With All Due Respect

With all due respect

Pluralism and parity of esteem

Tom Hennessey and Robin Wilson

democratic dialogue Democratic Dialogue Report No 7 June 1997

Democratic Dialogue 5 University Street Belfast BT7 1FY Tel: 01232-232230/232228 Fax: 01232-232228/233334 E-mail: [email protected] Web site: http://www.dem-dial.demon.co.uk

c Democratic Dialogue 1997 ISBN 1 900281 06 6

Cover design by Dunbar Design Photographs by Lesley Doyle Printed by Regency Press

2 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 Contents

Preface 4

Executive summary 6

National questions 13

A defining issue 44

British? Irish? Or what? 55

Feeling institutionalised 69

Reconciling a balance 79

Conclusion and recommendations 105

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 3 Preface

illie Thompson has recently writ- little work to fill out what ‘parity of es- ten: “The rise to prominence of teem’ might in practice entail. W ‘identity politics’ has to be reck- It is in this context, of intense ener- oned one of the most striking features of gies incoherently directed, that the whole the later twentieth century. In one sense parades controversy has erupted in all modern politics is identity politics ...”1 Northern Ireland since 1995. And it was Identity politics has of course always in response to this controversy that been the alpha and omega of the North- Democratic Dialogue decided to initiate ern Ireland conflict, particularly with the a research project on what was theoreti- emergence of the portmanteau term ‘par- cally and practically required to engen- ity of esteem’ in the 90s. Yet it is remark- der in Northern Ireland a climate much able how identity politics has been more favourable to pluralism and parity assiduously prosecuted in Northern Ire- of esteem. land almost completely without regard DD, in addition to its core funders, is to any understanding of its wider grateful to the Central Community Re- significance. lations Unit of the Northern Ireland Of- There has been no appreciation what- fice for supporting this project financially, soever of the wider international debate allowing the appointment of a researcher on nationalism, invigorated by the fall of for six months. This does mean that this the Wall in 1989. There has been no en- report is necessarily more rigorously ‘aca- gagement with the more specific debate demic’ than others from DD, and the ini- about the ‘politics of recognition’ in multi- tial, theoretical, chapter is inevitably cultural societies which has emerged in intellectually challenging as a result. this decade. And there has been precious In line with DD’s principle of carrying

4 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 out its work in a participatory way, however, the opening review of the international debate is balanced in subsequent chapters by teasing out the thoughts of a range of key players in Northern Ireland through interviews, and testing this against popular opinion on the ground via focus groups. Tom Hennessey diligently carried out these tasks. As ever, the views expressed in this report, unless attributed, are the responsibility of the authors alone. Further copies are available from the address on the inside front cover, price £7.50 (£10 institutions, £4.50 unwaged) plus 10 per cent postage and packing. DD aims to publish several reports per year. Readers may wish to return the en- closed subscription slip, to avail of reduced-rate payment for reports, free copies of DD’s newsletter and notification of all DD events. We are open to requests to organise discussions around any of the themes or ideas raised in this, or other, reports. Again, the contact number is on the inside cover, where details of our web site can also be found. DD Footnotes 1 Willie Thompson, The Left in History: Revolu- tion and Reform in Twentieth-Century Politics, Pluto, London, 1997, p198

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 5 Executive summary

he term parity of esteem has, since following the fall of the Wall. the Opsahl Commission of 1992-93, But one of the lessons of this interna- T become a political buzzword in North- tional debate is that in these uncertain, ern Ireland. Yet there has been no at- ‘post-enlightenment’ times, universal tempt to develop its intellectual potential democratic norms require particular ap- as the basis for an egalitarian and plu- plication. And so the report then explores, ralist politics in Northern Ireland. In the via interviews with key players from a absence of this, parity of esteem has be- range of social and political positions in come incorporated into a pre-existing Northern Ireland, what parity of esteem political culture based on adversarial means to them. These interviewee re- partisan claims, evidenced in 1996 in the sponses are also tested against the re- polarised aftermath of the Drumcree sults of several focus groups to get a sense crisis. of how ‘representative’ they are of the Part of the problem is that parity of broader mood(s) on the ground. esteem has, in Northern Ireland, been The methodology focused on two key played out regardless of wider interna- questions: (a) what is parity of esteem? tional conceptual debates. Though widely (b) how can parity of esteem be achieved utilised in political discourse in North- in Northern Ireland? ern Ireland, it is ill-defined. This report Aside from the broad international begins therefore with an international sweep of literature and commentary, the commentary on how concepts of plural- investigation involved interviewing a ism and parity of esteem have developed sample of some 20-30 prominent indi- in recent years, particularly since the ef- viduals from civil society in Northern Ire- florescence of ethno-nationalist conflicts land and running several diverse focus

6 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 groups. relationship of the data gathered in in- The interviewees were selected to terviews with the opinions of those in span government, relevant agencies, po- the focus groups. Given the short time litical parties, the main churches, trade available for the research project, six unions and the voluntary sector. Locat- months, the focus groups were again ing interviewees was almost always done brought together through networking. by networking—personal contact or in- They comprised: troduction. This may appear subjective • a Protestant urban focus group, but is normal in much ethnograpic re- • a Protestant rural focus group, search. The technique employed was that • a Catholic urban focus group, of a simple structured sheet of cues. The • a Catholic rural focus group, wording of the questions and the order • a Protestant women’s focus group, in which they were asked remained the • a Catholic women’s focus group, and same. • two youth focus groups. Data from structured interviews are generally regarded as more reliable than he review of the international litera- unstructured interviews: since the order ture and commentary highlights a and wording of questions are the same T worrying ignorance in Northern Ire- for all respondents, it is more likely that land—including in government—of the they will be responding to the same extent to which concepts regularly de- stimuli. Thus different answers to the ployed as if they were unproblematic are same set of questions will indicate real in fact quite inappropriate to addressing differences between the respondents; dif- such ethno-nationalist conflicts. In par- ferent answers will not therefore simply ticular, terms like ‘the right of peoples to reflect differences in the way questions self-determination’, of ‘sovereignty’ un- are phrased. Nevertheless, some flexibil- derstood as territorial integrity, and of ity was of course allowed to accommodate democracy understood in majoritarian differences in responses as interviews terms have all been thrown into question. progressed. Far from acting as a means to resolve In addition to the interviews, a conflicts such as that in Northern Ire- number of focus groups were established land, on the contrary, they merely pro- to compare the opinions with those of ‘or- vide vehicles for their prosecution. dinary’ people. The aim was to create in- The report thus explores new concepts teractive enviroments to assess the which may have a contrary potential, to

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 7 diminish conflict and favour pluralism fear and threat. and parity of esteem. It suggests that The sense of a British national con- such notions as multi-cultural citizen- sciousness among unionists was the most ship, minority rights and dialogic democ- fundamental difference distinguishing racy offer an alternative and more unionist from nationalist respondents. constructive basis for addressing group Among Catholic interviewees and focus antagonism. And in particular it notes group participants, it was clear that the emergence in the 1990s of a series of Britishness is exclusively a unionist con- international conventions enshrining cept in terms of a positive association such principles in a legal—if not yet with it. Irishness, on the other hand, was justiciable—form. an identity common to both unionists and This approach offers a manner of nationalists. But Irishness is a highly avoiding the cultural relativism—and contested identity, subject to funda- political antagonism—into which the mentally different nationalist and Northern Ireland debate on parity of es- unionist perceptions which profoundly teem has become mired, placing as it does affect notions of allegiance and group these particularistic concerns in a more membership. universal frame. This is crucial, because For unionists, their imagined politi- from the Northern Ireland fieldwork it cal community, or nation, extending be- emerges that while there is consensus yond the confines of Northern Ireland, is that parity of esteem should involve rec- a British nation—or British patriotism/ ognition and tolerance of differing cul- civic nationalism, depending upon one’s tural traditions, this begins to fragment definition—which is a social reality for as soon as those particular cultural them. Unionists describe themselves as identities and allegiances are explored. primarily British, although this does not Widespread misunderstanding—even in- mean that they exclude or reject a sup- tolerance—then emerges. It is clear that plementary Irish identity. But for many many in Northern Ireland are willing to unionists this Irishness is firmly subor- tolerate the Other’s cultural identity only dinate to a sense of belonging to a Brit- within the confines of their own core ide- ish national community. There is a ology. And it is further evident, when it perception of having been involved with comes to discussing how parity of esteem the rest of the people of the UK in great should be given institutional expression, historical events, such as war and em- that there is widespread dissensus—even pire, a strong identification with British

8 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 political tradition and a sense of sharing republic’s government in the ‘internal culture, extending beyond parochial affairs’ of Northern Ireland, while nation- Orangeism. Unionists thus see northern alists see the agreement as an expres- nationalists as an ethnic minority within sion of their political identity by right. Northern Ireland, and the UK generally. Unionists wish to see articles 2 and 3 uni- Northern nationalists do not, how- laterally removed from the republic’s con- ever, see themselves as an ethnic minor- stitution, because they are considered to ity within Northern Ireland, or the UK, represent an illegitimate and aggressive but as a constituent element in a wider claim. Dublin, by contrast, envisages al- Irish nation which transcends the bor- teration of the articles only in return for der with the republic. Furthermore, most unionist co-operation in a devolved as- nationalists have extreme difficulty in sembly and a north-south body. accepting unionists’ Britishness or, even Northern nationalists would hope to if they do, the idea that unionists do not exploit the ‘dynamic’ and ‘harmonisation’ constitute an Irish ethnic minority which potential of the 1995 framework docu- can ultimately be accommodated within ment, leading to joint authority or be- the Irish nation. If they do accept that yond. Unionists conversely fear eventual unionists have a right to be separate from imposition of joint sovereignty or the the rest of Ireland, nationalists do so on emergence of an all-Ireland government the basis that the Irish identity is equal by stealth. They wish to see a Council of to the British allegiance of unionists, and, the British Isles, to replace the Anglo- if it is to be granted full parity of esteem, Irish Agreement, and of which any north- this identity should be reflected as such, south body would be a component. The in institutional arrangements. key source of authority in any north- All interviewees were in favour of south relationship would rest with a power-sharing and a bill of rights. Un- Northern Ireland assembly, which would ionists see a bill of rights and proportion- have the right to withdraw from north- ality among the various parties in a south contacts. devolved assembly as sufficient to guar- The republic’s government rejects the antee minority rights in Northern Ire- concept of a Council of the British Isles, land. Nationalists, however, see a bill of arguing that unionists’ parity of esteem rights and proportionality working in is already provided for in their member- tandem with the Anglo-Irish Agreement. ship of the UK, and prefers the retention Unionists cannot accept a role for the of the Anglo-Irish Agreement on the

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 9 grounds that its removal would reduce denial of the Irishness of Northern Ire- the political value of any north-south land and their community’s position link. It resists the suggestion that a within it. This issue was closely con- Northern Ireland assembly should be the nected in respondents’ minds with pa- central authority in such a link, and sees rades and policing, with again many the agreement as guarantor of a default dividing along unionist-nationalist lines. option against unionist disruption of any While Catholics saw parades as an at- new arrangements. tempt to demonstrate cultural triumph- All respondents who expressed an alism, Protestants saw the parades opinion, apart from the Catholic Church, controversy as another attempt to dilute supported the principle of integrated edu- unionists’ ethos of Britishness. cation. It was felt, however, that the gov- The report focuses upon other defini- ernment could do more to promote this. tions of identity within Northern Ireland, There was a sense that initiatives such outside the traditional, two-communities as ‘education for mutual understanding’ model. It highlights the existence of a and ‘cultural heritage’ in schools were third strand of identity formation, which having only a limited effect, and there- stresses individualism and separation fore the role of the curriculum was also from unionist and nationalist definitions. highlighted by many interviewees. In The report also addresses the rather dif- particular, it was suggested by many that ferent views offered by organisations rep- history might be more effectively utilised resenting women and ethnic minorities. in this respect. And it sees some encouraging pointers, The issue of flags and emblems high- here and in the more sophisticated lighted the deep divisions over national understandings of some of the other in- identity/allegiance in Northern Ireland. terviewees drawn from civil society, as to Unionists and nationalists saw these as the potential for progressive steps to- ‘their’, or alien, cultural representations, wards pluralism and parity of esteem. with unionists believing that attempts to remove symbols of the British state were he report concludes that the problems aimed at diluting the Britishness of of language highlighted in the initial Northern Ireland and undermining the T chapter, the incongruent claims of es- unionist ethos. Nationalists, on the other pecially the party-political interviewees hand, saw symbols of Britishness as a and the tenor of the focus groups all add form of cultural discrimination and a up to a very sobering assessment of the

10 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 extent of polarisation, the gulf of under- establishment of pilot projects to foster standing and so the unreality of any early integrated housing. progress towards a settlement voluntar- On the constitutional level, the report ily arrived at by the parties themselves. argues for the incorporation into the It therefore argues that moves towards Northern Ireland Constitution Act of the pluralism and parity of esteem can not three significant minority rights conven- be allowed to be dependent on such agree- tions of the 1990s, alongside a more gen- ment spontaneously emerging or be ren- eral commitment by government to dered attendant upon its arrival. parity of esteem and equity of treatment. The report, however, is careful not to These provisions would be a powerful endorse a simply top-down approach. It statement of multi-cultural citizenship, stresses, again from the international lit- derived from universal norms, and would erature, the importance of non-govern- be rendered justiciable in the Northern mental organisations in peace-building Ireland courts, or a new constitutional and pioneering new forms of dialogue, tribunal. such as through the district partnerships At a policy level, the report addresses linked to the European Union ‘peace the lack of real impact of the equality- package’. Since it does not envisage a ‘big- proofing Policy Appraisal and Fair Treat- bang’ constitutional fix anytime soon, it ment guidelines. It concurs with the view recognises all the more the potential that that a new set of policy priorities should NGOs may have for securing modest, but be constructed, specifically tailored to at least tangible, progress. Northern Ireland, powerfully indicative Very real concern is expressed as to of government commitment to pluralism how government(s) have allowed such a and parity of esteem. starkly polarised society to develop, given There are a number of further specific its obvious implications for the chances recommendations—including in such dif- of that settlement to which government ficult areas as policing—but at a politi- is committed. And it worries that parity cal level the report sees the North review of esteem has been pursued in recent of parades as not only offering excellent years regardless of whether Northern substantive proposals but as also indicat- Ireland is moving towards a scenario of ing a model towards an eventual resolu- sharing or of separation. It strongly em- tion. It stresses that an absolutist defence phasises that support for integrated edu- of rights can only lead to permanent cation must be strengthened and urges antagonism, and that only through a

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 11 mutual recognition that rights must be tempered by restraint and responsibility can different groups work together towards a pluralist but equal future. DD

12 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 National questions

Thechallenge:co-existenceinonespace

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 13 arity of esteem has become a politi- backed up by the intense parades con- cal buzzword of Northern Ireland in troversy since 1995—parity of esteem has Pthe 1990s. become a partisan ideological battering In 1990, the second Standing Advisory ram between two increasingly segregated Commission on Human Rights report on and polarised communities, committed to Religious and Political Discrimination an unending and bitter ‘war of position’, and Equality of Opportunity in Northern solely on the grounds that defeat would Ireland suggested more could be done— be so much worse. Embraced more posi- both in amendments to the Northern Ire- tively, however, it conveys a recognition land Constitution Act of 1973 and in of intercommunal stalemate, after the substantive legislation—to guarantee most protracted sectarian conflict in “equal treatment and esteem of both tra- modern Irish history, and offers a lan- ditions in Northern Ireland”. In April guage for negotiation of a post-conflict 1993, the Northern Ireland secretary, Sir equilibrium. Patrick Mayhew, said that “each of the The Opsahl commission itself embod- main components of the community will ied this contradiction, in its recommen- need to be given recognition by the other, dation for ‘the legal recognition of and in any settlement each must be nationalism’ in Northern Ireland: accorded parity of esteem, the validity of its tradition receiving unqualified ‘Parity of esteem’ between the two communities should not only be an ideal. It recognition”. ought to be given legal approval, promoted The publication of the Opsahl commis- and protected, in various ways which sion report a few months later propelled should be considered. Such recognition the concept nearer the top of the politi- could be made operational at the highest cal agenda, where it has remained ever level by an Act of Parliament.2 since. In the joint framework document of February 1995, the London and Dub- For while this recommendation was pre- lin governments agreed that any new sented as “a future-oriented concession, political arrangements must “even- recognising the role of a constructive na- handedly afford both communities in tionalism within Northern Ireland”, Prof Northern Ireland parity of esteem and Opsahl’s own introduction described it as treatment, including equality of oppor- “an expedient to redress an imbalance tunity and advantage”.1 from the past, not part of a framework On a negative reading—a reading for the future”.3

14 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 This contradiction, and the vagueness has been its wholly provincial character. of the formulation, betray the slipperi- Apart from an excellent study by Lucy ness of the very concept of ‘parity of es- Bryson and Clem McCartney4 of one as- teem’ in Northern Ireland. And it is pect of the issue—cultural symbols—the precisely this room for partisan interpre- debate has been conducted entirely tation which has seen a notion promoted without any recognition of the wider in- as part of a vision for a benign future for ternational discourse on nationalism, the region reduced to simply another self-determination, minority rights and weapon in ideological arsenals. co-existence which has mushroomed in At one level, there must always be a recent years. degree of ‘play’ in a concept like parity of That wider engagement has had four esteem—including for policy-makers. notable facets. First of all was the intel- Even in a ‘peaceful’ Northern Ireland lectual renewal of work on nationalism, intercommunal tensions would remain, national identity and so on marked by requiring constant (re)negotiation; and the publication in 1983 of Ernest parity of esteem would have to be flex- Gellner’s and Benedict Anderson’s path- ibly defined to accommodate such ten- breaking studies.5 Second was the fall of sions in a positive manner. the Wall in 1989 and the subsequent ex- But that is quite a different matter plosion of ethno-nationalist pressures, from the utter cultural relativism in most tragically in ex-Yugoslavia. which the notion has become mired. Un- Third has been the promulgation of less there is some intercommunal under- declarations on minority rights from the standing as to what, objectively, parity Organisation for Security and Co-opera- of esteem can or should mean, then far tion in Europe (1991), the United Nations from acting as a fire-blanket for sectar- (1992) and the Council of Europe (1994). ian tensions it becomes the very vehicle Fourth and perhaps above all is the in- for conflict at a cultural level. And as the tensifying awareness that, on a global Drumcree ‘stand-off’ of 1996 demon- scale, questions of ethnic and national strated, ‘cultural’ conflict can have every identity, far from being relics of the pre- bit as much—or even more—impact than, enlightenment past, look set to play an say, the detonation of the IRA bomb in enduring role in a post-enlightenment Canary Wharf five months earlier. future—in which the ‘politics of recogni- A major factor in the relativism of the tion’6 will loom very large. Northern Ireland parity-of-esteem debate John Gray argues that the late 20th

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 15 century has seen the collapse of the ‘en- however, some provisional answers have lightenment project’ in its various emerged to this now-global challenge of universalist guises, liberal or Marxist, managing ‘agonistic (or competitive) plu- both having made the error of seeing cul- ralism’—answers which can put North- ture in general—and cultures are always ern Ireland’s own debate about parity of particular—as epiphenomenal, even ata- esteem into a more structured theoreti- vistic. (Thus, in Northern Ireland, for cal, and so hopefully more stable politi- example, liberals have promoted an ab- cal, context. stract ‘non-sectarianism’ against ‘tribalism’, Marxists ‘class politics’ against orrowing a phrase from Lenin to ‘bourgeois nationalism’—neither to much criticise liberal/Marxist rationalism, avail.) In ‘enlightenment’s wake’, we now B Gellner criticises the anticipated find “withering away of nationalism” evident in even so late a text as Eric Hobsbawm’s the supreme problem of communities in 11 our time, which is that of finding terms of Nations and Nationalism since 1780. peaceful coexistence among themselves ... On the contrary, he argues, “the idea that [C]ommunities make rival claims on ter- political boundaries must be congruent ritories they inhabit together, they are with ethnic ones, that rulers must not be animated by conflicting narratives and ethnically distinguishable from the ruled, cultural traditions, they renew their iden- now has a salience and authority which tities across the generations by strategies it has never possessed in the previous of exclusion and subordination, and so on. history of mankind.”12 The real agenda for political thought ... is Yet precisely the first lesson that the this agenda of relations among communi- wider international debate has thrown ties having irresolvably conflicting, and up is this: there simply is not enough geo- sometimes incommensurable claims ...9 political space for every ethnic group in Or, as Michael Ignatieff puts it more pith- the world to exercise unfettered ‘self- ily, “the key language of our age is ethnic determination’—not without trampling nationalism”.10 on somebody else’s space, at any rate. One has only to ask oneself what Thus, while there are some 184 independ- sense such statements would have made ent states, Will Kymlicka estimates that ten years ago to understand what a dra- there are more than 600 living language matically different place the world has groups and more than 5,000 ethnic become in the 1990s. By the same token, groups. If every group, in other words,

16 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 sought to replicate the Serb nationalist perceived as essentially synonymous slogan ‘All Serbs in One State’, the world with popular sovereignty.14 His secretary would be permanently pockmarked by of state, Herbert Lansing, saw the dan- ethno-nationalist wars. ger in the lack of clarity as to what the And yet the interfaces of such poten- unit of self-determination should be. He tial conflicts constantly proliferate in wrote in his diary during the Paris Peace these more assertive times: Conference in December 1918:

Minorities and majorities increasingly When the President talks of ‘self-determi- clash over such issues as language rights, nation’ what unit has he in mind? Does regional autonomy, political representa- he mean a race, a territorial area, or a com- tion, education curriculum, land claims, munity? Without a definite unit which is immigration and naturalisation policy, practical, application of this principle is even national symbols, such as the choice dangerous to peace and stability ... He of national anthem or public holidays. admires trite sayings and revels in formu- Finding morally defensible and politically lating them. But when he comes to their viable answers to these issues is the great- practical application he is so vague that est challenge facing democracies today ... their worth may well be doubted.15 There are no simple answers or magic for- By ten days later, Lansing was utterly mulas to resolve all these questions. Some conflicts are intractable, even when the agitated about Wilson’s embrace of ‘self- disputants are motivated by a sense of determination’: fairness and tolerance, which all too often The phrase is simply loaded with dyna- 13 is lacking. mite. It will raise hopes which can never ‘National self-determination’, of course, be realised. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives ... What a calamity that the phrase was the classical ‘simple answer’, as es- was ever uttered! What misery it will poused by the US president, Woodrow cause!16 Wilson, during the first world war. As Alan Sharp argues, Wilson, who saw A more distant observer came to equally Lenin as his arch-rival, tended to confuse disdainful conclusions. In his The Eco- two features of pre-war Europe—the re- nomic Consequences of the Peace, John fusal of multinational empires to grant Maynard Keynes wrote that Wilson “had autonomy to national groups and the lack no plan, no scheme, no constructive idea of democratic control in many states: whatever for clothing with the flesh of ‘national self-determination’ was thus life the commandments which he had

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 17 thundered from the White House. He self-determination’ as “a veritable could have preached a sermon on any of Pandora’s box”.21 them or have addressed a stately prayer The paradox of self-determination in to the Almighty for their fulfilment; but the 20th century is now well-established. he could not frame their concrete appli- Self-determination is normally under- cation to the actual state of Europe.”17 stood (though theoretically there are By June 1919, according to the ac- other options) to mean the formation of count of the leader of an Irish-American new, democratically legitimated states; delegation who saw Wilson, it seems the such legitimacy confers on states president had begun to share Lansing’s throughout the international system the forebodings: right to exercise sovereign power (as When I [Wilson] gave utterance to those against, say, being a protectorate of the words [‘that all nations had a right to self- United Nations); sovereignty is under- determination’], I said them without the stood in terms of the exercise of power knowledge that nationalities existed, within a clearly defined boundary, on the which are coming to us day after day ... other side of which another state legiti- You do not know and cannot appreciate mately rules; thus the corollary of self- the anxieties that I have experienced as a determination is the territorial integrity result of many millions of people having of democratic states. So what if a group 18 their hopes raised by what I have said. within such a state wants to secede—in Nor has clarity emerged in the interven- the name of self-determination—to join ing decades. Hurst Hannum comments another or become independent? wearily: “Perhaps no contemporary norm As Vincent Cable encapsulates it, “In of international law has been so vigor- a world where the politics of identity ously promoted or widely accepted as the looms large, the underlying tension be- right of all peoples to self-determination. tween the quest for minority ‘self-deter- Yet the meaning and content of that right mination’ and majority ‘territorial remain as vague and imprecise as when integrity’ will provide the basis of much they were enunciated by President future conflict, where rights and wrongs Woodrow Wilson and others at Ver- will never be clear cut.”22 sailles.”19 No international agreement It is all very well where what is per- has ever defined what a ‘people’ is.20 It is ceived as a national community with thus that Antonio Cassese, in his excel- the right to self-determination can found lent legal survey, describes the ‘right of a state co-terminous with itself. What

18 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 happens, however, when ethno-national fuelling the currency of ethno-national and political geographies do not so hap- intolerance, rivalry, tribalism, xeno- pily correspond? The simple answer, of phobia, and worse: a Golem turned on its course, would be to adjust the latter Creators.23 boundary to suit, or at least to provide a Yet, on the other hand, if the aspiration measure of autonomy for that group to self-determination by a minority group within the existing state. But this again is itself denied, then it can suffer the loss, depends on extremely tidy geography: the potentially, of all other human and demo- group concerned must live in an area cratic rights as well. While in theory wholly separate from the other or others there are numerous international con- with which it shares the state. ventions and courts, and there is the ul- If not, accommodation of its claim to timate authority of the United Nations, ‘self-determination’ can only be met at the the international community is loath to expense of a denial of self-determination intervene in sovereign states—because of to some or all of the members of the other the perceived domestic political costs and group(s). For example, three million Hun- because of fear of reciprocal claims—to garians live in the states around Hun- the extent required to punish oppression. gary. If they were all to enjoy, with their Ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda demonstrate fellow Hungarians, an untrammelled col- all too clearly how impotent the interna- lective right to self-determination, it tional community can be, even in the face could only be through the dismantling of of such massive human rights abro- Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and so on. gations as ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide. It is thus that the notion of self-deter- Moreover, it is perfectly possible for mination has soured in the international what are widely recognised to be demo- community. Cassese points out how af- cratic states to be experienced in quite ter the first world war it was seen as “the the opposite manner by minorities within animating political ideology” of a new them. In as much as democracy is con- order; after the second, it was perceived ventionally understood as the legitimate as an international legal norm; after the exercise of power on behalf of a majority end of the cold war, however, its revival of electors endorsing the government of has had a more disturbing complexion: the day (even if usually in a proportional If, in the past, self-determination used system rather than first-past-the-post), the coin of ‘progress’, in its third appari- it is clearly possible for a minority or tion it has come to be seen increasingly as minorities to be permanently excluded

