusola,

A. , 1993: 107).

Although not much is already being generated in terms of solid waste in the city area, solid foundations have been laid for the collection and disposal of refuse.

Initially, a contract existed with a sol id waste disposal firm that collected solid waste from designated points in the city, thus making for a cleaner environment.

Jn 1982, President Shehu Shagari also completed and commissioned the Abuja and Gwagwalada telephone network. In similar vein, both the Federal Radio

Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) and the Nigeria Television Authority {NTA) were established in Abuja, and commissioned in 1981. The radio corporation was temporarily located at Gwagwalada, while the television station was similarly located

71 in a temporary location along the festival road in Area 10 of Garki district. The

construction of a permanent headquarters for these two bodies was initiated by

President Shehu Shagari and was about 603 completion before the overthrow of his government in 1983 (FCDA, 1988).

It is important at this juncture to examine some special projects that were embarked upon by President Shagari, that were aimed at boosting the suitability of the new capital. Some of these projects included the Abuja [nternational Airport

(now Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport), State House Complex (otherwise called the

Presidential complex), the f nternational Conference Centre and the Presidential Guest

House (otherwise called Akintola Aguda House). As for the Abuja International

Airport, major work on the first phase of the three phases was completed in 1982.

[t has since then been put into use. The airport is capable of handling large aircraft of the size of Boeing 747.

The State House complex consists of two phases and a clinic. The complex

1s designed to accommodate the President and three other visiting heads of state simultaneously. [t is also proposed to accommodate all the official state functions of the President, during Presidential visits and at other times. The contract for this project was awarded to Messrs G.Cappa (Nig) Ltd at a sum of =N=180 million.

The construction work had attained an advanced stage before the coup that overthrew President Shagari (Olusola, A., 1993: 109).

The National Conference Centre was essentially a conference facility, consisting of a structure of four-floor levels. The central elements of the facility consisted of the main auditorium which was expected to accommodate approximately seven hundred and fifty persons, around which is a network of committee rooms,

72 ...... -- - ....

offices, storage and toilet facilities.

On the first floor is also a smaller auditorium with a capacity of about two

hundred and fifty persons. Sim ilarly, a network of committee rooms, offices, storage

and toilet facilities surround the main auditorium. On the second floor is located the

Presidential offices, suites and pantry, general office space, television rooms as well as interpreter translation and project rooms. The project was at about 75 3 completion during Alhaji Shagari's regime.

The Presidential Guest House, otherwise known as Akintola Aguda House is a three floor bedroom complex with an additional women's wing built for Mr.

President as a temporary facility to be used until the completion of the main

Presidential complex. It is to be ultimately converted into a Presidential Guest

House. The complex was completed within six months, and it was used whenever

President Shehu Shagari was in Abuja for official functions. The complex consists of a block of flats for presidential staff and security personnel . It contain other facilities like squash courts, gardens and offices.

Prior to General M. Buhari's regime, the provision of adequate service and social amenities in the new capital was not given high priority. This was despite the tremendous efforts made by his immediate predecessors to create the necessary conditions so that the seat of government and some ministries would be moved to the new capital. The government's resources were mainly concentrated in providing residential and office accommodation for the first group of people expected to be moved into the new capital without corresponding development of the basic social services and amenities such as schools, hospitals and the rest.

Therefore, on assumption of office, General M. Buhari noticed these

73 deficiencies in the development of the new capital. His first maJor task was to address the issue of providing essential services and amenities for the inhabitants of the new capital. This shift in priorities compelled the Buhari regime to de-emphasize the continuation of prestigious projects in the capital. The provision of basic infrastructural services especially in the areas of education and health therefore received a tremendous boost during his regime (Olusola, A., 1993 : 114).

Furthermore, General Buhari 's administration inherited a number of projects initiated by President Shehu Shagari which had not yet been completed. These projects were mainly the construction of road network, office and housing units, the

Lower Usuma Dam and some projects like the presidential palace complex. The military regime under Buhari having set new guidelines for the development of the capital was able to carry some of these projects to completion. Among those completed by the regime included: i) The Lower Usuma Dam which had reached about 65 % completion before the military administration took over, was completed and it now serves as the major source of water supply for Abuja. ii) The completion of most of the housing and office buildings that were at various stages of completion in both Garki and Wuse districts. iii) Most road construction contracts which had been awarded by the Alhaji Shagari 's administration were completed as part of the infrastructural programme (Olusola, A., 1993: 116).

Indeed, President Ibrahim B. Bababgida's regime represents a major landmark

111 the historical development of Abuja. On coming to power in August, 1985,

Bababgida undertook a careful study of the report of Justice Akintola Aguda's panel with renewed and dogged determination. This was with a view to setting the task of making Abuja a reality. The government was to work quitely but resolutely towards this goal, because of its belief that the case for moving the federal capital out of

74 Lagos still remained as compelling as it had been when the idea was first conceived.

Consequent upon this commitment therefore the administration was to

emphasize three broad areas of high priority in the development of the federal capital

and the entire territory. These were:

i) Development of infrastructural facilities and services especially roads, water, drainage system and electricity.

ii) Development of residential and office accommodation

iii) Provision of socio-economic facilities and services such as education, health, agricultural and rural development (Olusola, A., 1993:117).

Having set these programmes in place, the interest of President Babangida in

building the new capital could be described as been genuine and the decision of his

government to move the seat of government in December 1991 can be described as

being the decisive step towards making the dream of a new capital a reality.

In this light therefore, it would be necessary to examine his achievements in

the areas of city infrastructure, electricity supply and distribution, water supply,

sewage, solid and liquid waste disposal, post and telecommunications, residential

housing and office accommodation among others.

With the inception of President Babangida's regime, resources were fully

mobilised towards the provlSlon of some infrastructures like roads, water and

temporary electricity network in the other districts in the first phase of the city master

plan. This was an attempt to ensure an even development of the capital.

Consequently, a total of 63.43km equivalent of single carriage way roads, 59.5km of water lines, 65 .60km of sewer lines, 89.54km of storm water lines, 14 culverts and

3 lm length of bridge were commissioned and completed in Maitama district. While same district. In the central area district, about 44.5km equivalent of single carriage

way roads, 26.42km of water line, 45 .53 km of sewer lines, 59.9km of storm water

!me, 120 culverts and 55m bndge over head passes were constructed. At the

Asokoro district, a total of 37km equivalents of single carriage way road, 40.2km of water can, 30km sewage lines, 43.5km of storm water lines were also completed within this period (Olusola, A., l993 : 119) .

Similarly, the facilities for providing and distributing an efficient and uninterrupted supply of electricity in the new capital territory recorded tremendous progress under President Babangdia's regime. The NEPA primary responsibilities of connecting Abuja and other important areas in the territory to the national grid and to step down power at specific locations was accomplished during this period. While the FCDA was able to ensure the connection of power to both private institutional and government res idential houses and offices as well as other consumption points.

Hence several main distribution sub-stations were commissioned in the districts. As of l 991, the electrical installations which cover both reticulation and the provision of sub-stations were almost completed in Maitama, Asokoro and Wuse districts. At the

Abuja airport, a 7.5mva 33/1 lkv sub-station was installed. Furthermore, the rural electrification schemes for the various settlement within the territory also recorded significant progress during the Babangida regime.

Furthermore, in an effort to ensure adequate water supply forthe new capital city, the Babangida administration commissioned five water works projects within the territory. These included the Kubwa Water Works, primarily designed to provide the water requirements of Kubwa resettlement town and the housing estates located there.

The water works consisted of a package plant producing treated impoundment at the

76 rate of 200m3/hr from a cementry masonry were provided on nver Usuma.

Secondly, the airport water works were designed to serve the water requirements of

Abuja airport and the housing estates which were built within the vicinity. It has an

installed capacity of 100m3/hr. The others are the Gwagwalada water works, Usuma

Dan Water Works and Giri Water Works, all of which had been formally designed

to serve a specific area and purpose in the territory (Olusola, A., 1993: 120).

rt was envisaged that after the commissioning of these water works was the

government's drive aimed at providing a means to ensue the abundant, constant and

clean water supply to the entire territory. It was no wonder therefore that the Federal

Capital Territory Water Resources Agency was created in October, 1989.

Principally, it was charged with the responsibility of water resources management in the FCT.

The development of post and telecommunications received a boost during the

Babangida administration. Before 1985, NITEL services in the capital city were limited to providing telephone communication between the city and the outside world.

However, over the years, it has extended and improved its services to such an extent that Abuja now occupies an enviable position compared with other Nigerian cities in telecommunication services. As a matter of fact, Abuja was the first recipient of the analogue telephone and telex exchange in the country. Furthermore, the communication network was extensively spread and developed in and within the territory during Babangida's period.

The Babangida's regime also recorded a tremendous and commendable effort in terms of the provision of residential and office accommodation. During his time, various uncompleted hous.ing units that were scattered all over the Phase I

77 development area were completed and subsequently occupied. By the end of l 992,

a total of 18,191 housing units were completed in the various districts. In a similar

fashion, the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) commissioned 1,500 Junior,

intermediate staff housing units at Kubwa, 25 1 units at Karu, 482 luxury flats at

Maitama and 126 luxury flats at Asokoro (Olusola, A., 1993: 122).

The Babangida regime also paid adequate attention to the provision of office

accommodation. An ultra modern prototype secretariat complex was commissioned

and subsequently completed. Several office floors for parastatals and government

departments located in various districts were completed to give way for the movement

of some ministries and other establishments to Abuja.

The Babangida administration has undertaken some projects that were in I ine

with the movement of the seat of governmentand had also embarked on some special

projects that were found to be expedient for the new capital city. Some of these projects were the building of the three modern barracks in the territory (named after

Generals Yakubu Gowen, Sani Abacha and ), the construction of a new presidential villa which accommodated the entire presidency, the Centre for

Democratic Studies at Bwari, and the Centre for Women Development located in

Garki. Others were the construction of National Universities Commission (NUC) building and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) secretariat at the Asokoro district.

Having laid all these infrastructural developments and provided some basic social amenities, we may now look at the various attempts and indeed the eventual movement of the seat of government from Lagos to Abuja.

The first major effort was initiated by Alhaj i Shehu Shagari in September 1982

78 culminating in the celebration of the nation's 22nd independent anniversary on 1st

October at Abuja. At this time the federal government was to begin to establish its presence m the new capital as from that date. So much so that the initial movement of some federal ministries to Abuja were expected to commence while it was hoped that by 1986 the first phase of the planned movement would have been completed.

"' This was however aborted as a result of the overthrow of the Shagari ad ministration at the end of 1983.

The succeeding administration of General M. Buhari despite its sincere efforts made little headway in this regard as well. His programme of working a realistic schedule for the movement of some ministries in readiness for the transfer of the seat of government was prematurely annulled by the overthrow of his government in

August 1985.

President Ibrahim Babangida on his assumption of office addressed the issue of the movement of the seat of government with great zeal and determination with a view to bringing about it before the end of his administration. Towards realising this goal, a special task force was created to ensure the hitch-free movement of ministries and parastatals to Abuja. [n consequence of this decision, the first set of ministries and some government departments and agencies were successfully moved to the new capital in 1990. By the end of 1990, a total of six ministries and twenty-seven federal parastatals have moved into the new capital.

79 As part of this general movement, a date was set for the Presidency to move to the new capital and by December 12, 1991 the dream was actualised. The president and his team were formally welcomed to the new capital. Hence, Lagos as from that date ceased to be Nigeria's official cap ital.

It is important at this juncture to state that most of the infrastructural facilities were executed by Julius Berger, which started its romance with the Abuja dream in

1980. It was in Abuja that the company demonstrated once again the qualities that had made members of successive governments feel they could fully rely on it. Here, again, Julius Berger contributed in helping Nigeria grow into a modern nation-state, rather than the tribal society of yore. And it was in Abuja that the company's corporate culture truly matured.

The I ist of projects undertaken by the company would easily go beyond the bounds of th is work, but a brief synopsis is nevertheless in order. Julius Berger provided the infrastructure for three main districts in the new capital , each of them several hundred acres in size, namely the Maitama as well as Wuse I and Wuse II districts: infrastructure includes beneath the roads and pavements, telecom ducts, storm drainage, fresh and waste-water piping, and of course, electrical ducts. In addition, alongside large earthworks, they built countless bridges, water and sewage pipelines, and cable ducts in the capital 's Central Area (JBN Pie, 1996:105) it was initially in the three residential districts that they excelled, an area of operations again comparatively new to the company, which had hitherto only built smaller townships to accompany the steel mills.

The company was, of course, already a past master at constructing the main external roads with their bridges and inter sections, thus ensuring that rush-hour

80 traffic does not get bogged down at junctions. But in one respect Abuja took Julius

Berger into completely new terrain. It became involved for the first time in building

residential quarters and complex administrative facilities. The list ranges from

residences inhabited primarily by senior governmental officials, ministers and chief

judges, the officer's village, the barracks for the brigade of guards, the only

competed Ministry prototype Building, the Presidential and Vice-Presidential seats of

government, the National Assembly Annex, the Better Life Centre to foster rural arts

and crafts , water reservoirs, and sewage treatment plants in Wuse and last by no

means learnt, the rapidly growing new airport terminal building.

Julius Berger has undoubtedly shown great prowess in acquitting itself in the field of building, by learning and adapting, by blending local resources and flexible international technology and expertise.

4.2 Provision of Social Facilities

Social services affect the quality ofpeoples's lives and as a result governments now play direct role in their provision. This trend is a reflection of the growing emphasis on human well being and the rise of the welfare state in the last four decades of the 20th century. This is apart from the contribution of social services to the improvement of the productivity of the labour force. However, social services improve public goods because once they are provided at fixed points, the services are not equally or uniformly available at all other locations because of differences 111 distance or travel time between residential neighbourhoods and facilities.

It is for this reason that location and its corollary, access, are important considerations in the provision of social services in urban and regional systems. The

81 FCDA was not obi ivious of these important considerations, because in the master plan

it was stated

' ...the most important element of a city is the qua I ity and access of a wide variety of public services, ... their location and access to the future residents of the city has been given considerable attention as part of the master plan. Each service facility has been sized and placed at the appropriate location for accessibility and efficient service delivery' (IPA, 1979).

Tndeed, the provisions in the master plan are quite comprehensive, detailed and

largely adequate. By far, the two most important social services in the FCC and the

FCT are health care and educational services. Health care and education are usually regarded as the key components of the social services and most government both in

Nigeria and elsewhere place a lot of emphasis on them. Significant progress bad been achieved in this direction. At the inception of work in the FCC and FCT there were no hospitals or health centres in the entire area. But by 1988, there were quite a number of private as well as government owned clinics and hospitals which reached

20. Similarly, by 1988, there were 4 nursery schools, 211 primary schools, 8 junior secondary schools, 1 teacher training college, 1 technical school and 2 post-secondary• institutions (Okafor, S.I., 1990:2).

Thus, in aggregate terms, a Jot has been achieved. But an important question is whether or not provision is spatially organized in a manner that ensures the satisfactionof the considerations that informedthe provision of the social services in the first instance. [n this regards, there are a number of performance measures that can be used to evaluate the system. A particularly adequate procedure is one that explicitly recognises spatial variations in need and relates levels of provision to the variations in need. Indeed, this thinking was through the master plan provision for

82 social services, since the prov1s1011 of facilities is tied to specified population

thresholds. For example, the population threshold for primary schools is 3,000 to

5,000 pupils per pnmary school in the city and 2,000 pupils per primary school in

the rural area. The lowering of threshold for rural areas is commendable in the light

of the dispersed nature of rural populations. In such circumstances, high thresholds

would result in unreasonably extensive catchment areas forschool s, with large sectors

of the population residing beyond the maximum wal king distance to schools and

therefore not availing themselves of the educational opportunities provided.

In some settings, total population is used as the index of need for social

services but in other settings, this index is inadequate because there could be

differential needs between populations which are not captured by population size

alone. In such settings, appropriate population sub-groups or some other variables are employed. This procedure will be employed for the evaluation of the provision of social services in the FCT. However, it is important to stress that in planning the provision of social services, especially health care and education, need is a more crucial consideration than utilisation or demand. Utilisation is expressed need and it could be low where facilities are not available or not accessible. To base provision on utilisation or demand can be faulted on grounds of equity. It is against this backdrop therefore that the evaluation attempted here will be based on the concept of need, especially as social services are virtually provided from the scratch in the territory.

4.2.1 Health Care Facilities

Essentially the environment plays a significant role in disease causation, the disease profile in the FCT does not in any way differ much from the profiles in other

83 parts of the country. Initially, sceptics had expressed fears some diseases like river

blindness, sleeping sickens and schistosomiasis to be prevalent in the area. Despite

data problems in connection with the prevalent diseases in much of the territory,

Table 4. 1 shows the general profile of diseases in the federal capital city. As with

the rest of the country, malaria is a major scourge and most of the diseases are

preventable and communicable.

Table 4.1: Garld Health Centre : Attendance by Ailment Sex and Age, 1988

S/No Ailment Total Sex Age

Male Female Adult Infant

1 Malaria 393 87 155 87 64

2 Typhoid 68 44 14 2 8 Fever

3 Cholera 2 1 1 1 1

4 Measles 57 40 17 32 25

5 Diabetes 8 5 3 7 1

6 Appendicitis 70 20 42 5 3

7 Jermoa 141 105 18 16 2

8 Chicken pox - - - - -

Total 739 262 232 142 130

Source: MFCT (1988a).p. 20

The existing facilities in the FCT do not show any evidence of under-

utilisation. Rather, there seems to be pressure on existing facilities as shown in the

histogram below in which case it is quite clear that doctors are over-stretched. It

follows therefore that on both the basis of disease profile and the levels of utilisation

of existing facilities, there is a strong need for the provision and expansion of health services.

84 Figure 4: Number of Patients per day by Area Council in Government Owned Clinics/Health Centres in 1994

2 8

2. 6 2538

2 4 w -' 2 2 OJ <( :: 4'. > 4'. 1 8 \I)" a:0"' m 1 �

.• 1 4 � � .. 2 1.;;'.'. ,_ >-- «'-' 0 Lf; I- z w 0.8

;::<( 0 s (<

0 4

0 2 36 0 A8AJI GWAGIVALADA KU.JE MUN I Cl PAL

AAEA COUNC IL � FATI ENTS/DA'r � DOCTORS AVA ILABLE

Source: Fieldwork research conducted in 1996.

Table 4.2 sets out the allocation of facilities in the FCT as contained and the

master plan provisions and it is clear from the table that provision is based on need.

And in this case population is regarded as the index of need. As argued later, this

conceptualisation of need is quite adequate in the present circumstances in which,

among other things, there is striking similarity in population structure in different

areas . Furthermore, Table 3 represents that ultimate goal and so it is not proper to

use it for the evaluation of the existing situation. However, what can be done at the

85 present time is not examine the system in order to identify emerging trends. This will show whether or not the system is evolving in the right direction.

Table 4.2: Medical Facilities Allocation

Type of Population sit size Allocation to Satellite Central facility served/bed locations cities and Business sector District Rural Residentia centres l Districts

Health 6,000- 18.81HA x Choice 10,000

Health 20,000 1.81HA x (2-3 Centre Centres/re sidential district)

Referral 200,000- 5.9HA x Hospital 250,000 250 beds

Central 1250 beds 40HA x Hospital complex

Source: IPA (1979), p. 132

The health care facilities include hospitals and clinics, dispensaries or health posts, mobile clinics and patent medicine stores. The hospitals and clinics are owned by both government and private individuals, although the bulk of it is government- owned.

