SARTRE AND NISHITANI: TOWARD DEVELOPING A SOCIALLY ENGAGED

ZEN ETHICS

By

Peter Park

Submitted to the

Faculty ofthe College of Arts and Sciences

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

In

Philosophy

Chair:

Ellen Feder

Dean R.fthe ~le~", ~(~ ~I. CD\\) Date

2010

American University

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To all those beings who made this possible SARTRE AND NISHITANI: TOWARD DEVELOPING A SOCIALLY ENGAGED

ZEN ETHICS

BY

Peter Park

ABSTRACT

This project is a comparative textual study of the ontologies and ethics of Jean­

Paul Sartre and Nishitani Keiji in order to establish a basis for a socially engaged Zen

Buddhist ethics as exemplified in the Engaged Buddhism movement. Initially, I develop

a Sartrean ethics of fraternity based on a movement from independent self-centered personal freedom to an interdependent universal freedom. However, shortcomings of this

Sartrean ethics are illustrated through examining Nishitani Keiji's Zen Buddhist

philosophy of emptiness. Finally, Mahayana Buddhist philosophers including

Vimalakirti, Nagarjuna, and Dogen are brought out to develop a socially engaged

Buddhism which has become actualized in today's Engaged Buddhism movement.

11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is the culmination of not only many long, lonely hours of reading, thinking, and writing but more importantly a community of mentors, supporters, and friends. I am only the highest expectations of my community.

First, I would have to thank my mentor, Dr. Jin Y. Park. Her class and office chats were where I first envisioned my thesis. I am indebted to Dr. Farhang Erfani for teaching me Sartre's existential philosophy and helping me navigate through my confusion. Dr. Shubha Pathak, my thesis chair, for graciously reading my rough drafts, providing valuable feedback, and reflecting my ideas with clarity. Finally, Dr. Ellen

Feder for providing support and pushing me to make this not merely a personal work but a professional, scholarly work for the world.

I must also give thanks to my friends and peers for giving me the encouragement to continue this work in my darkest hours and valuable feedback on my early drafts. I almost quit at times, thanks Frankie and Shuo.

Finally, none of this would be possible without my parents. Their unfaltering support in my dreams has shaped who I am today.

Thank you.

111 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iii

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

2. FREEDOM AND FRATERNITY: JEAN-PAUL SARTRE'S ETHICS ...... 4

3. EMPTINESS AND INTERBEING: NISHITANI KEIJI'S PHILOSOPHY ...... 32

4. EMPTINESS IN SOCIETY: ENGAGED ZEN BUDDHIST ETHICS ...... 55

5. CONCLUSION ...... 75

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 79

lV CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Ontology and ethics. What is truly real and how does that impact one's actions?

Last year, I began reading Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness with the belief that he understood the human condition better than did any past philosopher whose work I had read. However, there were fundamental pieces missing from Sartre's essay. His work seemed too narrow, too focused on the individual's freedom, and too cynical about the possibility for loving relationships. Being and Nothingness ended with Sartre's promise to write a work on ethics that would fill the gaps left. His book of ethics was never completed, but his Notebooks for an Ethics does exist. Nevertheless, no matter how many of his later works I read, Sartre's ethics still seemed incomplete. I initially developed a Sartrean ethics based on his later ideas on fraternity or interdependence.

However, this developed ethics still proved unfulfilling. I was not alone in my pursuit to develop such an ethics. Secondary works, such as Thomas C. Anderson's Sartre 's Two

Ethics, or more recently, Paul Crittenden's Sartre in Search ofan Ethics, also attempt to construct a Sartrean ethics. Both are excellent, but they deal strictly with Sartre's philosophy. While there have been many works comparing Heidegger and Buddhist philosophy, there is a lack of comparative studies between Sartre and Buddhism.

Therefore, I looked to Zen Buddhism's ontology of emptiness. Zen Buddhist emptiness emphasizes the lack of self-existence of all beings. That is to say, nothing exists

1 2

independent of others. Bridging the gap between Zen Buddhism and Sartre's

existentialism was Nishitani Keiji, Sartre's contemporary who was the third chair of the

Kyoto School and who studied existentialism in Germany during the 1950s. Nishitani's

model of three fields, from consciousness to nihility to emptiness offered a bridge from

Sartre's ontology of being and nothingness to the Zen Buddhist ontology of emptiness,

but lacked a socially engaged ethics. For such an ethics, I turned to Engaged Buddhism,

which since the twentieth century has pursued economic, political, and social means to

overturn oppression and relieve worldwide suffering.

The first chapter of my cumulative ethical inquiry deals with constructing a

Sartrean ethics of universal freedom based on several ofSartre's works, including Being

and Nothingness, Notebooks for an Ethics, and Hope Now. Using these texts, I begin by

articulating his ontology of being and nothingness, along with its other forms, such as

facticity and freedom. I illustrate that he was always concerned with the problem of

ethics. Furthermore, I show the evolution of his philosophy over the years, from a strictly

free individuality towards an ideal vision of interdependent fraternity.

My second chapter introduces Nishitani's critique ofSartre's philosophy for

remaining attached to the ego and explains Nishitani's fields of consciousness, nihility,

1 and emptiness • Nishitani defines nihility as that which strips meaning from life, and emptiness is defined as all beings lacking or empty of self-existence in so far as nothing exists independently from other beings. Despite Sartre's admirable achievement of

bringing nothingness and nihility into philosophical discourse, Nishitani criticizes him for

1 Nihility is defined by Nishitani as that which renders things meaningless. In that sense, nihilism is not simply the lack of meaning but the impossibility for meaning to even exist. 3

remaining attached to the ego. As an alternative to Sartre's ontology, I give an overview from Nishitani's Religion and Nothingness of the fields of consciousness, nihility, and emptiness, which constitute his way of understanding the religious quest towards enlightenment.

My final chapter centers on a socially engaged Zen ethics based on Sartre's social engagement, Nishitani, and Engaged Buddhism. Before developing a Zen ethics, however, I ask whether Zen Buddhism is an anti-worldly religion seeking liberation from this world of suffering. If so, the possibility for a socially engaged Zen ethics would be impossible. Then, I draw on Nishitani to explain why Buddhism has historically lacked a socially engaged ethics. I conclude by developing a socially engaged Zen ethics. This socially engaged Zen ethics combines the best of Sartre's social engagement with Zen philosophy of emptiness. My hope in developing this ethics is to provide a philosophical and historical basis within Mahayana Buddhism for the emergence of Engaged Buddhism and its transition from personal liberation to a transformation of society. CHAPTER2

FREEDOM AND FRATERNITY:

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE'S ETHICS

In Being and Nothingness, Sartre asserted that all human beings, regardless of their situations, always had an absolute ontological freedom. His Being and Nothingness was dedicated to systematically proving through a phenomenological approach that

2 human beings were fundamentally free and thereby responsible for shaping the world .

His political life called upon humanity to become socially engaged in order to combat inequalities and injustices around the world. Thus, he was a humanist advocating social justice through his philosophy and his numerous political activities such as endorsing controversial writers or supporting the Algeria's independence. However, many of his readers criticize his philosophy as being individualistic and lacking ethics. Indeed, he himself, when interviewed by Benny Levy in Hope Now, admits, "In Being and

Nothingness my theory of others left the individual too independent."3 Because of

Sartre's emphasis on individual freedom, readers often conclude he does not take on the question of ethics. While it is true that a comprehensive ethics is not present in his early works, such as The Transcendence ofthe Ego and Being and Nothingness, his later works

2 Phenomenology is the study of experience from first person consciousness. Sartre makes use of everyday experiences to prove his truths are self-evident. The foundation of phenomenology is that consciousness is always conscious ofsomething. Sartre criticizes Husser], the founder of phenomenology, for deviating from phenomenology by positing entities outside of consciousness such as the transcendental ego which is discussed in the next chapter.

3 Jean-Paul Sartre and Benny Levy, Hope Now: The 1980 Interviews, trans. Adrian van den Hoven (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 71. 4 5

do extensively deal with ethics. In the progression ofthese works, his emphasis moves

from a free, individual subject to a free, conditioned subject in a community or fraternity.

At the end of Being and Nothingness, Sartre promises a study of ethics-a study never to be completed. My work is an attempt to elaborate the Sartrean ethics sketched in

Notebooks for an Ethics, by bridging the gap between his phenomenological ontology in

4 Being and Nothingness and his concept of fraternity in Hope Now • In order to accomplish this task, I will consider first his phenomenological ontology of the human being as a being-in-itself and a being-for-itself. Then, I will explore the dialectical interplay of Sartre' s notions of freedom and facticity. After identifying freedom as the creation of meaning and responsibility, I will explain the transition from bad faith to authenticity as the personal realization of freedom within facticity. Taking into account his ideas of human needs, fraternity, and situational ethics, I will conclude by demonstrating that the fact of human beings' freedom as individuals in communion with others leads to a basis for ethics.

The Building Blocks of Sartre's Phenomenological Ontology: Being-in-Itself and Being­ for-Itself, Freedom, and Facticity

The starting point for Sartre' s Being and Nothingness is his phenomenological ontology of being between being-in-itself (being of things, or nonconscious objects) and being-for-itself (being of consciousness, or conscious being). Being-in-itself is nonconscious substance or material being. The in-itself is the nonorganic, nonconscious

4 Ontology is the branch of philosophy that studies what is real or what exists. Then phenomenological ontology is studying one's experiences via first person consciousness to deduce what is real. 6

material world. Nonconscious being is fully itself, in complete identity with what it is.

Being-in-itself, as an undifferentiated wholeness, has no inherent meaning, reason, or purpose. Change, intention, and meaning go beyond being-in-itself, falling instead within the domain ofbeing-for-itself. For example, the transformation of firewood into ashes is an objectively real change of being. However, to recognize this change in being requires a consciousness of this change. There needs to be a witness who is aware of the history of a being, of its past and present. At one moment, there is firewood. At another moment, there are ashes. What binds these moments together and recognizes change, is awareness. Hence the proverbial question "If a tree falls in the woods and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound?" Sartre would answer that a sound occurred, but consciousness is required to bound the tree's falling and the resulting sound as one being.

Without any awareness of or relation to itself, the being-in-itself is full and solid like a rock.

Being-for-itself is consciousness, specifically, a consciousness of nothingness.

Being-for-itself assumes being as a given fact, such that the for-itself cannot exist independent of being. Consciousness is aware of its being but also stands at a distance from it. This distance is a distance of nothingness from the in-itself to the for-itself. Yet, at the same time, the for-itself is this very distance, this nothingness. The terms "for­ itself," "consciousness," and "nothingness" are used interchangeable because they are facets of each other. The term "for-itself' designates the conscious mode of being for sentient beings which is a being always in question. Consciousness is being conscious of something. Simultaneously, consciousness is conscious of its very being. But by being aware of itself, consciousness already transcends its being. Sartre calls transcendence 7

nothingness because of the lack of a determined essence or quality. This nothingness can take many forms, such as values, goals, and so forth. One way to understand this transcendent nothingness is in terms of one's projected future. The future can exist only for a conscious being. The future is a possibility or potentiality of nonbeing. This interplay between the in-itself and the for-itself, or between being and nothingness, is a common theme for Sartre.

He defines being-for-itself as a "being what it is not and of not being what it is."5

The being-for-itself is never identical with its being-in-itself. Being-for-itselfhas no essence because the for-itself is this distance of nothingness from being-in-itself. As a being-for-itself, one is not determined by or bound to any essence that dictates one's actions or future. This distancing from one's being-in-itself means one is always free to choose. Another way to explain the distancing that leads to this freedom is to assert that consciousness is always conscious of an object. It is impossible to imagine being conscious of nothing. However, consciousness, by itself, is nothingness. Consciousness has no static being. Sartre identifies the for-itself, consciousness, and the human condition as nothingness: "The being of consciousness qua consciousness is to exist at a distance from itself as a presence to itself, and this empty distance which being carries in its being is Nothingness."6

Sartre famously said the words "existence precedes essence," thereby giving a three-word summary of existentialism. This quote means that as a being-for-itself, one is not determined by any essence but rather one creates oneself through one's choices and

5 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Citadel Press, 1956), 157.

6 Ibid, 54. 8

actions. Sartre is assuming that material being exists whether conscious beings are around or not. However, the meaning or essence of one's life is notpredetermined.

Sartre's ontological phenomenology unites the dualism between materialism and idealism by arguing everything that exists has a being-in-itself. However, a being-for-itself is not determined by its being-in-itself, precisely because the for-itselftranscends being-in-itself.

Because consciousness exists at a distance from its being-in-itself, this transcending nothingness of consciousness is freedom.

Freedom is the inescapable condition of a being-for-itself transcending its being because it always remains at a distance from itself. Being-for-itself has no intrinsic essence or nature. Hence, human beings are not determined by a fixed essence or nature.

Consciousness transcends being-in-itself and opens the space for freedom. The distancing of the for-itself from the in-itself is freedom. By choosing a project, one acts to change the present world in accordance with one's ends. In this regard, Sartre says,

For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism-man is free, man is freedom ...... You are free, therefore choose-that is to say, invent. No rule of general morality can show you what you ought to do: no signs are vouchsafed in this world. 7

In repudiating essence, Sartre is arguing all human beings are their decisions, their actions. One is freedom itself and thereby condemned to choose, to remain always incomplete-incomplete in the sense that one's choosing, one's freedom, never ends. As

7 Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism and Humanism," in Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings, ed. Stephen Priest (New York: Routledge, 2001), 32, 34. 9

long as one lives, one is "condemned to freedom."8 In choosing projects, one creates

goals and acts to reach those goals. A project is defined as an endeavor where one's

actions are oriented towards realizing an end which is not present. One's chosen projects

shape one's beliefs, one's actions, and one's values. One is always absolutely free in that

one's being-for-itself can never unite fully with one's being-in-itself. One's freedom, as

a fact ofhuman existence, cannot be unwilled, one's freedom to choose one's projects is

inescapable. However, freedom is always a situated freedom. Freedom is always transcendent of a particular facti city of being. Thus, one begins with a unique facti city or

starting point, but nevertheless, one is always free to choose what to do from one's

starting position.

