Interpretation A JOURNAL A OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Fall 1993 Volume 21 Number 1

Carl Page The Unnamed Fifth: Republic 369d

Patrick Coby Socrates on the Decline and Fall of Regimes Books 8 and 9 of the Republic

Gulliver' Richard Burrow s Travels: The Stunting of a Philosopher

Book Reviews

Charles E. Butterworth AIf Layla wa Layla, The Arabian Nights, translated by Husain Haddawy

Michael P. Zuckert The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism, and the American Revolution, by Steven M. Dworetz

Charles T. Rubin Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, by Arne Naess

Lucia Boyden An Index to Interpretation, Volumes 11 Prochnow through 20 Interpretation

Editor-in-Chief Hilail Gildin, Dept. of Philosophy, Queens College Executive Editor Leonard Grey General Editors Seth G. Benardete Charles E. Butterworth Hilail Gildin Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) Howard B. White (d. 1974) Consulting Editors Christopher Bruell Joseph Cropsey Ernest L. Fortin John Hallowell (d. 1992) Harry V. Jaffa David Lowenthal Muhsin Mahdi Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) Michael Oakeshott (d. 1990) Ellis Sandoz Leo Strauss (d. 1973) Kenneth W. Thompson European Editors Terence E. Marshall Heinrich Meier Editors Wayne Ambler Maurice Auerbach Fred Baumann Michael Blaustein - Mark Blitz Patrick Coby Edward J. Erler Maureen Feder-Marcus Joseph E. Goldberg Stephen Harvey Pamela K. Jensen Ken Masugi Grant B. Mindle James W. Morris Will Morrisey Aryeh L. Motzkin Charles T. Rubin Leslie G. Rubin Bradford P. Wilson Hossein Ziai Michael Zuckert Catherine Zuckert Manuscript Editor Lucia B. Prochnow

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Fall 1993 Volume 21 Number 1

Carl Page The Unnamed Fifth: Republic 369d 3

Patrick Coby Socrates on the Decline and Fall of Regimes: Books 8 and 9 of the Republic 15

Richard Burrow Gulliver's Travels: The Stunting of a Philosopher 41

Book Reviews

Charles E. Butterworth AlfLayla wa Layla, The Arabian Nights, translated by Husain Haddawy 59 Michael P. Zuckert The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism, and the American Revolution, by Steven M. Dworetz 67

Charles T. Rubin Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, by Arne Naess 73

Lucia Boyden An Index to Interpretation, Volumes 1 1 Prochnow through 20 81

Copyright 1993 - interpretation

ISSN 0020-9635

The Unnamed Fifth: Republic 369d

Carl Page Emory University

Halfway through Book II of Plato's Republic, Socrates, Glaucon, and Adei

speech" mantus embark upon their famous construction of a "city in (369c). Their aim is to read the idea of justice off the scrutable face of the city as an alternative to having to fathom the obscurer depths of men's individual souls (368d-369a). Full development of the city in speech occurs in a series of dis tinguishable phases, culminating in the program of education that Socrates pro poses for his philosopher-kings at the end of Book VII (521c-540c). Of the many transitions that mark the overall development, two stand out for being the only ones marked by a dramatic interruption of the conversation. The one is occasioned by Glaucon in Book II (372c) and the other by Adeimantus (on behalf of Polemarchus) at the beginning of Book V (449b). Groundwork for the city in speech begins with Adeimantus and runs through two stages before Glaucon interrupts. The second, elaborated from 370c-372b, produces a model "healthy" "truthful" city that Socrates soon calls and (372e), while the very first

city" stage of the construction is dubbed "the most necessary (he anagkaiotate (andres)" polis) and it is made up "from four or five men (369d). As it hap

city" pens, the very brief account of skills demanded by "the most necessary had included only four by name: the arts of the farmer, the housebuilder, the weaver, and the shoemaker. In light of the procedurally crucial resolve to spell out their city with the largest, clearest, most discernible alphabet possible, the casualness of this "four five" or at the very outset appears arbitrarily vague; there is no evident reason for allowing the outlines of the model city to become blurred so early on. Still worse, however, is the oxymoronic conjunction in exactly the same Socratic

necessary"five." breath of "most and "four or Is the fifth needed or not? What sort of superlative necessity can they have discovered, if Socrates is unable even to count the number of occupations essential to "the most necessary city"? Socrates' These two observations suggest that mention of a fifth man is not embellishment. It is some casual slip of the tongue or thoughtless momentary too logically embarrassing or ridiculous for that. The unnamed fifth, therefore, presents a puzzle that calls for interpretation. Why should he (Socrates does say could unnamed function be? andres) have been mentioned at all? What his Socrates' Adeimantus happens to make no comment about the oddities in

most would be made from four or summary statement that "the necessary city

interpretation, Fall 1993, Vol. 21, No. 1 4 Interpretation

men" Socrates' five (369d). Were it not for the fact that interlocutors are so often represented as only partially understanding the force and direction of his questioning, this might be some ground for dismissing the need to interpret the Socrates' unnamed fifth. More importantly, though, remarks do not have to be meaningful in the context of his immediate conversation in order for them to be meaningful at all. Not only in the particular case of the Republic is there an audience represented within the dialogue, there is also the audience beyond the dialogue for whom Plato has constructed his monologic text. Moreover, it is to this latter level that all intradramatic speculations must eventually be referred. I have already given two reasons for supposing that at least Plato intended the unnamed fifth to be noticed, whether or not it could also be said that Socrates was tacitly addressing others in the dialogue or saying more than he knew "own" Adeimantus would understand for reasons of his own where has only dramatic meaning. My aim in what follows is to confirm that the unnamed fifth was meant to be noticed and to show that it is worth noticing, by deriving directly from the document entitled Republic the means for articulating its larger contextual significance.

Plato's dialogues are full of the quirkiest details. Hermeneutic response to such details varies along a continuum from impatient dismissal to sycophantic obsession. While I intend to pursue an expansive rather than lean interpretation of the unnamed fifth, there is in this case an obvious deflationary (though not dismissive) reading that in the interests of moderation needs to be considered first. It will turn out to be not so much incorrect as inadequate.

Socrates' Here is the entire discussion leading up to summary characteriza

city" tion of the "most necessary at 369d:

S. "Well now, first and greatest of our needs is the provision of food for the sake living." of being and A. "Absolutely." S. "Second is the need for housing, and third the need for clothing and such

things."

A. "That's so."

then," S. "Come I said, "how will the city be up to such provision? How else but that one be a farmer, another a housebuilder, and some other a weaver? Or shall we also install there a shoemaker or some other caretaker of bodily things?"

A. "Quite."

men." S. "So the most necessary city would be from four or five A. "Apparently."'

