Praxis Filosófica ISSN: 0120-4688 [email protected] Universidad del Valle Colombia

Felletti, Flavia IS ENDURANTISM REALLY MORE PLAUSIBLE THAN PERDURANTISM FROM A COMMON-SENSE PERSPECTIVE? Praxis Filosófica, núm. 45, julio-diciembre, 2017, pp. 77-99 Universidad del Valle Cali, Colombia

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Abstract

I will discuss three arguments in favor of perdurantism, the thesis that objects persist by having temporal parts located at different times. Firstly, I will introduce the rival accounts of persistence of perdurantism and endurantism. Then I will discuss three arguments for perdurantism: the problem of temporary intrinsics, the argument from vagueness and the argument from Special Relativity. I will conclude that none of them represents a knock-down argument for perdurantism. However, endurantism faces important difficulties in offering its solutions to the issues at stake, and the solutions proposed are often at odds with commonsense. Therefore, if one of the main problem for perdurantism is its being at odds with commonsense, endurantism is in no better position with respect to this issue.

Keywords: persistence; endurantism; perdurantism; temporary intrinsics; vagueness.

Recibido: 13 de septiembre de 2016. Aprobado: 21 de noviembre de 2016.

Praxis Filosófica Nueva serie, No. 45 Suplemento, julio-diciembre 2017: 77 - 99 (D): 2389-9387 (I): 0120-4688 / ISSN ISSN DOI: 10.25100/pfilosófica.v0i45S.6076 ¿Es realmente más plausible el endurantismo que el perdurantismo de acuerdo con el sentido común?

Resumen

En este artículo discutiré tres de los principales argumentos a favor de que los objetos persisten al tener partes temporales ubicadas en diferentes momentos. A este punto de vista se ha denominado perdurantismo. En la primera sección, presentaré dos teorías rivales de la persistencia, el perdurantismo y el endurantismo. A continuación discutiré tres argumentos a favor del perdurantismo: el argumento a partir de los intrínsecos temporales, el argumento de la vaguedad y el argumento de la relatividad especial. Concluiré que ninguno de estos argumentos es conclusivo a favor del perdurantismo, pero mostraré que el endurantismo enfrenta dificultades importantes para ofrecer sus soluciones a los problemas relevantes, y que las soluciones propuestas son a menudo en desacuerdo con el sentido común. En consecuencia, si uno de los principales problemas para el perdurantismo radica en su desacuerdo con el sentido común, el endurantismo no está en una mejor posición.

Palabras clave: persistencia; endurantismo; perdurantismo; intrínsecos temporales; vaguedad.

Flavia Felletti. Estudiante de doctorado en la Universidad de Duisburg-Essen y ex investigador visitante en la Universidad ICESI de Cali. Maestría en filosofía analítica de la Universidad de Barcelona. Maestría en Ciencias Cognitivas y Lenguaje de la Universidad de Barcelona. Sus publicaciones recientes incluyen “What autism can tell us about the relationship between empathy and moral reasoning?” en Phenomenology and Mind y (2016) “The Rule of Accommodation for Presuppositions in Lewis’ Language Game” en Dialogue. Sus áreas de interés son la filosofía de la mente y las ciencias cognitivas, la metafísica y la filosofía del lenguaje. Dirección electrónica: [email protected] IS ENDURANTISM REALLY MORE PLAUSIBLE THAN PERDURANTISM FROM A COMMON-SENSE PERSPECTIVE?1 Flavia Felletti Universidad de Duisburg-Essen

Introduction There are two main rival accounts of persistence over time. Endurantism is the thesis that objects persist by being wholly present at any time of their existence. Perdurantism is the thesis that objects persist by having temporal parts dislocated among the spans of time in which they exist. Endurantism seems to be the view most favored by commonsense, whereas perdurantism and the metaphysics of temporal parts have been criticized by many. Among these, Thomson (1983, p.210) defined it as “crazy metaphysics – obviously false”, while Van Inwagen claimed of temporal parts: ‘I think that no one understands what they are supposed to be, though of course plenty of philosophers think they do’ (Van Inwagen 1981, p. 90). However, never mind how peculiar perdurantism and the metaphysics of temporal parts might sound, perdurantists believe that there are very good arguments supporting their view. In this paper, I will discuss three of the main arguments in favor of perdurantism: the problem of temporary intrinsics (Lewis 1986, Sider 1997, 2001), the argument from vagueness (Sider 1997, 2001, and 2008), and the argument from Special Relativity (Putnam 1967, Dorato 2013).

1 I would like to thank Sven Rosenkanz, Francesco Gallina, and Alessio Santelli for their useful comments on a previous version of this paper. 80 Flavia Felletti provided byfollowingthecharacterizationofthemLewis: be can persistence of accounts different two these to introduction Agood philosophers define fourdimensionalism in conjunction with perdurantism generally (but notalways not always with two contrasting accounts ofpersistence. Presentism isusually (but associated generally are reality and time of accounts different two These – analogoustothethreedimensions ofspace– alongwhichreality extends. present, and future are all equally real; and that time is a fourth dimension the present time is real. Fourdimensionalism is rather the thesis that past, structure ofrealitythatderivesfromit.Presentismisthethesisonly Perdurantism andEndurantism to thisissue. odds withcommonsense, endurantism is innobetter position with respect Thus, ifoneofthemainproblem for perdurantism consists ofitsbeingat is. perdurantism as commonsense with conflict in much as be to appear difficulties in offering their own solutions, and that many of these solutions what emerges from the discussion is that endurantists certainly face important these arguments by proposing different solutions to the issues at stake. But argument in favorofperdurantism. Indeed, endurantists can replytoanyof located at different times of the objects’ existence. In this sense, objects can is thethesisaccordingtowhich objectspersistbyhavingtemporal parts 4 3 2 not differenta commonpart.Perdurance timeshastheenduringthingas does whenever itisinstantiated.Enduranceinvolvesoverlap:the contentoftwo a universal,if there are such things,would be wholly present wherever and wholly present attwodifferent places.Endurancecorresponds totheway through space;partofitishere andpartofitisthere, andnopartofitis more thanonetime.Perdurance corresponds tothewayaroad persists than onetime;whereas itendures iffitpersistsbybeingwhollypresent at stages, atdifferent times, though noone part of it is wholly present at more Something perdures iff it persistsby having different temporal parts,or