Although the for-itself is ontologically free, the for-itself is a freedom transcending facticity. According to Sartre, the "in-itself ... remains at the heart ofthe for-itself as its original contingency.... This perpetually evanescent contingency ofthe in-itself which ... haunts the for-itself and reattaches it to being-in-itself-this contingency is what we shall call thefacticity ofthe for-itself."9 One's being-in-itself is facticity, the background against which the for-itself stands as a figure. One's body, one's past, one's birth, and all the other concrete facts of oneself constitute one's facticity.

Sartre says, "[w ]ithout facti city consciousness could choose its attachments to the world," and thus facticity is one's grounding in being in the world. 10 Although one cannot change one's facticity, one is always free to choose one's attitudes and responses to one's

8 Being and Nothingness, 550.

9 Ibid, 59.

10 Ibid, 59. 10

facticity. Facticity has no inherent meaning or value. So, how one chooses to interpret

one's past and its influence on one's present actions is always within one's freedom.

That is, the meaning of one's past is always open to interpretation and thereby future

change. In moments ofhappiness, one perceives one's past as a great blessing filled with

love, friendship, and opportunity. Yet, in times of despair, one's past becomes a source

of oppression, a tyrant to one's future, to one's dreams. In these cases, one's facticity

remains the same, but one's consciousness holds different attitudes towards it. Thus, "the

past derives its meaning from the present."11 However, one's facticity can never be

changed. One is always free to value one's past differently, but one cannot change the

facts of one's past. One's facticity conditions one's realistic possibilities and

opportunities, i.e., one's practical freedom.

Ontological Freedom versus Practical Freedom

Sartre distinguishes between ontological freedom and practical freedom: ''Of

course my freedom to choose ... must not be confused with my freedom to obtain."12

That is to say, there is a difference between one's freedom to decide and one's practical opportunities to succeed. One's facticity can be experienced as a limitation upon one's ontological freedom or as the range of opportunities through which one's fi·eedom can be expressed. In relation to one's projected ends, one's facticity appears as a limitation to be overcome. However, in relation to the present, one's facticity is the starting point from which one's projects begin and derive their meaning. For instance, in a marathon, one does not perceive the starting line as a limitation to finishing first. Rather, the starting

II Ibid, 513.

12 Ibid, 481. 11

line marks the beginning possibility to win the race. Whereas a limitation is perceived as the resistance of being-in-itself against one's project, an opportunity is perceived as the welcomed beginning of being-in-itself aiding one's project. In choosing one's project, limitations and opportunities emerge from facticity as obstacles or aids to one's project respectively. Absolute ontological freedom is the ability to decide one's projects.

Opportunity, or practical freedom, is constituted by the intersection of one's project with one's facticity. One freely chooses a project, but its associated practical options are determined by a host of things outside one's control or choice. In other words, practical freedom would be "an ontological freedom with concrete power." For example, everyone has the ontological fi·eedom to become President of the United States. However, those who struggle to survive on a daily basis do not have the practical freedom to become

President. Sartre also recognizes the limitations on freedom by facticity when he says one's practical freedom is always situated and practical freedom as in the ability to act. 13

One's ontological freedom never occurs in a vacuum. Freedom is always within a situation. Furthermore, ontological freedom is only meaningful as the practical freedom to act. Sartre's freedom is not merely the Stoic freedom of thought, but it is a practical freedom which can change the situation. Nevertheless, the absolute ontological freedom to choose one's project exists even when one's practical freedom is greatly limited. One decides whether to be a Nazi sympathizer or a resistance fighter. For Smire, there is no middle ground. Sartre believed it was important to take responsibility for one's

13 Ibid, 484. 12

ontological freedom, however, if freedom is freedom to act then it is also necessary to

recognize the systematic and situational factors which affects one's practical freedom.

Although facticity may condition one's practical freedom, Sartre is adamant in

arguing human beings are still absolutely free because even the perception oflimitations

as limitations occurs through one's freely chosen projects. Being-in-itself is neutral, non-

conscious, and meaning-free. Only a conscious, free human being can enact projects and

bring meaning into the world. For example, I freely take on the project of obtaining a

graduate degree. It is only within the context of tins project that the difficulty of writing

a thesis is designated and thus perceived as a limitation by me. Without my free ability to

choose projects, the possibility for limitations could not exist. In freely choosing one's projects, one must also take responsibility for subsequent meanings and values. I cannot choose to write a thesis while denying the pain and hard work involved. Thus, any experienced limitation can only exist within the scope of one's freedom. For example, a falling rock does not experience the ground as a limitation. In a non-conscious world, things simply exist as they are. A limitation is to experience a limitation towards one's freely chosen ends. Thus, Sartre says that only freedom can limit one's practical freedom. 14

Freedom is total and infinite, which does not mean that it has no limits but that it never encounters them. The only limits which freedom bumps up against at each moment are those which it imposes on itself. 15 Thus our freedom itself creates the obstacles from which we suffer. It is freedom itself which by positing its end and by choosing this end as inaccessible or

14 Ibid, 501.

15 Ibid, 507. 13

accessible with difficulty, causes our placing to appear to our projects as an insurmountable resistance or a resistance to be surmounted with difficulty. 16

In freely choosing end goals, one also freely designates the value of "obstacle" or

"limitation" on to valueless beings. In choosing an end goal, one is freely choosing one's obstacles. If an individual could conceivably not have any projects or goals then there would no longer be any limitations. Hence, one's practical freedom is inseparable from limitations. For a man to be free is to experience limitations on his ontological freedom.

Coefficient of adversity is the resistance against being-for-itself by non-conscious objects. Previously, I defined facticity as the facts of the present situation which mark the starting point for one's practical freedom and projects. Consciousness is what creates value and meaning for these neutral facts. However, coefficient of adversity goes further to state that facticity also limits the scope of possible values upon an object. Sartre never provides a clear definition of coefficient of adversity, but he argues that there is an

"independence ofthings [being-in-itselfJ". 17 Coefficient of adversity is a particular facet about facticity's resistance to the valuations ofbeing-for-itself. That is to say, objects present themselves with limitations on how one may judge it. Sartre offers the example of a crag to help explain coefficient of adversity:

A particular crag, which manifest a profound resistance if I wish to displace it, will be on the contrary a valuable aid if I want to climb upon it in order to look over the country-side. In itself- if one can even imagine what the crag can be in itself- it is neutral; that is, it waits to be illuminated by an end in order to manifest itself as adverse or helpful. 18

16 Ibid, 4 71.

17 Ibid, 483.

18 Ibid, 458. 14

In climbing a crag, it presents itself in a particular way to the climber. For example, if

one wants to move the crag then it presents itself as resistant to this project. However, if

one uses this crag to climb over it then it presents itself as helpful. While one may freely

choose a project to this crag (moving it or climbing it), one cannot decide how it presents

itself once the project is chosen. For example, one cannot value the crag as helpful when

trying to move it. That would be mere lunacy. There are facts about this crag that cannot

be changed no matter how one values it. Furthermore, while one is free to take up any

number of projects to this crag, there are still obvious projects which are impossible. It

would be absurd to consider the crag as a food source or as a human being. David

Detmer, one oftoday's foremost Sartre scholars, sums up the coefficient of adversity's

limitations upon freedom as

(a) in my manner of regarding it, (b) in the range of choices of action that I may undertake with respect to it, and (c) in my possibility of achieving success with respect to the action that I have chosen to undertake." 19

Thus, facticity is not merely the starting point of one's practical freedom from which one

is free to do anything. Rather, facticity and the coefficient of adversity play a role in

what choices can be made and how realistically those actions will be successful. Thus,

objects as being-in-itself indeed do put up resistance (or aid) to one's projects.

Coefficient of adversity is another example that Sartre is not saying human beings can

realistically do anything. Rather, people are always free within a particular situation with particular options even if the only options are fight or die.

19 David Detmer, Freedom as a Value: A Critique of the Ethical Theory ofJean-Paul Sartre (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986), 46. 15

The meaningfulness of one's freedom and decision making relies on the possibility for failure and overcoming of limitations. Typically, the lament is that human beings are mortal creatures limited in abilities and destined to death. Yet, this very limitation of opportunities is what makes a defined, unique individual. Death is a limit, but "also a constitutive factor of one's freedom. There is freedom [only] if there is a choice among possibilities."20 If humans were immortal gods that could realize every imaginable type of life possible then we would no longer be an individual with freedom.

Making a choice involves limitations, contingencies, and risks, but these very things are absolutely necessary in constituting the situation. Choices are meaningful only because there are risks, obstacles, and challenges. As the colloquium saying goes, "nothing worth having comes easily". That is to say, the value of my project is related to the amount of risk and challenges overcome.

Sartre also mentions the freedom of Others as another unique limitation upon one's own freedom. One does not inhabit the world by oneself. Instead, one finds oneself amongst Others while "engaged in a world in which instrumental-complexes

[value objects] can have a meaning which [one's] free project has not ... given to them."21 The meanings and values created by others preexist alongside one's own values.

Indeed, one is already engaged in a meaningful world with meanings not of one's own creation?2 Everyone shares a world of values and meanings beyond oneself. Thus, there is a facticity of values, in addition to the facticity ofbeing. This facticity of meaning

20 Sartre, Notebooks for an Ethics, trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 326.

21 Being and Nothingness, 485.

22 Ibid, 486. 16

created by Others is not a facet Sartre highlights in Being and Nothingness. However, recognizing the facti city of values is important in assessing how the self is engaged in the world with Others. The existence of an Other "brings a factual limit to [one's] freedom. "23 When the Other confers meaning upon one, "[one] begin[ s] to exist in a new dimension ofbeing."24 The Other also places a limitation upon one's freedom by taking one as an object, as a being-in-itself. Sartre provides an example: the prohibition "No

Jews allowed" is to perceive me in "an objective form in which I exist as an objective structure."25 When I am objectified as a static object, I am placed in a situation which has an external outside of Others that I am alienated from. This is the being-outside-for- others which limits my freedom by the freedom of Others. Sartre argues that this limitation by the Other is never encountered in situation because it is the exteriority of situation which is alien to me. Again, Sartre uses the example of the Jew as object:

A Jew is not a Jew first in order to be subsequently ashamed or proud, it is his ptide of being a Jew, his shame, or his indifference which will reveal to him his being-a-Jew; and his being-a-Jew is nothing outside the free manner of adopting it.26

To Sartre, the facti city of meaning by Others is just another, albeit unique, facti city transcended by consciousness. Just as one must accept the past facticity, including all content one did not choose, one can freely respond to the facti city of meaning by Others.

Sartre writes:

23 Ibid, 499.

24 Ibid, 500.

25 Ibid, 50 I.

26 Ibid, 505. 17

Thus the Other's freedom confers limits on my situation, but I can experience these limits only if I recover this being-for-others which I am and if I give to it a meaning in the light of the ends which I have chosen?7

Sartre argues even meanings from Others are a facticity that can be transcended. One

only experiences these foreign meanings within the context of projects. However, I

would argue Sartre's argument that the meaning of Others is transcended seems a bit

naive and unhelpful to those without practical freedom. Previously, practical freedom

was constituted by the intersection of facti city, freedom, and projects. The facti city of values by Others also makes up practical freedom. Others do not just confer meaning

upon a person, but they also condition the scope of possibilities for action and meaning to the point of even being able to negate another person's very existence. The power ofthe

Other to condition one's freedom and existence brings up the important issue of ethics which will be addressed last in this paper.

Sartre does recognize limitations against one's practical freedom by Others as possible hidden opportunities. In Being and Nothingness, he mentions at the end of the chapter on freedom, " ... every event in the world can be revealed to me only as an opportunity .. . others as transcendences-transcended are themselves only opportunities and chances."28 After an entire chapter delineating how limitations only come about through one's fi·eedom, Sartre teases the reader with this single paragraph about every event being an opportunity. Rather than seeing the Other and being-in-itself as enemies against one's freely chosen projects, Sartre is beginning to recognize them as chances and opportunities to actualize one's ontological freedom.

27 Ibid, 503.

28 Ibid, 532. 18

Freedom is a negative concept as in a freedom from oppression,fi"om facticity.

Sartre writes "freedom per se is not lovable for it is nothing more than negation and productivity."29 Sartre says that practical freedom as a universal goal does not provide concrete answers to how to exercise one's ontological freedom. Freedom is only the possibility for choice, action, and projects. For Sartre, freedom is logically the highest value and end because freedom is the foundational ground for all possible values. One cannot place a value higher than freedom because ontological freedom is first necessary to even posit values. Because meaning and values exist only in the human reality for- itself, there are no intrinsic values. So, Sartre writes:

Values reveal freedom at the same time they surrender it. Any ordering of values has to lead to freedom. Classify values in a hierarchy such that freedom increasingly appears in it At the top: generosity.30

In order to create values, individuals must first be free. To put it another way, values are only meaningful if one freely chooses them. It makes no sense to say one can value a goal that's already pre-determined without one's free choosing. Sartre argues that all values necessarily include freedom and therefore freedom is the highest value and end to pursue. By undertaking a project with values and ends, freedom is already presumed as part of the project too.

Sartre makes a brief note at the end of Being and Nothingness that the other half of one's freedom is responsibility. After writing a lengthy text on defending the freedom of the being-for-itself, Sartre concludes his final chapter by writing a mere few pages on the relationship between freedom and responsibility. This brevity on the part of Sartre, I

2 ~ Notebooks, 507.

30 Ibid, 9. 19

believe, is due to his overemphasis on individuality and freedom. However, Sartre's

argument that one's practical freedom is always situated implicitly acknowledges responsibility. One's freedom can only be meaningful if one also takes responsibility for

one's choices. In making decisions, one is shaping the world. Sartre says, " ... man being

condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders; he is responsible for the world and for himself as a way ofbeing."31 Sartre defines responsibility as "consciousness (of) being the incontestable author of an event or of an object."32 One is responsible for one's freedom, actions, and choice of projects. By taking responsibility, one sustains particular values and gives up the possibility for other values. That is, in taking responsibility for one's projects in shaping the world, one also assumes responsibility for its results.

