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www.africa-confidential.com 20 April 2001 Vol 42 No 8 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL SOUTH AFRICA 3 ZIMBABWE Sniping at the President More of Mugabe The President’s insistence that he will fight the next election Does President Mbeki risk being ousted by his own party? Will he surprises few and worries almost everyone be challenged for the ANC The President’s indecision is final. President Robert Mugabe’s announcement on 17 April that he leadership at the end of 2002? A will contest the next presidential election as his party’s flagbearer has resolved nothing (AC Vol 41 strange declaration by Deputy President Jacob Zuma, who No 25). Many doubt that he has the support within his party to carry it through. His announcement suddenly denied that he planned was met with a deafening silence from senior figures in the ruling Zimbabwe African National to challenge Mbeki for the party Union-Patriotic Front and a predictable endorsement from loyalist Stalin Mau Mau. Mugabe’s leadership, has fuelled rumours. ‘decision’ is a blow to those ZANU-PF strategists who have been telling South African and Western officials that Mugabe should be allowed a graceful exit and a soft landing. Those options are now MOZAMBIQUE 4 blocked. Even ultra-loyalist Information Minister Jonathan Moyo was confidently telling Western correspondents at the Davos Summit in Switzerland in February that Mugabe would definitely retire Talks break down before the next elections. Mugabe’s announcement has rekindled suspicions that he will call an early presidential election Afonso Dhlakama, President Renamo, left after five hours of in July or August, which he will win by hook or crook, and then stand down to allow his chosen talks with President Chissano on successor to take over: Emmerson Mnangagwa, as parliamentary Speaker, has been aloof from 29 March, handing over a letter most of the partisan confrontations. That might just explain the current campaign of political terror prepared in advance. Having not in the towns by ZANU-PF and the ‘war veterans’. Whenever Mugabe and ZANU-PF decide to hold met for over a year, the two men the presidentials, the stakes will be high. Mugabe and his associates, aware that electoral defeat began talking in December and continued in January but each, could bring imprisonment or worse, have abandoned all pretence of legality and economic rationality. under pressure from hardliners in The land occupations have run out of steam pending the promised eviction of white commercial his party, wanted the other to yield. farmers in mid-year to allow new settlers time to plant next season’s crops. The focus has shifted to the cities and the mines. ZAMBIA 5 Veterans target business and unionists The cock crows In the first week of April, several small industrial businesses were targeted by Mugabe’s political Born-again Christian President storm-troopers, the war veterans. They say they are supporting the workers against both the Chiluba arrived back in Lusaka for employers and the trades unions, whom they accuse of selling out to the opposition Movement for Easter to denounce the ‘ministerial Democratic Change (MDC). Gangs of veterans have gone into factories, threatening and beating treachery’ against him in biblical managers and forcing them to reinstate workers who have lost their jobs. Kangaroo courts operate terms. He compared those ministers at ZANU-PF’s Harare headquarters, where errant managers are brought to be disciplined. who had been campaigning against his third term bid to Peter’s denial of The Falcon Mines group had planned to close three loss-making gold mines, hit by high inflation Christ. While Chiluba was abroad, and the fixed exchange rate: first it was threatened by veterans, then promised a rescue package by 60 MPs signed a petition opposing the government. The mines remain open but the government has no money to subsidise them. another rebirth. Managers are terrified. ‘What makes it so awful’, says one whose business was taken over, ‘is that the police stand by and watch. You know there is no recourse. You do what you are told or risk being NIGER 6 beaten up or worse’. Regular police officers behave like the war vets. Their latest casualty was a university student, pulled from his room and beaten to death by police who were supposed to be Starting from scratch restoring order on the University of Zimbabwe’s Harare campus. Nobody keeps a tally of small businesses closing as their owners and managers leave the country President Tandja’s team will face its first electoral test late this year, if they can. A Swiss businessman whose textile company was attacked by vets last week is reported with municipal elections in 205 to have fled, as have others. Manufacturing production, which fell by 10 per cent last year, is now communes. This will also be the lower than it was at Independence in 1980. This year’s figure is expected to show a further fall of test for a new decentralisation plan 8-10 per cent or more if the vets go on invading industries. drawn up by Prime Minister Hama Economists believe agricultural production will fall some 15 per cent in 2001, with a further 25- Amadou’s government. 