Among these, E.g. E.g Let’s discuss these twoviewsin order. First,Perdurantism. Perdurantism the and time about thinking of ways different very two are There I willconcludenoneofsucharguments constitutesaknock-down (1986, p.201) ., Brogaard(2000)argues that presentismiscompatiblewithperdurantism. , Parsons(2000)defendsfourdimensionalism whilerejectsperdurantism. 2 ) associatedwithendurantism,whereasfourdimensionalism e.g., Sider (1997)and Jackson(1998). 3 ) goeshandinwithperdurantism,andmany 4 . means, wrinkles also have temporal parts, and some ofthetemporal parts person also change over time. For instance, wrinkles become deeper. This whole personalongthesamedimension. Furthermore, thespatial parts ofa temporal dimension does not completely overlap with the extension of the not partofapersonalongherwholelife;thatis,their extension alongthe teeth as a child, and wrinkles whenshegets older. Teeth and wrinkles are have temporal parts. A persongrowsandgetsolderovertime. She grows inches distantfromherhead. Analogously, thespatialpartsofapersonalso the three spatial dimensions, by having, let us say, her feet around nineteen at a time parts might have temporal parts (Loux 1998). A temporal part of a person bigger thantheoneofanyhertemporalparts. her; wheretheextension of apersonalongthefourthdimension is certainly person, foranystage of aperson’s life corresponds toatemporal part of say that the newborn and the old woman are both temporal parts of the same Indeed, those who endorse the perdurantist account of persistence would asanewbornandsheanoldwomanareonethesameperson. that she do not share many characteristics. Despite this, we might be likely to think woman old an as person such and newborn a as person such sight, first At following example. Considerapersonalongthe durationofherwholelife. its partsatleast in itstemporal dimension coincides with thewholeobject itself. Indeed,theobject is biggerthanall whole object to which it belongs, none of the temporal parts of an object real onlybecauseitisfarfromus. we wouldnotsaythat what islocated at theendofaroadweareonisnot than all the parts that are accessible to us at any present time. In the end, can be far in the past, or in the future, but this does not make them less real They mightbemoreorlessdistantfromaconsideredtimeofreference,they time, oneat any ofthe times covered bythe existence ofa considered object. with theroad,all temporal parts are located along the fourth dimension of draws Lewis that analogy the Following times. different at located parts temporal different having by time through also and parts, spatial different be thoughas“spacetime worms”, whichextendsthroughspacebyhaving may survivefor long timeafteraperson’sdeath. This means,theypersist longerthanthe each spatial part of a person could be divided into smaller spatial parts, each of themaredeeperthanothers 6 5

A clearer example might be provided by taking into consideration, Unless webelieveininstantaneous objects. Furthermore, temporalpartsmighthavespatialparts,justas Moreover, aswellnoproperpartofanobjectcoincides with the t might be a newborn. Such a newborn obviously extends through 6 . And, itmightalso bepossiblethatjustas 5 . To clarify this, considerthe e.g ., bones. Bones

Is endurantism really more plausible than perdurantism ... 81 82 Flavia Felletti against this view. Iwill conclude that some of these counterarguments do and I will discuss some of the counterarguments that endurantists provide focus onthearguments thatsupport themoreradical view ofperdurantism, departure from the commonsense conception of time and parthood – I will is (atleastapparently) endurantism –foritdoesnotrequireanystrong favor andagainsteitherview. Sincetheviewmostfavoredbycommonsense have been introduced, we can proceed by discussing some of the arguments in identical withhimselfatanytimeofhisexistence. existing at another time’ (Loux1998,p.231). That is, Louxisnumerically as ‘thenumerical identity of onethingexisting atonetime withathing today’ bothdenoteasingleconcreteparticular, forpersistenceisconceived Loux (1998),expressions such as ‘The Loux ofyesterday’ and ‘The Loux of object endures,suchanisnumericallyidenticalwithitself.Following endure throughtime. And atanytimeinaninterval throughout whichan to endurantists objects are three dimensional, extend through space, and does. Indeed,endurantistsdenythatobjectshavetemporalparts. According means that she existsat that time, and notthat one ofhertemporal parts of these times in all her entirety. That is, sayingthat she existsat t their existence. A personthatexistsatsometimest according to which objects persist by being wholly present at any time of most ofthearguments infavor ofperdurantism. But whetherornottemporal parts canbeinstantaneous isofnoimportfor be parts temporal that require should definition as (mereologically)large enoughpartsthatareinstantaneous,butperhapsthe the question. By contrast, Sider (2001, p.67) claims: ‘I define temporal parts instantaneous temporal parts. Heller (1984),forexample, remains neutral on controversial andnotallperdurantistscommitthemselvestotheexistenceof times astoobtaininstantaneoustemporalparts.However, thismatterisvery similar toeachother. another along thetemporal dimension, the moretheymight be qualitatively into smaller temporal parts temporal part ofthat person –andofherspatial parts –couldbedivided instant there is a next instant and an immediately preceding instant (Shoemaker 1969, p.376). instant thereisa next instantandanimmediatelypreceding instant(Shoemaker1969, p.376). not necessarily committed to saythattime is dense,forit might be temporal partslocatedevenafter theperson’s bodyonesalong thefourthdimension. whole bodyofthepersontowhich theybelong,andthisinvirtue of thefact that they have 7

This is we consider time to be Now thatthetwocontrasting viewsofendurantism and perdurantism Finally, Endurantism. Roughlyspeaking,endurantismistheview It might finally be possible that temporal parts could be divided as many 7 . The more these temporal parts are close to one dense or continuous . However, fourdimensionalists are essentially 1 , t discrete 2 ,..., t instantaneous’. n existsateach , i.e., that for any 1 simply reason why it is so becomes clear if we assume a “timeless perspective” of (intrinsic) properties. identical with themselves over time, despite thefactthattheychangetheir are committed tocontradict (LL) forthey claim that objects are numerically different intrinsicpropertiesattimes. straight-shaped are two different objects, in virtue of the fact that they have same properties: with Leibniz’s Law: out bySider(2008)isthatitseems temporal parts of him. One reasonforfavoring this solution, also pointed temporal parts,justasthepropertyofbeingstraight-shapedbelongstoother Accordingly, person. thepropertyofbeingbent-shapedbelongstosomeLewis’s same the of parts temporal different to namely, things; different to belong intrinsics temporary different reasoning, his Following parts. by Lewis: the to solution problem of temporary intrinsics. Let us introduce the problem as presented a offer to persistence of account an such for possibility The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics problem ofbeingatoddswithcommonsenseisconcerned. not putendurantism in abetter position than perdurantism as longthe times: Lewis is bent-shaped, must be specified, then, is that such properties belong to Lewis at different straight-shaped belongto the verysameperson;namely, toLewis. What reality. Indeed,thepropertyofbeingbent-shaped andthepropertyofbeing ∀ the times.Howissuchchangepossible? Both shapesare temporaryintrinsicproperties: Ihavethemonlysomeof when Isit,haveabentshape;stand,straightenedshape. Persisting thingschangetheirintrinsicproperties. Forinstanceshape: However, asSider(2008)claims, thisargument isnotsatisfying. The According to a first formulation of the challenge, instead, endurantists For the perdurantists might say that Lewis bent-shaped and Lewis (LL) Foranyxandy, ifxisidentical to y, thenxandyhaveall the The solutionfavoredbyLewisappealstotheexistence of temporal One ofthemainarguments infavorofperdurantismreliesonthe x ∀ y[x =y→ ∀ P (Px↔Py)] e.g ., at t prima facie prima 1 , and he is straight-shaped, (1986,p.203-204) to avoid entering in conflict e.g ., at t 2 .