Socrates' countdown of needs stops at three: food first, shelter second, then

things" "clothing and such third. There is some vagueness built into the last of The Unnamed Fifth: Republic 369d 5 these needs, and it seems to be the ground for the question of whether the enumeration of skilled men corresponding to them should be extended to in

things." clude "a shoemaker or some other caretaker of bodily Although the caretaker" (tin' "other is not named, he is different allon) and therefore counted separately from the shoemaker, in the same way that the weaver is "some other" (alios tis) in relation to the farmer and housebuilder. The named occupa "four" Socrates' tions may reasonably be taken to correspond to the of sum

things" mary, which leaves "some other caretaker of the bodily as the obvious candidate for the unspecified fifth. Whatever else may be said about this, the number of human occupations in other words, the character of human life even in the most necessary city is underdetermined by the number of man's "three" basic needs. This is represented by the indeterminate inequality of and five." five" "four or In fact, "four or is strictly speaking not even a number. The most necessary city, once realized, is necessarily indeterminate. The deflationary reading would have matters end here; Socrates says "four five" or because he has named four and only vaguely alluded to the possibility of a fifth caretaker of bodily things. I accept the correlation, but deny that it sufficiently explains either the indeterminacy of the count itself or the merely generic characterization of the unnamed fifth. There is still an inconsistency between the resolve to be as precise as possible and the insouciance of counting five," "four or and still an inconsistency between the claim to have described the most necessary city without having said anything of the specific need in which the fifth occupation is rooted, that is, the need that makes it truly neces sary. There must therefore be more meaning to be gleaned from the simple fact

things" that the unnamed fifth is a "caretaker of bodily than this vague charac terization. Moreover, there is even greater reason to suspect some irony in the text at this point, for in expatiating on bodily care Socrates is made to add a

necessary" shoemaker to the "most city. Not only are shoemakers not obviously necessary, Socrates himself is notorious for going about unshod. If Socrates does not need shoes, the shoemaker is not necessary for at least the Socratic way of life (cf. Phaedrus 229a, Symposium 174a). This observation can be immediately interpreted in one of two ways: either shoemaking is without further qualification less necessary to the city than weaving, housebuilding, and farming, or Socrates is out of place even at the most fundamental level of the polis. On the second reading, the civilization implied by shoes would be a necessary part of political life yet not a necessary part of the philosophical one. But if shoes should mark the city for the sake of this contrast, it is still puzzling why they should do so with utmost necessity. On either reading, then, the sophistication or apparent luxury of shoes, their non-necessity, cannot be overlooked.

Socrates' mention of a shoemaker intimates that corporeal need, while com

complete measure even of the most neces pelling, does not in truth supply the Socrates' to the cities of men needs for sary city. According picture, embody 6 Interpretation things not strictly necessary for survival, for things like shoes in addition to food, shelter, and clothing. The principle that underlies this enriched form of Socrates' need is not survival, to which need only food is explicitly related in list, but care (therapeia). This Socrates clearly indicates by his general charac terization of the unnamed fifth as "some other caretaker (therapeutes) of bodily things." In seeking to care for the body, one seeks more than to ensure its survival, hence one is inclined to speak of self-preservation as an instinct instead of something purposive. Rather, such caring implies an emerging consciousness of the body's well-being and its potential flourishing, in other words, an emerging consciousness of the good. For this reason, it could be said that care responds to need with infinitely more than is necessary, for it locates need inside a universal horizon; care for the body is the first manifestation of freedom.2 human There can therefore be no simple deduction of the forms of human care from physical necessity alone, and hence the number of primary arts must indeterminately outstrip the number of corporeal needs, even at the very foundation of the city in speech. The peculiarly unnecessary addition of the shoemaker as fourth in "the most

city" necessary is a first clue that the necessity proper to cities cannot be under stood on the paradigm of survival. It is not material necessity. Foi creatures that care, their actions are compelled in different ways from the activities of

politics.3 creatures that do not, and such a difference is at the root of The paradigm of care, which contains the seed of freedom from the given, is in serted even before Socrates arrives at the unnamed fifth. It is against this back ground that the latter may be further understood.

II

The unnamed fifth has been all but universally neglected. Aristotle at least noticed him (Politics, iv 1291a23) yet gave no further comment. Most recently, however, Seth Benardete has hazarded that the unnamed fifth must be a war rior.4 Warriors do not officially appear until some time after Glaucon's inter ruption and therefore after Socrates and company have long since expanded their model beyond the most necessary city. At first the warriors appear under (phulakes)" the ambiguous designation of "guardians (374d), and not until much later is the distinction between rulers (archontes) and warriors (stratiotai) explicitly made (412a). It is clear, though, that they are originally introduced to serve an expressly military function and lead a martial way of life. The devel opment that leads from the most necessary city to the emergence of warrior- guardians is the requisite background for understanding Benardete's proposal. The most necessary city was never, in the first place, complete. Having five," gotten to "four or Socrates soon points out that the skills of farming, housebuilding, weaving, and the rest are in need of auxiliary arts. They there- The Unnamed Fifth: Republic 369d - 1 fore add carpenters and smiths, cowherds and shepherds, merchants, sailors, shopkeepers, and laborers, together with a market and a system of currency (370d-371e). What does this list mean? The highest ends of such a city are no more than agricultural and mercantile, its basic structure simply economic. No explicit mention is made of political or governmental structure, no account given of social structure, family life, or religion, and no reference made to war and the need for military resources at least not while the city is being con structed.5 Socrates' rhapsodic summary of the idyllic way of life in such a community prompts the spirited Glaucon to break in, claiming that his brother's city is not fit for men but fit only for those most accommodating and unspirited of animals, namely pigs (372d). With notable alacrity, Socrates takes up Glaucon's point and rapidly sketches "fevered" "luxuriating" what he calls the (phlegmainousa) or (truphosa) city, in Adeimantus' "healthy" "truthful" contrast with city which he now calls and (372e).6 Socrates adds a whole swarm of further occupations in order to satisfy "imitators" Glaucon's expectations (373b-d), beginning with huntsmen and (mimetai). These two additions make it clear that both spirit (thumos) and imagination were absent from Adeimantus's austere polity. Other groups men tioned include the craftsmen of female adornment, reminding us that women and the political consequences of sexual relations had been conveniently over looked in the original construction, and a whole host of servants, implying a far more complex social structure than was envisioned by Adeimantus. First on the list of servants are teachers, reminding the reader of education, and last are the doctors. The total number of new occupations is seventeen. The significance of the transition pivots on the natural force of specifically human desire and its crucial link with the forms of recognizably human politics. Adeimantus's healthy city dissatisfies Glaucon because it leaves the ways of human life in servitude to nature as given. It acknowledges that the given is not on its own sufficient, for this is the precondition of any and all political asso ciation (cf. 369b), but the healthy city merely manipulates the given (tilling fields, building houses, weaving cloaks) and pursues activities that supplement the given for the sake of simple bodily goods. To be sure, such goods are developed within the horizon of care, but care of the body as practised in the healthy city is for the most part preservational (excepting the hint contained in the use of shoes). There is, for example, no teacher of gymnastic in the healthy city to make of the body more than is given, let alone a teacher of the soul. Adeimantus' city accepts the insufficiency of the given without moving to re ject, deny, efface, transform, or transcend it. It merely deals with it. Its pro ductions are convenient rather than beautiful, or meaningful, or noble. This is all summed up in Glaucon's image of the accommodating pig, who will wallow in whatever is at hand and whose horizon of satisfaction extends little farther than the feeding trough. 8 Interpretation

