Elements of the Arena Active Protection System include ring of explosive panels at lower margin of turret ring and radar on turret roof. Active Protective Systems: Impregnable Armor or Simply Enhanced Survivability? by Captain Tom J. Meyer are employed by many armies world- ergy (KE) tank-fired munitions. A sys- wide. They currently do not pose a sig- tem that can defeat modern antitank nificant threat to our forces, but as these weapons increases survivability for tank- Why Develop Active Protective systems proliferate and technology im- on-tank duels. Systems (APS)? proves, this picture may change radi- • ATGM production, lethality and pro- cally. liferation has far outpaced armor protec- Your task force’s mission is to attack In the context of armored vehicles, ac- tion. This, coupled with advances in top- along Axis Mustang to seize OBJ Patton tive protection is a defensive system de- attack ATGMs and munitions launched and destroy elements of the 152nd MRR signed to intercept, destroy, or confuse by aerial platforms at ranges that far ex- in order to gain depth for the defense attacking enemy munitions. Active pro- ceed that of direct support (DS) air de- and prevent the enemy from attacking tection systems can be broken into two fense systems, have multiplied the threat into 2nd BCT’s northern flank. Your categories, “active” or “hard kill” sys- to the armor force. company team attacks with steady mo- tems and “countermeasure” or “soft kill” mentum and sets its support-by-fire posi- systems. An active or hard kill system • tions. You observe the enemy in his BPs engages and destroys enemy missiles or Latest-generation main battle tanks that your S2 had accurately templated, projectiles before they impact their in- (MBT) stand at around 60-70 tons, and and order your Bradleys to target their tended target. It is a close-in system of this figure (mostly driven by armor pro- TOWs on the enemy T-80s at a range of antimissile defense that creates an active tection) is perceived by many combat developers as the maximum tolerable 2.5 km. They engage, and impact with a fire zone of protection at a safe distance 2 cloud of fire and smoke, but to your around the vehicle.1 Countermeasure, or limit. The addition of explosive reactive amazement, they have no effect. The en- soft kill, systems confuse and divert the armor (ERA) packages would possibly emy BMP-3s and T-80s immediately en- inbound enemy missile with the use of exceed maximum tolerable suspension gage your positions with their laser- munitions (obscurants), jammers, de- limits, thus degrading performance. guided AT-10 and AT-11 missiles. Your coys, and signature reduction measures. Moreover, latest generation shaped- charged antiarmor weapons have been Bradleys and a few tanks are hit and Why develop APS when tank surviv- your team is being attritted at an alarm- purposely developed to overcome ERA, ing rate. How is this possible? Why were ability, lethality and mobility have in- through either tandem or triple war- the TOWs ineffective? creased dramatically over the last dec- heads, ballistic caps, or a change in the ade? Consider the following reasons: attack profile.3 • Current active protective systems • Awaiting a qualitative breakthrough Is this total fiction, or a real possibility (APS) are designed to counter antitank in armor or ERA is not an option for ar- in our not so distant future? Various guided missiles (ATGM), not high veloc- mored forces that are already outclassed types of active protection systems (APS) ity, high explosive (HE) or kinetic en- by modern weaponry. ARMOR — May-June 1998 7 • It is simply less expensive to increase survivability by adding an ERA and APS package than by buying or developing new tanks in sufficient quantity. This is more cost-effective to Middle Eastern and Eastern European countries because these packages are fitted to T-55s, T-62s, and T-72s during routine retrofits and are light enough not to degrade automotive performance. • Furthermore, the future antitank threat will, by definition, be omnidirec- tional, forcing tank designers out of their cozy frontal arc fixation and into trying to provide virtually the same level of protection all around their vehicles. 