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 19 from power—by ‘democratic’ means. The case as an instance of the dilemma:

old Stormont régime is by no means a Within the two islands of Ireland and the unique instance. Turkey, for example, United Kingdom, for example, the rel- currently wants to join the democratic evant ‘self’ might be both islands then [un- club of the European Union, yet its til 1921] together, despite their ethnic mix Kurdish minority in the south-east of English, Scots, Welsh and Irish; each (which would likely settle for autonomy island separately, despite the mix of the rather than secession) is just so excluded, first three in Great Britain and of Irish and indeed repressed in the context of the and Scots in Ireland; the two existing war against the state conducted by the states; or each ethnic/geographic group, Kurdish Workers’ Party. which would include at least four separate entities of England, Scotland, Wales, and What this argument indicates is that Ireland, with from zero to two additional reliance on conventional democratic groups (Irish Catholics and ‘British’ Prot- norms—self-determination, sovereignty estants) in Northern Ireland. Citing a and majority rule—cannot turn the trick multitude of equally irreducible situations in ethno-nationalist conflicts. On the con- will not advance our thinking very far, but trary, such norms can simply be mobi- their existence does underscore the fact lised in a partisan and mutually that the assertion by one ‘self’ of political uncomprehending fashion by protago- auto-determination almost necessarily nists on both sides, leading to endless entails the denial of auto-determination deadlock. Cyprus provides a perfect ex- to another ‘self’ which may be either ample. In as far as Greek and Turkish greater or smaller; as is the case with Cypriots perceive themselves as mem- minorities, selves can never be wholly 24 bers of two antagonistic communities, eliminated. each rejects the compromise widely As Gellner puts it with customary astrin- touted—a bizonal, bicommunal federa- gency, “The phenomenon of nationalism tion—in favour of what they deem to be is like a recurring decimal, it has no end, ‘their’ community’s national rights: enosis every national flea has smaller fleas to with Greece versus the maintenance of plague it in turn, not to mention the fact partition. that fleas of the same size also torment The crux of the difficulty is that the each other.”25 notion of self-determination can never The significance of this for Northern resolve any prior dispute as to who the Ireland today cannot be overstated. For ‘self’ is to be. Hannum takes the Irish there is a widespread, and unfortunately

20 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 ill-informed, assumption that the formu- This leaves nationalists feeling them- lation on Northern Ireland’s constitu- selves subject to a ‘unionist veto’ on their tional status in the Sunningdale self-determination right, which nation- agreement of 1973, the Anglo-Irish Agree- alists therefore seek to prosecute through ment of 1985 and the Downing Street enhanced involvement by the govern- Declaration of 1993—the so-called ‘con- ment of what they believe to be their na- sent principle’—has resolved the self- tional community in the day-to-day determination conundrum. Under this affairs of Northern Ireland. Unionists in formulation, it is held that Northern Ire- turn, fearful of a process of ‘creeping uni- land will remain a part of the UK because fication’, resist such involvement and a majority so wishes; should a majority other north-south links, in order to pre- eventually determine, however, that it vent what they see as a de facto should become part of a united Ireland, ‘Irishising’ of Northern Ireland, whatever that wish would be facilitated. reassurances they receive about its de Yet the fact that this 24-year-old for- jure position from British ministers. As mula hasn’t, in practice, brought the con- the political interviews later in this re- flict to a close should perhaps give pause port indicate, there is a very clear aware- for thought. Indeed, on closer scrutiny it ness, amongst both sets of protagonists, is apparent that it is trapped within the as to what is at issue here. limits of the conventional discourse. For The upshot is that there is neither it merely counterposes the competing agreement on the constitutional desid- unionist and nationalist self-determina- eratum for Northern Ireland, nor on its tion claims—to remain with the UK or to relationship with the Republic of Ire- end partition—neither offering a via me- land—and hence no agreement on even dia between them nor suggesting any the parameters of a settlement. And nor, mechanism other than majority rule for within the current language, could there making an arbitration. It thus cannot be. provide a basis for a settlement short of a mass conversion of Catholics to the sta- he implications of the foregoing dis tus quo, a mass conversion of Protestants cussion are momentous. Nothing to nationalism, or the demographic emer- T short of a radically new language can gence, peacefully accepted, of a Catholic- allow any settlement of the Northern Ire- nationalist majority—none of which land conflict to be conceived, never mind seems a remotely plausible scenario. implemented. In the absence of such a

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 21 new discourse, no end of talks or fora (and of peoples can be made compatible with Northern Ireland has had five sets of democratic stability.26 major talks and five fora since 1969) will It is similarly essential to question the deliver up a new dispensation; nor, in- concept of the ‘nation-state’ which na- deed, will any proposals constructed by tional self-determination usually seeks to the two governments if these remain establish, but which is bedevilled by non- circumscribed by the language of the correspondence between the terms on participants. either side of the hyphen. (Indeed At the 80th anniversary of the onset Stephen Ryan estimates that only one of the first world war, Vernon Bogdanor quarter of ‘nation-states’ really qualify wrote: for that definition.27) As Bhikhu Parekh contends, The slogan of the peacemakers in 1919 was national self-determination. The The nation-state has obvious advantages, problem with the notion is that in Cen- which explains its enormous past and tral and Eastern Europe—and in Ireland, present popularity. It liberates individu- too—where majorities are intertwined als from the tyranny of narrow communi- with minorities, there is no way of creat- ties, guarantees them personal autonomy, ing homogeneous national communities by equality and common citizenship, and drawing lines on a map. Wherever the line unites them all within a collectively is drawn, significant minorities will be left shared way of life. But it also has its dis- on the wrong side. For this reason, the advantages. Since it sees itself as the high- principle of national self-determination is est moral community, it cannot cherish not part of the answer to the question of and beyond a certain point even tolerate how states should be organised, but rather ethnic, cultural and religious communities a large part of the problem ... Woodrow lest they should become rival loci of alle- Wilson’s notion of self-determination was giance and identity and detract from the founded on the 19th-century liberal idea majesty of the national community. It that humanity was naturally divided into speaks in the language of secular individu- nations and every nation should have its alism and has no patience with those own state. Such an idea is clearly not ca- speaking in different languages. In this pable of realisation in Central and East- respect even the most liberal state is fun- ern Europe [or Northern Ireland], where damentally monocultural. minorities are territorially dispersed. This The nation-state might be suited to the means there is an urgent need for new needs of a culturally homogeneous soci- thinking as to how the national identities ety, but is a source of much mischief and

22 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 disorder in a culturally plural society. It Irish nationalist material suggests to me insists on homogeneity and uniformity that ... it is indeed pure verbiage.”30 which its constituent groups naturally Elaborated concepts of pluralism and resent, and its repressive attempts to en- parity of esteem do not exhaust the new force its demands inevitably provoke vio- lexicon required to achieve a resolution. lent reactions from them. The state, an Outside of this politico-cultural arena, for instrument of order, then becomes an in- instance, there are of course such vexed strument of disorder, and forfeits its raison questions as policing and criminal jus- d’être.28 tice, a whole raft of social concerns un- On the cognate concept of sovereignty, der the heading of social exclusion, the Hurst Hannum is equally robust: economic challenges of long-term unem-

[I]t is ... important to underscore the in- ployment and so on. But new thinking in herent vagueness and unhelpfulness of this arena is certainly a necessary, if not terms such as ‘nationhood’ and ‘sover- a sufficient, condition of a settlement. eignty’ in attempting to resolve legal and For the fundamental argument of this political conflicts. Both terms have been report is that well-honed concepts of plu- more frequently used to obscure question- ralism and parity of esteem can displace able motives and defend existing privilege the blunt tools of ‘majority rule’ and ‘self- than to promote comprehension or com- determination’. Thus, as Dunn and promise ... [T]o emphasise the theoretical Hennessey argue, if “recent world devel- rights of every ‘nation’ or the immutable opments”, interpreted pessimistically, characteristics of ‘sovereignty’ is unlikely indicate “the universality, obduracy and to resolve the inherent tension between timelessness of national questions”, more these two components.29 optimistically read they show “how cur- And finally, even the very discourse of rent ideas about nationalism, pluralism nationalism itself (including, in this con- and internationalism can inform the text, unionism of course), however much Irish dilemma and point to ways forward one defends it as a deeply felt emotional instead of back”.31 identity, remains intellectually vacuous. The big distinction is between a lan- As Gellner witheringly remarks, “nation- guage of zero-sum and a language of alism as an elaborated intellectual theory equilibrium. Majority rule and self- is neither widely endorsed, nor of high determination both imply that somebody quality, nor of any historic importance ... wins and somebody loses. As Gellner la- I would only add that my own reading of conically puts it, “not all nationalisms can

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 23 be satisfied, at any rate at the same time. political identities, none of which tries to The satisfaction of some spells the frus- ground its legitimacy and its action in a tration of others.”32 Pluralism and par- mission predetermined by universal his- ity of esteem, by contrast, are terms, tory—whether that be the mission of a meaningless in a monocultural context, universal class, or the notion of a privi- 33 which at least implicitly recognise leged race, or an abstract principle. that identities and rights collide and But Laclau argues that while these must therefore be accommodated and particularisms challenge the enlighten- balanced. ment notion of a universal political subject (‘citizens’, ‘the proletariat’) they do he end of the cold war has not only not vitiate the idea of universal values. been marked by an explosion of On the contrary: T ethno-nationalism but also by a more For the emergence of highly particularistic general efflorescence of discrete and dis- identities means that the particular parate political subjects, throwing up groups will have to coexist with other another whole set of dilemmas: how can groups in larger communities and this identities defined by their particularity coexistence will be impossible without the discover any mutual comprehension? assertion of values that transcend the Ernesto Laclau sets the scene: identities of all of them.34 [T]he end of the Cold War has also been And it is through a notion of rights that the end of the globalising ideologies that for Laclau the universal and particular had dominated the political arena since can be related. 1945. These ideologies, however, have not Parekh agrees that the problem is been replaced by others that play the same that these categories are defined as if structural function; instead, their collapse they were mutually exclusive. It is per- has been accompanied by a general decline haps illuminating to read the following of ideological politics. The discourse of both quotation with an ideal-typical unionism camps in the Cold War has been, in this and nationalism, substituting for sense, a last version of the political ideology of modernity: that is, the attempt to universalism and particularism, in mind: legitimate one’s own ideology by present- The universalist trend is grounded in the ing it as a fulfilment of a universal task Enlightenment belief that the liberal, capi- (whatever that might be). In a post-Cold talist, and secular way of life alone is con- War world, on the contrary, we are wit- sistent with human nature and represents nessing a proliferation of particularistic the last word in human wisdom. In such a

24 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 view there is only one true way of being For a start, the history of Northern Ire- rational, moral, civilised, human. Not sur- land has been a history of one commu- prisingly its moral monism is inherently nity being, as Orwell would have put inhospitable to cultural pluralism and it, more equal than the other. Moreover, leaves no space for cultural diversity. The ‘two traditions’ thinking, however be- particularist trend makes the opposite nignly, projects an essentially Irish na- mistake. Thinking that the only way to tionalist focus on national identity on to counter universalism is to embrace naïve the primary unionist concern with state relativism, it either holds that each way of life represents a distinct, incorrigible allegiance. and equally valid vision of the good life, As Bryson and McCartney explain, or that, in spite of all its limitations, it Unionists are often told that Britishness alone suits the genius of those born within is not a real identity; there is no British it. In either case it insulates and places nation; Britishness is an expression of citi- the prevailing way of life above criticism zenship. But this misses the point of what and leaves no space for inter-cultural dia- unionists want from their Britishness: citi- logue and borrowing ... Multi-cultural, zenship in the sense of identification with multi-religious and multi-ethnic societies the institutions of the state. They are not need to develop new models of political necessarily looking for a sense of nation- universalism that both respect deep dif- ality, or if they are they may be looking ferences and ensure equal citizenship. If elsewhere.36 they were to embrace an abstract and cul- Yet if the inequality between the ‘two turally insensitive universalism, they would provoke violence and secession. But communities’ has been the raw material if they surrendered to particularities in of the ‘factory of grievances’, the asym- the name of celebrating differences or out metry between them offers a space for a of a naïve belief in moral relativism, they way forward. This space becomes appar- would sacrifice social cohesion, common ent once one separates the notion of citizenship and a shared way of life, and ethnos (perceived national community) risk disintegration.35 from demos (polity of citizens). Now consider another distinction, on uch representation of the North how nationality itself is conceived—be- ern Ireland conflict is as if it were tween the classically French and German M symmetrical in nature—‘two tra- models. In the French revolutionary traditions’ and so on. In fact on closer in- dition, all are citizens (citoyens), ab- spection this is clearly wide of the mark. stractly defined by their secular,

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 25 universal rights, regardless of any lin- dominant national group—hence the in- guistic or national particularity—‘indif- tense and sustained controversy stirred ferent to difference’, as a French in France a few years ago by the appar- commentator has encapsulated it. In the ently trivial episode of two Muslim girls German tradition, arising from the proc- who wanted to wear headscarves to ess of unification, all are part of the peo- school. ple (Volk), defined by what differentiates The space for multi-cultural citizen- the ascribed national ‘spirit’ from that of ship arises where ethnos and demos, other national groups. French and German models, are bal- Now map these concepts into a anced. As Parekh succinctly puts it, this matrix: is about “equal respect, public recognition and the valuing of cultural identi- German French ties”.37 In Northern Ireland that allows model model of someone who feels secure in the recognition of their primary identity as an Ethnos Ethno- Multi-cultural Irish national to feel nevertheless s/he nationalism citizenship can be relaxed about being a citizen of Demos Multi-cultural Assimilationism the state of Northern Ireland/UK, just citizenship as it allows of someone who defines him/herself primarily by their alleg- What the diagram shows is the space iance as a citizen to the British state between extremist approaches to ques- to find an Irish/Northern Irish identity tions of national identity and state alle- non-threatening. giance which can be opened up if a more It is here that the ‘trap’ of nationality nuanced approach is adopted. Thus, at can have a benign reprise. Just as there one extreme, if one focuses on ethnos at can never be enough states in the world the expense of demos, and one operates to have one for every ethnic group, so the with a German model of nationality, one necessary non-correspondence between can only end up as an ethno-nationalist ethnos and demos allows for creative ex- protagonist: ‘All Serbs in One State’. At ploitation of opportunities to assuage the other, if one resists ethnos in the intercommunal conflict. name of demos, and one operates with a It is clear, however, that this poses French model of nationality, one can only greater challenges to unionists than na- end up demanding all assimilate to the tionalists. For it does require unionists

26 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 to modernise attitudes to citizenship of the status quo or calls for separation (away from subjecthood) and to Irishness by nationalist groups, that can, as in the (away from stereotypical conceptions). case of former Yugoslavia, lead to the The dominant trend within unionism horror of ethnic cleansing. Both of these conforms to David Miller’s model of ‘con- simplistic solutions usually involve a servative nationalism’: “At the core of turning away from dialogue in favour of conservative nationalism stands the idea that national identity integrally involves allegiance to authority. To think of oneself as British [in this view] is ipso facto to acknowledge the authority of institutions such as the monarchy which form the substance of national life.”38 This implies that the state must give formal recognition to those institutions deemed to express nationality, and associated beliefs and practice must be de- fended against criticism. Within this view, well articulated in the interviews later, parity of esteem can only be deemed a threat to a whole way of life. But the approach outlined here does not require unionists to stop being unionist. What it does require is that they embrace an ‘inclusivist’39 or ‘civic’40 unionism. And nor does it fail to challenge nationalists at all: on the contrary, it requires of nationalists a recognition that the vanishing point where state and nation correspond is precisely that. As Ryan argues, “the fact that states and nations are going to be with us for some time is no reason to accept either statist solutions suggested by supporters Don’tthreatenmywholewayoflife

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 27 a unilateral solution.”41 collective identities are not only primary This approach, however, also allows identities but are also exclusive of other of a multiplication, not simply bifurca- identities ...: both nationalism and union- tion, of identities—which Salman ism are very much defined in opposition Rushdie describes as “the norm of life in to each other. Up until now the dominant tendency in the debate about peace has the 20th century when we are all so jum- been to seek common ground in the ex- bled up”.42 Indeed, it is arguable that even tremes of the two traditions upon which a with a recognition that most individuals peaceful and democratic society can be in Northern Ireland will always adhere built. While on one level that is indeed primarily to a single identity, as union- commonsensical, on another level it can- ist or nationalist, it is crucial that there not be the basis for an enduring political is a—hopefully, in the long run, grow- culture ... [N]ationalism and unionism are ing—minority in each community, com- themselves incapable of wielding demo- prising individuals who reflexively cratic norms upon which a post-national construct their own more complex, mul- identity could be built. This is because tiple identities from the cultural reper- they are based on essentialist identities toires available to them. and the reality is that people have multi- For such a group, even if a minority, ple identities, even if these remain largely repressed or unarticulated ... Essential to is crucial to cementing the two conven- the task of creating a new collective iden- tional blocs and of suffusing them with a tity is the need to find less common ground commitment to pluralism. As indicated in the extremes of the two traditions than above, nationalists don’t have to convert in achieving common ground between the to being unionists or vice versa; what is moderate sides.43 required is that the distinction be rendered non-antagonistic, through a com- ut how can such ‘common ground’ be mon recognition of the legitimately plural established, when in Northern Ire identity spectrum within which they fall. Bland perceived rights so obviously As Gerard Delanty argues, and the collide and the protagonists so common- succeeding research confirms, ly talk past each other—as evidenced

The conflict in Northern Ireland has dem- in both cases by the parades contro- 44 onstrated the absence of a point of con- versy? The tendency is to avoid—as ‘too vergence in the extremes of the two difficult’—the intellectual ramifications traditions and very little in the main- of such questions, in favour of an ap- stream currents. This is because their proach based on negotiation. But as the

28 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 independent review of parades recog- moderate political forces, flowing as it nised, while such negotiation is welcome, does from principles of liberal democracy, it can not in itself be sufficient to resolve widely recognised today as the only le- conflicts.45 For, of course, if rights are per- gitimate political order: ceived as colliding and there is no Now in liberal democracies people sub- commonality of discourse, ‘negotiation’ scribe to different, often incompatible con- can only become another vehicle for pros- ceptions of what makes life worthwhile. ecution of conflict. These may be religious, ethical, or philo- Thus, as Laclau puts it, sophical views. Since such views are the subject of disagreement and are also Negotiation ... is an ambiguous term that sources of the deepest convictions people can mean very different things. One of have about how to lay out their lives those these is a process of mutual pressures and facts must be represented as ‘givens’ in concessions whose outcome depends on the any model of the circumstances in which balance of power between antagonistic the question of rights arises for us. In other groups. It is obvious that no sense of com- words, our thinking about rights takes munity can be constructed through that place against certain background beliefs type of negotiation. The relation between that are not in question within the liberal groups can only be one of potential war. democratic perspective: (1) that citizens Vis pacis para bellum.46 are to be treated as equals from the point So what can be done? The first answer is of view of politics; (2) that certain liber- to distinguish the universal principle of ties, such as the liberty to practise a reli- equality from particular conceptions of gion, are of fundamental importance; (3) the good. Focusing on the former alone that disagreement about the fundamen- makes us ‘group-blind’; focusing on the tals of human existence is to be tolerated latter alone leads to utter relativism. (even regarded as a good thing) rather Attracta Ingram has developed a com- than stamped out by force. Together these beliefs direct us to find a moral basis for plex and sophisticated argument, worth an acceptable system of rights, one that recounting at length, as to how a scheme can be endorsed by all citizens, in some of rights can come to be endorsed by di- point of agreement which overarches dif- verse citizens. Certainly, it will not be ferences in conceptions of what makes life acceptable to extremists who cannot ac- worthwhile. Intuitively, the clearest point cept alternative conceptions of the of agreement is that expressed in the third good as legitimate. But it should be a belief, that moral pluralism is to be tol- basis for ‘common ground’ between more erated. While this belief cannot stand in

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 29 isolation from the other two (toleration But not any dialogue. If the outcome would not be important to people who did of discourse is to be based on reason not believe in democratic equality and fun- alone—rather than propaganda, decep- damental liberties), it is a useful point of tion, appeals to tradition or exercise of entry to the unifying moral basis of all power—then, following Jürgen Haber- 47 three. mas, Ingram argues that the participants Underlying all three principles, Ingram must enjoy equal freedom of expression, argues, is the (universal) value of indi- equal individuality and equal power, and vidual autonomy. Here she challenges the all motives except for the co-operative widespread assumptions that rights de- search for truth must be excluded.50 This rive from self-ownership of property, Habermas calls ideal speech and Ingram arguing instead that they should be un- terms ‘ideal discourse’. derstood as deriving from the capacity of Through such an ideal discourse we all moral persons for self-government: can, despite differing conceptions of the [E]qual respect for persons cannot flow good, elaborate a set of rights principles from the thought that others are due the on which all citizens can concur, derived respect we claim for ourselves because from a common regard for autonomy. they are like us in sharing our judgments Ingram thereby outlines four: of what makes life worthwhile. Instead, (1) that each citizen has an equal right to equal respect must come from the thought the liberties, opportunities and powers of that what matters is that people develop citizenship; and exercise their capacities to form and (2) that the citizen is incomplete outside implement their own plans and projects.48 relations to others, so citizenship cannot Autonomy, however, while individual is be defined through the provision of rights not private: developing one’s own projects of non-interference by a minimal state; entails reasoning, which in turn entails (3) that their interdependence means that citizens must stand to each other in rela- engagement with the judgments of oth- tions of mutual concern and respect ex- ers about the substance of a worthwhile pressed in their co-operation in a just life. Whereas a proprietorial conception state; of rights implies a relation between (4) that their necessary mutuality and citizens of a social contract, based on reciprocity is shown in citizens’ acceptance bargaining, an autonomy-regarding con- of dialogue rather than force or deception ception implies resolution of these rela- to settle their political arrangements and tionships through dialogue.49 resolve the conflicts that arise from time

30 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 to time.51 has to refer to fundamental rights which are not absolute but relative ...52 This provides a powerful theoretical un- derpinning for a package of rights under Bobbio also importantly reminds us how the banner of parity of esteem, deliber- the very idea of human rights developed ated upon and accepted thereby as based in reaction to an organic conception of upon the common interest of free and society, in which the social whole, embod- equal, if different, citizens in the pursuit ied in the sovereign, defined the duties of autonomous, though interdependent, of individual members, conceived as sub- lives. It allows us to re-present the con- jects. Emerging first in the name of reli- cept of parity of esteem in the language gious freedom, this generalised into an of opportunity and choice for individual individualistic conception of society, citizens, rather than as the clash between whose members were re-defined as ideologically armour-plated, collective rights-bearing citizens.53 It would surely political protagonists it is often thought be a perverse historical reprise to reintro- to connote—both for the progatonists duce an organic conception, in the name themselves and for broader publics alien- of the ‘nationalist community’ and the ated from the debate as a result. ‘unionist community’ religiously de- The focus on an acceptable régime for fined—thereby disempowering indi- the adjudication of rights, and on the vidual citizens—as part of a project principle of continuing dialogue, is cru- ostensibly intended to extend the sphere cial for another reason. As Norberto of rights. Bobbio recognises, and he could easily Indeed, Bobbio goes so far as to ques- have been writing about the parades tion the very idea of ‘the people’ on which controversy, the idea of national-self-determination rests: in the majority of cases concerning human rights two equally fundamental human ‘People’ is an ambiguous term, which has rights conflict with each other, and it is been used by all the modern dictatorships. impossible to protect one unconditionally It is an abstraction which can be deceiv- without making the other inoperative. ing: it is not clear what sections of the in- Take, for example, the right to freedom of dividuals living on a given territory expression on the one hand, and the right constitute the ‘people’. Collective decisions not to be deceived, provoked, scandalised, are not taken by the people, but by the offended, libelled or vilified on the other. individuals it is composed of, whether In these cases, which are the majority, one they are many or few. In a democracy,

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 31 collective decisions are taken directly or is deemed to advance the interests of indirectly only by single individuals in the one’s own group and to control or exclude moment in which they place their voting the other(s). From this, then, it follows paper in the ballot box.54 that the only ‘solutions’ that are possible et it is sometimes argued that the are informal or formal apartheid, parti- politics of recognition necessarily tion, ‘repatriation’ or genocide.55 Y entails enshrining ‘collective rights’. The ‘two traditions’ emphasis of recent Conventional human rights régimes, it years has been a mixed blessing in this is said, treat each individual identically regard. On the one hand, it is certainly as a homo civicus, enjoying of civil and superior to the ‘one tradition’ mono- political liberties by dint of democratic culturalism which dominated, and stul- citizenship. Their very universalism tified, Northern Ireland in the old makes them blind to considerations of dif- Stormont years. On the other hand, it can ferential identities. What therefore needs itself be constricting, implying as it does recognition, it is then suggested, is the a pre-determined fixity of cultural styles rights of particular groups held to em- and political affiliations: as Liah Green- body a conscience collective. field argues, nationalisms defined in This, however, is very much a road to collectivist terms are inherently authori- hell, albeit paved with good intentions. tarian.56 Where they clash, as in North- As John Cash points out, such corporate ern Ireland, recognition of the rights of conceptions not only subordinate indi- collectivities qua collectivities can only viduals to ascriptive group membership perpetuate the stand-off, institutionalis- and define their entitlements according sectarianism and preventing the ingly—at some peril to individual lib- emergence of a broader pluralist and erty—but also it follows that the democratic culture. behaviour, beliefs and aspirations of other In extremis, of course, emphasis on groups can only be evaluated relativ- ‘group rights’ can only conjure up an istically, in terms of their compatibility, apartheid society, in which all politics— or otherwise, with those of one’s own as dialogue and exchange—is impossible. group. And since the constitutive politi- And, looking at the South African case, cal relationship is no longer between the Adrian Guelke warns that if “the old citizen and the state but between the assumption that ethnicity would be group and the state, political authority dissolved in the process of modernis- is granted legitimacy only in so far as it ation and state integration has been

32 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 thoroughly discredited”, nevertheless, “A social justice.58 danger now exists that a contrary and As Amy Gutmann puts it, “The demand equally false assumption will be made, for recognition, animated by the ideal of postulating the inevitability and central- human dignity, points in at least two di- ity of ethnic divisions in any multi- rections, both to the protection of the ethnic society.”57 Ironically, South Africa, basic rights of individuals as human be- where the African National Congress ings and to the acknowledgment of the stuck by non-racialism in the face of the particular needs of individuals as mem- perpetuation of group division by the bers of specific cultural groups.”59 National Party, here provides (as so of- It is for all these reasons that the lan- ten) more contrast than comparison with guage of the international conventions on Northern Ireland. minority rights refers not to such groups Kymlicka comes to similar conclu- as legal subjects but to ‘persons belong- sions. He rightly stresses that without ing to’ them. This reserves to individuals minority rights provisions, “talk of ‘treat- the crucial rights to be both less and more ing people as individuals’ is itself just a than a representative member of an eth- cover for ethnic and national injustice”. nic group—less in the sense of a right of But he warns: exit, more in the sense of a right to addi- Recognising minority rights has obvious tional identities. During the war in ex- dangers. The language of minority rights Yugoslavia, one writer passionately has been used and abused not only by the complained: Nazis [vis-à-vis the Sudeten Germans ‘trapped’ in Czechoslovakia by the Ver- That is what the war is doing to us, re- sailles treaty], but also by apologists for ducing us to one dimension: the Nation. racial segregation and apartheid. It has The trouble with this nationhood, how- also been used by intolerant and belliger- ever, is that whereas before, I was defined ent nationalists and fundamentalists by my education, my job, my ideas, my throughout the world to justify the domi- character—and yes, my nationality too— nation of people outside their group, and now I feel stripped of all that. I am no- the suppression of dissenters within the body because I am not a person any more. group. A liberal theory of minority rights, I am one of 4.5 million Croats.60 therefore, must explain how minority rights coexist with human rights, and ‘Collective rights’, in other words, turn how minority rights are limited by princi- persons belonging to ethnic, national or ples of individual liberty, democracy, and religious minorities into non-persons. At

