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The Soviet Invasion

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The Soviet Invasion Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 14, September, 1968 Czechoslovakia, Page 22909 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. The Soviet Invasion Powerful Soviet forces, together with military units of four other Warsaw Pact countries– Poland, Hungary, Eastern Germany, and Bulgaria—invaded Czechoslovakia during the night of Aug. 20–21, as stated in 22885 A, and occupied Prague and other leading cities, including Brno and Bratislava, within a few hours. Reports from Western correspondents in Czechoslovakia put the strength of the occupation forces at 250,000 to 300,000, though by the end of August it was estimated that over 600,000 foreign—predominantly Soviet—troops were on Czechoslovak territory. A Tass statement in Moscow in the early hours of Aug. 21 said that the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact allies had occupied Czechoslovakia to forestall a ―counter- revolution,‖ and alleged that this ―fraternal assistance‖ had been requested by ―a group of members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Government, and the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.‖ No mention was made in the Soviet statement, however, of any individual Czechoslovaks who had asked for this purported ―assistance,‖ and after the invasion the Russians were unable to find a single Czechoslovak leader willing to collaborate with the occupation forces. The population of Prague, and of towns and villages throughout the country, similarly treated the Soviet occupation forces with scorn, contempt, and frequently derision, the civilian population displaying great courage in demonstrating against the invaders despite a massive display of Soviet tanks and armour. A chronological account of developments in Czechoslovakia covering the three weeks after the invasion is given below. August 21. - The Invasion. - Czechoslovak Protests. - Moscow Statement. At 1 a.m. on Aug. 21 Prague Radio broadcast the following statement by the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party announcing the invasion of Czechoslovakia: ―To the entire people of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic: ―Yesterday, August 20, around 23.00 hours [11 pm], troops of the Soviet Union, the Polish People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, and the Bulgarian People's Republic crossed the frontiers of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. ―This happened without the knowledge of the President of the Republic, the Chairman of the National Assembly, the Premier, or the First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee. ―The Central Committee and the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party appeals to all citizens of our Republic to maintain calm and not to offer resistance. Our army, security corps, and people's militia have not received the command to defend the country. ―The Central Committee and the Presidium regard this act as contrary not only to the fundamental principles of relations between Socialist States but also as contrary to the principles of international law. ―All leading functionaries of the State, the Communist Party, and the National Front—remain at your posts as representatives of the State, elected by the laws of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. ―Constitutional functionaries are Immediately convening a session of the National Assembly, and the Presidium is at the same time convening a plenum of the Central Committee to discuss the situation that has arisen.‖ The confused events of the night of Aug. 20–21 and the morning of Aug. 21 were described as follows by The Guardian on an hour-by-hour basis: 01.00 hours (Aug. 21): Prague Radio broadcast the above statement announcing the invasion of Czechoslovakia. 02.15: all telephone lines between Czechoslovakia and Vienna were cut. 03.30: Soviet troops took up positions outside Prague Radio building. 03.45: Soviet tanks and armoured cars surrounded the Central Committee's building in Prague. 03.47: Prague Radio went off the air. 04.20: a statement on the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces was issued in Moscow–for text see below. 04.45: Prague Radio came back on the air, urging the people to heed only the voice of their lawful Government and again calling for non-resistance to the invaders in view of the latter's great numerical strength. 06.36: Prague Radio announced: ―When you hear the Czechoslovak National Anthem all will be over.:‖ The National Anthem was played a minute later and it was believed that the building had been occupied by Soviet troops. 07.00: President Svoboda made a personal appeal over the radio for calm and said he could offer no explanation of the invasion. 08.20: Pilsen (Plzen) Radio described itself as ―the last free radio station in Czechoslovakia.‖ 10.00: The Czechoslovak news agency (Ceteka) said that a number of ambulances had arrived outside Prague Radio station, where a Soviet tank was on fire. 10.25: Ceteka reported shooting in the centre of Prague and said that the offices of Rude Pravo (organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party) had been seized by ―occupation units.