4 Although many countries have devel- oped soft kill or countermeasure sys- tems, only Russia has moved from the concept to production stage to create a Drozd defensive launchers are visible at the outer edges of the turret, below and outside the smoke grenade launchers. Activated by a radar system that detects incoming rounds, the sys- truly hard kill, or active system. Current tem’s short-range self-defense rockets use fragmentation warheads. (All story photos taken at Russian active protection and counter- Omsk, Russia demonstration by Ron Dritlein of TACOM) measure systems include: Drozd, Shtora- 1, and Arena. Drozd suffered from several shortcom- MBT. The first known application of the ings. Its radar was unable to determine system is the Russian T-90 MBT that en- Drozd threat elevation levels adequately, and tered service in the Russian Army in the self-defense rockets would almost 1993.10 The first operational APS, named certainly have caused unacceptably high The Shtora-1 system comprises four Drozd, was developed by the Soviet Un- levels of collateral damage — particu- ion between 1977 and 1982. This system larly to accompanying dismounted infan- key components, the electro-optical in- was installed on some 250 naval infantry 7 terface station, which includes a jammer, try. The system costs around $30,000 modulator, and control panel; a bank of T-55As (redesigned T-55ADs) in the and is reported to have been around 80 early 1980s, and was designed for pro- percent successful against rocket pro- forward-firing grenade dischargers tection from ATGMs and antitank gre- pelled grenades (RPGs) in Afghanistan.8 mounted on either side of the turret that nades.5 It used primitive millimeter-wave are capable of firing grenades dispensing radar sensors on each side of the turret Shtora-1 an aerosol screen; a laser warning sys- to detect incoming rounds. A filter in the tem with precision and coarse heads; and radar processor was intended to ensure Shtora-1 is an electro-optical jammer a control system comprising control that the system responded only to targets that jams the enemy’s semiautomatic panel, microprocessor, and manual flying at speeds typical of ATGMs. command to line of sight (SACLOS) an- screen-laying panel. This processes the titank guided missiles, laser rangefinders information from the sensors and acti- These are engaged by one or more short- 9 11 range rockets carrying fragmentation and target designators. Shtora-1 is actu- vates the aerosol screen-laying system. ally a soft kill, or countermeasures sys- warheads (similar to mortar rounds), Shtora-1 has a field of view of 360-de- fired from four-round launchers (one on tem. It is most effective when used in grees horizontally and -5 to +25-degrees each side of the turret).6 Drozd provides tandem with a hard kill system such as in elevation. It contains 12 aerosol maximum overlap and protection only to the Arena, which is discussed later. screen launchers and weighs 400kg. The the forward 60° portion of the turret, During the International Defense Expo- screening aerosol takes less than 3 sec- leaving the sides and rear vulnerable. sition (IDEX) held in Abu Dhabi in onds to form and lasts about 20 seconds. The tank crew can change the orienta- 1995, the system was shown fitted to a The screen laying range is between 50- tion of the system by rotating the turret. Russian T-80U and a Ukrainian T-84 70 meters. 12 8 ARMOR — May-June 1998 The system is activated when the laser warning system detects the threat laser system. The tank commander (TC) presses a button that automatically orients the tur- ret in the direction of the threat. It then triggers the grenade launch- ers. The aerosol screen is effective over a frequency band of 0.4-14 The Shtora system jammers are the two boxes at either side of the gun tube. Grenade dischargers are at Em. The composition of this the rear of the turret. cloud is claimed to screen the tank against laser rangefinders vehicles during retrofit. It is available for radar then operates in the target-tracking and designators and is also claimed to be sale on the open market. mode, locking onto the target at between sufficiently hot to seduce IR homing 7.8 and 10.06 meters from the tank, and weapons away from the MBT. The elec- enters target data into the computer. Af- tro-optical jammers, designated TShU1- Arena ter processing this data, the computer se- 7, introduce a spurious signal over the lects the countermunition (CM), one of 0.7-2.5 Em band, into the guidance cir- The Arena defense aid suite (DAS) was the rounds of protective ammunition that cuitry of the incoming ATGM through developed by Russia around 1993 and are housed in 20 silos around the turret, the use of a coded pulsed IR jamming currently has no counterpart. The Rus- and fires a small projectile (similar to a signal. The jammers provide coverage sians have demonstrated the system to Claymore mine) into the path of the ap- over 20 degrees in azimuth on each side the Germans and French, and it is re- proaching ATGM. At the determined of the main armament and through 4 de- ported to have performed as advertised. moment, the computer generates com- grees of elevation, and is effective within The French were involved in further de- mand signals via a converter unit to the 2 seconds of target identification.