Living Freedom & Facticity: Bad Faith, Good Faith, and Authenticity

The interaction between the in-itself and for-itself, between freedom and facti city is made personal when Sartre discusses bad, faith, good faith, and authenticity.

According to Sartre, bad faith is the natural, initial mode ofbeing for individuals. In bad faith, I objectify myself as a being-in-itself or insist that I am not conditioned by my facti city. In both cases, I am denying a vital part of my being-for-itself as freedom and facticity intertwined. In Sartre's view, acting in a mode ofbad faith is an escape from one's freedom and facticity and thereby an unethical mode ofbeing. The transition from bad faith to authenticity is a transformation of the individual from an unethical, passive self to an ethical, active self.

31 Being and Nothingness, 529.

32 Ibid. 20

Bad faith is the lie to oneself that one is fully either facticity or transcendence.

Thus, there are two types of bad faith, either identifying only with one's freedom or one's facticity. In bad faith, one identifies fully as freedom without facticity or facticity without freedom. In the case where one identifies with facticity or being-in-itself, one runs from one's future freedom. However, freedom is still being exercised in being conscious of one's situation and deciding to identify with facticity. A person in bad faith may abandon responsibility for one's freedom by identifying oneself as a passive being­ in-itself object determined by the situation and others. But even this decision to abandon responsibility is a free action, but it is a decision to ignore and blame others for one's life.

A person tells himself that it is not their fault that they are who they are. Sartre uses the example of the waiter who considers himself as only a waiter. In this case, the waiter is identifying with his social, job position to the point of neglecting his transcendent freedom which always distances him from any being. On the other hand, bad faith is also possible by insisting only on identifying with transcendent freedom. One can ignore altogether facticity and look towards the horizon as one's future, one's real self. In both cases ofbad faith, there is a piece of the truth missing. A person is both being-in-itself and a being-for-itself. Bad faith is marked by this identification with a fixed essence that defines who the self is. However, consciousness always knows that it is lying to itself with half truths because subconsciously one is always conscious oflying. Thus, Sartre says bad faith rather than a bad lie. In bad faith, one pre-reflectively is aware of the truth even while one may believe in the lie. Hence, it is a faith despite doubts that the being­ for-itself and being-in-itself can be united into a for-itself-in-itself. 21

Consciousness can move beyond bad faith towards good faith with its higher

standards for beliefs. Sartre values good faith over bad faith, but ultimately both are

continuing the project to become for-itself-in-itself. As a good faith believer, one begins

questioning one's perspective of the world. Good faith is the recognition that one's

previous beliefs might be incorrect. However, good faith still believes in the idea of

essence that determines a person, but no longer certain what the essence might be.

Ronald Santoni is a Sartre scholar who has done extensive research on Sartre's concept of

authenticity. He offers a good definition of good and bad faith:

... bad faith is unwilling to be persuaded by critical evidence, good faith is willing; that, whereas the "spontaneous determination of our being" in bad faith- in other words, the "original project" of our bad faith- is a closed, uncritical attitude toward available evidence, the fundamental attitude, or original determination of being in good faith is an open, critical attitude toward evidence.33

Thus, good faith is the project of the believer who is open to change his beliefs by critical evidence. This person holds better justified beliefs. However, the end goal between bad faith and good faith is the same to latch on to a defined, closed essence. The true situation ofbeing human as being-for-itself and being-in-itself remains unrealized. For

Sartre, the realization of these two halves of the human condition, ofbeing-in-itse]f and being-for-itself, of freedom and facticity is found in authenticity. Sartre writes in a footnote in Being and Nothingness that we can radically escape bad faith by a "self- recovery of being which was previously corrupted."34 This self-recovery is authenticity.

33 Ronald Santoni, Bad Faith, Good Faith, and Authenticity in Sartre 's Early Philosoph_v (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), 71.

34 Ibid, 68. 22

Sartre defines authenticity as "living one's freedom, living- not refusing- one's human reality" which is a freedom always in situation.35 Sartre writes authenticity

"consists in having a true and lucid consciousness of the situation in assuming the responsibility it involves."36 Authenticity is assuming one's freedom within a situation along with taking responsibilities for one's situation and actions. Unlike bad faith which involves only half truths of the situation as either facti city or transcendence, authenticity simultaneously embraces the transcendental freedom beyond the facti city of a bounded facticity of a situation. Practical freedom is conditioned by facticity and Others however these limitations do not negate the fact one is still ontologically free to choose one's project. An authentic response is possible by responding to the present situation within the scope of practical freedom, which is the intersection of freedom and facti city. A reader can mistakenly read Sartre to argue that people have absolute freedom in the sense of omnipotent power or limitless practical freedom. However, as I have illustrated previously, this reading of Sartre would be false. Indeed, freedom only has meaning in a situation bounded with limitations. As I said before, if I could act however I wished without limitation, consequence, or responsibility then my actions would lose meaning and be merely arbitrary.

In Notebooks for an Ethics, Sartre says that no one has really understood what he meant by "We are condemned to be free."37 Sartre does not mean that one is invested with absolute freedom and power. Rather, he says that man is in the world surrounded by

35 Ibid, 94, 90.

36 Ibid, 96.

37 Notebooks, 431. 23

facticity and a "project that surpasses it."38 Man is both situated and free. Facticity limits

man's practical freedom in that it conditions his present situation. But "as project, he

assumes his situation in order to surpass it."39 This is to say that even in pursuing one's

hopes and dreams, which are by definition a project beyond one's current being and

facticity, facticity is preserved and changed. Only by taking responsibility of one's

present self can one possibly change one's future self. However, the self is conditioned

by its being in the world as always a situated self. In every moment, the world intervenes

into my space, "[it] abruptly limits my possibilities and my horizons."40 Suddenly, I

could fall sick or be fired from my job. However, "even though the new situation comes

from outside, it has to be lived through" by assuming it in order to surpass it. Not only

does one have to take responsibility for past actions, but also has to take responsibility for the accidental aspects of one's past that were not desired or willed. But what can never

be taken from a person is their inner freedom to choose their attitudes and responses to

the situation. Hence, Sartre writes " ... there is something true in an ethics that places the

greatness of man in his acceptance of the inevitable."41 A person must accept the present; however it may be, if he aims to surpass it. Thus, for Sartre, it is immoral both to act as if the outside situation deprived a person of all freedom as well as to dream of a future which does not take responsibility for the past. An authentic person must take responsibility for both one's absolute, inner freedom and the given facticity of being that

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid, 432.

41 Ibid, 433. 24

one already is. According to Sartre, good faith and bad faith are both wrong because they have a one-sided view of humanity either as determined being or absolutely transcendent freedom. In fact, the true human condition is the ambiguous place of facti city and transcendence, in a unique situation with limited practical freedom.

Sartrean Ethics: Universal Freedom, Human Needs, Fraternity and Situational Ethics

An ambiguity within Sartre's philosophy of freedom is how one's personal fi·eedom as the highest value logically and necessarily leads to willing universal freedom as one's highest value. My question is why is this necessarily true? Does freedom intrinsically have sufficient impetus from valuing one's personal freedom to lead to valuing the freedom of others? Is not human history filled with examples of individuals pursuing their own freedom and projects at the cost ofthe freedom of others? Thomas

Anderson has dealt extensively with this issue in his two books dealing with Sartre's ethics. He criticizes Sartre's possible arguments about universal freedom. Particularly, if personal freedom is the highest value then naturally universal freedom is the highest value for all human beings. As Sartre would say in choosing I choose for all people.

However, Anderson points out:

All that the argument shows is that I am responsible for the image of man I project to others by my fundamental choice and corresponding acts. As for the choice of freedom, I am responsible for proposing as the primary value for each man his own individual freedom. But this is not to propose to any man that he choose to value the freedom ofothers ... IfSartre wants to contend that it does, it is incumbent on him, then, to demonstrate that there is a necessary connection between asserting that each man's freedom should be his supreme value, and my choosing hiss freedom as a value for me .. .he simply has not done this. 42

42 Thomas C. Anderson, The Foundation and Structure ofSartrean Ethics (Lawrence, The Regents Press of Kansas, 1979), 81. 25

I agree with Anderson that Sartre does not clearly demonstrate why one should value the

freedom of others. Sartre seems to believe that it does not require explanation because

logically one would fight for the freedom of others if freedom is recognized as a supreme

value. Although I do agree with Sartre that the freedom of Others is related to one's

personal freedom, I also believe this connection between personal and universal freedom

is unclear and would benefit further exploration. Furthermore, I argue that the project for

universal human freedom is the ground for Sartre' s ethics. Therefore, it is absolutely

vital to understand how Sartre's ontology of freedom can move from realizing my

personal freedom towards acting to free others. This process is a transition from Sartre's

early independent, self-centered perspective towards an interdependent, de-centered perspective. The crucial pivot point is the issue of common human needs and the interdependent nature of the for-itself.

As an embodied being, common human needs exist which shape the hierarchy of projects undertaken as individuals and communities. The desire to survive and live a prosperous life informs the core of one's projects. I take this desire for life as a starting point, a given facti city of all human beings. The possibility for fulfilling one's freedom is to a large degree influenced by the satisfaction of one's basic needs. The instinct for life is a universal underlying end goal. I am not arguing that as a human being one is inttinsically bound to an instinct for life. However, the instinct for life and the socialization of the self is the starting point of human life and consciousness. And with the acceptance of the project for life, one takes on a large number of subprojects to satisfy basic needs such as health, food, shelter, relationships, and so on. Thus, people begin to have social projects because people share the same goals based on codependence. 26

According to Sartre, if "freedom can only be limited by freedom" then famine would be a human experience of lack of food for survival. However, this "lack" takes on the meaning of lack because we have the overarching project to survive. If we did not require food as a need or did not care about surviving then the absence of food would not be experienced as a lack. The self-evident fact that we recognize these basic needs for everyone and the basic right of everyone to have the capability to satisfy these needs is the bridge from the independent self-centered consciousness to an interdependent consciousness. The project of universal fi·eedom as the highest value for all individuals makes sense if we acknowledge the right for every human being to be capable of satisfying their basic needs. Universal freedom rather than being a logical necessity, I would argue that universal freedom is grounded in an affective empathy with others in their struggle for basic human needs. Ethics is based on the recognition of a fundamental interdependent relationship between you and me. This interdependent relationship between you and me is Sartre's idea of fraternity discussed in Hope Nmv. 43

Fraternity is the ideal community of authentic human beings. Authenticity was defined as the realization and living of one's human condition as a being-for-itself I would argue Sartre's fraternity is the actualized, authentic human relation to others. This idea of fraternity is one of the key points of discussion in Hope Now. These interviews are absolutely vital in illustrating Sartre's distancing from his past philosophy and opening the hope and possibility for "a society in which the relations among human

43 Inm1ediately, controversy surrounded Hope Now with Sartre's old guard objecting that Levy, the interviewer, twisted Sartre's words. However, I consider the work more than acceptable because Sartre himself approved its publication despite pressure from his friends including Simone de Beau voir. For more infom1ation on the controversy, I suggest Shlomit C. Schuster's T7Ie Philosopher's Autobiograph_v: A Qualitative Studv (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Publishers. 2003 ): 178-182 or the Introduction to Hope Now. 27

beings are ethical."44 Unlike the antagonistic, impossible relationship between

individuals in Being and Nothingness, he explains the need for the development of an

ethics for society to survive. His introduction of fraternity is the cornerstone, I believe,

for any possibility for a Sartrean ethics beyond the self-centered consciousness seen in

Being and Nothingness. He writes, "there is a slow movement, in history, of man's becoming conscious ofhis fellowman."45 Fraternity recognizes individuals as free

subjects rather than as a being-in-itself object. Thus, we finally live like human beings.

Just as there was a dialectical relationship between fi·eedom and facti city, there is an interplay between individual freedom and the facti city of shared origins and ends. The collective facticity of a community shapes one's practical freedom for better or for worse.

However, a community of human beings shares interests and projects so that it is a community rather than a group of atomized individuals. According to Sartre, family symbolizes fraternity:

In a certain way, we form a single family ... To belong to the same species is, in a way, to have the same parents. In that sense, we are brothers. Besides, this is how people define the human species - not so much in terms of certain biological characteristics as a certain relationship that obtains among us, the relationship of fraternity. It's the relationship of being born of the same mother.46

Fraternity is the relationship members of the species have with one another.47

We call the relationship of a man to his neighbor fraternal because they feel they are of the same origin. They have a common origin and, in the future, a common end. Their common origin and end- that's what constitutes their fraternity. 48

44 Hope Now, 107.

45 Ibid, 61.

46 Ibid, 87.

47 Ibid, 88. 28

Without a relation with others, a person would merely be an atomized, self-centered individual. A self-centered individual would above all value himself and his immortality.

He would see everything as objects and value them by their instrumental value to him.

He would take others as merely a means to his personal ends. However, the self-centered perspective does not accurately reflect the true condition of human existence. To believe it was even possible for such an individualized existence would be in bad faith by ignoring the pre-existing connections one has with each other. Sartre says:

Since we are constantly in the presence of the other. .. the other is always there and is always conditioning me- my response which isn't only my own response but is also a response that has been conditioned by others from the moment of my birth, is of an ethical nature.49

Sartre recognizes that even one's free responses are nevetiheless conditioned by one's relationship with others which has always occurred since the moment ofbirth.

Furthermore, one's response is of an ethical nature. An authentic person recognizes an indebtedness and interdependence with others for survival, for practical freedom, and shares a common origin and end. In acting to help create better situations and practical freedom for others, one acts in communion with others to achieve a common end.

Moreover, one begins to identify not only as a human individual transcending the situation to fulfill personal projects, but additionally, as a family member with responsibilities to the freedom of others.