Is endurantism really more plausible than perdurantism ... 83 84 Flavia Felletti a possible solution might be to distinguish then between different kinds different between then distinguish to be might solution possible a latter casethepropertywouldexistsimplyasinrelation to time. Tentatively, in questionexistsrelationbothtotimeandanother individual,inthe straight-shaped might still hold. Indeed, whereas in the first case the property relational properties” such asbeing-a-sister, andproperties suchasbeing that areintuitivelyverydifferentintheirnature. commonly regarded asgenuinely relational – suchas‘beingasister’ –and distinction between this kind of properties and all those properties that are straight-shaped’ to relational properties, then, is that this move levels the The problem of reducing properties as ‘being bent-shaped’ and ‘being “being a sister or sonbornfromthesameparents.Inotherwords,there is nosuchthingas existence of anotherperson;namely, ontheexistence of anotherdaughter a-sister. Havingthe property of being a sister necessarily depends onthe that certainly are relational. Consider, forinstance, the propertyofbeing- bent-shaped’ and ‘being straight-shaped’ are different from other properties are relational is that there isaclear sense inwhichproperties suchas‘being why wemightnotwanttocommitourselvestheclaimthatallproperties they arerelational inthesensethattheyarerelationstotimes. The reason that thesepropertiesarenotintrinsicproperties,butrather straight-shaped’ are all fundamentally indexed properties. This also means ‘beingbent-shaped’committed tosaythatpropertiessuchas or‘being they havethem temporal parts ofwhichtheyareconstituted have non-indexedproperties: their whole temporal existence havetemporally indexed properties, but the can have non-indexed properties. In this sense, then, objects considered in of temporalpartsisthat parts –byexisting onlyatasingletime– endorse perdurantismhaveoverthosewhodenytheexistence those who i.e perspective, such propertiescan beseenastemporally indexed properties; of temporalpartsemerges. But byelaborating this argument, Sidernotes,anotherargument infavor are relational, which implies itself animportant departure from ourway of appealing, althoughitrequires theacceptanceofclaimthatallproperties quite solution this find I individuals. or objects other to also or times, to the basis of its possibility to have such properties in relation either only of relationsandtocategorize thepropertiesthatanobjectcanhaveon ., propertiesthatanobjecthasinrelation to times. The advantage that However, as Isee it, anessential distinction between “genuinely On thecontrary, thosewhodenytheexistence of temporalpartsare If weconsider, indeed,thepropertiesthatanobjecthasfromtimeless per se simpliciter ”, for a sister in necessarily a sister of another person. . relational ; time exists, northat theonlypropertiesthatanobject has arethose thatit property could still be intrinsic. Yet, oneandthesameobject Following thissolution, properties would notberelations to time, but they problem oftemporaryintrinsicsconsistssayingthatproperties aretensed argument fromSpecialRelativity. partly discussthisissueinthefourthsectionofpaper, togetherwiththe have beendiscussedintheliteratureofPhilosophy of Time. Iwill times – that is, against presentism – aswell as replies to these arguments possible solutiontotheproblemoftemporaryintrinsics. and reality would berequiredinordertoprovideabetter evaluation of this existence of characterization specific Plausibly,more does. a time present of dinosaursandfuturecivilizations exist inthesamesensewhich future are both as real as their present is; or – generalizing – that the times times. For, surelynotmanywouldbelikely to saythat their pastand exist. Very muchmight depend onwhatis meant by the existence of other a future,andonwhatitmeansthatall times, except the presentone,donot controversial. It depends,forexample, on whatismeant by havingapastor that no one would believe that he has neither future, nor past, might be more However,developed inanydepthbyLewis. theacceptability of the claim that he has no past’ (Lewis 1986, p. 204). This argument has not been his execution, believes that he has no future; still less does anyone believe what iscommonlybelieved,for‘Noman,unlessitbeingthemomentof equally unreal. objects would exist in thepresent,andpastfuturetimes would beall present time, and thatothertimesdonotexist at all. That means,allexisting intrinsic properties that an object has are those properties that it has at the discussed –andalsodiscarded – byLewis(1986) reject thisalternative. perspective is at stake, such adeparture might constitute a goodreason to conceiving properties. And, aslongtheplausibilityfromacommonsense that Lewis-in-the-past is numerically identical with Lewis-in-the-present, instantiates at the present time. Goingback to Lewis’s example, assuming 11 10 9 8

See But supportedbyMerricks(1999), aswewillseeinthelastsectionof thispaper.

Finally, afurtheralternative thatendurantists might embrace tosolve However, many arguments Lewis rejectsthisargument because,accordingtohim,itgoesagainst Another possible solution to the problem oftemporary intrinsics See I wishtothankSven Rosenkranzforpointingout thisalternative. e.g. e.g. F , but no longer has it. This would not imply that only the present Sider (2001)fordiscussion. Markosian (2004) fordiscussion. 9 against the unreality of past and future 8 istosaythat the only x mayoncehavehada 11 10 .

Is endurantism really more plausible than perdurantism ... 85 86 Flavia Felletti plank. (Let’s calltheshipobtained afteronereplacement‘Ship agree that The Shipof Theseus wouldsurvivethereplacement of asingle to replace all planks, one by one, with other similar ones. Most of us would The Shipof Theseus, discussedinSider(2001). and showing howperdurantism might help to solve this case: the case of this argument by discussing first a famous case in which vagueness occurs argument from vagueness(Sider1997,2001,and2008).Iwill introduce Vaguenessfrom The Argument sense whatisconcrete. present canbeconcrete, then itisnotpossibletodetermine in anyabsolute on theobserver’s frameofreference. Therefore, ifonlywhatexistsinthe absolute sensewhatispresent,forpresentanobserverdepends of Special Relativity is exactly that it is nopossible to determine in any see in more detail in the last section of this paper, one of the consequences a privileged existence with respect to pastandfuture times. But,aswewill within a relativistic framework, for it presupposes that the present time has to quantifyoverthem That is,sayingthatobjectsinthepastexist,simplymeansitispossible of pastandfuturetimestowhichthissolutionappealsisaveryweakone. Lewis presentlyphysicallylocatedinthepast.Rather, thenotionofexistence what ispresentcanbeconcrete. Roughlyspeaking,thereisnobent-shaped to claimthat‘past,present,andfuturetimesareall future times do. Indeed, following this reasoning, it becomes misleading distinction between the way the present time exists and the way past and allows thatnotonlythepresenttime exists, it seemstodrawanimportant past doesnotimplythatLewis beenbentshapedinthe has are notincompatible.Indeed,thefactthatLewis for heisstraight-shaped shaped; but, in the present, it is no longer the case that Lewis is bent-shaped, endurantists maysaythat,inthepast,itwascasethatLewisbent- = m). And suchdefinitionisin no waycommittaltotheclaimthat whatexistsisconcrete. the propertyofbeingstraight-shaped. a furtherreplacement‘Ship 13 12