Glaucon, on the other hand, represents the gesture of actively negating the given, of being unwilling to accept that simple necessity must dominate human life. His own first suggestion for how to improve his brother's city is to get the vegetarian feasts that were portrayed by Socrates off the "rushes strewn with

myrtle," yew and i.e., up off the ground, and onto the tables and couches (372d).7 appropriate to civilized men Glaucon thus asserts a certain freedom by setting up distance between himself and the earth, creating such distance by interposing artefacts produced by a form of human ingenuity uncompelled by material necessity but driven by an inchoate urge for refinement. At its root, human dissatisfaction with the given is indeterminate; simple rejection or negation does not result in any specific plan of action. Hence the young Glaucon is represented as not being entirely sure of what is missing from his brother's city. Socrates, on the other hand, the expert in human eros, has fathomed the reaches of human desire and is perfectly capable of immediately

speech.8 filling out Glaucon's presentiment in terms of their city in There may be extravagance and luxury in the full-blooded version of Glaucon's city, but it is at least a city in which art, sex, social structure, education, politics, and in a moment, war may be found and recognized. The fevered city is manifestly a more adequate portrayal of the phenomena of civilized political life, because it acknowledges the forces of spirit, imagination, and erotic desire. Immediately following their second expansion of the city, the first having been from utmost necessity to health and the one now from health to luxury, Socrates discerns the origin of war (373d):

S. "And what about the land, the land that was then sufficient for feeding the men then; it will become small from having been sufficient. Or how should we

speak?"

way," G. "This he said. S. "Then there will be need of cutting off the land of our neighbours, if we are going to have enough to graze and plough, and there will be need for them to cut off ours, should they too let themselves go to the unlimited acquisition of

necessary." wealth, overstepping the boundary of what is Socrates," G. "Quite necessarily, he said. be?" S. "So we shall go to war after that, Glaucon? Or how will it

way," G. "This he said.

yet," S. "Well let's not say I said, "whether war works evil or good, but only this much, that we have in its turn discovered an origin of war out of those things that most of all occur bad in cities, both in private and in public, when they occur. G. "Quite so."

For reasons he does not here specify, Socrates simply assumes the existence of other cities and a natural scarcity of material resources. The first supposition makes no difference to the conflict implied by finite resources and expansive desire, for the same conflict would also occur in a single, global polity. The The Unnamed Fifth: Republic 369d 9 second supposition is initially problematic because it suggests that war is rooted in the merely contingent and extrahuman fact that resources happen to be Socrates' scarce. deeper point, however, is that natural, given resources are in principle inadequate to the demands of emancipated (but as yet undisciplined) human desire. This is why he speaks of letting go "to the unlimited (apeiron)

necessary," acquisition of wealth, overstepping the boundary of what is a possi bility attributed not only to the other cities but also to their own. War is rooted in the indeterminate omnivorousness of human desire. The human negation of the given is comprehensive, totalizing, and thus intrinsically prone to the vice of pleonexia, of wanting more than is sufficient. The path has now been traced from farmers to warriors and so I return to Benardete's account of the unnamed fifth. He reasons as follows:

Glaucon and Socrates originally expanded the city dialogically (373d7), and now it is confronting invaders; but a moment's reflection shows that the army cannot be first formed now but it had to precede the original expansion; indeed, it had to precede the surplus the city created for export. The soldier must have been an original member of the true city. He is the fifth man (369dll). (P. 54)

Benardete's first point rightly uncovers the prestidigitation involved in Soc rates' "guardians." calling their army an army of Regardless of the possibly pedagogical purposes of such a maneuver with respect to the overall course of the conversation, in its essence the fevered city requires aggressors as much as it requires defenders. Fighting is, on the reading I have given, coeval with the totalizing form of desire that underlies the move away from the healthy yet subhuman city of pigs. The spirited expansion of the city is necessarily aggres sive, and forsakes passive caretaking of the body for a whole host of possible goods that would not exist at all were it not for the presence of human beings. Guarding therefore is, as Benardete maintains, logically posterior (though code- termined with the possibility of invasion) to the aggression at the heart of active human freedom. It is, on the other hand, difficult to see how the army needs to be formed prior to the emergence of Glauconian desire. The wholly mercantile world of the healthy city is also a peaceful one, as Socrates emphasizes when he com health" ments that its inhabitants "will live out their lives in peace and (372d). Those who define their lives in economic terms can take pecuniary advantage of war and might welcome it for that reason, but they can have no interest in waging it. Merchants do not care who wins. The only threat on this score to the health of the healthy city is the strange potency of money. If care for comfort, security, and refinement of material good should become desire for the unlim ited power apparently promised by massive wealth then of course commerce becomes transformed into war. But that move transgresses exactly the same boundary transgressed by Glaucon on behalf of more civilized and noble inflec tions of indefinite desire. In sum, warriors might be useful to the mercantile 10 Interpretation ends of Adeimantus's city, but there is no principle within its dynamics that makes them necessary.

Ill

If the unnamed fifth cannot be a warrior, what else or who else could he be? My positive answer to this question falls into two parts. The first counts as a preamble to the second and examines the general functional significance of the unnamed fifth in the development of the city in speech. The second is my interpretation of the unnamed fifth's specific character.

five" In the first section, I interpreted the indeterminate count of "four or in terms of how human care necessarily outstrips the dull imperatives of the given. This outstripping is reflected both in the fact that the count is left inde terminate, for it could only be made determinate if caring and surviving were commensurate in kind, and in the fact that the tasks of the fifth are left un specified; care has more forms than need demands. If care of the body is a minimal expression of human freedom, passive though it be in comparison to the expansiveness of Glauconian desire, then the unnamed fifth becomes a placeholder for all the future forms of human freedom. In this generic sense, the unnamed fifth would indeed be an anticipation of the warrior-guardian, but he would also be an anticipation of the swarm of occupations Socrates adds in the initial construction of the fevered city, not to mention an anticipation of the philosopher-king. Whether one thinks of the tasks added to complete the healthy city as new forms of freedom or not depends on one's assessment of their auxiliary status. In any event, the placeholding function, while consistent with the hypothesis of the unnamed fifth as a warrior, does not require it. Socrates understands that the city of utmost necessity needs elaboration if it is to become an adequate model for human political life and thus an alphabet for the spelling out ofjustice. It is not until they have described the healthy city in its entirety that Socrates asks if it is complete (telea) and where justice and injustice may be found within it (37 le). As it happens, Adeimantus cannot locate the elements of justice in his own city and Socrates does little to help him; instead he waxes eloquent on the healthy, truthful way of life that soon provokes Glaucon to declare its pastoral charms swinish. Socrates also under stands that the healthy city is similarly inadequate. As already noted, his elab oration of the luxurious city swiftly draws attention to the powers of eros, spirit, and imagination overlooked in the previous construction, and it is not long before he passes onto the complex topics of education and rule, also un Adeimantus' considered in the account of city.