48 Ibid, 90.

49 Ibid, 71. 29

Sartre argues the situation right here and right now calls us forth to act towards an

immediate better world. Rather than working towards helping "future mankind", Sartre

focused on the concrete immediate problems which would lead to long-term benefit:

There is no reason to prepare a kingdom of morality or of happiness for strangers or unknown people at the price of injustice and unhappiness today. We have rather today to reach some improvement that will prepare the way for tomorrow's improvement. 50 ... the end is born from the event itself. There is a perpetual renewing of near term ends. The distant end is contained in the close one. 51

His injunction is to invest in today rather than only for an unknown future stranger

because there is always a danger with a never-ending promise in the distant future. A

focus on a future utopia leads to justifying violence and injustice to the present as

necessary measures for a future happiness or safety which may never be completed. By

staying in the concrete here and now, one has a perpetual renewing of short term ends

rather than putting all of one's eggs in one future aim. Sartre writes in the Notebooks

"Authenticity reveals that the only meaningful project is that of doing (not that ofbeing)

and ... the one meaningful project is that of acting on a concrete situation."52 The starting

point is facticity or concrete situation. From this starting point, one acts towards

fulfilling human needs and acting on behalf the fi·eedom of others. Authenticity and ethics go hand in hand because to act from any other starting point would be to be in bad faith. Earlier, authenticity was defined as living one's situational freedom which affirms both one's transcendental freedom and concrete facti city. This facti city includes the fraternity among human beings in the sense of sharing a common origin and end. Thus,

50 Notebooks, 50.

51 Ibid, 85.

52 Ibid, 475. 30

an authentic person acts ethically in the sense of affirming that everyone is interdependent on each other in achieving our shared aims. When it comes to how to exist, we do not need abstract formulas but simply to live in our concrete situations. Thus,

Sartre writes, "Ethics [of Being] is by definition an abstract fact. It is the goal one gives

oneself when there is no goal. It is a certain way of treating others when one has no other relation to others."53 Sartre's situational ethics justifies an ethics of universal freedom through the concrete actions of today by arguing the interdependent relationship of fraternity that all human beings share.

Although Sartre never published a fully developed ethics, the necessary components for a comprehensive, Sartrean ethics can be fashioned based on authenticity, fraternity, and situational action. Being and Nothingness emphasized the freedom of the individual in all circumstances at the cost of marginalizing responsibility and ethics.

Sartre, himself, seems to recognize this imbalance when he finishes his book with a short discussion on responsibility and a promise for a future work on ethics. In Hope Nm1',

Sartre acknowledges his early work was too individualistic and did not pay sufficient attention to freedom as always being situational freedom. Over the course of Sartre's works, Sartre increasingly emphasizes practical freedom and the interrelatedness of human beings, i.e. fraternity. Both fratemity and practical freedom have to do with the intersection between being-in-itself and being-for-itself. That is to say, between facticity and freedom. This intersection between freedom and facticity is the situation, the ambiguous space where practical freedom and opportunities arise. It is always in situation that one lives and acts. Authenticity is difficult precisely because it must be

53 Notebooks, 103. 31

continually renewed in the present situation. One's practical freedom is constantly being reshaped. Fraternity, as the shared origins and ends of all human beings, illustrates the facti city of interdependence. Freedom can never be separated from others. The oppression of another is oppression on me because our facti city intersects each other such that we share the same world. While a person can oppress others, it would be denying this original relationship of family with one another. In this sense, one's freedom can never be separated from the freedom of others. CHAPTER3

EMPTINESS & INTERBEING:

NISHITANI KEIJI'S PHILOSOPHY

In Chapter Two, I constructed a Sartrean social ethics of universal freedom based on his phenomenological ontology. This Sartrean ethics relied on the recognition of

shared needs and ends of all human beings, in that everyone has a vested interest in each other's mutual welfare. However, Sartre's concept of self was only implicitly addressed as the ambiguous intersection between facticity and transcendence. In this chapter, I examine Sartre's Transcendence ofthe Ego to analyze his ideas on consciousness and the constitution ofthe ego. Then, I will introduce Nishitani Keiji's criticisms ofSartre's phenomenological ontology and philosophy of consciousness. His primary criticism is that Sartre remains on the field of consciousness. Nishitani argues that Western philosophers since Descartes have begun with the cogito as their starting point and never progressed past it. Nishitani argues that death and nihility provide an opportunity to break through the bubble of consciousness to arrive at the fundamental, field of emptiness, which is the heart of Zen Buddhism. First, I shall cover Sartre's theory of consciousness and self-ego formation before introducing Nishitani Keiji and his three fields.

Sartre's Ego: An Object fOr Consciousness

32 33

Sartre's first book, Transcendence ofthe Ego, is a repudiation ofHusserl's argument of a transcendental ego within consciousness. Instead, Sartre contends that the

4 ego is an object for consciousness, an object among objects. 5 He maintains consciousness, in itself, has no contents of its own. Consciousness is only conscious of the phenomenon of objects. Sartre reiterates Husserl's core phenomenology by repeating that consciousness is always conscious of something.

Consciousness is present to objects. Consciousness is a great emptiness, a wind blowing toward objects. Its whole reality is exhausted in intending what is other. It is always outside itself. 55

For Sartre, consciousness is a great emptiness, a void which gains content by intending an object. Consciousness, as defined in Chapter Two, is nothingness without any intrinsic or inherent being or self within it. Additionally, Sartre does not equate the ego and consciousness as synonymous. The ego is an object for consciousness. Sartre writes:

We should like to show here that the ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness: it is outside in the world. It is a being of the world, like the ego of 6 another. 5

The ego or the "I" is an object outside of consciousness among the world of objects. Past philosophers such as Kant and Husser! posited that there must be a true self behind consciousness which unifies the experiences of selfhood. However, Sartre argues that the experience of a unitary, single self does not prove the existence of a transcendental ego.

Rather, consciousness is continually unifying the divergent past and present experiences into one coherent experience of selfhood. Consciousness "refers perpetually to itself"

54 Jean-Paul Sartre, Transcendence of the Ego, trans. Forrest Williams and Robert .Kirkpatrick (New York: The Noonday Press, I 957), 21.

55 Ibid, 22.

56 Ibid, 32. 34

7 thereby retaining its past memories and experiences. 5 This continual referencing to itself creates the unity of consciousness and makes the ego as a possible object.

Sartre distinguishes between the first order reflecting consciousness and second order reflected consciousness. The reflecting consciousness is consciousness of an object.

Consciousness is always an intentionality directed at an object. Simultaneously, the reflecting consciousness is also aware of its own consciousness. Sartre says that this self­ awareness is self-evident. It is impossible for a person to do an action without being conscious of doing the action. If someone suddenly asks me what I'm doing while I'm engrossed in writing, I would reply without delay that I am writing. Consciousness is always directed outwardly, while at the same time, aware on a pre-reflection of its own activity. The second order, reflected consciousness, is consciousness reflecting on itself, i.e. self-consciousness. The "I" or ego is the synthesis or product of these two consciousnesses. The ego or "I" is not intrinsic or necessary to consciousness but rather constituted by consciousness, reflecting on its own actions as an object. Sartre writes,

"Thus the consciousness which says I Think is precisely not the consciousness which thinks."58 The "I" is not present on the first order of consciousness because the "I" is an object for consciousness. When I run after a bus, when I am absorbed in music, or when

I stare at the sunset, the "I" is not in my consciousness. In those moments, consciousness is constituted only by its objects, those experiences. In the experience of staring at the sunset, there is only "sunset-being-seen." Sartre writes the "I" never appears except in a

57 Ibid, 39.

58 Ibid, 45. 35

reflection of oneself. In self-reflection, there is a second level reflected consciousness

which says, "I am seeing the sunset." Furthermore, Sartre says that on the first order of

consciousness, one sees the qualities of objects without the ego intervening with its own

reflection. For example, consider one's consciousness seeing an injured friend named

Paul. On the first order, pre-reflective level, consciousness has "Paul-needing-help" as

9 its object. 5 Without reflection, one responds immediately and spontaneously to Paul's

needing assistance. On the reflected level, consciousness has an additional ego object

superseding consciousness with "I, as a helpful person, should help Paul." Thus, the ego

or "I" is a product stemming from self-reflection which alters one's perception of the

world. I would argue that the ego is an additional abstract field of experience for

consciousness. This is not to say that the ego is good or bad, but Nishitani will deeply

criticize the limits and problems of the field of consciousness where these observations of the ego will prove helpful.

Nishitani Keiji

Nishitani was born on February 27, 1900 in a small town in Ishikawa Prefecture,

Japan. Nishitani confronted the problem of death at a young age. When he was fourteen years old, his father died from tuberculosis. Early in his life, Nishitani read not only the

Bible but also works of St. Francis of Assisi, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Friedrich Nietzsche,

Henrik Ibsen, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Thomas Carlyle, and August Stlindberg. After

Nishitani graduated from high school, his options were to pursue law school, become a

59 Ibid, 56. 36

Zen monk, join a utopian commune, or follow his interest in philosophy. He chose to

study philosophy in Kyoto with Nishida Kitaro. 60 Today, he is recognized as the third

chair of the Kyoto School, a philosophical movement centered at Kyoto University,

bridging Western philosophy and Japanese religious ideas. In his view, the problem of

nihilism was the driving force behind his philosophical endeavors:

My life as a young man can be described in a single phrase: it was a period absolutely without hope.... My life at the time lay entirely in the grips of nihility and despair.... My decision, then, to study philosophy was in fact-melodramatic as it might sound-a matter of life and death .... In the little history of my soul, this decision meant a kind of conversion.61

Whereas most young people would not think much about death or nihilism, Nishitani was

consumed by the question of death with battling tuberculosis and the early death of his

father. His wrestling with the problem of nihilism found resolution in philosophy and

Zen practice. In 1937, he began a twenty-four-year period of Zen practice under

Yamazaki Taiko. However, it was only later that Nishitani incorporated Zen into his

academic works. From 1937 to 1939, he studied philosophy with Martin Heidegger and

gained a fascination with German mysticism. His masterpiece, Religion and Nothingness,

describes different fields of existence by dealing with a variety of topics from Meister

Eckhart's Christian mysticism to criticisms ofSartre's ego attachment. It also reflects his

unique interest in the relationship between nihilism and Buddhist emptiness, which serves

as the primary bridge between Sartre's existentialism and Zen Buddhism. Religion and

Nothingness was translated into English in 1972 by Jan Van Bragt, who studied under

60 James W. Reisig, Philosophers a_( Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 183.

61 Nishitani, "Watakushi no Seishun Jidai," in Kaze no Kokoro (ToJ...-yo: Shinchosha, 1980) 195, 198, 204, quoted in Jan Van Bragt, introduction to Religion and Nothingness: Keiji Nishitani, trans. Jan van Bragt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), xxxv. 37

Nishitani. Unfortunately, many ofNishitani's other works have not yet been translated.

James W. Reisig, one of the foremost scholars of the Kyoto School thinkers, praises

Nishitani, arguing that the Kyoto School would not be as well-known today ifNishitani

did not make "intelligible and tangible much of what his predecessors had left in the

abstract."62

You may wonder why I choose Nishitani to respond to Sartre' s ontology and

social ethics. After all, Nishitani primarily focuses on Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Eckhart.

I argue Nishitani's writings on consciousness, nihilism, and nothingness serve as both an

aid and critique of Sartre' s philosophy. Furthermore, Nishitani explicitly mentions Sartre in both The Self-Overcoming ofNihilism and Religion and Nothingness. Nishitani dedicates thirty pages in Religion and Nothingness to criticizing Sartre's atheistic existentialism as not pursuing nihilism to its limits. Likewise, when I first read Being and Nothingness, there was a distinct feeling of incompleteness. I believe Sartre creates a wonderful argument for every human being's absolute freedom. However, he only perfunctorily mentions responsibility or ethics in Being and Nothingness. Sartre, himself, acknowledges this deficiency of ethics in his own later works including Critique of

Dialectical Reason, Notebooks for an Ethics, and Hope Nmv. Finally, I agree with

Nishitani that Sartre's phenomenological ontology remains incomplete in so far as he remains attached to the ego due to his remaining on the level of consciousness. As I shall describe in this chapter, Sartre never realizes the true nature of reality; the field of

6 ~ Philosophers o_lNothingness, 187. 38

absolute nothingness or emptiness underlying and constituting the field of consciousness.

In Religion and Nothingness, Nishitani argues that religion becomes a necessity in

order to break through one's self-centered consciousness to become truly aware of reality

or for reality to realize itself in one's consciousness. Ordinarily, he argues one is always

engaged on the field of consciousness pursuing some external object. He writes that

religion becomes a necessity when one breaks from this self-centered perspective of

judging things and instead questions the value of one's own existence. For what purpose

does one exist? This existential questioning is often prompted by engagement with death

or nihility. Nishitani criticizes past philosophers, including Descartes and Sartre, for

never breaking through the field of consciousness to nihility or emptiness. Instead, they

remain on the field of consciousness as a "field of relationships between those entities

characterized as self and things."63 Only by breaking through the field of consciousness

to the field of nihility is the problem of nihility and death adopted to the extent that one

fully becomes the question, "for what purpose do I exist?" 64 Nishitani criticizes Sartre

for still viewing nothingness from the standpoint of consciousness. Instead, Nishitani

writes that by breaking through consciousness due to nihility can one reach at emptiness or absolute nothingness and thereby become truly aware of reality. This elemental, original tl.eld of emptiness is a neglected or unexplored concept in Western philosophy.

The field of absolute nothingness or emptiness is the fundamental difference between Nishitani and Sartre. For Sartre, nothingness is defined as negation or non- existence. His equating human consciousness with nothingness is not the same as

63 Nishitani Keiji, Religion and Nothingness, trans. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 16.

64 Ibid, 3. 39

Nishitani's definition of absolute nothingness or emptiness. For Nishitani, absolute

nothingness is not stating that things do not exist. Rather, emptiness is asserting that no

being exists by itself If everything depends with each other then nothing has self­

existence or self-essence. All things are empty of self-essence, which means that

ontologically emptiness is the primary reality. Likewise, Sartre says that "nothingness

lies coiled in the heart of being" such that the being of consciousness is a being-for-itself,

which is always in question. 65 Sartre also says human beings do not have an inherent

essence and therefore are capable of creating or defining themselves. However, this call

for self-creation contradicts the Zen Buddhist view that emptiness is the true, inescapable reality. Nishitani writes that Sartre views nothingness as the basis of the free human beings, and this leads to individuals continually choosing themselves as a self, to creating themselves.66 For Nishitani, Sartre makes the misstep of asserting that one could possibly define one's being such that one could cover over one's nothingness. Whether this is a legitimate criticism of Sartre remains to be seen. Arguably, Sartre never wrote that one could possibly fix one's essence but rather that one has the freedom and responsibility in every moment to choose one's life. However, in the Zen Buddhist perspective, even one's self-definition is empty and exists only in relation to others. On the field of emptiness, all things are an appearance of "Fonn of non-Form", of a being that is simultaneously absolute nothingness. 67 Nonetheless, these appearances are absolutely real in the sense that there is nothing behind the appearance or anything

65 Being and Nothingness, 56.

66 Religion and Nothingness, 31.

67 Ibid, 200. 40

beyond appearance. All that exists is appearance on a field of emptiness. Each of these fields will be further discussed in order.