Consider The Ship of Theseus, made of planks.Imagine that one starts A second,and more recent,argument infavorofperdurantismisthe considered when difficulty important an faces solution However,this it though even that, is solution this regarding notice to thing first A This supposing for a moment that Lewis still exists in the present, and that he now has This supposingforamomentthat Lewisstillexistsinthepresent,andthathenow A definition of existence that would be in accord with solution would be, e.g., Ǝx (x Ǝx e.g., be, would solution with accord in be would that existence Aof definition 13 . 12 . Havingbeenbent-shapedandbeing 2 ’, and so forth.) The ship that we finally obtain by presently isbentshapedinthepast. equally real’,foronly 1 ’, Ship 1 after after with Replacement.Butthisdoesnotseemtobethecase. they are made of the same exact planks, then Planks mustalsobe identical transitivity of identity, andPlanksisidentical with The Ship of Theseus for other. Infact,if The Shipof Theseus isidentical with Replacement for the relevant characteristic,PlanksandReplacementarealso identicalwitheach be committed to saythat, despite the fact that they do notseem to shareany for thetransitivity ofidentity. Followingsuchprinciple, indeed, wewould this claim would bring about an important problem. And this is so, again, an object (asitwasbefore)wouldcreate a newobject.However, accepting before. We arguably would not say that disassembling and reassembling object issimplydisassembledandreassembledagainexactlyasitwas planks. The situation, indeed, seems analogoustoasituation in whichan Planks areidentical with oneanother, fortheyaremadeofthesameexact call this ship‘Planks’. We mightwanttosaythat The Shipof Theseus and were reassembled together into a newship.Following Sider again, let’s of identity(Sider2001,p.7): any stageoftheprocess. To clarifythis,considerthe followingstatements survives thereplacement of asingleplank,andsodoesanyshipobtainedat y, andy=z,thenxz)togethertoaccept that The Shipof Theseus to sayifwewereapplythePrinciple of Transitivity of Identity (if x= identical with The Shipof Theseus, thisiswhatwewouldbecommitted original Shipof Theseus. FollowingSider, let’s callthisship‘Replacement’. substituting oneplankpertimedoesnotshareanyincommonwiththe of whichthese objectsareconstitutiveparts. every classofobjects has afusion,ormereological sum, Principle of Unrestricted Mereological Composition, according towhich fourdimensionalism –and themetaphysicsoftemporalparts–and According to Sider (2001), an answer can be provided by accepting both Ship Ship . . . Ship Ship The Shipof Theseus =Ship Which is, then, the ship that really is identical with The Ship of Theseus? Now imagine further that all planks removed from The Ship of Theseus Despite the fact that many of uswouldnotagree that Replacement is n n-1 2 1 =Replacement =Ship =Ship = Ship 3 2

n

1

i.e ., alarger object

Is endurantism really more plausible than perdurantism ... 87 88 Flavia Felletti simply populated byahostofcontinuing spacetime worms, ofwhichwename, not name,thinkof,orquantifyoverallofthem:‘The worldistherefore stages areconstitutive parts. this despitethefactthatweusuallydo And scattered and apparently unrelated) is part of alarger object of whichthose mereological sum means toaccept that any setofstages(nomatter how perdurantist picture of reality. But accepting that the spacetime worms thatcorrespondtoordinaryobjectsaccordingthe stages hasamereological sum. Among thesemereological there are sums fourdimensional world as a world of stages, whereas any set of these principle ofunrestricted mereological composition, wecansee the temporal partsjustastheyhavespatial also comprises what I defined as perdurantism: the claim that objects have it but paper), this of beginning the in fourdimensionalism defined I how is to theclaim that past andfuturetimes are as realasthepresenttime is (that conception of time as afourthdimension along which reality extends and it, fourdimensionalismcomprisesthemetaphysicsoftemporalparts: distinction between fourdimensionalism and perdurantism; for, as he defines employed by Sider might be needed. Indeed, Sider does not make any with whatIcharacterized asperdurantism. rather that itisadefinition that binds together what Icharacterized as fourdimensionalism that Sider’s definition offourdimensionalism is notthesameasoneofperdurantism, but perdurantism could alsobeconsistently associated with presentism. Indeed,Iwouldsay fourdimensionalism, for some philosophers(seee.g.Brogaard2000)defendtheviewthat specified thatsuchanaccountof persistenceisusually, 14 (Sider 1997,p.7) the object into temporal partsthat are connected to those intervals of time into separateintervalsoftime,there isacorresponding wayofdividing to time,the idea is that to anywayofdividing up the lifetime of anobject the object into partswhichexactly occupy thoseregions ofspace. Applied space occupied by agiven object, there isacorresponding waytodivide arbitrary partsmeans,roughly, thatforanywayofdividingtheregion of arbitrary temporalparts.Whenappliedtospace,theideathatthingshave to space:justasthingshavearbitraryspatialparts,they likewise have relation behaves analogouslywithrespect to timeasitdoeswithrespect As Iseeit,theheartoffourdimensionalismisclaimthatpart-whole

Following his definition of fourdimensionalism together with the with together fourdimensionalism of definition his Following the to limited not is fourdimensionalism of definition Sider’s this, In Before discussing Sider’s solution, a clarification about the terminology Noteworthy, if might be though that Sider’s definition offourdimensionalism is theviewthatIcalled‘perdurantism’. ButwhenIcharacterized perdurantismI 14 but notnecessarily . any setofstageshasa , associatedwith with very different properties, occupy the very same location at the very same time? The can twodifferentcome tocoincideatthetimeinwhich thestatuteiscreated.How objects, statue haveverydifferent properties.Itseems,however, that thestatueandlumpofclay imagine a situation in whichalumpofclay is modeled into astatue. A lumpofclay and a that is, the argument from cohabitation, discussed –among others –byHeller (1984).Inbrief, to be taken into account, but this is sobecause we tend to trace objects planks areequallymixedup. These spacetimearenotverylikely worms worm whichcomesintoexistence only whentheoriginal and thereplacing left after theremovaloforiginalplanks.Ortheremightbeaspacetime spaces empty the up fill to used are they before even replacement the for There mightbe, co-located at some time at which they co-exist with The Ship of Theseus. of ‘ship’ thatshipsmustretainthe sameplanks. does notemphasize samenessofplanks,orperhaps itispartofourconcept that is identical with The Ship of Theseus. Perhapsourconcept of ‘ship’ the continuity in the ship’s shape,wemight want tosaythat isReplacement of Theseus. Rather, if we are referring to the spacetime worm that traces ship, wemight wanttosaythat it isPlanksthat is identical with The Ship are referringtothespacetime worm thattracestheplanksoforiginal ‘The Ship of Theseus’, which plausibly reflects our concept of ‘ship’. If we the spacetime worm thatweintendtoreferbymeansoftheexpression Planks is identical with The Ship of Theseus, indeed, depends on which is worms sharingsomeoftheirtemporalparts end oftheprocess. These twospacetime worms, then,aretwospacetime The Ship of Theseus at the beginning of the process, andwith Planks at the (Sider callsthis“TheOriginalPlanks Worm”); anditisco-located with that traces the planks of the original Ship of Theseus at any oftheir stages this “The Replacement Worm”). But there can also be a spacetime worm spacetime worm that traces any stage of the replacement process (Sider calls to of Theseus, then,wecouldsaythatthereisaspacetimewormcorresponding to the question of whether Planks or Replacement is identical with The Ship think of,andquantifyoverasmallminority’ (Sider2001,p.8).Goingback simply aretwodistinctobjectssharing some,butnotall,oftheirtemporalparts. with eachother. Perdurantists, instead,maysolvethisissuebysayingthatthetwoobjects according to whichtwo objects occupying the same location at the same time are identical comes intoexistence contradicts both Leibniz’s LawandtheLockean Principle of Identity, endurantists’ answerthat the lump of clay and the statue wholly coincide when the statue each 15