Using population as our index of need for health care, it is fairly clear that there are some discrepancies between need and provision. In other words, some Area

Councils have larger shares of facilities and personnel than their population size would justify. There is the case with Abaji Area Council and Gwagwalada Area

86 Council with regards to hospitals and clinics. Their shares of facilities exceed their

shares of population. Since number of facilities says noth ing about size of fa cilities

and, by extension, the quantity and quality of services available, indexes of size are

more appropriate for evaluating the discrepancies between need and provision. In th is

connection, the distribution of some personnel and hospital beds can be used for this

purpose. On the basis of these indicators, the discrepancies between need and

provision stand out in stark relief. The excessive concentration of services in the

Municipal Area Council is very apparent. Outside the Municipal, for instance, the

number of doctors and nurses is far too small for the level of need in the other Area

Councils, especially in Kuje and Abaji. Even if allowance is made for a major regional or referral hospital in one of the Area Councils, the situation in Kuje and

Abaji Area Councils with regard to doctors and nurses is hardly defensible. For example, in both Area Councils there is only five doctors each to the entire population.

However, by 1991 significant increase have become noticeable in the area of manpower. See the line graph below.

87 Figure 5: Availability of Medical Personnel in the Territory Between Two Time Periods

600

500

4f'\(l ':'l w z z 0 tll " w 300 a. u_ c

0 z 200

100

NURSES PHA�'1ACI STS PARAMEDI CAL

PERSONNELS

D 1985 + 1991

Source: Field work research conducted in 1996.

The sudden influx of people to the territory which led to the considerable increase in health services and institutions, has necessitated the construction of a large number of health care facilities. The territory can now boast of a 300-bed Specialist

Hospital at Gwagwalada (this is the first phase of the 500-bed hospital); General

Hospitals at Garki and Wuse, a comprehensive health centre at Bwari, Karshi and

Rubochi, a maternal child welfare centre at Gwarimpa that provides 24 hours service and health centres at Yaba, Abaji, Kubwa and Nyanya. Similarly, Kuje clinic became operational and so was Idu drug compounding unit.

88 In brief, the Gwagwalada Specialist Hospital is a 360 bed complex which was

partially commissioned in May, 1992 , but operated functionally as a small General

Hospital under the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) uptill March,

1994. By April 1994, the Federal Ministry of Health took over its running as a

tertiary care hospital. Presently, the Hospital serves the Federal Capital Territory and

the neighbouring states. The spectrum of the clinical work covers General out­

patient, internal medicine, paediatrics with Neonatology, General Surgery with

Urology, Orthopaedics Obstetrics and Gynaecology. Physiotherapy, Dental Surgery and a few complements of laboratory medicine among other departments (GSH

Bulletin, 1997:5).

The movement of the Federal Government ministries and Parastatals to Abuja has brought to focus the important role this Hospital is expected to play, being the only Federal Government Tertiary Health Care facility in the whole of Federal

Capital Territory. Suffice it to say that the Gwagwalada Specialist Hospital has been equal to the task.

The School of Nursing in 1991 successfully moved its temporary site to

Gwagwalada Specialist Hospital and has since been fu nctioning accordingly. A Drug

Revolving Fund Scheme (DRFS) was launched and put into operation in all the Area

Councils in the FCT. From inception, grants have been yearly disbursed to the scheme for the purchase of genuine and cheaper drugs and also for the efficient distribution of drugs and dressings.

The MFCT over the years has fully participated in the implementation of the primary health care schemes. The result of the National Programme on Immunization

(NPI) coverage survey placed the FCT in 1991 in the first position in the country

89 with 80.4% coverage. fn various parts of the FCT hundreds of thousands of children

are yearly being immunized against the six most deadly diseases plaguing children.

Details of some of the achievements of the MFCT in the control of diseases

are shown in Table 4.3 below.

Table 4.3 Control of Some Diseases

Year Cases

NPA ORT OPD Guinea Worm

1985 31,852 643 119,804 -

1986 54,112 8,451 312,483 -

1987 105,840 2,360 405,407 -

1988 110,084 3,778 268,785 1,405

1989 269,633 7,866 121,314 779

1990 106,595 8,350 113,511 736

1991 225,435 10558 101,058 194

Source: Adopt ed from ABUJA. Achievements of MFCT. 1985-92, p.44

The realities of health care provision in the FCT are in part reflected on the

problems encountered by clients with the system. The problems reported include

drug shortage, long waiting time in hospitals, long trips to hospitals and other

facilities, high transport cost to health care facilities and high cost of medical care.

Although some of these problems, such as drug shortage, were widely indicated, the

problems of long trips to facilities, high transport cost and high cost of care featured

frequently in Abaji and Kuje Area Councils.

There is no specific provision in the master plan for private medical practice.

All that is stated in the plan is "the private office space be allocated in the hospitals and health centres to accommodate physicians in the private practice of medicine"

90 (IPA, 1979). It was stated elsewhere that the health services department encourages

the setting up of private clinics and hospitals in the federal capital city and FCT in

order to supplement government effort (FCDA, 1988b). There is thus no specific

locational policy or requirements for private facilities to comply with; and given the

importance of economic considerations in the locational behaviour of private

practitioners, it is to be expected that most private fa cilities will be in and around the

federal capital city.

4.2.2 Educational Provision

Like health care provision, significant progress has been made in the provision of educational services in the FCT. The master plan provides for five types of educational needs : pre-schools, primary schools, secondary schools, post-secondary schools (including tertiary) and others (IPA, 1979). Pre-schools facilities will largely be in the hands of the private sector. The other levels of the educational system will presumably be controlled by government. It is also clear from the master plan that the number and distribution of educational facilities, especially primary and secondary institutions, will be based on the size of relevant school age population.

At the inception of the FCT there were no post-primary institutions in the area, while primary schools were comparatively fe w. But by 1988 the picture had changed. Primary and secondary schools are understandably the most numerous in the FCT and Tables 4.4 and 4.5 summarize the distribution of these institutions by

Area Councils. [n both cases, the appropriate indexes of need are primary school age population and secondary school age population, rather than total population. Unlike health care facilities, the discrepancies between need and provision are not too glaring

91 with regard to primary and secondary schools. However, this is not to suggest that

the disparities are not there and should not form the basis for future action. The co-

efficients for primary and secondary schools (Tables 4.4 and 4.5) confirm that the

geographical concentration of resources is not a serious problem.

Table 4.4: Distribution of Secondary School Facilities by Area Councils (1990)

Area Secondary Total No. Of Total enrolment Number of Council school age Secondary in Secondary teachers population schools school

No % No % No % No %

Abaj i 10,264 12.65 3 11.54 2,857 10.66 83 12.6

Gwagwalada 19,995 24.65 8 30.77 7,882 29.41 172 25. l

Kuje 18,159 22,38 4 15.38 4,539 16.93 76 11.6

Municipal 32,708 40.32 11 42.31 11,52 43.00 327 49.7 6

Total 81,126 100.0 26 100.0 26,80 100.00 685 100.00 0 0 4

Source: Ministry for Federal Capital Territory 1988a P.55.

The geographical allocation of educational resources in the FCT is therefore largely equitable since it is largely in keeping with the spatial pattern of need. In particular, primary schools are quite ubiquitous in the territory. Each of the village areas has at least one primary school. This geographical distribution is a way of ensuring that the institutions are within the reach.

92 Table 4.5: Distribution of Primary School Facilities by Area Councils (1990)

Area Primary school Total No. Of Total enrolment Number of Council age population pnmary m pnmary teachers schools school

No % No % No % No %

Abaji I 1,952 12.65 24 19.90 7, 101 10.83 203 12.2

Gwagwalada 23,282 24.65 61 32.80 18,884 28,79 546 32.7

Kuje 24, 144 22,38 42 22.58 10,437 15.92 234 14.0

Municipal 38,085 40.32 59 31.72 29, 161 44.46 685 41.1

Total 94,463 100.00 186 100.0 65 ,583 100.0 1,668 100.00 0 0

Source: Ministry for Federal Capi tal Territory 1988a P. 56.

By their nature, post-secondary institutions have larger catchment areas,

require higher population threshold, and are attended by older pupils. In addition, they are typically fewer in number than primary and secondary institutions. For these and other reasons, the provision of this category of institutions is usually not too closely tied to local levels of needs.

The University of Abuja which 1s umque 111 terms of its dual structure

(conventional and Distance learning programme) and national spread in its catchment area and composition of staff and students, took off in 1991, had experienced remarkable developments.

The siting of a University in Abuja followed the decision to relocate the seat of the federal government from Lagos to Abuja. Th is was necessitated by the fact that as a new seat of government, a University of special nature was desirous of the city. As early as 1976 when the idea of relocating to Abuja was conceived and accepted, one committee after another was inaugurated to give credence to this noble

93 objective. Finally, it was the Ezeilo's committee's recommendation that gave birth

in 1988 to the University of Abuja, with a dual mandate, comprising the conventional system and the Distance Learning programme. Among the basic documents of the

University are the University of Abuja Decree No. 110 of 1992, the Academic Brief and the Master Plan for the development of the permanent site.

The major aims of the University are:

i) to provide opportunities for higher education to Nigerians without discrimination;

ii) to provide courses of instruction and facilities 111 the search for knowledge in all its branches;

iii) to promote scholarhsip and conduct relevant research in areas critical to balanced national development; and

iv) to relate the activities of the University to concrete realities of Nigeria (University of Abuja Calendar, 1990- 1993: 36).

What makes this University spectacular is its striking features that made it unique among all Nigerian universities today. This is not only because it is a new

University in the new Federal Capital Territory with its challenges and opportunities, but also because of its revolutionary concept and planning. For it is the only federal university such that is conceived and planned from the very beginning to be dual mode or two-in-one university. This means that it is both a conventional University running traditional courses for resident students and at the same time running some programmes, where possible by distance education. The Centre for Distance

Learning which is a strong component and an integral part of the university 1s respons ib le for performing the functions of the defunct Open University.

The early years of the University were utilised in establishing the basic administrative and academic structures for its take-off. Considerable effort was made

94 111 this respect as the University had to start from the scratch with no previous

structures and facilities to back on. Having initially operated from the Wuse district

of Abuja municipality, the University later moved to its present mini-campus at

Gwagwalada on 29th January, l 990.

The University commenced academic programmes in the conventional area in

the 1990/91 session with four foundation facilities. These were : Faculty of Arts and

Social Sciences; Faculty of Education; Faculty of Law; and Faculty of Science. The

number grew to six in 1992/93 session with the establishment of the Faculty of

Management Sciences and the Faculty of Arts which was removed out of FASS.

Developed along with these are well stocked, fu lly equipped laboratories, modern computer centre and a befitting and modest library.

The University of Abuja Decree No. 110 promulgated 111 December 1992 prescribed a Collegiate System for the University. With this development, the former

Faculty system was then transformed into the Collegiate system with the establishment of Colleges streamlined into three. These are College of Arts and Education; College of Law, Management and Social Sciences; and College of Science and Agriculture.

The colleges have departments under them which have risen to twenty in number and offers a total number of twenty-three degree courses. In addition to the conventional component of the University, its Distance Learning programme offers degree and diploma courses in almost all the disciplines obtainable in the regular system.

The apparatus of the Centre for Distance Learning and Continuing Education

(CDLCE) was established in 1990 and headed by a Director. Academic programmes commenced in the 1992/93 session. By 1996, its pioneer students have completed their 300 level. As a matter of fact, the idea of the CDLCE is to complement the

95 conventional academic programmes of the University by providing non-residential

instruction courses to students through a variety of methods, mostly by

correspondence.

The programmes of the Centre are therefore intended to cater for a large

number of candidates who want to benefit from further education but who, for one

reason or the other, could not go for fu ll time courses at conventional universities.

Thus the underlying philosophy is to I iberal ise and democratise education to a large

number of interested candidates. It is hoped that ultimately, the increased educational opportunities would substantially contribute to the rapid socio-economic development of the country (UNIBUJA, CDLCE Publication, 1993:20) .

Specifically, the cardinal objectives of the Centre are: i) providing opportunities for university education for those who for one reason or the other cannot acquire it through regular attendance at the university; ii) providing opportunities for those, who though they already have regular university education, are interested in acquiring new knowledge and/or some specialised skills in other areas outside their initial areas of specialization; iii) organising in-service training, occasional seminars and workshops for workers in both private and public sectors to enable them keep abreast of new developments in their various professions;

iv) providing avenues for life-long education; and v) filling the gap created by conventional universities' inability to admit many of the qualified candidates (UNIBUJA Calendar, 1990-93: 148)

It is important to state that both programmes of the regular and Distance

Learning are basically the same in the contents and quality, the difference is only in mode of instruction and duration.

Apart from conventional schools mentioned above, there were es tab I ishment of special educational institutions in Women, Adults and Nomadic education. There

96 was the establishment of Women Education Unit in l987 to improve the quality of life of rural women through education. The pilot women training centre was estabhshed in Garkt. Later four women centres were opened at Kwal i, Abaji, Kuje and Wuse.

An Agency for Mass Literacy for Adult Learners was created in 1990. The agency is to monitor and ensure not only a mass but functional I iteracy programme in the FCT. Tt liaises with former MAMSER now National Orientation Agency

(NOA) to train adults. About 1000 adult literacy classes were opened in Gwagwalada and over 20,000 adult learners have been graduated .

Nomadic schools with veterinary/health clinics and recreational facilities were set up at Tudun Fulani, Bwari and Rugan Wal iki Baraje in Kwal i. Three nomadic schools were established by 1992 in Kutunku and Gwako both in Gwagwalada and

Atako in Abaji. The aim of the programme is to teach the nomads basic skills in

Learning (reading, writing and arithmetic) and catering for their animals.

97 CHAPTER FIVE

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS IN HOUSING DEVELOPMENT

5. 1 Introduction

Housing as the most visible and the most important land use agent in the

federal capital city and the FCT and one which touches intimately on the 'liveability'

of each individual deserves a special attention and focus. The master plan at its

inception makes certain assumptions on which housing needs and demand in the federal capital city and FCT were based. These assumptions have been overtaken by events and housing projections based on them have become unrealistic. Despite these

however, the nation has not been able to produce the required types and number of units envisaged by the master plan in the federal capital city and FCT.

This chapter appraises the housing provisions of the Abuja master plan noting the underlying assumptions and examining the achievement profile of the master plan with respect to housing. We shall also discuss the role of the Federal Housing

Authority (FHA) in this regard.

The housing delivery system as a mechanism which allocates housing to different households, often according to affordability levels, is a combination of many inter-related processes. Such a process consists of the production of new houses, the renovation or rehabilitation of the existing units and distribution of both the new and the existing units (Agboola, T., 1988:5). These according to Racster (1980), include the economic demand and the need of the demanders; the producers perception of this demand; the socialist goals and corresponding governments; the many town planning; land and house building laws and regulations and the tax considerations cost of home financing.

98 There are usually two main processes of housing delivery-the private and the

pubI ic-and they are expected, between them, to significantly reduce the housing

deficits, improve the quality of the existing units and convert one use to the other, if

need be. While each of these models of housing delivery has its own peculiarities,

they share almost the same laws and regulations. Despite this, it is noteworthy,

especially in the light of existing discussions, to note that the two modes of housing

delivery differ significantly in their mode of housing allocation, as will be found in

the course of this chapter.

The private sector housing delivery system is that which is conceived,

planned, and construed (or executed) through the customary and or modern

institutional channels and which are subsequently offered for sale, lease or rent in the

open housing market. Not until recently, there have not been empirical evidences of

the numerical contributions of either the public or private models of housing production to the total housing stock. The Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic

Research (NISER) has, however, shown in 1981 that the private sector is making four times the efforts of the public sector in the production of houses. In Abuja as will be found later, the private sector has been very much involved in the housing delivery system.

Generally, private developers are less concerned with housing need since their markets are for housing demanders. Whether they build in single units or groups of houses, whenever those houses are for rent or lease, the competitive market forces operate. Sada (1981) noted that whenever any nation embarks on housing programme whose cost (rent) is beyond the reach of the majority of the population, such a programme can only satisfy housing demand, not housing need . It could thus be said

99 that the housing allocative method of the private sector housing does not favour the

low income people. Yet such people constitute about 70 per cent of the Nigerian

populace, even m Abuja. Therefore, solutions to their housing problems inadequately

catered forby the private housing market must be found in the public sector.

This therefore is the theoretical justification for governmental intervention in

housing. Governments intervene in housing to correct market imperfections in the

al locative inefficiencies of the housing market; to justify housing as a merit good; to

redistribute income and wealth; force the consideration of externalities ; subsidize the economy, and promote miscellaneous non-housing objectives. These methods of

housing provision to satisfy these ideals are through direct housing construction; provision of serviced land; availability of mortgage finances at below market interest rate and tax relief measures.

However, it is sad to note that the various modes of public housing production strategies have been abysmal failures. The high liopes, noble pledges, huge sums of money and goodwill which welcomed the various public housing intervention programmes and projects were not sufficient to prevent their failures.

5.2 Housing and the Abuja Master Plan Provisions

The prjncipal aim of the Abuja master plan is to create a most attractive environment for the national seat of government and, most importantly, to provide decent and healthy living conditions for its residents. "A decent and healthy living" just like the American housing goal of "a decent home and a suitable living environment" are emotive, utopian and sometimes indefinable phrases. This, however, is the goal of the plan and it is to be achieved through the provision of

100 housing among other ranges of supporting and complementary infrastructure.

In articulating the master plan provisions for housing, it should be emphasized,

as noted earlier that although housing issues may be endogenously determined they

are also exogenously affected or influenced. Accordingly, housing provisions in the

plan may not be meaningfully articulated without first articulating those factors that

intimately touch on the housing delivery processes. For instance, land 1s

indispensable in the determination of the location, type and number of units of

housing demanded or to be provided. There is thus the need to know the land allocation provisions of the plan for housing. Secondly, housing are for the people, either born in the territory or who have migrated to the city to seek various types of fortune or have been 'forced' to reside in the city temporarily or permanently by reason of work or business. What population estimates and in what categories did the master plan hope to cater for the variously proposed housing units? It is against this background that the type and number of housing units provided over time in different residential districts can be meaningfully presented.

5.2. l Land Allocations and Housing

T n the allocation of land for residential purposes, the master plan observed that residential land use requ.irements are especially sensitive to alternative assumptions about household size and occupancy, dwelling units and plot sizes, unit type and floor area ratio (Master Plan, 1979). Therefore in the residential land use elements, density per hectare varies according to house types. For instance, between one and twenty-five units of detached units were to be built on an hectare; 100 tO 133 detached or semi-detached to hectare; 166-286 units of flats per hectare; 42-83 units

101 of multiple family units per hectare and 42 transitional units per hectare. A total of

12,486 hectares of land was allocated for residential land use.

The master plan based its land use allocations on both usable and unusable

land, reserving the unusable land such as rock outcrops etc forparks and open spaces .

Despite this, additional unusable land for residential purposes were fo und. For

example, in phase one of the developed areas of the federal capital city, a total of

4,342 hectares were allocated by the master plan for the six residential districts. This was to be cut down to 3,698 plots based on the assumptions on household size etc, identified above. It was found that only 4,039 hectares were actually useable and that only 3,450 plots could be carved out. (See Table 5. 1). This has great implications for the number of that could be housed and on the nature of initial assumptions made as would be found below.