Representations- The Field of Consciousness

Consciousness has been the starting point for modem philosophical inquiry. Both

Descartes and Sartre view the cogito as an absolute certainty. Satire's phenomenological ontology depends on the certainty of consciousness. Consciousness is consciousness of phenomenon. Sartre writes that the being of an object is transphenomenal and that the being of an object overflows beyond its mere appearance to consciousness. Thus, the being of things is not dependent on consciousness. Consciousness cannot directly get at the being of an object but only its appearances. All things appear to consciousness as an objectified representation or appearance and a dichotomy naturally occurs in consciousness between the perceiving subject and the known object. The division of experience between a separate subject and object is a fundamental problem for Nishitani and Zen Buddhists. Consciousness, operating on the level of sensation and reason, apprehends not the total series of appearances of objects but a particular, limited appearance through the filtering lens of the subject's senses and thought. Consciousness mistakenly believes these appearances to truly be the real object. However, the senses and reason incorrectly objectify the true nature of objects. Nishitani writes:

On the field of consciousness where they are ordinarily taken for real, however, they are not present in their true reality but only in the form of representations. 68

On the field of consciousness things are all "received" as objective entities by the

68 Religion and Nothingness, 10. 41

self-conscious ego posited as a subjective entity. Things are set in opposition to consciousness as "external" actualities .... An object is nothing other than something that has been represented as an object, and even the very idea of something independent of representation can only come about as a representatiOn.. 69

Consciousness "receives" objects in the form of phenomenal representations that are outside of the self. This bifurcation of consciousness and outside beings occurs because one believes phenomena are independent, separate entities, distinct from one's self. This dichotomy between self and other leads to an ingrained, habituated self-centeredness. In this self-centered consciousness, the selfbelieves that these appearances of objects must be external, independent entities from me. There are two mistakes happening here. First, one's subjective representation of a being does not get at the essence or totality of a being.

To consider any appearance of an object to represent its totality would be to falsely objectifying the object's being and closing off its meaning outside of one's biased perception. This objectification of things has its roots in the naming of things. Nishitani writes:

People give names to persons and things, and then suppose that if they know the names, they know that which the names refer to. So, too, people presume that just because they "have seen" something before, they know what it is. The deeper our "association" with certain persons and things, the more we converse with them and mix with them, so much the better do we get to know them and to become more intimate with them.70

In naming things, one believes that by knowing the name that one knows the object.

However, the name is just an appearance or representation. A name itself is not an absolute, necessary designation nor does a name truly encompass the total meaning of a

69 Ibid, 108.

70 Ibid, 101. 42

being. If I were to say that my name is Peter, you do not really know anything about me

beyond the fact that I call myself Peter. Furthermore, I could equally be called by many

names. Thus, it is the same with all names. Zen Buddhism particularly criticizes the role

of reason and sensation for causing a false belief in the permanent reality of names and the beings they point to. However, this trap of objectification of things is inevitable only

if one remains on the field of consciousness. Nishitani illustrates a model of consciousness as two concentric circles sharing a single center point. These two circles are reason and sensation. Consciousness only receives the periphery of being from these two circles, resulting in a subjective representation of being rather than getting at the center of the being. The true being of an object occupies the center point, what Nishitani calls the homeground of a being. Nishitani argues that it is possible to reach at the homeground of beings on the field of emptiness via the field of nihility. Nishitani's project is to reach at things on their homeground, at their center.

Nishitani's Critique ofSruire

According to Nishitani, the ego is self-centered due to its constituted nature as consciousness mirroring itself. Nishitani's critiques become clearer with the aid of

Sartre's definition of ego:

... ego is seen as self-consciousness mirroring self-consciousness at every tum and the cogito is seen from the standpoint of the cogito itself, ego becomes a mode of being of the self closed up within itself. In other words, ego means self in a state of self-attachment. 71

71 Ibid, 14. 43

Sartre defined the ego as the synthesis ofthe reflective and reflected consciousnesses where consciousness has itself as its object. Sartre's definition ofthe ego is in accordance with Nishitani's view that the ego is a mirroring or reflecting of consciousness with itself. Nishitani adds that the ego is an illusory object created and sustained by consciousness. Typically, one would consider the ego to be equivalent with one's self. Nishitani's goal is realizing the difference between the ego and one's true self.

When the self lives purely through the ego, the self is closed off from the world in a state of self-attachment.

Nishitani examines being and nothingness not merely from the viewpoint of dualistic consciousness but also from the view of nihilism and emptiness. Nishitani argues one must break through the egoistic field of consciousnesses to a "more elemental field of the elemental self."72 The ordinary field of consciousness, which is the starting point for Sartre, exists mutually dependent on the field of nothingness, the abyss beneath being. Consciousness itself is the web of connections between entities:

Consciousness is the field of relationships between those entities characterized as self and things. That is, it is the field of beings at which the nihility that lies beneath the ground ofbeing remains covered over. 73

For Nishitani, being and nothingness arise together in the world. This is far different from Sartre who claimed that human beings have this paradoxical nature as a being always in question. That is to say, Sartre only believed human beings had that dual nature of being and nothingness. Nishitani magnifies this nothingness, this nihility to

72 Ibid, 15.

73 Ibid, 16. 44

cover all things such that all things are contingent and impermanent. Conversely, Sartre claimed that it is only in human consciousness that nothingness, which exists independently from consciousness, becomes recognized in the world. However,

Nishitani's claim is that everything is both being and nothingness in so far as all beings are interconnected to exist. Nishitani advocates a breaking through the field of consciousness, which is a field of being, to the field of nihility in order to have a comprehensive experience and understanding of true reality. By living through the field of consciousness, one naturally remains attached to being and, thereby, to life.

Nishitani identifies Sartre's existential atheism as "elevated to the position of serving as a substitute for theistic religions" in so far as atheism provides an "ultimate basis for our human existence and [serves] to assign the ultimate telos of human life."74

Nishitani believes that existential atheism considers itself as the only "comprehensive, sufficient standpoint for modern man."75 Nishitani cautions that Sartre, just like

Descartes, begins with the conscious ego as the starting point. The difference is that

Descartes postulates consciousness as derived from God, whereas Sartre views consciousness as "constituted on a subjective nothingness."76 Sartre shifted the foundation of consciousness from an absolute God to a relative nihility, from theism to atheism. This existential atheism has become its own dogmatic religion shaping the worldview ofhuman consciousness. Sartre's existentialism transferred values from God­ given absolutes to man's nothingness such that'' ... man can find nothing to rely on, either

74 Ibid, 30.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid, 31. 45

within himself or without."77 However, Sartre still remains solely within the field of consciousness. While Christianity believed man was created out of God's image, whereby every man had an intrinsic essence. On the other hand, Sartre argues that man's existence precedes his essence such that each individual, by being grounded in nothingness, takes his self as a free project, an image out of nothingness to be chosen and created. Sartre's nothingness begins by destroying essence but then becomes a ground for freedom such that one can determine one's values and essence. However in creating one's own being, Sartre is introducing a being which always is in question. This continual self-creation leads to a human anxiety that one's values are merely subjective.

There must be a ground upon which one may establish values, rather than merely establishing them in the nothingness of the being of consciousness. Sartre shifts from the foundation of a God-fixed essence to the contingent being by the individual. This constant freedom sets up the impossible task of attempting to create one's ego or self- identity. In so doing, one remains forever shackled to the ego. Sartre's nothingness is what Nishitani calls "nothingness-at-the-bottom-of-the-self." This attachment to the self or ego endures in Sartre's philosophy as a call for individuals to create themselves.

Rather than embracing emptiness as the inescapable condition of all things, Sartre utilizes nothingness as the ground for creating one's being. Nishitani says,

Nothingness may seem here to be a denial of self-attachment, but in fact that attachment is rather expontentialized and concealed. Nothingness may seem here to be a negation ofbeing, but as long as it makes itself present as an object of consciousness in representative form -- in other words, as long as the self is still attached to it- it remains a kind of being, a kind of object. 78

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid, 33. 46

Thus, Sartre says that one is condemned to be free because one is always defining one's

essence or self. He correctly writes that we create our being through our choices and

actions. However, Nishitani's point is that any attempt to define one's self, to sustain an

ego, is doomed for failure precisely because all beings are inherently empty or nothingness always lies coiled at the heart ofbeing. Only by deeply confronting death and nihility can one come to realize the true nature of one's self. Thus, Nishitani goes on to write about the field of nihility, which undermines the delusion of independent, permanent beings.

Field ofNihility

Nihilism was the fundamental problem for Nishitani. I would argue all of

Nishitani's works can be understood as a response to the issue of nihilism. Nishitani defines nihility as "that which renders meaningless the meaning oflife."79 Nishitani, in following Nietzsche's footsteps, believes nihilism is not a problem to be covered over or to run from. Rather, nihilism "signals nothing less than that one's awareness of self­ existence has penetrated to an extraordinary depth."80 The field of nihilism is a deepening of consciousness where one realizes the abyss of nothingness underneath being. By passing through death and nihilism, one has the opportunity to return to the field of emptiness, a field where one anives at the homeground, elemental being of things.

Nihilism as the abyss undermining one's being appears to consciousness as a gaping

79 Ibid, 4.

80 Ibid. 47

abyss threatening one's life and meaning:

A void appears here that nothing in the world can fill; a gaping abyss opens up at the very ground on which one stands. In the face of this abyss, not one of all the things that had made up the stuff of life until then is of any use. 81

This nothingness negates the possibility for meaning. On the field of consciousness, we conceive of things in a dualism between being and nothingness. In Zen philosophy, all beings are impermanent and empty of self-existence. Nishitani writes that the problem of nihility is keenly experienced with the death of a loved one. This sudden negation of a person, of a being, brings a rupture to one's common sense. In one moment, there is a person with life, interests, and passions. Then, there is suddenly nothing. In face of this nothingness, one questions the reality of being:

Nihility is absolute negativity with regard to the very being of all those various things and phenomena just referred to; death is absolute negativity with regard to life itself. Thus, if life and things are said to be real, then death and nihility are equally real. Wherever there are finite beings- and all things are finite- there must be nihility; wherever there is life, there must be death. In the face of death and nihility, all life and existence lose their certainty and their impmtance as reality, and come to look unreal instead. 82

Stable beings that one took for granted as real are thrown into question when confronted with the problem of death and nihility, for all beings change and eventually are negated.

Then this means the being and nothingness of an object are equally real. The being of things is revealed to be grounded in absolutely nothing:

On the field of nihility, all that is ordinarily said to exist or to be real on the fields of sensation and reason is unmasked as having nihility at its ground, as lacking . . 83 roots fr om th e very b egmnmg.

81 Ibid, 3.

82 Ibid, 7.

83 Ibid, 122. 48

On the field of consciousness, the primary question is evaluating the value of things in relation to one's self-centered being and projects. One only sees the instrumental-value in relation to one's project. However, with the appearance ofnihility, the value of the

self and existence is thrown into question. This field of nihility is a field negating what one commonly understands as being. Instead, being is revealed as a being-sive- nothingness. Being exists through nothingness, and nothingness exists through being.

The field ofnihility, however, is not a stable standpoint to live one's life. Inevitably, such a viewpoint would likely lead to despair and nihilism. Nishitani clearly states that nihilism is a transitional field from the field of consciousness to the field of emptiness.

This nullification of meaning by nihility is valuable because it brings one "nearer to an original subjectivity."84 On the field of consciousness, one questions whether the appearance which one cognitively apprehends is true. On the field of nihility, one questions the reality of things and the self. Aware that death and nihility are real, one is thrown into doubt about the reality of being:

On the field of nihility, where the field of reason has been broken through, cognition is no longer the issue. Things and the self are no longer objects of cognition. The field of nihility is rather the appearance of the self-awareness that the selfness of things and the self are utterly beyond the grasp of cognition. Once on the field of nihility, objects (things and the self as objects) and their cognition cease to be problems; the problem is the reality of things and the self. Moreover, this reality, and our apprehension of it are made possible not by returning from the field of nihility to the field of reason, but only by advancing from the field of nihility to arrive at a field where things and the selfbecome manifest in their real nature, where they are realized. The field of nihility appears at the point that one breaks a step away from the field of consciousness and reason; and this is at the same time a step further in the direction of the field of sunyata, or emptiness. 85

84 Ibid, 108.

85 Ibid, 136-7. 49

Although nihilism is commonly heard as an incredibly negative experience associated with despair and depression, Nishitani argues that it is a forward step from the delusion of a self-centered consciousness towards the field of emptiness. On the field of consciousness, the reality of death and nihility is avoided, suppressed, or transformed into a being. In short, one who lives on the field of consciousness is in bad faith about the true nature of things. However, the field ofnihility is not an endpoint. Nihilism questions the reality of things in order to arrive at the emptiness of all things. Even the field of nihility is qualified as a relative nothingness mutually dependent on being and thereby empty of independent existence or being:

... the nihility seen to lie at the ground of existence is still looked upon as something outside of existence; it is still being viewed from the side of existence. It is a nothingness represented from the side of being, a nothingness set in opposition to being, a relative nothingness. And this brings us to the necessity of having nihility go a step further and convert to sunyata. 86

This is perhaps a critique against Sartre himself for examining nothingness from the perspective of a conscious being. His examples of nothingness, such as a missing friend in a cafe, always are objects. He never studies nothingness from the standpoint of the subject negated. Indeed, he negates God and essence, but only to transfer the power to create values from God to the individual. At this point, it is time to explore the field of emptiness (sunyata).