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 33 worst, as Ryan indicates, ethnocentrism politically on that basis. The result, too and enemy images become entrenched, often, is an obsessive particularism as a “exaggerated awareness and concern way of embracing or coping with contin- about cultural difference” being manifest. gency. And as critics of community have “As a result of this black and white think- pointed out, social pluralism and the proliferation of associations do not necessar- ing ‘deindividualisation’ takes place, a ily mean variety for men and women collective ethic emerges and polarisation personally: embeddedness means people becomes easier.”61 can get stuck. This is not to reject any notion of com- The challenge for modern advocates of munal identity—that would be to relapse community, therefore, is to imagine com- into abstract universalism. And as munity without either neo-tribalism or Jeffrey Weeks argues: “A community of- self-immolation ... The co-existence of dif- fers a ‘vocabulary of values’ through ferent communities depends upon a rec- which individuals construct their under- ognition that the condition of toleration standing of the social world, and of their of one’s own way of life is a recognition of sense of identity and belonging. Commu- the validity of other ways of life.62 nities appear to offer embeddedness in a As Jean Leca pungently asks, “How can world which constantly seems on the citizenship be combined with the coex- verge of fragmentation.” But Weeks goes istence of different cultural groups which on to warn only communicate between themselves with the deafness of resentment?”63 A major problem, of course, is that a par- Cyprus here provides an eloquent ticular definition of community may un- warning. The Treaties of Zurich and Lon- dermine a wider sense of community don granting qualified independence in embodied in the best of humanist tradi- 1960 were based on residential, electoral tions. The strongest sense of community and political segregation between Greek is in fact likely to come from those groups who find the premises of their collective and Turkish Cypriots. “Individuals qua existence threatened, and who construct individuals did not possess rights vis a out of this a community of identity which vis the national state; rights were provides a strong sense of resistance and reserved for communal groups, while empowerment. Seeming unable to control small minorities were forced to choose be- the social relations in which they find tween the two communities.”64 The rest themselves, people shrink the world to is history. the size of their communities, and act

34 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 ith this key caveat, however, mi- Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, nority rights provisions are cru- Religious and Linguistic Minorities. And W cially important in engendering the declaration is itself rather weak: not parity of esteem: they represent the coun- only has it no legal force but there is no terbalance through which the demo- monitoring mechanism and its substan- graphic weight of a majority is reduced tive implications are imprecise (‘appro- to equilibrium with the minority(ies) with priate ... measures’) or qualified (‘where which it shares a territory. That being required’). so, it is worth considering why they have Nevertheless, the declaration does taken so long to emerge in the inventory commit UN members in general to “pro- of international law, and why they still tect the existence and the national or eth- only have declaratory status. And the an- nic, cultural, religious and linguistic swer, of course, lies not only in the fail- identity of minorities within their respec- ure of the inter-war League of Nations, tive territories, and ... encourage condi- or the opportunist way in which Hitler tions for the promotion of that identity”. embraced the rights of German minori- In particular, its provisions range com- ties outside the Vaterland—but in the prehensively over equality and non-dis- way the régime of international relations crimination; rights to linguistic, religious embodied in the United Nations was and other cultural expression; education premised precisely on sovereign, self- for cultural diversity, including education determining nation-states. via the ‘mother tongue’; rights to partici- Thus, minority rights are absent from pate ‘effectively’ in all aspects of public the founding UN Charter of 1945. While life and decision-making; freedom of com- in 1946 a UN Sub-commission on the Pre- munal association and in terms of devel- vention of Discrimination and the Pro- oping relations with co-nationals in tection of Minorities was established, the neighbouring states; and co-operation ‘parent’ Human Rights Commission con- between states to promote rights and strained its work, reflecting the unwill- mutual understanding.65 ingness of member states to delve too Many of the same considerations ap- deeply into this area. In 1978, the HRC ply to the Framework Convention for established a working group to study a the Protection of National Minorities,66 Yugoslav draft on minority rights. Yet it which covers much the same terrain as took 14 years for that to be translated the UN declaration. Council of Europe into the Declaration on the Rights of sources indicate that the Parliamentary

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 35 Assembly of the council wanted the con- belonging to ethnic groups. And, like vention to be attached as a protocol to other instruments on minority rights, it the existing European Convention of insists that every such person “shall Human Rights—a weakness of which is have the right freely to choose to be that it does not address the rights of treated or not to be treated as such” to members of ethnic (in the broadest sense) no disadvantage. groups, as against abstract individuals— Its preamble states that “a pluralis- but the “main powers” in the Committee tic and genuinely democratic society of Ministers of the council took a “politi- should not only respect the ethnic, cul- cal decision” in favour of a framework tural, linguistic and religious identity of convention instead. The new code does each person belonging to a national mi- not, thus, allow representatives of ‘na- nority, but also create conditions enabling tional minorities’ to bring cases before the them to express, preserve and develop European Court of Human Rights to seek this identity”. It stresses that “the crea- redress against the states in which they tion of a climate of tolerance and dialogue live. is necessary to enable cultural diversity Nevertheless, as the explanatory re- to be a source and a factor, not of divi- port attached to the convention indicates, sion, but of enrichment for each society”. “The framework Convention is the first The key provisions of relevance to legally binding multilateral instrument Northern Ireland are: devoted to the protection of national mi- • prohibition of discrimination, in favour norities in general.” It arose from recog- of equality before the law and equal nition by the heads of state of the protection; 38-member council, at their summit in • promotion of equality “in all areas of Vienna in 1993, “that the national mi- economic, social, political and cultural norities which the upheavals of history life”; have established in Europe had to be pro- • promotion of conditions necessary for tected and respected as a contribution to national minorities to preserve their peace and stability”. Both the UK and the identity, in “religion, language, traditions Republic of Ireland have yet to ratify the and cultural heritage”; convention. • encouragement of “tolerance and The explanatory report makes clear intercultural dialogue” and effective that no recognition of ‘collective rights’ measures to promote mutual respect and is implied here, as against persons co-operation, particularly in education,

36 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 culture and the media; international principles of self-determi- • specific protection of language rights, nation and non-violability of borders can including education through the minor- be resolved. ity language, access to the media and of- Earlier, in 1992, the Council of Europe ficialdom, street names, etc; had promulgated the European Charter • fostering knowledge in education and on Regional and Minority Languages. research of minority and majority cul- This ranges from education in the tures, history, etc; medium of the language, to its use in com- • creation of the conditions for “effective munication with authorities, in cross- participation” of persons belonging to border exchanges and in economic and national minorities “in cultural, social social life, to expression through the me- and economic life and in public affairs”; dia and via cultural activities and facili- • non-interference with “free and peace- ties. Again, there is no vehicle for an ful contacts” across frontiers, especially aggrieved citizen or group to avail of the where ethnic identity or cultural herit- charter to secure legal redress. age is shared; and Finally, in this context, the work of the • encouragement of “bilateral and mul- Organisation for Security and Co-opera- tilateral agreements with other States, tion in Europe should be mentioned. The in particular neighbouring States, in or- 1989 Vienna Declaration of the then CSCE, der to ensure the protection of persons the 1990 Paris Charter and (in the same belonging to the national minorities year) the Copenhagen meeting addressed concerned”. the rights of national minorities and the The convention also stresses the need last addressed mechanisms for prevent- for national minorities to respect the ing violations. At the Helsinki meeting rights of others and that nothing within in 1992, a post of High Commissioner on it implies any right to engage in activity National Minorities was establishing. contrary to the “sovereign equality, ter- The holder (Max van der Stoel) began ritorial integrity and political independ- operating in the following year, but he ence of States”. It thus goes as far as the has a staff of only four, is essentially ori- international community yet has in ented to early-warning prevention of squaring the circle of how, in the many emergent conflicts and can not com- European countries in particular where municate with any party condoning states and ethnic groups do not follow the violence.67 same boundaries, the clash of the two key These minority rights provisions could

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 37 clearly be substantially strengthened, congruent with liberal-democratic norms. notably by rendering them justiciable Indeed, the displacement of political con- before domestic and international tribu- flicts into litigation, as so often in the US, nals in the manner of the European Con- may serve to heighten, rather than as- vention of Human Rights. But Rekosh, suage, group antagonisms. while a strong supporter of minority John Gray is perhaps overly world- rights to guard against the ‘tyranny of weary, but he takes us to the heart of the the majority’, nevertheless has an appo- matter:

site warning of the limits of inter- For the pluralist, the practice of politics national human rights safeguards, is a noble engagement, precisely on ac- however robust, when applied to particu- count of the almost desperate humility of lar situations: its purposes—which are to moderate the enmity of agonistic identities, and to gen- [N]o treaty will ever solve all of the issues erate conventions of peace among warring that can divide national, ethnic, religious communities. The pluralist embrace of and linguistic groups ... [P]recise decisions politics is, for these reasons, merely a rec- about these issues must take into account ognition of the reality of political life, it- the particular circumstances. The best self conceived as an abatement of war.69 way to address these thorny problems is to engage in a genuine dialogue in good But how is pluralism to be practised, with faith with the participation of all inter- such a benign, or at least less malign, end ested parties.68 in view? After all, it could in theory be argued that the more pluralism a soci- nd this is why this report has broad- ety allows, the more potential sites for ened the argument beyond parity of conflict are established. In extremis, if A esteem to include the related issue every individual were reduced to selfish of political pluralism. Legalistic solutions difference, then society would be reduced can only bear so much weight: if citizens to a Hobbesian war of all against all, in and their representatives can not prac- the absence of a sovereign dictator. tise ‘dialogue in good faith’ in their eve- And, indeed, as Anthony Giddens ryday and political lives, without warns, in today’s “post-traditional social requiring constant legal direction or con- order”, a cosmopolitan culture partly in- straint, then there is no prospect duced by globalisation, there is a ten- of Northern Ireland ever functioning as dency to retreat into various types of a multi-cultural society in a manner “fundamentalism”, that is to say not only

38 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 a defence of tradition, but a defence of antagonism), or to assimilate the latter’s tradition in a traditional way.70 An in- concerns, what Giddens calls “dialogic de- stance would be not only to insist on the mocracy” accepts this need for rational right to march down a particular road to engagement: express a particular tradition, but to in- On the one hand, democracy is a vehicle sist precisely on the ground that it had for the representation of interests. On the been traditional to do so. other, it is a way of creating a public arena Thus the danger of today’s world to in which controversial issues—in princi- which Gray points—and in Northern Ire- ple—can be resolved, or at least handled, land’s case the danger of the conflict sim- through dialogue rather than through ply becoming permanent, ‘peaceful’ or pre-established forms of power. While the not—is that competing religious or other first aspect has probably received most ethnic fundamentalisms hold sway in re- attention, the second is at least equally action to one another, in a relationship significant.73 which Frank Wright described as “com- And Giddens recognises the particular 71 munal deterrence”. A healthy democ- role of dialogic democracy, in countering racy, Chantal Mouffe insists, is not fundamentalism and constraining vio- represented by “a confrontation between lence, in ethnically divided societies. In- non-negotiable moral values and essen- deed, unless one accepts—or could even 72 tialist identities”. without ‘ethnic cleansing’ achieve—com- The alternative, however, is to recog- plete segmentation of populations, there nise that liberal democracy in a context is no alternative if conflict is to be of agonistic pluralism must have another stemmed: function beyond the expressive: it is not simply about the collection and counting Difference ... can become a medium of hos- of ‘mandates’, but also about the further tility; but it can also be a medium of creating mutual understanding and step of creating a relationship as near to sympathy ... Understanding the point of ‘ideal discourse’ as possible between view of the other allows for greater self- elected representatives. understanding, which in turn enhances This, as Giddens presents it, is communication with the other ... Dialogue essentially the opposite of fundamental- has great substitutive power in respect of ism. If fundamentalism refuses to expli- violence, even if the relation between cate its concerns to other groups (the the two in empirical contexts is plainly latter perceived as in a relationship of complex ... These things having been said,

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 39 dialogic democratisation is likely to be cen- protagonists to the conflict, with the tral to civil cosmopolitanism in a world of vested interests in which they have in- routine cultural diversity.74 vested so much—political or paramili- It will be immediately clear that dialogic tary—will be the initiators of such a democracy, in as much as it insists on a cultural transformation. broader notion of democracy than the merely representative, is incompatible he key implication of this intellectual with any notion of ‘majority rule’. overview of notions of pluralism and Majoritarian notions of democracy pre- T parity of esteem is that old concepts cisely represent a refusal of the equality of national self-determination, sover- between majority and minority repre- eignty, the nation-state and majority sentatives on which ‘ideal discourse’ de- rule—whose direct interlinkage has pends. Dialogic democracy, by contrast, turned them into a formidable chain lock- aims to find a point of mutual under- ing situations into conflict—have to be standing which bears no necessary rela- unpacked and replaced by a more differ- tionship to the respective sizes of the entiated discourse, in which the space for groups involved. It is not a mere out- cultural diversity can emerge. working of a negotiated balance of power. As Ryan, more optimistically, argues, Nor is it a process confined to elected rep- it is possible for ethnic citizens to show resentatives, but it can embrace an en- allegiance to a state which equitably fos- gagement between such representatives ters communal life; it is possible to es- and what Norman Porter calls “the poli- tablish incentives to ‘make moderation tics of civil society”.75 pay’. It is for all these reasons, as the work of Ingram, Laclau and Giddens in sum All of this, however, will mean a move demonstrates, that attempts to resolve away from the concept of the nation-state in favour of the separation of the nation intercommunal relations in Northern Ire- and the state and an effort to live with land via political talks have so far proved cultural pluralism ... This will not, of entirely abortive. Unless a political cul- course, be easy, but a combination of de- ture characterised by dialogic democracy nationalisation and democratisation of is developed and consolidated, theologi- the state, the de-internationalisation cal and political fundamentalisms, and of ethnic conflict and ethnodevelopment ‘war of manoeuvre’ power plays, will pre- do seem to offer the best hope for the vail. By definition, it is unlikely that the creation of peaceful and democratic multi-

40 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 ethnic societies ...76 stake in this debate from their particular embodiment in a concrete situation. Cassese agrees: So let us turn now to the views of Perhaps the best solution is neither to key players in Northern Ireland as to embrace some form of utopian what, for them, parity of esteem is all cosmopolitanism nor to assume an atti- about. DD tude that decries ethno-cultural differences. Too much richness would be lost Footnotes if diverse cultural expression could not find expression. What deserves, instead, 1 I am indebted to a paper on parity of esteem careful consideration is the need for by David Stephens of the Irish Council of separation of ethno-cultural differences Churches for the material in this paragraph. 2 from the State as a political entity. Thus, A Pollak ed, A Citizens’ Enquiry: The Opsahl Report on Northern Ireland, Lilliput, Dublin, the next stage in the evolution of self- 1993, p113 determination, the most radical stage of 3 ibid, pp 133 & 5 all, might be one in which States would 4 Lucy Bryson and Clem McCartney, Clashing increasingly become polities belonging Symbols, Institute of Irish Studies, Queen’s to their citizens defined in ‘civic’ terms University, Belfast, 1994 5 rather than ‘ethno-national’ terms. The Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983; Benedict Anderson, Im- separation of ‘State’ and ‘nationality’ agined Communities, Verso, London, 1983, re- would imply that within the ‘non- vised 1991 national’ or truly ‘multi-national’ State— 6 The phrase is drawn from Charles Taylor et al, that is, the State that belongs to all its Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Rec- citizens—citizens would be free to group ognition, Princeton University Press, New Jer- sey, 1994. themselves around their cultural herit- 7 A D Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Glo- 77 age and symbols ... bal Era, Polity, Cambridge, 1995, p2 8 Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nationalism, This, in turn, implies a “plural constitu- Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, pp 22-31 tion”—a concept we return to at the end 9 John Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and of this report—as well as an acceptance Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, Routledge, London, 1995, p129 that “the problems of multicultural ex- 10 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Jour- istence, even in a non-national State, neys into the New Nationalism, Farrar, Straus would [still] be legion”.78 and Giroux, New York, 1994, p5 11 But, as this theoretical/international Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cam- overview has itself highlighted, one must bridge, 1990 distinguish the universal principles at 12 Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism, I B

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 41 Taurus, Oxford, 1994, p38 33 Ernesto Laclau ed, The Making of Political 13 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Identities, Verso, London, 1994, p1 Clarendon, Oxford, 1995, p1 34 ibid, p5 14 Alan Sharp, ‘The genie that would not go back 35 Parekh, op cit, pp 148-9 into the bottle’, in Seamus Dunn and T G Fraser 36 Bryson and McCartney, op cit, p50 eds, Europe and Ethnicity: World War I and 37 Parekh, ‘United colours of equality’, New Contemporary Ethnic Conflict, Routledge, Lon- Statesman, December 13th 1996 don, 1996, pp 12-14 38 David Miller, On Nationality, Clarendon, Ox- 15 cited in Daniel Patrick Moynihan, ‘On the “self- ford, 1995, p124 determination of peoples”’, in his Pandae- 39 John D Cash, Identity, Ideology and Conflict: monium: Ethnicity in International Politics, The Structuration of Politics in Northern Oxford University Press, 1993, p82 Ireland, Cambridge University Press, 1996, 16 cited in ibid, p83 passim 17 cited in Antonio Cassese, Self-determination 40 Norman Porter, Rethinking Unionism: An Al- of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge ternative Vision for Northern Ireland, Blackstaff, University Press, 1995, p141 Belfast, 1996, pp 167-213 18 cited in Moynihan, op cit, p85 41 Ryan, op cit, p228 19 Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and 42 Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, Nationality and Self-determination: The Accommodation of Con- Citizenship: A Discussion, HCA, Prague, 1993, p13 flicting Rights, University of Pennsylvania 43 Gerard Delanty, ‘Habermas and post-national Press, Philadelphia, 1992, p27 identity: theoretical perspectives on the conflict 20 Moynihan, op cit, p71 in Northern Ireland’, Irish Political Studies, vol 21 Cassese, op cit, p1 11, 1996, p30 22 Vincent Cable, The World’s New Fissures, 44 Dominic Bryan and Neil Jarman, Parade and Demos paper no 6, London, 1994, p48 Protest, Centre for the Study of Conflict, Uni- 23 Cassese, op cit, p4 versity of Ulster, Coleraine, 1996 24 Hannum, op cit, p31 45 Report: Independent Review of Parades and 25 Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism, pp Marches (the North report), Stationery Office, 178-9 Belfast, 1997 26 Vernon Bogdanor, ‘Exorcising the ghosts of 46 Laclau, Emancipation(s), Verso, London, 1996, 1914’, Independent, August 1st 1994 p32 27 Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and Interna- 47 Attracta Ingram, A Political Theory of Rights, tional Relations (second edition), Dartmouth, Clarendon, Oxford, 1994, pp 97-8 Aldershot, 1995, p3 48 ibid, p98 28 Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Introduction’, New Commu- 49 ibid, pp 121-2 nity (special issue on national identity), vol 21, 50 ibid, pp 125-6 no 2, April 1995, p149 51 ibid, p171 29 Hannum, op cit, pp 25-6 52 Norberto Bobbio, The Age of Rights, Polity, 30 Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism, pp Cambridge, 1996, p27 65-7 53 ibid, pp ix-x 31 Seamus Dunn and T W Hennessey, ‘Ireland’, 54 ibid, p90 in Dunn and Fraser eds, op cit, p178 55 Cash, op cit, pp 101-2 32 Gellner, op cit, p2 56 Liah Greenfield, Nationalism: Five Roads to

42 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 Modernity, Harvard University Press, 1992, pp p12 10-11 72 Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 57 Adrian Guelke, ‘Ethnic Rights and Majority Verso, London, 1993, p6 Rule: The Case of South Africa’, in International 73 Giddens, op cit, pp 15-16 Political Science Review, vol 13, no 4, 1992, pp 74 ibid, pp 244-5 415-432 75 Porter, op cit, p50 58 Kymlicka, op cit, pp 194 &6 76 Ryan, op cit, pp 237-8 59 Amy Gutmann, introduction to Taylor, op cit, 77 Cassese, op cit, p365 p8 78 ibid, loc cit 60 S Drakulic, Balkan Express, Hutchinson, Lon- don, 1993, p51 61 Ryan, op cit, pp 83 & 87 62 Jeffrey Weeks, ‘The idea of a sexual community’, Soundings, no 2, spring 1996, p72 63 Jean Leca, ‘Questions on citizenship’, in Chantal Mouffe ed, Dimensions of Radical De- mocracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, Verso, London, 1992, p30 64 Adamantia Pollis, ‘The social construction of ethnicity and nationality: the case of Cyprus’, Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, vol 2, no 1, spring 1996 65 The declaration is reproduced in full in Asbjørn Eide, New Approaches to Minority Protection, Minority Rights Group, London, 1993, p4. 66 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and explanatory report, Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg, 1995 67 J Quigley, ‘Combination of national groups’ interests in multi-ethnic states: international practice’, in Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly of Moldova, Civic Peace and Democracy in Multi- ethnic Societies, Chisinau, 1995; Oxford Re- search Group, New Conflicts in Europe: Conflict and Resolution, Oxford, 1992 68 E Rekosh, ‘Minority issues in an international human rights context’, in ibid, p31 69 Gray, op cit, p129 70 Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics, Polity, Cambridge, 1994, pp 5-6 71 Frank Wright, Northern Ireland: A Compara- tive Analysis, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1988,

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 43 A defining issue

learly the most key player in defin- rural divide and the influence of the in- ing parity of esteem in Northern Ire ternational mass media; and C land is the British government itself. • socio-economic divisions—with disad- On behalf of the (outgoing) government, vantage more pronounced in the Catho- Sir David Fell, head of the Northern Ire- lic community, though the recent growth land civil service, refers to Sir Patrick of a professional Catholic middle class Mayhew’s speech of December 16th 1992, and changing employment patterns com- on culture and identity, in which he iden- plicated the picture. tified four significant lines of division: Sir David claims that the govern- • national identities—where the divi- ment’s approach to the divisions in sions were between those who primarily Northern Ireland is based on equality of identified themselves as British and opportunity, equity of treatment and those who saw themselves as primarily parity of esteem. In applying the latter Irish; principle, he argues the government rec- • religious traditions—where historic ognises the validity of the majority com- antagonisms between Catholics and Prot- munity’s predominant wish to remain estants had been maintained longer, and British, as well as the minority commu- with more intense feeling, than in most nity’s predominant nationalist aspira- parts of Europe; tion; does not discriminate in favour of • cultural traditions—where Gaelic, particular cultural traditions in terms of Anglo-Irish, Scottish and English influ- government policy and financial assist- ences were reflected in language, sports, ance; provides legal redress against music and literature, though these pat- discrimination by government or in em- terns were complicated by the urban/ ployment, on grounds of religion or

44 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 political opinion; and seeks to reduce to represent a language inadequate to the socio-economic differentials between the resolution of conflicts such as that in communities. Northern Ireland. For the government, however, this does not imply identity of treatment. At fter government, church leaders the constitutional level, Sir David con- must be principal definers of parity tends that there are limits to the appli- A of esteem, given its primary focus cation of parity of esteem: a change in is on the equilibrium, or otherwise, be- the constitutional status of Northern Ire- tween the two religiously defined com- land can only come about only with the munities. To Dr Sean Brady, Catholic consent of a majority of the people of archbishop of Armagh, parity of esteem Northern Ireland. Though the British means that the political and religious government has indicated that it has no views of people should be treated with ‘selfish strategic or economic interest’ in respect. The expression of these views Northern Ireland and agrees that it is for alone, or in groups, should be granted full the people of the island of Ireland alone, liberty and tolerance within the bounds by agreement between the two parts re- of public order and public morality. spectively, to exercise their right of ‘self- For Dr Brady, parity of esteem also determination’ on the basis of consent, means that elements such as religion, freely and concurrently given, to bring culture, race, gender and status, which about a united Ireland, if that is their are markedly different, and some of wish, parity of esteem for the British and which have been accorded greater Irish national allegiances/identities in weight, might be henceforth given equal Northern Ireland must be placed within weight and equal respect. It means that the context of United Kingdom sover- equal respect would be shown to people, eignty, based on consent. so that all citizens would be equal before It should hopefully be clear from the the law. Dr Brady argues that parity of comments in the first chapter that this esteem ensures that no one is discrimi- paragraph, while a fair representation of nated against on the basis of their reli- what appears as a robust and cogent po- gion or their culture, or their race or sition, is in fact intensely problematic. gender. For it is strewn with concepts—majori- Lord Eames, the Church of Ireland tarianism, self-determination, sover- primate, conceives of parity of esteem as eignty—which have already been shown meaning two things:

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 45 First, how I view my own community. claim a parity of esteem and not be pre- Unless the community has self-respect, pared to give it. But parity of esteem ... confidence and a historical basis which it really for me, is respect for and accept- can live with, and can be content and ance of the differences of other people.” happy with, it is not going to have its own parity of esteem ... Secondly, it is looking any agencies established by gov- from within your community to another ernment under what has been community and saying ‘you have an equal called the ‘new constitutional- right, you have an equal core, you have M an equal esteem’ ... and to be able to say, ism’ of direct rule have obviously been because you are confident in your own concerned with the many-faceted community, to another community ... I re- intercommunal balance in Northern Ire- spect what you believe. land. Thus Bob Cooper, chair of the Fair Employment Commission, is not sure Therefore, parity of esteem is “first to be that parity of esteem has a single treated equally by the law, to be equal meaning. culturally, to be treated fairly in all such Mr Cooper however believes that it things as employment, in all such things means that “one community is not re- as answerability to the courts and above garded as inferior to the other”, and that all else to be treated fairly in human a community’s fears and aspirations are relationships”. respected, so that “each community be- As far as Dr Henry Allen, outgoing haves decently to each other”. In his opin- moderator of the Presbyterian Church in ion, “some of the old inequalities, not all Ireland, is concerned, parity of esteem of them”, disappeared with the original similarly “should mean the respect of, civil rights agenda—unfairness in the al- and acceptance of, each other, regardless location of houses, unfairness in alloca- of differences”. So far, so unproblematic. tion of jobs, unfairness in electoral But Dr Allen believes that parity of systems. But the psychological dimen- esteem has been “hyped up politically” sions of the conflict remain, the “aspects and he warns how the concept has be- of how each community looks at the come something of an intercommunal other”. cudgel rather than a shared aspiration: Dr Mari Fitzduff, outgoing director a phrase to be “bandied about ... and it of the Community Relations Council, has really has almost little or no meaning ... a rather different brief from that of [T]here is the danger that people can Mr Cooper—a focus on intercommunal

46 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 relationships, rather than intercom- identity. Ultimately, this means that all munal differentials. And the concern for institutions in Northern Ireland “must parity of esteem has been associated with recognise the diversity that is real in this the latter, not the former. community, and not overcompensate un- It is thus not surprising that Dr duly in recognising one and disregarding Fitzduff manifests some ambivalence the other”. But Mr Loughrey recalls a about the idea of parity of esteem: policeman telling him that road accidents

When you talk about parity you talk about were seldom caused by actions, rather two flags, you talk about two anthems ... reactions: “It is when we swerve to avoid and I think some people are going to try something that we have a crash and ... I and use it like that. But the reality is that think society at the moment is in danger in all of our different districts we vary in of over-correcting, and creating aliena- our numbers and strengths ... so I don’t tion and unease by over-correction, and think it is as simple as 50/50, split it down we should, in our attempts to correct so- the middle in terms of our actions or sym- ciety, be more patient.” bols ... That’s not the way we are in our Popular culture—in its male-domi- communities, so I worry about the word nated form—when not about TV, is often ‘parity’. about sport, again highly charged in Patrick Loughrey, as controller of BBC Northern Ireland, given its associations Northern Ireland, is acutely sensitive to with communal antagonism. Eamon how the corporation in Northern Ireland McCartan, of the Sports Council of North- faces questions of ‘balance’ wholly more ern Ireland, is thus again highly con- exacting than elsewhere in the UK. Along- scious that the issue is not only inequality side UTV, of course, BBC provides the most but also division. Mr McCartan thinks widely consumed source of cultural im- parity of esteem must mean that both ages in Northern Ireland and therefore sections of Northern Ireland’s divided its output is at the heart of the parity of community recognise the value and esteem debate. His comments are thus worth of each other “and it is about the notable for their stress on mutuality and actual living of the statement”. gradualism. For him, sport is first and foremost a Mr Loughrey argues that for there to social activity: be parity of esteem there has to be “rec- So if we live in a divided society, which is ognition, mutual recognition, and mutual divided by symbols and a whole host of regard” of each tradition’s culture and other things, then … I believe you will