So much, then, for the general functional significance of the unnamed fifth. The next question is whether there is anything native to the structure of the most necessary city in its own right that allows one to specify a task or tasks The Unnamed Fifth: Republic 369d 1 1 that belong intrinsically to it but which were not, for whatever reasons, men tioned. I have two possibilities to suggest.

things" The most obvious "caretaker of bodily that Adeimantus and Socrates fail to mention in reflecting on the most necessary city is the doctor. Besides its intrinsic plausibility, there are a few textual clues that support this reading for the occupation of the unnamed fifth. It will be recalled that doctors are explicitly mentioned as the last of the seventeen occupations first added to create and support the fevered city. Here is how they are introduced (373d):

S. "Accordingly, won't we also be in much greater need of doctors, spending our

manner?" time this way than we would be spending it in the previous G. "Much greater."

The comparatives are important; it is the only occupation in the new list that is

need" spoken of in such a way. And how could there be "much greater in the fevered city, unless there was already need in the city that went before? One is encouraged to overlook the comparative progression because the need for doc tors is not explicitly mentioned until the city has become inflamed and swollen, plagued by the unnecessary effects of its effete self-indulgence. But this is not the only form of medicine that Socrates countenances. Much later, in Book III, he has occasion to distinguish the flattering medical art of Herodicus, which tends to those who waste their leisure and freedom in hypochondria, from the much more severe art of Asclepius, which tends to those who need to get well in order to continue performing their citizenly tasks (405d ff.). It is not an accident that the one man who is mentioned by name as being patient to Asclepius's art is a carpenter (406d, 407b), i.e., a member of the healthy city. The carpenter also happens to be the very first auxiliary to be added to the most necessary city (370d); he is, in effect, numbered directly after the unnamed fifth. According to these clues, the role of doctor appears to be the pivot between the city of utmost necessity and its elaboration into a healthy one. The very "healthy" designation itself suggests as much, for how could a city of human beings be healthy in body if not by the presence of doctors? But it is striking that while consistently called healthy, doctors are nowhere mentioned by name Adeimantus' in city. This provokes the evident question: Why are the doctors suppressed? To state my thesis on this point in shortest compass, the doctors are sup pressed because the problem of rule is initially suppressed, and medicine throughout the Republic is a metaphor for the preventive and corrective aspect of rule. (The other main aspect of rule, namely guidance, is constantly repre sented by the image of the pilot. Moreover, pilots and doctors are almost in variably mentioned together. On this imagery see also Nicomachean Ethics, ii 11 04a10.) Let me now indicate the basis of my twofold claim, beginning with Socrates' suppression of the issue of rule. 12 Interpretation

Socrates reveals his awareness that rule is demanded even by the dynamics implied by the city of utmost necessity in several ways. First is his discussion of the kairos in the exercise of any art (370b). There is a proper moment for the performance of any task, and it cannot be left "to await the leisure of the man it." who does This raises the question of who is to ensure that a man should compromise his leisure, which is to say his autonomy. Next, in introducing the auxiliary art of shopkeeping, Socrates makes a passing reference to "rightly

cities" managed (371c) wherein those too weak to engage primary tasks take up the secondary ones. Finally, some time after Glaucon's interruption Socrates hints at the need for policing the most necessary city when he notes that "we prevented the shoemaker from trying at the same time to be a farmer or a weaver or a housebuilder; he had to stay a shoemaker just so the shoemaker's

us" art would produce fine work for (374b). Aristotle's commentary on the most necessary city confirms the point: "Yet even amongst the four or however many partners there be, there must be someone to assign and to judge what is just" (Politics, iv 1291a22). The coordination of doctoring and rule is almost too pervasive to require separate comment. In setting up the problem of justice, doctors and pilots ap pear as important examples in the opening exchanges with Polemarchus (332e) and Thrasymachus (341c, 346b), while they are also mentioned in Glaucon's request for a more thorough treatment (360e). When rulers (archontes) are mentioned for the very first time, their function is directly compared with the doctor, the gymnastics trainer, and the pilot (389b). This is done in an effort to explain the potential justification for using lies as drugs (pharmaka), itself a further and subsequently crucial medicinal analogy; Asclepian medicine is char "statesmanlike" lie" acterized as (politikon; 407e); the infamous "noble of Book Socrates' III is first actual example of a pharmacological lie told for the sake of

doctor," the city's health (414c); at 459c he calls for a "most courageous not one of the ordinary kind, who is willing to use a further "throng of lies and deceptions" as drugs "for the benefit of the ruled"; and finally, in the well- known image of the city as a ship (488a ff), Socrates asserts a direct analogy between the excellence and nobility of the pilot, the doctor, the philosopher, and the statesman (489b). Not naming the doctors of the healthy city, therefore, is entirely of a piece with not alluding to its governance and the governance of the necessary city at its core. The unnamed fifth is both a doctor and the hidden ruler in the first city; he is both the prime example and regulator of care's first manifestations. It could be said that the doctor is in truth the first of human beings to overrule nature and by that right he rules those who remain subservient to the impera tives of the given. In other words, his is the first architectonic art. The doctor does not, however, negate the given; Asclepian medicine is the necessary but not sufficient condition for freedom.

The final question provoked by the unnamed fifth, therefore, is why sup- The Unnamed Fifth: Republic 369d 13

Socrates' press the issue of rule? I think the reason for represented coyness on this score is tied up with the pedagogical need to discipline the inherent fascina tion, indeed excitement, in the practical question of who should rule. A truly serious response to the question of who should rule requires that the most care ful attention be given to all the sources of unruliness in the community of human beings spirit, eros, self-interest, sex, attachment, laziness, vanity that is, sober attention must be given to the theoretical question of why rule is necessary. Hence Socrates postpones his outrageous answer to the practical question, namely that philosophers should rule, until after its theoretical under pinnings are clear. Barely asked, the question of who should rule is naturally prone to cloud the judgment of youthful souls such as Glaucon, Adeimantus, and some of the other young men present. Articulated to the outrageous length of installing philosophers as kings it is virtually guaranteed of having no audi ence at all. Little wonder, then, that Socrates should introduce his thinking on the matter with such caution.

NOTES

1 . Translations from the Greek are mine throughout.

2. Aristotle coordinates consciousness of the good with the essence of man as both rational and political: "speech [logos] is for making evident what is advantageous and what is harmful, and therefore also what is just and what is unjust; for this is, in relation to the rest of living things, proper to human beings that only they are able to perceive good and bad, just and unjust, and the

city" rest, and community in these things makes both household and (Politics, i 1253a 15- 18).

Socrates' city" 3. This counts as a rejoinder to Aristotle's criticism in his commentary on "first that it implies that "every city is composed for the sake of necessities rather than for the sake of

noble" what is (Politics, iv 1291al8). Socrates' 4. Seth Benardete, Second Sailing: On Plato's Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 54. 5. Socrates tacitly draws attention to many of these oversights when he goes on to summarize the healthy city's way of life at 372a after he has supposed it complete enough to pose the question of where to find justice. His summary introduces elements nowhere mentioned in the specific construction: "Setting out noble loaves of barley and wheat on some reeds or clean leaves, they will stretch out on rushes strewn with yew and myrtle and feast themselves and their children. After wards they will drink wine and, crowned with wreaths, sing of the gods. So they will have sweet intercourse with one another, not producing children beyond their means and keeping an eye out

war" "war" against poverty or (372b). The speech ends on the word because that is precisely where Glaucon is made to interrupt. The reference to not producing children beyond their means is an anticipation of the political vagaries introduced by sexual eros and reproduction that even the best regime cannot ultimately control and which are therefore the ultimate cause of corruption in all regimes (546a ff.).