However, these two are not the only spacetime worms that might be Since eachsetofstagesconstitutes a spacetime worm, therecanbea Analogous considerations might apply toanother argument in favoroftemporal parts, answer. This canbeexplainedasfollows. e.g ., aspacetime wormwhichtracesalltheplanksutilized 15 . Whether Replacementor

Is endurantism really more plausible than perdurantism ... 89 90 Flavia Felletti assignment is aD-fusionof that assignment that exists onlyat times in the fusion ofanassignment at thosetimesasvalues. takes timesasarguments ofobjectsthatexist non-emptyclasses andassigns and standingincertainrelations. a possiblesituationinvolvingclassofobjectshaving certainproperties mereological compositionsomedefinitionsmightberequired. Before introducing Sider’s argument in favor of (diachronic) unrestricted to him,oneofthemostpowerfularguments infavoroftemporal parts. he considersbothatemporally and diachronically – bringsabout,according the argument that Sider (1997, 2001) offers in favor of such principle – that acceptance of theprinciple of unrestricted mereological composition. And the spacetimewormscountsasaship. would remainunansweredisthemerely the the question regarding which shipisidentical with The Ship of Theseus, though fourdimensionalism alone doesnotprovideacomplete answer to Theseus simplydependsonourconcept of ‘ship’. And, Siderclaims, even it isPlanksorReplacementtheshipthatidenticalwith The Shipof of unrestrictedmereologicalcomposition,instead,wecouldsaythatwhether and byreassemblingallitsplanks. Ship of Theseus andthe two other ships respectively obtained byreplacing suitable alternative toestablish theidentity(ornon-identity)between The a find to easy not least at seems it where Theseus, of Ship The of one the this But represents an obstacle for us toexplain away vagueness in casessuchas objects. about beliefs ordinary our fit that and name a have we that wedonot.Inotherwords,chosetotrace only theobjectsforwhich those objectsthatwechosetorecognize and totrace over time, and those between line” “anthropocentric an as defines (2008) Sider what drawing premises (Sider 1997,p.26-27): in favoroftemporalparts. The argument isstructuredinthethreefollowing argument infavorofdiachronic unrestricted mereological composition and assignment’s domain. metaphysical With these four definitions at hand, we can now introduce Sider’s introduce now can we hand, at definitions four these With Fourth, Third, Second, First, However, argument animportantfactaboutthis the isthat itpresupposes Accepting fourdimensionalism (as defined by Sider) and the principle case ofcomposition diachronic fusion minimal diachronic fusion assignment puzzle would be dissolved, and the only question that f iff . Hereassignment is intended asafunction for every ( D-fusion (or, inshort, t in , inshort). An object . A minimal diachronic fusion ofan f ’s domain, conceptual case ). A caseofcompositionis x questionofwhich is afusion-at-tof x is a diachronic is adiachronic f that f (t). finitude to infinity makes the difference on whether D-fusion occurs or whether itdoesnot. occurs D-fusion on whether difference the makes infinity to finitude a by objects continuous series.Still,itwouldbeimplausible to claim that ajumpfrom many infinitely with case a with connected be can objects connected byacontinuousseries.Forinstance,nocase withfinitelymany particles, and so on.Second,the objection that not every pair of casesis composed themselves ofsmaller particles, composed these of even smaller the possibility that small particles, such as electrons and quarks, might be parts. The weaknessofthisassumptionconsistthefactthatitgoesagainst really exist,ratherallthatexistsaremereologicalatoms, thathavenoproper all thosethingthatwecall ‘objects’ –aschairs,tables,andsoondonot occur. However, strictlyspeaking,thisviewreliesontheassumptionthat cases in which D-fusion occurs with cases in which D-fusion does not proper parts);andconsequentlythereisnocontinuousseriesconnecting occurs. According tothisview, there are no composite objects (objects with objections to them. First, only objections that he can think of – and proceeds by offering his counter- this premise. Rather, heindividuates two objections to it – asheclaims, the in moredetailthedefenceofeachpremise. this is so because all assignments have a minimal D-fusion. Let’s see now there isnorestriction on theassignmentsthathaveaminimal D-fusion;and Therefore, implausible. is this and cutoff, abrupt an be would cutoff such adjacent very similar cases. But since minimal D-fusion can never be vague, D-fusion would require a cutoff in a continuous series between a pair of two a minimalD-fusion,forrestrictionontheassignmentsthathave never arisesfromlogic. vagueness arguesThen he all assignmentshave that the object exists only aslongit maintains all its parts. Accepting this object isamereological sum, ofwhich eachpartisessentialtoit;andthat represented by P3: In any case of minimal D-fusion, either minimal D-fusion definitely P2: In no continuous series is there an abrupt cutoff in whether minimal P1: Ifnot every assignment has aminimal D-fusion, then there must be a Second, Premise 2. A possibleobjection to this premise, instead, is First, Premise 1. Sider does not offer any positive argument in favor of The defence of the argument briefly runs as follows. Sider assumes that occurs, orminimalD-fusiondefinitelydoesnotoccur. D- fusionoccurs. mal D-fusion occurs, but in the other minimal D-fusion does not occur. pair ofcasesconnected by a“continuous series” suchthat in one,mini mereological essentialism Nihilism : the view that (diachronic) fusion never ; that is, the thesis that every -