Field of Emptiness

Absolute nothingness or emptiness (sunyata) is the heart ofNishitani's philosophy

86 Ibid, 123. 50

and Zen Buddhism. Emptiness is the teaching that all things are empty in so far as they lack self-meaning, self-causation, or self-existence. This radical negation denies any possible dualism of separate entities, whether it is the body and mind or "I" and other.

On the field of consciousness, one egoistically believed oneself to be self-sufficient and separate from other beings. On the field of nihility, one became doubtful about the reality ofbeings due to a confrontation with death and nihility. Finally, on the field of emptiness, the separation between all entities is realized to be false. All things exist in a state of mutual interdependence such that Zen Buddhism says emptiness or absolute nothingness is the root of all existence. This is not to say that things are not real or do not exist. Rather, absolute nothingness is beyond relative being and nothingness, so one could equally speak of absolute being, too. Emptiness means entities do not exist by themselves but as a part of a whole.

In the mode of consciousness through reason and sensation, one never apprehends an appearance of whole reality. In fact, the ego is continually influencing how consciousness sees the world, including a duality between the self and other. Sartre advanced a step in philosophy by arguing that human beings do not have a fixed essence but that one's actions defines one's essence. However, the doctrine of emptiness goes even further than Sartre by stating that all things, not just human beings, are empty of not meaning/essence but also self-existence. The first, elementary mistake occurred when philosophers used the word being to represent distinct entities. Likewise, Sartre makes 51

this same mistake naturally, because he begins from the field of consciousness in forming his ontology of being and nothingness. Nishitani states that there is nothing behind man:

Person is an appearance with nothing at all behind it to make an appearance. That is to say, "nothing at all" is what is behind person; complete nothingness, not one single thing, occupies the position behind person.87

This complete nothingness behind one's personhood is not accounted for on the field of consciousness. However, the polar opposite end of nihilism is not the answer. Nishitani criticizes the existential atheists such as Sartre for remaining shackled to nothingness and thereby making nothingness into a "thing", a being. Instead, what is necessary is a point of view that harmonizes both being and nothingness, life and death. This is to see the world in a "double exposure" where life and death or being and nothingness intersect:

... the emergence of any given thing in the Fonn of its true suchness can be considered as the point at which the orientation to life and the orientation to death intersect. Everything can be seen as a kind of "double exposure" of life and death, of being and nihility. In saying this, I do not have in mind the sort of thing Plato did in speaking of things in the sensible world as impermanent entities in constant flux because of a "mixture" of being and non-being. Neither do I mean that being and non-being mingle together in each thing as if they were quantitative elements; and certainly not that death comes when life wears down to its end, or that nihility appears when being disappears. I mean instead that while life remains life to the very end ... they both become manifest in any given thing, and therefore that the aspect oflife and the aspect of death in a given thing can be superimposed in such a way that both become simultaneously visible. In this sense, such a mode of being might be tenned life-slve-death, death-sive-live.88

All things exist in this intersection between life and death. Nishitani's ontology is neither being nor nothingness. Rather, emptiness is a being-sive-nothingness and nothingness- sive-being. Emptiness is not mere negation like nihility but rather a reversal of figure and

87 Ibid, 70.

88 Ibid, 93. 52

ground, " ... not that the self is empty, but that emptiness is the self; not that things are

empty, but that emptiness is things."89 Thus, Zen Buddhism is not a life-negating or death-denying philosophy. To frame emptiness as being or nothingness would be to posit

an already false dualism. That is to say, the statement does not even make sense because being and nothingness are inseparable. Nishitani is not supporting the dualism between noumena and phenomena, nor is he following Plato with transcendental Forms and appearances. Rather, at the elemental mode of being, on the field of emptiness, illusory appearance is absolutely real in that all that exists is this illusory appearance, an interdependent appearance with nothing behind it:

Therefore, the elemental mode ofbeing, as such, is illusory appearance. And things themselves, as such, are phenomena. Consequently when we speak of illusory appearance, we do not mean that there are real beings in addition that merely happen to adopt illusory guises to appear in. Precisely because it is appearance, and not something that appears, this appearance is illusory at the elemental level in its very reality, and real in its very illusoriness.90

This reality of phenomena is not understandable on the field of consciousness which mistaken} y takes everything to be a permanent being. In so far as everything is absolutely negated to absolute nothingness, everything is realized as truly real by emptiness as a Great Affirmation. In nihilism, the selflooks upon the world and says everything is meaningless. On the field of emptiness, a reversal occurs between emptiness and being. A self-centered consciousness would understand emptiness as the selfbeing empty, all things are empty. Once emptiness is realized within consciousness, emptiness is the self, emptiness are things. As such, on the field of emptiness, one can

89 Ibid, 138.

90 Ibid, 129. 53

pierce through reason and sensation to get at the home-ground, heart of things. One

becomes the object of consciousness in so far as the ego no longer intervenes. This field

of emptiness is not an intellectual concept but rather a lived experience. To prevent an

essentialization of emptiness, emptiness can only be an experience of the middle ground between appearance and being. Once consciousness stops the discriminatory naming of things, the possibility for the realization of emptiness opens up:

Non-discerning mind that lets the being of all things be, a field on which all things can be themselves on their own home-grounds, the field of sunyata that I have called the field of the elemental possibility of the existence of all things. 91

When consciousness ceases to discriminate the contents of its awareness, the field of emptiness reveals itself as the homeground of all appearances and consciousness.

Emptiness is realized as the foundation and being of all things such that the dualism between self and other or body and mind dissolve. In short, Nishitani is really reformulating the classic lines by Zen Master Dogen:

To learn the Buddha Way is to learn one's self. To learn one's self is to forget one's self. To forget one's self is to be confirmed by all dharmas [things]. To be confirmed by all dharmas is to cast off one's body and mind and the bodies and minds of others as well. 92

If I asked someone to define themselves in one word, it would be impossible. The more one tiies to figure out one's true self, the more one finds there is a complex web of connections with others. Eventually, a reversal of figure and ground occurs where one's self is an expression of others and others are an expression of one's self.

91 Ibid, 181-2.

92 Dogen, Th<' Heart ofDogen 's Shoboge1Eo, trans. Nom1an Waddell and Masao Abe (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 41. 54

In this chapter, Nishitani Keiji has appropriated Sartre's existentialism and Zen

Buddhism in order to formulate an ontology of emptiness. Nishitani praises Sartre for

bringing nothingness back into philosophical conversation. However, he criticizes Sartre

for not expanding upon nothingness to the point ofbeing-sive-nothingness or

nothingness-sive-being. In Nishitani's ontology, being and nothingness arise together in

existence on the field of emptiness. Ordinarily, one's consciousness is preoccupied with

personal interests so that one never truly sees things as they are but rather by one's

judgments. Death and nihility shock consciousness out of its complacency and prompt

the spiritual questioning of why does one exist? What is the meaning of one's life?

Nishitani experienced this religious despair at a young age as a result of his health

problems and death of his father. Nihilism provides a breakthrough by the method of

breaking down. By realizing the reality of death and nihility, one questions the reality of

life and meaning. By corning to a double exposure consciousness of the field of

emptiness, one reconciles these false dualisms by seeing the true reality of the world.

The goal ofNishitani and Zen Buddhism is to break through to this elemental ground at

which being and nothingness are both real - this double exposure of reality where the real is absolutely empty and the empty is absolutely real. CHAPTER4

EMPTINESS IN SOCIETY:

ENGAGED ZEN BUDDHIST ETHICS

In this chapter, I will construct a socially engaged Zen Buddhist ethics by drawing

from Sartre, Nishitani, and various Buddhist thinkers. The purpose is to reconcile the teachings of emptiness, as seen in Chapter Three with Nishintani, along with the socially­ engaged ethics of Sartre from Chapter Two. I begin by reviewing the deficiencies of

Sartre's ethics in light ofNishitani's critiques ofhis ontology in Chapter Three. Then, I will establish the groundwork for a possible Zen Buddhist social ethics based on the writings ofBuddhist philosophers, including Vimalakirti and Nagarjuna. Third, I will review Nishitani's concerns about the lack of a Zen social ethics and why he believed this was so. Finally, a socially-engaged, Zen ethics will be constructed based on Japanese

Zen philosopher Dogen and the principles of Engaged Buddhism.

Throughout this chapter, three questions shall guide my thoughts on the possibility of a socially- engaged, Zen ethics. First, is Zen Buddhism a life-negating philosophy focused on the escape from this world of samsara? Second, why has a socially-engaged Zen Buddhist ethics not been prevalent previously? Third, is social engagement secondary in Zen Buddhism to the personal path of ultimate enlightenment?

I will examine each of these questions in tum, before comparing Sartre's ethics and my

Zen Buddhist ethics.

55 56

Limitations of Sartrean Ethics

Nishitani's critiques of Sartre's ontology and existentialism are relevant because

Sartre's ethics are grounded on an incorrect ontology of individual self-interest and self­ existence. The only reason for working towards universal freedom was through fraternity, realization of shared origins and ends. However, even with Sartre's fraternity, individuals are still viewed as self-sufficient, disconnected individuals. Sartre does not adequately address the ways in which the conditions for fraternity always exist not just between human beings but for all beings, in that everything is interdependent for existence and meaning. In short, Sartre's ontology and ethics is still mired in a dualism due to remaining on the field of consciousness. As explained in Chapter Three, human beings on the field of consciousness are likely to be self-centered because consciousness on the surface level supports this dualism between "I" and other. Descartes' dictaum, cogito ergo sum, asserts that the starting point for all certainty is in one's conscious thinking. As Nishitani points out, though, consciousness in taking itself as absolute and primary only would see the appearances or representations of other beings. Ordinarily, one remains shackled within an egoistic, self-centered consciousness, which constantly seeks to create one's being.

Sartre defends the absolute freedom of every individual to determine his own essence within the bounds of his facticity. However, from the Buddhist viewpoint, this very desire to create oneself is a delusion; because, one's being can never be defined or fulfilled. Sartre's claim to create one's being leads to the belief that one can define one's being or essence. However, as Nishitani shall argue, all being is empty in that all being is empty of self-existence or self-being. Rather, the project to create oneself is always an 56

on-going process, which is involved with others. Instead, Nishitani argues that SmiTe

goes on to say that unbound from any social or biological essence, mm1 is free to choose his projects and become whatever he wills, within certain limitations. Thus, freedom and nothingness become the ground upon which one wills one's self-centered projects.

The ego has not gone through the field of nihilism and broken through the field of emptiness. Thus, even Sartre's ethics is a provisional ethics of universal freedom based on the self-centered recognition of mutual needs rather than mutual being. In Chapter

Three, the solution from Nishitani was for one to break through the individual consciousness to arrive at the field ofnihility where one doubts one's existence and meaning. This great doubt provides the starting ground for the religious quest to get at the true nature of existence. On the field of consciousness, one never pierces onto the homeground of things, including one's true empty nature. By following Nishitani's roadmap, one can reach an understanding of emptiness as the true ontological condition of the world and thereby begin constructing a plausible Zen Buddhist, socially-engaged ethics.

Grounding a Zen Buddhist Ethics

I purposefully choose Zen Buddhism, a sub-school of Madhikya School (Middle

Way), which itself is a branch ofMahayana Buddhism; because, Nishitani practiced Zen meditation, and emptiness is a primary tenet of Zen Buddhism. Furthermore, as I shall address later, Thich Nhat Hanh, a leader in Engaged Buddhism, is also a Zen master.

Before crafting a Zen social ethics, I will address the historic roots of Zen

Buddhism by examining the rising of Mahayana Buddhism from Theravada Buddhism 57

and pivotal Mahayana philosophers, including Nagmjuna and Vimalakirti. Mahayana

Buddhism is a later school of Buddhism, which broke away from Theravada Buddhism.

One of their primary disagreements was whether the highest spiritual achievement was

the arhat or bodhisattva. The arhat was understood to have reached nirvana and was no

longer shackled to the wheel of samsara. On the other hand, the bodhisattva was a

compassionate one who vowed to remain in the world in order continually to help other beings. I argue this conflict is important for a socially-engaged Buddhist ethics, because

this dispute is whether the scope of Buddhism should (or could) enlarge from a monastic,

personal religion to a more social, layman religion.

The original, and possibly only, difference between Theravada and Mahayana

Buddhism was over the question of whether the ideal spiritual figure was the arhat or the bodhisattva. In the Theravada tradition, the ultimate aim was to achieve nirvana and thereby free oneself from the cycle of rebirth. In order to become enlightened, the arhat must have perfected his moral virtues, which include social precepts. Nevertheless, from the Mahayana perspective, the arhat's ultimate aim was to depart from the world of samsara thereby leaving behind the rest of humanity. Mahayana Buddhists interpreted the arhat's goal as selfish and shifted the ideal to the bodhisattva figure who vows to stay behind in the world of samsara to help save all sentient beings. In addition, Mahayana

Buddhists believed that Buddha did not truly die but rather still exists in order continually to help sentient beings achieve enlightenment.

Finally, there is a difference in tenninology about enlightenment from early

Indian Theravada Buddhism to later Japanese Zen Buddhism. Originally, the goal of 58

Buddhism was nirvana, the extinction of one's karmic debts and to become free from this

world of samsara. This language of extinction of karmic debt and thereby release from

the world has a perceived anti-worldly attitude. Japanese Zen Buddhism emphasizes

satori or awakening to one's true nature. This distinct shift from extinction from this

world to an awakening to true reality denotes how Mahayana Buddhists saw themselves

differently from Theravada Buddhists. This shift from personal nirvana towards the

enlightenment of all sentient beings brought about social and philosophical changes in

Mahayana Buddhism.