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 47 Morethansportsupported over the heads of Northern Ireland’s elected representatives. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that this ‘democratic deficit’ is unsatisfactory in terms of liberal-democratic norms of accountability and participation and so the London and Dublin governments, as well as the international community, support efforts to assuage that deficit via new constitutional arrangements, if such could be established through inter-party dialogue. The views of party spokespersons are therefore important for two reasons, albeit neither as immediate as for those with their hands on government or exercising agentised authority. Firstly, if they are unable to generate a common dis- have that in sport. And that is not to put a course which can adequately address qualitative judgement on it, whether that questions of pluralism and parity of es- is a good or bad thing. I think it [sport] teem, they will by definition be unable to will be a mirror image [of society]. I think arrive at a macro-constitutional deal. [Nelson] Mandela has been quoted as say- Secondly, if they were to prove incapable ing ‘there is no such thing as normal sport of dealing with the working out of these in abnormal society’, so therefore it de- issues in government, then any such deal pends which premise you come from. If you would be vulnerable to shocks and early come from the premise that Northern Ire- collapse. land is an abnormal society, then obviously sport will have an abnormal element ... Jonathan Stephenson argues that his We are an abnormal society, we are a di- party, the Social Democratic and Labour vided society, for better and/or for worse. Party, seeks parity, or equal treatment, for the “two traditions in Northern Ire- he various measures taken over the land”—in employment opportunities, so- period of direct rule to try to amelio- cial and human rights, and political T rate intercommunal divisions and in- rights, as evidenced in political institu- equalities have largely been introduced tions. Although the phrase itself has

48 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 achieved prominence in political dis- British government ... [and] have lived course in recent years, Mr Stephenson to all intents and purposes in a system identifies the underlying connotations in which discriminates wholesale against the civil rights movement and the “dis- them—discriminates against them in parity of esteem” which existed in almost terms of their identity and their culture”. every area of public life in Northern Ire- Thus the republican conception is that land in the late 60s—perhaps an inter- this is an issue of power, perceived as esting reminder, in contrast to the rather ultimately stemming from the ‘British past-tense reference to civil rights by Bob presence’ but manifested most evidently Cooper, of the longevity of the sense of in loyal-order parades: “Because these grievance in the Catholic community. marches [controversies] are really not In local government, Mr Stephenson about just routes ... these Orange parades wants to see parity of esteem given insti- and Apprentice Boys parades essentially tutional recognition through the sharing are about equality, about respect and I of the symbolic posts such as mayor and think that in their own way they sym- deputy mayor. He points to the SDLP’s bolise the core of the problem in this so- record in sharing out such posts in coun- ciety. And basically what it comes down cils where it holds majority sway. Insti- to is that one section of people in this tutional expression, however, of parity of state want to lord over another section esteem at a regional, or archi-pelagic, and Drumcree and the lower Ormeau and level—as against in local government— Garvaghy Road is what this conflict is may, however, raise more difficult issues, really all about.” as subsequent discussion indicates. Ian Paisley Jnr, of the Democratic From a Sinn Féin perspective, Jim Unionist Party, takes a wholly contrary Gibney prefers to speak about “equality view, however, decoding parity of esteem of treatment”—a clear hint of the concern as the alienation of the Protestant com- within the republican constituency that munity: “[T]he community is conditioned parity of esteem should be more than to think that it means equality, but I warm words, that it should have real, think the political meaning is quite sim- material significance. For Mr Gibney, it ply the alienation and the lowering of concerns the plight of “people who in British and Ulster identity and the el- this state are Irish nationalists, or Irish evation of a nationalist identity.” nationals living in this state against Observing from his party standpoint their wishes under foreign occupation by the changes which have taken place

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 49 under direct rule, Mr Paisley detects this and that should include liberty to express process in the actions of government, his own cultural and ethnic preferences”. quangos and certain institutions—for But, in a comment perhaps again re- example the removal of God Save the vealing the impasse towards which the Queen from graduation ceremonies at equation of liberal democracy with ma- Queen’s University, the suggestion that joritarianism can lead, Mr McCartney the name of the Royal Ulster Constabu- says: lary should be changed or that the ‘royal’ [G]radually I came to realise that what should similarly be dropped from the they [nationalists] mean by ‘parity of es- Royal Courts of Justice, and the number teem’ is not parity of esteem for the indi- of visits to Northern Ireland by the re- vidual but parity of esteem for the public’s president, Mary Robinson. He in- constitutional identity of the state. I don’t terprets all these as being “designed to know of any democracy which says that condition people here to just accept ... the minority shall be allowed the same [that] nationalism has to be elevated rights as the majority in determining the while unionism’s identity, not so much constitutional and political identity of the [its] politics but ...[its] identity, has to be state itself, [for] that seems to me to be a concept that has got nothing to do with denigrated”. civil rights, protection of individual rights This view is shared by many union- or protection against majoritarianism ... ists. Initially, when Bob McCartney, leader of the United Kingdom Unionist Jeffrey Donaldson of the Ulster Union- Party, heard the term ‘parity of esteem’ ist Party interprets parity of esteem in a he could not understand what all the con- similarly hyper-political way—from the troversy was about, since he considered other side of the divide—to the fashion himself a pluralist, and he believed in of Mr Gibney of SF. For Mr Donaldson, it ‘parity of esteem’ for every individual. He is a phrase developed by nationalists to believed there should be equality of eco- mean that the “Irish nationalist minor- nomic and employment opportunity, ity in Northern Ireland should have equality before the law and equality of equality in terms of their treatment, in educational opportunity—in other words terms of their identity and their involve- that “every citizen, regardless of his own ment in political institutions”. And he specific political aspirations or ambitions, makes the equal but opposite linkage to should be entitled within the state to British jurisdiction: have all the same rights as everybody else Now that is where unionists, and I as a

50 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 unionist, encounter difficulty with this means for me ... is ... respecting someone idea of ‘parity of esteem’ because I think else’s opinion.” [of] parity of esteem ... and the idea of an David Adams of the Ulster Democratic ‘Irish dimension’ as in fact being ... a po- Party similarly defines parity of esteem litical ruse for arguing for the creation of as “total equality across the board” and all-Ireland or north-south institutions, the “particularly in the Northern Ireland purpose of which would not be to encap- situation equality as regards people’s sulate the Irish dimension so much as to treatment and respect for people’s reli- create a dynamic towards the ultimate creation of some sort of political entity that gion ... their political views ... [the right] embraces the whole of the island ... There- to pursue their political views by peace- fore when nationalists talk about parity ful means ... [and the right] to practise of esteem ... [it] is in fact about the dimi- their religious beliefs”. He recognises, nution of the British identity of Northern however, that what is seen as a gain for Ireland, and the British identity held very one side is seen as a loss for another, “so dearly by the unionists in Northern Ire- we have almost moved to a position now land, [so as] to elevate the Irish dimen- where both nationalists and unionists sion to the point where political structures call for parity of esteem. Both Protestants created to accommodate that Irish dimen- and Catholics talk in terms of getting a sion in fact actually lead towards the at- raw deal in comparison to the other side, tainment of the political objectives ... of so it’s very much a winners-and-losers Irish nationalists. situation. Whereas, to my mind, parity Concerns with a raft of other inequali- of esteem is not about winners and los- ties—notably class—seems to lie behind ers: it is about everyone being winners.” the notably more relaxed attitudes of the ‘fringe’ loyalist parties to parity of esteem. hile most people in Northern Ire- Billy Hutchinson of the Progressive Un- land assume parity of esteem is ionist Party thinks of it in terms of “equal W reducible to relations between citizenship”. And while considering par- Protestants and Catholics, Mr Adams ity of esteem to be “about recognising the points out that there are also growing mi- people outside of your own culture and norities of Chinese, Indian sub-continent political group”, he wants to see equal and travelling people in Northern Ire- treatment irrespective of class, creed or land. This is an important point, not only sexual orientation, at all levels of the for the minorities concerned but also in community: “what parity of esteem terms of the issue flagged in chapter one

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 51 of the fear of consolidating ‘two teams’ argues, have come to fear that if they thinking if ‘group rights’ are entrenched. adopt a high profile they will simply be- A big gain in thinking through parity of come a greater focus for racist attacks. esteem in terms of international con- Therefore, they have tried to remain ventions is that these are inherently anonymous, only alerting the police to addressed to any kind of ethnic minor- such attacks when life-threatening. Ironi- ity—not just Protestants and Catholics— cally, these appeared to intensify in the and implicitly invoke a broader wake of the republican and loyalist multi-cultural pluralism. In particular, ceasefires. they refuse any notion that there might The order, in contrast to the original be a hierarchy of group grievances—an British legislation, encompasses the ex- important worry in Northern Ireland in istence of travellers in Northern Ireland. as much as any such implication could Michael Noonan, of the Belfast Travel- be viewed as a disincentive against non- lers’ Education and Development Group, violence. insists that parity of esteem—which he Patrick Yu, of the Northern Ireland defines broadly as meaning equality of Council for Ethnic Minorities (NICEM), respect for the various cultures and eth- takes up precisely this point. Mr Yu finds nic/religious groups in Northern Ire- that in Northern Ireland “racism is al- land—“has to be translated into policies ways the issue at the bottom of the pile”, and guidelines ... if it is to be anything and he claims that ethnic (in the narrow other than an empty phrase”. And even sense of racial) minorities in the region if in theory now protected, Mr Noonan have low self-esteem because of the rac- points out that the traveller lifestyle ism they encounter. This is compounded “isn’t accepted as legitimate. It’s often by other hurdles, such as the language looked on as either deviant or archaic ...” barrier faced by the Chinese community. Mr Yu feels that the problem of rac- here is a further difficulty here with ism is not focused upon at all—the delay the concept of parity of esteem, even in introducing the Race Relations Order T if sensitively defined to include other might be thought to have borne that ethnic minorities in Northern Ireland. out—and, indeed, that many people be- For there is still an implicit hierarchy of lieve that racism does not exist in North- grievance since gender and other in- ern Ireland. Through bitter experience, equalities not readily falling under a ‘cul- Northern Ireland’s ethnic minorities, he tural’ (or violence-related) heading

52 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 remain excluded. one level, it points up the need to boost Thus Evelyn Collins of the Equal Op- the agenda inaugurated by the Policy Ap- portunities Commission, while interpret- praisal and Fair Treatment guidelines, ing parity of esteem broadly—as embracing as these do a diverse range of “treating people in the same way regard- sources of inequality, gender included, less of their background or allowing peo- sustaining at least formally a ‘parity’ be- ple the same opportunity regardless of tween them. We return to this issue in their background, or valuing differ- the conclusion. ences”—believes it “would be a very nar- At another, however, it reminds us row entity in relation to women” because that parity of esteem can neither be per- it does not recognise the particular ceived as coterminous with social equal- gendered needs of women: ity nor as exhausting all concern with That would be a very narrow definition coping with social difference. Thus, for because there are instances where equal- example, if the delay in governmental ity of opportunity is not about treating eve- response to the demand for race relations rybody the same because it doesn’t legislation in Northern Ireland was recognise that people have different start- highly regrettable, there has been essen- ing points. So, for example, you can’t treat tially nil response to the demands by the a pregnant woman in the same way you EOC NI for reform of equal opportunity law. would treat a man because men don’t get While it is true that the latter issue has pregnant and so on and the [industrial] been related to wider UK arguments, it is tribunals got themselves terribly mixed up nevertheless again suggestive that, sotto in the 80s about that. So I think the sim- voce, a hierarchy of inequalities/differ- ple concept of equal treatment is some- ences is indeed taken for granted in times not that easy in relation to equality issues. What you are looking for ... is reality. equality of outcome ... and that is different from equality of treatment ... You can rom all these interpretations of what say quite easily we treat everybody the parity of esteem means, it can be seen same knowing quite deliberately it will F that there is agreement that it should disadvantage one community or another embrace mutual recognition of, and re- ... Equality of outcome is actually differ- spect for, the culture of other traditions ent—that is a much more serious ap- in Northern Ireland. But it is already proach to equality. clear that differences of interpretation This question has no easy resolution. At bedevil the argument, even at this level

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 53 of generality. And, as we move from the universal to the particular, our interviews show that any attempt to produce an atmos- phere of mutual respect and tolerance for the Other’s culture and identity is undermined, as we shall see, by a marked reluctance to accept the allegiance or identity of the Other as defined by the Other. DD

54 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 British? Irish? Or what?

n Northern Ireland, one of the more which are unique to Northern Ireland”. common perceptions is that the Prot- But as far as his ‘Britishness’ goes, he I estant community’s predominantly perceives it in terms of the “British way unionist identity is confused and incoher- of life”: “I don’t look to see what is hap- ent, based upon an outmoded loyalty to pening in the Irish exchequer. I am in- the Protestant crown of the United terested in what is happening in the Kingdom. British budget ... interested in English David Adams (UDP) does see the domi- football teams, in television, such as Brit- nant strain within unionism as being the ish soap operas, all those things.” While Protestant religious identity, which he the “revolutionary settlement” and “our identifies with the DUP and especially its perceptions of the British constitution leader, Ian Paisley Snr. But he believes and how it operates and our contract with the way forward for unionism is to de- the British” continue to be foundation velop a secular ideology, arguing that “the stones for him, Mr Paisley also accepts very basis of Protestantism in my mind separation from Britain would be re- is the freedom to choose whatever politi- garded by unionists as “harmful in socio- cal philosophy or belief you want”. economic terms, harmful in pluralist From a different perspective, Ian Pais- terms and indeed harmful in religious ley Jnr (DUP) argues that his unionism is terms”. indeed more than evangelical Protestant- This goes beyond loyalty to crown, as ism, describing his identity as “very ec- George Patton of the Orange Order indi- lectic” and including “things which I cates. Mr Patton considers himself “a loy- choose which are British and things alist and a monarchist”, but “if push came which are Irish and things which I choose to shove and the situation arose, I can

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 55 see where we could live without a mon- “within my community ... a sense of be- archy ... [T]he monarchy is a big thing, trayal that in our hour of need we weren’t there is no doubt about that and it would having that [loyalty] reciprocated, that hurt, it would hurt but I think we would many people on the mainland didn’t survive that ... [W]e are all very proud of feel that we were actually part of the the monarchy and we are very loyal to family”. Queen and Country, but at the end of the Bob McCartney (UKUP) defines the day the presence or absence of a monar- identity of any individual as “composed chy will not decide our sense of first of all of how he sees himself in terms Britishness.” of the territory where he lives, and I see Mr Patton perceives the ‘British Isles’ the territory where I live as part of the as a natural geographical entity, which United Kingdom of Great Britain and means for him that “ultimately we are Northern Ireland, so I am a British citi- all British”. As regards northern Protes- zen by definition of territory”. And he tant culture specifically, “we are part gives a particularly worked up version English, large part Scottish and part of what, to him, that citizenship connotes:

Irish and there are other little mixes like I see myself as British because my whole Hugenots and all sorts of European in- cultural heritage is British. I was educated fluences and things. So in essence the on the basis ... as any other citizen on the Ulsterman is multi-cultural because he mainland would be. I was taught British is drawn from these various backgrounds constitutional history which I identify and he can relate to the aspects of what with. Now as a schoolboy my, if you like, might be considered British culture, Eng- military heroes were people like Nelson, lish culture and very much Scottish cul- Wellington, [Admiral] Beattie and so forth. ture.” Although Mr Patton finds British Part of that was because all the members culture hard to define, he argues this is in my family for five generations had served in the ranks of the British armed so because of its very diversity. forces—none of them I may say in the of- The unionist sense of Britishness is ficer corps ... So my background in terms also one of a shared historical experience, of my allegiances and my experiences and a sense of communion with the popula- my knowledge was very, very much Brit- tion of Britain, especially of wartime ad- ish. But even culturally in terms of ... lit- versity. The reverse of that coin is that erature: I mean I believed that while during the current ‘troubles’ there has Shakespeare belonged to the world, he was been, as Mr Patton again describes it, primarily part of my culture, he was my

56 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 nation’s first before he was given to the Standing Advisory Commission on Hu- world just as Tolstoy is a Russian … So man Rights, acknowledges that unionists my whole development, both culturally, regard themselves as being “primarily historically and socially, gives me a very, British and would have an aversion for very positive identification as being the southern Irish”. But for him union- British. ists’ Britishness “is just a label: I don’t Billy Hutchinson (PUP) similarly contends think they are British in any way in the that his Britishness was shaped by a posi- sense of the term that the other British tive identification with British cultural are regarded as British”. For Mr Lavery, and political life, albeit in more popular the difference between the British in forms. Supporting an English soccer Northern Ireland and the British in team, such as Leeds United, helped cre- Great Britain—and in this he is indubi- ate an affinity with Englishness, even to tably correct—is that “the other British this extent: “I would have gone to watch regard them [unionists] as being an Irish Northern Ireland but, I mean, basically tribe, [and] they regard the Catholics as England would be the team I would sup- being another Irish tribe”. port in the World Cup or in the European Mr Lavery describes his own identity Championships, and to this very day I as “primarily Irish, influenced obviously would be an ardent fan of England.” by Europe and the fact that I live in the There were other influences, such as the British Isles and speak English ... I think belief in British justice and the Westmin- it is a sense of pride in being Irish and ster model of government, and for Mr being pleased when Ireland gets inter- Hutchinson unionists are “very, very national recognition, in its football closely connected to England in a politi- matches, [when General] de Gaulle came cal sense”. Added to this is his sense of on his holidays here, [when] an Irish man class solidarity with fellow UK citizens, becomes a leader in Europe, when Mary and he defines his culture and identity Robinson and Ireland are seen to have “as anyone would in any working-class influence in international affairs”. He city in the United Kingdom. I am British sees his Catholicism as secondary, al- working-class ...” though he recognises that “Catholicism is obviously a part of the Irish culture ationalists are not, in the main, will and there is a long history of inter- ing to take these notions at face reaction between the Irish people N value. Michael Lavery, chair of the and the Catholic Church, not all of it

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 57 affectionate.” Jim Gibney (SF), defines his identity Archbishop Sean Brady defines his “as Irish ... It has a linguistic aspect, it Irishness as made up of various cultural has a literary aspect, it has a music as- and territorial ingredients: pect to it, it has the culture of dance, it has all of these elements which when I am an Irish man from rural Ireland. My they are taken together then make up name is Brady. I belong to one of the old Gaelic clans associated with the what we regard as the Irish nationalist Castletara area in Co Cavan, province of tradition, the Irish nationalist culture.” Ulster. I was born in the country but I have For Mr Gibney, this culture is reflected lived most of my life in the city. I am a right across the island and so is not al- Roman Catholic, layman for 20 years, ien to the way of life of unionists: he priest for another 30, and now archbishop. discounts the proposition that nat- I owe allegiance to my native parish but ionalist culture is in some way hostile or also to my native county. I am interested offensive to the Protestant community: in the Gaelic Athletic Association; I sup- “[I]t is not an exclusive culture ... it is port my club and county in competitions. embracing.” In religion I follow Jesus Christ, the way, He accepts, however—and this makes the truth and the life. his views worth exploring at greater Jonathan Stephenson, a “British-born length—that nationalists and unionists English Protestant”, identifies two need to get to know each other better: “I strands of thinking in the SDLP. There are do think that the Irish nationalists have those “who would want to see a united got to try to develop a deeper understand- Ireland in the morning in which Protes- ing of the Britishness of the unionist peo- tants would play a part and have full ple. [And] I think the unionist people expression of their civil and religious lib- have got to try and explain their case erties and everything else, but it would much better than they have when they be a unitary state”. But there are also talk about being British.” Mr Gibney has those, the much larger group in his esti- been one of the key republicans involved mation, “who would want to see them- in private dialogue with members of the selves able to realise being Irish [and] Protestant community. they would want to see that reflected in It is perhaps in this context that he the institutions of the area in which they highlights the many Irish people who live, but they wouldn’t want to ... see the have made a contribution to British soci- attainment of a unitary Irish state.” ety—literary, musical, architectural—

58 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 and that he does not see the ‘two tradi- Europe and indeed in Britain. The exer- tions’ in classically separatist terms: cise of democracy is not conditional, it is “Irish republicans, we have got to recog- universal. And we are entitled to it, the nise the British in us and the unionists people of this island are entitled to it, the have got to recognise the Irishness in people that live in the Cove of Cork, the people that live in the Ring of Kerry, the them and I think that that type of notion people that live in ... Donegal are as enti- ... is quite revolutionary if you come at it tled to a view and expression about this from a straightforward republican point part of Ireland as they are about their own of view, but nonetheless I feel that the part of Ireland ... I have struggled my en- proximity of the two islands, the inter- tire life for the reunification of Ireland, for play at a human level, the shared his- the removal of the British government’s tory of the two islands—all of this mix involvement in Ireland, so I start from that indicates clearly that there is a premise. Britishness to the Irish people, whether nationalists or unionists, and that I think The republic’s government, an official is where I believe you can map out for explains, would want to stress that na- the future a plan for negotiation, a plan tionalist definitions of Irishness have for sharing different institutions etcetera become more pluralist and inclusive in within the island.” recent years. For example, in 1994 the Nevertheless, recognising the taoiseach, John Bruton, organised a re- Britishness of unionists does not, even membrance day ceremony in Island- for a liberal republican like Mr Gibney, bridge, a deliberate show of sensitivity extend to allowing unionists to remain to the British military tradition in Ire- within the UK. In a mirror image of Bob land. The government argues that there McCartney’s still-majoritarian liberal has been evolution over the last ten years unionism, Mr Gibney regards unionists in southern attitudes towards unionists, as a national, or ethnic, minority within with a very clear sense emerging that the Irish nation. The island of Ireland nothing can be achieved without the remains for him an unproblematic unit agreement of the latter. Unionists are of ‘self-determination’: perceived as representing a tradition Ireland and the people of this island, what- which is very coherent and clear in its ever their allegiances, are entitled to the objectives, and Dublin cannot conceive of exercise of a democracy in exactly the a future in Northern Ireland which does same way as other people in western not reflect their values.

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 59 ut unionists remain as wedded as Mr Stephenson argues, as he feels un- republicans to a right to ‘self-deter- ionists and republicans would like to ig- Bmination’, while contesting of course nore them, with one side saying ‘Dublin what the unit of self-determination has no say in the affairs of the north; should be—in their case, Northern Ire- Dublin is the capital of a foreign country’ land. Within one of the focus groups for and the other saying ‘if the British would this research, a republican sympathiser only leave and take their troops with asked what objections unionists would them, we Irish can settle it ourselves’. He have to a united Ireland, if their religious supports the SDLP’s view, which “is essen- rights and economic position were guar- tially to arrive at arrangements to share anteed. To this, Billy Hutchinson replies: these counties”. “I’m British and Irish … I’m British ... His criticism is also aimed at those irrespective of economic rights or civil or unionists, such as Ian Paisley Jnr, who religious liberties ... [T]he reality is that do not accept that northern nationalists we live in the United Kingdom ... and I form a constituent part of an Irish na- would say to them [republicans] that tion extending beyond the borders of the there is not a border in the world that republic into Northern Ireland. Mr Pais- isn’t artificial.” ley considers “the idea of the Irish David Adams argues that Northern diaspora as a joke” and argues that the Ireland has a right to self-determination southern Irish have rejected northern on the grounds that it has been in exist- nationalists. ence for over 75 years, and he rejects the He says to nationalists that the flags notion of a ‘natural’ geographic unit. Mr and symbols of the UK “belong to every- Adams criticises republicans for wanting one and there should be a claiming of “to go back to 1916 or 1920 ... [to] wipe those flags and symbols by the national- the slate clean ... In the real world that ist community ... the Union Jack is part doesn’t happen, what you do is you start of this. First of all it is the national sym- where you are...” bol and it is not exclusively mine as a For Jonathan Stephenson, the SDLP unionist: it is everyone’s, and maybe the offers the best vehicle towards achieving reason why the Union Jack is used so a political settlement in Northern Ireland much by unionists is because there is a as it recognises the very clear divisions failure by nationalists to claim it as their of national identity within Northern Ire- own.” land. These divisions can not be ignored, Mr Paisley insists upon the “British-

60 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 ness of the minority community”. By this, Gibney believes that it is “really only he means since 1920 you get this ‘we are British’ whether the nationalist community like from the unionists”. to accept it or not they are British and they It was this sense of British ‘national’ are British as much as in those things consciousness among unionists which which make me British, in other words our clearly separated unionists from nation- way of life. Let’s face it, the political things alists in our interviews. Among those that happen here happen because of a Catholics and nationalists interviewed, British direction ... whether it is socio- and amongst participants in the focus economic policy or whether it is political groups, it was evident that Britishness policy ... was almost exclusively a unionist con- In a similar vein to Mr Stephenson, Terry cept, in terms of a positive association. Carlin, Northern Ireland officer of the Irishness, on the other hand, was an iden- Irish Congress of Trade Unions, reacts tity common to both unionists and na- against the violence of the Provisionals: tionalists. But this is deceptive: in “I’m bitterly anti-Provo, and when I go Northern Ireland, Irishness is a highly abroad and you have to fill in your na- contested identity, with fundamentally tionality ... I ... usually put ‘Northern Ire- different perceptions between national- land’. I don’t say Northern Irish, I don’t ists and unionists which have profound say British, I don’t say Irish, I just say implications for definitions of allegiance Northern Ireland.” He does this “because and group membership. this is the place where I was born and Unionists describe themselves as pri- reared, and lived in, and I am anxious to marily British and, although this does try and promote relationships between not exclude a supplementary Irish iden- the peoples of this place and the republic tity, the latter is firmly subordinate to a and ... Britain.” sense of belonging to a British ‘national’ Jim Gibney, however, is as reluctant community. For unionists, their ‘imag- to concede a durable sense of Britishness ined community’, or nation, extending be- to unionists as Mr Paisley is to recognise yond the confines of Northern Ireland, is a wider sense of Irishness. For him, un- Britain, regardless of whether other ele- ionists, primarily, are part of the Irish ments of Britishness—such as the nation, and the “Irish national identity Scots—accept this in preference to a pri- ... is ... close ... to everyone on this island, mary Scots nation. For Irish nationalists, irrespective of their allegiance”. Mr their imagined community, extending

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 61 beyond Northern Ireland, is that of the am Catholic and reformed. In purely po- Irish nation as a distinct political com- litical terms I live in a part of the United munity. For many unionists, Irishness is Kingdom but in cultural terms I see my- more akin to a regional patriotism. self very much as being identified with a Ulster unionist identity is thus di- part of the island of Ireland.” verse and multi-layered, particularly Lord Eames thus sees himself as be- perhaps for those church leaders presid- ing a citizen of the UK, with the allegiance ing over all-Ireland institutions. This is that that involves, but also as being part illustrated by Dr Henry Allen: of the island of Ireland. He is convinced that people in Northern Ireland have to I’m British with Protestant and the dis- stop returning to the ‘us and them’ syn- senter background ... I am an Ulsterman and ... I would have an affinity with being drome, and he believes the ‘new Europe’ Irish because I am born in the island of is gradually eroding the idea of national Ireland, in the Ulster part of it ... I have a identity. For him, Britishness is a posi- great love for this island of Ireland, a great tive identification in a political sense with love for its people and in my position, I being part of the UK: am a member of a church which is a I see a greater affinity with Scotland and church, the Presbyterian Church in Ire- Wales obviously in that sense than I would land, not the Presbyterian Church of Ire- with England, but I also feel that you have land, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, got to separate the purely political aspi- which means that we have outreaches and ration of that from the cultural. Politically we have congregations right throughout I would see myself in United Kingdom the length and breadth of this land and I terms, culturally I am very conscious of am very proud of that ... the Celtic tradition ... I would see myself Archbishop Eames was unusual among in cultural terms very easily identified interviewees from among the majority with what a Welshman and a Scotsman would see as terms of their culture because community, in that he went so far as to of my Celtic link. I call Wales, Scotland place a greater emphasis upon his the Celtic fringe. I can see that much more Irishness than Britishness, while still clearly than I can with the identity of describing himself as British-Irish: “I south of the Watford gap ... I am not liv- see myself as Irish, I see myself as living ing on the mainland of England, I am liv- in that part of Ireland which for histori- ing on the island of Ireland, I am living cal reasons is still part of the United among a people, and minister and work Kingdom ... [I]n purely religious terms I and try to lead a people who are unsure of

