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Home , Angolan Civil War

The Origins of the Angolan

The Origins of the Angolan Civil War Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict

Fernando Andresen Guimaraes First published in paperback in Great Britain 2001 by MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-1-349-26184-0 ISBN 978-0-333-97766-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-0-333-97766-8

First published in paperback in the of America 2001 by ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, LLC, Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 978-0-312-17512-2 cloth ISBN 978-0-333-91480-9 paperback

The Library of Congress has cataloged the hardcover edition as follows: Guimaraes, Femando Andresen, 1965- The origins of the Angolan civil war: foreign intervention and domestic political conflict / Femando Andresen Guimaraes. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-312-17512-2 (cloth) I. -History-Civil war, 1975- -Causes. 1. Title. DTl428.G85 1997 967.304-dc21 97-9652 CIP

© Femando Andresen Guimaraes 1998. 200 I First edition 1998 Reprinted with new Preface 200 I All rights reserved. No reproduction. copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced. copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright. Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. 90 Tottenham Court Road. London WIP OLP.

Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright. Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources.

Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. For Sallie

Contents

List of Tables viii Preface to the 200i Edition ix Preface x Abbreviations xii introduction xiv

Part I The Internal Sources of Conflict in Angola Portuguese Colonialism in Angola 2 Angolan Anti-Colonialism 31 Exile Politics 58

Part II The Externalization of Angolan Conflict 4 The Angolan Civil War 1975-76 85 and South 114 6 and 136 The and the United States 161

Conclusion 196 Notes 202 Bibliography 237 Index 245

vii List of Tables

1.1 Value of total Angolan exports by origin, 1961 and 1962 18 1.2 Main Angolan export commodities, 1966 18 1.3 Coffee exports from Angola, 1948-70 21 1.4 Angolan population by race and 'civilized' status, 1950 25 1.5 Racial composition of Angolan population, 1777-1970 27 1.6 White population in Angola 1940-73 29 6.1 Cuban troop strengths in post-independence Angola 1975-76 147

viii Preface to the 2001 Edition

As I write this additional preface to the paperback edition, Angola has descended into conflict. But what is going on now in Angola at the end of the century is not a new armed conflict; it is the continuation of the civil war that erupted fully in 1975. In fact, it is distinctly pos• sible to see the history of independent Angola as a single war. This book addresses the origins of the Angolan civil war of 1975-76 but provides also, I believe, the basis for understanding the fighting that continues in Angola. Today, it has become even clearer that the roots of conflict in Angola are far deeper than a case of outside interference and intrigue. The '' model simply does not stand up to closer examination. Of course, foreign intervention was a fundamental conditioning force on the Angolan civil war of 1975-76. Then, exter• nal actors served to define and intensify the bids for control of post• independence Angola. But even after the end of the cold war, which gradually removed external rivalries from the equation of Angolan hostilities, the parties remained irreconcilable. By 1999, the combined and concerted efforts of the international community towards a peace settlement had been in vain. The fact is that the struggle for power that lay at the heart of the conflict in Angola remains unresolved and while foreign intervention had a significant impact on events in Angola, the actions of outsiders can no more be seen to be the source of conflict than the sufficient condition for peace. This can only emanate from the antagonists themselves.

Fernando Andresen Guimaraes 1999

ix Preface

This book is based on my PhD dissertation, which was prepared in the welcoming environment of the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics between September 1987 and December 1991. The transformation from dissertation into book has significantly altered the structure of the text, but the fundamental the• sis is the same. When I began my work on the Angolan civil war, the superpowers were still engaged in the cold war. By the time I had finished my dissertation, the had fallen and an agreement on Angola had brought independence to and the withdrawal of Cuban troops. were scheduled for September 1992 and the candidates were precisely those rivals that, as government and rebel movement, had just spent over fifteen years struggling for control of the country. Then, the explanation for conflict in Angola was predominantly seen to be in the intervention of foreign actors. Many claimed that the key to peace, therefore, lay in removing external involvements. And yet, as I write this five years later, after the end of the cold war, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of in , peace in Angola is still precarious. As it turned out, the roots of conflict in Angola are much deeper. One of the on the Angolan conflict was the politicization of much of the academic literature on its modern history. My work has sought to wade through the existing claims and counter• claims and present as clear a picture as possible of what happened in 1975. For the internal power struggle between the Angolans I drew on many sources, but a special note of recognition is owed to John Marcum's two-volume The Angolan Revolution. To this, I also added the personal testimony of participants who provided an eyewitness perspective. I was fortunate enough to be working on my dissertation at a time when revelations on the hidden history of the MPLA were emerging for the first time. These revelations are, of course, included in this book. My appreciation goes out to the Department of International Relations at the LSE which provided me with the academic 'home' for the prep• aration of the dissertation. In particular, Fred Halliday and James Mayall Preface xi gave me the wise direction I needed, and to them I am grateful. Many others deserve to be credited here, but a special debt is owed to Mark Simpson for encouraging me to undertake the project in the first place and to Spyros Economides for his solid advice and invaluable friend• ship throughout the writing of the dissertation and more recently of this book. I must also thank other friends and colleagues, in particular, J oao Cravinho, Hugh Dyer and Leon Mangasarian, whose contribu• tions have clearly enriched my work. However, none of this would have ever been possible without the support of my family, especially that of my father, whose unwavering faith and constant questioning challenged me to go further. To Sallie's patience, devotion and love, I dedicate this book.

