Elements of the Arena Active Protection System include ring of explosive panels at lower margin of turret ring and radar on turret roof. Active Protective Systems: Impregnable Armor or Simply Enhanced Survivability?

by Captain Tom J. Meyer are employed by many armies world- ergy (KE) tank-fired munitions. A sys- wide. They currently do not pose a sig- tem that can defeat modern antitank nificant threat to our forces, but as these weapons increases survivability for tank- Why Develop Active Protective systems proliferate and technology im- on-tank duels. Systems (APS)? proves, this picture may change radi- • ATGM production, lethality and pro- cally. liferation has far outpaced armor protec- Your task force’s mission is to attack In the context of armored vehicles, ac- tion. This, coupled with advances in top- along Axis Mustang to seize OBJ Patton tive protection is a defensive system de- attack ATGMs and munitions launched and destroy elements of the 152nd MRR signed to intercept, destroy, or confuse by aerial platforms at ranges that far ex- in order to gain depth for the defense attacking enemy munitions. Active pro- ceed that of direct support (DS) air de- and prevent the enemy from attacking tection systems can be broken into two fense systems, have multiplied the threat into 2nd BCT’s northern flank. Your categories, “active” or “hard kill” sys- to the armor force. company team attacks with steady mo- tems and “countermeasure” or “soft kill” mentum and sets its support-by-fire posi- systems. An active or hard kill system • tions. You observe the enemy in his BPs engages and destroys enemy missiles or Latest-generation main battle tanks that your S2 had accurately templated, projectiles before they impact their in- (MBT) stand at around 60-70 tons, and and order your Bradleys to target their tended target. It is a close-in system of this figure (mostly driven by armor pro- TOWs on the enemy T-80s at a range of antimissile defense that creates an active tection) is perceived by many combat developers as the maximum tolerable 2.5 km. They engage, and impact with a fire zone of protection at a safe distance 2 cloud of fire and smoke, but to your around the vehicle.1 Countermeasure, or limit. The addition of explosive reactive amazement, they have no effect. The en- soft kill, systems confuse and divert the armor (ERA) packages would possibly emy BMP-3s and T-80s immediately en- inbound enemy missile with the use of exceed maximum tolerable suspension gage your positions with their laser- munitions (obscurants), jammers, de- limits, thus degrading performance. guided AT-10 and AT-11 missiles. Your coys, and signature reduction measures. Moreover, latest generation shaped- charged antiarmor weapons have been Bradleys and a few tanks are hit and Why develop APS when tank surviv- your team is being attritted at an alarm- purposely developed to overcome ERA, ing rate. How is this possible? Why were ability, lethality and mobility have in- through either tandem or triple war- the TOWs ineffective? creased dramatically over the last dec- heads, ballistic caps, or a change in the ade? Consider the following reasons: attack profile.3 • Current active protective systems • Awaiting a qualitative breakthrough Is this total fiction, or a real possibility (APS) are designed to counter antitank in armor or ERA is not an option for ar- in our not so distant future? Various guided missiles (ATGM), not high veloc- mored forces that are already outclassed types of active protection systems (APS) ity, high explosive (HE) or kinetic en- by modern weaponry. ARMOR — May-June 1998 7 • It is simply less expensive to increase survivability by adding an ERA and APS package than by buying or developing new tanks in sufficient quantity. This is more cost-effective to Middle Eastern and Eastern European countries because these packages are fitted to T-55s, T-62s, and T-72s during routine retrofits and are light enough not to degrade automotive performance. • Furthermore, the future antitank threat will, by definition, be omnidirec- tional, forcing tank designers out of their cozy frontal arc fixation and into trying to provide virtually the same level of protection all around their vehicles. 4 Although many countries have devel- oped soft kill or countermeasure sys- tems, only Russia has moved from the concept to production stage to create a Drozd defensive launchers are visible at the outer edges of the turret, below and outside the smoke grenade launchers. Activated by a radar system that detects incoming rounds, the sys- truly hard kill, or active system. Current tem’s short-range self-defense rockets use fragmentation warheads. (All story photos taken at Russian active protection and counter- Omsk, Russia demonstration by Ron Dritlein of TACOM) measure systems include: Drozd, Shtora- 1, and Arena. Drozd suffered from several shortcom- MBT. The first known application of the ings. Its radar was unable to determine system is the Russian T-90 MBT that en- Drozd threat elevation levels adequately, and tered service in the Russian Army in