62 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 their own identity because they have this in a positive way: dilemma of British-Irish. I see the British nation as being a very Bob McCartney, on the other hand, rep- diverse nation ... [W]ithin that nation resenting North Down in Parliament, has you’ve got the Scots, the Welsh, the Eng- a far greater psychological attachment to lish and the Irish, some people prefer to a British state patriotism than a cultural say the Ulster people, but ... if you look at sense of Irishness: “I don’t see myself as the symbols of the British state, look at Irish in that sense at all. Indeed, when the Union Flag, it includes the cross of St Patrick ... I do not believe there is a con- one talks about what makes you Irish, tradiction between having a regional iden- certainly historically you were not Irish tity in that sense, because the British in a classical sense unless you are both nation is the United Kingdom and there- Gaelic and Catholic.” For him, Irishness fore that recognises that in fact there were is a territorial or geographical identity, ... originally [separate] kingdoms ...which similar to a Yorkshireman’s regional iden- made up what became known as the tity, while his Britishness is bound up United Kingdom. with the sense of belonging to a British Mr Donaldson thus sees his Irishness in ‘national’ community. And, like Mr Pais- a regional, rather than a national, con- ley, he doesn’t see preference coming into text and he recognises that it is here the it: gulf with nationalists lies: If ... simply the geographical accident of your birth is to determine the nature of Irish nationalists argue that the Irish na- your political identity, then one can say if tion ought to be united as one political you are born in Ireland you are Irish— entity on the island of Ireland, and that is whether it be northern Irish or southern where I differ. I believe that it is possible Irish is neither here nor there. But if you to be Irish and British, or Ulster and Brit- apply the litmus paper of which state has ish, and that in fact they [nationalists] real and actual sovereignty over the area were once part of the British nation they in which you live, then you are very clearly opted out of. But they cannot, on the other British. hand, impose the idea of the Irish nation upon those of us who see ourselves as part In terms of his British-Irish identity, of the wider British nation. So, politically, Jeffrey Donaldson (UUP) similarly insists I think that is where the fundamental dif- that “I would see myself first of all as be- ference lies and I accept that Irish nation- longing to the British nation”. And he alists aspire towards the integrity of the would perceive his British nationalism Irish nation, apart from and separate from

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 63 the British nation, whereas I believe that Donaldson’s contention that Irishness as I can be part of the British nation and still defined by nationalists is the key factor have my own regional identity. making it difficult for unionists positively

Billy Hutchinson (PUP) agrees with Mr to express their sense of Irishness. But he nevertheless takes a somewhat more relaxed view: “I feel that we shouldn’t exclude things that are Irish because they are Irish, and I think that is what we tend to do.” In a similar fashion, David Adams (UDP) argues: “I think we have to recognise that we are Irish, we are also Brit- ish and at the present time the majority of the people in Northern Ireland wish to remain part of the United Kingdom, but there is a large, substantial minority who wish to have close relationships with the republic.” Not all unionists, however, accept that they have any Irish identity. In a poign- ant indication of how the gulf has wid- ened during the ‘troubles’, George Patton of the Orange Order describes himself as Ulster-British:

Eighty-five, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, I think was a defining point and a turning point in who we are because at that stage I personally, and a lot of people that I would know and associate with, would have stopped using the term Irish alto- gether. I would no longer consider myself even to be Northern Irish: I’m an Ulster- man and I am British ... We can never turn Thinkingmultinationally,actingregionally the clock back, but back in the 60s it

64 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 probably would have been easier to even- the people of Great Britain. They defined tually convince my community that our their Britishness in a similar vein to that future was in a 32- county Ireland. In the expressed in the interviews—directly re- foreseeable future that is not going to hap- lated to an historical communion forged pen because of the emotional aspects of through experience of great shared his- the terrorist campaign ... [I]t is a sense of torical events, such as the two world ‘we cannot betray what has happened to wars. For many of the older members of a lot of our people’. the focus groups, the second world war he discussions in the focus groups on remained a vivid memory. identity closely reflected many of the Against this were counterpointed the T points raised by the interviewees, in- Easter rising—when Ulstermen died at dicating that the latter were representa- the Somme the same year—and the neu- tive of wider community feelings. It was trality of the then Free State during the also apparent that concepts of identity, second world war. Confusion was felt at particularly national identity, cut across the apparent lack of reciprocal empathy age, class and gender lines. shown by Britain in protecting ‘fellow Within the Protestant focus groups, Britons’ in Northern Ireland from attacks and among the Protestants in the youth from within and without. This, it was felt, focus group, there were both definitions produced a sense of siege and abandon- of Britishness in terms of an ethnic Prot- ment among Ulster Protestants, and pre- estant identity, closely related to the vented many of them feeling confident in crown being Protestant, and a sense of reaching out across the sectarian divide. being part of a British ‘nation’. But it was Yet this recognition of apparent rejection also argued that Protestantism was not by the population of Great Britain did not an essential component of unionism, nor appear to dilute Protestants’ attachment unionism a necessary part of the Protes- to the UK. They rejected Irishness as de- tant community. Some Protestants com- fined by the political ethos of the repub- pletely rejected any sense of Irishness, lic, perceived as Catholic, Gaelic and preferring to define themselves as mem- republican. bers of an Ulster ‘nation’, although most Expression was given to the lack of accepted some form of Irish identity, usu- self-confidence which persists about Prot- ally ‘Northern Irish’. estants’ sense of identity. The main prob- All the Protestant participants lem centred on the relationship between exhibited some sense of community with notions of Britishness, Irishness and

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 65 Ulsterness. This dilemma did not appear Ireland, which was also defined as what to be one generated by the members constituted the Irish nation. Since the na- of the groups—who appeared confident tion extended to the whole of the island, and certain of what their cultural iden- nearly all Catholics, including those who tity was; rather, it was a lack of self- did not classify themselves as support- confidence in defending their cultural ers of SF, expressed difficulty in under- identity, when compared with other defi- standing unionist descriptions of nitions presented by actors external to Britishness. the Protestant community. Unionists were described as a ‘na- This was particularly the case with tional minority’; partition by the British the notion of being British and Irish, for government had enabled an ‘artificial’ although many Protestants felt British majority to be elevated to a position of and Irish it was difficult to express this dominance. There was a general belief in terms of a geographical entity. Other among Catholic participants, including actors focused on the territorial unity of those who acknowledged the Britishness the island of Ireland, whereas to describe of unionists, that unionists primarily oneself as British and Irish entailed a sought to create and perpetuate a Prot- map image of Great Britain and an am- estant ascendancy. A theme of these fo- putated segment of the island of Ireland. cus groups was the belief that unionists Ironically, while some Protestants were unwanted by the population of Brit- complained that nationalists denied un- ain, and this made them less British ionists the right to be British, it was a than the inhabitants of the neighbour- feature of the focus groups that other ing island. Protestants denied that nationalists had This sense of Catholic Irishness was, a different national identity. Catholics however, not limited to the geographical living in Northern Ireland were perceived definition. Others within the focus groups by such participants as British citizens defined Irishness in terms of the unique who should give allegiance to the state; culture of Ireland’s past, particularly its as one person expressed it, “Catholics are language and traditional music. None British whether they like it or not.” described their national identity as Catholic members of the focus groups ‘Ulster’. To Catholics, the term Ulster clearly identified themselves as Irish. refers to the nine-county province, a pro- The central element in this definition vincial consciousness reinforced by cross- was that they were born on the island of border contacts in numerous arenas, such

66 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 as Gaelic football, where the nine-county away from a primary allegiance to Brit- unit is recognised. The unionist notion ain and replace it with a primary alle- that the Northern Ireland problem was giance to Ireland. This was to be an a territorial conflict between states was evolutionary process, without coercion rejected by Catholics in the focus groups, and utilising self-interest, accomplished on the basis that the border was an arbi- via co-operation in north-south bodies. trary division which did not recognise that most Catholics belonged to the Irish his chapter has explored, particularly nation. with the party-political interviewees In this context the demand for parity T and focus group members, what no- of esteem, whether cultural or institutions of Britishness and Irishness, alle- tional, was made on the basis that Catho- giance and identity mean to unionists lics in Northern Ireland should enjoy and nationalists. And there are modestly equality in all respects: it was suggested encouraging pointers, such as Jonathan that a group constituting more than 40 Stephenson’s attempt to steer a middle per cent of the region’s population could course and the relative moderation of the not be considered a ‘minority’. Greater loyalist ‘fringe’ parties. recognition of Irishness was no more than But, overall, the conclusion has to be the right of nationalists to have their a dispiriting one. What this closer scru- culture treated equally and to see this tiny shows is that general favour of the expressed in all the institutions of the notion of parity of esteem in the round state. While remaining nationalists and comes close to disintegrating when one wishing to see a united Ireland, this was explores the particular senses of self a long-term aim; what was important for which seek recognition. For not only is a the present generation was to see that gulf of mutual understanding evident: their cultural identity had sufficient amongst the more ‘extreme’ interviewees expression. and focus group participants there is in Strong north-south bodies were per- reality not even an acceptance of the ceived as required in order to give right- right to espouse a contrary allegiance or ful expression to this identity. Those identity. The most determined protago- Catholics who recognised the British- nists still operate with a concept of plu- Irish identity of unionists also put par- ralism so narrow as in fact to delegitimise ticular emphasis on what they saw as the their adversaries’ conceptions of their long-term potential to wean unionists social worlds.

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 67 The next chapter takes this scrutiny to an even more concrete—and demanding—stage. How, in the views of our respondents, should parity of esteem be materially expressed? What institutional form(s) should it take? DD

68 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 Feeling institutionalised

uch of the debate about negotiat- until everything is agreed’ formula. Mr ing the future of Northern Ireland Stephenson looks to the future and the M is in essence about how an equi- positive impact of power-sharing in build- librium between the two main religious ing trust between the people of North- communities, consistent with freedom ern Ireland—speculating that some and equality for all—and not excluding decades ahead a shift might occur in the other forms of citizen identity—can be political landscape, with an emergent given institutional expression. social-democratic/conservative axis obvi- Jonathan Stephenson accepts that the ating the need for power-sharing. SDLP would be interested in a power-shar- Jeffrey Donaldson explains that the ing arrangement in a devolved Northern UUP’s attitude to any new governmental Ireland administration, involving com- arrangements is shaped by the fact that mittees allocated proportionately to the “firstly, we want to see, obviously as un- various political parties. He points out ionists, Northern Ireland remaining part that this was the model which almost of the United Kingdom”, as against na- resulted in agreement between the par- tionalists who want to “establish struc- ties during the Brooke-Mayhew inter- tures which will actually undermine that party talks of 1991-92, although he is constitutional status”. Within Northern keen to rebut unionist claims that the Ireland itself, the UUP would like to see SDLP backed away from agreement in administrative structures returning con- ‘strand one’, emphasising that his party trol of local affairs as elsewhere in the could not agree on internal government UK, with the various parties involved on until there had been agreement in all a basis of proportionality. In place of the three strands—the ‘nothing is agreed Anglo-Irish Agreement, Mr Donaldson

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 69 offers a bill of rights, encompassing not Mr McCartney defends his stance by only the rights of individuals but also of reference to the conventional language minority groups. Since, in addition, gov- of the post-war international order—of ernance would be on the basis of propor- territorial integrity versus self-determi- tionality, “you are not talking about a nation—which the first chapter showed return to pure majority rule”. He also was unable to resolve the conflicts envisages a requirement for “sufficient (Northern Ireland included) associated consensus”—ie across the sectarian di- with the disorder of today:

vide—on controversial matters. “What ... the basic principle after the second we will not agree to is this idea that the world war, for settling the affairs of Eu- Irish government will act as a guarantor rope, was to say that all the nations must in relation to the internal institutions of respect the territorial integrity of their Northern Ireland.” neighbours, even though their neighbours Ian Paisley Jnr (DUP) also advocates a contained significant minority elements bill of rights, though he balks at the idea coming from the country of origin. So as of minority protection as such. He rejects, far as ‘parity of esteem’ in this sense is too, the idea of any guarantor role for the concerned, it runs totally and completely Irish government vis-à-vis northern against the international principles for the settlement of such disputes that have been Catholics. For him, “An accountable de- agreed post the 1945 war. mocracy really is the key.” Bob McCartney of the UKUP has “no All shades of nationalism reject as inad- objection to cultural rights, nor have I nor equate these unionist gestures towards could I have, if I claim to be a democrat, accommodation. While nationalists agree any objection to political aspirations that there should be a bill of rights and about a change in the nature of the state”. some form of internal power-sharing, this But Mr McCartney believes that when is deemed insufficient to recognise their nationalists talk about parity of esteem, Irish identity—their sense of being part “you are now talking about an equal right of an island-wide community. National- being given to the minority to decide that ists thus seek strong north-south bodies the Republic of Ireland should have as with executive powers, and the ‘dynamic’ much executive and constitutional say mentioned in the framework documents. over the running of Northern Ireland as Unionists, conversely, prioritise the in- ... the majority has. Now this is absolute ternal government of Northern Ireland, rubbish.” want weaker north-south bodies, and

70 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 look to an east-west axis—the ‘Britannic operation, even in fairly proscribed policy dimension’—in which a Northern Ireland areas, they find that the scope of the in- assembly would have the key role, replac- tegration agenda expands quickly. Neo- ing the Anglo-Irish Agreement. functionalism is held to be inherently cumulative and dynamic:

any of the fears and aspirations of At the start, the integration process is seen unionists and nationalists are pro- as involving governments horse-trading to Mjected on to the institutional struc- conclude package deals. Deals of this kind tures proposed in the framework oblige some governments to take action on document promulgated by London and a particular matter in return for other gov- Dublin in February 1995, particularly the ernments agreeing to do something in north-south body foreshadowed there. another policy sphere. Because these re- The economist Paul Teague1 has de- ciprocal actions invariably have unin- scribed a widely-held nationalist expec- tended consequences in yet other tation that closer economic co-operation unrelated areas, governments feel com- pelled to further spread the integration between the two parts of the island will arena. After a time it is not only the po- induce unionists to shift their loyalties litical and administrative élites who are away from Britain and towards the re- engaged in the integration process, but public. As a result of this gradual proc- citizens too. The spillover dynamic, by cre- ess, the political foundations will be laid ating new centres of decision-making, will for unification. This view is best de- encourage citizens to turn away from ex- scribed as ‘rolling integration’, and it isting jurisdictions. This is largely because closely resembles the neo-functionalist their general well being will be increas- account of integration inside the Euro- ingly tied to the integration process. Even- pean Union. tually citizens are persuaded to regard the Neo-functionalism sets out to explain institutional apparatus associated with in- the process whereby political actors in tegration as representing a legitimate new separate national settings are persuaded political community, thereby rendering the old jurisdictions obsolete. to shift their traditional loyalties, expec- tations and activities from a well-estab- Teague identifies the unionist position, lished political formation towards a new by contrast, with intergovernmentalism. constitutional order. A key proposition is Cross-border co-operation organised that once different national political and along intergovernmental lines normally economic élites decide to deepen co- has two distinct features:

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 71 One is that the objective of the integra- groups, business lobbies and so on. As a tion process is not to wither away exist- result, additional support structures for ing constitutional borders, but to promote the integration process are created that peaceful co-existence between different at once legitimises cross national collabo- nations. Secondly, the institutional design ration and generates pressure for further of intergov-ernmentalism ensures that the initiatives. Overall, the integration project participating countries control the deci- is made more dynamic and less tied to the sion-making process. Thus, should any interests of governments. In the end, country disapprove of a specific proposal, dense commercial, policy and social it has the capacity to say no. In practice interdependencies emerge across fron- narrow and broad versions of intergovern- tiers. But these interactions are contained mental-ism can be found. Under the nar- inside an institutional structure commit- row version, the participating countries ted to respecting sovereign boundaries. keep a tight grip on the collaboration proc- Perhaps the best example of broad or aug- ess so that no spillover or incremental mented intergovernmentalism is the EU dynamic comes into play. Although au- itself. tonomous organisational structures can be established these normally have no strong Ultimately, a nationalist might wish to decision-making powers. Examples of nar- see the establishment of joint authority row intergovernmentalism would be the or sovereignty over Northern Ireland, Nordic Council which promotes co-opera- exercised by the London and Dublin gov- tion between the Scandinavian countries ernments and created by a neo-function- and, at the international level, the United alist process. A working illustration is the Nations. co-principality of Andorra in the eastern The broad version of intergov- Pyrenees, the oldest and most successful ernmentalism is not so tightly controlled example of condominium in the world. by the involved nations. A limited form of For over 700 years, since 1278, its has autonomy is enjoyed by the integration survived as a tiny republic between centre to pursue quasi-independent pro- France and Spain, by involving both of grammes. Moreover, a range of collabora- them in guaranteeing its liberties. Inter- tive economic and social initiatives emerge nal affairs are generally left to the An- which are associated with the formal integration project but are not under the dorran people, while foreign relations are direct control of national governments. handled by France. Thus, the intergovernmentalist structure A working example of intergovern- is augmented by the activities of interest mentalism, as unionists would prefer, is

72 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 provided by the Nordic Council. The have been unable to feel an ownership of council, founded in 1952, representing Northern Ireland, as unionists have had, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and without resort to a pan-nationalist iden- Denmark, serves as an advisory body tity extending throughout the island, and dealing with economic, social, cultural, therefore they seek expression of their environmental, legal and communica- identity through all-Ireland institutions tions affairs. Recommendations and which, while falling short of all-Ireland statements are sent to the Nordic Coun- governing institutions, offer reassurance cil of Ministers, whose formal decisions to the nationalist identity. North-south must be unanimous. co-operation, on issues such as tourism, Jonathan Stephenson argues that any agriculture, or ‘mad cows’, makes eco- political settlement cannot be internal to nomic sense as well as reassuring nation- Northern Ireland alone, and he would alists that they are “not being fobbed off” wish to “move closer to some form of joint with an internal settlement in which they authority”. And he does favour a process will always be the minority. of north-south integration, while recog- Jim Gibney (SF) quite explicitly fa- nising the right of unionists to argue for vours the ‘rolling integration’ scenario. a contrary position. Were there to be a What he finds interesting in the frame- power-sharing government, work document is the proposed north- south body: he calls for the political yes, there would still be those elements representatives of the island of Ireland within the SDLP who would push to move things forward. We would want to use that to come together in such an institution as a dynamic. We would still aspire to a and incrementally remove the British united Ireland and there would be those presence: the more institutions at a po- elements within the unionist parties who litical level on an all-Ireland basis the would wish to push things back, to move better. Mr Gibney envisages an all-Ire- it in the old direction. And those elements land economic council and harmonisation would have a right to their aspirations and of social welfare, education and health they would have a right to peacefully pur- boards and all sporting bodies. He be- sue their objectives ... I think it is now a lieves that the “more the island is united very long-term objective to most people in institutionally the easier it would be for the SDLP but it is an objective that they the people to be united in an institution would feel the right to pursue. of an all-Ireland character at some stage In 75 years, he explains, nationalists in the future”.

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 73 Unionists tend to counterpose the state cannot survive within itself, that east-west axis to north-south, with sug- there is an all-Ireland character to the gestions for a Council of the British Isles. resolution of this problem and we would Mr Gibney rejects this as “going in the say we would push that even further and wrong direction ... I think that the sover- further and further and further. eignty ... or at least the statehood that As to unionist fears: the people of the south of Ireland have I think they are right. I think that, and arrived at, and their sense of independ- they know that ... They have got to face ence ... could well be eclipsed by the no- reality. I mean David Trimble can either tion of a Council of the British Isles. But lead his people into the 20th century or ... in the context ... where we are moving he can lead them back to 1912. Now he’s towards British disengagement I think been leading them back to 1912, but he we have to look at everything.” needs to realise that the momentum is To Mr Gibney—his hopes a direct re- clearly towards all-Ireland institutions— flection of unionist worries—this process clearly towards all-Ireland political devel- of disengagement is manifest in the opments, economic developments, social Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Downing and cultural developments. That is the way it’s going ... He is not going to be able Street Declaration, and the framework to stop the changes that are on the way. document, in which there is an “Irishisation of the process”: Again in direct contradiction of unionist insistence that only an ‘internal’ settle- There is a Northern Ireland ethos at- ment can be negotiated, he believes that tached, very definitely attached, to all of an accommodation is only possible if it is these documents. So, incrementally if you taken “out of the context of the north of like, despite John Major’s remarks that Ireland ... [W]ithin the confines of the the north of Ireland is as British as Sur- north of Ireland ... I don’t think anything rey—ten years ago it was as British as is workable, I think that has [been] Finchley—despite all of these things, if proven beyond any, any shadow of doubt. you live in Surrey or you live in Finchley In the context of the island, yes, I think you don’t have all these elaborate agreements, institutions or whatever: you just that we can make accommodation with send MPs to Westminster. But the point is unionists, I think that we can make ac- that I think, incrementally, we are faced commodation with their Britishness and into a situation where more and more and that that can be reflected in the in- more the British are recognising that this stitutions in the island.” But the “Irish

74 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 nationalist aspiration for independence the economies, the markets, taxation cannot be reconciled with British sover- régimes and now even the harmonisation eignty in Ireland”. Even joint sovereignty of currencies, as it will be under the pro- or a federal Ireland would have to be con- posals in the framework documents. You sidered “as staging posts towards an all- will have harmonisation of the economies of Northern Ireland and the Irish Repub- Ireland democracy”. lic and nationalists hope that through the Aware of what he sees as its analo- harmonisation of the economy they will gous significance for Northern Ireland, create a framework within which politi- Jeffrey Donaldson sees dangers in the cal harmonisation can also take place. functionalism of the European Union. They will then be able to argue much more Looking back to the genesis of the Com- powerfully, much more forcefully that, mon Market, he points out that for many since there is economic harmonisation, the the ultimate goal was a federal European natural progression is political harmoni- state, which it was recognised was not sation. So that is why I see, as a unionist, going to be created overnight or by very real dangers in the type of proposals putting political structures in place— that are being put forward, for example, rather, the key was to be economic unin the framework documents but more ion, developed on the basis of gradualism. generally in this Anglo-Irish process which is about much more than simply giving ex- Nationalists, he claims, realised in the pression to the Irish identity—it is in fact New Ireland Forum Report of 1984 that about creating political structures and a an ‘agreed Ireland’ could similarly be political framework through which nation- achieved by a process of gradualism: “[I]t alists will be able to achieve their politi- had to be a staged process to achieve their cal objectives in the medium-to-long term. political objectives, ... a united Ireland was not going to happen overnight, it Mr Donaldson argues that most union- wasn’t going to drop out of the sky, ... they ists are in favour of north-south co-op- had to create a framework within which eration—they were not saying ‘close the they could achieve their objectives”. The border’. Instead “we are saying yes, there Anglo-Irish Agreement created this are many areas in which there is benefit framework and the framework document for both parts of the island of Ireland for set it out in more detail: both Northern Ireland and the Irish Re- the key being harmonisation, a word public to work together and co-operate which is at the heart of European inte- on matters of mutual interest, and gration ... you have got harmonisation of therefore we want to see cross-border co-

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 75 co-operation.” But unionists were “cer- strongly linked into Great Britain and tainly against the idea that you create the rest of the United Kingdom than it is north-south bodies or all-Ireland institu- in economic and social terms with the tions which will have in themselves a dy- Irish Republic.” The framework in which namic”, as proposed in the framework unionists want to see a new political document, which “actually move away agreement is first and foremost the ‘Brit- beyond the idea of co-operation and the ish Isles’—“strictly within that frame- spirit of co-operation to create the framework, not in isolation from it.” A work ... which is to ... weld the two parts prerequisite is perceived to be the re- of the island together, not just economi- moval of the republic’s territorial claim, cally but politically”. which unionists see as in contravention Unionists “do not believe, as nation- of the spirit of co-operation. alists seem to believe, that the political Ian Paisley Jnr echoes the concern entity, the framework within which such that the framework document represents co-operation can take place, is exclusively a “piece-by-piece, incremental movement all-Ireland. We believe that the proper towards a de facto unified state. Whether framework, whether you look at it in so- it then becomes legally and constitution- cial or economic terms, is in fact the Brit- ally a unified Irish state doesn’t really ish Isles as a whole, and what we want matter because everything else is there to see is a new political agreement and a ... [I]t’s Irish unity by stealth.” He claims new political arrangement is first and that there is already a process of condi- foremost a political framework which en- tioning the people of Northern Ireland for compasses the British Isles.” a shared administration, starting, for ex- Within the political framework of ample, with a common tourist policy. Mr these islands, Mr Donaldson argues that Paisley argues that there will only be there can be north-south co-operation, harmony in Ireland when there is a “rec- but again he turns to the east-west di- ognition that the border is there ... that mension: “[W]hy not Northern Ireland this is a different country”. also working with Scotland, the Irish Re- While unionist politicians are pre- public working with Wales and so on? ... pared to accept some policy ties between [T]he reality is that both the Irish Re- north and south, this is conditional on a public and Northern Ireland do the bulk narrow intergovernmental model apply- of their trading with Great Britain and ing—there being no overarching institu- that Northern Ireland is much more tions and with the Dáil and any Northern

76 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 Ireland assembly in full control. Ulti- practical expression to nationalists’ mately, the assembly would have the identity. right to withdraw co-operation. The government believes, moreover, The republic’s government rejects that the southern electorate would not many of these fears. It denies that un- support change to the articles in a refer- ionists have anything to fear from a endum, unless reciprocated by a reassur- north-south body, emphasising that if ance of another kind. It points out that they were to take part they would see no alteration of articles 2 and 3 would leave powers being conferred against their will, unionists with the constitutional cer- as any such body would have to reach tainty from the republic they have always decisions by unanimity; they would, in wanted and an assembly for Northern effect, have a veto over whether or not Ireland. The quid pro quo would be un- the body actually got off the ground. For ionist agreement to a north-south body Dublin, ‘harmonisation’ is nothing for to keep northern nationalists happy, as unionists to be alarmed about, again be- they would otherwise be destabilised by cause it is subject to unanimity, and any the change to the republic’s constitution. ‘dynamic’ would be similarly constrained. For Dublin, the key east-west rela- Unionists, they feel, are being paranoid: tionship is, and will remain, the Anglo- a north-south body would be brought into Irish Agreement, although a number of existence by a Northern Ireland assem- the functions of the Anglo-Irish secre- bly and by the Dáil, would be dependent tariat would be transferred to any new on both and would draw its authority Northern Ireland assembly: both govern- from both. ments would continue to need a struc- The republic’s government also argues tured way of consulting each other on that the framework document is predi- whatever residual functions they re- cated on constitutional change in its ju- tained. There are reservations about any- risdiction. If it is going to propose such thing, such as a Council of the British change, acceding to unionist concerns by Isles, which would apparently attempt to diluting articles 2 and 3, then northern diminish the importance of the national- nationalists have to have some sense that ist identity within Northern Ireland. their own identity will be otherwise The republic’s government argues catered for—and that compensation that its emphasis upon north-south bod- should take the form of a north-south in- ies is an attempt not to ‘Irishise’ North- stitution which would give day-to-day, ern Ireland at the expense of its

