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Temporal Experiences and Their Parts

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Temporal Experiences and Their Parts volume 11, no. 11 september 2011 1. Temporal Experiences? We think we perceive worldly objects (cows, chairs, fire-trucks) and some of their properties (colour, shape, the spatial relations between objects, as well as their parts). We don’t perceive all of their properties, of course: seeing a cow in a pasture usually provides little information about its birthday or DNA. One difficult question is how to draw the Temporal Experiences line between those properties that are strictly speaking perceptually accessible and those that aren’t?1 This paper focuses on one specific sort of property: are temporal properties and relations perceptible — in the same way, that is, as shapes, colours, and spatial relations?2 and Their Parts Examples like the following apparently support a positive answer:3 Change/motion: we perceive objects change properties over time, including changes in spatial location, as when one sees a cockatoo fly through one’s visual field. Succession: we perceive different events succeeding one another, as when one hears the successive notes in a melody. Duration: we perceive the length of some intervals, as when one hears the duration of a single tone. Philippe Chuard 1. “Strictly speaking” because it’s often possible to infer the presence of some Southern Methodist University property upon seeing another, the presence of which is correlated (more or less reliably) with the former. For a lean answer according to which we visually perceive only colours and shapes, see, e. g., McGinn (1982); for a less lean one, Siegel (2005). 2. If perceptual experiences have a representational content, the question is whether they represent temporal properties and how. If they are a-representational, the question can be phrased in terms of whether we perceive temporal properties and how they appear to us. I assume the former throughout (pace Alston 2005; Martin 2002, 2004; and Travis 2004) — though nothing really hangs on this, I think. © 2011 Philippe Chuard 3. See, e. g., Dainton (2000: 113–14; 2002: 94), Le Poidevin (2004a; 2007: 76–77, <www.philosophersimprint.org/011011/> 87), Tye (2003: 85–88). philippe chuard Temporal Experiences and Their Parts Taken at face value, these examples suggest, first, that we perceive not mentioned. The positive answer — we do perceive succession, order, only objects but also events and processes. Second, it seems we can and duration (in the same way we perceive colours and shapes) — is perceive some of the temporal relations such events and processes in- associated with a view, or family of views, sometimes referred to as the stantiate. Succession is a relation between at least two events, such “extensional model”, sometimes as the “specious present”. I’ll call the that one event occurs earlier or later than another; duration can be negative answer — we don’t perceive such temporal relations —“tem- thought of as the “length” of an interval separating its beginning and poral perceptual atomism” (one often hears the term “retention theory” end; as for change and motion, they involve instantiations of different for a similar view).6 properties at different times, when the instantiation of one property What’s particularly interesting about these answers is how both succeeds another. It’s worth noting that the existence of such relations seem motivated by different conceptions of the temporal ontology of is common ground between the two contending theories of the meta- experience. For the positive answer, we can perceive temporal rela- physics of time: the A-theory and the B-theory.4 Hence, whether we tions between non-simultaneous events precisely because our experi- perceive such relations or not has little bearing on whether (1) events ences are temporally extended in some way, either by having an ex- have properties such as being past, present, and future (and whether tended content, representing a temporally extended portion of reality they are perceptually represented as having such properties, veridi- (even if the experience itself, qua mental event, isn’t extended), or in cally or not), and whether (2) time passes.5 the sense that experiences themselves have a certain duration. Advo- In any case, the concern here isn’t what implication (if any) our ex- cates of the negative answer insist, on the other hand, that the reason periences may have for the metaphysics of time. The question, rather, why such temporal relations aren’t really perceived is that our expe- is whether we have “temporal experiences” in the first place, by which riences lack any temporal extension. We’ll see shortly what grounds I mean: perceptual experiences of temporal relations of the sort just such differences, and what these views amount to, exactly. 