the self-defense rockets would almost 1993.10 The first operational APS, named certainly have caused unacceptably high The Shtora-1 system comprises four Drozd, was developed by the Soviet Un- levels of collateral damage — particu- ion between 1977 and 1982. This system larly to accompanying dismounted infan- key components, the electro-optical in- was installed on some 250 naval infantry 7 terface station, which includes a jammer, try. The system costs around $30,000 modulator, and control panel; a bank of T-55As (redesigned T-55ADs) in the and is reported to have been around 80 early 1980s, and was designed for pro- percent successful against rocket pro- forward-firing grenade dischargers tection from ATGMs and antitank gre- pelled grenades (RPGs) in Afghanistan.8 mounted on either side of the turret that nades.5 It used primitive millimeter-wave are capable of firing grenades dispensing radar sensors on each side of the turret Shtora-1 an aerosol screen; a laser warning sys- to detect incoming rounds. A filter in the tem with precision and coarse heads; and radar processor was intended to ensure Shtora-1 is an electro-optical jammer a control system comprising control that the system responded only to targets that jams the enemy’s semiautomatic panel, microprocessor, and manual flying at speeds typical of ATGMs. command to line of sight (SACLOS) an- screen-laying panel. This processes the titank guided missiles, laser rangefinders information from the sensors and acti- These are engaged by one or more short- 9 11 range rockets carrying fragmentation and target designators. Shtora-1 is actu- vates the aerosol screen-laying system. ally a soft kill, or countermeasures sys- warheads (similar to mortar rounds), Shtora-1 has a field of view of 360-de- fired from four-round launchers (one on tem. It is most effective when used in grees horizontally and -5 to +25-degrees each side of the turret).6 Drozd provides tandem with a hard kill system such as in elevation. It contains 12 aerosol maximum overlap and protection only to the Arena, which is discussed later. screen launchers and weighs 400kg. The the forward 60° portion of the turret, During the International Defense Expo- screening aerosol takes less than 3 sec- leaving the sides and rear vulnerable. sition (IDEX) held in Abu Dhabi in onds to form and lasts about 20 seconds. The tank crew can change the orienta- 1995, the system was shown fitted to a The screen laying range is between 50- tion of the system by rotating the turret. Russian T-80U and a Ukrainian T-84 70 meters. 12 8 ARMOR — May-June 1998 The system is activated when the laser warning system detects the threat laser system. The tank commander (TC) presses a button that automatically orients the tur- ret in the direction of the threat. It then triggers the grenade launch- ers. The aerosol screen is effective over a frequency band of 0.4-14 The Shtora system jammers are the two boxes at either side of the gun tube. Grenade dischargers are at Em. The composition of this the rear of the turret. cloud is claimed to screen the tank against laser rangefinders vehicles during retrofit. It is available for radar then operates in the target-tracking and designators and is also claimed to be sale on the open market. mode, locking onto the target at between sufficiently hot to seduce IR homing 7.8 and 10.06 meters from the tank, and weapons away from the MBT. The elec- enters target data into the computer. Af- tro-optical jammers, designated TShU1- Arena ter processing this data, the computer se- 7, introduce a spurious signal over the lects the countermunition (CM), one of 0.7-2.5 Em band, into the guidance cir- The Arena defense aid suite (DAS) was the rounds of protective ammunition that cuitry of the incoming ATGM through developed by Russia around 1993 and are housed in 20 silos around the turret, the use of a coded pulsed IR jamming currently has no counterpart. The Rus- and fires a small projectile (similar to a signal. The jammers provide coverage sians have demonstrated the system to Claymore mine) into the path of the ap- over 20 degrees in azimuth on each side the Germans and French, and it is re- proaching ATGM. At the determined of the main armament and through 4 de- ported to have performed as advertised. moment, the computer generates com- grees of elevation, and is effective within The French were involved in further de- mand signals via a converter unit to the 2 seconds of target identification. It is velopment of the system, as of 1997. 