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 77 Britishness but to balance unionist and of opposition between even the ‘moder- nationalist identities, since the reality of ate’ protagonists is daunting. It must di- the unionist vision is all around in mem- rect us to the development of a new bership of the UK. It is not offering un- language for an overall settlement—a ionists an agreed Northern Ireland task in which the work of those groups within the UK for nothing. Unionists are committed to building mutual under- being asked to make concessions, but standing, to be explored next, must play then so are nationalists—the consider- a critical, long-term role. DD able concession of accepting, certainly for the foreseeable future, that a united Ire- Footnotes land is not achievable, and that they will 1 Paul Teague, ‘The European Union and the have to settle down to be contented resi- Irish peace process’, Journal of Common Mar- dents of the United Kingdom. ket Studies, vol 34, no 4, December 1996, pp 549-70

his chapter has teased out in more detail what nationalists and union- T ists envisage by parity of esteem in practice. It is clear that unionists are un- willing to break with core conceptions of sovereignty and majoritarianism—however qualified by proportionality or bills of rights—and that their focus is almost entirely internal or east-west. It is equally clear that northern nationalists refuse to ‘set a boundary to the march of the nation’, resisting internal settlements and east-west structures in favour of the north-south ‘dynamic’. Dublin’s position is more sensitive to unionist concerns, strongly hinting that a political stabilisation is possible, essentially within a UK context, if only northern nationalists’ sense of Irishness is fully accommodated. But the starkness

78 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 Reconciling a balance

econciliation groups emerged in which emphasised three objectives: (a) to Northern Ireland for the first time increase opportunities for contact be- R in 1964 but mushroomed post-69. tween Protestants and Catholics, (b) to The focus of their activities varied and encourage tolerance of cultural pluralism included addressing political issues, de- and (c) to seek to achieve equality of veloping ecumenical understanding and opportunity for all citizens. A comm- bringing children and families from the unity relations infrastructure was re- two sides together. They can be classi- established with the creation in 1987 of fied in four ways: international commu- the Central Community Relations Unit nities of reconciliation, containing groups (CCRU) within the Central Secretariat of formed with the specific intention of act- the Northern Ireland civil service, fol- ing as centres for reconciliation, such as lowed by the establishment of the North- the Corrymeela Community; local groups ern Ireland Community Relations formed in the midst of hostility; groups Council (NICRC) in 1990. formed out of the experience of violent An instance of such official recogni- bereavement; and children’s community tion was the 1989 Education Reform Or- relations holidays.1 der, with the inclusion in the new core As community-based programmes school curriculum of ‘education for mu- evolved, mainly within the voluntary sec- tual understanding’ (EMU) and a commit- tor, their influence began to be felt in such ment to promote integrated education. areas as education, youth work and com- Other initiatives have included the en- munity development. In the latter half couragement of cross-community contact of the 80s, government came to espouse between schools, the employment of an explicit community-relations policy, community relations officers in local

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 79 government and, outside government, in the Northern Ireland curriculum: EMU the anti-sectarian programmes of the and ‘cultural heritage’.3 EMU has four ob- trade union movement.2 jectives: Yet two things are evident about these • fostering respect for self and others, community-relations initiatives. The first • understanding conflict, is how long it took—two decades of in- • appreciating interdependence, and tense political violence—before govern- • understanding cultural traditions. ment responded to the challenge of Cultural heritage addresses three communal division and to innovative de- concerns: velopments on the ground. The second is • interaction, interdependence, continu- their overall failure: there is widespread ity and change; agreement amongst commentators that • shared, diverse and distinctive features Northern Ireland is now not only more of different traditions; and segregated but more polarised than ever. • international and transnational influences. lthough teachers and academics had The order placed a statutory respon- been active from the early 70s in this sibility on school governors to report an- A arena, government was more cau- nually to parents on steps taken to tious about suggestions that schools promote EMU, but there is no direct EMU should be involved with community re- assessment of individual pupils. It has lations. Its first public commitment was become clear that many schools also see a 1982 circular called The Improvement the aims being communicated less for- of Community Relations: The Contribu- mally, by the nature of relationships tion of Schools, which said: “Every within the schools, and between the teacher, every school manager, board school and the wider community. In this member and trustee, and every educa- sense, many schools claim that the aims tional administrator within the system of EMU are already implicit in their whole- has a responsibility for helping children school ethos. learn to understand and respect each While the themes are a mandatory other.” feature of the curriculum, cross- By 1989 this had been worked up to community contact with pupils of other the Education Reform Order, which speci- schools remains an optional strategy fied that two cross-curricular themes re- which teachers are encouraged to use.4 lated to community relations be included By 1994-5, 45 per cent of schools were

80 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 involved in the cross-community contact Shareddiversity—thesemusiciansdon’talltapwiththesamefoot scheme, though the Department of Edu- cation has estimated that this involved fewer than 20 per cent of primary and fewer than 10 per cent of secondary pupils. Perhaps the most dramatic development in education over the past 20 years has been the emergence of integrated schools, now attended by around 2 per cent of pupils. It is envisaged that they should be open to children from all and no religious backgrounds, but in practice schools are Christian in character and the founders, parents, teachers and managers have developed workable procedures for teaching religion. The be impossible to integrate pupils from Education Reform Order created a inner-city areas, but was generally sup- mechanism for funding them and placed portive of integrated schooling and EMU. a statutory responsibility on government David Adams (UDP) describes himself as to promote integrated education. a “great supporter” of integrated educa- Among those interviewed for the pur- tion, thinks that “on both sides of the pose of this report, there was universal community the churches have a lot to support for integrated education. Person- answer for” and argues that respect for ally speaking, Jim Gibney (SF) believes other people’s culture “has to be nurtured in multi-denominational education: from an early stage ... in the schooling “[T]he integrated schools at the moment system”. clearly are trying to have a balanced There was common complaint that, at ethos, a balanced curriculum and it is school, many of those interviewed had certainly something that I would wel- learnt nothing of their, or the other, com- come ...” Jonathan Stephenson (SDLP) of- munity’s identity. Carmel Gallagher of fered the caution that integrated the Northern Ireland Curriculum Advi- education was “not the only solution” sory Council points out that although it because without forced bussing it would was intended that a common Northern

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 81 Ireland history curriculum would provide lags and symbols are central to the a structured history of Northern Ireland, debate about parity of esteem. Bryson this is no longer the case. This compo- F and McCartney explain that while nent has been altered, giving only a snap flags have their practical uses, their pri- shot of certain events in the region’s his- mary function has always been social tory, such as the Belfast blitz and the 60s. communication. National flags in par- She would like to see a specific compo- ticular stimulate the viewer to feel and nent of the history curriculum, catering act in a calculated way. They represent for the history of the north, pre- and post- or identify the existence, presence, ori- partition. Although Ms Gallagher admits gin, possession, loyalty, glory, beliefs, ob- there is opposition from teachers being jectives and status of an entire nation. placed, as they see it, in the front line of They are empowered to honour, dishon- community relations, she argues that the our, warn and encourage, threaten and absence of any other sources of informa- promise, exalt and condemn, and com- tion about the history of Northern Ire- memorate. Flags authenticate claims, land, apart from family and peer group, dramatise political demands, establish a may be a significant factor in the repro- common framework within which like- duction of sectarian perspectives. minded nations are willing to work out Dr Mari Fitzduff, formerly of the mutually agreeable solutions—or postu- NICRC, calls on government to “face up to late and maintain irreconcilable differ- the existing educational interests and put ences that prevent agreements from a priority on integrated education”. This occurring. would involve financial incentives for Flags are a mark of identity: they schools who “will take on board the inte- identify ourselves, they identify others grated school ethos ... I would be happier and they provide a sign around which with a situation where you actually had people can gather. As well as being a dis- to be financially penalised for keeping an tinguishing mark, they are also a sym- exclusive [single religious] school”. While bol of identity in a more emotional and endorsing EMU, Dr Fitzduff stresses that psychological sense—a symbol through in a shared educational environment which one expresses one’s loyalties and “you learn contacts and you learn net- allegiances. Symbols become simple rep- works that actually go away beyond resentations of group identity. They can schooling”. be unifying, but only for those who want to identify with the group. They not only

82 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 express a sense of belonging, but they can Britain is being weakened. For unionists, play a more active part in encouraging the symbols of the Irish state are seen as it, particularly when they are used as irredentist and threatening and union- part of some ceremony. They help to cre- ists would prefer them to be controlled. ate a sense of occasion and highlight the On the other hand, when nationalists importance of an event, and in turn they see the British flag, or hear the anthem, are honoured by being included in a spe- they also do not see them as represent- cial function.5 ing the people or territory of the UK. Like Bryson and McCartney argue that unionists, they are more aware of them both unionists and nationalists treat as symbols of the state. Unlike unionists, British and Irish symbols as represent- nationalists do not have the same benign ing the institutions of the state, not the view of that state. For them it is an or- people or the territory, although they may der imposed within Ireland, in a most not articulate this distinction, or perhaps hostile form, and is seen as an imperial- even recognise it consciously. For unionist system. ists it is the institutions of the state which Not all nationalists share the degree are important. The British national an- of hostility republicans display towards them and the Union flag represent the the British state. Some are willing to re- state institutions which exercise sover- spect the symbols, though they tend to eignty over Northern Ireland, and feel they are overused and unnecessary thereby provides a sense of security in on many occasions. But all nationalists the face of the perceived risk of the unifi- have a sense of Irishness, whether or not cation of Ireland. they want the early reunification of Ire- Unionists are often told that British- land. An important expression of identi- ness is not a real identity, that there is fication is the Tricolour and the anthem. no British nation, that Britishness is an On the other hand, many nationalists do expression of citizenship. But this, say aspire to a united Ireland, and would Bryson and McCartney, misses the point work for that goal. They share some of of what unionists want from their the émigré sense of attachment to the Britishness—citizenship in the sense of symbols of the motherland: the exile may identification with the institutions of the be able to return home; the colonial sub- state. For a unionist, if the Union flag is ject may see the country become free. not flown, or the national anthem is not Divisions within Irish nationalism are played, it is a sign that the link with reflected in the differing perspectives of

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 83 Jonathan Stephenson and Jim had to date, a British state imposed upon Gibney. Mr Stephenson has “no problem a community which does not want that with the Union Jack on public buildings”, state to be here. but “I do have a slight problem with it on For the republic’s government, one of the kerb stones ... because that’s dogs mark- successes of the Anglo-Irish Agreement ing out territory”. was the repeal of the Flags and Emblems Mr Gibney argues that until such time Act, allowing the Tricolour to be flown as the constitutional future of Northern more frequently. It suggests that atten- Ireland is resolved, northern nationalists tion could be paid to the use of flags at should be treated with “respect ... integ- police stations and court houses, favour- rity and ... dignity, and that needs to be ing diminished use of the Union flag and reflected in the laws of the land and in greater emphasis on neutrality. It real- symbols of the state as well”. He goes ises that it would too much to expect that further than Mr Stephenson, however, the Tricolour would be allowed to fly over calling for the removal of all symbols of state buildings in Northern Ireland, but Britishness from the Northern Ireland would wish portraits of the Queen to be state, claiming that their usage demon- removed from police stations. strates cultural discrimination against Although Dublin is conscious that it nationalists and republicans: cannot say this publicly, effectively it is We either ... seek neutral symbols, which trying to get nationalists to accept North- both communities can pledge their alle- ern Ireland as their home, providing giance to, or else, where the Union Jack them with incentives in terms of how the flies, so the Irish national flag flies along- region is administered on a day-to-day side it. The prefix ‘royal’ for example, [is] basis. It accepts this may be perceived again the symbol of one community. We as ‘Irishising’ Northern Ireland, but ar- believe you should seek neutral symbols, gues that in practice if Northern Ireland [so] there shouldn’t be ‘Royal’ Courts of is going to stay British—as its commit- Justice, the ‘Royal’ Ulster Constabulary, ment to the ‘consent principle’ implies for the ‘Royal’ Mail; all of these [symbols] ... the foreseeable future—then symbolic need to be removed and [in] this process of removing them, what you are in fact adjustment in the direction of national- doing is ... legitimising a tradition, an iden- ists is not really going to have any im- tity which has been delegitimised since pact on the constitutional status of the 1920, since this state was formed. In other region. words, a total reversal of what we have From a loyalist perspective, David

84 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 Adams cautions that if parity of esteem institutionalised political anxiety and means a complete removal of all flags and worry and fear about our future among symbols from government buildings, or the unionist community. And therefore institutions of the state, it will be “very they have become hyper-sensitive to any hard to achieve”; and as for the Tricolour symbol or indications that their Britishness is being undermined. This has flying side by side with the Union Jack, been accelerated by the other side, by the “I believe that would be impossible”. desire of extreme nationalism. Unionists do not know where the process will end and become concerned about ‘Extreme nationalism’, Mr McCartney what the future holds. He accepts that claims, has politicised its culture and many “clearly haven’t made the jump” in “they are saying, this is our culture, this recognising the Irishness of northern na- is going to be the predominant culture tionalists, but also fears nationalists, and and as we advance these cultural sym- republicans in particular, wish to have bols we are pointing out to the unionists no recognition of the “British-Protestant- this is the way it is going to go”. Ulster” culture. On the other hand, he contends, un- Rationalising the fears many union- ionists, conditioned by the uncertainty of ists have of the consequences which their political future, become increasingly might arise, following the removal of attached to the symbols which reassure British symbols in Northern Ireland, Bob them that they are British. The advance McCartney (UKUP) stresses that the de- of Catholic cultural symbols is “not seen bate over symbols and expressions of with the political confidence and assur- identity, such as over increased showing ance [with which] that would be viewed of Gaelic games on television, are “things in a state that was totally pluralist or which people like me in a pluralist soci- where the citizens were confident and ety don’t give a toss about”. However, Mr certain of their political identity. It is seen McCartney recognises that a lot of un- as a state which is under threat and ionists are paranoid, and he claims they where the advance of nationalist symbols are paranoid because, since 1921, the is very often at the expense of a reduc- British government has tion of the symbols which assured them kept them at arm’s length in a sort of that they were still British.” limbo where it would put them out if it As for Gaelic culture, many unionists, could, it would solve the Irish problem Ian Paisley Jnr (DUP) contends, “feel un- [thereby] and, therefore, it has almost comfortable whenever the Irish language

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 85 is spoken”. He feels uncomfortable, claim- Ireland since the establishment of the ing that it has been “politically hijacked state, and they continue to divide the two and [that] those who even don’t use it ... communities. [make of it a] political vehicle ... I don’t On the one hand, most unionists see identify with it, it is not mine and indeed the various institutional arrangements I have a sense that it is hostile to me.” and legislative frameworks for the main- Mr Paisley’s interaction with Catholics tenance of law and order as essential to is on the basis that “at the end of the day the preservation of the constitutional sta- we are all English-speaking”. He claims tus quo, faced with the threat of militant nationalists, including in such contexts republicanism. On the other hand, most as graduation at Queen’s University, nationalists view the same institutions should “accept the national anthem and legislation as yet more examples of because that is the nation’s national the sectarian nature of the state. From anthem”. the creation of the state, the RUC was For all the moderation of the efforts trained to perform not only the normal of the republic’s government, then, it is functions of a civilian police force, but clear that unionists feel almost univer- also a para-military role to counter the sal unease or even fear that what they threat posed by the IRA. In that role it see as symbolic expressions of their iden- was to be supported by the Ulster Spe- tity are being challenged in a zero-sum cial Constabulary, from the outset viewed unionist-nationalist game. with suspicion, resentment and even ha- tred by most Catholics. nstitutional forms of cultural expres- Following the communal disturbances sion in Northern Ireland range beyond of 1969, in 1970 the USC was replaced by I flags and symbols, particularly in the Ulster Defence Regiment and, to free terms of policing and public order. Pa- the RUC from political control, a Police Act rades remain a flashpoint, as demon- established a new Police Authority for strated during the successive Drumcree Northern Ireland, intended to be repre- disturbances, in 1995 and 1996, which sentative of the main sections of the com- brought Northern Ireland to a standstill munity. The RUC complement, previously with widespread civil unrest. Issues con- limited to 3,500, was raised, leading ul- cerning policing policies, structures and timately to a full-time force of 8,478 by practices—and the administration of jus- 1992, when there was also a full-time tice generally—have polarised Northern reserve of 3,160 and a part-time reserve

86 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 of 1,432. This increase was not, however, Northern Ireland is tilted towards the matched by increased Catholic participa- Protestant community and fails to meet tion: whereas in 1961 Catholics com- the aspiration for parity of esteem. It is prised 12 per cent of the force, this had also clear that a radical overhaul would fallen back to 7.7 per cent by 1992. be required to rise to this challenge—in- A mixed and polarised opinion has cremental change would simply be too been recorded in surveys and polls on slow and too limited. It is thus unfortu- policing. A Belfast Telegraph poll in 1985 nate that the widespread debate initiated reported that while a substantial propor- by the Police Authority under its former tion of both Protestants (59 per cent) and chair, David Cook, was not translated Catholics (43 per cent) said the RUC car- into more innovative responses after Mr ried out its duties fairly, the rest of the Cook was forced from his position by in- Protestants (37 per cent) said that the ternal dissent. RUC carried out its duties very fairly, while But there is also no doubting union- the rest of the Catholics (53 per cent) said ist sensitivities. Dr Henry Allen affirms that it carried out its duties unfairly or that unionists “at the present time ... very unfairly.6 would not want to give up the ‘Royal’ The ‘security forces’ are one of the because the ‘Royal’ to them is an assoc- largest employment sectors in Northern iation with Britishness ... I mean to Ireland, amounting in total to some start trying to go against everything 21,000 jobs. Some 11,500 are employed that is British is to me totally counter- in the RUC and some 7,500 in locally re- productive.” cruited and locally deployed units of the The policing question is itself entan- Royal Irish Regiment, formerly the UDR. gled with the major parades issue. For The remainder are employed in the pris- those who support and oppose the right ons service and publicly financed secu- of parades to follow ‘traditional’ routes, rity positions. In 1992, 87 per cent of which the RUC has to police, perceptions these employees were drawn from the of what the events symbolise differ sub- Protestant community, whereas only 7 stantially. Jarman and Bryan argue that per cent were Catholic (the remainder the formalised and routinised nature of being in many cases recruited in Britain). parades and their repetitiveness over There is thus clearly a widespread time gives the impression of social conti- Catholic perception that the institutional nuity—of tradition. As ritual events, they weight of the security apparatus in may convey a lack of change, and many

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 87 participants understand them as ‘tradi- Aughrim, which was the bloody battle of tional’, and therefore depoliticised, but the war and where it probably was more they are clearly part of the present religion than anything else. charged political situation. Indeed, it is Many unionists see attempts to reroute precisely at times of change that commu- parades as a deliberate and co-ordinated nities require certain identifications with assault on their Britishness. Billy a past to be perceived as more secure. To Hutchinson of the PUP believes the “pa- many outside the bands and orders, it rades issue is one that has been picked feels like the parades are a conspiracy to up particularly by republicans” whom he rule the streets of Northern Ireland each accuses of “a lack of recognition ... that summer, whereas to those taking part the British presence is not the Brit- each parade expresses a localised vari- ish government ... [but the] unionist ant of an increasingly disparate population”. loyalism.7 Yet much about a parade can indeed George Patton of the Orange Order be perceived as triumphalist. The ban- denies that an Orange parade is ners carry images of battles and individu- triumphalist and sees it as an expression als deemed central to the Protestant of religious and civil liberty for all North- cause. For many Catholics there is little ern Ireland’s citizens: religious about the Orange institution: it People think we remember 1690 and the celebrates and represents political victo- Battle of the Boyne because the Prods beat ries. Moreover, the order is seen in a the Taigs, which is nonsense—they didn’t. broader context: it was, and to a certain Protestants and Roman Catholics fought extent still is, part of the Northern Ire- on both sides ... There was an element of land state from which many Catholics religion in that war as there was in every feel alienated.8 war during that century and many wars The republic’s government regarded before and since, but what the Battle of Drumcree in 1996 as a devastating dis- the Boyne was all about was a system of missal of parity of esteem, arguing that government, James II, absolute power, or there has been no equivalent effort by William and Mary, willing to co-operate with Parliament ... So that is why the ‘glo- nationalists to shove their values down rious revolution’ and the Boyne which se- the throats of unionists. It regards the cured the revolution is important to me, reversal of the RUC’s original decision rather than a battle. If we wanted to be not to let the Orange parade down the triumphalist we would actually celebrate Garvaghy Road in Portadown as a

88 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 massive surrender, raising fundamental be one police service or, as the SDLP sug- questions about the institutions of the gests, comprising three or four area po- state and their attitude towards lice services with greater community Orangeism and loyalism. The episode sig- input, perhaps within an all-Ireland nalled, in Dublin’s view, that while the context. British government might make certain While recognising that “symbols are assertions about parity of esteem, when not unimportant” for him they “are not it came down to it all that unionists had the be-all and end-all”. Thus in Dublin to do was to beat the drums and those “you have the Royal Dublin Show ... and assertions of neutrality would go out the I am sure if I looked hard enough I could door. Reacting to unionist fears about the find any number of ‘Royals’ in Dublin ... cultural retreat of Britishness in North- I think I could live with something like ern Ireland, the republic’s government The RUC/Northern Ireland Police Service starts from the premise that in 1922 un- ... [with] each side calling it what it bloody ionists were given ‘a Protestant state for well wanted.” a Protestant people’, and if unionists and Jim Gibney takes a tougher view. Re- nationalists are to share the Northern hearsing the events surrounding Drum- Ireland state then there is an element of cree, he describes the RUC as a “sectarian cultural retreat involved in moving away force that regards Irish nationalists as from dominance to sharing. little more than criminals and treats For Jonathan Stephenson, the crucial them as such. So that force has to go.” SF element, especially after Drumcree, “is wants it phased out, replaced by a how this state will be policed ... civilianised, localised, unarmed policing [B]asically it is ‘their’ police force or ‘our’ service. And he insists: “You see our pri- police force, it is not an inclusive police mary demand is for the dissolution of this force.” In any political settlement, Mr state.” Stephenson argues that the police would need to be responsible to the political in- n Northern Ireland, economics has had stitutions, whether through a minister of knock-on effects on the basic political justice, in a devolved assembly, as the Idivisions. Social and economic factors Alliance Party has suggested, or through have contributed to Catholic alienation a more broadly based, democratically before, and during, the current ‘troubles’, accountable Police Authority. He also particularly in fuelling the perception wants a debate as to whether it should among Catholics of unfair discrimination.

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 89 The 1991 census revealed once again how Anti-discrimination legislation is an im- unemployment bore down heavily on the portant component in this, though here Catholic community: Catholic male un- equality of outcome is not an objective. employment was 28.4 per cent, compared In relation to particular services or fa- with 13.9 per cent for Protestants and cilities, however, equality of participation other categories; amongst women the and outcome for marginalised groups is equivalent rates were 14.5 per cent for often regarded as a desirable end and Catholics and 8.8 per cent for Protes- monitoring may be undertaken to con- tants. Evidence from other sources, such firm this is being achieved. as the Labour Force Survey, showed simi- The Northern Ireland Constitution lar results. Act of 1973 outlawed discrimination by Because of their higher unemploy- government and other public authorities ment levels, Catholics have also been on grounds of religious belief or political forced into greater dependence on state opinion. Subsequent legislation provided benefits. A 1988-91 survey found that 30 protection against religious and political per cent of Catholic families were in re- discrimination in employment (1976 and ceipt of income support, compared with 1989), on gender grounds (1976), and in 16 per cent of Protestant households. And relation to disability (1996) and race although there has been a narrowing of (1997). the income gap between Catholic and The government’s cultural traditions Protestant households in general, the policy meanwhile aims to increase under- Catholic average remains lower. standing and appreciation of all the com- For the British government, Sir David plex strands of Northern Ireland’s Fell argues that, although they can be cultural heritage. In socio-economic distinguished, the general thrust of policy policy, since 1991 government has been is to approach economic, cultural and committed to ‘targeting social need’ (TSN), political pluralism together. Neverthe- directing resources, as far as possible, less, the concepts of equality of opportu- towards areas and people objectively de- nity and equality of treatment mainly fined as being in greatest need. The relate to the economic realm. Here gov- government expects that TSN will, over ernment’s objective is to ensure all time, help erode intercommunal socio- individuals can participate, without economic differentials. suffering disadvantage by virtue of com- Since 1994, Northern Ireland de- munity background, race or gender. partments and other parts of the public

90 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 sector have applied Policy Appraisal and explored in the conclusion. Fair Treatment guidelines when consid- The Fair Employment Agency initially ering new policies or services, and review- concentrated its work on individual coming existing ones. The PAFT guidelines plaints of discrimination by employers. require departments to identify potential But relatively few complaints were made discriminatory impacts and to consider and it was very difficult to establish that whether they are justifiable. Categories there had been any direct discrimination. of potential discrimination include reli- During the 80s, the agency shifted the gion and political opinion, gender, race focus of its work to more general investi- and disability. gations of patterns of employment in sec- The government’s main political ob- tors or firms, notably the civil service. In jective remains a ‘comprehensive settle- almost all such cases it was found that ment’ which would both return greater more Protestants were employed than power, authority and responsibility to all would have been expected and that some the people of Northern Ireland, on an employer practices were failing to ensure agreed basis, and take full account of Catholics equality of opportunity. Northern Ireland’s wider relationships The results of this external monitor- with the rest of the UK and of the island ing eventually persuaded government of Ireland. Sir David and the government that more could be done by all employers believe that the policies outlined above to provide equality of opportunity if they work towards that objective by signalling were required to monitor the composition to the two main politico-religious commu- of their own workforces. A formal obliga- nities that legal and administrative tion to this effect, supervised by a mechanisms can safeguard their politi- strengthened Fair Employment Commis- cal and cultural identities within a sion (FEC), was imposed on all employers Northern Ireland context. The detail of with more than 25 employees under an such arrangements would be within the amending Fair Employment Act in 1989. scope of the talks process initiated in the The practical result is that, though summer of 1996. there are no quotas for the numbers of It has already been suggested, in the Protestants or Catholics in any work- opening chapter, that the government’s force, there is considerable pressure on constitutional project is fundamentally employers to take action to secure a rea- incoherent. The limitations of the other sonable balance. One of the major key policy planks, of PAFT and TSN, are achievements of the FEC has been to make

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 91 it no longer acceptable in business cir- Catholic schools, whereas games with cles to regard open or covert discrimina- British pedigree, such as rugby union, tion as either tolerable or unavoidable.9 hockey and cricket, predominate in many Bob Cooper, FEC chair, believes govern- Protestant establishments. There are, ment has a crucial role to play in secur- however, a group of sports—including ing parity of esteem. The commission, soccer, basketball and netball—which cut like other government agencies, is “part across the denominational split. Never- of the solution and part of the problem”. theless, simply playing a game which is In the long term, he sees fair-employment played by people in the other community legislation positively influencing Catho- counts little towards integration if it is lic attitudes to the state: “ I think that only done ‘against them’ and in the com- the bulk of Catholics sometime would like pany of those from ‘your own side’. to see a united Ireland, sometime in the Outside the school gates, a subtle future, but basically they want a decent sporting apartheid is sustained by a vast situation ... a decent economic future.” He network of voluntary organisations and accepts that the FEC is “seen by the Prot- governing bodies through which separate estant community as a threat”, as if “we community affiliation is confirmed, in are here to take jobs away from them and terms of what games are played and give them to Catholics”. He believes that watched, which teams are supported, and one of the ways in which this fear can be which clubs and societies are joined and removed is by much greater investment. patronised. Indeed, sport has developed Terry Carlin (ICTU) concurs on this last as one of Northern Ireland’s most impor- point. He wants to see a devolved gov- tant symbols of national and community ernment where politicians in Northern identity: it has been estimated that, out- Ireland co-operate on issues like housing, side of schools, up to a quarter of a mil- jobs, education, and health: “Somebody lion people are actively involved in sport asked me one time what I wanted for in the region.10 Northern Ireland. I said 100,000 jobs, The Sports Council of Northern Ire- 30,000 houses.” land attempts to ensure that sectarian- All aspects of Northern Ireland’s so- ism is removed from the sporting arena ciety are touched by its divisions. The as far as is possible. For its director, games curriculum of many, if not most, Eamon McCartan, sport can be an “agent schools is predominantly Catholic or for good and an agent for not so good. We Protestant. Gaelic sports prevail in most try to develop policies and strategies,