Table 5. 1: Land Allocation and Population by District in Phase I of the Federal Capital City

District Land Actual land Planned Actual pop. No. of No. of Actual allocated by developable pop. By Projection neighbour- residential no. of the Master the master by FCDA hoods plots by !lats by plan plan M/P FCDA

Garki I 365.00ha 324,00ha 26.000 24,000 4 383 367

Garki II 100,00ha 455.00ha 24,100 22,000 4 l,371 1,226

Wuse I 830.00ha 614.00l1a 34.000 26.000 6 461 437

Wuse lI 900.00ha 964.00ha 35.000 28.000 9 593 574

M<1itama 897.00ha 825.00ha 30,000 24.000 4 416 398

Asokoro 3.050.00ha 958.00ha 35,000 26.000 6 469 443

Total 4.342.00ha 4.039.00ha 124.100 150.000 33 3,695 3.450

Source: Ago (1984. 1987. FCDA Repo rt (1986a), P.9

102 This is obviously a lapse that could be effectively eliminated in the next phase

of development if careful planning and site investigations are made. Instead of

allocating land to prescribed number of houses, an alternative process could be an articulation of the number, type and location of residential units and the matching of

land to these since land, as the master plan observed, although an inflexible cost of residential construction, is uniquely less problematic owing to the federal ownership of the land in the federal capital city and the absence of current users.

5.2.2 The Population to be housed as envisaged by Master Plan over Time

The demand of a house is a derived demand. People demand for housing because of the many services houses provide not just for housing sake. This is why it is imperative to know the number of people to be housed over time, their composition and characteristics and even their cultural traits. These are vital for meaningful short and long term planning for the eliciting housing satisfaction from the eventual beneficiaries of such housing units. The nature and magnitude of housing problems which a particular community has is, to a large extent, a function of the nature of the population dynamics of that community.

The master plan prescribes a target population of 1,642, 100 by the year 2000 and an ultimate projected population of 3.20 million at full development after which further population expansion are to be accommodated at the satellite towns. The approximately 1.6 million people projection was based on the assumed household size of 5.89 (or 6 people) and thus a total 278,400 households and a residential density of about 180-200 people per hectare. At inauguration in 1986, a permanent population of 150,000 was expected to be in residence by the master plan.

103 Certain basic assumptions from which the above population figures were derived were made. Those, which relate mainly to employment projections, influenced the master planners population projections and consequently the estimates of the type, number and location of housing units (Agboola, T. , 1990: 10). Such assumptions relate to the number of local government personnel , number of police, the mil itary, state liaison officers and members of the diplomatic corps.

Perhaps the most significant for our present purpose is the projected incremental growth of the new fe deral capital city between 1981 and the year 2000

as shown in Table 5 . 2 .

104 Table 5.2: Incremental Growth of the Federal Capital, 1981-2000

l 98 l l 986 1990 1995 ::woo

1. Pub I ic Sector:

Federal Civil Service 500 11,30 0 30, 100 45,600 60,300

Federal Corporation 8,800 33,600 55,700 65 ,000 City Administration & Police I ,000 6,100 14,600 21 ,900 Military 500 3,000 5,600 9, 100 12,500 State Government Liaison 1,800 3,000 5,800 7,600 International/ Diplomatic Corps 700 3,000 4,000 4,000 Sub-total 1 ,000 26,600 81,400 134,800 171,3 00 2. lndustrial Sector:

Manufacturing 3,600 6,500 22,200 43,700 Construction 25, 000 40,500 40,500 40,500 40,500 Sub-total 25,000 44, 100 47,000 62,700 84,200 3. Services Sector:

Transport and Communications 1 ,500 4,300 11,400 16,300 24,000 Wholesale/Retail Trade 3,000 12,000 28,300 53,500 88,300 Finance, Insurance

Rental Estate 3,600 8,200 21,300 28,900 Services, Other 8,200 21,000 59, 180 100,650 Sub-Total 4,500 28, 100 68,900 150,200 241,050

Total Formal Employment 30,500 98,800 197,300 347,78019 7,350 Informal Employment 3) 200 11,100 110,380 233,600 361,00 Total Labour Force 33,700 109,900 315 ,080 583,380 853,350 Total population 858 708 658 588 528

*TOTAL POPULATION 39,050 157,759 485,660 1 ,000,800 1,642,100

Note: Percentages may not add to indicate total, due to rounding errors.

Source: Abuja Master Plan (1979) p. 60.

105 For example, by 1990, the federal capital city should have an estimated

population of 485,600 distributed according to vanous employment categories.

Subsequent analysis highlights the faulty basis of the assumptions, the under­

estimation of the political turbulence in Nigeria, the down turn in the economy and

the consequences of these on housing supply. More importantly, the relevance of these projections for housing supply and demand which are the main determinants of housing delivery system are examined subsequently.

5.2. 3 Public Housing and Private Initiatives

The master plan has not been categorical about the number and or types of units to be built over a specified period of time. What is apparent from the provisions of the master plan are the matching of house types to different categories of officers and the categories of officers and the categorization of houses into upper,

middle and lower income dwelling units within these different house types. ·

106 Table 5.3: Principal Types of Dwelling Units and Land Use Intensity

SIN Housing Type Suh-Type Plot Area Per Built Space Spatial Household Pc:r Standard or Household Land Use Intensity (Range)

I Detached/Semi A. Large l,OOOM2 L20-160M2 Between 1-35 Detached 8. Medium l00-800M2 70 -100M2 cl.u/ha for C. Small 75 - 100 30 - 60 detached to l 00- 133 cl.u/ha for semi- detached.

II Serviced Land A. Large l,OOOM2 B. Medium 400

156-286 [JI Flats A. Large 80M2 100M2 cl.u/ha B. Medium 60-80 84-100 C. Small 35-60 47-70

IV Multi Family A.2-3 Family 120-150* 40-75 42-83 cl.u/ha B. 4 Family 180* 60-80 C. Transitional 240* 60-80

Table 5.3 shows the house types, variants of each type, the plot area per household, built up spaces and for whom those houses are for essentially. The land use density of each type has also been gleaned from the land use section of the plan.

Thus, a wide range of housing types and locations at varying densities were proposed. Four main housing types-the single family detached and semi-detached, service land, flats and multi-family housing were proposed. These were to be provided by the government (though public agencies) and private developers.

107 5. 3 Visitation into Housing Development in Abuja

Tn order to provide a thorough understanding and comparative basis for the

nature, extent, and limitations in the execution or implementation of the housing

elements of the master plan, it is necessary to disaggregate the various evaluating

criteria into (or by) its residential districts. Since efforts have been concentrated on

phase I of the plan, appraisal is also I imited to this phase and other satellite towns that

service the phase.

5. 3. 1 Residential Districts in Phase I

There are six planned residential districts in this phase. These are Garki I,

Garki II, Wuse I, Wuse II, Maitama and Asokoro Districts (see Fig. 6). It should

be added that while the first four districts are of mixed high and medium densities,

Asokoro and Maitama districts are purely of low residential densities (Ago, S.,

1984:28). Each district is broken into smaller neighbourhoods presently called Areas.

Each district is served by a district centre, and each neighbourhood by a

neighbourhood centre. Both types of centres are designed for the distribution of goods and services to satisfy the residents. Each neighbourhood centre is designed to provide such facilities as a primary school, corner shops, a dispensary or clinic, a postal agency, a community hall, etc.

108 Fig: 6

. .r-- """( ·,,_ ; . . I ...... · �·· �...... � · · . . ., ...... / · �- '· :·, . I . . . I , °>l'."'- l -· ' ' ' . � ...... · ,\ '·" //" . I'.\ \ ·. · I. I•. 1 •. ' /: . . , .;.\ I ; .. '' ·. " :r ·. .- ·:' ' '; . · : � "\ ,,! • '' � I '•� • • • • : I C ' Lt) : , 1 : � , :': •• \ , / . .. /·, · �tah'�'.i11\str�': ·!; ;· '"/ ' . : . ·� : . /' .. ..� .

: .· ;':•,/' ·_; ..· . . , ·� . (.. ,. ·· . . _:. '.. .:w�·�§; ·_ ,./. . . . \· . . . . . ·, ·f·· :���i'�:l' \ " '\ . . . . ' . ! I . , , CITY •" . I , : ,: , CENTR-E' i � t 'J I !; l. II .. :1 L

:- / !.

"· ......

' ;

I c '1 A neighbourhood is allotted a target population of between 4,000 and 5 ,000.

This figure is considered to be a good threshold for sustaining its centre facilities.

This prescription also holds for each district - the population of which depends on the

number of neighbourhoods within it. Each district centre is provided with such

facilities as a health centre, a secondary school, a market shopping centre, pol ice and

fire station and a post office. The details of the targeted population by the master

plan and actually realistic population by FCDA per district is shown in Table 5.1.

As appraisal of the housing situation even in Phase I would be incomplete

without the inclusion of the now unplanned satellite settlements of Garki, Kubwa,

Maitama villages, the Julius Berger Construction camps, the Nyanya labour camp and

the Karu new towns (Agboola, T., 1990:16). This is more so since the junior and

middle level staff of many federal ministries and parastatals are allocated residential

units in the last two areas and they commute daily to the Federal Capital City. Space

does not permit the discussion of these two areas in detail now. Suffice it to note that

the two settlements, Karu and Nyanya are satellite towns (about 16krn from the

federal capital city) and built in intentionally as dormitory towns by the FCDA as a

means of decongesting the population of the federal capital city.

5.3. 2 Appraisal Strategy

Six evaluation criteria have been evolved to assess the extent to which the

execution of the Abuja master plan have followed the housing provisions of the plan.

These include:

1) The number of housing units completed 111 relation to the master plan requirements;

110 2) The amendments to and planning implications of the amendments made to the plan with reference to housing provisions;

3) The relevance of the design of the completed and occupied housing units:

4) The perceived quality of completed units by occupiers of units;

5) The level of functionality of the residential districts; and

6) The contribution of the private sector to the housing delivery system (Agboola, T. , 1990: 18).

5.3. 3 Achievements in Housing Provision

As we have stated earlier, the master plan made provision for a population of

184 ,000 in the six residential districts of phase I and this was deemed to be achieved

in 1986. However, during implementation, this population was found to be unreal istic. This is because the plan based its projection on both developable and undevelopable lands (which amounted to 4,342.00 ha) in the districts. Thus, during implementation, FCDA found that a total of 303.00 hectares of land were unsuitable for residential development. This resulted form the reductio of the master plan's land area to 4,039.00ha (see Table 5.1). The 303.00 hectares unsuitable for residential development had to be allotted for other uses, which essentially were open spaces and recreation. This led to the reduction of the master plan residential plots from 3,450.

Furthermore, because the federal governmenthad initially decided in 1982 that the first phase of the movement of some federal ministries from Lagos to Abuja would commence in 1986, FCDA had to plan for a targeted population of 150,000 in all six residential districts for that same year, 1986. This figure was also expected to be accommodated in 25,000 dwelling units. The population projection was based on a household size of six persons! But in terms of actual implementation, the

111 number of dwelling units completed was far from the FCDA targeted 25,000 dwelling units .

By April 1988 (about 1-and-half year after the 1986 target) only 14,00 housing units of different types had been completed by FCDA in the federal capital city. This shows an addition of 1,442 housing units when compared with the figure (12,558 units) for 1987. The 14,000 units comprised 6,878 housing units in the six residential districts in Phase I, 6,355 room ing units at Nyanya labour camp and 767 units at

Karu new town. Even then, the completed 24,000 housing units were far behind the target units. This shows a difference of about 11,000 units as at April, 1988.

However, when this figure (14,000 units) is compared with the housing units

(43) completed by the private builders in April, 1988 as explained below, it shows that about 99,00 per cent of the housing units in the federal capital city has been provided by the public sector through the FCDA.

Perhaps a professional would be looking at the issue of population dynamics, the nature of housing shortage is best understood in relation to the population to be served.

112 Table 5.4 shows this explicitly.

Table 5.4: Yearly Housing Shortage in the FCC (1982-1987)

Year Tota I Population Total No. of Annual population Aiumal Annual (a) completed increa se (c) increase in Housing dwelling units (b) completed shortage dwelling units (c-d) (ct)

1982 5,840 2,432 - - -

1983 10,430 3, 142 4,590 710 1,004

1984 18,000 5,724 7,570 2,582 828

1985 25,500 6,971 7,500 1,247 1,529

1986 39,847 9,348 14,347 2,377 3,943

1987 48,650 12.596 8,803 3,248 3,617

Source: Actopt cct from Olanivan, 1988.

From the above table, it could be seen that in 1983, there was a quantitative shortage of 1,004 dwelling units. The situation was worse in 1986 with a shortage of 3,943 dwelling units. Although there was a significant reduction in 1987 (when compared to the 1986 figure) to 3,617 dwelling units, there was still no match between the population figure and dwelling units that year. The problem of quantitative housing shortage is further compounded by the fact that the completed housing units were occupied mainly by civil servants of FCDA and other federal ministries and parastatals (Agboola, T. , 1990:). Even then, not all the civil servants could secure accommodation.

5.3.4 Total Number of Houses Completed Between 1988 and 1996

Between 1988 and 1996, only modest addition have been made to the housing stock. According to the information available from the Estate and Public Works

Department of the FCDA, a little less than a thousand units have been added. This

113 is shown in a comprehensive table (Table 5.5), in which the results of a recent

housing survey by the Planning, Research and Statistics Division of the FCDA is combmed with data supplied by the Public Works Department for Phase I housing development. The table shows the total number of housing units completed and the on-going projects.

Table 5.5: Details of Completed and On-going Housing Projects in all Districts of the FCT.

S/No. FCT No. of No. of Total Completed Uncompleted (a+c) - (c) Houses (a) Bui1ding (b)

1. Garki 4,040 236 4,284

2. Wuse 2,024 709 2,733

3. Maitama 14 94 108

4. Asokoro 22 181 203

5. Nyanya 6,687 342 7,029

6. Karu 1,10 8 76 1, 184

7. Bwari/Ushafa 130 50 189

8. Karshi 42 174 216

9. Gwarimpa 150 68 218

10. Kubwa Low Cost 198 715 913

11. Kubwa Resettlement 555 555

12. Usu ma 186

Sub-total 14,0 18 1 7 8 1 8

114 ABAJI LGA

I. Abaji 82 85 167 I Yaba 46 73 119

Total

GWAGWALADA LGA

1. Gwagwalada 693 71 764 2. Giri 165 165 3. Kwali 110 99 209 Sub-Total 968 170 1, 130

KUJE LGA

1. Kuje 106 102 208 2. Rubochi 42 43 85 Sub - Total 148 145 293

Source: Field Survey Conducted in June 1996.

A breakdowu of these units in to house types by districts is presented in Table

6, while the locations of on-going projects and for those which contracts have been

awarded by districts and house type as at January 31st 1990 are shown in tables 7 and

8 (Figures in Tables 5,6 and 7 may not tally due to their diffe rent sources). Since

th is work also covers the whole of the FCT, Table 5 also shows the number of completed and uncompleted units in the then three other Area Councils of the FCT.

Unfortunately, available data do not allow for comparability over time.

A critical look at the housing situation in the then four Area Councils shows that the federal capital city (i.e Abuja municipality) has over 90 % of all the housing units and also of the occupants, followed by Gwagwalada. The effect of this on the city especially in the light of existing housing shortages are obvious.

115 [t could be observed that even in l990, total housing units 111 the federal

capital city may not be more than 15,000 about 10,000 units short of what it ought

to have been in 1986 by the master plan provisions. Were free housing market

allowed to operate according to the delivery system, majority of the low income

workers would be without houses. Even now, most of them live outside the federal

capital city and where they live are fast becoming another "Maroko" or "Ajegunle".

Table 5.6: Completed Housing Units in FCC as at 1st Jan. 1990

District St:tge IBF 11311 21lF 2BF 3BF 3BF 41lF 4BF .IBF .IBll 6BII TOt3l Units Uni ls Room l\oo

Comp- Ill lctocl

Garki llni1s 73.1 38.1 1142 480 .192 133 210 102 4116 Com� leled

\Vuse -do- 488 .186 27.1 384 214 .14 109 2126

Asokoro/ -do- 22 25 II .18 £'\lailama

Nyanya -d- .1767 1656 6923

Kam -do- 200 64 612 96 184 47 1129

Kubwa -do- .136 102 638 Low Cost

Kubwa -do· Nil Reset- tlement

Total No. 6003 16.16 1223 38.1 2084 147 167 .Ill 274 283 II 12 14.99 Units or Units 2 Complete d

Source: Public Works De12artment, FCDA. June 1990, Q.40.

116 Table 5.7: On-Going Housing Units in FCC as at 31st January, 1990

Dis1ricl Stage I Room 2Room IBI' 1811 2BF 2BF 3BI' 3BF 4BI' 41lF .IBF .I BH 6JlH Total ll11i1s l'nits

c·,·mrktcd

G:irki Fnits 20 40 60 Completed

\\fuse -do- 120 120 II 80 116 32 463

Asol.'.orol -do- 44 113 39 196 �\llaiW.llKI

Nyanya -d- NIL

Kani -do-

Kubwa -do- 200 n 278 Low Co:-1

Kubwa ·dO· 209 209 136 .1.14 Reset- llcmtnt

Total No. 200 Nil 288 Nil 88 420 78 330 375 Nil 39 Nil 1.818 or Units Uni1s Completed

NOTE: KUBWA LOW COST HOUSING PHASE 11 - 1,300 units of both 1 room and 2BR units under construction.

Source: Public Works Department. FCDA. June 1990. P.41.

Table 5.8: Information on Housing in All Districts (Units Awarded)

District Stage I Room 2Roo !Ill' lllll 2BF 2BF 3BF 3BF 4llF 4BF .llJF .IBl-I 6BH Total Units llnits Ill Completed

Garki Units 73.\ 385 1472 489 604 193 226 102 4.310 Co1npleted

\Vusc -do- 922 780 400 1196 290 518 21.1 6 4.387

Asokoro/ -do- 66 286 .18 48 Mai Lama

Nyanya -d- 5267 1656 6.923

Kam -do- 286 64 664 88 109 67 6 1.58

Kubwa Low -do- 209 209 136 .\5 Ccn-1

Kubwa -do- 72 18.I 913

Reset- llemeut

Total No. 6105 1656 1657 385 2382 1947 1848 801 84 886 .12 12 18• .14.I Units or tin.its Source

Source: Public Works Department. FCDA. June 1990. P.42.

117 5.3. 5 Amendments to the Master Plan with Particular Reference to Housing Provisions

ln June 1982, because of the pressure of the intended commencement of

movement of six federal ministries from Lagos to Abuja, the necessity arose to

provide housing units for civilian ministers, top civil servants and members of the

then National Assembly. Hitherto, there was no provision made for such category

of houses in Garki I and Wuse I. Consequently, FCDA had to award contract, that same year, for building of 700 units of such houses in Asokoro and Maitama districts

(Ago, S., 1984:20). Out of this figure, 74 units of different types had been completed. These comprised 22 units of 2-bedroorn flat at Asokoro district; 10 units of 4-BH, 9 units of 5-BH and 33 units of 6-BH all at Maitama districts.

This action of FCDA has been criticised on the ground that the awarding of contract for these units in the two districts contradicted the logistics of the master plan which requires that the provision of infrastructure should proceed any other form of development in any given area of the city. Thus, because infrastructures were not provided in these areas. Initially, it appears the two districts are not part of the federal capital city.

Another action carried out by the FCDA in housing prov1s1on which contradicts the prescription of the master plan is the building of "boys quarters".

These are annexes to the main buildings in most low density areas in most urban areas in Nigeria. The approved master plan provided that these quarters should not be built in the federal capital city. But when FCDA started building residences for the defunct ministers and members of the defunct National Assembly of the Second

Republic, these quarters were built along with the main buildings. The then politicians were of the view that they could not afford to have their domestic servants-

118 cooks. drivers, cleaners, gardeners, etc residing far away from them at Nyanya or

elsewhere. Thus "boys quarters" had to be built at Asokoro and Maitama districts

only excluding the other four residential districts in the city.

