'99The Industrial Bank of Japan, Limited
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50p10/66p2 50p10/66p2 THE INDUSTRIAL BANK OF JAPAN, LIMITED The Industrial Bank of Japan, Limited Annual Report 1999 ’99Year ended March 31, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 1999 Printed in Japan C4 C1 50p10/66p2 50p10/66p2 Introduction IBJ was originally founded as a public- The 1918 amendment to the IBJ Act During the high-growth period of the sector bank under the Industrial Bank permitted the underwriting and offering Japanese economy in the 1960s, the Bank of Japan Act of 1902. At that time, Japan of equities. At that point, the Bank had was particularly active in financing steel was in the throes of its industrial revolu- the full capabilities for what is now production, shipping, shipbuilding, and tion, and there was a strong demand for termed investment banking. However, vehicle manufacturing. Following the long-term investment capital. IBJ raised that was at what proved to be the peak first oil crisis, Japan moved to a pattern of funds by issuing bank debentures. of the demand created for Japanese lower growth as a mature economy, and The Bank also acted as the trustee in products by the First World War and the the Bank expanded its customer base at corporate debenture issues—notably, the consequent economic boom. home and started the process of expan- major Japanese railway company issue Thereafter, the next 30 years of Japan- sion overseas. of 1906 in London, amounting to the ese history encompassed many adversi- Domestically, the wholesaling of bank then-enormous sum of £1 million. These ties for society in general and for financial debentures to major financial institutions activities contributed to the building of institutions in particular: the Great Kanto and the regional banks led to a network the domestic securities market and to the Earthquake, the Showa Financial Panic, of strong relationships. This was all sup- generating of a higher profile for Japan- and, finally, the Second World War and ported by the fact that, originally a pub- ese borrowers in the international market. the postwar recovery. lic-sector bank, the Bank had no keiretsu This early experience of a sophisticated The Bank became a private-sector bank affiliations: the Bank has always been in- mix of corporate and investment bank- in 1950 and took on its current legal form dependent of the large corporate group- ing with exposure to trust work is unique under the Long-Term Bank Act of 1952. ings characteristic of Japan. Internationally, to the Bank among Japanese banks. In However, the Act was framed within the the Bank was free to pursue its invest- the original Act, there was the wording, terms of the U.S.-led Occupation policy ment banking ambitions. “trust business related to local govern- of compartmentalizing financial services. The current round of liberalization, ment bonds, corporate bonds, and equi- IBJ was forced to retreat from much of its Japan’s Big Bang, is enabling the Bank ties”. This was the first time for the term former investment banking activities and to return to its domestic investment “trust”, or “shintaku”, to appear in the return principally to long-term lending banking roots and more fully explore Japanese statute book. funded by issuing bank debentures. the benefits of its independence and relationship networks. Contents Financial Highlights Funding Reliance on Bank Debentures Market Risk 1 13 27 Non-Performing Loans Liquidity Risk Message from the President 14 31 2 Emerging Market Exposure Operational Risk 15 32 Management Rationale and Strategy at IBJ Frequently Asked Questions Year 2000 Problem Systems Risk Rationale 16 32 6 Legal Risk Restructuring and Re-orientation 32 Steps to “First Call Bank” Status Preparing for Heightened Competition 7 in the Post-Big Bang Era Internal Control 33 Corporate Governance Revenue Plan 8 17 Compliance 33 Transparency in the Management Strategy Rationalization 9 18 Operations in Outline IBJ’s Future-Oriented Business Strategy Personnel Policy Balancing the Center and the Periphery 10 20 35 Differentiation with Strategic Alliances Other Leading Domestic Banks 22 Financial Section 11 49 Competition with Leading Foreign Banks Risk Control and Compliance Issues 11 Controlling Risk and Ensuring Compliance Corporate Data 103 Specialist Subsidiaries and Affiliates Risk 12 24 Credit Risk 25 C2 C3 Financial Highlights (in thousands of Financial Highlights (in millions of yen) U.S. dollars)** 1999 1998 1999 For the Years Ended March 31 Total Income ¥ 3,386,760 ¥ 3,321,902 $ 28,094,239 Total Expense 3,642,993 3,635,020 30,219,769 Loss before Income Taxes and Others (256,232) (313,118) (2,125,530) Net Loss (181,276) (202,660) (1,503,748) At March 31 Total Assets 46,166,409 49,229,785 382,964,825 Loans and Bills Discounted 23,327,907 24,001,429 193,512,295 Investment Securities 8,942,151 8,847,249 