92 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 encourage people to undertake actions or seeds in the governing bodies and in the programmes of work which are inclusive clubs, about community relations, about and cohesive, rather than exclusive and improved relationships—because “that is divisive.” A sports development officer is what we are talking about, relationships tasked with looking at community rela- between people, ordinary people”. tions and the SCNI is in the process of com- The televising of various sports, iden- pleting a community relations strategy. tified along communal lines, is only one Mr McCartan describes the Sports of the problems broadcasters encounter Council as a non-sectarian organisation regarding parity of esteem. Now BBC NI which seeks to develop sport in a non- controller, Patrick Loughrey has been sectarian environment. The SCNI looks at involved with community-relations ini- models of good practice which might be tiatives such as the Cultural Traditions more generally deployed, but he recog- Group of the NICRC, which he argues was nises that while it can develop strategies a far-sighted attempt to “grasp the ta- “it is down to the club, down to the gov- boos, because there is no doubt that we erning body, and one thing you couldn’t were crippled by our politeness to a large do is ... force people into it”. extent”. This drew broadcasters, print He warns that Catholic-Protestant journalists, museums, publishers, insti- sporting encounters, such as those be- tutes and universities into addressing tween schools, can actually accentuate identity issues. tensions, if badly managed: “So you need Mr Loughrey expresses unease about to create an environment which is a posi- an analysis of Northern Ireland which tive environment where the competition only recognises two traditions: “I have is brisk and robust for the purposes of argued for a very long time that there sport, because competition is the key el- are many traditions, many backgrounds, ement of sport, but you are being com- many identities and that to easily suc- petitive because you wish to win the cumb ... to an analysis that is simple di- sport—not because you wish to knock the chotomy ... is to take the political shit out of one or the other because of polarisation and to allow it to appropri- their religion.” ate a far more diverse cultural historical Mr McCartan stresses that change in group.” While he can see a danger of be- Northern Ireland is very difficult because ing accused of “escapism from the polar- of its conservatism and so favours evolu- ised truth”, he stresses that the future tion over revolution, gradually planting must be “one of true individualism rather

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 93 than this collectivism, because collectiv- Party also emphasises the diversity of ism is a way to tribalism and danger ... Northern Ireland’s identities. Alliance there are not just two communities”. again prefers to see identity as an indi- Mr Loughrey believes that all broad- vidual matter, and to ensure that the casters have an obligation to communi- unionist and nationalist traditions are cation, dialogue and the avoidance of easy not perceived as exhaustive. For the labelling, particularly since Northern Ire- party, the ‘third tradition’ is the ‘liberal land has been a community lacking a and democratic’ one, based not on land common forum for discussion and debate, and nationality, but on freedom, plural- lacking a parliament, lacking opportuni- ity and internationalism. Its primary ties for confrontation with issues—broad- value is deemed to be respect for indi- casters can potentially, fill that gap. As vidual conscience and it stands for de- to whether the BBC should ‘educate’ the mocracy, values minorities and distrusts community, he claims that its output re- the authoritarian tendencies of the big flects concerted attempts to open up for battalions. It welcomes diversity in all discussion, and awareness, that which is societies, as a source of strength and incomprehensible to each tradition. richness. But he also believes that, like educa- Quintin Oliver, of the Northern Ire- tion, broadcasting needs to be aware of land Council for Voluntary Action, recalls its limitations and he worries there is a how, following Drumcree, he encountered danger that either education or broad- an air of demoralisation in the voluntary casting can be expected to do rather more sector: “We thought that there was a than it can. The information and enter- more progressive mood of tolerance but tainment roles of broadcasting are also a lot of us are examining that, post- hugely significant and “people take from Drumcree, because we failed, because us what they want and our role of ‘giving people went back into their trenches.” Al- the people what’s good for them’ has though Northern Ireland is considered to changed dramatically ... so I don’t think have a strong civil society, Mr Oliver per- we can effect certain change if society ceives that there remains “a gulf ... a doesn’t want to accept it. What we can chasm that still needs to be bridged”. do is continue to offer opportunities for On the other hand, the positive aspect awareness, for debate and discussion and of voluntary and community life is that dialogue ...” “we have done a lot, we have picked up Dr Philip McGarry of the Alliance the pieces from the ‘troubles’, we have

94 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 kept people talking, we have kept can- without major political or structural dles of hope glittering in both communi- changes.” ties, we have developed a lively women’s It is worth adding the rider, though, movement which is credited with having that from her community-relations, done a lot of the development and dis- rather than community-development, cussion work across the communities and perspective, Mari Fitzduff is a little criti- emerged very positively during the cal of the voluntary sector in Northern peace as vehicles for negotiation at talks”. Ireland. She argues that it has actually Mr Oliver also cites some local anti- been reluctant to acknowledge sectarian- sectarian development work, and the ism and deal with it. broader community activity in Northern Many of those interviewed, while rec- Ireland, “which is unrivalled and at the ognising that parity of esteem involves leading edge in UK and European terms”. an accommodation between the two main He sees civil-society organisations as traditions, also emphasised that a genu- “absolutely critical” in developing a plu- inely pluralist society requires a wider ralist society in Northern Ireland. Where tolerance and equity. In particular, the people say ‘we can do nothing, it is the place of women in Northern Ireland has politicians’, ‘we can do nothing, it is the dramatically altered during the ‘trou- governments’, ‘we can do nothing, it is bles’, assisted by the expansion of serv- the men of violence’, Mr Oliver counters ice industries. Between 1952 and the that “there are lots of things that we in 1990s, the female proportion of employ- our various roles can do, in trade unions, ees increased from 36 per cent to over 48 in churches ... in business organisations, per cent in an expanded workforce. local councils, community groups, volun- Women, have, however, been concen- tary groups and so forth, and that is trated in a very limited number of sec- where we in NICVA are doing work with tors and in low-paid, frequently our counterparts at the Northern Ireland part-time, jobs. The most dramatic level, with the C[onfederation of] change has been the increase in married B[ritish] I[ndustry] ... and the farmers’ women in employment, from just under organisations to build a Social Partners’ 30 per cent in 1961 to 59 per cent by the Forum to underpin civil society, to 80s. strengthen the voices of civil society and Evelyn Collins of the Equal Opportu- business organisations and to give a lead nities Commission is quite heartened by on these areas where action can be taken the success of the Women’s Coalition in

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 95 being elected to the Northern Ireland talk, you have to get round the table, you Forum and talks, as evidence of how have to put everything on the table and there have been “tremendous energies find a solution, as opposed to ‘we are not put in by women into practical, non-con- talking because we think there is no so- stitutional political questions over the lution’, or ‘we are not talking because we last 25 years ... in spite of what was hap- don’t like the solution that we think you pening and ... you can observe that quite might have’.” clearly and I think that is interesting. As regards ethnic minorities in North- Does that say that women aren’t inter- ern Ireland, Patrick Yu of the Northern ested in the constitutional question? Or Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities that they are more interested in health feels that the inadequacy of government care ...?” support indicates the low priority at- Ms Collins claims that women do rec- tached to their needs. Thus, the Chinese ognise that constitutional issues are im- community has had to depend upon its portant, but many realise that “we own resources to set up a Chinese-lan- shouldn’t ... just ... not talk about any- guage school, and a similar process has thing else”. She feels that one problem had to be undertaken by Indian, Paki- with cultural identity in Northern Ire- stani and other Muslim communities. Mr land is that it is used by many “not as a Yu also insists that there are more than kind of general description of what they the two main traditions in Northern Ire- are but actually as an aggressive weapon land. On top of the new Race Relations against what somebody else is. So I think Order, he urges a coherent policy to re- that is where incompatibility arises, move institutional racism—for example, when people go beyond saying ‘this is through providing interpreters at health what I feel I am because of these reasons’ and social service access points. to ‘it is because I feel I am in opposition He identifies a need for the police to to what you are’. I don’t feel really hos- be more receptive to ethnic minority tile to anybody.” needs. At some RUC stations, he claims, Her thoughts on the Northern Ireland there is an ambivalence about the lan- political situation are rather of frustra- guage difficulties ethnic minorities en- tion and depression and she sees the counter when reporting crime, while at Women’s Coalition as “actually a good other stations, such as Donegall Pass in encapsulation of what I think [is] the way Belfast, a conscious effort has been made a lot of women feel, that people have to to be accommodating. He would like to

96 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 see an extension of this good practice, or not. Certainly there was no effort to through the training of police officers, examine how the delivery of education throughout Northern Ireland. And he might be tailored to the needs of a no- calls for a “cultural programme” in madic group or indeed how their culture schools, believing it to be “very important and so on might be reflected within the in life that any community should respect school curriculum.” Mr Noonan calls for another community rather than ... em- all children to be educated, via the cur- phasising one single perspective”. riculum, about the various cultures of Speaking on behalf of the travelling Northern Ireland, including the culture community, Michael Noonan summarises of travellers. the reaction of the state as one of “straightforward repression”. He cites the he key theme to emerge from the fo- Miscellaneous Provisions Order (NI) 1985, cus groups was, again, the close cor- “in effect a law which can allow the im- T relation with the interviewees’ position of a quota of travellers to a par- responses. For example, while there were ticular area if a local authority can satisfy similarities in the outlook of women and the D[epartment] o[f] E[nvironment] that their experiences, expressed in the ‘adequate’ ... provision has been made for Catholic and Protestant women’s focus travellers who normally reside in, or re- groups, this comity ended with introduc- sort to, a particular district. So once an tion of the subject of defining parity of area is designated ... whole areas can be esteem and its relationship to the com- declared off limits to travellers not munity from which the women hailed. camped on these official sites.” Mr From this point onwards, the core myths Noonan argues that this is in contraven- about Britishness and Irishness ex- tion of the UN Charter and the Universal pressed in the other focus groups re- Declaration of Human Rights, prescrib- entered the debate. ing that everyone has the right to free- When the debate was restricted to dom of movement and residence within women and gender identity, participants the borders of each state. in the women’s groups argued that there Travellers, he contends, have not en- was no ‘parity of esteem’ for them. And joyed parity of esteem in terms of equal- they could extend this to a lack of esteem, ity of access to services. Historically, the defined as respect and tolerance, enjoyed education authorities “really didn’t give by other social groups, such as ethnic a damn whether travellers went to school minorities, homosexuals or the disabled.

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 97 It was suggested that parity of esteem moreover, that involvement in cross- meant that men and women should have community contact schemes led them to the same degree of authority and respect become more tolerant of the symbols and in society generally. It was felt, by both cultural identity of others. Protestants Catholic and Protestant women, that within the group spoke, however, of there was a stereotypical role into which opposition they had encountered with- women were placed, where they were in their community to such schemes, expected to remain at home engaged in apparently out of fear of their ultimate domestic housework and take primary purpose. responsibility for raising children. Nevertheless, it was noticeable in this Many felt that barriers were placed group that once a discussion of flags and in the way of women achieving parity symbols began divisions broke out along with men, such as lack of childcare pre- religious lines. This was also true of dis- venting women utilising job or educa- cussions about the Irishness of Catholics tional opportunities. It was felt that and the Britishness of Protestants, which greater involvement in politics—in which reflected the views exhibited by adults the Women’s Coalition appeared to offer in other groups. This appeared to indi- some encouragement and a good role cate that even in a mixed environment model—required political parties to take where the participants knew each other greater account of women’s issues and well the introduction of issues revolving perspectives. around a unionist-nationalist axis evoked Within the youth focus group, partici- a deeper response. pants recalled positive experiences of From both the Protestant focus meeting in a forum where they could en- groups, urban and rural, parallel claims counter young people from the other com- emerged of a sense of being under cul- munity. The perception among this tural pressure. Some members of the mixed, Protestant and Catholic, group groups were extremely opposed to initia- was that meeting members of the other tives such as EMU and cultural heritage. community broke down stereotypes and There was a very real apprehension that prejudices, making it easier to view this was part of a government effort to people of differing religious groups on ‘Irishise’ Protestants, with a view to the an individual rather than a communal ultimate disengagement of the British basis. state. By contrast, Catholics, from all fo- Members of this group claimed, cus groups, felt at ease with the notion

98 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 of increased cross-community contact. and unquestioned coverage. Those Protestants opposed to EMU and While some Catholics, including one cultural heritage were not, on the other republican, were prepared to accept lim- hand, necessarily opposed to integrated ited use of British symbols, such as on education, which found widespread sup- government buildings, on certain days port among both Catholics and Protes- such as the Queen’s birthday, they found tants. There was a sense within the focus it offensive that the Union flag flew over groups that while many people wanted police stations—particularly in or near to send their children to integrated Catholic areas—and unionist-controlled schools they did not have the opportu- councils. Nearly all Protestants, on the nity. The impression was that parents other hand, were very much opposed to wanted to send their children to inte- any further reduction in the display of grated schools which offered a high British symbols. The idea that there standard of education, but were often pro- should be dual display of the flags of the hibited by lack of access to such schools UK and the republic on government build- locally. ings, while it found favour among Catho- From the focus groups it could be seen lics (although many did not regard it as that many of the issues raised by politi- realistic in the short term), met total cians—flags, symbols and the Irish lan- Protestant opposition. guage—were concerns reflected within Protestants only perceived attacks the society more broadly. Regardless of upon their symbols of Britishness, not on class or gender, Catholics expressed hos- nationalist symbols of Irishness. Catho- tility to the monocultural British ethos lics argued this was necessary to estab- of the Northern Ireland state. There was lish an equilibrium between Irishness concern at the lack of funding for Irish- and Britishness in Northern Ireland. language schools and approval for the While Protestants consoled themselves increased coverage of Gaelic games on that they had their Britishness recog- television. Yet this angered many Prot- nised by their membership of the UK, they estants, who contended that the Orange saw efforts to upgrade Irishness in con- Order was portrayed as a sectarian or- junction with their fears about the frame- ganisation whereas the Gaelic Athletic work document at one level and Association—which banned members of European economic and monetary union the RUC, the Royal Irish Regiment and at another—all seen as geared towards the British army—was given substantial loosening Northern Ireland’s position

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 99 within the union. Protestants within the replaced, others were willing to accept focus groups tended to react negatively substantial reform. This included sugges- to all expressions of nationalist Irishness. tions that a new police service might have Any suggestion that the RUC should the dual title of The RUC/Northern Ire- have its name changed or be disbanded land’s Police Service; introduction of a produced bitter comments. Yet while completely independent complaints pro- some Catholics wished to see the RUC cedure; and removal of controversial symbols of Britishness, such as the flying of the Union flag outside police stations, the oath of allegiance to the Queen and royal portraits. Many Catholics emphasised, however, that they would now insist upon greater changes to the RUC since the Drumcree ‘stand-off’ of 1996, when it was seen to have been ineffective in standing up to the marchers, and to have used dispro- portionate force towards nationalists. Drumcree was seen as a fundamental attack on parity of esteem. Catholics rejected the claim that parades in controversial districts should be permitted because they were ‘traditional’, since they did not admit that these had been welcome on previous occasions. And it was accepted by most Catholics that Protestants were right to assume that concessions on symbols, policing and parades would not result in nationalists abandoning aspirations for far-reaching constitutional changes. All Catholics in the focus groups argued that loyal-order marches should Well,timeforanamechange? acquire the consent of residents in Catho-

100 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 lic areas through which the marchers had routes. March organisers should also give to pass. This was described as a human- assurances about marchers’ behaviour rights issue. The marchers were seen as and those who associated themselves attempting to dominate local residents with parades had to ensure sectarian and emphasise that Northern Ireland re- provocation was avoided. Permission for mained a Protestant state. Most Catho- future parades should be dependent on lics found it difficult to accept that those wishes being fulfilled. Protestant culture was being discrimi- For Protestant participants, on the nated against by the failure to march other hand, the resistance of local resi- along ‘traditional’ routes, which were re- dent groups to marches, in areas such as garded as traditional only because they the Garvaghy Road in Portadown, was had been imposed on Catholic residents seen as a direct attack upon Protestant in the past, or because Protestants had and British culture. To many Protestants once, but no longer, lived there. within the focus groups, all the rhetoric For many Catholics, the coming of the of nationalists on parity of esteem was Orange marching season recalled expe- just that—rhetoric. As one person ex- riences of fear, intimidation and taunt- pressed it, he would love to see parity of ing by marchers. It was felt that decisions esteem for his, Protestant and British, on proposed parade routes should be culture on the Garvaghy Road. For these locality-sensitive, taking full account of Protestants, residents’ groups were the rights and feelings of the communi- merely a cover for republicans who had ties living along the routes. It was needed another outlet for their anti- stressed that local communities had Britishness during the IRA ceasefire. rights as well as the marchers and these Most Protestants in the focus groups should be recognised. believed that there was an attempt to They held that people had the right remove British culture from Northern to march but that right was not absolute Ireland. Protestants continually claimed and should be exercised with the sensi- that the loyal orders were not anti- tivities of others in mind. The residents Catholic. It was suggested that where Or- of areas through which parades intended angemen could not walk Protestants to pass had to have the right to withhold could not live, as illustrated by the boy- their consent to parades if they caused cott of Protestant businesses following offence; if that consent was not given then Drumcree. The view was expressed that march organisers should seek alternative the issue of parades was far bigger than

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 101 walking down a stretch of road: it was the other hand, were prevented from en- about whether the British culture of Prot- tering many city or town centres, contrib- estants was to survive. uting towards a feeling that Protestants This was not seen in isolation, but in still ‘owned the place’, that the ‘public conjunction with other examples of as- face’ of Northern Ireland remained Prot- saults on Protestantism, such as ‘ethnic estant. Many Catholics found it intimi- cleansing’ on the border. The view was dating that public places flew the Union expressed that Protestants had been flag, or that council buildings continued pushed eastwards from rural areas, near to display such signs as ‘Castlereagh Still the border, and now an attempt was be- Says No’. ing made to exclude them from parts of One person, who described herself as Northern Ireland’s cities and towns as neither nationalist nor republican, but well. It was felt that anyone should have Catholic, complained that she was tired the right to walk along the ‘Queen’s high- of continually hearing the same old rheto- way’, along ‘traditional’ routes walked by ric from unionists. For her, the important their forefathers. consideration was how would her rights Many Catholics believed that, despite be protected, as a non-political Catholic? the changes which had come about since She wished to hear some positive encour- the fall of Stormont, they were still seen agement from unionist politicians that as enemies of the state, as being ‘disloyal’, she, and people like her, had to a right to and frequent reference was made to Lord exist in the Northern Ireland state. Brookeborough’s statements in the 30s. There was tension expressed by some There was a perception that Catholics members of the focus groups towards were not able fully to express their Irish what they regarded as ‘Castle Catholics’, identity. The true measure of esteem, it those middle-class Catholics who, it was was suggested, was the respect, equality felt, had compromised their national- and justice accorded to the culture of one’s ism to attain a certain status. It was felt ‘enemy’. This absence of respect for Irish that working-class Catholics had been nationalist culture contributed towards constantly faced with violence, while Catholic alienation from the state. middle-class Catholics had not had to live With more than 3,000 marches every with a conflict on their doorstep. As one year, of which more than 90 per cent were person put it, some people had lived in loyalist, Northern Ireland was considered Belfast but for the last ten years had been a Protestant place. Catholic marches, on unaware there was a war on.

102 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 Although both Catholics and Protes- instances cited of political, social, eco- tants expressed a desire to end segre- nomic and cultural experience in North- gated housing, it was also apparent that ern Ireland, reinforcing socio-economic few thought much could be done in a grievances, for many Catholics fair em- practical way to achieve this, given the ployment legislation was not enough to intercommunal tensions. Some Protes- remedy their sense of alienation: for tants expressed a fear of what they saw them, the main source of grievance was as the slow, but steady, colonisation of the existence of the state itself. formally Protestant areas by Catholics. The Northern Ireland state was re- This was related to fear that the closing garded as inherently sectarian, having of ‘Protestant’—that is, state—schools in been established on the basis of a reli- those areas was part of a deliberate at- gious headcount to preserve an artifi- tempt to drive Protestants out. cially large Protestant and pro-British In a different vein, the Fair Employ- majority. For these Catholics, the state ment Commission was seen as being a was irreformable and the only way to predominantly Catholic organisation. achieve equality was through its disso- Protestants who accepted the need for lution and the establishment of an all- fair employment legislation to reduce Ireland unitary or federal state. These employment inequities warned that this Catholics felt that because of the British in itself was creating a sense of injustice guarantee, the ‘unionist veto’, there could within their community. It was also sug- be no change within the UK, because this gested that if Catholics did have genu- merely encouraged Protestants to adopt ine grievances in the past, this was no an intransigent attitude to change. longer so. Direct rule, it was argued, had Those Catholics who welcomed such materially and culturally shifted the bal- reforms as fair employment legislation ance towards Catholics, often on the back nevertheless criticised the British gov- of IRA violence. ernment for their piecemeal character, in For Catholic group participants, by the context of an overall policy perceived contrast, issues of employment and un- as reactive with a priority of containing employment were closely wrapped up the security situation. Moreover, fair with their perceptions of the Northern employment legislation would continue Ireland state. There was a sense that to have a limited impact if its benefits Catholics did not have a fair and equal could not be demonstrated to more role in Northern Ireland. With various people in deprived areas. For many

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 103 Protestants, on the other hand, fair em- for conciliation and mediation’, in Seamus Dunn ployment legislation was seen as prima- ed, Facets of the Conflict in Northern Ireland, Macmillan, London, 1995, pp 230-3 rily directed at them. Some believed it to 2 ibid, p241 be part of a general preparation for an 3 Alan Smith, ‘Education and the conflict in ultimate British disengagement from Northern Ireland’, in ibid, pp 172-3 4 ibid, p175 Northern Ireland, part of a general run- 5 Lucy Bryson and Clem McCartney, Clashing ning down of the material well-being of Symbols, Institute of Irish Studies, Queen’s Uni- the Protestant community. versity, Belfast, 1994, pp 8-9 6 Andrew Hamilton, Linda Moore and Tim Trimble, Policing a Divided Society: Issues and his section has explored a wide gamut Perceptions in Northern Ireland, Centre for the of sites of grievance and contention, Study of Conflict, Coleraine, 1995, pp 13-16 T from cultural expression to policing. 7 Neil Jarman and Dominic Bryan, Parade and Again, the proliferation of these sites and Protest: A Discussion of Parading Disputes in Northern Ireland, Centre for the Study of Con- the gulf of understanding and aspiration flict, Coleraine, 1996, pp 94-8 are striking. 8 ibid, p99 On the other hand, however, two posi- 9 Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden, Northern Ire- land: The Choice, Penguin, London, 1994, pp tive conclusions emerge from this discus- 45-6 sion. The first is that there are ways in 10 John Sugden, ‘Sport, community relations which parity of esteem can be themati- and community conflict in Northern Ireland’, in cally addressed in a manner susceptible Dunn, op cit, pp 200-2 to tangible reform, and in some areas— such as fair employment—significant reform has already been made. And the second is that, outside of government and the parties, there is a wealth of individual and organisational talent in Northern Ireland, derived from experience and social networks, which has shown a capacity to think through the issues in a manner rather more adequate to their complexity. DD

Footnotes 1 Derick Wilson and Jerry Tyrrell, ‘Institutions

104 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 Conclusion and recommendations

his report began with a presentation nationalists a bit more north-south in- of the two-sided nature of parity of stitution or unionists a bit more internal T esteem: a potential solvent of conflict power. on the one hand, a potent weapon on the And this, in itself, leads to the first other. And our research has been sober- policy conclusion. Parity of esteem has ing in this regard. tended to be pursued in recent years, not It is impossible to read the interview as if it were a complement to pluralism, material, reinforced by the focus groups, but as if it stood in contradiction. In other without developing a deep sense of two words, there has been little apparent ethnic groups, and their leaders, funda- concern as to whether measures seen to mentally talking past each other, inhab- promote parity of esteem might inadvert- iting largely hermetically sealed ently also consolidate stereotypical eth- discourses with a clear inner logic but ut- nic group roles and so attenuate terly incompatible with each other. Close pluralism, thereby further diminishing reading of the argument, particularly the scope for meaningful intercommunal with the representatives of the parties, dialogue. shows that, if anything, the gulf is wider In the international debate around than it appears on the surface: superfi- this issue, such concern has been much cially similar words betray wholly differ- more evident. A cynic would say that it ent interpretations. And because of suits both unionist-minded public offi- the radical nature of these disjunct- cials and nationalist-minded activists ures, and how they replicate themselves for nationalism to receive a cultural across a raft of concerns, they cannot be booster—as long as it keeps to ‘its own’. readily negotiated away—say by offering It is remarkable that only Tom Hadden

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 105 and Kevin Boyle have really aired this by denominational (as well as class) in- concern domestically, in their presenta- terests, pursues this policy with any en- tion of the choice facing Northern Ireland thusiasm. It should be given much more, as that between separation and sharing.1 public and wholehearted, ministerial and Yet in an additional set of focus groups other official endorsement, at every level. conducted recently for Democratic Dia- Currently, there remain far too many logue, it became clear this was also a parents for whom the integrated option popular concern—that entrenching cul- is not a real one, as the focus groups for tural identities was risky since opposed this project confirm. It must become just identities were the perceived source of as ‘normal’ as the segregated choice. The the problem. And what this research goal must be to bring about a level play- project highlights, in the round, is that ing pitch wherein a parent can choose an not only must the already extremely poor integrated school, and that choice be ef- intercom-munal communication not be fected, as easily as a decision in favour of further impoverished, but there is also the denominational alternative. an overwhelming need for the promulga- The focus groups also confirm the de- tion of greater intercommunal under- sire for closer residential integration, standing. Frankly, there is no chance of tempered by concern about its realism. moves towards a settlement getting off But there is no reason why pilot inte- first base unless the different players feel grated schemes could not be developed, at least some empathy for (rather than as suggested by the Opsahl Commission just hear or misinterpret) what others and the Standing Advisory Commission say. on Human Rights. This is an area where As in every test of popular opinion the growing involvement of the social ever done in Northern Ireland, in these sector in housing provision could be of latter, unrelated, focus groups, partici- innovative value, in the design of such pants volunteered integrated education projects. While allocation could still be way ahead of anything else they could on basis of need, as in existing segregated suggest as likely to encourage concilia- estates, tenants would thereby be able tory intercommunal feelings. While, for- to express a choice for mixed housing. As mally, government policy is now to both Opsahl and SACHR recognised, this promote integrated education, there is no would require some government finan- evidence that the Department of Educa- cial support to counter-balance the un- tion, captured as it has historically been certainties associated with integration.2

106 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 he second major conclusion from this movements, in particular, can explore study is that it really is futile to hope new political spaces, extend horizons and T that agreement on measures under establish connections. They may develop the rubric of parity of esteem (or indeed a new language of dialogue to replace the much else) is going to emerge spontane- language of conflict and sectarianism.”4 ously from the inter-party talks, whoever In so doing, NGOs which embrace cultural is in attendance. The intellectual where- diversity can provide an important coun- withal is simply not there, as our inter- terweight to ethno-nationalist statism.5 views show, for such agreement to be The exigencies of equal opportunities found by the participants. legislation in Northern Ireland have ren- The implication of this is at one level dered it common for organisations to as Hurst Hannum reads the Northern have a defined equal opportunities policy Ireland case: “[T]he imposition of a rea- and responsible senior officer. This policy sonable and responsive solution from could be extended to the wider objective above may be a necessary first step of promoting cultural diversity both towards a more permanent settlement, within the organisation and in dialogue as a way of avoiding the ‘democratic’ with other cognate bodies. Community stalemate that might result from un- and voluntary organisations, in particu- compromising political extremes and lar, should consider inclusion of such com- intimidation.” mitments in their constitutions and But this should not be read as a recipe mission statements, where they have not for top-down ‘passive revolution’. Ernest already done so, with larger organisa- Gellner rightly spots the potential tions designating a senior staff member (though no more than that) of civil soci- as having particular responsibility for ety in making co-existence possible. “In implementing the policy (though not to fact,” he argues, “civil society is based on the exclusion of others). Even full and the denial of ideological monopoly, on the frank internal discussion of why such an acceptance of compromise on deep issues initiative was required, sensitively han- concerning the nature of things, on doubt, dled, could be a valuable way of raising irony and all kinds of adjustments.”3 the issue. Stephen Ryan stresses the role of The third major conclusion is about non-governmental organisations in a the significance of parity of esteem itself. ‘peace-building’ (rather than simply Within one view, of course, it is a matter ‘peace-making’) strategy: “[C]ritical social of no consequence—if everything in