5. 3. 6 The Functionality of the Residential Districts

The master plan made provision for residential districts each with its own

population threshold and support facilitate and amenities. The goal is to facilitate

intra and internal neighbourhood in tractions. However, the inadequate provision for

user amenities such as corner shops, recreation centres in majority of the

neighbourhoods has been a source of poor intra-neighbourhood interaction among the

residents (Agboola, T. , 1990 :32). Besides, because majority of the residential

buildings are apartment blocks, especially in Garki I, Garki II and Wuse l districts

(the most populous districts in Phase I), it does not enable most households to interact

much with one another except those whose flats are opposite each other. What is

more, informal activities are not permitted in these areas. The principal (and hence the only) source of inter-neighbourhood interactions is through the grouping of children (from different households and neighbourhoods) for playing football on "their own created football field" from the open spaces within a neighbourhood.

In the Nyanya Labour Camp, because of the high density of residential units coupled with the existence of extensive urban informal sector activities at Nyanya village, many of the residents indicated that they enjoyed I iving there (Agboola, T. ,

1990:33). This is not surprising since the sale of such goods as beer, foodstuff, beverages, etc are freely displayed.

119 -- -- -

Similar situation was also reported in Karu-a twin settlement with Nyanya.

It is apparent therefore that the Nyanya and Karu settlements which are considered

slums have societal cohesion and exhibit the desired neighbourliness which are almost

totally absent in the planned residential districts. The question then is why and what

is responsible and how can the desired neighbourliness be achieved?

5.3.7 Private Sector Contribution to Housing Provision in the Federal Capital City

The private sector house builders could be variously categorised into either

three or five. The initial three could be individual builders, business or corporate

bodies and philanthropic organisation like the Non-Governmental Organisations

(NGOs). The five groupings on the other hand could be merchant builders, builder

investors, on-site builders, land developers and pre-fabricators. It would seem that

the merchant builders and builder investors are like business or corporate bodies,

while individual builders are the on-site builders. Owing to the required threshold

units for profitability in the prefabrication or housing units, only governments do

patronize them in most developing nations. Since the individual or on-side builders

constitute the largest share of the private housing market thus, this section assess the contribution of on-site builders in achieving the housing target for the federal capital city.

Table 5.9 below gives a birds eye view of the contribution of this sector to housing in the federal capital city. It shows the breakdown of the number of completed private individual housing units. However, during a reconnaissance survey, it was found that there are five additional units, bringing to 174 the number of privately built units. When this figure is compared with the 14,000 housing units

120 (of different types) completed by FCDA (public sector) at the same period, it shows

that it is about 0. 30 per cent. In essence, the contribution of the private sector in

housing provision 1s less than 1.00 per cent. Some of these have been abandoned for

a variety of reasons while some are at various stages of completion.

Table 5.9: Private Residential Housing Provision in the Phase I of the Federal Capital City as at 1996

District No. of No. of Units Completed Under Housing Units Construction

Garld I & II 54 71

Wuse I & fl 60 87

Maitam a 40 110

Asokoro 20 20

Total 174 228

Source: Fieldwork Research. Conducted in June 1996

With the above as the balance sheet of the housing sector with respect to

master plan implementation of the housing sector, what issues should the planners of

the next phase concentrate on to avoid ignorantly wasteful action and or inaction in

the city's next phase of physical growth?

5 .4 The Role of the Federal Housing Authority

The Federal Housing Authority (FHA) though not created by Babangida, was established in the 1970s to provide proposals and construct houses. However, as opposed to the previous period when it was funded as a parastatal, it was later

121 entirely transformed into a commercially oriented organisation as from the mid-l 980s.

This new dispensation was a consequence of its:

minimal involvement in the federal housing programme ...and its inability to discharge effectively the functions of providing affordable housing for all income groups in the country due to over-dependence on subventions from the FMW & H; inability to recover outstanding mortgage repayments from the beneficiaries and administrative and financial mismanagement (National Housing Document, February 1991 : 16- 17) .

In the light of the above, the federal government decided to transform the

FHA into a commercial housing institution capable of generating funds and making profit. In this regard, the FHA has established viable housing projects in urban centres like those of Kubwa in Abuja, FESTAC and Ipaja in Lagos, Sharada in Kano and Egbeda in Owerri, among many others.

In terms of performance since the introduction of the Structural Adjustment

Programme (SAP), the FHA has constructed a large number of houses in many urban towns. For instance, in the case of our study area, over 2000 housing units which include two, three and four bedroom bungalows were completed in the Kubwa

Housing Estate. Large number of such houses have already been sold to the general public at economic rates. The source of the fund for the construction of the houses came from World Financial Institutions, regional finance houses and finance houses in Nigeria. In the case of the Kubwa Housing Estate, the sum of N 1.5 million came as loan from the Shelter Afrique Organisation based in East Africa. This estate according to the former General Manager of FHA, Alhaji Yabo Abubakar, "is the largest in Africa" (National Concord, January 19, 1993: 1).

122 However, in spite of the effective performance of the FHA since 1985 to date,

there are serious hazards which have been identified. Of particular significance is the

case of the Kubwa estate where:

lack of originality in the concept of the Kubwa estate, Abuja's largest satellite town has been identified as the main cause of its inefficient infrastructural facilities ...that right from time Kubwa had not been part of the original master plan for the FCT development projects ...the estate came as a contingency measure meant to cushion the accommodation problem which arose at the initial stage of the city's development (National Concord, January 19, 1993: 1).

While this problem is more akin to the Kubwa estate, similar situation obtains

in FESTAC Housing Estate created in mid-1970s by the FHA. Like the FESTAC

case, the Kubwa estate and even Kano and Kaduna projects have assumed important

dimensions, a stage that cannot be neglected . Even worse and more difficult is the

fact that the pressures cannot be sustained as a result of rising costs and the increasing

demands by the occupants for infrastructure.

A close study of the Kubwa estate confirms clearly that there are acute dearth

of basic social amenities, where water supply, electricity, sewage, refuse disposal

systems as well as varied infrastructural facilities are absent. Indeed, a housing estate

is only functional if these essentials of lifeare provided. We cannot state that a house

is complete for occupation unless the essential infrastructural facilities are provided.

In the case of the Kubwa Housing Estate where many agencies are involved, the FHA as our investigation showed had strongly requested the appropriate agencies to

readjust and readapt their infrastructural facilities to the exigencies that have emerged

in terms of lay out, and design in order to accommodate the needs of the estate

(Amdii, l.E.S., 1993: 190) .

123 More revealing issues at some of the FHA housing estates deal with the

question of drainage, sewage and refuse disposal systems. These three issues are

indeed very strategic for a viable estate but as it is the case at the moment, there is

a lot to be done. With respect to the Kubwa estate, the FCT Water Resources

Agency (FCTWRA) in conjunction with the FCDA indeed have to redesign a more

workable piped water system to link the Lower Usuma Dam in order to ensure

adequate supply of water for the residents of the Kubwa estate.

At any rate, the FHA had done a commendable job in using local building

sector. The use of burnt bricks in almost all its recent housing projects across the

country needs to be acknowledged. Furthermore, the utilisation of local inputs for

housing development not only in Kubwa but also the country at large, as a matter of

policy has mobilised a good number of Nigerians to embrace the usage of local

building materials forthe housing constructions. This has saved some resources with

respect to the use of paints for the exterior part of the buildings. What imp! ies is that

the essence of using local inputs has demonstrated the serious focus of government

and the strategic choice of the actual people that are to be housed particularly that

they are owner-occupiers. The strategic focus of the FHA on sourcing and utilisation of local raw materials for housing development is without any doubt a challenge to chart a new course for shifting the housing industry away from excessive dependence on materials and technology from foreign sources into a new concept of national self- reliance. What the new dimension has proved in the case of the FHA is that the:

country's dwindling resources have only brought into sharper focus the critical importance of turning a suitable local building materials if we must collectively continue to increase have availability of shelter to the rapidly growing populace and at affordable price (Abubakar Y., Military Administrator, FHA, 1989:3).

124 The above signifies that given the momentous hazards confronting the housing

industry, it has become inevitable for all hands to begin a programme of down-to-

earth indigenisation of material inputs for housing in order to keep in tune with the

resource endowments available to the country. To a large extent, the FHA has done

this and it should be acknowledged and commended.

Table 5.10: FHA Houses In FCC by 1996

ESTATE HECTRES BUNGALOWS REMARKS

Karu Estate 6.323 25 1 128 4-Bedroom 128 3-Bedroom

Kubwa l & II 37.00 1380 442 Phase I 2-Bedroom Estates 938 Phase II 2-Bedroom

Kubwa Ill - 346 124 2-Bedroom 222 3-Bedroom

I Kubwa IV - 426 - ,1

Maitama 31.95 480 174 2-Bedroom 1',c District 231 3-Bedroom 75 4-Bedroom (i� �

� Asokoro 35.00 181 81 3-Bedroom District 100 4-Bedroom

Source: Field Work Research Conducted in March, 1996

lt is interesting to note that of the 8000 low income houses planned for the

period of 1987 to the year 2000, over 50 per cent have been completed and sold out.

However, it is ironical to acknowledge the fact that the low income earners were

eliminated by the market price mechanisms. According to Edmund Dell, there must

be a rapport between policy pronouncements and executions. The intension of the

125 policy was to house the low income earners and therefore, by implication the lay out plans, designs and cost of the houses were all borne in mind at the preliminary stage.

But as evidence has demonstrated, as was the case in the 1970s, the low income houses were largely bought up by med ium and high income earners, thereby eliminating the target population. The government is aware of the character of the deregulated economy and therefore the operation of the interplay of market forces.

If th is is noted , there I ies the contradiction between the governments focus on affordability and what occurs after houses have been duly completed. Thus seriously speaking, the FHA must work a mechanism of designing real low income housing system in true sense in order to enable low income earners share the droplets from the housing fund. What the foregoing insinuates is that apart from controlling the

2400 planned for medium and high income earners, the low income houses have also to be monopolised by these groups. This calls to question FHA 's objectives and philosophy.

The FHA was appointed the executing agency of the National Housing

Programme (NHP) at inception in 1994. Essentially, the NHP amongst other things has the objectives of:

(i) to increase the stock of housing in the country;

(ii) translate the NHP objectives into reality; and

(iii) establish a permanent housing delivery system.

Under this programme, the FHA has intensified its activities 111 Abuja as demonstrated in its involvement in the development of the fo llowing estates .

(a) Kado r: This estate has since been completed and commissioned with 878 housing units of 3 bedroom bungalows, 3 bedroom low-duplexes, 4 and 5 bedroom semi-detached duplexes.

126 (b) Kado lI: This estate is made up of 124 units of 3 bedroom detached bungalows most of which have been completed and accommodated .

(c) Karu fl: This estate has 204 unit of 3 bedroom detached bungalows. The estate has since been effectively occupied.

(d) Lugbe: This is the largest low and medium income housing estate currently under construction under the NHP. It is made up of about 3012 housing units ranging from one to three bedroom bungalows.

(e) Gwarimpa II: This is a prime estate fa vourably located next to Kado I estate. It is proposed for over 3000 housing units of 8 types with adequate facilities and services. It is an ultimate choice in the high income housing under the N.H.P.

Jn cone I us ion, there is no doubt that the FHA has achieved tremendous

progress in providing mass housing to facilitate the movement to Abuja. These

achievements have been in the areas of:- Provision of decent accommodation in a

good neighbourhood; provision of affordable houses for all income groups;

enhancement of communal living and group security; provision of job opportunities

thus contributing to the national economy; provision of opportunities for the

development of social and recreational facilities in the estates; and ultimately creating

opportunity for uniting Nigerians through Housing.

Nonetheless; there have been a number of factors inhibiting mass housing delivery in the Federal Capital Territory. These factors include land acquisition, finance, infrastructural cost, inadequate skill-labour and technology, building materials, contractual defaults and inflation trends.

The provision of the housing infrastructure has been able to assist tremendously in accommodating quite a large number of civil and public servants who have been relocated from Lagos to Abuja. If this effort was not done in the first place, the influx of people wold have necessitated a chaotic housing delivery system, perhaps that would have been worse than it obtained in Lagos.

127 Be that as it may, it needs to be mentioned that the housing delivery system

seem lopsided. As it tends to favour the middle and the high level classes to the

detriment of the low income group. Indeed the low income group consists of more

than 50 % of the total work force. As such the few houses provided for them in the

Federal Capital's suburbs of Nyanya Karu, Kanno, Gwagwalada etc evidently was

inadequate.

Moreso, the houses are not only illegal but also poorly constructed . In general, water supply, health facilities and refuse disposal facilities are forremoved from such shelters. Usually, these shelters are outcrops of western form of urbanisation. Since the low income groups cannot occupy house in the heart of the urban centres, the only opportunity left forthem is to settle at the peripheries that are hardly organised. It must be noted that housing the low income group in a developing economy like ours constitute a problem more so that demand exceed supply of houses (Amdii, I.E.S., 1993:220). Whatever the situation, however, the problems can not be left unresolved, as intervention either at public or private levels are inevitable.

The environments of the low income group are essentially characterised by slums and squatter settlements in virtually all the locations in the periphery of the

Federal Capital. As earlier mentioned, these include Nyanya, Karu, Gwarinpa, Kado,

Lugbe Karmo, etc. Th is is because what they were able to afford then are those faci Ii ties that the middle income households can afford today (Martin, 1984).

Gentrification, a process through gradual replacement of largely low income houses by middle income households, have not changed the situation over the years even in the urban peripheries. The implication of the degrading conditions of the low income

128 group for the year 2000 is that as the large members of the middle income group

move towards the squatter areas, the low income strata will become more

impoverished since the habitat they inhabit will degrade further to a worse situation.

With the coming of seat of the Federal Government to Abuja, hasty

developments took place. This hasty developments gave birth to the ugly incidences

of tempering with the master plan. Most often than not, all the places designated

"green areas", have been occupied with such caricature structures like kiosks,

business centres, food canteens , petrol stations, and even residential houses in some

instances. These needless to say have affected the original master plan and ultimately

tempered with the aesthetic beauty the Federal Capital City was expected to score.

It must be mentioned that this unwholesome practice needs to be checked as a matter of great urgency before it degenerates beyond redemption.

129 CHAPTER SIX

ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION POLICY IN THE FCT

6. 1 Introduction

As we have already discussed in chapter two, public policy mainly has to do

with the general determination or direction of possible publicly resolved societal

policy cannot be overemphasised because it intrinsically determines how and in what

form resources are shared. The state through public policy measures also shares

responsibilities between the various sectors within the public sector and between the

pub I ic and private sectors. By implication therefore, any decision that has to do with

housing, ecology, pollution, exploitation of resources in order to improve the I iving

standards of people in their environment, among others revolves around the state.

Hence our fo cus here would be the FCT and the environmental protection board , as

it affects the overall sanitation programme of the territory. Equally, the sanitation policy is used as a case study to illustrate the weaknesses in pub! ic policy making against the backdrop of implementation.

6.2 Public Policy and Environmental Sanitation

ln Igwe's opinion, "the main determinants of the quality of the decision made are the skill and the experience of the decision maker, the information available to him at the time of making the decision, the situation or condition in which the decision is being made" (Igwe, B. U.N and Ndekwu, E. , 1983:7). As a matter of factly, there is no doubt that public policy often concentrates on certain aspects of the society to bring about change through a selected line of action. However, the experience of the policy maker, the interests it represents, the covert and overt

130 declaration of intent and how and why such a policy is adopted are very vital. This

has significant impact on what Gold Smith called the "implementation of intent" - that

1s, actions actually undertaken viz-a-vis the suspect of society to be affected in

pursuance of the choices and the declaration (Gold Smith, M., 1980:23). What is

therefore important for any pubI ic policy, is the attempt to define an objective and

achieve a given particular result. Beyond this any serious policy must work out the

modality on how the result is to be achieved . In essence therefore, any policy that

fails to produce a clear statement of intent and expected consequences or outcomes

of a pol icy is not worth its salt.

Edmund Dell re-echoed this particular position when he argued that the theory

of what the state says and does must meet with criteria: that the action will be in the

public interest and that someone must be responsible (Dell, E., 1973: 101). [f the

state so represents the "phenomenon of social consequences, the policies so pursued

should not consistently favour a particular group" (Amdii, I.E.S., 1984:78). If the

state receives inputs and pressures from all sectors of the society, the onus lies on the state to reflect the heterogenous interest especially with regards to what, when, and how policies are to be made and who really benefit from the outcomes of such pol icy.

While it can be mentioned that successive governments since 1976 have adopted one form of measure or the other to improve the environmental sanitation through health policies, the policy attention given was inadequate to cope with the outcome of "rapid urbanisation and industrialisation ... some of these problems become more acute and they relate to the mental, social and physical health of the citizens". (World Health Organisation Technical Report, 1952:17). Similarly, in

1983 the Shagari administration introduced the Environmental Control and Protection

131 Agency Bill which died at the official table . Thus it was the prevailing

circumstances in the urban areas which fo rced the government to intervene by t984

particularly that the management of urban waste by fam ilies and communities could

achieve very little.

The Environmental Sanitation Policy launched under the Buhari administration

by decree was an extension of the War Against Indiscipline (WAI). This policy was

organised to improve the urban conditions particularly the sanitation aspect. Each

state government and indeed the FCT was empowered to enact Environmental

Sanitation Edict. The major objective of the policy "was to make specific Provision

regarding environmental sanitation. It was also meant to stop unhealthy practices and

acts injurious to life, health and property (Environmental Sanitation Edict, 1984:5).

The federal government in an attempt to mobilise the state governments to this noble

cause, attached one million naira for competition among the states.

In order to achieve the objectives of this policy, refuse disposal bins were

fixed in some locations along the major roads. Equally, the government provided

refuse disposal vehicles, judiciary courts, police personnel and other allied fa cilities

to assist the implementation of the policy.

The governmentin its attempt to enshrine environmental cleaning culture made

it mandatory for all citizens in the country to clean their houses and immediate environment on the last Saturdays of each month, and that everybody must remain

indoors to make the policy effective. Perhaps, it is important to stress at this point that the agents of environmental hazards are multi-purpose. These include air,

industrial waste, oil pollution, individual as pollutants, water and the rest. The policy by all intents and purposes targeted individual households to be the major actor to

132 recast this social enigma. Therefore, to what extent is the state's perception tenable

given the multi-faceted nature of urban pollution?

6.3 Abuja Environmental Protection Board

Prior to its establishment by the then Minister, Major General Mohammed

Gado Nasko in 1989, there were some palliative measures to curb the growth and

spread of environmental hazards. [ndeed, the demands forpositive and realistic

planning that balances human needs against the potential that the environment has for

meeting them exacerbated, thus environmental problems came into sharp focus as a

priority which must be halted before disastrous health and irreversible environmental

degradation occurs. Hence, the Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB) was

established in 1989 to ensure a healthy and conducive environment of the Federal

Capital Territory.

According to the AEPB decree No. 10 of 1997, it has the fo llowing aims and

objectives:

(a) to secure a quality environment adequate for the health and well being of residents of the Federal Capital Territory;

(b) to conserve and use the environment and its natural resources for the benefit of the territory;

(c) to minimise the impact of physical development on the ecosystems of the Federal Capital Territory;

(d) to raise pub! ic awareness and promote understanding of essential I inkages between the environment and development within the Territory; and

(e) to co-operate with the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) and other States Environmental Protection Agencies to achieve effective prevention of abatement of trans-boundary movement of waste.