Fernando Andresen Guimaraes Abbreviations

ALC African Liberation Committee (OAU) ANC African National Congress (RSA) BOSS (RSA) CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US) CONCP Conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies COPCON Operational Command of the Continent () DGS Security Directorate (ex-PIDE) EEC European Economic Community EFTA European Free Trade Association ELNA Army for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) EPLA Popular Army for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) FAPLA Popular Armed Forces of the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) FLEC Liberation Front of the Enclave of FLN National Liberation Front (Algeria) FNLA National Front of Liberation of Angola FRELIMO Liberation Front of Mozambique GRAE Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (FNLA) JSN Committee of National Salvation (Portugal) MFA Movement of Armed Forces (Portugal) MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NIC Newly industrialized country NSC National Security Council (US) OAU Organization of African Unity PAl GC African Party of the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde PCA Angolan Communist Party PCP Portuguese Communist Party PDA Democratic Party of Angola PIDE International Police for the Defence of the State (Portugal) RSA Republic of South Africa SADF South African Defence Force SWAPO South People's Organization UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

xii Abbreviations xiii

UPA Union of the Angolan Peoples (ex-UPNA) UPNA Union of the Peoples of Northern Angola UN US United States USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Introduction

There is no question of pledging our policy to either of the two blocs dividing the world. The only promise we make to the two blocs is that we will honestly seek to exclude attempts at establish• ing a cold war climate among the Angolan nationalists and to pre• vent the implications of international intrigues in the Angola of tomorrow.' In this manner, the leader of one of the Angolan movements fighting Portuguese colonialism promised in 1962 to keep the cold war out of Angola. As it turned out, his promise was in vain. In 1975, after the collapse of Portuguese colonialism, a civil war broke out between Angolans. Struggling among themselves to determine which movement would take the reins of the newly-independent state, the Angolans brought in external backers. By the time the conflict had come to the general attention of the world in late 1975, early 1976, it had transcended its local origins. The Angolan power struggle at the heart of the conflict was now overshadowed by the involvement of the superpowers. Even today, the Angolan civil war of 1975-6 is still studied as an episode of the cold war, one which seemed to exceed its relative importance to the state of superpower rivalry but which is, nonetheless, a part of the history of the East-West conflict. The Soviet Ambassador to the United States at the time stated Angola was ' ... one of the most acute regional points of confrontation between Moscow and Washington .. .' ,2 which had a negative impact on the process of detente between the superpowers. Most notably, Angola was where thousands of Cuban troops disembarked after crossing the Atlantic Ocean and had a decisive impact on the military outcome of the conflict. Even after the civil war had come to an end in 1976, the general cold war parameters of the conflict did not change and persistently overlaid the Angolan struggle for power. A second, long and wasteful civil war began almost immediately and lasted right into the early 1990s. Throughout that period, both the Soviet Union and the United States continued to view the situation in Angola through the prism of the cold war. During the 1980s, Angola even provided one of the great ironies of the East-West struggle: Cuban troops tasked with the defence of American-owned offshore oil rigs from attacks by American-backed UNIT A rebel forces.

xiv Introduction xv

On the face of it, however, and despite the oft-mentioned mineral wealth of Angola, there seem to have been no intrinsic reasons as to why Angola should have commanded the attention of the two most powerful states in the world for such a long time. This book seeks to unravel that paradox. It looks at how and why the Angolan civil war of 1975-6 was externalized to the extent that it was, and what were the roots of that conflict. The fact is, the cold war did not bring conflict to Angola in 1975. By that time, the roots of the civil war had already been laid. During the preceding decade, a dogged struggle for supremacy had developed between the three main anti-colonial movements. When the authoritarian regime in Portugal was toppled in 1974, the motivation for being the leading anti-colonial movement intensified into an outright bid for power in a soon-to-be independent Angola. Thus, in 1975, a ferocious civil war erupted between the MPLA and the combined forces of its two rivals, the FNLA and UNIT A. But it was not purely a war between Angolans. Behind the antagonists now stood an array of international backers, vigorously striving to give their chosen movement the impetus to win the war on the ground. The Soviet Union and Cuba were the main support for the MPLA. According to them, the principal reason for their intervention in the conflict was the fact that the military forces of South Africa had stormed Angola in order to deny the MPLA its legitimate right to govern. For Cuba, the dramatic airlift of troops was an expression of solidarity with the besieged MPLA, which, according to Havana, was the target of a coalition of 'imperialist' and 'racist' forces. Both Cuba and the Soviet Union claimed their intervention was legitimate. On the other side, the FNLA and UNIT A were supported by South Africa, Zaire, China and the United States. Washington took a different perspective of the prevailing situation from that of the MPLA's supporters. For the United States, Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola was an attempt by Moscow to gain a foothold in and significantly extend the USSR's global reach. Furthermore, these Soviet hegemonic designs were, in Washington's eyes, testing the rules of detente and, therefore, had to be challenged. To counter this perceived threat, Washington intervened covertly in Angola in favour of the MPLA's rivals. One of the main US policy-shapers of the time, , remains committed to this perspective of the Angolan civil war. Still convinced that the US was right to resist Soviet adventurism in Angola, Kissinger only rues the fact that Congress forced the Ford Administration xvi Introduction to cease its covert support for the anti-MPLA coalition. Some years later, the Reagan Administration did what Kissinger had wanted to do earlier, though for a quite different set of reasons. All of these views are relevant for an understanding of the origins of the Angolan civil war, and they will be analysed in turn. Furthermore, each international actor had specific interests for intervening which inevitably shaped the decisions made and the action taken. These will also be looked at. However, all of these views fail to take into account the importance of the conflict at the heart of the civil war, the struggle for power between Angolans. The focus of this book is that power struggle, how it emerged, how it developed and how it externalized itself and transcended its localized relevance. In this way, perhaps, the international aspects of the Angolan civil war, which made that relatively insignificant conflict in a far-off corner of the globe an integral part of the history of the cold war, will be explained.