74,177,945 Debentures 20,461,865 20,840,941 169,737,583 Deposits 8,116,321 10,053,551 67,327,432 Total Shareholders’ Equity 1,561,350 1,320,019 12,951,888 (in yen) (in U.S. dollars)** 1999 1998 1999 For the Years Ended March 31 Per Common Stock Net Loss ¥ (70.64) ¥ (79.80) $ (0.586) Cash Dividends 7.00 8.50 0.058 Return on Equity (14.3%) (14.2%) At March 31 BIS Capital Adequacy Ratio 11.30% 10.26% * All figures are on a consolidated basis, unless stated otherwise. ** U.S. dollar amounts are converted, for convenience only, at ¥120.55 per dollar (interbank rate in Tokyo at March 31, 1999). U Net Income (Loss) U Total Assets U Total Shareholders’ Equity U BIS Capital Adequacy Ratio (¥ billion) (¥ billion) (¥ billion) (%) 50 50,000 2,000 12 40,000 1,500 9 0 30,000 1,000 6 20,000 (50) 500 3 10,000 (200) (250) 0 0 0 94 95 96 97 98 99 94 95 96 97 98 99 94 95 96 97 98 99 94 95 96 97 98 99 (Years ended March 31) 1 Message from the President would like to thank all our friends for their interest and support during the past year. We are at a crucial stage in implementing our strategy of focusing our resources in commercial banking, investment Ibanking, treasury operations, and securities and asset management, while Message from the President selectively strengthening international banking operations and substantially enhancing our capabilities for the development of sophisticated financial technologies. We are also taking steps to increase our competitiveness by rationalizing our cost structure and strengthening our capital base. Achieving these aims will ideally position us to take the maximum advantage of opportunities presented by Japan’s Big Bang and to be a player in the fast-changing global market. Operating Environment Fiscal 1998, ended March 31, 1999, was marked by a number of important developments. Japan’s financial Big Bang was formally launched, with a series of new laws and administrative measures. These included the enact- ment in April 1998 of a revised foreign exchange law and the authorization in December of investment trust sales at bank offices. The year also saw decisions on the timing of other important Big Bang measures to be intro- duced over the next few years. For example, the government decided to allow bank-related securities companies to begin handling equities from October 1999. Another important legal development of the year was the enactment of a series of laws and other measures to provide a safety net as well as to reform and strengthen the Japanese banking system. In October, the Diet approved a proposal for public funds to be used to strengthen the capital base of banks. This resulted in ¥7.5 trillion in public funds being invested in preferred shares and subordinated liabilities of the 15 largest Japanese banks before the end of March 1999. IBJ was the first among these banks to announce its willingness to cooperate with the government’s restructuring program. In response to these developments, not only banks but also other finan- cial institutions, including securities companies and life insurance compa- nies in Japan and overseas, embarked on a series of business tie-ups and mergers to maintain and strengthen their competitiveness as well as pro- vide the services required in the new financial environment. IBJ remains one of the most active players in this area and has concluded alliances with the Nomura Securities Co., Ltd., and the Dai-ichi Mutual Life Insurance Company. 2 Message from the President Message from the President Business Results for Fiscal 1998 Anticipating these developments, in April 1998, we identified five principal tasks to substantially reform the management of our operations in the year ended March 31, 1999, and the year ending March 31, 2000. These were to •conduct a thorough review of our business and financial positions, •take decisive steps to dispose of non-performing loans, •proceed with the restructuring of our operations, •strengthen our position in core businesses, and •respond effectively to the Big Bang and the reorganization of Japan’s financial sector. As part of our efforts to fulfill these tasks, we adopted aggressive mea- sures to make our final write-off of non-performing loans and provided conservatively for the reserve for possible loan losses. We accordingly reported the highest level of credit costs in IBJ’s history, ¥924.3 billion. As a result of this and other factors, we reported a net loss for the second consecutive year, of ¥195.7 billion, on a non-consolidated basis. With a view to maintaining our BIS capital adequacy ratio at a level ap- propriate for a leading international bank, we made a third-party capital allocation of ¥67.0 billion to Dai-ichi Mutual Life Insurance and issued ¥176.0 billion in preferred shares through overseas subsidiaries and ¥64.0 billion in subordinated bonds, for a total of ¥307.0 billion in new capital Masao Nishimura raised through our own efforts.