133 In order to achieve these aims and objectives, the AEPB performs the

following functions:

(a) the control and removal of liquid and solid wastes m the Federal Capital Territory;

(b) the control of :-

(i) industrial waste, borrow pits and quarry sites and particularly to direct construction companies and individuals to refill borrow pits excavated and ensure that such places are replanted to avoid soil erosion;

(ii) vector pests, rodents and reptiles;

(iii) the quality of portable water, waste water-effluent and discharges;

(iv) bush burning, poaching and indiscriminate felling of trees ;

(v) the use of septic tanks and sewage maintenance;

(vi) stray and wandering animals;

(vii) public conveniences and cemeteries.

(viii) the use of residential areas for prohibited purposes; and

(ix) walking or driving on prohibited areas, and

(c) doing such other things as are necessary or expedient for the purpose of enhancing a healthy environment within the Territory.

6.4 Waste Management and Sanitation

Refuse is the collective name for all the component parts of solid wastes both domestic and industrial which may be found in human environment. The components may be grouped under the following; garbage, rubbish, ashes and dust and dead animals. The proportion of the different components in refuse of a particular community varies according to standard of living, custom, the food habit, climatic conditions (Oluwande, P.A., 1983:1 56). Even within any community, the quantity

134 and to certain extent, the quality of refuse vary with days of the week, with weeks

of months, months of the seasons and with seasons of the year. Therefore, for

efficient refuse collection and disposal, it is important to be familiar with these

variations. The quantity of refuse produced at weekends is often more than that of

other days of the weeks. This is because more people go for shopping at weekends

than at ordinary days. In the peripheries like Nyanya, Karu, Karshi, Idu, Gwarinpa

etc, where certain market days are held on certain days of the week, the quantity and

quality of refuse in such places vary with the market days. But in the highbrow areas

of Maitama, Wuse, Asokoro and Garki, where salaries and wages are paid in certain

weeks of the months, the quantity of refuse produced on such salary weeks has been

found to be more than other weeks. Equally, the types of food items being harvested

in a particular month or season are often reflected in the quantity and quality of

refuse. This is especially true in the entire Federal Capital Territory when corn 1s

being harvested.

Table 6.1: Composition of Refuse from 3 Social Class Areas within the FCT

Mean % By Weight

Components Maita ma Garki Nyanya

Leaves 13.2 33.7 81.3

Paper 12.6 11.3 2.5

Garbage 65.3 41.6 8.2

Tin 4.6 6.2 3.5

Gla�s 2.1 2.5 0.0

Rag 1.6 3.4 4.3

Dust 0.6 1.3 0.2

Density 0.256 Kg/Litre 0.28 Kg/Litre 0.296 Kg/Litre

Moisture Content 64. 8% 61.4% 49.7%

Source: Fieldwork Research - September, 1996.

135 It can be observed from the above table that in the periphery area of Nyanya,

where majority of people of various culture reside, exhibit local habits and more than

803 of the refuse by weight are leaves. In the middle class area of Gark1, where the

people are literate working class, the refuse contains about 303 leaves and 40 3

garbage. While in the highbrow area of Maitama, the bulk of the refuse by weight

is garbage.

The Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB) has equipment and other

facilities which are used in collecting refuse from time to time. Such equipment

include compacting trucks, street sweeping household and communal bins, landfill

compactors and sanitary landfill site for waster management treatment and disposal .

The refuse vehicles drive to the houses and the dustbins are emptied into the

collection in Garki, Wuse, Maitama, Asokoro, Gwarinpa and Jabi districts has its

disposal site at Karmo landfill site. Nyanya and Karu areas have Jikoyi landfill site.

While Karshi - Orozo has Karshi landfill site and Gwagwalada - Kwali have theirs at

Gwagwalada landfill site. It needs being mentioned that these landfill approach is adopted forthe treatments and disposal of social waste in the areas mentioned above.

In addition, street sweeping using both manual and mechanical means to sweep the major roads in the capital city daily to maintain a clean environment is regularly.

6. 5 Achievements

The Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB) has recorded some progress through the Department of Public Health in the following ways:-

136 (i) House-to-house inspection and appointment of unit/block leaders for high-rise

buildings.

(11) Over 8000 dwelling umts were fumigated including schools, residences,

hospitals and offices.

(iii) Curtailment of nuisance through impounding of stray animals like goats and

cows.

(iv) Drastic reduction of street trading and hawking in streets and neighbourhood

centres.

(v) Formulation of School Environmental Clubs in over 17 schools and colleges

within the Federal Capital Territory.

(vi) The Board in collaboration with the Development Control of the Federal

Capital Development Authority controlled illegal structures especially within

the Federal Capital City.

(vii) Policing the environment to ensure that the Federal Capital Territory residents

complied with the environmental regulations.

It is important to mention that inspection is usually carried out and defaulters are prosecuted by the Legal Unit. Similarly, mobile court sitting are organised randomly and regularly to handle demanding situations. It also received complaints from members of the public 011 observed nuisances and embarked 011 fol low-up actions.

137 6.6 Re-aligning Policy Objectives with Implementation

Evidence has shown that the "implementation of basic needs strategy may not

necessarily lead to equity or satisfaction in human needs in the society" (Salau, A.T. ,

1983: 144). Therefore the achievements of the AEPB has been marred by the inherent

weaknesses and contradictions enshrined in the policy itself. As we have already

maintained, unless there is a close relationship between policy objectives and

implementation, such a given pol icy is not worth its salt.

While it can be argued that government intervention to nnprove the

environment and the ecology of our urban areas is healthy, it is quite evident that the

infrastructure set up to translate the objectives into realities fel l far short of

expectation. The Board has more or less being a toothless bull dog. Seemingly,

refuse bins, vehicles etc were in short supply. One can therefore posit that either the

government was paying a lip service or it was overtly organised as an elitist

programme to serve the interest of the better classed urban dwellers in Garki, Wuse,

Asokoro and Maitama. The mere fact that the objectives could not be translated into

reality goes further to contradict government intention.

Clearly, the sectoral impact of the policy in terms of spatial location of the

equipment and services rendered respectively should be noted. Evidence available

shows that although refuse bins, vehicles and other facilities were provided by the

Board to assist in improving the environment, the beneficiaries were essentially those

living the Federal Capital City to the detriment of the urban marginal or ghettoes like

Nyanya, Gwagwa and the rest.

Equally, the contradiction between the state and individual roles needs some surgical operation. The decree tended to emphasise the individual or citizen's role.

138 This is proper if the state is to achieve its objectives. But the corrollary of this

contention is that there has been the tendency on the part of the state to undermine

its role (Amdi1, I.E.S., 1993:273). The environmental hazards that now characterise

the urban conurbations today is beyond the resources of the individuals. Tile effort

of the individual may be more fe lt within the household but the large environmental

problem has an external source traced to water or wind erosion and strong pollutants.

Individuals have little resources to maintain sewage or drainage. The resources so

far invested by the Board has been no doubt unimpressive. The government cannot

expect individuals or groups to satisfactorily clear slums or re-allocate land as a

means of solving slum problems.

The insipid ritualization of the cleaning process appears healthy, but the government itself has not been able to match rituazation at the last Saturday of the month with actions. The prevention of people from going out between 7:00 - 10:00 a. m on such days by policing the streets and the use of "on the spot court" is by no means an adequate measure to instil culture of environmental cleanliness into the society. It is believed that although some house-holds lag behind in general cleanliness, on the average each household often keeps its house clean. Th is culture of maintenance has to do with wider socio-economic hazards which contribute to the present day low commitment of people. Some people leave early for their farm work on Saturdays. Even when at home, lots of people remain unconcerned about this ritual . Thus, it has become necessary for the government to reconsider this state in order to motivate and change the diminishing attitude of many Nigerians toward this programme.

139 In conclusion, the refuse, the maJor concern of this study has been an examination of the role of the state in making public pol icies. We also examined the relat10nsh1p between policy objectives and 1mplementat1on. The findings clearly revealed that there was hardly any relationship between what the state says and what it does in the words of Edmund Dell.

140 CHAPTER SEVEN

THE POLITICS OF RESETTLEMENT AND COMPENSATION

7 .1 Synopsis

One of the thorny issues antecedent to capital relocation in Nigeria is the

problem of resettlement and compensation to the displaced communities. Fair play

demands that the inhabitants whose land had been acquired for the development of the

new capital city be justly compensated and resettled. Indeed, it is often to lessen the

hardship of such movement of affected communities that the authorities concerned

usually deem it necessary to put in place resettlement schemes.

However, since the promulgation of the enabling Decree that gave legal cover

to the creation of the new federal capital in 1976, the issue of resettlement and

compensation to the natural inhabitants of the affected areas had continued to be

unresolved. Thus, as would be expected, most of the affected communities had at one time or the other, either directly or indirectly unhappily expressed their

indignation against the unjust acquisition of their God-given land.

It could be recalled that at inception the initial conception was to relocate all the affected inhabitants elsewhere outside the city. It is the inability of government to religiously execute the resettlement and compensation programme that have left so many as hang on with utter disregard to their plight. It should be noted that consequent upon the seizure of their land, most of the people were forced to migrate further into the hinterland in search of fertile and cultivable land. In the process, they were separated from their ancestral kith and kins while searching forfertile land for their agricultural occupation. Today, the displaced communities are widely dispersed within Abuja and neighbouring states like refugees. The theme of this

141 chapter is to describe, compare and analyse similar resettlement schemes in some

African countries to enable us draw analogy with the resettlement schemes of the

Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. Accordingly, effort would be made to critically

review the implementation of resettlement of FCT, Abuja.

7.2 The Evolution of Resettlement Schemes

It is pertinent to acknowledge that while resettlement is a topical issue in

capital relocation, even though world wide, this area suffers a great dearth of

literature. In his works, "Resettlement Programmes in Africa", Nicholls (1955)

observed that studies on this subject attained prominence noting that such schemes attracts huge resources. In resettlement, the resources often referred to include land,

labour, technical and administrative expertise. Resettlement programmes have been

implemented in a number of African countries such as Zambia, Uganda, Kenya,

Sudan, Ghana and Nigeria among others.

Resettlement and settlement as concepts are most often used interchangeably.

In his works, Chambers (1969) maintained that:

whether populations have been displaced by dam waters, by political disturbances, by over-population or by disease, or whether potential settlers consist of migrant labourers or urban unemployed, resettlement involving a high degree of self help and limited officials assistance have generally succeeded in linking people and land in relationships which are stable and which do not give rise to further problems (1969:250-25 1).

The difference between the two is that while settlement entails some kind of selective approach in recruitment of individuals for rehabilitation, resettlement on the other hand involves rehabilitation of whole culture. It is therefore, relevant to make a distinction between migrant labourers or the unemployed who for one reason or the

142 other migrate from one place to the other and those who had to be resettled due to

reasons of acquisition of their natural place of habitat for purpose of human

development. We do know for instance that migrant labourers mostly do possess

specific characteristics of age, education, sex etc that make it convenient and possible

for successful adjustment to the new found environment. Typical examples of this

sort of settlements that provides good examples of rehabilitation of individuals and

their families were the Western Nigeria farm settlement and the rehabilitation

programme of the depressed coal mining community. In contrast, the rehabilitation

of the Terna fishermen in Ghana is an example of resettlement since it affected the

entire community with their cultural heritage. Butcher and Whiteman (1975) had

clearly buttressed the above when they recounted that,

when in 1952 it was decided to build a new port and harbour at Terna, the problem arose of the future of a small fishing village lying on the part of the chosen port site. On being approached by government officials the people of Terna declared that if they had to move, they wanted as far as possible to retain their traditional culture, social organization and means of livelihood.

What we can infer from the above is that in the case of settlement it involves a high degree of self-help and possibly little assistance from the government. On the other hand, resettlement is seen to be induced or motivated from outside essentially by those in authority or the government as the case may be. According to Umar (1993)

The fundamental difference between resettlement and settlement is that the former seeks to evacuate socio­ cu 1 tural entities rather than isolated individuals. And those individuals evacuated are rehabilitated in the new environment in order to make necessary adjustment by modifying the new atmosphere to accommodate their traditional ways of life.

143 The above often calls for substantial assistance from the government in order to ease

the adj ustment of the affected people. ft is noteworthy to state herewith that the

administration of resettlement policies varies from one country to another taking into

cognisance the prominent role tradition, culture, socio-economic as well as political

system plays.

f n view of different sets of circumstances , settlement schemes in Africa

assumes a diverse position. Nonetheless, certain basic elements and trends within

their background and origins are to some degree common to all. The most important

of these elements are the physical environment, people, government and indeed the

process of change in which these elements are involved. It is also pertinent to note

that the pattern of settlement in traditional setting African is usually nucleated with

land being traditionally vested in the community. The fam ily is thus regarded as the basic economic unit.

7 .3 Early Resett]ement Schemes in Africa

African history is replete with population movement tbc.t ;-.i:,-..�cs.s itated resettlement schemes. In 1906, along the Ugandan coast of Lake Victoria, there was a massive movement of population on humanitarian grounds to evacuate those areas infected with disease like sleeping sickness. Similar movement took place in Zambezi in 1913, in Azande-Southern Sudan in 1920. In the same vein, movement of population for political reasons took place in Kenya for the reasons of establishing

European settlements and sometimes purposely to separate tribes into diffe rent areas

(Scudder, R., 1965). Thus, resettlement could be induced or embarked upon to save population from impenalizing natural calamities such as acute soil erosion, earthquake

144

• or even flood like the fa mous Ogunpa flood that submerged settlements along the

Ogunpa river bank in fbadan, Nigeria. f n such instances, spirited efforts were often

made even in situation of scarce resources to move and resettle the affected

population on a more viable ground that would guarantee their collective survival.

Scudder has further pointed out that resettlement scheme could be necessitated due

to ecological imbalances and in such circumstances, they are designed to attract or

move people from densely populated geographical location to unoccupied or sparsely populated land in order to lessen pressure on land use. Instances of such resettlement schemes were the Shendam resettlement scheme in of Nigeria, the Kigzi resettlement scheme in Uganda, the Makueni settlement in Kenya and the Sukumaland

Development Scheme in Tanzania (Scudder, R., 1965 : 180).

However, in contrast, unlike the resettlement programme of the FCT, Abuja, colonial resettlement schemes were simply in form of assistance to migrants with the minimum provision of services without any appreciable change in their traditional farming. Indeed, government mostly concern itself with the provision of services such as water supplies, roads and bush clearance while the people themselves were often expected to supplement with self-help.

Resettlement arising out of over-population differed among countries ostensibl.y due to variations in their demographic and political circumstances. However, in countries like Nigeria, Uganda and Tanzania, there are abundance of fertile land and therefore, obstacles to settlements are very minimal. Tn some countries such as

Kenya, European settlement and occupation greatly affected the size of land available for the use of native Africans.

145 The establishment or irrigation settlements was another negative way of

responding to the problem of over-population by the colonialists in some part of

Africa example is Kenya - especially between 1953-1956. For instance, the

resettlement scheme of Mwea-Teberer designed for political stabilization was intended

to provide settlement for the displaced Kikuyu considered then as security and

political danger.

Settlement schemes could also derive from ideological belief. President

Nyerere (I962) of Tanzania once stated that,

before we can bring any of the benefits of modern development to the farmers of Tanganyika, the very first step is to make it possible to start living in village communities(l962:7).

Thus, toeing the above ideological line, the Tanzania conception of African socialism

and Ujama greatly emphasized on communal activities and peasant cooperation. In

Kenya, however, because of the land shortage among the Kikuyu and Luo as a result of European settlement and occupation, approach to settlement was inclined more towards individualism with family autonomy as against communal cooperation.

Garry Thomas (1967) in his studies did discover that the post-independence approach to settlement schemes in Zambia was varied and cautious. While in some other African countries, the purpose of the schemes were related to national problems. For instance, the belief of over-crowding, organization of scattered population and job opportunities for the unemployed formed the basis of settlement schemes in Zambia. Thomas (1967) saw Zambia as being concerned more on how to turn the rural sector into becoming attractive and economically viable.

From the above brief analysis, regarding factorsthat often induces resettlement schemes in Africa, it does seemed that the genesis of resettlement schemes in Africa

146 are country specific. This is because it is evidently clear from the above that issues

or problems that often call for organised settlements programmes diffe red from one

country to another.

7.4 Resettlement and the Issues of Housing Families

Reynolds (1963) had observed that majority of families usually took up new addresses not far away from their previous ones. In a study, he carried out on the effect of relocation of some families in Boston (USA), he pointed out that 3,300 persons left the city of Boston due to the West End renewal project; of these 2,800 settled in other parts of the metropolitan area wh ile 500 left Boston metropolitan area altogether.

In a similar study, Hartman (1974) maintained that large scale relocation of families and individuals probably arising from the construction of highways and urban renewal poses some basic questions of social importance essentially on how relocation affects the family's ability to meet the society's minimum standards for quality and quantity of living space and the extent to which the familyfulfils its needs and desires in terms of housing and neighbourhood characteristics and convenience to employment, community facilities, family and friends.

Some other studies have equally shown that environmental considerations were not often taken into account in the assignment and evaluation of relocation of dwellings. Though there is no acceptable straight-j acket kind of definition of what constitute a "suitable living environment". Fried (1964) in his works, Resettlement or Displacement, observed that the delirious effects of the uprooting experience, the loss of familiar places and persons and the accompanying difficulties of adaptation to

147 and acceptance of new living environment may be far more serious problem than

mere improvement of housing status.

The resettlement of mdividuals usually pose a serious challenge to local public

authorities. For example, the local authorities have a statutory obligation to resettle

all families in a decent, safe and sanitary housing, convenient to their place of work.

Most of the local agencies are often confronted with lack of enough resources to carry out such an assiduous task imposed upon them. The problem most often relates to the fact that available resources cannot cope with the demand especially when we consider the magnitude of fam ily displacement as a result of private and public programmes.

Meltzer (1953) has asserted that,

in the final analysis any relocation plan is dependent on available supply of housing both public and private. To recognize the fact that relocation must inevitably accelerate competition for an already adequate supply of housing particularly for housing at levels the bulk of relocatees can afford, and then to proceed with the relocation of families without providing for meeting this need is to fly in the face of reason and reality (1953:452).

Some research findings have shown that relocation of displaced communities or individuals due to lead to high percentage of families living in standard housing.

However, because of poor house keeping habits and inadequate training, such standard houses often ended up becoming slums within a spate of time.

It is against this backdrop that John (1964) cautioned that unless there is detailed consideration of some vital issues, it is difficult to know whether we are improving the living conditions of slum families or just shifting the slum to another group. According to him, whether relocation aids the poor familyor whether it is

148 a devise to use certain land for a favoured group in the society, the implementors of

relocation policies are in difficulty to impartially judge their action. Again, it is

observed that in terms of funds, time and manpower, policy makers always allocate

meagre resources for social welfare programme.

7.5 The Administrative Problems of Resettlement and Compensation in Some African Countries

7.5.1 The Volta Resettlement Experience

The Volta dam in Ghana was conceived as a means of providing cheap hydro- electric power for the exploitation of the large deposit of bauxite in the Volta region.

It was also envisaged that the project would facilitate the diversification of the country's economy which then relied heavily on cocoa.

Just like other resettlement schemes in Africa, the Volta resettlement scheme had its social as well as physical problems associated with human relocation. The

Volta Basin bad a difficult terrain that impaired effective communication with the various communities. Similarly, there were few motorable roads which traversed the entire region. Added to the above was the fact that there was no rough estimation of the number of inhabitants to be resettled. The inhabitants of the Volta Basin were widely scattered in small communities thereby making enlightment campaign an assiduous task.