Is endurantism really more plausible than perdurantism ... 91 92 Flavia Felletti D-fusion definitely occurs or definitely it does not, and since given since and not, does it definitely or occurs definitely D-fusion Now, sinceitistruethat,inanycaseofminimal D-fusion, minimal minimal D-fusion. That is,P3istrue. cannot be vague whether a given assignment has ordoesnot have a numerical sentences shouldbeeithertrueorfalse. This means,it and vagueness never arises from logic (Sider’s assumption), then sentences only contain logical terms andthepredicate ‘concrete’, value of thissentence would beindeterminate. But sincenumerical truth the then is, world objects many finitely a in objects concrete application conditions. If itwereindeterminate what thenumberof logical terms and the predicate ‘is concrete’, which hasdeterminate Where ‘C of exactlytwoconcreteobjects: instance, consider the following numerical sentence expressingthe existence For false. nor true, neither be would that objects concrete of number finite would beanumerical sentence expressingthe existence of adeterminate whether or not to include their minimal D-fusion. But this means that there in the set. Still, we wouldface a problem, for it would beindeterminate objects concrete all include to have would we Then objects. many finitely D-fusion. Butsupposewewerecounting all concrete objects inaworldof be vaguenessonwhetheranassignmenthasordoesnothaveaminimal assumes forreduction that P3 isfalse.Ifthiswerethecase,thenthere could better positionwithrespecttothisissue. with commonsense, mereological essentialism does not seem to be in any problems for the metaphysics of temporal parts concerns its being at odds object wouldbeidentical with itselfovertime. Thus, ifoneofthemain that anyobject faces atleastthelossofsome ofitsmicroscopic parts–no quite at oddswithourordinaryconception of objects, for –considering this viewentails thatnoobject survivestothelossofapart. And thisseems the temporally longest assignment foraconsideredclass ofobjects. However, assignment wouldhaveafusiononlyinthecasewhichsuchis view, itwouldbepossibletorestrict minimal D-fusion notvaguely, foran has aminimalD-fusion: every assignment minimal andthose thatdonot,then,byP1, D-fusion a have that assignments those between cutoff abrupt no is there P2 (U) Everyassignmenthasaminimal D-fusion (NS) Third, Premise 3. The defense of this premise goes as follows. Sider ∃ x ∃ x y[Cx &Cyx≠y ’ means‘ x is concrete’. This sentence contains only ∀ z(Cz →[x=z ∨ y=z])] x same placeattheverytimeareidentical with eachother. Moreover, principle of identity, according to whichtwoobjects occupying the very and they occupy the same exact location. But this would violate the Lockean distinct bothat “occasional identity”. not many would be likely to endorse the view that there is suchthing as would be identical at some times, but distinct at other times. And probably But thiswouldmeantosaythatthetwoobjects,consideredintheirentirety, t exact same partsandoccupyexactly the same location, but aredistinct at number offurther objects t given an object possible assignment there would be many other objects wholly coinciding at the principle of(diachronically) unrestricted mereological composition, x at bothtimes.Let’s discuss thesetwoalternativesinturn. e.g two objectsareco-located at atime, alternatives that endurantistsmightendorsetoexplain a situation in which those whoendorseendurantism(Varzi 2005).Indeed,therearetwopossible and thattheyareco-locatedat the threeobjects havesome,butnotall,oftheir temporalpartsincommon, The easiestwaytoaccount for suchpossibility, then,wouldbetosaythat x e.g f the classes of objects that constitute, this would be a case in which the two assignments and t is possible that there are two assignments existence of temporal parts. And thisissofor, ifIunderstand itcorrectly, it from perdurantism),forthisthesisisnotavailable to thosewhodenythe favor offourdimensionalism (which, asheconceives it, is indiscernible ’ wouldcomprisetheclassesofobjects thatconstitute two distinct objects, 2 2 1 1 1 , for they are composed of different parts and occupy distinct locations. distinct occupy and parts different of composed are they for , , theclassofobjectsthatconstitute and , at andx ., ., Second, First, However, there is the possibility that (U) isan option also available to And, accordingtoSider (1997, 2001),(U)constitutes an argument in x t 2 2 t , suchthat that, at 2 , while maintaining the idea that the two objects are wholly present 1 and x , couldsuccessivelyconstitute twodistinct objects ( 2 2 wouldnotbetheonlytwoobjectscoinciding at , are identical with eachotherat contingent identity x 3 massive co-location . That is,theclasses ofobjectsthatconstitute the singleobject t 1 x andat at a time f k suchthat t t 2, eventhoughat 1, x 1 f t , (t1) = 1 . Followingthisalternative, two objects, , it is possible that at a successive time, x 2 t , ..., 1 , butnotat . According tothisalternative, f f ’(t1); but, at k(t x e.g n x . Again, ifoneofthemain problems e.g 1 at ) = ., an object ., t f t 1 and t 1 theirpartsarefullycoincident t would finally be part of a great a of part be finally would 1 1 f t , fortheyarecomposed of the , butnotatasuccessivetime, (t1)’ (Varzi 2005,p.15). For, 2 . f ’, having in their domain t t 2 , f f x (t and 1 2 , at ) ≠ ) f t ’ wouldcomprise t f t 1 1 ’(t 1: ‘one for each . But, at . For, accepting x 2 2 ). Intuitively, and x 1 and x t 2 3 , ) at x f e.g e.g 2 and are are t 2 ., ., 1 .