4. As I understand the dispute, A-theorists claim that (1) events have so-called Here I develop what I take to be an important difficulty for the ‘A’-properties — such as being present, past, and future — and that (2) time is positive answer — the mereological argument. In essence, the argu- dynamic in the sense that different events become present, and then past, ment targets what advocates of the extensional model should say over time. B-theorists, in contrast, deny (1): there are only B-locations such as particular dates or temporal locations, and B-temporal relations like being about the mereology of temporally extended experiences — and what, simultaneous with, earlier or later than. Hence, they deny the passage of time I try to argue, they cannot really say, or have no reason for saying, at in the sense of (2). But there’s no reason why A-theorists cannot acknowledge B-temporal relations (and locations). See, e. g., Butterfield (1984), Callender least. Though the argument does in fact apply to versions of the view (2008), Dainton (2002), Mellor (1998), Newton-Smith (1980). 5. Conversely, it has little bearing on whether we perceive such relations that 6. Terminological difficulties: the positive answer is often tagged “the specious their relata are perceptually represented or not as present (or past), pace Le present” — presumably because James (1952) is the one theorist mostly Poidevin (2004a) — compare Le Poidevin (2007: 80–81). Thus, as Tye (2003: concerned with the “specious present” and his seems to be an extensional 86–87) and others (e. g., Callender 2008; Mellor, 1998: §4.3) have suggested, model. Recently, however, Barry Dainton (2008) has used “the specious experiences may well represent events as occurring now (rather than as being present” for the phenomenon to be explained rather than for a particular present), where this picks out a B-relation (simultaneity) to the experience theory, so that even the retentional model attempts to account for the itself. Presentness doesn’t appear to be James’s (1952: 399) main concern — see “specious present”, by his lights. Since this is a merely terminological issue, Kelly (2005: 226, n. 14): he considers experiences of events at a time that is and a rather confusing one, I’ll refrain from using the phrase “specious the present, not whether such events are perceived as present or not. For his present”, which is probably just as well. Note also that not all versions of part, Dainton maintains that experiences have a certain phenomenological what I call “atomism” are versions of the retention theory: the latter, rather, is presence, not that they represent things as present (2000: 121–23; 2008: 371). a specific version of atomism, as I understand it. philosophers’ imprint – 2 – vol. 11, no. 11 (august 2011) philippe chuard Temporal Experiences and Their Parts according to which only the content of such experiences is extended, In contrast, temporal perceptual atomists deny both (i) and (ii): we the discussion will focus on the claim that experiences themselves don’t really perceive temporal relations between non-simultaneous have duration.7 But first, a few words about the nature of the dispute. events, since neither our perceptual experiences nor their content are temporally extended. 2. The Dispute First, a word about the connection between (i) and (ii). What seems Understanding what exactly is at stake between the positive and nega- to crucially inform the dispute is an assumption, apparently shared by tive answers isn’t easy. I shan’t engage in any exegesis. Instead, I’ll both sides, about the perceptual representation of relations in general: limit myself to laying down what strike me as the central bones of The relational constraint contention between these different accounts of temporal experience. For any relation R, a subject S can perceive R between x and y only if S perceives both its relata x and y. 2.1. The Relational Constraint At the heart of the positive answer we find the idea that (i) we perceive It’s plausible that I wouldn’t be able to see the difference between the temporal relations between non-simultaneous events and (ii) are able shade of red on the left and the darker one on the right if I couldn’t to do so in virtue of our experiences being extended in time — by hav- see both shades. Nor could I see Mathilda’s being to the left of Izzy if I ing an extended content, or by occurring over a given interval. For couldn’t see them both. The same goes for temporal relations, it seems. instance, This would explain why different views about the ontology of ex- The unit of composition of our perception of time is a perience guide different answers as to whether temporal relations are duration, with a bow and a stern, as it were — a rearward- perceived or not. According to the extensional model, it’s precisely and a forward-looking end. It is only as parts of this dura- because our perceptual experiences are temporally extended that a tion-block that the relation of succession of one end to the single experience can represent non-simultaneous events and the other is perceived.
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