There was also the problem of policy formulation as there were no existing records or data that will ease policy formulations in respect of the Volta resettlement scheme. According to Kalistsi (1970),

149 because of the poor communication system and the wide scattered small villages and hamlets, little was known of the people living in the Basin and some were so well hidden that they had never paid tax or been counted in censuses.

Thus, the entire resettlement scheme was seen as government affair. Kalitsi also

pointed out that a team of consultants submitted a total cost of 2 million cedis. The

report was accepted and endorsed by the government in 1952 with a pledge that all

the affected people would be accordingly compensated. It was in consonance with

the above acceptance that the government went further to conduct a preliminary

survey of population, cocoa, oil palms, sample count on perennial crops, a valuation

of land including its farming potentials including that of the public and private

buildings.

However, it is pertinent to point out that wh ile the government accepted compensation as a legal obligation, it viewed resettlement as an issue of discretion.

lt went ahead to adopt the approach of resettlement through self help programmes by offering only incentives. This approach was informed by the conviction that was the only way of retaining communal initiatives and ancestral ties.

What the government did was to provide simple village layouts, plans for houses suitable to the resources and customs of the affected people, block making machine loan and a free technical advice and training in house construction.

Furthermore, the authorities undertook the construction of roads and public amenities and conducted an agricultural survey of the areas proposed for settlements. As indicated earlier, the rationale for adopting this approach was to enable the affected population to resettle themselves, retain their ancestral I inkages, build their own houses in manner that suits their customs and tradition and retaining their means of livelihood by their own initiative devoid of any radical change.

150 r n 1957, prior to the implementation of the above policy, some concerned

planners and architects offered professional advice to the government urging that the

affected population should be resettled in model modern villages that would be a

source of pride to the country. It was believed that by so doing, the standard of

living of the population would also be enhanced. Eventually, the endorsement of this

professional advice forced the authorities to merge some of the villages together to

allow for optimal provision of basic infrastructural facilities and amenities.

However, the above though plausible was not without its attendant

consequences. According to Chambers (1970) the design and allocation of

resettlement housing units at the Volta Scheme created some conflict. The affected

people were provided with a single-room accommodation per family leading to over-

crowding in the fa mily set up. Polygamous men saw this as an embarrassment to

have more than one wife in the same room.

The authorities were very sensitive in their choice of agriculturally suitable

resettlement sites. Serious efforts were made in both planning and execution of

improved system of farming within the environment of resettlement. In his review,

Nicholas (1970) observed that;

co-operative farming was selected as the best option for the people as against individual title of ownership and group farming. This is so because co-operative farming offers the advantage of bulk purchasing and selling and gives the farmer a democratic say in the affairs of the community.

In his assessment of the adoption of such a novel approach, Nicholas (1970) pointed out that this new approach proved unworkable because of the preference of the old system of farming by the inhabitants.

151 In a nutshell, the fo llowing analysis and appraisal of the Volta resettlement

scheme could be aptly summed up by this assertion;

the whole process of evacuation, resettlement and fa rming new and larger communities were bound to involve stress and shock of change. A major contribution to the success of evacuation and resettlement in the Volta Basin was due to the package of measures such as social survey, discussions on resettlement groupings and sites, the opportunity to choose to be resettled or to accept compensation, the written warnings of the date of evacuation, the care taken to ease the shock of moving, the provision of new houses and better services which reflected a concern for the welfare of the people and an acceptance of responsibility for their wellbeing (Chambers, 1970:285).

By way of comparison, the administration of resettlement and compensation by the Volta Basin Authority bore some close resemblance to that of the FCDA,

Abuja. In both cases the authorities saddled with the responsibilities of resettlement and compensation were confronted with the problems of adequate data for policy formulation, appropriate resettlement approach and lack of resources for full implementation of the resettlement policies. However, it is pertinent to point out here that the origins of the Volta Resettlement Scheme differs remarkably from that of the

FCT bearing in mind that the former was conceived as a result of the construction of a dam for irrigation and power supply purposes while the latter was info rmed by the decision to relocate the seat of the national government to a more central and a neutral location within the country.

7.5.2 Terna Resettlement Scheme

According to Amateifio (1966), the Tema resettlement scheme in Ghana was the first of its kind in the West African sub-region. He reported that the government of Ghana in 1952 took a decision to construct a new port and a new town at Tema

152 which led to the displacement of about 12,000 inhabitants. In another account,

Butcher et al (1966) stated that the objective of the resettlement programme was

mainly to build a new town east of old Terna to accommodate the affected inhabitants

in such a manner that would permit the retention of their occupations, their traditional

set-up along with their ancient techniques of agriculture and fishing while

substantially improving the standard of their housing. To accomplish the above stated

objectives, the government of Ghana went further to fo rmulate appropriate policy

guidelines to administer the resettlement programme as fo llows:

i) that a house owner was entitled to receive equal number of rooms as he had before;

ii) that the individual who prefer cash compensation were free to do so and they would be regarded as tenants in the new site for the first three years during which they were expected to complete their new houses;

iii) that those identified as fulltime farmers were to be given eight (8) acres of farm plots with a free lease of seventy-five (75) years; iv) that social services and facilities such as schools, portable water, roads, rural electricity would be made available by the government (Butcher, 1966).

As revealed by the accounts of Butcher and Whiteman (1966), that it took almost seven years of consultation to convince the people as there was violent opposition as a result of the prevalent differing political beset among the various communities. Thus, the time lag between policy formulation and policy implementation was so great that the initial enumeration of displaced persons was rendered invalid. The additional resettlers created serious of problems bearing in mind that everybody had to move out of the old Terna town. The resulting surplus population had to be accommodated in temporary structures and not accord ing to the number of rooms required by surplus settlers. The disparity between the enumerated

153 resettlers and actual number that needed to be evacuated was alarming.

7.5.3 The Kainji Resettlement Scheme

The Kainji resettlement scheme came into being as a result of the

Parliamentary Act which established the Niger Dam Authority in 1962. Atkinson

(1968) summed up the objectives of the dam as fo llows:

i) the generation of 880 megawatts of electricity;

ii) improve navigation of River Niger;

iii) ensure better control of flood for irrigation;

iv) provide another way for crossing the River Niger; and

v) increase the fishing potentials of the area.

It was in a drive to achieving the above objectives that it dawn on the

government that the displaced population would have to be resettled and rehabilitated .

Kainji dam itself was a public venture embarked upon for the development of

infrastructure to serve the whole nation. Jn his accounts, Atkinson, disclosed that the

Kainji lake region with an area of about 500 square miles was inhabited by about twelve different ethnic groups. These ethnic groups were said to be fo und on both the riverine and the lowland areas of the river. The tribes of Gungawa, Yaurawa,

Bakara, Lopara and Shangarwa lived within the riverine areas on the islands and banks of the middle Niger. The low land areas was inhabited by the tribes of

Karnbari, Dukawa, Sulkawa, Hausa and Fulanis. Atkinson further established that the displacement of the riverine and the farming communities involved a total sum of

42,026 people from 192 settlements made up of towns, villages and hamlets. The

Niger Dam Authority was assigned the task of re-housing the displaced population at

154 a minimum cost while also ensuring that the housing and the environment would be

acceptable to the people. This it was believed would encourage the people to move

willingly to the new house without having to resort to the use of force and with

minimal stress. The other decision of cash compensation was jettisoned considering

the fear that the money to be given out for compensation might not afterall be used

for resettlement purposes. However, efforts were made to ensure that the new

settlements were as near as possible to their previous locations to enable them where

feasible retain some of their farm lands.

For reasons of convenience and optimal use of resources, all the smaller

hamlets or settlements were pulled together in order to share some social facilities

like schools, water, clinic, market and other public institutions. In the Niger Dam

Resettlement Scheme fo ur types of settlements were identified as urban, semi-urban,

semi-rural and rural. Each new village site was treated separately and the layouts were different. Each of the 121 new settlements had its own individual plan related to the ethnic group being re-housed, their present stage of development, their likely future trends in development and the topography of the new site chosen by the villagers.

In another account, Atkinson (1965) maintained that the resettlement project at Kainji was not carried out with any pre-conceived political motive, nor with the aim that the lives of the affected population would change in any specific way nor with the anticipation that the resettlement would be carried out without expecting changes.

[n his studies, Negedu (1969) had estab I ished that of the 43,700 persons settled

30,345 were in the Yauri Emirate of Sokoto State. While 1,632 were from Borgu

155 Emirate of the then Ilorin Province. Thus, it can be seen that the Yauri Emirate was

the most affected in the displacement.

The ethnic groups that lived in the lake area had their distinctive culture,

tradition, building habits, religion and occupation. These ethnic groups also have

their separate hierarchy of chiefs with a paramount chief possessing immense

influence. The resettlement authority had a problem of reconciling the choice of site

for Bussa people whose village was completely sub-merged. The people prefer to be

settled on the site chosen to accommodate contractors. The people wanted the site

because it was an upland and more healthy for human habitation. Allied to this was

the issue of reconciling and maintaining the conflicting interests of fishermen, farmers and cattle rearers among the various communities being resettled.

The Niger Dam Resettlement Authority was specifically set up in October

1962 to oversee the resettlement work under the aegis of the then Northern Nigerian government. Considering the enormity of problems associated with resettlement, the

Northern regional government constituted an advisory committee to look into the various administrative and resettlement problems. Some of such notable problems were the resettlement of cattle population, the issue of the displaced fishermen, the political problem of boundary adjustment between the neighbouring emirate of

Kotangora as well as the Yauri and of course the problem of Kainji navigation.

However, due to differing needs of the people being resettled, it was impracticable to apply uniform resettlement policy among the ethnic groups. For instance, the Kambari and the Gungara people loathed houses built by the government. This was due to the fact that it was their custom to live in scattered camps about a mile apart and usually they decamp from a particular settlement once

156 it dawn on them that the soil fe rtility of their farm lands had been exhausted. Thus,

taking into cognisance the Kambari's peculiar life style, the administration of the

resettlement policy granted that compensation be paid to the tribe while permitting the

people to build their own houses though within the limit of soil and water survey.

But the resettlement agency had to change their pol icy of resettlement and

thereafter embarked upon the construction of houses for the affected people. Decision

was also taken on the need to group certain settlement together at sites to facilitate

easy provision of water and other social services to them. Even when grouping

villages together, the authorities were sensitive about ensuring that the people being

merged do not lose their distinct identity.

Negedu (1969) had equally pointed out that in designing the resettlement

houses a number of factors were taken into consideration. Such considered factors

were the building habits of the various ethnic groups. The communities consisted of

urbanized and semi-nomadic fa rmers, river-side dwellers to mention but a few. The

resettlement authority ensured that all the communities were housed traditionally in

line with their customs and needs. The houses consisted of those with doors and

shuttered windows hung on pivots with entrances, compound units looking in towards

each other with one entrance providing access to the street, scattered compounds

whose rooms had small entrances without doors and shuttered windows and circular

rooms with raised floors and domed segmented roofs. The rooms were either square

or circular in shape. In the large villages partial fencing was provided while in

smaller villages there was no fencing at all.

Negedu (1969) further highlighted in the following words, the difficulties attendant to allocation of houses to the resettlers by the resettlement authorities:

157 one of the most difficult exercises from the view point of resettlement was the allocation of the new accommodation to the displaced persons. Before resettlement the impression had gained strength among the displaced persons that they would be offered accommodation approximately of the same size, that is, number of rooms and other facilities of which they owned before resettlement. Some villagers had thought that the Niger Dam Resettlement Authority would replace their granaries in the new villages and were rather perfused to learn that they were to build these themselves. Apart from these problems, it was found that in the rural areas some people refused to move into houses provided for them because of their social structure of their feeling that accommodation provided was not suitable. On the other hand, in towns such as New Bussa where an internal sewage system was provided in each compound the people had neither the financial resources nor the technical knowledge necessary for maintaining the system.

One of the most difficult issue that confronted the resettlement agency bothers

on how to reconcile the traditional needs and aspirations of the inhabitants and the

provisions of shelter designed with modernization. At the conception of resettlement policy, it was planned that displaced farmers should not be settled haphazardly rather they were resettled in an organized agricultural settlement. This decision was said to have been informed by the earlier experience of Shendam which was reported to have ended in failure. Thus it was planned that in resettling displaced farmers, land should be allocated for farming purposes in accord to what the people were used to.

Another thorny issue that was faced by the resettlement authority was that of the cattle Fulanis. This bothers on the need to locate suitable site for the grazing of their cattle. With the Niger Dam project, most of the marshy areas of the river basin became flooded by the lake. Fear was expressed that fa ilure to resettle the nomadic fulanis at appropriate location where they can graze their herds, they may be forced to migrate to the neighbouring countries of Niger and Benin Republic. The

158 implication of this was that it would result into great financial loss to Yauri and

Borgu emirates in form of taxes . To avert such envisaged mass emigration of the

nomads, they were provided with supplementary feed. In the same vein, the

resettlement authority constructed a veterinary treatment centre in Borgu emirate. All

these notwithstanding the Fulanis were reported to have expressed their dissatisfaction

with the "Borgu" grass and the inland mashes.

In terms of comparison, the FCT resettlement programme was necessitated by the need to build a new FCT for the country. It therefore become imperative that in implementing the master plan for the new capital city, the inhabitants had to be relocated to pave way for infrastructural layout and development of the new city.

However, the process of merging existing villages took the same pattern with that of

Kainj i resettlement scheme. It can be recalled that the resettled population of the

Kainj i resettlement scheme consisted of farmers, fishermen, cattle Fu Janis and a few other occupations. But those affected as a result of building a new capital city were mainly farmers.

7 . 5 . 4 The Bakolori Resettlement Progranune

This resettlement programme was designed to resettle a population of 45 villages that were displaced as a result of the construction of Bakolori Dam in Sokoto

State. The Bakolori Dam project was solely for irrigation purposes. According to

Abumere (1985), the approach adopted in the case of the Bakolori resettlement programme was cash payment for irreplaceable items and the provision of farm lands almost equivalent in size to what they had at their former settlement. These farm lands were given in fragments and at different locations. Abumere pointed out that

159 the fragmentation was due to the fac t that a farmer who had a consolidated holding

might be given a large piece of land whose soil type might not be suitable for all the

crops he might have been used to cultivating. What the above imp I ied was that small

scale farmers who indeed constitute the majority were greatly disadvantaged bearing

in mind that their fragmented lands were in different locations meaning higher cost of transportation.

The Bakolori resettlement programme was confronted with a lot of problems that eventually culminated into rioting and loss of lives and properties. The crisis arose from the fact that the farm lands provided for the farmers were not only inadequate but also very far away from their residential houses. It was also discovered that some of the farmers spent the cash compensation other things rather than use it for the purpose for which it was meant. It was believed that this act of misplaced priority on the part of the resettlers accounted for the discontent and the unrest that was witnessed.

However, in comparison with the resettlement scheme of the FCT, the displaced population of Abuja were predominantly subsistence farmers. Here prototype housing units were built for the resettlers. Social amenities such as electricity, portable drinking water, health facilities, e.g. clinics, markets were all provided for the people.

7 .6 Resettlement Problems of the Federal Capital Territory

It was apparent that once the decision to relocate the seat of the federal government to Abuja was taken, the inhabitants of the area being earmarked were going to be displaced. It was consequent upon this perception that a machinery was put in place to handle all issues relating to resettlement and compensation to such

160 displaced communities and households.

Decree No. 6 of 1976 which gave legal backing to the creation of a new

capital city of Abuja provided foradequate compensation and resettlement in Section

6(1) thus:

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the constitution of the Federation or of a State or of any other enactment or of rule of law, comprised in the Territory shall be assessed and computed in accordance with the provision of this Decree Land affected by this Decree for an amount equal to total rent paid by the lease over the period between the date of the execution of the lease and the date of its determination by the authority together with the interest at the bank rate between the last mentioned date and the date of payment of compensation (FGN, Gazette No. 6 of 1976).

The same Decree also provided for immovable assets like buildings and economic crops thus:

building on such land, for the amount of the actual construction of the building and crops on such land for an amount equal to the fair market value of such crops.

At inception, the resettlement policy was to pay compensation to all the displaced communities made up of 845 villages and settle them outside the FCT. This initial policy was informed by the desire to ensure that all Nigerians have equal access to land and other opportunities in the federal territory thereby doing away with any claim to ancestral and primordial rights.

f n accordance with the above policy guidelines, the federal government disbursed the following amount to the respective states from which the FCT was carved out:

161 i) Niger State =N =4 million

ii) Plateau State - =N = 1.5 million; and

iii) Kwara State - =N =I million

However, with time, it became clear that to evacuate everybody from the

territory would involve an enormous sum of money as to leave the development

authority with little or nothing to build the city after the resettlement programme.

Therefore, a review of the resettlement policy became imperative for at least two

reasons. These were, first, the issue high cost of evacuating everybody out and

secondly, the vast proportion of the land of FCT (measuring about 8,000sq.kms)

might never be required afterall for city construction and expansion. It then became

obvious that to pursue such resettlement policy, this substantial expense of land which

was strongly believed to have high agricultural potential would be left uninhabited

waste land and consequently loss of valuable resources. This was considered

undesirable not only because of the eventual loss of valuable resources but also due

to the close association between the resultant sparse population density and the growth and spread of such disease vectors such as simulium and tse-tse fly.

Taking cognisance of the above, the FCDA with the consent of the federal government later agreed to change the resettlement policy by restricting evacuation of inhabitants only to areas that would be needed for city construction and future expansion. This was seen to be cost effective. The rest of the territory, outside the priority areas was to remain as before but then to be administered by a new body known as the Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA). However, the initial amount of =N=6.5 million earlier paid to the states was regarded as an abortive cost. The creation of the FCTA which was done for administrative convenience was

162 later dissolved due to lack of legal backing. The above accounts depicts the existing

position of state of affairs then when the civilian ad ministration under the leadership

of Alhaji Shehu Shagari took office in 1979.

7. 7 The Presidential Ad-Hoc Committee on Resettlement of Displaced Communities of the FCT

Considering the intricacies surrounding the issues of resettlement and

compensation to the displaced inhabitants, in 1980 a special meeting was held

between the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Governors of Niger,

Plateau and Kwara States (the States from which the territory of the FCT was carved

out), along with the chairmen of both the Senate and the House of Representatives

Committees on the FCT. At this special meeting , a general review of the problem

of resettlement was undertaken. rt was agreed that the inhabitants of the territory should be evacuated from their present settlements only where it becomes necessary to do so. It was also decided that where such evacuation becomes necessary, the affected people should be resettled at the expense of the federal government either within or outside the territory depending on their choice.

For a proper handling of the problems, a Presidential Ad-hoc committee made up of the chairman of the then Senate Committee on the FCT (As chairman), the then

Secretary to the federal government, the then secretaries to the three state governments concerned and the then permanent secretary for the FCDA, was constituted and charged with the implementation of the following terms of references. i) to determine priorities for mandatory resettlement at places of the inhabitants' choice at the expense of the federal government; ii) to determine the number of inhabitants who wish to move out voluntarily from FCT;

163 iii) to bring up a plan for the phasing of movement and resettlement in accordance with available funds and to determine the extent of federal government assistance:

iv) to determine priority of resettlement of inhabitants in peripheral towns and villages;

v) to submit an interim report by 30th September, 1980, if necessary and a final report by 31st December, 1980 (FGN, 1981).