Nagatjuna (c. 150-250 CE) was the founder of the Madhyamaka sect of

Mahayana Buddhism and the foremost Mahayana philosopher known for his discourse on

emptiness (sunyata) as the central Mahayana doctrine. At the time ofNagmjuna, the

prevailing Buddhist school was the Abhidharma School, a Theravada sect, which

believed that there were real dharmas or atoms constituting the makeup ofbeings and that

different collections of these dharmas were what created all objects. According to the

Abhidharma Buddhists, the self was empty of a self-nature but was still constituted by

these real dharmas. N agmjuna criticizes this doctrine of real dharmas by arguing that all

things, including these dhannas, are empty of svabhava or self-existence.

Co-dependent arising means all things are dependent on each other for existence.

However, a possible assumption would be that each thing is ontologically real in and of itself, separable from other things. For example, I am dependent on my parents for my existence, but this original dependence does not seem to negate my real being. However, a belief in distinct, separable entities would be incorrect. Nagmjuna argues that all things 59

do not have any being or essence in and of themselves. "I" as a being-in-itself or a being- for-itself do not ultimately exist but am instead an aggregate of infinite elements, which has enough continuity that one conventionally can distinguish one's self from others.

According to Nagmjuna, all things including people, ideas, and material objects are ultimately empty of independent self-existence. N agmjuna is going further than Sartre' s interdependence of meaning by arguing that all things are not separable entities but part of a larger whole. All things require each other for their very existence.

In the previous chapter with Nishitani, emptiness was addressed as the elemental field or real homeground of things. However, long before Nishitani, Nagmjuna emphasized the teaching of emptiness over other teachings. Emptiness is the logical outcome when co-dependent arising (pratitysamutpada) and no-self(anatman) are applied together. Mahayana Buddhism is indebted to Nagmjuna for radically changing the meaning of co-dependent arising and emptiness.

Prior to N agmjuna, co-dependent arising and emptiness were polar opposites.

Co-dependent arising was understood as the causal, linear chain which explained the wheel of samsara and process of reincarnation. The goal ofTheravada meditation was to purify the mind to bring about a break in this causal chain and thereby break free from the wheel of sam sara. 93 N agarjuna, by defining co-dependent arising as emptiness, constituted "a terminological sea change that was part of the evolution of the Mahayana and the rise of Madhyamaka."94

93 Nancy McCagney, Nagwjuna and The Philosophy (l Openness (Oxford: Rowman & Littletield Publishers, Inc., 1997), 58.

94 Ibid. 60

In addition, by equating co-dependent arising and emptiness together, Nagarjuna was also equating samsara and nirvana together. The world of samsara, previously understood by co-dependent arising, is the very same as nirvana. Nirvana is defined not as the extinction of sam sara but as the realization of the emptiness of all things.

Therefore, the Japanese Zen goal of satori or awakening to emptiness, the true nature of the world, becomes a "positive" experience rather than a "negative" experience. Nirvana becomes the extinction of previous} y incorrect views (bad faith) and the realization of the field of emptiness.

The Vimalahrti scripture, dating as early as the first century after Nagmjuna, is an extremely influential piece for all Mahayana Buddhists. The text is also unique in that its hero is Vimalakirti, a layman bodhisattva whose wisdom and compassion rivals the

Buddha and superior to Sariputra, who in the Theravada tradition, was one of the highest disciples of the Buddha. Unlike the disciples, Vimalakirti is still actively engaged in the world and also compassionately helps others and teaches them the dharma. Also, one of the distinguishing features of Mahayana Buddhism was its usage of expedient means

(upaya) or teaching devices. The Buddha is said to have been a master at expedient means. He would give a sermon to a large crowd, and each person understood the sermon according to his level of progress. Likewise, Vimalakirti who had infinite knowledge and skill with expedient means was able to teach all people:

He engaged in all sorts of businesses, yet had no interest in profits or possessions. To train living beings, he would appear at crossroads and on street comers, and to protect them he participated in government. ...To demonstrate the evils of desire, he even entered the brothels. To establish drunkards in correct mindfulness, he 61

entered all the cabarets. 95

What is striking in this passage is that Vimalakirti, as a lay Buddhist, is engaging with

people and places that were traditionally understood to be detrimental to one's being and

spiritual progress. Vimalakirti enters brothels and cabarets, engages in business, and

participates in government. Rather than the world-denying monk ofTheravada

Buddhism, Vimalakirti fully engages himself in the world of samsara. Thus, samsara is

no longer a necessary evil that one must escape from. Rather, Vimalakirti, as a great

bodhisattva in both wisdom and compassion, is able to continue living and teaching in the

world. If Vimalakirti, who is engaged in what was commonly considered as kannic-

causing activities, is just as wise as the Buddha, then this raises the question of whether the Buddhist teachings and precepts themselves are expedient means which great bodhisattvas or Buddhas can disregard.

Vimalakirti shows that aU things are empty and are not intrinsically good or bad.

Good and bad are relational values which do not exist in the world of being-in-itself. An example of the emptiness of all things is seen in one story where a goddess, as a sign of respect, showers heavenly flowers upon the bodhisattvas and disciples. However, the flowers stick to the disciples regardless of their attempts to shake them off. The goddess asked Sariputra why he is frantically trying to shake off these flowers:

Sariputra replied, "Goddess, these flowers are not proper for religious persons and so we are trying to shake them off." The goddess said, "Do not say that, reverend Sariputra. Why? These flowers are proper indeed! Why? Such thoughts have neither constructural thought nor

95 Vimalakirti, The Holv Teachings ofVimalakirti: A Maha)'ana Scripture, trans. Robert A. F. Thum1an (University Park, P A: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1976), 21. 62

discrimination. But the elder Sariputra has both constructed thought and discrimination."96

Sariputra, representing a Theravada disciple, is in bad faith by being attached to the

Buddhist teachings, including the belief that monks should not receive praise or flowers.

Sariputra is seeing the world through the lens of his discriminatory, dualistic thought

rather than recognizing the true nature of emptiness. In this sense, even the Buddhist

teachings are a guide or a fmm of expedient means intended to help free the student from

his bad faith and realize the field of emptiness.

Since the Buddha first taught the dharma, the danger has existed of the teachings

of emptiness and no-self doctrine to be misinterpreted, as everything is permissible

because nothing exists. Hui-neng, the sixth patriarch of Zen, warns students to not fall

into a void of indifference or nihilism by attempting forcibly to empty one's mind:

Learned Audience: when you hear me speak about the void, do not fall into the idea that I mean vacuity. It is of the utmost importance that we should not fall into that idea, because then when a man sits quietly and keeps his mind blank he would be abiding in a state of the "voidness of indifference." 97

Emptiness is neither affirming being nor nothingness; emptiness transcends both categories. A misunderstanding of emptiness as non-existence has tended to confuse readers to believe this means all things are nothing. Instead, to say things are empty is not to negate their existence or affirm their existence but to point out a vital quality of their existence. That is to say that everything is interdependent and mutually arising from each other. If a person fixates on nothingness, then he will fall into a state of "voidness

96 Ibid, 59-59.

97 Huineng. The Ptarform Sutra. http://www.sacred-texts.com/budlbblbb27.htm (accessed November 20, 2009). 63

of indifference" which would be the opposite ofbeing socially engaged. Nagatjuna

earlier explained that all things require each other by stating that codependent arising is

emptiness and emptiness is codependent arising. By negating all things, including one's

sense of ego as ultimately real, to negate any possible "real being" behind appearances,

then emptiness brings one back to elemental appearances without any dualism. By

realizing the field of emptiness, one is able to have this double exposure of reality where

one sees things as they are and also sees them empty of self-existence.

By tracing the philosophical development of Mahayana Buddhism, the first

question of whether Zen Buddhism is a life-negating philosophy focused on escaping

from this world of samsara has been answered with a clear no. Mahayana Buddhism was

a dramatic change in the belief that every sentient being was already an unrealized

Buddha and Vimalakirti illustrated that the layman is capable ofbecoming a great

bodhisattva. In addition, Vimalakirti is a reminder that the world is not inherently a

world of suffering; but, rather, our discriminative consciousness causes us suffering by not realizing the emptiness of things.

Afterward, I explained Nagarjuna within the Madhyamika tradition, placing emptiness as the central doctrine. Rather than an escape from co-dependent arising or samsara, Nagaijuna equates co-dependent arising and emptiness together, thereby equating samsara and nirvana together. Again, this non-dualism is an illustration of

Vimalakirti's teaching that the world is not inherently bad. Rather, our dualistic views to the world are what cause us suffering. 64

Through the perspective of Mahayana Buddhism, we can understand Buddhism as

life-affirming and not an attempt to escape this world. As Nagatjuna and Hui-neng both

point out, Buddhism is not saying the world does not exist. Rather, everything exists

interdependent of each other such that no thing exists with its own self-existence.

Buddhism, as the Middle Way, is the middle way between being and nothingness.

Buddhism Lacking Social Ethics

Although the development of Mahayana Buddhism successfully demonstrates

Buddhism as not being a world-denying religion, the criticism that Buddhism is a

personal religion of awakening which lacks a developed, social ethics remains

unanswered. Thus, the second question of why a socially-engaged, Zen Buddhist ethics

has not been prominent previously must be addressed. Buddhism's primary focus seems

to be on helping people realize personal enlightenment in so far as altering one's

perception from the field of self-centered consciousness to the field of emptiness.

However, the betterment of society seems to be understood only as a secondary,

sometimes necessary, means to help people become enlightened. Thus, Zen Buddhism

does seem to dictate cultivating personal enlightenment before being able to truly help others. Nearly all previous forms of Buddhism can then be challenged as a quietist religion oriented towards ultimate awakening to the detriment of a comprehensive ethics for society.

Nishitani is keenly aware of the criticism that Buddhism, of all sorts, is under the threat of becoming outdated as well as addresses the lack of a Buddhist social ethics: 65

... some problems emerge when we attempt to bring Buddhism, with its long history, face to face with the issue of modernization. Let me enumerate some of them. First of all, the objection is oftentimes raised against Buddhism that it has no ethics. This is an impression that Occidental people often have when they come into contact with Buddhism .... At the same time, it is also said to be devoid of a 'social ethics.'98

In one ofhis final works, On Buddhism, Nishitani tackles many of the pressing problems

for Japanese Buddhists to remain relevant in modem times. He attlibutes the lack of

social engagement due to the tendency to focus on the transcendental enlightenment of

the Buddha and dharma to the detriment of the sangha, society, and history. He writes:

Where does Buddhism fall short? ... the history of the sangha- namely, the theory of Buddhist community- does not comes to the fore as inseparable from Buddha and dharma. In considering the Buddha and dharma, we must also advance our argument to include the sangha. I am convinced that, unless we attend to the latter, dharma cannot be sufficiently accounted for, to say the least.99

Nishitani calls for Buddhism to focus on the sangha, a community of Buddhists which

were traditionally the monastic monks and nuns. In all forms of Buddhism, the sangha

composes one of the three treasures of Buddhism along with the Buddha and the dharma.

In focusing on realizing the dharma and becoming a Buddha, Buddhists have placed the

sangha in a subservient role as a temporary refuge mired in the world of samsara. In

addition, Nishitani believes another reason for a lack of social ethics is that Confucianism

and Shintoism have provided social ethics in China and Japan. The people followed

Confucianism for social ethics and Buddhism for salvation. Finally, Nishitani argues that

a third key reason for the lack of social ethics in Buddhism is partially a result of a lack of historical consciousness in East Asia. Nishitani attributes this lack due to the belief in

98 Nishitani Keiji, On Buddhism, trans. Seisaku Yamamoto and Robert E. Carter (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 38.

99 Ibid, 50. 66

reincarnation and past beliefs of samsara, which were discussed earlier. The belief that

enlightenment may take lifetimes can lead people to view themselves as trans-historical

actors, where this particular life becomes less critical.

Historical consciousness involves the understanding that we ourselves live within history ... That is to say, it is by living through history that we come to grasp that our human activities are themselves historical. .. we then realize that we are able to reform historically what was constructed historically: once the realization that history is a human product dawns on us, we can accept that to reshape it in the direction that we think to be right is well within our reach. 100

For Nishitani, historical consciousness is the realization that history is a "human product"

so that one may change the future by acting right now; or, as Sartre said, one's past is

facticity, but one's future will be determined by one's free actions now. Nishitani says

Buddhism has often equated time with samsara:

... the fact that Buddhism places emphasis on the negative inherent in the contention that time is somewhat transient and that this is a world of suffering. Buddhism seems to have failed to grasp that the world of time is a field on which something new emerges without interruption. 101

Just as Buddhism has previously been understood as an escape from the world, Buddhism was also understood as an escape from historical time. However, if samsara and nirvana are the same, then time and emptiness are the same. As Nishitani says, time is a field where something new emerges because time is the same as emptiness. Nishitani goes on to say:

My sense of Buddhism is that, while it has made various attempts to understand the world of time as something to be negatively transcended, there have been few

100 Ibid, 42.

101 Ibid, 49-50. 67

attempts that assume a forward-looking and mainly positive £ose that regards the world as a field in which something new constantly occurs. 1 2

The conception of time as a field to be transcended casts a negative light on the world

and hinders the possibility for a social ethics. The Christian concept of time, which has is

deeply embedded within Western culture, is linear and progressive with a clear beginning

and end. Actors in Western culture understand themselves to be historic performers

capable of changing history. On the other hand, Asian concepts of time are characterized

as circular or cyclical. However, Nishitani points out that Zen Buddhism has an

alternative perspective of time. Within Zen Buddhism, the present moment is "not as a

point in a progression, be it circular or linear, but as an opening to the 'homeground' of

time itself, in which ... all the meaning of history has its elemental, and infinitely renewable, source."103 By returning to the present moment on the field of emptiness,

actions are possible which transcend the past and future.

The second question dealing with the lack of a socially-engaged Zen ethics has been addressed with Nishitani' s observations, and the final question of developing Zen

Buddhist social ethics may be pursued. Sartre's ethics are not feasible as a Zen ethics, because he never broke through to the field of emptiness and remained in an attached, self-centered consciousness. Even his ethics of interdependence was still based on satisfying the needs of an individual, separated self. However, Nishitani is also aware that Buddhism has historically lacked the type of situational, social ethics for which

Sartre is a vehement advocate. Is Buddhist emptiness and an engaged social ethics

102 Ibid, 50.

103 James W. Heisig, Philosophers ofNothingness (Honolulu: University ofHawai'i Press, 2001), 244. 68

mutually exclusive? This is a final question that I attempt to answer with the recent

phenomenon of Engaged Buddhism.