30 per cent fall over the following year, when resettlement starts to make its impact. The Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU) says maize plantings fell by 43 per cent last season, wheat was POINTERS 8 down 30 per cent and tobacco, 15 per cent. Livestock losses were 10 per cent for dairy cattle, 18 per cent for beef cattle and over 35 per cent for goats. Some 16,000 jobs have been lost on commercial Congo-Kinshasa, farms and just 16,600 plots have been allocated to resettlement farmers. It is estimated that 31,000 Sudan & Ghana illegal occupants live on commercially owned land and by this month, some 550 farms will have been 20 April 2001 Africa Confidential Vol 42 No 8 ‘fast-tracked’ into the hands of new owners. entrepreneurs; and decay in the police, army, public service, health Gold production fell from 27 tons in 1999 to 21.5 tons last year, and education systems. with a further two-ton decline so far this year. Production from Mugabe’s economic hopes rest on South Africa. Last month, other mines has fallen less drastically. Tourist arrivals fell by two- Impala Platinum announced a joint venture with Australian- thirds last year and there is no sign of a revival nor likely to be owned Zimbabwe Platinum Mines to open up the Ngezi mine with unless the veterans stop campaigning in the towns. finance from SA’s ABSA Bank. ABSA owns 26 per cent of the In last year’s elections, all the towns voted against the government Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (Jewell Bank), close to the and, despite intimidation, support for the opposition MDC is government. Pretoria’s state-owned Eskom is looking at taking holding up. Matebeleland, where ZANU-PF was all but wiped out over the Hwange thermal power station, in a so-called privatisation last year, is said to be even more anti-government today. Ministers deal. Pretoria Portland Cement is buying 44 per cent of Portland hope that the United Nations, by deploying peace monitors in Holdings Zimbabwe from another SA group, Anglo American. Congo-Kinshasa, will help them bring home some of the 13,000 The most likely buyer of the OK Bazaars retail chain in Zimbabwe troops they have sent to support President Joseph Kabila (AC Vol is SA’s Shoprite Checkers, which has opened an outlet in Bulawayo. 42 No 1). Last year, Finance Minister Simba Makoni said the Mugabe’s exit would not transform the country overnight. Early Congo campaign was costing Z$1 billion (US$18 million) a month; this year, when he was on holiday or abroad, members of ZANU’s officials say the monthly bill has risen to an estimated Z$1.25 bn. second team made the populist gestures. Foreign Minister Stan (US$22.5 mn.). None of these figures explains the wider damage Mudenge had public rows with the UK Foreign and Commonwealth to Zimbabwe’s economy caused by the Congo operation. The Office and the Commonwealth Secretariat. Information Minister foreign-exchange cost, at Z$327 mn. a year, equals almost one- Moyo expelled and threatened journalists, and rushed repressive fifth of annual foreign earnings, while debt servicing costs more broadcasting legislation through parliament. Justice Minister than Z$100 bn. in the current year. Patrick Chinamasa ousted Chief Justice Tony Gubbay. Control of land policy was seized by Lands and Agriculture Minister Interests in the Congo war Joseph Made and by the man who would be king, Mugabe’s Harare insists that the Congo-K intervention will pay off. Some of former favourite and current Local Government Minister, Ignatius ZANU-PF’s business supporters are active there, notably multi- Chombo, who has been eclipsed over the past year. millionaire and Mnangagwa-ally John Bredenkamp, who is now Absent from the scene were the technocrats who were supposed operating a joint venture to export cobalt and copper with Congo’s to revive the economy. Since taking office last August, Industry state-owned Gécamines, in its still lucrative Groupe Central Minister Nkosana Moyo has barely been seen or heard. division. Bredenkamp and his associates are putting some business Oppositionists believe he is fed up and wants out. Finance Minister muscle behind new President Kabila II, whom Bredenkamp has Makoni is presented as an economic reformer with the political accompanied on several recent foreign trips. Zimbabwe has agreed muscle to win arguments in cabinet and parliament.
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