15 selected ammunition. The ammunition claimed to be effective against Western detonates 1.3 to 3.9 meters from the tar- ATGMs such as TOW, HOT, MILAN Arena is intended to protect tanks from antitank grenades and ATGMs and top- get, generating a directed field of de- and Dragon, as well as Eastern Bloc structive elements, which destroy or dis- ATGMs such as the AT-3. The TShU1-7 attack munitions, including ATGMs able the target to levels which are no has a specified life of 1,000 hours, a launched from aerial platforms. When longer dangerous. After .2-.4 seconds, mean time between failures (MTBF) of these threaten the MBT, the computer the system is ready to repel the next tar- 250 hours, and a radiation source of 50 system automatically activates the active get.17 hours.13 defense system with a reaction time of .05 seconds.16 Arena is fully automatic Arena will not respond to false images Shtora-1 has three methods of opera- and provides a very high degree of pro- or targets such as: small caliber projec- tion: fully automatic, semiautomatic/tar- tection through 300° with a dead area to tiles, targets flying away from the tank, get designation, and manual and emer- the rear of the turret. targets outside of the 50 meter envelope, gency mode. According to the manufac- or slow-flying objects, such as pieces of turer, the system reduces the hit prob- The system is switched on from the earth. Additionally, the system does not ability by the following factors: TOW commander’s control panel, then oper- respond to shells or projectiles exploding and Dragon, Maverick, Hellfire, and ates automatically. On completion of the around the tank, or targets whose trajec- Copperhead laser seeker systems by a serviceability self-control check, the sys- tory does not cross a protected portion of factor of 4-5:1; MILAN and HOT by tem operates in combat mode. All infor- the tank.18 The concern for dismounted 3:1; Artillery and tank projectiles fired mation on the modes of operation and infantry is considered, with a danger from systems with laser rangfinders by status of the system and its integrated 14 units is displayed on the control panel. zone identified 20-30 meters around the 3:1. There is no reference to success tank. Arena is day- and night-capable against the Russian AT-4 and AT-5 or In combat mode of operation, the mul- and operates in any climate or terrain. cannon-launched laser beam riders like tidirectional radar mounted on the roof Arena is reportedly effective against the AT-10 and AT-11. of the MBT constantly scans for ap- TOW, HOT, MILAN and Hellfire, as Shtora-1 is currently installed on the T- proaching ATGMs and locates any target well as man-portable AT-4 and LAW 80. 80UK, T-80U, T-84 and T-90 MBTs and approaching within 50 meters of the tank Again, there is no reference to its ef- offered for installation on other armored within the designated speed band. The fectiveness against Russian-designed ARMOR — May-June 1998 9 ground-launched ATGMs or cannon- cles. France and Israel currently employ MALS can be upgraded to incorporate launched ATGMs. By mid-1997, the systems similar to Shtora-1 on their an IFF system.24 POMALS is currently Arena system remained at the prototype tanks. Poland has developed and em- in its prototype stage. stage and is understood not to have com- ploys soft kill systems on AFVs. The 19 The Third Eye laser warning system pleted its developmental phase. UK, Canada, Israel, and the U.S. are all was designed for instantaneous detection Arena is expensive, costing around researching hard and soft kill systems. of laser rangefinders, designators, and IR 20 $300,000 per copy. The GALIX System searchlights. It indicates the direction and type of threat on a display screen Drozd and Shtora-1 are designed to be used with hull and turret ERA packages. The French Galix countermeasure sys- provided for the TC. An audio warning tem mounted on the Leclerc MBT con- is also provided through the vehicle in- Tanks equipped with Arena have ERA sists of an electrical control unit and tercom net. It can differentiate between packages mounted on the hull. If the sys- launching tubes set into the rear of the the various lasers and is insensitive to tem’s munitions are not effective in stop- explosions, flashes, or smoke. According ping the incoming projectile, the tank is turret. Galix is turret mounted and pro- still protected by ERA. Arena’s ammuni- vides 360° protection. It can fire 80mm to the manufacturer, the Third Eye sys- smoke rounds, anti-personnel rounds, or tem has been in operational use with the tion panels, located around the turret, act decoy rounds out to 30-50 meters, in sin- Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and has as the turret’s ERA, providing protection if the selected ammunition fails to func- gle rounds or in salvoes. The Galix sys- proven its performance and reliability tem reaction time is less than one second under field conditions.25 The effective- tion. and is reported to protect Leclerc against ness of these systems is unclear. It is also 21 IFVs versus Tanks any known weapon on the battlefield. unclear whether the three Merkava Mk 3 MBTs recently destroyed by the Hezbol- There are several possible reasons why The Galix 13 smoke round can pro- lah with either AT-3s, AT-4s, or TOWs, the Russians have not mounted APS on duce a smoke screen that includes visual were equipped with any countermeasure and multi-band screening agents, over an devices.26 BMPs or other IFVs. A hard kill system arc of 120° to the front of the vehicle, may not destroy the entire incoming pro- that can last up to 30 seconds. This jectile. Tank