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Country Information and Guidance Iran: Journalists and Bloggers 9 October 2014 Preface

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Country Information and Guidance Iran: Journalists and Bloggers 9 October 2014 Preface Country Information and Guidance Iran: Journalists and Bloggers 9 October 2014 Preface This document provides guidance to Home Office decision makers on handling claims made by nationals/residents of Iran as well as country of origin information (COI) about Iran. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether - in the event of a claim being refused - it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under s94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the guidance contained with this document; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Office casework guidance in relation to relevant policies. Within this instruction, links to specific guidance are those on the Home Office’s internal system. Public versions of these documents are available at https://www.gov.uk/immigration- operational-guidance/asylum-policy. Country Information The COI within this document has been compiled from a wide range of external information sources (usually) published in English. Consideration has been given to the relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and traceability of the information and wherever possible attempts have been made to corroborate the information used across independent sources, to ensure accuracy. All sources cited have been referenced in footnotes. It has been researched and presented with reference to the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April 2008, and the European Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country of Origin Information report methodology, dated July 2012. Feedback Our goal is to continuously improve the guidance and information we provide. Therefore, if you would like to comment on this document, please email: [email protected]. Independent Advisory Group on Country Information The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office‘s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office‘s COI material. Information about the IAGCI‘s work and a list of the COI documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector‘s website at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/ It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. IAGCI may be contacted at: Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 5th Floor, Globe House, 89 Eccleston Square, London, SW1V 1PN. Email: [email protected] Website: http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews Page 2 of 18 Contents Preface 2 Section 1: Guidance 1.1 Basis of claim 4 1.2 Summary of issues 4 1.3 Consideration of issues 4 1.4 Policy Summary Section 2: Information 6 2.1 Overview 6 2.2 Legal Position 7 2.3 Bloggers 9 2.4 Journalists Map of Iran Caselaw BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) Page 3 of 18 1. Guidance 1.1. Basis of claim See Asylum Instructions on Considering the 1.1.1 Fear of harassment, harm and/or arrest and detention by the asylum claim and Iranian authorities due to actual or perceived criticism of the assessing credibility government in their role as a journalist (including internet-based media), a blogger or as an online activist. 1.2. Specific issues Is the person’s account a credible one? Do journalists and/or bloggers form a particular social group (PSG)? Is the person at real risk from the Iranian authorities? Are those at risk able to seek effective protection? See Asylum Is the person able to internally relocate within Iran to escape that Instruction on risk? Considering the asylum claim and Return to contents assessing credibility 1.3. Consideration of issues and also the process guidance on Is the person’s account a credible one? interviewing/assessing the claim 1.3.1 Decision makers must consider whether the person’s account of their experiences of being a journalist or blogger are both internally consistent and externally credible (i.e. consistent with the generally known facts and the objective country information). Do journalists and/or bloggers form a Particular Social Group See country (PSG)? information 1.3.2 Journalists and/or bloggers are not considered to form a Particular social Group (PSG). However, ill-treatment due to being a journalist, blogger or on-line activist is likely to fall under the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention on the basis of actual or perceived political opinion. Is the person at real risk from the Iranian authorities? 1.3.3 The Iranian authorities severely restrict freedom of speech and press freedom. It reviews all potential publications – including foreign printed materials – prior to their domestic release and may deem books unpublishable, remove text or require word substitution for terms deemed inappropriate. However, simply being subject to such censorship does not of itself give rise to a See country protection need. information Page 4 of 18 1.3.4 Despite this, the Iranian authorities do harass, detain, abuse, torture and use vaguely worded criminal provisions to prosecute and severely punish publishers, editors and journalists, including those involved in internet-based media, such as bloggers and users of social media, where their reporting is, or is perceived to be, critical of the government. Perceived government critics including journalists and bloggers are likely to be held in detention conditions, some of which are capable of breaching the Article 3 ECHR threshold. 1.3.5 Decision makers must be satisfied that persons claiming to be journalists or bloggers are able to demonstrate that their activities have brought, or will bring them to the adverse See Asylum attention of the Iranian authorities. Decision makers should give Instruction on consideration to all relevant factors, including in particular: Considering the asylum claim and the subject matter of the material in question; assessing credibility. the language and tone used; the method of communication; the reach of the publication (i.e. how many people are they communicating with); the publicity attracted; the frequency of such publications; any past adverse interest by the authorities. 1.3.6 Large numbers of Iranian nationals take part in protests and political demonstrations in the United Kingdom. Since the Iranian Government is not able to monitor every individual who takes part in such activities, decision makers must consider the level of involvement of the person, in addition to any political activity that the person may have previously been involved with in Iran. 1.3.7 With regard to sur place activities, an assessment of risk must be made taking account of factors similar to those set out in the country guidance case of BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) 1.3.8 Family members of journalists and online activists have been targeted on occasions. When considering claims from such persons, decision makers should give consideration to all relevant factors, including in particular: the degree of relationship to the person; actual or perceived support for or facilitation of the activities of the person; Page 5 of 18 any previous adverse interest in the family member from the authorities, e.g. arrests, detention, harassment; the specific profile, history and activities of the person. Are those at risk able to seek effective protection? 1.3.9 As this category of claim concerns a person’s fear of ill treatment by the Iranian state they cannot reasonably be expected to avail themselves of the protection of those authorities. Is the person able to internally relocate within Iran? 1.3.10 As this category of claim concern’s a fear of ill treatment by the state authorities, relocation to a different area of the country to escape this threat is not viable. Return to contents See Asylum 1.4. Policy summary Instruction on Internal Relocation Perceived government critics, including journalists, social media users and bloggers may be subjected by the Iranian authorities to harassment, intimidation, arbitrary arrest, severe custodial sentences, incommunicado detention, unfair trial and torture. Victims of such treatment would not be able to access effective state protection or internally relocate to mitigate any risk. In some cases, family members may also be at risk of ill- treatment. Each case should be considered on its individual merits, but persons who fall into this category and can show that they have come to the adverse attention of the authorities or are reasonably likely to do so, will normally qualify for asylum on the grounds of their actual or perceived political opinion. Where a claim falls to be refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Return to contents Page 6 of 18 2. Information 2.1. Overview 2.1.1 The constitution provides for freedom of expression and of the press, except when words are deemed “detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public.” The law states that anyone who undertakes any form of propaganda against the state may be imprisoned for as long as one year. The law does not define “propaganda.” The law also provides for prosecution of persons accused of instigating crimes against the state or national security or “insulting” Islam, and the latter offence is punishable by death. The government severely restricts freedom of speech and press and it used the law to intimidate or prosecute persons who directly criticized the government or raised human rights issues.
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