[n accordance with the given terms of reference, the Ad-hoc committee conducted a number of social surveys and in the event held meetings with various community leaders, governments of the neighbouring states and the officials of the

FCDA. In line with their discoveries, the committee made a number of useful and important recommendation bothering on resettlement and compensation. One such was the committee's standpoint that all those who preferred to leave the FCT outside the priority areas should be offered federal assistance as they move out with immediate effect. On the other hand, the committee recommended that for those inhabitants who chose to remain in the FCT, they should be properly integrated . In doing this, it advised that accurate records be kept of all their properties as well as land holdings and as well be issued with Certificate of Occupancy. To this end, the old settlements were to be provided with planning and effective integration in the development plan of the FCT. It further advised that inhabitants should be permitted to develop their lands within development controls and regulations of the FCDA.

The Ad-hoc committee subsequently made recommendations that were accepted by the federal government, that all households in the areas earmarked for city construction and expansion, as identified in the master plan, be compulsorily evacuated and resettled elsewhere after due compensation. As depicted by Table 7. 1 below, a total of 5,412 head of households opted to move out of the territory while the majority, 20,619 opted to remain within the territory.

164 Table 7. 1: Resettlement Preferences in the FCT, 1980

FORM ER DISTRICT TOTAL TOTAL HOUSEHOLD STATE AREAS HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS S WITHOUT STAYING LEAVING OPINION

Niger State Gawu 78 744 2 Suleja 74 314 9 Kuje 4,679 127 55 Kwali 7,279 255 65 Bwari 3,823 776 34 Lapai 369 215 3

Sub-total 16,302 2,467 168

Plateau State Kam 526 957 23 Karshi 396 23 1 4 Total 161 404 7 Gadabuke 1,581 l,346 65

Sub-Total 2,664 2,938 99

Kwara State Koton-Karfe 1,653 7 30

Grand FCT 20,619 5,412 297 Total

Source: Presidential Ad-Hoc Co mmittee Repo rt. 1980: P.20

If total heads of households that must be compulsorily resettled were added to the local heads who voluntarily chose to leave the territory, it would be discovered that the total number of heads of households that needed resettlement were in order of l2-14 thousand. Again, from the series of surveys carried out during this period in the FCT, it was evidently clear that there were an average of 52 persons per household. This would probably translate to mean that about 62 thousand to 73 thousand individuals were involved in the resettlement programme.

In I ine with the recommendations of the Ad-hoc committee's report, several villages comprising of Wuse and Asokoro in the former Niger State section of the

FCT, Karu, Nyanya and Karshi in the former Plateau State were all resettled outside the territory. The former compensation practice was for the heads of households to

165 be paid their due compensation through their state governments. This practice was

however abandoned for a system that allowed the FCDA and the resettlements to

participate in the payments to the people. The resettlement agents included the three

state governments concerned, i.e. Niger, Plateau and Kwara and the FCDA.

The Presidential Ad-hoc committee also discovered that there was great

disparity between the resettlement figures computed by the affected states and the

figures arrived at by the FCDA. In fact, there was disagreement between FCDA and

the States on what constitute abortive investment incurred by the states as a result of

the change in the former Federal Military government policy on total evacuation. It

was to rectify this disagreement that the committee recommended that an independent

assessor be engaged to determine what constitutes abortive investment against which

to evaluate the claims of the states.

With regards to the problems of the satellite or periphery towns and villages

of the territory, the Ad-hoc committee tried to identify them but discovered that the

surrounding boundaries of the territory were not properly demarcated. This therefore

made it impossible to know all the satellite or peripheral villages that were supposed

to be in the FCT. It was foundthat in the cases where the villages were in the FCT,

the inhabitants were in most cases separated from some of their farm lands, social amenities or even their traditional leaders.

The Presidential Ad-hoc committee on the resettlement of inhabitants in the

FCT listed the fo llowing assessment procedure in determining compensation entitlements:

i) that only agreed compensation rates would be used; ii) that an individual must have indicated his intention to be resettled;

166 iii) that the individual has assets that were within the compensation able items earlier agreed upon between FCDA and the concerned states; and

iv) that the beneficiary has reached the age of 18 or more years at the time of assessment.

The following constitutes items on which compensation were to be paid and

rates chargeable:

TabJe 7.2: Recommended Compensation Rates Applicable in the FCT

Items New Rates Rccommcudcd

Building and S1ruc1ure

Mud hut with thatch roof Nl9.32 perM2 ' Mud brick with thatch roof N20. 70 per M2

.

Iron Sheet N42.78 per M2 Mud brick hut with corrngated iron Sheet N53.72 per M2 . \ Cement plastered mud iron sheets N 104.88 per M2 t Concrete built corrngated iron sheet

. ·.

Household Amenities

Wells N 136.62 per M2

Granaries

Mud walled granary N34,50 per M2 Grass walled granary N 11. 04 per M2

Community Structures

Primary School} Mosques } Churches } .N4,500 per M2 Courts } Dispensaries } Village Halls }

Public wells concrete } Wells to be examined against valuation Unchanged and verification }

Market stalls - type of be identified Unchanged and subject to valuation Source: Digest of Stat1st1cs. MFCT. 1981. p.38.

167 The committee advised that where they were above NS,000.00 the building

in question should be physically inspected and valued accordingly. It further urged

that if for any reason there were disagreement on the valuation earlier made by

FCDA agents , those concerned should be called upon to employ the services of an

Estate Value to assist them in working out valuation most acceptable to either party concerned. a) that those living in other parts of the territory but not forced to leave their villages by the city development projects can chose to go back to their states of origin. These group of people were to be compensated and resettled through their respective states governments.

10% b) of the total compensation were to be paid to the state ap admi11tistrative1t t services in resettling their own people; · � • "' 1 ..1 . . ·' "' � 1 ., . l c) that an acceptable compensation rate would be determined lbf.,the FGDA�� j. Niger, Kwara and Plateau state; \ ·• .. .t"' ·. d) that an independent assessor would be employed to determine the expenses · previously incurred by state and local governments in the provision of social services and facilities in the territory as well as in the development of new settlement villages before the change of policy on resettlement.

These policy decisions were fashioned out to enable the FCDA realise the following policy objectives: i) to facilitate the resettlement of the affected population with minimal inconvenience and least disruption of their normal way of life, occupation and local administration; ii) that the environment of the new settlement should be such that is acceptable to the people so that they could delightfully move in without having to resort to the use of coercion; iii) to make sure that the standard of living of those being resettled is enhanced and improved; and iv) to facilitate by way of financing the relocation of those who prefer to be resettled outside the territory through the state governments concerned.

168 7 .8 Movement of Inhabitants out of the Capital Territory

In a bid to resettle the inhabitants at the various designed resettlement centres, as indicated above, the FCDA decided to provide funds to the affected state governments to facilitate resettlement of the displaced people. However, partisan politics, particularly during the second republic did to a greater extent hindered the effective implementation of the resettlement policy. The FCDA was to discover later that the number of those who chose to be resettled outside the territory substantially increased against the initial stated enumeration. This in effect entails that the FCDA had to disburse more money to the states more than was initially budgeted for. This in itself created some sort of stalemate.

Sequel to the above mentioned settlement, a Joint Verification Committee on resettlement and compensation was instituted by the FCDA in 1986 to amicably resolve the issue. The objective of the verification committee was in the main to verify the amount of money already given out to the States of Niger, Plateau and

Kwara. Secondly, the committee was also assigned the responsibility of ascertaining the number of those who had actually moved out of the territory. The Joint

Verification Committee had the following terms of reference: i) to verify the number and locations of people evacuated out of FCT and resettled by each of the government concerned; ii) to determine the total compensation entitlements of the resettlements in I ine with the assessment carried out using the agreed compensation rates; iii) to verify how much of the compensation entitlement(s) of each resettle had been paid to him/her; iv) to determine the number of people who have received either partial or full compensation but were still residing in the territory; v) to ascertain the locations and conditions of the houses vacated by those resettled outside the territory; and

169 vi) to recommend appropriate measures regarding the findings of the committee in relation to the above terms of reference and any other issue the committee may deem necessary for consideration (FGN, 1981).

Upon the completion of its assignment, the then Honourable Minister of FCT,

Abuja along with the State Military Governors of Niger, Plateau and Kwara met on the 30th November, 1988 to discuss the Joint Verification Committee's report. At the end of the meeting, the communique arrived at stated thus inter alia:

i) that the resettlement policy be reviewed to allow for the payment of the outstanding balance of compensation due to those individuals as contained in the verification report volume II. Further movement out of the FCT should be confined to only those areas needed fordevelopment and the inhabitants of such areas be resettled in the areas of their choice using current rates; ii) that FCDA has conceded to its demand for refund from Niger State government in respect of certain facilities left behind in Suleja and Lapai local governments in return, and similarly waived its claims on certain services rendered to FCDA' iii) that the 10 3 administrative charges on payment of compensation due to states be waived; iv) that the abandoned houses by those who moved out of FCT be taken over by the FCDA after full compensation; v) that the Federal Ministry of Works and Housing be requested to direct the Federal Surveyor-General to speed up work on boundaries in dispute; vi) that a joint security committee under the chairmanship of the Assistant Inspector-General of Police in-charge of Zone 7 be set up to consider matters of security interest affecting the FCT along with the three adjoining states of Niger, Plateau and Kwara; and vii) that those beneficiaries of the outstanding balance of compensation should exercise patience while concerned efforts were being made to source funds for payment (FGN, 1988).

170 7. 9 Resettlement Centres

In view of the inhabitants that chose to move out of the new FCT and those actually affected by city development, it became imperative to create resettlement centres. Accordingly, resettlement centres were created both within the territory and in states of Niger and Plateau. In the case of Niger State, three resettlement centres were created. These were New Bwari, New Gawun and New Wuse. The New

Bwari resettlement centre had the following villages or settlements incorporated -

Bwari, Shishipe, Parda, Kaima, Kuduru, Barungoni, Zumabisa, Galwyi, Igu and

Pananike.

For the Wuse resettlement centre, the villages resettled included Wuse,

Asokoro, Karon Majigi, Dakibiyu, Kuruduma, Katampe I, Katampe TI and Katampe

III, Tungan, Jaba and Kaimadna. In the case of the New Gawun resettlement centre, the villages affected or incorporated were Gawun, Yelwa, Kayu, Dagun, Guti, Suita,

Fuka, Domi, Tando I, Tando II, Tugan Agora, Gasakpa and Kitikpa.

Plateau State had five resettlement centres. These were Ukya, Gwargwada,

Karn, Karshi and Gudun Karya. The Ukya resettlement centre was made up of the following villages, i.e. Ukya Sabo, Atako, Yewuye, Zakutu, Madalla, Takpe,

Ahinza, Ore, Sungba, Tika Offa and Dereguma. The Gwargwada resettlement centre involved the villages of Gwargwada, Gwamber, Pesu, Tika, Rubochi Bassa, Gaiwa,

Huni Sabo, Hunigude, Tashara, Rubochi Gwari, Ubwa Yango, Zagabutu, Jullo,

Rubatu, Kiri, Kutumba, Guba Gwari, Gwamfa and Mono.

Affected in the new Karu resettlement centre were the villages of Karu,

Nyanya, Jikwoyi, Kurudu and Gagarape. For the new Karshi, the underlisted villages were included - Karshi, Kuffai, Orozo, Sariya, Pasali Orozo, Atapi, Orozo, Lokoja

171 Orozo, Sagiya Orozo, Orozo. Gugugu, Kwoe and Lakotiye.

Finally, the new Gudun Karya resettlement centre these villages were

incorporated - Gudun Karya, Kukekwa, Buga, Odun Kassa, Odun Adoga, Karmo

Tukura, Karmo Gangi, Karmo Rumadu and Bida.

In conclusion, the ruling class has exploited the low income group in the rural areas during the exercise of resettlement and compensation. This exploitation was

made worse by the activities of the middle class who more often than not under paid the indigens rural population. Even the few indigens who opted for relocation could not be allocated new settlements on time, due mainly to the activities of the middle class. At best, the indigens have remained unhappy about the entire resettlement and compensation exercise. In effect this has affected the socio-economic and indeed political activities for the FCT settlers.

172 CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Tn chapter one, we essentially discussed the research proposal , which encompassed all the rubrics of general introduction, objectives of the study, research problems and methodology of study. Furthermore, scope, significance and limitations of the study were examined. While in chapter two, literature review and theoretical framework occupied a prominent place. Attempts were made at discussing the structural functionalism, policy instrument strategy and the Marxian perception. The utility of this framework gave rise to the effective usage of the policy analysis.

In chapter three, evidence from the discussion show that the evolution of

Abuja is not strange, as it happened in other parts of the globe. Most of these evolutionary trends in such countries were either due to demands from the society, which government put into decision, or the government reasoning itself. By and large, government try to articulate the interest of the society and evolved the policy instrument into reality. We have seen that various factors such as the dual role of

Lagos, inadequacy of land space, security, population dynamics and ethnicity pattern of Lagos among others were responsible for policy shift of the seat of Federal

Government from Lagos to Abuja.

Chapter four discusses the impact of infrastructural investment in the growth of Abuja right from the regime of General Olusegun to the time of President Ibrahim

Babangida. Abuja being a virgin land at its inception in 1976 bad to be given some face-life by way of construction of various infrastructural and social service-oriented programmes which will take billions of Naira in order to make it habitable. To supplement these infrastructural facilities, were two vital social services, namely

173 health care and education, which have been analysed in the discourse.

Tn chapter five, the role of public and private sectors in housing development

in Abuja occupies a central point in the study. This is because, housing as the most

visible and most important land use agent in the Federal Capital and one which

touches intimately on the "Iivea bility " of each individual deserves special attention

and focus. Therefore an appraisal of the housing provisions of the Abuja Master

plan, public housing and private initiatives and the role of Federal Housing Authority were dis cussed.

The chapter on Environmental Sanitation Policy in the Federal Capital

Territory mainly focuses on the state in relation to the policy on sanitation. The agency responsible for translating the pol icy intention into reality is the Abuja

Environmental Protection Board. We examined its strengths and weaknesses, and from all indications, it is obvious that there hardly any relationship between what the state says and what it does in the words of Edmund Dell.

Chapter seven is devoted to the political economy of resettlement and compensation in the Federal Capital Territory. There is no way the people of this area would have imagined the impact which the coming of the Federal Capital

Territory was going to have on their lives. The impact has had the force of a social earthquake, to say the least. Resettlements the world over, have been very sensitive issues. In the case of our study area, it got off to an inauspicious start. This is because quite a significant number of the indigenous people indicated their unwillingness to move out of the area. The government was uncomfortable about this. Rather than allow for unnecessary delays, it went ahead to move them out compulsorily, relocating them either within or outside the Federal Capital Territory.

174 The major aspect of the problem of resettlement is the issue of compensation for

physical structures, personal effects and the loss of right to use farmlands. The details of this is what informed us to refer to the issues in the chapter as the political economy of resettlement and compensation.

The last chapter comprise of summary, conclusion and recommendations on the government policy towards the evolution of the Federal Capital Territory of

Abuja.

Conclusion: Some Wider Issues

In the discourse, the decision to evolve new capital cities are usually based on certain philosophies, either on political, economic or social reason. Our case study of Abuja shows clearly that the philosophy was very objective and structures were set up to actualize it. Abuja, we must not forget, was conceived as a place where the very best of Nigeria would be on display in letter and spirit. Abuja was conceptualized as proof that Nigeria had finally become one, despite the strains of nationhood. The primary lesson of Abuja is that we have put all those negative things that have stalled our march to true nationhood behind us. Specifically, Abuja as conceived by the Murtala/Obasanjo government was meant to provide tangible evidence that the sorrow, tears and blood of the 30-month old Civil War was finally behind us. To this extent therefore, it may be concluded that the government has been able to articulate and aggregate the interest of the various Nigerian peoples.

T n general there should be a relationship between planning and implementation in terms of input and output. Our findings show that in the case of our study area of

Abuja, there is some disequilibrium between inputs in terms of financial, physical and human resource investment as opposed to the total output of that policy. For instance

175 there is still pressure on urban facilities, because the Federal Capital Development

Authority had been overstretched in providing accommodation for the civil servants

and other social services within the capital territory.

Since most of the civil servants cannot be accommodated in the city centre,

they live in such distant areas as Keffi, and Marraraba in and Suleja

in Niger State. They hardly reach their various offices before 9.00 a.111 .

Furthermore, shortly after the influx of civil servants to Abuja, several parts of the

territory including Kubwa, Kado, Wuse and Gwagwalada faced shortage of water.

This was because the Jabi Dam Project commissioned in 1982 had been over­

stretched. Also hit by the upsurge in population is electricity supply to Abuja. The

city all along depended on the 132 KV transmission line from Minna and 132 sub­ station at Garki for the supply of electricity. With the increased population the

National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) had to embark on load sheding in Abuja.

Even with regard to health care and education, the spatial pattern of provision reveals varying degrees of discrepancies may appear to be on the low side, it would be unwise to ignore them. Inevitably, it is safe to conclude that in order to improve the availability of social services in the Federal Capital Territory, it is important to ensure that the expansion of social services in the territory takes fu ll cognisance of the spatial pattern of need as implied in the Master Plan Provisions. This will further ensure that future development in this sector does not exacerbate the nascent discrepancies in the system. This is important because of the tendency for such discrepancies to be self-perpetuating because of the operation of market forces as well as some biases in public policy.

176 Of special mention is the issue of resettlement which has given vent to very

serious problems, and thus creating gap between policy planning and policy

execution. The initial plan of the Federal Military Government was to evacuate all

the villages therein and resettle them in their former states of origin or other places

of their choice, so that no single ethnic group could lay claim of the territory.

However, the government discovered from the result of comprehensive population survey of the entire territory, that to compensate, evacuate and resettle all the original inhabitants outside the territory would require about N2.0 billion at then.

This was regarded as detrimental to the initial development and expansion of the

Federal Capital Territory. Moreso, the government considered it uneconomical, as it would destabilise the economic base of the territory, and it was unwise to move out the original inhabitants who are Nigerians, only to replace them with other Nigerians.

In the light of the above development, the government substantially changed the resettlement policy limiting it to only those who opted to be resettled in their former states of origin and those affected by the city development as well as other priority areas . This policy was applied fro m 1982 and some villages were resettled both within and outside the territory. By 1991 the administration of General Ibrahim

Babangida sought for integration with modification and thus rescinded the comprehensive resettlement options decision, as it was not expedient to remove Garki indigens who are Nigerians and to replace them with other Nigerians.

[t can be concluded that the implementation of the policy of Abuja has created very serious contradictions, which the policy maker cannot resolve. These include shift in the Master Plan, the policies of compensation, exploitation of the rural ites, the emergence of ghettoes or peripheral development and the encroachment of Federal

177 Capital Territory lands office, green areas meant for vegetation or recreation were

allocated to powerful individuals. Thus the Master Plan has indeed been bastardised

by powerful officials who made millions from selling land to unsuspecting property

developers. Additionally, it is a known fact that the most blatant distortions of the

Master Plan were perpetrated by the Military. Aso Rock, the operational

headquarters of various governmentsas well as the various military barracks, military quarters and even the National Assembly buildings, constitute some of the worst structural distortions.

Due to years of neglect, several other features of the city were also ignored.

Prominent among them was the law forbidding the conversion of residential quarters to commercial use. By the time the government knew what was happening, residential houses in Garki, Wuse, Kado and Karu had fallen into the hands of corporate organisations. Apart from causing scarcity, conversion of residential houses to commercial use also led to increase in rents.