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 107 Northern Ireland is, ultimately, ‘political’, parity of esteem, allowing individuals/ then a political settlement agreed by the organisations thereby to seek redress parties will resolve it. The very evident through the courts or for non-complying intellectual limitations of the thinking of government initiatives to be declared the parties on parity of esteem, as evi- ultra vires.7 denced by the interviews, itself implic- But since then the UN declaration, the itly reflects this ‘it will be all right on the Council of Europe framework convention night’ assumption—and one recalls how and the minority languages charter re- the power-sharing executive of 1974 rap- ferred to in the introduction have all been idly agreed on the abolition of the old promulgated. So in addition to the gen- Community Relations Commission. eral statement SACHR recommended, The implication of this study is the these more specific provisions should also contrary: the significance of issues like all be incorporated into the act, so ren- parity of esteem lies precisely in that they dering them, merely exhortatory in their are more manageable, discrete themes, current form, also actionable in the amenable to positive and tangible inno- Northern Ireland courts. This would vation in policy and practice, including mean that the key areas of concern about by non-governmental actors. Thus, as cultural recognition would not only be Ryan puts it, thinking particularly of symbolically endorsed at the heart of the NGOs, “The idea of a plurality of small state but would also have real material moves forward rather than one break- effect. Whether it was felt that the exist- through is an attractive one, not least ing courts system in Northern Ireland because it recognises that peace is more could address adequately this new juris- than successful mediation.”6 prudence or whether it was felt desirable One of the ways in which the issue to establish a specialist constitution- can be manageably addressed is by in- al court would be a matter for expert corporating, and rendering justiciable, debate. existing minority rights guarantees into Either way, this move would be a cru- Northern Ireland’s embryonic constitu- cial indication that Northern Ireland’s tion—the Northern Ireland Constitution constitution was indeed understood to be Act of 1973. The second SACHR report an evolving, pluralistic one, able to rec- suggested incorporating a statement into ognise all residents of the region as equal the act requiring government policies citizens in their diverse and equally le- to deliver equality of treatment and gitimate ways. Such an initiative would

108 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 also have the merit of being easy to im- manner non-threatening to liberal- plement and being defensible solely on pluralist Protestant opinion. the basis of universal values as interpreted by bodies, like the UN and the imilar principles apply to the policy- Council of Europe, whose bona fides are oriented arena, currently addressed unquestioned by any Northern Ireland S by the Policy Appraisal and Fair faction. It would thus not need to attend Treatment ‘equality-proofing’ guidelines, upon inter-party agreement in talks. introduced in 1994. Indeed here it is Moreover, this approach would have worth underscoring the scope of the PAFT the not inconsequential final advantage guidelines, which not only embrace all po- that these international conventions are tential national and ethnic minorities but universal—and so can be appropriated to considerations of gender (and sexual ori- address the concerns of all ‘persons be- entation and marital status), having/not longing to’ particular national/ethnic having a dependant, age and disability. minorities in Northern Ireland, includ- And they apply to the all government de- ing the Chinese community, travellers partments and ‘Next Steps’ agencies. and smaller groups. It does not thereby But the status of these equal-treat- fall foul of the ‘two teams’ syndrome, with ment guidelines, not defined by law, is the consequent unintended effects of en- unclear. As Osborne et al have reported, hanced polarisation and marginalisation while the Central Community Relations of groups not defined in Protestant/ Unit at Stormont has a ‘challenge role’ Catholic terms. in equity issues, it has no power to insist In particular, this approach offers us that departments pursue any particular the value base for innovative constitu- policy or action in the context of PAFT. The tional thinking on Northern Ireland. It Lead Officers’ group established to co-or- provides a legitimation and clarification dinate departmental responses to PAFT of the intercessionary role (rather than has not functioned effectively. Not all de- the famously vague ‘more than consulta- partments have the information collective but less than executive’) of the re- tion mechanisms to make PAFT judgments public’s government in the region. And it on the basis of adequate data. Implemen- provides a preferential focus on the con- tation can vary from a positive approach cerns of the Catholic community, includ- based on ‘sensitivity’ to a negative, ‘check- ing the securing of redress against any list’ attitude. And the response of non- depredations of its rights—yet in a departmental public bodies has been

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 109 uneven.8 a SACHR paper by Nigel Hutson.11 But For all these reasons, it has been ar- more substantive concerns about putting gued that PAFT should be put on a legal PAFT on a legislative footing in the footing. But the issue has been clouded manner he suggests have been advanced by being linked to a specific proposal by by Tom Hadden and others, some of them Christopher McCrudden. Dr McCrudden relating to the issues raised earlier in this argues: “PAFT should become an anticipa- conclusion.12 tory, participatory, and integrative tool Prof Hadden points out that in fact for identifying where proposed actions PAFT arose in the context of a UK-wide are likely to advance or retard the equal-opportunity policy initiative (of achievement of the greater material limited political depth). This raises im- equality of particular groups in North- mediate problems as to giving real pur- ern Ireland.”9 This would include a statu- chase to its application in the particular tory responsibility upon the Northern circumstances of Northern Ireland, espe- Ireland secretary to reduce progressively cially given that differentiated ap- ‘material inequalities’.10 proaches are required to address the Dr McCrudden envisages the process, different types of inequality in the region albeit delimited by screening and (without creating a hierarchy between scoping, as covering a wide range of them): many of the ‘parity of esteem’ con- public bodies and a wide range of their cerns, for example, of those who identify actions. By a process derived from envi- themselves as Irish in Northern Ireland ronmental impact assessments, he antici- are decidedly non-material, being of a pates such bodies being required to symbolic nature. Moreover, there is the subject proposals to assessments of their challenge of ensuring coherence with the compatibility with the inequality-reduc- separate demands of the third public ex- tion criterion. He envisages this allow- penditure priority—specific to Northern ing scope for public participation, before Ireland—of ‘targeting social need’. and after PAFT impact statements are Secondly, the logic behind going be- prepared. yond the equal-treatment focus of PAFT in Some of the practical problems of de- the way Dr McCrudden suggests is to tail thrown up by Dr McCrudden’s pa- achieve substantively egalitarian out- per—particularly the major challenge of comes—reducing ‘material equalities’. screening and scoping to reduce the idea Outside of the former Soviet bloc, where to manageable proportions—are aired in aspiration and reality mightily conflicted,

110 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 such quasi-constitutional policy require- Moreinequalityinanybody’slanguage ments have always been abjured. There is, therefore, a disturbing lack of models on which to draw: the case of environmental impact assessments is unique precisely because in that policy area there is a specific need to avert adverse substantive outcomes which to a devel- oper represent a mere externality. This must raise real questions about the political realism of the idea. Conversely, however, the attempt to extend a UK equal-opportunity scheme to achieving greater substantive equality between various groups in Northern Ire- land suffers from the additional difficulty that the biggest source of substantive inequality does not fit into an anti- discriminatory policy framework—and so would be unaffected by placing PAFT on a statutory footing in the manner suggested. That category is class. Research by Vani Borooah and others has demonstrated the self-evident point that class inequalities in Northern Ireland are sig- nificantly greater than sectarian inequalities.13 Yet the problem is that class inequalities are not amenable to a dis- contrary, equal-opportunity policies are course based on the notion of ‘discrimi- largely about ensuring that those with nation’, linked as they are to other the same qualifications, etc, enjoy the disadvantages, such as in educational same labour-market opportunities. qualifications, and so to poorer life- Fourthly, the UK origin of PAFT makes chances in the labour market. On the it blind to the dynamic towards sharing

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 111 or separation referred to earlier. Parity communities; of esteem allied to sectarian apartheid (d) fostering communal sharing and reduc- would hardly be a policy achievement to tion of communal separation; and trumpet. Efforts to secure it must thus (e) equal treatment in respect of race, gen- be allied to equal prosecution of the work der, and disability. of reconciliation, and patient commit- Prof Hadden’s approach avoids the eli- ment to build, house by house and school sion from equality of opportunity to by school, more integrated community equality of outcome—except where the life. Thus, in his authoritative survey for latter is the appropriate focus, such as the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation in the reduction specifically of inequali- in Dublin of arrangements for group ac- ties of income across the board. commodation, Asbjørn Eide stresses: Legislation could certainly be introduced in this context to ensure that pro- The legitimate competing approaches to nationhood must not preclude the devel- cedures for policy appraisal, ensuring opment of a civic society in Northern Ire- they match these strictures, were both land, in which each community can more determinedly pursued and more participate on an egalitarian basis ... It is transparent than PAFT has proved, in the assumed that any measures leading to spirit of the Osborne et al research and further physical separation within North- the McCrudden and Hutson papers. ern Ireland based on communal identity The advantages of this approach are should be avoided. The experience in other that it would give civil servants clearer parts of the world, including Bosnia, to di- policy guidance: at the moment, as one vide [sic] land by ethnic or religious iden- senior Stormont official put it, “We tity, is so frightening that it should be haven’t a clue what we’re talking about avoided at all costs.14 on PAFT and how to take it forward.” And Prof Hadden therefore argues that, it would elevate TSN (redefined as (b)) rather than moving to give the PAFT guide- above its current marginal status, where lines legal force, a new set of policy it is subordinated as a priority to ‘law and priorities should be formulated as order’ and ‘strengthening the economy’.15 follows: It would, however, sustain the concern (a) parity of treatment and esteem be- with a raft of inequalities and while rec- tween the two main communities; ognising their different character—in (b) less inequality between rich and poor; particular how central ‘parity of esteem’ (c) reconciliation between the two main is to the religious dimension—establishes

112 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 no hierarchy between them. broader attack on the so-called ‘structural But one has to recognise the limits of factors’—class, educational disadvantage this endeavour. Ultimately, the challenge and so on—to achieve further progress in Northern Ireland is one of generating, in reducing intercommunal employment and sustaining, the political will to se- differentials, while similarly addressing cure an egalitarian society, guaranteeing the plight of socially excluded Protestant individual opportunity for all, with maxi- communities.16 mum public participation. That, however, is a matter for the interplay of political ooming even larger in this report has forces and democratic argument. It is an of course been the issue of parades. argument which its liberal-left advocates L But here the North review has done have to keep on making and winning, great service, not only for its specific rec- rather than expecting a once-and-for-all ommendations but also for its wider dis- guaranteed outcome, reliant on admin- cussion of the broader themes involved.17 istrative mechanisms thereafter. Indeed, the former need not detain us for Discussion of PAFT and TSN inevitably long, because the new Northern Ireland raises the issue of fair employment. This secretary has committed a Labour ad- report has touched on the latter con- ministration to implement the North rec- cern—perhaps even more in terms of the ommendations in full—notably that an fears attached to it by some Protestants independent commission should be em- than the hopes of many Catholics. We do powered to issue binding adjudications not, however, attempt in this conclusion on whether and under what conditions to discuss it in more detail, as it is point- particular parades go ahead.18 less to do so given (at the time of writ- It is the broader perspective which the ing) the imminent publication of the review adopts which is revolutionary in quinquennial review of the legislation by its potential, once one recognises, as SACHR. North does, that the parades controversy Salutary indications are nevertheless represents in many ways the Northern available in the argument of Pete Shirlow Ireland problem—and in particular the et al that existing ‘group rights’ thinking challenges of pluralism and parity of es- has failed to address intra-group in- teem—writ small. And it is the discourse equalities and unnecessarily fostered it deploys which begins to offer the new Protestant alienation from the very idea language which this report has indicated of fair employment. They point to a is a necessary if not sufficient conditionof

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 113 progress. relativism provides no basis for resolv- The first, dramatic claim of the review ing conflicting group claims—on the con- is its emphasis, rightly, on the internal trary, it encourages the protagonists to nature of the conflict—not ‘internal’ in pursue them more avidly, since force the sense of advocating a UK-oriented, majeure will prevail, as both sides in the unionist outcome, but internal in the parades controversy have come to suspect sense of a recognition that, as with all in recent years. More generally, the whole such ethno-nationalist conflicts, it is the principle that Northern Ireland’s con- antagonism between the communities in- flict—and the problem of parity of esteem volved themselves, rather than the role within it—will be negotiated away by the of external actors, which is crucial to the parties, by trading their existing incon- problem and central to any settlement. gruent positions, is rendered utterly in- It has been neglect of this fundamental coherent by these relativist premises. truth that has allowed government to In this context, what the review does preside over the dramatic polarisation, is not simply to juxtapose unionist and most visibly manifested at Drumcree in nationalist claims, but to mobilise a tran- 1996, almost without seeing it coming: scendent rhetoric of ‘fairness’ and ‘rea- sonableness’—to considerable effect, it The sources of the problem lie within our society—not just within the deviant po- might be said, given the opinion-poll sup- litical behaviour of the few, but with the port it demonstrates for its principal inability of the many to deal positively propositions—allowing government to with difference and with shared time and adopt a much more proactive and poten- space. tially widely supported approach not at- The solution to the problem equally tendant upon party vetoes: lies within our society. The question is whether we have the will to bring forth We were given the very clear impression, from the reservoirs of goodness and integ- from all the evidence available to us, that rity in this community the resources to the great majority of people desire a peace- deal with the pain and the pressures ful and just resolution of these difficult which arise out of living together yet issues. We hope therefore that most peo- apart, as we have done for so long.19 ple will be prepared to accept what fair- minded people would accept as being The second remarkable feature of the reasonable solutions in local situations. review is its refusal of relativism. As We believe it is essential to encourage that the first chapter of this report stressed, constituency to be as broad as possible,

114 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 and that those who would seek to object with itself. to constructive and reasonable proposals are positively influenced by the fair- hich brings us finally to the quest minded majority.20 for a political settlement. It is a Finally, the review, recognising as it does W bizarre paradox that the deter- that parity of esteem obscures the sharp mined prosecution for seven years of such asymmetry of claims by each side, makes a quest, ever since the Bangor speech in a fundamental break with what might be January 1990 by the then Northern Ire- called a ‘rights absolutism’ guaranteed to land secretary, Peter Brooke, has been lead, not to comity and reconciliation, but matched with such apparent unconcern to endless protagonism and polarisation. about the steady polarisation of society The “civic values” it draws upon entail in Northern Ireland, before and since— the following: polarisation which is so strongly manifested in the focus groups for this report a) recognising that rights carry responsi- and which by definition has rendered the bilities, and are not absolute, which is seen possibility of ‘sufficient consensus’ on a most clearly in the fact that neither what settlement an ever-receding goal. are often described as the ‘right to march’ This polarisation is no accident. It ul- nor the rights of residents are absolute, b) exercising rights with both restraint timately arises because of the inability and responsibility, and with respect for the of government to transcend the language well-being of others in the community, of the past which, as demonstrated ear- c) working together to create a society that lier, is hopelessly obsolete in the context not merely tolerates but positively cel- of ethno-nationalist conflicts in the ebrates cultural diversity.21 1990s. By merely laying side by side the majoritarian claims of unionism, vis-à- These three key insights are in fact the vis the constitutional status of Northern most valuable way for this report to con- Ireland, to resist unification, with the clude, perhaps preserving a modicum of long-term majoritarian alternative of optimism that progress may be possible. nationalists, to secure the latter objective They represent, together, a Gestalt shift through ‘rolling integration’, far from on the part of government and a clarion- ameliorating the terms of the conflict, call to civic responsibility to all those so- government has merely institutionalised cial actors who can play a part in moving it. towards a Northern Ireland more at ease And, as the interviews and focus

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 115 groups make clear, nationalists, mindful rights with restraint and responsibility. both of the weight of historic grievance In other words, a Northern Ireland and of their modern assertiveness and settlement will only be possible when at power, will not accept majoritarian con- least some unionists are persuaded that cepts of Northern Ireland—even the they would rather govern the region in qualified majoritarianism of more mod- full partnership with nationalists than erate unionists. Nothing less than full have someone else (now Britain, perhaps equality is any longer acceptable. eventually Dublin) do it for them. This Equally, increasingly defensive and would mean abandoning their ‘right’ to frightened unionists are not going to be have Northern Ireland defined as un- rolled over into all-Ireland structures, via equivocally part of a sovereign and a ‘dynamic’ north-south body which looks territorially bounded UK, but far from this increasingly like a proto-government of entailing their further disempowerment a united Ireland. Nor will they accept it would empower them—on a par with joint authority as a stepping stone.22 their nationalist colleagues—in assuag- There is no doubt that if unionists in- ing the ‘democratic deficit’. sist—with considerable justification, in Equally, a Northern Ireland settle- terms of international legal precedent— ment will only be possible when at least on the absolute principle of the inviola- some nationalists are prepared to say bility of territorial integrity, then no that they will ‘set a boundary to the accommodation is possible. There is also march of a nation’, that such a settlement no doubt that if nationalists insist—again is not simply a staging-post to somewhere with many international conventions to else. Of course, it can and must involve call in aid—on the absolute right of the strong north-south institutions for policy people of Ireland to self-determination, co-ordination island-wide, for its intrin- again no settlement can be achieved. sic mutual benefits and its recognition of And so we come to another paradox: the nationalist sense of an island-wide if the debate about parity of esteem has community. But if such institutions are, been characterised by ever more vocifer- like their northern counterparts, to have ous assertions of rights, on either side, a reconciliatory, trust-building character, its resolution actually depends, as the it must be clear that one side is not sim- North review so insightfully realised, on ply there to make up the numbers—that a willingness not to prosecute rights to there will be an optimal equilibrium the ultimate, a willingness to temper reached well short of unification, as the

116 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 outgoing government in Dublin well rec- of Delanty earlier, government—both ognises.23 True, this means abandonment governments—need to forsake the oppor- of the idea of an eventual nationalist ‘vic- tunist ‘quick fix’ of indulging extremism tory’, but the point of equilibrium is a in the hope of peace and accommodation: never-before attained summit of real that way, as we now know, lie dashed equality and parity of esteem. hopes, polarisation and despair. It must What this means, for unionists and turn to the determined long haul of build- nationalists alike, is the positive achieve- ing moderation: only that way can the ment the North review envisions—of widening intercommunal gulf of the past working together to create a society cel- near three decades begin to be narrowed. ebrating cultural diversity. But such a This is patient, footslogging work. It society is inconceivable unless both sides has no photogenic attractions, boosts no abandon absolutist insistence on ‘sover- political egos, and is reducible neither to eignty’ versus ‘self-determination’ and slogan nor soundbite. But like the fable come to embrace the idea of multi-cul- of the tortoise and the hare, it is the only tural citizenship held out in the opening long-term guarantee that a Northern Ire- chapter. As Fr Eamon Stack, chair of the land defined by pluralism and parity of Garvaghy Road Residents’ Coalition, puts esteem can be achieved—rather than, as it, now, appear an ever-receding horizon.

Today we hold that liberal democracy, with its fundamental principle of free and equal hat does this mean in terms of citizenship, is the best form of government practical agendas? Take symbols. available to us. It has been able to accom- W In line with the North philosophy, modate, on the basis of equality, groups Bryson and McCartney recognise the which are otherwise fundamentally di- right of those acting provocatively or for vided on moral, philosophical, and reli- sectarian reasons to express their views, gious grounds. In Northern Ireland, while insisting they do not have the right however, we cling to ideologies of roman- to limit the free expression of others. Set- tic nationalism and confessional democ- ting rights against responsibilities, they racy, such as have led Europe to therefore recommend greater tolerance destruction in the past.24 of other people’s display of their symbols And where does this leave the role of gov- and a recognition that one’s own should ernment? Again, the implications are only be expressed in the least offensive revolutionary. Following the arguments way, bearing in mind the sentiments of

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 117 opponents. grasp of whence we all, diversely, have It might be possible to develop sym- come is a prerequisite of any resolution. bols which would not replace anthems The overriding public interest in such and flags, but which would manifest a minimum political awareness on the part sense of shared heritage and identity. of citizens is surely at least as pressing Bryson and McCartney call for legal limi- as the individual labour-market demands tations to avoid excesses which interfere of literacy and numeracy skills render- with the greater good and with the rights ing other subjects compulsory. of others.25 And the more detailed recom- Within such a core subject, schoolchil- mendations of the North review, such as dren would be expected, by age 16, to the guidelines for whether parades demonstrate an understanding of all as- should be permitted and codes of prac- pects of the identities, ideologies and tice for parade organisers, fill this prin- events which have shaped Northern Ire- ciple out. Surely it is not beyond the land. A model might be the current ‘A’ capacity of reasonable people to accept level Irish history syllabus covering the display of the Union flag only on a par period 1912-23. In the absence of sus- with elsewhere in the UK of today (that tained cross-community interchanges, is, hardly anywhere or ever), without proactive use of the curriculum may be nationalists demanding that the Tricol- the only mechanism to counteract, in a our (flown only on some national build- limited manner, the prejudices school- ings in the republic) fill the gap. children inherit from their peers.26 Or take education. We have already A third area for progress is the ‘part- mentioned above how, despite the mer- nership’ experience, preparing as it does its of EMU, there is no substitute for en- on a micro-scale for the macro-challenges hancing integrated education. But we of ‘dialogic democracy’ in Northern Ire- share the concern expressed earlier in land. Most developed are the district this report about the lack of a require- partnerships established under the Eu- ment to learn history until the minimum ropean Union ‘peace package’—drawing school-leaving age and about the episodic together as they do representatives from engagement with the history of North- the district council in the area, the com- ern Ireland that even then may apply. munity and voluntary sector, the private While there are risks in any policy that sector, trade unions and local statutory smacks of compulsion, it is surely evident interests. Some of the key ingredients of in the context of the conflict that a good partnerships have been identified as:

118 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 • building trust, confidence and under- existing symbolism of the Royal Ulster standing between the different sectors ; Constabulary, to make the force more • developing a shared vision, common acceptable to nationalists.29 objectives and agreed goals, promoting Yet, with a mixture of ingenuity and equality between the partners; much goodwill even such contentious • developing flexible structures to facili- challenges can be addressed. Mgr Denis tate feedback and to foster the participa- Faul, for example, having made the ef- tion of the community; fort to understand the sense of loss and • cultivating effective leadership skills, betrayal of dead relatives, friends and especially in coalition-building, amongst colleagues which a dropping of the cur- project leaders; rent name would entail—and as our Prot- • decentralising the decision-making of estant focus groups bear out—has come state agencies; and to propose a compromise alternative: ‘The • developing effective links back to na- RUC: Northern Ireland’s Police Service’. tional policy-making.27 While doubtless many would still find With a continuing absence of demo- this difficult to swallow, it is from such cratic regional government in Northern micro-, even personal, efforts at mutual Ireland, the partnerships provide a model understanding, through dialogue, that of how to involve different sectors in pluralism and parity of esteem in North- confidence-building, through exploring ern Ireland will slowly, and patiently, be common socio-economic objectives. Part- built. DD nerships also have the potential to intro- duce greater representation of the Footnotes community, through the involvement of 1 Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden, Northern Ire- persons not motivated by the constitu- land: The Choice, Penguin, London, 1994 2 A Pollak ed, A Citizens’ Inquiry: The Opsahl tional question alone. Report on Northern Ireland, Lilliput, Dublin, Or, finally, take policing—one of the 1993, p120; Standing Advisory Commission on most fraught issues of all. Hamilton, Human Rights, Religious and Political Discrimi- nation and Equality of Opportunity in Northern Moore and Trimble advocate a number Ireland: Second Report, HMSO, London, 1990, of reforms, including the principle—now p116 accepted—of an entirely independent 3 Ernest Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism, complaints procedure.28 More contentious I B Tauris, Oxford, 1994, 9173 4 Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and Interna- are their recommendations for a change tional Relations (second edition), Dartmouth, in the name and removal of much of the Aldershot, 1995, p151

DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7 119 5 ibid, p231 18 Marjorie Mowlam, ‘Towards genuine consent 6 ibid, p152 in Ulster’, Independent, February 25th 1997 7 SACHR, op cit, p119 19 Independent Review ..., p5 8 R Osborne, A Gallagher, R Cormack and S 20 ibid, p10 Shortall, ‘The implementation of the Policy Ap- 21 ibid, pp 10-11 praisal and Fair Treatment guidelines in North- 22 It is worth noting that these arguments about ern Ireland’, in Eithne McLaughlin and Pádraic the bottom-line positions of the two sides were Quirk ed, Policy Aspects of Employment Equal- also clearly rehearsed by the Opsahl Commis- ity in Northern Ireland, SACHR, Belfast, 1996, pp sion, on the basis of the widespread evidence 127-52 submitted to it; see Pollak ed, op cit, pp 24-5. 9 Christopher McCrudden, Mainstreaming Fair- 23 Indeed, a very senior source in the former gov- ness?: A Discussion Paper on ‘Policy Appraisal ernment claimed that the scope for north-south and Fair Treatment’, Committee on the Admin- institutions had in fact diminished since 1979, istration of Justice, Belfast, 1996, p9 since so many governmental functions in the 10 ibid, p11 north had been transformed through privatisa- 11 Nigel Hutson, Policy Appraisal and Fair Treat- tion and agentisation, creating disjunctions with ment in Northern Ireland: A Contribution to the still relatively conventional public-service ar- Debate on Mainstreaming Equality, SACHR, Bel- rangements in the republic. fast, 1996 24 Eamon Stack, ‘Major questions facing the Or- 12 Tom Hadden, ‘Possible structures for the ange Order’, Irish Times, May 27th 1997 development and implementation of Policy Ap- 25 Bryson and McCartney, op cit, pp 184-8 praisal on Separation and Sharing (PASS)’, un- 26 It is interesting in this context that a further published paper, February 1997; see also Paul set of focus groups conducted by DD, this time Gorecki, ‘A comment on Mainstreaming Fair- solely among young people, manifested a sur- ness?’, unpublished paper, March 1997. prising appetite for political education in school 13 V Borooah, P M McKee, N Heaton and G and via the youth service. See Politics: The Next Collins, ‘Catholic-Protestant income differences Generation, DD report 6, Belfast, 1997 in Northern Ireland’, Review of Income and 27 Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Ac- Wealth, series 41, no 1, March 1995 tion, Partners for Progress: The Voluntary and 14 Asbjørn Eide, A Review and Analysis of Con- Community Sector’s Contribution to Partner- structive Approaches to Group Accommodation ship-building, Belfast, 1995, p16 and Minority Protection in Divided or 28 A Hamilton, L Moore and T Trimble, Policing Multicultural Societies, Dublin, 1996 in a Divided Society, Centre for the Study of 15 Pádraic Quirk and Eithne McLaughlin, ‘Tar- Conflict, Coleraine, 1995, pp 155-7 geting Social Need’, in Quirk and McLaughlin 29 ibid, pp 151-2 eds, op cit, pp 153-85; Paul Teague and Robin Wilson, ‘Towards an inclusive society’, in Social Exclusion, Social Inclusion, DD report 2, Belfast, 1995, pp 79-97 16 P Shirlow, I Shuttleworth and M Evans, ‘FEC facts’, Fortnight 361, May 1997, pp 21-3 17 Independent Review of Parades and Marches, Stationery Office, Belfast, 1997

120 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE NO 7