Socrates' "true," 6. epithet here is alethine (rather than alethes). It can be translated either as which has been the more common for this particular passage, although its primary meaning is

"truthful." "truthftil" For an explanation of why is the preferable rendition, see Carl Page, "The Republic," Truth about Lies in Plato's Ancient Philosophy 11 (1991): 1-33. 7. Benardete states the point nicely: "Tables put meat off the ground, and couches put men off the ground (372b4-6); they separate man from pig by elevating him and delay the satisfaction of his desires. They are the first instruments that intervene between the consumer and his immediate

things" consumption of (p. 51). 14 Interpretation

8. Socrates consistently testifies to his own expertise in erotics. In the Symposium he describes

erotics" himself as someone who "knows (epistasthai) nothing other than (177d-e); in the Phae

art" drus he claims to possess the "erotic (he erotike techne; 257a); and in the Theages he is least modest of all: "I happen to know (epistasthai) nothing except a certain small subject erotics. Yet in this subject I rank myself as awesomely accomplished (deinos) beyond anyone else among those live" (128b)." who have been and among those who now Socrates is not made to mention those to come because that would include Plato. Socrates on the Decline and Fall of Regimes: Books 8 and 9 of the Republic

Patrick Coby Smith College

At the end of Book 9 of the Republic, Socrates describes the human soul as an amalgam of unrelated parts, one third human, one third lion, and one third many-headed beast, or hydra. Reason is the human part, spiritedness the lion, and appetite the hydra. Covering the soul is a body which in appearance is entirely human. This uniform exterior, however, misleads as to the reality within, for within there is absent any unity of form; and, barring education, there is absent as well any unity of purpose. Human beings are a composite of body and soul, and of reason, passion, and desire. When left to their natural and uncultivated condition, human beings are divided and factious. Now it is Socrates' contention and more will be said of this below that man and city are analogous entities, that what is present in the individual is reflected in the group. If man is a combination of parts, so too is the city a combination of classes. And if man's parts are unrelated in their natures and discordant in their union, so too are the classes of the city. Accordingly, civil strife, rather than a temporary disequilibrium, is the common and expected state of political affairs. Why is there faction in politics? Because there is diversity within human be ings. More importantly, there is diversity among human beings, for some are predominantly appetitive, others are spirited, and a few are rational. While it may be possible to so order these types that the whole can function as a unit, the whole in question is nevertheless a monstrous fabrication, the social equiva lent of a hydra tied to a lion tied to a human, all wrapped up in a form that is human.

Socrates argues that psychic parts and human beings do lend themselves to a right ordering and that right ordering exists when reason rules appetite with the assistance of spirit, or when philosopher-kings with warrior auxiliaries rule over a city of workers. Faction is a problem, but seemingly not one which defies resolution. The question is how to effect the remedy. Since the soul is naturally diverse, unity must be created, and created out of elements apt to be at war. Only reason can create this unity because only reason is just: it gives to other parts their due (586e), whereas the other parts, when exercising power, take for themselves and oppress (587a, 590a-b). The soul cannot be ruled well by a lion or a hydra, and the city cannot avoid faction by any scheme to set free the emotions and appetites. The liberation of emotion and appetite is thought by

interpretation, Fall 1993, Vol. 21, No. 1 16 Interpretation modern authors to be a realistic expedient and not at all incompatible with civil

ambition" peace; for with the proper institutions in place, "ambition counteracts hand" and an "invisible distributes society's resources to self-serving competi Socrates' tors. But in estimation these structured freedoms represent the feeding of the lion and the many-headed beast, with the result that the lion and the

other"(589a3-4).' beast "bite and fight and devour each For when the lion is overfed, the soul becomes stubborn and ill-tempered to the detriment of the beast and the human; and when the beast is overfed, the lion and the human suffer injury as the soul becomes soft, licentious, and cowardly. Civil peace depends, therefore, not on the institutions of politics and economics, but on the moral discipline imposed by reason. "When all the soul follows the philosophic factious" and is not (586e4-5), says Socrates, each part receives its own plea sures and only the savage heads of the beast are suppressed (589b). Socrates' What exactly is faction? answer is somewhat unusual, for he does not define it as political division caused by disagreement about who should rule (immoderation; 43 le). Aristotle defines faction in much this way, as a problem of distributive justice (Politics 5.1.2-5). But to Socrates faction is tantamount to privacy; it also is the consequence of privacy (464c-d). Faction is the great est evil that can afflict a city, he contends, and its counterpart, a "community

pain," of pleasure and is the greatest good (462a-e, 464bl). A community of

own" pleasure and pain exists when citizens say "my own and not my about the same things, or when privacy is all but eradicated. Socrates is something of a "republican" humanist,"2 here, or what present-day scholarship calls a "civic for he expands the public and constricts the private, proposing a homogeneous community of patriotic citizens as the solution to faction. Aristotle, by contrast, "liberal," is more of a his solution being a compromise, a polity regime, in which citizens retain a class identity and where law and a sharing of offices protect against the abuse of power (on the sharing of power by the classes of rich and poor, see Politics 6.3). It should be noted, however, that what Socrates recommends, an extreme 466a8- melding of interest, applies mainly to the ruling class (464a9, 464b6, b2). The rulers must surrender their private lives and transform themselves into perfectly public beings; they must all be as one, like-minded and in agreement. The ruled, on the other hand, are not asked to agree, and no measures are taken to insure their loyalty. Even in an aristocracy little attention is paid to teaching the ruled moderation. The supposition throughout is that the ruled will support the established order, or at least not actively oppose it, and that faction arises when private pleasures divide the rulers and interfere with the performance of their duties (465b, 545d). As Socrates remarks, the kind of faction that can topple regimes occurs among the rulers: "Or is it simply the case that change in every regime comes from that part of it which holds the ruling offices when faction arises in it while when it is of one mind, it cannot be moved, be it composed of ever so few?" (545c9-d3). Since stability is a consequence of unanimity at the top Socrates on the Decline and Fall ofRegimes 17 rather than of inclusivity and breadth of support, it should follow that the fewer the people who need to agree, the more unified and secure the regime. Accord ingly, the most durable regime is monarchy, whether a kingship or a tyranny; and the least durable is democracy. But this conclusion is incorrect, for it presupposes that the individual, in his original state, is a unified whole with a single interest or purpose in life. Socra tes' analogy of the tripartite soul says otherwise. So too does the conversation in Book 1 of the Laws about the ubiquity of war and the political primacy of war preparations. Two of that dialogue's discussants, Cleinias and the Athenian Stranger, agree that not only are cities perpetual enemies but also neighbor hoods within cities, individuals within neighborhoods, and persons in relation to themselves (625e-626d). When discord is carried this far, into a person's very identity, it is impossible to determine victors and vanquished in the war of all against all. Cities cannot recognize victory, much less achieve it, if their citizens are divided in their ends, and the soul cannot pursue its selfish interests if the self is a chaos of discordant parts. The soul or the city must be mastered and made whole before the combatant is ready for a world at war. Thus whether monarchy is a lasting regime depends less on the concentration of power than on the harmony of the monarch's soul. Education is what harmo nizes, and if the king is educated while the tyrant is not, then kingship and tyranny, rather than equally durable monarchies, are political opposites with opposite prospects for success. Education is mentioned frequently in Book 8 but never with precision (un like in Book 7 where it is described as the turning around of the soul). Some times it is called argument, sometimes speech, sometimes music, and some times practice (546d, 548b, 549a, 552e, 554b, 559b, 559d, 560b). It seems to include both instruction and habituation. Its purpose is not truth and the idea of the Good but psychic constancy. The soul has many parts; willy-nilly some ordering will obtain with some one part in command. But whether that part remains in command depends on its skill as a guardian, and guardianship de pends on education. Unless there is education, the order of the soul and the order of the city will not endure. Education is the means to peace and stability. We have been considering such questions as why faction exists, what faction is, whether it is curable, and how it is cured. Before a final answer is given to these latter two questions, some observations are in order about the general Socrates' character of Socratic regime analysis. The starting point of political science is the proposition that the individual is prior to the regime or that the