Creating a Socially-Engaged Zen Buddhist Ethics

A socially-engaged Buddhism has appeared in the 20111 century in the form of

Engaged Buddhism. The term "Engaged Buddhism" was coined by Vietnamese Zen

Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh for the Buddhist peace movements during the Vietnam

War, and the usage of Engaged Buddhism has widened to include the liberation

movements of worldwide Buddhists on issues of social justice, peace, poverty, politics,

and environment. Engaged Buddhists have had to justify being involved in global socio-

political efforts which critics say are not pertinent to Buddhist teachings of detachment.

Traditionally, Buddhist liberation has been understood as a "personal, spiritual liberation

that transcends the material, psychological, and social confines of this world."104

Engaged Buddhism focuses on changing structural oppression in order to reduce

suffering and provide a fertile ground for the possibility of enlightenment. Thus,

Engaged Buddhism expands the definition of liberation to include "mundane awakening",

which seeks to include all people in this lifetime and this world with certain objective

ends:

We may conclude that a profound change in Buddhist soteriology- from a highly personal and other-worldly notion ofliberation to a social, economic, this-worldly liberation. 105

104 Christopher S. Queen, "Introduction: The Shapes and Sources ofEngaged Buddhism" in Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia, eds. Christopher S. Queen and Sallie B. King (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 9.

105 Ibid, 10. 69

There are critics, however, that caution that Buddhism is ultimately a spiritual religion

aimed at removing the spiritual attachments rather than social alleviation of oppression.

For example, James E. Deitrick writes:

.. .it [Engaged Buddhism] appears to forget the most basic of Buddhism's insights, that suffering has but one cause and one remedy, that is, attachment and the cessation of attachment (the Second and Third Noble Truths). As noted above, suffering for Buddhism is not typically equated with physical pain or societal oppression, at least not in the deepest sense of the term dukkha. Rather, is it the sense of lack of satisfaction that comes with the perverse human tendency to cling to the self and other ostensibly illusory objects in an ever-changing world .... Engaged Buddhist social ethics are, therefore, probably best regarded as nominally Buddhist. 106

Deitrick wams that engaged Buddhists forget that the root of dukkha (suffering) is not

physical pain or social oppression but rather one's clinging to the self or ego, which is an impermanent, an illusory object. He equates Engaged Buddhist ethics as only nominally

Buddhist, because he believes its aim is not to liberate beings from suffering but rather merely to make this mundane world more pleasant to live in. He argues that Engaged

Buddhists may mistakenly confuse the means of social betterment and the ultimate end of enlightenment together: "engaged Buddhist movements do not typically make clear distinctions between the 'worldly' or 'mundane' suffering which is caused by temporal conditions, and the more profound 'spiritual' suffering (dukkha) that is the result of individuals' attaclunents."107 According to him, Buddhism's ultimate aim of nirvana is the extinction of individual attachments so that the social work towards a better society

106 James E. Deitrick, "Engaged Buddhist Ethics: Mistaking the Boat for the Shore" inAction Dharma: New Studies in Engaged Buddhism, eds. Christopher Queen, Charles Prebish, and Damien Keown (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 263, 265.

107 Ibid, 265. 70

"holds no intrinsic value for Buddhism."108 Rather, mundane awakening or the social

betterment is only good from the Buddhist perspective in so far as it provides better

conditions for sentient beings to become liberated from the world of samsara. According

to this definition, Engaged Buddhism is only providing better conditions for individuals

to practice Buddhism. Then, Engaged Buddhism is not really Buddhism, because

according to Deitrick, the true aim of Buddhism is the individual, psychological

liberation from attachments.

With the use ofDogen's resolution of the paradox between original and attained

enlightenment, I want to argue that Engaged Buddhism is a Middle Way between the

extremes of an individual, isolated approach to enlightenment and Sartre's engagement

against systems of oppression. I argue social work is itself a Buddhist practice of

compassion and selflessness which cannot be separated from the practice of one's enlightenment and cultivation of wisdom.

Dogen is a Japanese 13 111 century Zen philosopher who founded the Soto sect of

Zen Buddhism. The Kyoto School philosophers, including Nishitani, extensively draw from Dogen and Zen Buddhism in philosophy and practice. In drawing from Dogen, we have followed a development in Mahayana Buddhism of collapsing the distinction between formal practice and social engagement, between nirvana and samara. Nagarjuna,

Vimalakirti, Hui-neng, Dogen, and Nishitani in their different ways have emphasized the non-dualism between Buddhist practice and worldly, social work.

108 Ibid, 263. 71

Dogen is famously known for his inquiry, "If all sentient beings are already

enlightened then why do we have to practice?" This question prompted Dogen to travel

extensively throughout China to study under several Zen masters and to return to Japan

after realizing the answer. Dogen realized that although all sentient beings are already

enlightened with Buddha-nature (both the being empty of self-being and the capability to

realize emptiness), practice is necessary as the ideal condition for one's realization of

Buddha-nature or field of emptiness. Thus, Dogen says that practice is enlightenment

and enlightenment is practice. There is no point at which one achieves enlightenment or

becomes enlightened. Rather, the practice of meditation itself is the manifestation of

one's enlightened nature. In Zen philosophy, all dualisms are reconciled into a whole

when one pierces at the homeground or emptiness of things.

Likewise, for Engaged Buddhists, the practice of helping others is an act of enlightenment or the manifestation of enlightenment itself Assisting others in their mundane or spiritual awakening naturally follows from the compassion ofbodhisattvas and Buddhas. While Buddhist philosophy may emphasize the cultivation of wisdom, compassion is the natural outgrowth from the wisdom of one's selflessness and interbeing with others. The separation barrier between "I" and other are no longer present on the ultimate level in the realization that the being of all things is intertwined. Thus, Engaged

Buddhists who are socially engaged in important issues are acting out of compassion on a grandeur scale, which modernity has provided.

While acting towards social welfare is justified as the compassionate acts of a

Buddha or bodhisattva, how are we to understand social welfare in relation to oppressed 72

people and their enlightenment? That is to say, is improving social welfare assisting in

the ultimate enlightenment of all sentient beings, which is the vow of all bodhisattvas?

Yes. Engaged Buddhists, in helping people fulfill their basic material and social needs,

are empowering oppressed people to have the practical freedom necessary to pursue their

liberation ideally. In responding to the social, political, and economic structures of

oppression, Engaged Buddhism is not only relieving suffering in the world but fostering

better conditions for all people to practice their freedom and enlightenment. In the

compassionate act of helping another, the dharma or teachings ofthe Buddha are being

transmitted through action, and oppressed people are learning and incorporating the

dharma through their interactions with Engaged Buddhists. Individuals may already be

Buddhas, just as, for Sartre, they may already be absolutely free; but, practical freedom is what provides the beginning situation from which individuals choose and act.

Furthermore, there is a false, dichotomous discrimination between mundane vs. ultimate awakening, personal vs. social, and self vs. other. The "mundane" betterment of a society contributes to the possibilities for each individual to pursue his enlightenment.

The personal enlightenment of a single individual has an effect on the entire society.

Ultimately, the practice of Engaged Buddhism is enlightenment, and enlightenment is the practice of Engaged Buddhism.

A socially-engaged Zen Buddhist ethics is not only possible but has become realized in the form of Engaged Buddhism. Engaged Buddhism fulfills the teachings of emptiness while also following Sartre's engagement of overturning systems of suffering, including the economical, political, and social spheres. However, Zen philosophy goes 73

further than Sartre's ontology in finding the root reasons for why one should care for

others. At best, Sartre's philosophy recognizes that human beings are in a relationship of

fraternity where they share common origins and ends. As long as one recognizes this

mutual relationship of shared fates, then a social consciousness to assist others naturally

develops.

However, Zen Buddhism goes even further than Sartre's fraternity in stating that

all beings exist not only in a relationship of shared ends but fundamentally require each

other for existence. Nagmjuna's teaching of emptiness shows that no being can exist by

itself with its own self-being or self-existence. Rather, being is relational. To neglect the

welfare of others is to fundamentally damage one's own being and existence.

Furthermore, the realization of the field of emptiness within one's awareness leads to a

negation of all false dichotomies - including self and other or enlightenment and practice.

This collapsing of dualisms means that the self still exists on a conventional,

phenomenon level in so far as I am obviously an individual; but, on an ultimate level, my

existence and very being exists only due to my relations with other beings. Although,

Sartre claims that each individual creates his own essence, like an artist creates his work,

Zen Buddhists would deny this claim. Sartre's self-creating artist view leads to nihilism,

that there is nothing to ground one's values or goals upon, beyond one's subjective, ever­

changing nothingness.

However, on the field of emptiness, one realizes that one's being is always empty of self-being and, instead, one sees that what are truly important are the relationships and 74

connections with other beings. From this point of view, a social consciousness and engaged ethics is no longer a demand but a core of one's being. CHAPTERS

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I attempted to illustrate the ethics of two philosophies sometimes

criticized to be lacking a developed ethics: Jean-Paul Sartre and Zen Buddhism. In

Chapter Two, I relied on Sartre to demonstrate the ontological freedom of all human

beings based on their condition as a being-for-itself. Then, I developed a Sartrean ethic

of universal freedom based on this being-for-itself and fraternity. Sartre believed that human beings can unite in a state of fraternity, where each individual shares common origins and ends. However, Sartre's fraternity required a shared project in order for individuals to recognize the ethical value of challenging oppressions and fighting for universal freedom. In the end, the isolated individual still was prominent in Sartre's philosophy.

Afterward, I introduced Nishitani Keiji in order to criticize Sartre and introduce the novel idea of the field of emptiness. According to Nishitani, Sartre critically fails in his project, because he remains on the field of consciousness, where all beings are objectified as separated entities from oneself. Nishitani argues that through an engagement with nihility and death, one can break through the field of consciousness to the real homeground of things. That is to say, one can move from appearances to the source of those appearances. However, unlike Kant, the source is not an essence or noumenon. Rather, the homeground of things is emptiness or absolute nothingness. On

75 76

the field of emptiness, one realizes that all beings are empty of self-existence or self­

being so that beings do not exist in a mere state of interdependence but of interbeing.

Zen Buddhism begins with the teaching that there exists no being by itself. All

being is relational. Whereas, Sartre still preserves the notion of independent individuals

coming together to unite in interdependence for a common project, Zen philosophy holds

that there are no independent beings to begin with. However, does this naturally translate

into socially engaged ethics? In Chapter Three, I wanted to prove that social ethics is

both important in Mahayana Buddhism and not contradictory to the teachings of

emptiness. I relied on several Mahayana Buddhist philosophers including Nagmjuna,

Vimalakirti, Hui-neng, and Dogen in order to illustrate that there is no separation

between enlightenment and social practice. In fact, the realization of emptiness or

enlightenment is the dissolution of such false dichotomies.

Social engagement is a logical next step once one realizes, on the field of

emptiness, that one's very being is constituted by other beings. Responsibility is another name for meaningful freedom. By understanding that one's freedom and being is interdependent with others, responsibility and social engagement is a necessity not as a

"should'' but as a "must". Responsibility for the care of all other beings is the result from the awareness that one's being is not separate and distinct from others, but indeed, always intertwined with others such as it makes no sense to say you versus me. From the perspective of Zen Buddhism, these boundaries between you and me are onto logically false but conventionally useful for everyday activities. Thus, responsibility is not an

"ought" but a "must" where personal responsibility and social responsibility intermingle. 77

In the past century, Engaged Buddhism has realized this philosophy of emptiness

and social engagement in order to relieve suffering and challenge systematic forms of

oppression. They are helping to relieve suffering, and through this practice, realizing this

mundane world as the world of enlightenment. This study is a response to those who

hold the incorrect view that Zen Buddhism is incompatible or contradictory to a socially­

engaged ethics. Rather, it shows that social engagement can constitute Zen practice.

Furthermore, this work is a work for practicing Engaged Buddhists to help their sense of

identity and provide a theoretical background to their social work against critics who

would challenge them. As I mentioned earlier, there are scholars such as Deitrick who

would contend that Engaged Buddhists are not true Buddhists. I argue this is a mistaken viewpoint and have drawn from the history of Mahayana Buddhist philosophers to prove

that social engagement is not only in accordance with but fulfills the bodhisattva vow to help all sentient beings. Socially engaged models such as Vimalakirti have been present throughout Mahayana Buddhist history for over a millennium now.

However, there remains much work left to be done. Nishitani understood that

Sartre's existentialism frees human beings from a belief in fixed essence, but at the same time, places a heavy burden on the individual to constantly do the impossible project of creating oneself. On the other hand, Nishitani also saw that Buddhism has historically emphasized personal liberation to the point of neglecting social responsibilities. Engaged

Buddhism is just one contemporary form which combines Sartre's social activism and the

Zen teachings of emptiness. However, one may ask can we draw out a socially engaged

Buddhism fi·om Theravada sources too? Or how does liberation theology compare to 78

Engaged Buddhism? I also look forward to continuing dialogue between East-West philosophy, especially between modem thinkers like Sartre and Buddhism. One recent

109 example was Simon Glynn's Sartre, Phenomenology, and the Buddhist No-SelfTheory •

Additionally, one of the most prominent scholars in this field is my own mentor, Jin Y.

Park. Her Buddhism and Postmodernity explores the intersection between Zen Buddhism and postmodem thinkers as well as offers the possibility for a Zen ethics through Huayen

110 Buddhist phenomenology • This field continues to grow and provides a hopeful future of mutual enrichment for the field of ethics and the world.

109 Simon Glym1, "Sartre, Phenomenology, and the Buddhist No-SelfThemy" in Buddhisms and Deconstructions (New York: Rmvman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006) 197-211.

110 Jin Y. Park. Buddhism and Pas/modernity: Zen, Huayan, and the Possibility ofBuddhist Postmodern Ethics (New York: Lexington Books, 2008) BIBLIOGRAPHY

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