Is endurantism really more plausible than perdurantism ... 93 94 Flavia Felletti has andlacks respectively the property are committed to say that property, orpart,at that properties, butalsotoparts.Insum,Merrick’s argument runsasfollows. all equally unreal. Noteworthy, Merricksextendshisargument not onlyto properties that it has at the present time, whereas pastandfuture times are arethose (1986)thattheonlypropertiesanobjecthas by Lewis problem of temporary intrinsics anddevelopsfurtherthe solution discarded against endurantism. which, ifMerrick’s argument iscorrect, constitutes an indirect argument against presentism( presentism. Secondly, Iwilldiscusstheargument fromSpecialRelativity present Merrick’s (1999)thesisaccordingtowhichendurantism implies briefly will Firstly,I steps. two in argument this discuss will Relativity.I The Argument from SpecialRelativity such reasonsgoesbeyondthescopeofthispaper. for favoringoneoftheconsideredavailable alternatives, but ananalysisof commonsense isconcerned. There mightstillbe,ofcourse,furtherreasons not seem in any better position than perdurantism as far as the departure from mereological essentialism,oroccasionalidentity, or massiveco-locationdo alternatives available, constituted bytheacceptance of eithernihilism,or that could block this argument at each of its premises. However, the main argument infavorofperdurantism,formanyotheroptionsareavailable mereological composition,thatisatitsbase,donotrepresentaknock-down of Theseus’ Shipdiscussedabove–andtheargument forunrestricted be usefultoexplain away casesinwhichvaguenessoccurs–astheone position ifitacceptedthisalternative. commonsensical picture of reality, endurantism would notbeinanybetter for themetaphysicsoftemporal partsconsistsofitsbeingatoddswiththe indeed, that it has them at the present time; therefore, no contradiction arises. indeed, thatit has thematthepresenttime; therefore,nocontradiction arises. real. The fact that those properties, or parts, that it has at the present time. For, noother time is presentists wouldsaythatthe onlyproperties,orparts,thatanobjecthasare apparent contradiction can beexplained away by accepting presentism, for x Consider anobject First, endurantism implies presentism. This argument relies onthe A lastargument in favorofperdurantism is theargument fromSpecial In conclusion,theargument fromvagueness,eventhoughitmight has an(intrinsic) property x had the property t 2 Cf. . Endurantistsappeartofallincontradiction, forthey Putnam1967,Sklar1981,andSaunders2002), x x existing (at least)attwotimes , being it wholly present both at F , orapart F , and the part F and the part P , at t 1 ; butthatit lacks such a P , at t t P 1 doesnot imply, 1 and . However, this t 1 and at t 2 . Suppose t 2 , both according to Special Relativity (at least in its Minkowskian formulation), are simultaneous depends onthe observer’s frame of reference. And, since Relativity of Simultaneity, accordingtowhichwhetherornottwoevents framework important difficulties itself, especially when considered within a relativistic easily explained away. However, it is certainly true that presentism faces problems forendurantism – theproblem of temporary intrinsics – canbe Thus, wemightthinkthataccepting presentism, atleastoneofthemain and propertiesithassimpliciter vary dependingonwhichtimeispresent. such anobjectmaychangeitspartsandpropertiesovertime,which time it hasallpartsandproperties presentism, we cansaythat whenever anenduringobject exists atapresent have atthepresenttime that And, given that only the present time is real, then, not lead to any contradiction, for when from simpliciter at O time passesandthat t enduring object andthatitexists–iswholly present-atatime In fact, for thepresentist, only one time is real. So, supposethat the possibility of change in parts and in properties is to endorse presentism. thesis that objects are whollypresentatanytime in whichtheyexistwith as follows: this of section paper. Following first this reasoning, Merricks the (1999, p. 5) definesin endurantism provided reasons same the for accept to want have intrinsic properties; which isaconsequence that not everyone would present time. And, sinceforthepresentistsallthatisrealwhatexists in not evenpossibletodetermine which eventsaresimultaneous withagiven in any absolutesense whethertwoeventsaresimultaneous. This means,itis there is noprivileged frame of reference, then it isnotpossibletodetermine . All partsandpropertiesof exists–andiswhollypresent-at 16 (E) Foranypresentlyexistingobject O, O O

One of the main consequences ofSpecialRelativityisindeedtheOne ofthemainconsequences Indeed, heclaims, the only way to makeconsistent the endurantist On thecontrary, anon-presentist endurantistmustdenythatobjects See alsoMeyer(2005) forfurtherobjectionsagainst presentism. t to doesnothavethosepartsandproperties that ithadat and t ’, andthat it was wholly present at all 16 . of O’s [propertiesor]parts t ’. And thefact that t isnolongerpresent,for t ’. Invirtue of this,bycombining endurantism with O exist O simpliciter may have changed its part or properties simpliciter t simpliciter ’. t ’ is present O endures hasallitspartsandproperties t andis wholly present at atthattime. And, giventhat at t exist atthepresenttime. ’present, andthat isnow if andonlyOpersists t . Butsupposethenthat t t ’ isnolonger real, so is no longer present. t butdoesnot O t ’ does isan

Is endurantism really more plausible than perdurantism ... 95 96 Flavia Felletti denies theexistenceofpastandfuturetimes,butalso deniestheexistence main problemwiththisview, however, resides inthefactthatitnotonly In thissense,then,simplytherearenospatiotemporally distant events. The of spacetime is real, and that such point coincides with the absolute present. two ofthemconsideredbySider(2001). discuss briefly will I framework. relativistic a in spacetime of conception embrace to make compatible their account of existence and reality with the that onlythoseeventsarepresentexistmustberejected. frame ofreference of of reference of of thefactthatsuchaneventislocated in thepresentrelative to theframe the sameeventdoesnotexistforbothtwoobservers relative to whereas O O presentism runsasfollows: for itisabsurd.Moreconcisely, thefourdimensionalist argument against frames ofreference, which is a consequence they might not wanttoaccept to andevents committed,then,torelativize therealityofobjects seem not possible to determine in any absolute sense what is real the present –that is, whatis any absolutesense whatcanexistasconcrete. simultaneously with aconsidered present moment, then it is not possible to determine in far weaker sense, given that it is not possible to determine in any absolute sense what exists only whatexistsinthepresentcan beconcrete,whilepastandfuturethingsmightexistina temporary intrinsics – , , andthat,whereas e 17 P3: The notion of existence should notberelativized to frames of referen P2: If two events P1: Since,accordingtopresentism,allandonlythoseeventsthatarepre 2

First, thesocalled“ However, there might still be somealternatives that presentists could But suppose that two events This isthesameproblem that the lastpossible endurantist solution totheproblem of isactually future(orpast)for should alsoco-existforanobserver ce. That is,iftwoevents present exist. the presentists, they do not co-exist for O sent exist,then if two events , thentheyco-existfor e 2 O existsfor but notrelativeto O , butitislocated in the future (orinthe past) relative to the i.e e e 1 ., claiming that intrinsic properties are tensed –faces. Indeed, if O O and 1 isalsopresentforanobserver ’. This wouldbeabsurd,thusitseemsthattheclaim here-now-ism but notfor e 2 are not both present for an observer simultaneous O e 1 O . and ’. But this contradicts P3, for it implies that ’. ButthiscontradictsP3,foritimpliesthat e e 1 1 and and O O e 2 ”. They maysaythatonlyasinglepoint ’. And thisissobecause ’. Then co-existforanobserver O e e 2 2 ’ movingrelativeto are both present for an observer are both present for an observer O with the present time – then it is , foronly those events that are e 1 existsbothfor O ’ movingrelative to O and O O O 17 . , thenthey O . Presentists e , then, for O 1 ispresent ad for ’ invirtue - - O ’, embrace the view that they are relativized to times. thattheyarerelativizedtotimes. embrace theview it,theissue Isee as Thus, existence ofintrinsic properties (and ofparts possessed to takeadesparture from ourwayofconceiving properties and reject the (and parts)arerelational. Here muchdependsonwhetherwearedisposed objects have properties (or parts)inrelation to time, with presentism,forsuchargument mightstillberejected by claiming that represent aconclusiveargument forthe necessaryassociationofendurantism perdurantism. ButwehavealsoseenthatMerrick’s of argument doesnot favor in argument an offer to seem would Relativity Special options, Therefore, assumingthatperdurantismandendurantism exhaustthe we might say that endurantism is incompatible with Special Relativity. claim that endurantism implies presentism. If webuythisargument, then in arelativisticframework fits straightforwardly most that view the is fourdimensionalism that claim as theyhavebeenpresentedtousbyscience,then,itseemsplausible commonsense favors.IfweaccepttheconsequencesofSpecialRelativity motivated bycommonsense,forplausiblypresentismistheviewthat such reasons are not available at the moment, I take this view to be mostly come in thefuturefromscience itself; but since(atleast to myknowledge) there isaprivileged frame ofreference. Certainly, furtherreasonsmight in a relativistic framework to accept the scientifically revisionary claim that view. ButIsimplydonotseeanyreasonother thandefendingpresentism arguing for competences scientific necessary the have not this do against I what iswidelyconsideredasthemainconsequenceofSpecialRelativity. an absoluterelationship of simultaneity between distanteventscontradicts accepting revisionary, for scientifically is reference of frame privileged a distant objectsandevents.However, itisalsotruethatthepostulationof to that all that exists and is real coincides with what is present with respect the existenceofaprivilegedframereference regarded asexistentwouldfitintoreality. object can fit into a single point, it is hard to see how all objects commonly of any object located outside a single point. And, since no macroscopic by Godfrey-Smith (1979)and Weingard (1972). And, eventhoughwemight agreethatpresentismisunderminedbySpecial concerning whetherornot endurantismimpliespresentismremainsopen. F 18 . This would allow the presentist to accept the existence of spatially