soul. principle stated in Book 2 as city is an image writ large of the This is first Socrates begins the work of founding (368d-369a), and it is repeated here in Book 8 as Socrates relates the history of political decay (544d-e). What it means is that the democratic soul, for instance, comes before and is the cause of the democratic city. From this relationship Socrates concludes that the re gime is a function of the likes and dislikes of the ruling class. By whatever means the souls of the rulers come to be arranged (whether by the education of 18 Interpretation a founder or by the interplay of chance events), that ordering of parts shows itself in the regime, or in the laws, customs, and institutions of the city. And the regime in turn shapes the souls of the ruled; it "tip[s] the scale, as it were, [it]" "tipping" draw[ing] the rest along with (544el-2). But how this occurs exactly is not explained, for we never see the regime in action, or the rulers relating to the ruled.3 Socrates classifies regimes not by the number of their rulers (as with the one, few, and many of Aristotle's typology; Politics 1.7.2) but by the good to which the rulers aspire. What they love and honor most determines who they behave.4 are and how they Applying this method, Socrates defines aristocracy as the regime in which the rulers love virtue or wisdom; timocracy is the re gime where the love of honor or reputation prevails; in oligarchy the love of wealth is primary; in democracy it is freedom, and in tyranny love itself. There are five regimes in all examined, although aristocracy, the subject of the middle books, is seen only in transition. One element missing from the analysis despite remarks made above is consideration of the durability of regimes. We are not told how long they last, and they are not evaluated in terms of their relative staying power. Instead, regimes are ranked on a descending scale corresponding to the capacity of the 587c-e).5 thing loved to make people happy (580b, 583a, Socrates does not explain why the oligarchic man is happier than the democratic man or why the timocrat is next to the aristocrat. The contrary might well be expected, for the oligarch knows something of the happiness of the timocrat and rejects it; like wise the democrat rejects oligarchic happiness knowing something of the neces sary pleasures of money-making and so on down the scale (582a-c). One point is clear: the important rankings are those of aristocracy and tyranny at the extremes; the king or aristocrat is happier than the tyrant, Socrates affirms; indeed the former is 729 times happier than the latter (587e). The middle three regimes seem ranked by their proximity to the worst regime, and what makes them proximate or remote is the degree of self-restraint operating in the ruling class:6 democrats are restrained by law, oligarchs by law and necessity, and timocrats by law, necessity, and honor. If this observation is true, democratic freedom is not less conducive to happiness than oligarchic wealth (democracy is heroic on the Hesiodic scale, whereas oligarchy is bronze [546e; Strauss, 7 1959, p. 36; 1964, p. 130]). It is rather the case that democracy, because of its freedom or lack of restraint, is closer to tyranny and that tyranny is the regime least conducive to happiness. Democracy is the precipice and tyranny the abyss. Defective regimes are all troubled by the presence of mixed principles in the ruling class. Timocrats are defined by their love of honor, but they harbor a secret attachment to wealth. Oligarchs love money-making but also the unnec essary pleasures which money can buy. And freedom-loving democrats are tempted by the lawlessness of tyrannical lust. In every case the rulers expel an alien element from their company only to find that the division without has been replicated within. Mixed principles coexisting in the souls of the rulers are Socrates on the Decline and Fall ofRegimes 19 the bane ofpolitics and the cause of a regime's decline. That mixed principles are a political good, stabilizing the city through a balance of power, is an outcome which Socrates does not foresee, although his comments would seem to invite a consideration.

Given that political faction is an evil, the question of its prevention is under Socrates' standably foremost. To this end it is worth noting that in story of decline and fall mixed principles seem not to be the consequence of necessity. It is not as if timocrats need oligarchic wealth in order to buy off the working class, or that oligarchs need democratic numbers in order to fill the offices of state and to broaden support for their money-making regime. Nor do demo crats, in fact, need the leadership of a tyrant in order to defend against oli garchs bent on reprisals (oligarchs are described quite differently). (It is true that philosophers need warriors, but this particular mixing of types is not what brings about the destruction of aristocracy.) If coalition governments were a political imperative, their diversity of purpose might cause it to seem that fac tion is constant and degeneration unavoidable. But what we observe instead is that mixed principles are freely adopted by the people in charge, that timocrats, for instance, change themselves into oligarchs. This choice, which follows from the claim that faction occurs among the rulers, suggests that the preserva

rulers' tion of single principles and pure types is within the disposing and re

education.8 quires only that the rulers take seriously the work of The fact that ameliorative legislation is hinted at and sometimes proposed furthers the im pression that political science is equal to the task of supplying political peace, even outside the best regime. But an optimistic reading of Books 8 and 9 is finally impossible, for stability is not made attainable by having education named as its cause. Education means either the knowledge which informs reason when reason rules in the best regime, or the habits which restrain emotion and desire when emotion and desire rule in defective regimes. Human knowledge, however, is insufficient to understand causes and to control effects, and habits are unsustainable without the support of knowledge-directed legislation. To a degree, an educated reason is causative when it rules the city or the soul, but there are causes outside itself which are fundamentally mysterious. The situation is much worse when reason is merely advisory, with spirit or appetite holding sway, for with the "acrop olis" (560b7-8) thus vacant, the causes impacting the city or the soul grow in number and complexity. If even the best regime and the rational soul are prone to change,9 defective regimes and irrational souls are hopelessly unstable.

