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In the Supreme Court of the United States NO. 19-____ In the Supreme Court of the United States STATE OF ARIZONA, Petitioner, v. PHILIP JOHN MARTIN, Respondent. On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Arizona Supreme Court PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI MARK BRNOVICH ORAMEL H.(O.H.) SKINNER Attorney General Solicitor General JOSEPH T. MAZIARZ JOSEPH A. KANEFIELD Section Chief Counsel Chief Deputy and Chief LINLEY WILSON of Staff Deputy Solicitor General Counsel of Record BRUNN W. ROYSDEN III OFFICE OF THE Division Chief ATTORNEY GENERAL 2005 N. Central Ave. Phoenix, AZ 85004 (602) 542-5025 [email protected] Counsel for Petitioner i QUESTION PRESENTED In Green v. United States, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial of a greater offense when the jury’s “verdict was silent” on that offense. 355 U.S. 184, 186, 190–91 (1957). In Rich- ardson v. United States, the Court affirmed that the hung jury rule permits retrial of an offense on which the jury was unable to agree. 468 U.S. 317, 324 (1984). Here, a jury convicted respondent, Philip Martin, of second-degree murder. In its verdict, the jury stated it was “unable to agree” on the greater, first-degree murder charge. Martin successfully appealed, and his conviction was reversed. On remand, the State again sought—and obtained—a first-degree murder conviction. The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the conviction, holding the Double Jeopardy Clause barred Martin’s retrial for first-degree murder under Green. The question presented, upon which courts are di- vided, is: When a jury expressly states it is “unable to agree” on a defendant’s guilt for a greater offense and con- victs the defendant of a lesser offense, and the de- fendant successfully appeals his conviction, does the hung jury rule permit retrial of the greater offense or does Green instead bar retrial of that offense? ii STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS State v. Philip Martin, CR-18-0380-PR (Ariz.) (opinion reversing first-degree murder conviction filed Aug. 9, 2019). State v. Philip Martin, 1 CA-CR 16-0551 (Ariz. App.) (opinion affirming first-degree murder conviction and memorandum decision addressing other issues filed June 19, 2018). State v. Philip Martin, CR-15-0034-PR (Ariz.) (order denying review of State’s petition for review filed Ju- ly 10, 2015). State v. Philip Martin, 1 CA-CR 13-0839 (Ariz. App.) (memorandum decision reversing second-degree murder conviction filed Dec. 23, 2014). State v. Philip Martin, CR-2012-01326 (Mohave Cty. Super. Ct.) (judgment and sentence for first-degree murder entered Aug. 1, 2016; judgment and sentence for second-degree murder entered Nov. 8, 2013). iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTION PRESENTED........................................... i STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS ......... ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................ iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... vii OPINIONS BELOW .................................................... 1 JURISDICTION .......................................................... 1 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED ...... 1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 4 A. Martin Is Tried For First-Degree Murder ...................................................... 4 B. Jury “Unable To Agree” On First-Degree Murder, But Convicts Of Second-Degree ...................... 5 C. Martin Appeals And Secures A Retrial Based On Jury- Instruction Error ...................................... 6 D. The Trial Court Grants The State’s Motion To Retry Martin For First-Degree Murder, And The Second Jury Convicts Him Of This Offense ........................................ 6 iv TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued Page E. The Arizona Court Of Appeals Affirms Conviction, Rejecting Double Jeopardy Claim Premised On Green .................................. 8 F. The Arizona Supreme Court Reverses Martin’s Conviction, Holding That Green Controls Rather Than Richardson ......................... 9 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ....... 11 I. The Decision Below Cannot Be Reconciled With The Hung Jury Rule Or The Continuing Jeopardy Rule .............................................................. 12 II. The Arizona Supreme Court’s Decision Deepens A Widespread Conflict ......................................................... 18 III. The Question Presented Is A Recurring Issue Of Nationwide Importance ................................................... 30 IV. This Case Is In The Best Possible Posture For The Court To Resolve The Split And Clarify The Interaction Of Its Existing Cases ............... 33 CONCLUSION .......................................................... 34 v APPENDIX Appendix A Arizona Supreme Court Opinion (August 9, 2019) ............................ App. 1 Appendix B Arizona Court of Appeals Opinion (June 19, 2018) ............................ App. 19 Appendix C Minute Entry of the Mohave County Superior Court of Arizona (April 5, 2016) ............................. App. 30 Appendix D Arizona Court of Appeals Memoran- dum Decision (December 23, 2014) ................... App. 42 Appendix E Arizona Supreme Court Order (July 10, 2015) ............................. App. 53 Appendix F Minute Entry of the Mohave County Superior Court of Arizona (August 1, 2016) .......................... App. 55 Appendix G Jury Verdict Filed in the Mohave County Superior Court (October 10, 2013) ....................... App. 59 Appendix H Excerpt of Trial Transcript of Proceedings in the Mohave Coun- ty Superior Court on October 10, 2013 ............................................. App. 61 vi Appendix I Minute Entry of the Mohave County Superior Court of Arizona (November 8, 2013) ..................... App. 68 vii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Arizona v. Washington 434 U.S. 497 (1978) ................................................ 17 Bravo-Fernandez v. United States 137 S. Ct. 352 (2016)...................................... 2, 3, 30 Brazzel v. Washington 491 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007)...................... 11, 27, 28 Bullington v. Missouri 451 U.S. 430 (1981) ...................................... 1, 15, 32 Calderon v. Thompson 523 U.S. 538 (1998) ................................................ 32 Cleary v. State 23 N.E.3d 664 (Ind. 2015)...................................... 24 Comm. v. Carlino 865 N.E.2d 767 (Mass. 2007) ................................. 26 Currier v. Virginia 138 S. Ct. 2144 (2018)............................................ 30 Green v. United States 355 U.S. 184 (1957) ........................................ passim Justices of Boston Mun. Ct. v. Lydon 466 U.S. 294 (1984) ................................................ 15 Kennedy v. Washington 986 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1993)................................ 26 Lockhart v. Nelson 488 U.S. 33 (1988) .................................................. 14 viii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued North Carolina v. Pearce 395 U.S. 711 (1969) ................................................ 15 People v. Aguilar 317 P.3d 1255 (Colo. App. 2012) ........................... 25 People v. Fields 914 P.2d 832 (Cal. 1996) ............................ 12, 23, 24 People v. Fisher 632 N.E.2d 689 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) ....................... 29 Price v. Georgia 398 U.S. 323 (1970) .................................................. 3 Richardson v. United States 468 U.S. 317 (1984) ........................................ passim Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania 537 U.S. 101 (2003) .............................. 14, 16, 27, 32 Schiro v. Farley 510 U.S. 222 (1994) .................................................. 3 Selvester v. United States 170 U.S. 262 (1898) ................................................ 13 State v. Glasmann 349 P.3d 829 (Wash. 2015) .............................. 21, 22 State v. Kent 678 S.E.2d 26 (W. Va. 2009) .................................. 26 State v. LeBlanc 924 P.2d 441 (Ariz. 1996) ........................................ 5 State v. Martinez 905 P.2d 715 (N.M. 1995) ................................ 22, 23 ix TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —Continued State v. Sprang 251 P.3d 389 (Ariz. App. 2011) ................................ 5 Terry v. Potter 111 F.3d 454 (6th Cir. 1997)............................ 28, 29 United States ex rel. Jackson v. Follette 462 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1972) ................................. 25 United States v. Allen 755 A.2d 402 (D.C. 2000) ................................. 11, 25 United States v. Bordeaux 121 F.3d 1187 (8th Cir. 1997).................... 11, 19, 20 United States v. Ham 58 F.3d 78 (4th Cir. 1995) ..................................... 26 United States v. Scott 437 U.S. 82 (1978) ............................................ 16, 32 United States v. Williams 449 F.3d 635 (5th Cir. 2006).................................. 20 United States v. Wood 958 F.2d 963 (10th Cir. 1992)................................ 26 Yeager v. United States 557 U.S. 110 (2009) ................................................ 11 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS U.S. Const. amend. V .................................................. 1 STATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ...................................................... 1 x TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued RULES Ariz. R. Crim. P. 23.3 .................................................. 6 1 OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court is re- ported at 446 P.3d 806. App. 1–18. That opinion re- versed the Arizona Court of Appeals’ opinion, which is reported at 424 P.3d 443. App. 19–29. The order of the state superior court in which the question pre- sented
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