On the politics of compensation, two salient points must be noted here: the protocol of compensation and resettlement of those who preferred to have was replete with fraud. Either the monies never reached them or their poverty, innocence and simplicity were exploited with abandon by those who carried out the exercise. The upshot is that some of these short-changed original inhabitants have found their way back. Those who preferred to remain did not fare any better. They were given a raw deal. Cubicles were constructed at the Usuma Town Resettlement and Kubwa schemes to house the original inhabitants. The poignancy of this raw deal is further underlined by the fact that civil servants live in decent and well-appointed apartments whereas those who gave up their ancestral homelands to pave way to the Federal

178 Capital Territory live in hovels. This is not to add the fact that forceful ejections,

with complete lack of compassion and pathos, preceded their evacuation to these

settlement schemes.

Our findings show that the issue of vertical and horizontal equity with regard

to housing has not been resolved. For instance, the pluralist arguments believe in the

perfect market ideas of fairness, balance and diversity or put simply, that government

should provide good quality environment to the extent that housing resources are so

redistributed such that the low income bracket could be favoured. While the marxian

conception of equity argues that resources be distributed from each according to his

ability to each according to his needs. But from indication, it is clear that the marxist

argument holds water because vertical equity appears to dominate the construction of

housing in Abuja. Essentially, what vertical equity connotes is a situation where a progressive decision can be adopted by pol icy makers to the extent that households particularly at the lower rungs of the ladder derive substantial benefit. And this poses a very serious implication of housing policy development in Abuja.

The incongruities that characterise Lagos as an urban conurbation appears to have reared its ugly head in Abuja. The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that it has very serious implications on the Abuja dream. These incongruities can be seen in the realities of decaying infrastructure, health, transport, housing, education, urban pollution, and environmental sanitation among many others.

Abuja, Nigeria's political capital of 8000 square kilometre has started to suffer from structural depreciation barely two decades of its existence. This has led to inefficiency of public utilities, dearth of aesthetics and environmental hazards. This development which political engineers and policy analysts referred to as the beginning

179 of infrastructural decadence has mostly affl icted road network, health facilities,

environment and energy supply. Most roads within the Federal Capital Territory

have become death-traps and the authority seems helpless. Baside potholes that have

taken over the Kubwa township, Nyanya-Jikoyi, Karshi-Danbi, Kuje-Maije, Yaba­

Rubochi roads, and Gwagwalada town, some parts of Bwari settlement area have been

cut off from the rest of the capital territory. Further research revealed that beside the

poor condition of Abuja roads, bridges within certain areas are usually water-logged

at the slightest down pour. Bridges within this group in the Berger-Wuse, Area 3,

Area 8, Zone 1 and Zone 8.

Some public buildings as well as many residential quarters are also in a

terrible state of disrepair. Many of them have yielded to the harsh environmental

effect like the Urban Development Bank in Zone 6, official quarters of the Ministry

for Federal Capital Territory/Federal Capital Development Authority staffers. In

these quarters, the wall paint has peeled off, while some of their roofs half blown.

Same fate befell official quarters in Kuje, Gwagwalada, Kwali and Abaji Area

Councils. In some, these structures have become dilapidated due to neglect and lack of renovation.

In some locations within the Federal Capital Territory, the problem of burst sewage is another to contend with. The possibility of an epidemic outbreak has forced residents within such areas to make alternativearrangements on waste disposal.

Apart from blocked sewages and their attending stench, burst pipes, overgrown weeds and dilapidated equipment and instruments do cause menace to the environment. The

Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB) do not help matters, as evacuation of waste materials often take a long time, and is very irregular.

180 Investigation further revealed that certain areas as contained in the Abuja

Master Plan have been taken over by government agencies. The Green Belts, play­

ground, and some recreational zones, have either been turned into corner shops,

fi lling stations, party offices or even motor parks. In terms of energy supply, as

Abuja assumes more political and economic prominence, electricity supply has

dwindled. Because areas originally earmarked forresidential settlement now parade printing press, bakeries, filing stations, hotels and sawmill-instead, without a corresponding boost in power supply and bottom-level capital utilization of existing infrastructures within the areas.

Conclusively therefore, that Abuja has become a reality is no longer in doubt.

In fact, great cities, are to adopt a phrase mean different things to different people.

No wonder therefore that great cities such as Abuja can be controversial and even more likely to provoke diverse and conflicting responses from different angles. Abuja like any other capital city in the world, is much more than a mere congeries of physical sub-divisions, salient landmarks, streets and public institutions. It is in the final analysis, more appropriate to describe Abuja as a time reflection of Nigeria's social evolution. The policy of relocating the Federal Capital from Lagos to Abuja can be described as a sociotherapic policy which is a type of policy that seeks to treat an undesirable condition that has become associated with a group" (Resenbloom, A.,

1987:240). By late 1960s and early 1970s, the role of Lagos as a capital city was faced with serious problems, which, by and large, became public problems as there were demands from people that permanent solutions should be foundto them. The choice of Abuja as the new Federal Capital Territory was made by the regime of the late General Murtala Mohammed . Effective construction of the new city began in

181 the Shehu Shagari administration. General Ibrahim Babangida formally moved the seat of government in December 1991, and has since been growing steadily.

However, an area of great concern is the phenomenal growth of ghettoes on daily basis. Undoubtedly, these ghettoes will have very serious multiplier effects in terms of economic, social, environmental and cultural milieu. This area needs further critical studies.

182 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A BOOKS:

Abu mere, S. r. Abuja : The New Federal Capi tal of Nige ria. Lagos, 1983

Aina, T.A. and Salau, A.T. (eds.) The Challenge of Sustainable Developm ent in Nigeria. fbadan, 1992.

Almond, G.A. and Coleman J.S. The Politics of Developing Areas. Princeton, New Jersey Princeton University Press, 1960.

Almond, G.A. and Powell, B. Jr. Comparative Politics: A Developm ent Approach. Boston and Toronto, Little Brown and Co. , 1966.

Almond, G.A and Powell G.B. Development Model of the Political Sys tem. New York, 1966.

Amateifio et al Terna Manhean: A Study of Resettlement, Ghana University Press, 1966.

Amdii, I. E.S. Analysis of Government Housing Policy in Nigeria. Zaria, ABU Press, 1993.

Anderson, J.E. Public Policy Making. New York, Praeyer Publishers, 1976.

Appleby, P.H. Policy and Administration. University of Alabama, 1949.

Araoz, A. Instruments for the Implementation IDRC, Canada, 1972.

Atkinson, F. Carving for Peopl e: Resettlement. Abuja Capital Territory. Lagos, 1982.

Atkinson, R.J. "Resettlement Problem in Kainji Lake Basin" in Mabogonje, A.L. (ed.) Kainji, A Nigerian Man Made Lake, NISER, Ibada, 1985.

Barry, B. Public Managment and Policy Analys is. St. Martins Press, New York, 1979.

Breese, G. (ed) The City in Newly Developing Countries Readings on Urbanism and Urbanisation pretice-Hall f nc. Engelwood Cliff, New Jersey, 1969.

Burns, L. S. and Grebler, L. The Housing of Nations: An Analys is of Policy in a Comparative Framework, Macmillan, London 1973.

Butcher D.A. P. and Whiteman, A. "The New Village as Planned and Built" in Amateijo et al (eds.) Terna Manhean: A Study of Resettlement. Ghana University Press, 1975.

183 Chambers, R. (ed.) The Volta Resettlement Experience, Pallmall Press, London, 1975 .

Dawudu, Y. Abuja: The New Federal Capi tal. Abuja, 1991.

Drior, Y. Public Policy Making Re-examined, Lionard Hill Book, London, 1973.

Easton, D. A Framework of Political Analysis. Engelwood Cliff, New Jersey, Prentice - Hall Inc, 1965.

Easton, D. The Political System: An Inqu iry into the State of Political Science. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1953.

Easton, D. An Approach to Analysis of Political System. London, 1975 .

Friendrick, C.J. Public Policy are the Nature Administrative Responsibility.Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1940.

Hartman, J., Resettlement and the Problems of Housing Families, Princeton, N.Y., 1974.

Hofferbert, R. The Study of Public Policy in Indianapol is. Bobb Merrill, New Jersey, 1974.

Ikelegbe, A.O. Public Policy Making and Analys is. Uri Publishing Ltd, Benin-City, 1996.

Jekins, W. Policy Analysis: A Political and Organisational pe rspective, Martin Roberton, 1978

Jones, G. Science Policy Instrument, London, 1972.

Lindblom, C. Foundation of Modern Political Science. Prentice Hall Inc, New Jersey, 1970.

Lindblom, C. "The Science of Muddling Through m the Public Administration Review. 1959.

Mabogunje, A.L. (ed.) Kainji: A Nigerian Man Made Lake, NISER, Ibadan, 1985

Marris, P. Family and Social change in an African City Roouledge and Kegan Paul London 1961.

Moss, R. P. and Rathborne, R. J. (eds). The Population Factor in African Studies. The proceedings of a Conference organized by African Studies Association of United Kingd om, University of London Press, London. 1965 .

184 Negedu, A.A. "The Administrative Problems of Resettlement in the Kainji Lake Basin" in Mabogunje, A.L. (ed.) Kainji : A Nige ria Ma Made Lake. NISER, Ibadan, 1985.

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Triman, D. The Government Process. Alfred Knopf, New York, 1977.

185 Uchendu, C. Issues in Public Policy Analys is, University of Calabar Press, Calabar, 1991.

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Wildarsky, A. The Political Economy of Efficiency. New York, 1970.

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186 B. REPORTS:

Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital of Nigeria, Lagos, December, 1975.

F.H.A. Progress Report and Remarks on Building Contracts in Festac Town, Lagos, 1979.

Panel Report on the Implementation of the National Housing Programmes, Lagos, 1979.

National Housing Policy, Federal Ministry of Works and Housing, Lagos, 1991.

Report on Recommednation of Resettlement Compensation 111 the FCT, University of Ibadan, Consultancy Services, 1981.

C. PUBLICATIONS:

FCDA (1988) ABUJA: The New Federal Capital of Nigeria, Abidjan, Cote D'Voire.

FCDA (1988a) Health Statistical Yearbook, Department of Health, FCDA, Abuja.

FCDA (1988b) Abuja: The Making of a New Capital City for Nigeria, FCDA, Abuja.

FCDA (1979) Master Plan for Abuja. The New Federal Capital of Nigreria, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Lagos.

GSH (1997) Bulletin

MFCT (l988a) Digest of Statistics, Abuja.

MFCT (l988b) Directory of Business Establishments, Abuja

MFCT (1990) Ministerial Press Briefing, June 4, 1990

IPA (1979) The Masterplan of Abuja: The New Federal Capital of Nigeria International Planning Associates.

IPA (1986) Industrial and Commercial Requirements of the FCT, PAI., Ibadan.

JBN Pie (1996) 1970- 1 995

MFCT (1992) ABUJA: Achievements of MFCT 1985-1992, Abuja

187 UNIBUJA (1992) UNIBUJA Decree No. 110 of December, 1992 , Abuja

UNIBUJA (1993) UNIBUJA CDLCE Publication. 1993, Abuja.

UNIBUJA (1992) UNTBUJA Academic Calendar, 1990- 1993, Abuja.

D. WORKSHOP PAPERS:

Agboola, T. (1990) "The Housing Delivery System and an Evaluation of the Housing Situation in Abuja and the FCT. "

Ago, US (1984) "Implementation a Master Plan: The Abuja Experience".

Ayeni, B. and Tilani, M.O. (1990) "Commerce and Industry in the FCT."

Egunjobi, L. (1990) "Capital City Development: Lessons from Industrial Experience. "

Okafor, I. I. (1990) "The Provision of Social Services in in the Capital City and the FCT. "

E. THESIS:

Umar, A. (1993) A Study of the Administration of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Ph.D. Thesis submitted to the University of Ibadan.

F. NEWSPAPERS:

New Nigerian Newspapers

The Guardian

Abuja Newsday

The Punch

Daily Times

188 APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE SCHEDULE

Questionnaire schedule for those resettled as a result of the New Capital Territory, Abuja. The questionnaire was conducted between November 1995 to July, 1996 at various centres.

INTRODUCTION: Name of Respondent

Resettlement Town .

Age ......

Tribe ......

Religion .... .

Education ...... Marital Status Number of Children . Recorder's Remarks .

You were formerly in your house and then the Government asked you to move. to this new home. We want to ask you a few questions about how you are living here.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

1. (a) What is your present occupation?

(1) Farming (2) Fishing (3) Trading (4) Civil Servant

189 ...... (b) Any other, specify ......

(c) What was your occupation before the resettlement'?

2. (a) What is your annual income (approximately)?

(1) Less than Nl,000.00 (2) N 1,00 1.00 N3,000.00 (3) N3,00 1 .00 NS,000.00

(4) NS,001.00 N7,000.00 (5) N7,001.00 And above.

3. Please you are required to indicate a comparative distance in the fo llowing activity areas from your house before and after the resettlement re-alocation. For each in the boxes provided tick the most appropriate.

COMPARATIVE DISTANCE

Activity Area More Less

Market 1 Clinic 2 School 3 Religious Place 4 Farm 5 Office 6 Police 7 Recreational Place 8

190 4. Are you making more gams from your farm produce than before the relocation?

( 1) Yes (2) No

5. Is it easier now to acquire land than in your former village?

(1) Yes (2) No

6. Was transport provided for your evacuation to the new settlement?

(1) Yes (2) No

7. During evacuation, were you paid some allowance for loss of production?

(1) Yes (2) No

8. (a) In your present location do you experience improved crop production?

(1) Yes (2) No

(b) If Yes, what is the reason: ......

191 9. What was the size of your family before resettlement?

(I) 2 members (2) 3 5 members (3) 6 9 members

(4) 10 15 members (5) 15 and above

10. What is the size of your family now?

(1) 1 2 members (2) 3 5 members (3) 6 9 members (4) 10 15 members (5) 15 and above

11. How many rooms your family were occupying in your former village?

(1) 1 2 Rooms (2) 3 5 Rooms (3) 6 9 Rooms (4) 10 15 Rooms (5) 16 and above.

12. How many rooms are your fam ily occupying now?

(1) 1 2 Rooms (2) 3 5 Rooms (3) 6 9 Rooms (4) 10 15 Rooms (5) 16 and above.

192 DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

13 (a) Was the allocation of houses on room to room basis?

(1) Yes (2) No

(b) rf no what is the criterion of allocation?

14. There was more space for additional buildings. (l) Before resettlement (2) After resettlement (3) None of the above.

15. (a) Are you satisfied with the village grouping at the new settlement?

( l) Yes (2) No

(b) If no why?: ......

16. Has the resettlement programme resulted into overcrowding?

(1) Yes (2) No

193 BUILDING SURVEY

17. Are you satisfied with the housing design?

(1) Yes (2) No

18. How do you assess the resettlement buildings?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Fair (4) Bad

19. Are there bad things you have noticed about the resettlement buidings?

(1) Yes (2) No

20. If Yes, what are they? ......

21. (a) How true are these statements?

(i) The site of the resettlement town is unpleasant. (1) (ii) The spatial pattern (planning) of the houses is not satisfactory. (2)

(iii) The design of the houses is bad. (3) (iv) The size of the rooms is small. (4)

(v) There are inadequate infrastrctural facilities rn the houses. (5)

194 (vi) ls the Government involved in the maintenance of the resettlement housing units?

(b) Were you introduced on the general use and cleanliness of the housing units?

(1) Yes (2) No

22. (a) Do you have any complain about your new house?

(1) Yes (2) No

(b) If Yes, specify:

23. What good things have you noticed about your new house?

(1) Well built (2) Adequate rooms (3) Has space for expansion (4) Not far away from farmland.

24. Please choose tbe most appropriate option with regards to how your resettlement house was built.

The Government built the house and allocated it to you.

(1)

The Government paid you cas to build the house. (2)

195 The Government provided you building materials to build the house. (3)

The Government made layout plots and gave you money installmentally to build the house. (4)

25 . Did the Government provide granaries to your resettlement housing units.

(1) Yes (2) No

26. Did the Government provide tarred roads and side drainages at the resettlement towns?

(1) Yes (2) No

27. Did the Government provide access road to the resettlement town?

(1) Yes (2) No

28. (a) Have some of your people left the resettlement town to other places?

(1) Yes (2) No

(b) If Yes, give reason (s): ......

196 29. Do you prefer to be in your former village and be integrated with the development of the Federal Capital Territory?

(1) Yes (2) No

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

30. Was there enough publicity on the reasons for your resettlement?

(1) Yes (2) No

3 1. Were you consulted on the selection of the new site?

(1) Yes (2) No

32. (a) Were you consulted to the type and design of the new housing units?

(1) Yes (2) No

(b) lf yes, what was your opinion?

(1) The rooms should be rectangular

(2) The rooms should be circular.

33. (a) Have all the group of villages come under the leadership of one traditional ruler?

(1) Yes (2) No

197 (b) Has the resettlement pol icy reduced your opportunities m pol itical participation?

(1) Yes (2) No

(c) If Yes, in what way (s)?

(I) I have Iittle chance for political appointment.

(2) I can not vote in all the elections.

(3) None of the above

35. Were you involved in the choice of farm lands at the New settlement?

(1) Yes (2) No

36. Are you encouraged by the Authorities to form Community Development Associations? (1) Yes (2) No

37. Do you have a forum to complain to the Authorities about you condition in the new resettlement?

(1) Yes (2) No

38. (a) How do you rate the effort of Government in the maintenance of the resettlement town?

(1) Low

198 (2) Average (3) High

(b) Please give reason(s) for the choice of any of the grade in 8 (a):

39. (a) Do you pay the same tax now as before the resettlement?

(1) Yes (2) No

(b) If "No" which tax is higher?

(1) Before resettlement (2) After resettlement

40. Indicate the services available at the old and new settlements?

Pre-Resettlement Post Resettlement

(I) Pipe borne water (11) (2) Electricity (12) (3) Schools (13) (4) Market (14) (5) Clinic (15) (6) Town Hall (16) (7) Mosque (17) (8) Church (18) (9) Burial Ground (19) (10) Recreational facility (20)

199 41. (a) Do you like this new settlement?

(1) Yes (2) No

(b) ff no give reason(s): ......

42. Did you like it at first when you told to move to the new settlement?

(1) Yes (2) No

PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION

43. (a) Are you satisfied with the type of properties and crops assessed for the payment of compensation?

(1) Yes (2) No

If (b) "No" give reason(s): ......

,

44. Were you informed how much you were entitled for compensation before payment effected?

(1) Yes (2) No

• '

. '

200 •A

. v:lf.,' 45 . (a) Was the cash compensation correctly paid to you?

(I) Yes (2) No

(b) If "No" give reason(s): ......

46. The time it took between assessment and payment of compensation.

( l) Nine months (2) About one Year (3) About 3 years ( 4) More than 4 years

4 7. If 46 ( 4) is your answer, was inflation taken into consideration?

(1) Yes (2) No

48. (a) Were all of you paid the same amount of compensation?

(1) Yes (2) No

(b) [f "No" explain: ......

49. Were some individuals or villages omitted in the payment of compensation?

(I) Yes (2) No

201 50. Was compensation paid before movement to the new settlement?

(1) Yes (2) No

51. Who owns the house you left in the former town?

(1) Yourself (2) Government (3) Others (4) Demolished

52. (a) Have you been completely paid compensation by Government?

(1) Yes (2) No

(b) If No, how much balance are you expecting to be paid to you? N: ��-

Once again, thank you very much for your responses. And be rest assure that your responses will be utilised solely for academic purposes, and confidentiality is guaranteed .

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