base armor and ERA pro- United Kingdom Developments vide protection against any residual frag- screen can blind any optically or IR-con- trolled weapon system. The IR decoy de- ments that may survive a hard kill deto- viates the trajectory of antitank missiles The UK Defense Research Agency is nation. BMPs do not have this level of collaborating with British companies un- protection, or the suspension systems ca- controlled by an IR seeker. It is operated der the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and from the top of the vehicle and is effi- pable of carrying additional armor plat- 22 Industry Defensive Aids Systems (MI- cient for more than 10 seconds. A ma- DAS) program of applied research into ing and ERA. Additionally, the cost fac- jor shortfall of the Galix system is the tor makes it more advantageous to pro- lack of an LWR to alert the crew and low-risk technology that could defeat tect tanks, rather than IFVs. The BMP-3 current precision-guided weapons such can be replaced for $800,000, while a T- automatically cue the system. as antitank missiles. An extensive trial of 80U costs around $2 million. available equipment aboard an armored Israeli Developments fighting vehicle in the autumn of 1995 Western “Countermeasure Systems” successfully demonstrated all aspects, The Merkava 3 MBT is fitted with the from warning to countermeasures, oper- It appears that the Russians developed Laser Warning System 2 (LWS-2) ad- ating under a central controller architec- Drozd to counter RPG and ATGM vanced threat warning system. The sys- ture.27 threats in Afghanistan. Shtora and Arena tem provides an alert whenever optical followed, with the hope of sales to for- radiation is aimed at the vehicle from MIDAS involves system and integra- mer Soviet arms customers. While many any direction and warns against a possi- tion studies, together with investigations nations have developed soft kill systems, ble enemy presence and attack intentions of sensor and countermeasure technolo- few have shown any interest in hard kill in real time. The indication includes the gies. These include radar and laser warn- systems until recently. Research and de- type of radiation, such as IR searchlight, ing receivers; electro-optical (IR and ul- velopment costs, coupled with dwindling laser rangefinder, or laser designator. The traviolet) and acoustic sensors for initial defense budgets and a perceived lack of Merkava 3 is believed to be the first detection; confirmation devices such as an antiarmor threat to modern armor MBT fitted with a threat warning system pulse-Doppler radars; soft kill response seems to account for this lack of interest. as part of its standard production.23 (defensive maneuvering, decoys, jam- mers, and rapid-blooming multispectral Next-generation soft kill systems will The Israeli POMALS system operates obscurants); and hard kill weapons.28 include a laser warning receiver (LWR) similarly to Shtora-1, and is designed as that automatically cues the system to the an add-on or retrofit package. It features Sanders Missile Countermeasures De- incoming projectile. Currently, this is not the LWS-2 that identifies incoming ra- vice (MCD) AN/VLQ-8A jammers were a characteristic of all soft kill systems. diation emitted by laser designa- developed in the U.S. at the time of the The Japanese were actually the first to tors/rangefinders or IR sources. The Gulf War, and 1,000 units were delivered introduce laser warning receivers com- 60mm launch tubes are mounted on the to the Army. However, they were only bined with a countermeasure system on turret to fire a wide variety of munitions fielded to the M2A2 ODS Bradley as of first line AFVs. Their Type 90 tank in- that produce countermeasure options, in- 1996. Last year, Lockheed Sanders took cludes a soft kill system. Sweden is cur- cluding visible or IR smoke grenades, the development of IR jammers/decoys a rently developing a sensor-initiated hard chaff/flare decoys, HE and antipersonnel step further by combining one with elec- kill system for its armored fighting vehi- grenades, and special munitions. PO- tro-optical detectors and successfully us- 10 ARMOR — May-June 1998 “Current generation APSs do not possess the capability to engage and destroy kinetic energy projectiles. However, as technological advances in fire control and detection in- crease, next generation APSs will most likely engage and destroy both ATGMs and kinetic energy projectiles.” ing it on a moving vehicle to decoy an available on the open market, especially 9Russian Armored Vehicle sales brochure, from attacking missile.29 TOW II, Hellfire, Maverick, or Javelin. the International Defense Exposition (IDEX) 97, Moreover, there is little reference to their Provided to the Threat Branch, Directorate of Boeing, under contract with the De- ability to engage and destroy simultane- Force Development, USAARMC from the Na- fense Advanced Research Projects tional Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), July Agency (DARPA), is developing a ous threat engagements. There is also no 1997. reference