‖ 11.50: Pilsen Radio said the occupation had already cost 25 lives. 12.28: Ceteka said that Mr. Dubcek was ―under restriction‖ in the Central Committee building. With road, rail, and air links between Czechoslovakia and the outside world cut off, developments in Czechoslovakia on the first day of the invasion could be ascertained only by reports from foreign correspondents in the country, from fragmentary statements issued from time to time by Ceteka, and in particular from broadcasts from a number of secret transmitters which started up in many parts of the country, frequently changing their wavelengths to confuse the Soviet occupation forces. The inability of the Soviet invaders to silence radio stations loyal to the Czechoslovak Government was shown by the number of clandestine radio stations—in Prague, Brno, Plzen, Ceske Budejovice, and elsewhere—which broadcast throughout the day and night hourly descriptions and commentaries of events—including live street broadcasts—and denunciations of the invaders. A secret television station calling itself ―Free Television Station of Prague‖ also came on the air and showed films of Russian tanks moving through the city, gun emplacements, and anti-Soviet demonstrators running away from the Russians. Foreign commentators pointed out that the efficiency with which the clandestine radio stations had gone into operation within a few hours of the invasion indicated that plans for this type of resistance must have been prepared well in advance. As stated above, no resistance to the invasion was offered by the Czechoslovak armed forces, in view of the overwhelming strength of the Soviet and allied units employed; a clandestine broadcast said that the High Command of the Czechoslovak Army would obey orders only from President Svoboda, and that a directive to this effect had been signed by General Dzur, the Minister of Defence. Another broadcast said that the Foreign Ministry had denounced the invasion as a violation of the Warsaw Pact and the bilateral treaties between Czechoslovakia and the countries taking part in the invasion. Ceteka reported during the day that the Russians were holding several Czechoslovak leaders prisoners in the Central Committee building, including Mr. Dubcek, Mr. Smrkovsky (president of the National Assembly), Mr. Frantisek Kriegel, and Mr. Josef Spacek, all members of the Presidium. It was also announced that Dr. Cestmir Cisar, the secretary of the Central Committee and known for his liberal opinions, had been taken away by the Russians in a car to an unknown destination. Meanwhile occupation troops took up positions in different parts of Prague, setting up gun emplacements and antiaircraft positions and stationing tanks and armoured cars at strategic points in the principal streets and squares; one of the first objectives to be captured was Prague airport (Ruzyne), where Soviet aircraft landed throughout the day with troops, supplies, and ammunition, and where tanks and armoured troop carriers were ferried in by transport planes. Despite frequent radio appeals for calm, large numbers of civilians—many of them students and young people—demonstrated in Prague and elsewhere against the Soviet occupation troops, who were reviled, booed, jeered, and spat upon; in many cases Soviet tanks were chalked with Nazi swastikas. From time to time Soviet troops fired over the heads of the crowds, and according to reports by foreign correspondents several youths were killed by Soviet fire; in one case youths set ablaze and destroyed two Soviet tanks in Prague, four of them being killed by machine- guns when the tank crews opened fire. The Czechoslovak National Assembly, hastily summoned in extraordinary session, met in the evening and unanimously approved the following declaration: ―The deputies of the National Assembly have met and unanimously agreed on the following declaration at a time when the Government and other organs cannot carry out their functions: ―(1) We fully agree with the declaration of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Presidium of the National Assembly protesting against the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the armies of the five countries—members of the Warsaw Treaty—and considering it a violation of international law, of the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty, and of the principles of equal relations among nations. ―(2) We demand the release from detention of the constitutional representatives, namely President of the Republic Ludvik Svoboda, Prime Minister Oldrich Cernik, President of the National Assembly Josef Smrkovsky, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Alexander Dubcek, Chairman of the Central Committee of the National Front Frantisek Kriegel, Chairman of the Czech National Council Cestmir Cisar, and others in order that they can carry out their constitutional functions entrusted to them by the sovereign people. ―The delegation which we have sent to the Soviet Embassy this morning has not yet returned.
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