Before, wehavediscussedMerrick’s (1999)argument in favor of the Second, the acceptance of For further discussion, see also Savitt (2000)against the presentist alternatives proposed 18 . a privileged frame ofreference F , the presentist might claim , thepresentistmightclaim i.e. , thatall properties simpliciter) . Assuming to to

Is endurantism really more plausible than perdurantism ... 97 98 Flavia Felletti “being-straight-shaped X-at-t’. disjunction ofsomethoseX-nessdistributions,theonesthatare compatible with being of correspondingpermanent distributional properties: the X-nessdistributions.X-at-tisa are understoodas - suchasbeingbent-shapedorstraight-shaped–canbeunderstood asintrinsic if they compatible with endurantism. According to this alternative, temporally indexed properties endurantism losesthenoneofitsgreatestadvantages. does notappear tobeinanybetter position withrespecttothisissue. And of persistence concerns itsbeingatoddswithcommonsense, endurantism This considered, if one of the main problems for the perdurantist account relies exactly on itspoorplausibility from the commonsense perspective. it isimportant to notice that a goodpartofthecriticism to perdurantism primary issue with which a metaphysical theory ought to be concerned, but appear tobeatoddswithcommonsense.Commonsensemightnotthe different solutions to the issues at stake. However, most endurantist solutions the rival view of endurantism can reply to any of these arguments by offering a conclusiveargument in favor ofperdurantism. Indeed, those whoendorse Relativity. What emerges from the discussion is that none of them constitutes intrinsics, theargument fromvagueness,andtheargument fromSpecial perdurantist account of persistence over time: the problem oftemporary Conclusion favor ofperdurantism in argument conclusive a offer not does still Relativity Special relativity, views together)might wanttoacceptthisview. who endorseeither endurantism or fourdimensionalism (or that might want to endorse both from ourordinarywayofunderstanding properties. that atleastnotallphilosophers And against this view, if not the fact that it is a view that requires itself an important departure an object instantiates the property of being straight-shaped. I donothave any argument of being-straight-shaped-at-t Following Wherever 19

In thispaper, Idiscussedthreeofthemainarguments infavorofthe Parson (2000)proposedafurtheralternative, which mightmakefourdimensionalism

we haveatemporally indexed propertyofbeingX-at-t,wehaveanumber this reasoning, wecanthinkofanobjecthashaving, this reasoning, distributional properties ness 19 ” distribution, whose disjunctions correspond to the properties . 1 /t 2 /.../t n . Where t . Where . Parsons(2000,p.11) claims: 1 , t 2 , ...,t n correspond to all times at which such e.g. , apermanent Varzi, A. (2005).‘Change, Temporal Parts,andthe Argument from Vagueness’. Van Inwagen, P. (1981):‘The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts’, Thomson, J.,J.(1983):‘Parthood and Identity Across Time’, Sklar, L. (1981): ‘Time, Reality, and Relativity’, in R. Healy (ed.), (2008): ‘Temporal Parts’, in (2001): Sider, T. (1997):‘Four-Dimensionalism’, Shoemaker, S. (1969): ‘Time Without Change’. Savitt, S. (2000): ‘There’s No Time Like the Present (in Minkowski Spacetime)’, Saunders, S.(2002): ‘HowRelativityContradictsPresentism’, inC.Callender (ed.), Putnam, H.(1967):‘Time andPhysicalGeometry’, Parsons, J.(2000):‘MustaFour-Dimensionalist Believein Temporal Parts?’, Meyer, u.(2005):‘ThePresentist’s dilemma’, Merricks, T. (1999):‘Persistence,PartsandPresentism’, Markosian, N.(2004): ‘A defense ofPresentism’. InZimmerman, Dean W. (ed.) Loux, M.,J.(1998) Lewis, D.,K.(1986): Jackson, F. (1998):‘Metaphysics bypossiblecases’.In Heller, M.(1984):‘Temporal Parts ofFour-Dimensional Objects’. Dorato, M.(2013): Brogaard, B.(2000):‘PresentistFour-Dimensionalism’, References Praxis Filosófica William Godfrey-Smith (1979):‘Special Relativity andthe Present’. Weingard, Robert(1972),‘Relativity andtheReality of PastandFutureEvents’, 36, No.3(Oct., 1979),pp.233-244. Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. British JournalforthePhilosophy ofScience Dialectica Philosophical Quarterly 80: 201–20. and Hawthorne, SiderandZimmerman,Oxford:Blackwell,241–62. 66, No12,pp.363-381. Lansing: PhilosophyofScience Association. Chapter 8. Conditionals Studies Carocci Editore.Chapters2-3. 64, 240-247. Monist Studies inMetaphysics in D. Howard(ed.), PSA98, (pp. 277-292),Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity. Time, Reality &Experience Four-Dimensionalism Reality , 46:323–334. cuenta conunalicencia Creative Commons “reconocimiento, nocomercial ysin obrasderivadas 2.5Colombia” 83: 399–418. , Volume 59,Issue4,pp.485–498. (pp.129-142),Cambridge:Chicago UniversityPress. . London:Routledge. Metaphysics: A ContemporaryIntroduction Che cos’èiltempo?Einstein, Gödel el’esperienzacomune On thePluralityofWorlds ,Volume 1(OxfordUniversity Press,2004),pp.47-82. , 62:123–137. , Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics , Vol. 50ofRoyal Institute ofPhilosophy Supplement Part II: SymposiaPapers Philosophical Studies Philosophical Philosophical Review . Oxford:Blackwell.Chapter4. 23:119-121. The Journal of Philosophy Journal ofPhilosophy, Monist Noûs (pp.S563-S574),East Journal of Philosophy , Vol. 122,pp.213-225. Mind, Method,and , London: Routledge. , London:Routledge. , 33:421–38. , 106:197–231. , 83:341–56. Reduction, Time, Philosophical Philosophical , edited by Pacific Oxford , Vol. Vol. Vol. . ,

Is endurantism really more plausible than perdurantism ... 99