to the employment, or effec- 10 small, low-cost, fully self-contained ac- tiveness, of any of the Russian systems Jane’s Armour and Artillery Upgrades 1997- tive defense system for military vehicles in Chechnya. Arena is not yet in its pro- 1998, p. 158. and high value assets. The system, desig- 11, 12, 13, 14Ibid, p. 159. nated the “SLID,” for “small, low-cost duction stage and Drozd and Shtora-1 are abundant, but have not proliferated 15, 16 interceptor device,” will provide protec- Ibid, p. 158. extensively. These are simply additional 17, 18 tion from missile and artillery threats. Kashin, p. 3. protection systems that enhance surviv- 19 Threats are defeated at stand-off ranges ability. Jane’s Armour and Artillery, p. 85. of up to 250 meters and include ATGMs, 20 HEAT rounds, mortar rounds, and artil- Current generation APSs do not pos- Danussi interview. lery shells. Boeing is also evaluating ad- sess the capability to engage and destroy 21Ferrard, Stéphane and Gérard Turbé, The Le- vanced SLID applications, including kinetic energy projectiles. However, as clerc System, Quercy S.A: 1’Imprimerie Tardy, protection of assets from anti-radiation technological advances in fire control 1992, p. 37. missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned and detection increase, next generation 22Ibid, p. 38. 30 aerial vehicle threats. APSs will most likely engage and de- 24Bonsignore and Bustin, p. 12. stroy both ATGMs and kinetic energy 25 Counter Active Protective Systems projectiles. Technologically advanced Jane’s Armour and Artillery, p. 154. (CAPS) countries will continue R&D into ad- 26Blanche, Ed. “Hezbollah Turns Up the Heat on Israel,” Jane’s Pointer, Oct 1997, p. 6. The U.S. military is not sitting idly vanced APSs called defensive aid suites (DAS). DAS are a collection of hard and 27Jane’s Armour and Artillery, p. 154 while APS technology improves and proliferates world-wide. The CAPS pro- soft kill subsystems that operate together, 28Hewish and Ness, p. 35. providing an integrated defense against 29 gram is designed to counter this threat to antiarmor precision weapons. ERA and Ogorkiewicz, R.M., “Transforming the Tank,” our armor force. The purpose of the base armor provide the last tier of a Jane’s International Defense Review, Oct 1997, CAPS program is to demonstrate a suite p. 40. DAS. These advances will pose a sig- 30 of technologies that, when applied to nificant threat to our ability to acquire, http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/missiles/ current and future Army antitank mis- engage, and destroy threat armored vehi- slid/slid.htm siles, will neutralize the effectiveness of 31 cles. http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/defense/ threat tanks equipped with any one of a dtap_dto/we_dto.htm#WE.13.02.A. variety of APSs. Technology components Shtora-1 and Drozd performance video of the CAPS suite are expected to in- tapes are available at the Threat Office, clude electronic countermeasures, ad- Directorate of Force Development, vanced long-standoff warheads, decoys, USAARMC. ballistic hardening countermeasures, and Captain Tom J. Meyer, an Intelligence RF electronic countermeasures. These officer, has served as a Chapparal and will be demonstrated in a modular com- Notes Stinger platoon leader, battery XO, and ponent form by FY 98 and in prototype assistant S3 with 5th Battalion, 3rd Air by FY 99 and FY 00. A variety of long- 1 Defense Artillery, 8ID (M); as G2 opera- Kashin, Valery, “Arena: Active Protection tions officer with 7ID (L); as S2 with 1st standoff warhead technologies are to be System For Tanks,” Military Parade, May-June demonstrated by FY 98. This effort is 1996, p. 2. Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech) and com- designed to neutralize the effectiveness 2 pany commander with the 502nd MI bat- Bonsignore, Ezio and Ian Bustin, Towards talion at Fort Lewis. Currently, he is the of threat tanks equipped with any one of “Electronic Armour,” Military Technology, Dec. a variety of APSs. Funding for this pro- 1993, p. 10. Fort Knox Threat Manager and Threat Branch Chief, for the Directorate of Force gram is around $9.7 million over the 3Ibid, p. 10. 31 Development at the U.S. Army Armor next three years. 4 Ibid, p. 11. Center. He holds a BBS in Political Sci- The systems mentioned are not failure 5, 6, 7Hewish, Mark and Leland Ness, “Shoot ence from Hardin-Simmons University proof, nor do they provide 100 percent First, Ask Questions Later: Smart Tanks Learn and is a graduate of ADOBC, MIOAC, protection to all areas of the host tank To Fend For Themselves,” Jane’s International CAS3 and CGSC. against an ATGM threat. Hard and soft Defense Review, Mar. 1996, p. 34. kill systems have not rendered ATGMs 8Danussi, Gerry, Captain, U. S. Army, National E-mail: [email protected] obsolete. It is unlikely they have been Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) Analysts. Phone: DSN 464-7563 or commercial 502- tested against the full range of ATGMs Personal Interview, 16 Jan 1998. 624-7563. ARMOR — May-June 1998 11