I. TIMOCRACY

Timocracy declines from aristocracy because the philosopher-kings, at some point in their tenure, make a mistake in the timing of births. Several genera tions later the ruling class is revealed to be a composite of all four metallic 20 Interpretation types. A compromise is effected in which one of these types is excluded (gold), and in which one of the remaining three (silver) dominates the other two (bronze and iron). A single timocrat emerges as ruler, but his soul is divided between love of honor and love of money. Socrates will not tell the tale of the fall of aristocracy in his own voice, but invokes the authority and tragic irony of the Muses. How "faction first at tacked" is explained by an act of poetic imagination, as must indeed be the case since Socrates ties political decline to revolutions of the cosmos and to the life cycles of organic beings of these obscure subjects only poets and prophets can speak. To say that all created things (even those created by man) will of necessity decompose is to resign oneself to the city's fate and to discourage accusations that its founding was imperfect. The founding was perfect in the sense that philosophers were installed as rulers. But the intelligence of philoso phers is a part of nature, and like nature its capacities rise and fall. Reason passes through cycles of vitalization and exhaustion. When worn down by time, it misidentifies the period for conceiving divine offspring, a period com prehended by perfect numbers and ascertained mathematically. Socrates is a tease: there is knowledge to be had which can correct the impermanence of becoming; but we cannot have it or have it with sufficient regularity. We are invited to look for solutions, in particular to fix the problem of faction, but we are cautioned that no fix will forever hold. Even in the best regime where philosophers are in power, reason is defeated by a mysterious nature, and social harmony gives way to discord. Decline is not immediate, however. Four generations are needed to ruin the ruling class. In the first generation a mistake is made in timing the matings with the result that the best of the offspring are unworthy. The second generation, upon coming of age, fails to defend the education, and so its children are less worthy still. Being unmusical, this, the third generation, is unable to perform the testing of the races. Thus the fourth generation is a "chaotic mixing of iron

gold"(547a2).' with silver and bronze with The mixing of metallic types inside irregularity" the ruling class produces "unlikeness and inharmonious which in hatred." Socrates' turn produce "war and conclusion is that "faction must al

ancestry' arise" ways be said to be 'of this wherever it happens to (547a4-5).

ancestry" The expression "of this is borrowed from Homer's Iliad (6.211); Glaucus speaks it after reciting the generations of his forefathers. Because of this recitation, Diomedes, the Achaean enemy to whom the speech is ad dressed, recognizes Glaucus as his family's guest-friend and proposes that the two of them exchange armor his bronze for Glaucus's gold and that they agree to avoid each other in combat, or that they declare a private peace. Peace and friendship rather than enmity and war are the results of an encounter used by Socrates to illustrate, paradoxically, that mixing breeds faction. This puzzle is further complicated by the fact that the mixing in question (all four metallic types in the ruling class) does not lead to faction and civil war but to compro- Socrates on the Decline and Fall of Regimes 21 mise and civil peace: "Struggling and straining against one another, they came to an agreement on a middle way: they distributed land and houses to be held privately, while those who previously were guarded by them as free friends and supporters they then enslaved and held as serfs and domestics; and they occu

men" pied themselves with war and with guarding against these (547b-c). The

way" compromise is a "middle because the money-makers are rewarded with private property while the guardians are rewarded with mastery and combat. But what has become of war and hatred, said to be the consequences of faction in the ruling class? One prominent feature of the Glaucus-Diomedes story is the judgment by the poet that Glaucus's exchange of gold armor for bronze was a witless trans action (6.234-36). Now it is well worth noting that in the Republic the silver- souled warriors of the timocratic regime trade away their alliance with golden- souled philosophers for an alliance with bronze- (and iron-) souled laborers. Is

way" this too a bad exchange, even though Socrates calls the deal a "middle and specifies the social peace that issues from it? Yes it is, for without the

way" guardianship of philosophers, this "middle comes to favor the lesser of the contracting parties (timocrats become oligarchs) and sets in motion a pro cess of decline characterized by ever increasing levels of violence: Aristoc racy's transformation into timocracy is wrought by compromise rather than by war; but then the enslavement of free citizens is an ugly feature of this new re gime. Oligarchy comes about through intimidation or force of arms (551b3-5), democracy through civil war (556e-557a), and tyranny through a usurpation and betrayal which Socrates twice calls parricide (569b, 575d). The mixture that is timocracy consists of elements drawn from aristocratic and oligarchic regimes and of elements peculiar to itself. Vestiges of the old aristocracy are the honoring of rulers and their separation from the money- making classes, plus common meals and gymnastic training. Harbingers of the oligarchy ahead are the love and accumulation of wealth concealed from view

timocrats' behind the walls of the private homes. Missing from this new regime

waves" are the "three of sexual equality, familial communism, and philoso pher-kingship. What is distinctive about timocracy is the exclusion from rule of

mixed" the wise few on grounds that they are "no longer simple and earnest but

(ouketi ... haplous te kai ateneis ... alia meiktous; 547e2-3). Is it to be understood that the philosophers have suffered a fall from perfection similar to that which has afflicted the city? Are they corrupt because they are "mixed"?

earnest?" And when was it that they were "simple and Since the philosopher- king is the product of a dual education of music-gymnastics and dialectics, and since his responsibilities are twofold, that of philosophizing and of ruling, he is from the outset a mixed personality. Mixing ought not then to be regarded as a mark of his corruption and a disqualification from office. But if so, who were longer" the simple and earnest rulers that are "no (ouketi)! Presumably, these are the elder warriors (412c2) who were installed as provisional guardians be- 22 Interpretation fore the advent of philosopher-kings. The warrior-guardians are said to be wise mixed imita (428b-429a), and one feature of their education is that they avoid mixed be tion (of bad and good characters alike) and the company of men, cause "there's no double man among [them], nor manifold one, since each man

thing" does one (397el-2). The exclusion of mixed philosophers represents

sophisticates," then not a weeding out of deceitful but a rebellion by auxiliaries against philosopher-kings, as well as a rejection of the other institutions which so radicalized the regime of spirited warriors. Having described the timocratic regime as a mixture of principles in which the love of victories and honors is predominant, Socrates turns to the character Socrates' of the timocratic man. purpose is to point out the correspondence between city and man (548d). And indeed the correspondence is fairly exact: there is some remembrance of the aristocracy-lost in the timocrat's love of music and rhetoric, but without skill in either; some anticipation of the oligar chy-to-come in the timocrat's growing love of money; and much of timocracy at the core in the timocrat's devotion to war, gymnastics, and the hunt. It might be recalled, however, that Socrates said more than that the citizen corresponds to the city. He said that the citizen, or the ruling class of citizens, by their loves and their hates, cause the city to be what it is, that the city's regime is a reflection of the dispositions of its governors. But nowhere in Books 8 or 9 do we see Socrates establishing this causal connection. Indeed, the whole question of cause and effect is left in the dark. For not only does the citizen not plainly produce the city, but the city in no instance plainly produces the citizen. What is meant by this claim is that Socrates chooses to examine how a timocratic youth emerges from an aristocratic household rather than examine how a house hold in tune with the regime produces a citizen just like the regime (and the pattern is repeated with every regime). Nor will it do to answer that Socrates is looking for the very first timocrat, who necessarily comes from a household that is not timocratic; for the household in question exists in a city that is already a timocracy (this too is true of all other households, except the one producing a tyrant; that is, the timocratic household exists in an oligarchy and the oligarchic household exists in a democracy). Why then does Socrates begin

regime" with "the young son of a good father who does not live under a good Socrates' (549c2-3)? Bloom has noted that beginning indicates the possibility of an aristocratic man if not of an aristocratic city; also that families, banished from the best regime, play an important, conservative role in the history of defective regimes (1991, pp. 415, 420). But it is also true that the choice of households compromises the formative power of the city. How does the timo cratic youth come by his beliefs and loves? Not by law or by public education as such, but by the accidental clash of contradictory influences. His aristocratic father nourishes the calculating part of his soul. But this father, unambitious and apolitical, is despised and abused by his timocratic neighbors and by his wife and servants wanting property and respect. Public opinion weighs in Socrates on the Decline and Fall ofRegimes 23

against private instruction, and the result is a contest among the three parts of the soul with spiritedness emerging victorious. The youth becomes a timocrat, but easier and more certain would the outcome have been if the father were himself a timocrat, who, in concert with the city, simply taught the son to love honor above all else. The choice of an aristocratic father, then, serves to ob scure the operation of causes and to impugn the importance of regimes. But of course the regime is itself an effect caused by the character of the man. What then produces the man? This question also will yield no clear answer since Socrates chooses to investigate the city before the man, his reason being that "luminous" the city is the more of the two (545b4).

II. OLIGARCHY

But can we not do better in discovering the origins of oligarchic man? He is a timocrat whose secret love of wealth, supported by a private storehouse of treasure, looks for commodities to buy. Timocracy is an austere regime, and timocrats abstain from farming, manual arts, and money-making (547d). In theory they do. In practice they break the law, first by accumulating wealth, then by spending it conspicuously and forcing others into a rivalry with them, finally by changing attitudes about who and what is worthy (550d-551a). The oligarch is an erstwhile timocrat whose love of money displaces his love of honor. And oligarchy is created when a property qualification confers power and privilege on a wealthy few. There is no founder of oligarchy, or of any of the other defective regimes. They come about because, in the absence of education, the soul's center of gravity moves from reason, to spiritedness, to appetite. They come about be cause nature, of a kind the body's nature assumes command when unim peded by wise legislation. Aristocracy is safeguarded by the music and gym nastic education, which is its law, and the neglect of this education is the efficient cause of aristocracy's decline (546d). Timocracy declines when its prohibitions against money-making are ignored (547d, 548a, 550d-e). Oli garchs fail to pass a law against the alienation of one's property (552a, 555c, 556a) and a law withdrawing protection from commercial contracts (556a-b). Finally, democrats lose their regime because they lack the foresight to control (564b-c).12 by law the criminal and beggar drones In every case the man, whose soul is writ large in the regime, is not self-made or the product of fatherly tutoring or of some founder's design, but is a result of legislative/ educational errors which set free the lower powers of his soul. Hence the first cause of either man or city is traceable to mistakes too various to identify, committed by people too numerous to name. Causality is truly obscure. It follows then that there is no political science, armed with the knowledge of faction." causes, able to prevent the occurrence of When Socrates laid the 24 Interpretation blame on the ruling class for their own disintegration and demise, he made it seem that remedial actions could be taken if only rulers would consult their true interests. But since they do not know exactly where they came from or who they are, much less know what their regime is or how it functions, they are at a loss to protect their regime when dangers to it arise, especially when those

us!" dangers arise from within "We have met the enemy and they are Unfor Socrates' tunately, citizens never attain this particular of self-knowledge, or attain it in time. Every man, every family, and every city mixes its own defining principle Socrates' with that of its successor this is a constant of analysis. Aristocracy is a mixture of wisdom and spiritedness in the ruling class. When wisdom is banished by spiritedness, a new division emerges between spiritedness and money-loving. And when spiritedness is banished from oligarchy's ruling cir cle, appetite divides into necessary and unnecessary desire. Likewise, when necessary desire is excluded, unnecessary desire splits into lawful and lawless pleasure. Under the influence of the higher principle, the lower principle ap pears to be some one thing: when serving as reason's auxiliary, spiritedness seems to be wholly separate from appetite; but when reason is gone, spirited ness shows itself to be just another form of desire, half honor-loving and half money-loving. The downward pull of the body, ending in the tyrant's lust, is what causes the divisions along with the defectiveness of the principles them selves: For honor is dependent on the opinions of others; it is a noble but voluntary sentiment displaced by the compulsions of self-interest. Wealth is more substantial than honor; but wealth is not for its own sake, and the virtues which produce it are lost in the indulgent life which enjoys it. The indulgent life is the free life, and the free life is pleasing; but if freedom is nice, license is better. Accordingly, the timocrat exchanges honor for the independence of the oligarch, who is drawn to the enjoyments of the democrat, who sinks into the excesses of the tyrant. How is the oligarch defined? He is a greedy man and parsimonious, but hardworking and capable of self-denial. Wanting to succeed in his labors, he allows himself little time for education or amusement. Socrates traces his deter mination to the disgrace of his timocratic father and the loss of his family's

"retrograde" fortune. Once again the youth is raised in a environment, and his character, rather than a product of conscious design, is a chance blending of dissonant forces. But on this occasion no conversation is recorded between father and son. It seems that the elder timocrat has nothing to say, either be cause he or is unmusical, because he cannot manage to vindicate honor in a city profit.14 dedicated to All other fathers fight for the souls of their sons; but then all fathers save the timocrat have an identity apart from the city and can survive the change of regimes. In any event, the youth swears himself to a life of acquisition and makes calculation and spiritedness the servants of enterprise. Despite such singleness of purpose, the oligarch is not whole inside (554d- Socrates on the Decline and Fall of Regimes 25 e). His continence is the work of fear, rather than education. It is not true virtue, and its control of the soul is uncertain. Thus the oligarch is tempted by unnecessary pleasures and is unjust when out of the sight of law. Pity the orphan entrusted to his care (554c). The oligarchic city, says Socrates, corresponds to the oligarchic man. Like the man, the regime is defined by its dominant passion, which is avarice. Money-loving is institutionalized by a property qualification which reserves the honor of citizenship for those most successful at amassing wealth. Oligarchy is also defined by three deficiencies relating to class-functions in society and to faculties of the soul. Ruling is done badly in an oligarchic regime because the requirement that citizens be rich excludes from office some of the city's most gifted individuals. War-making is ineffective because the city is weakened by factions of rich and poor and because miserly oligarchs are unwilling to put up the funds for an adequate defense. And the economy is poorly managed be cause the principle of job specialization, or one man, one art, is not respected: as money-makers, oligarchs are meddlers in political affairs; as politicians, oli garchs are meddlers in financial affairs (which may explain why oligarchs en

evils" courage profligacy even to the point of engendering "the greatest of all [552a4], the classes of stinger and stingless drones). Oligarchy is the first of the defective regimes in which appetite rules. Hence it is not surprising that there would be shortcomings respecting reason and spiritedness. But like the man, the regime does not abandon these higher faculties as much as it twists them to its own purposes (Nettleship, 1937, p. 297). One final point: because oligarchs are former timocrats, the principle holds that faction in the ruling class is the cause of regime transformation. Oligarchs come to power by excluding from the ruling elite those timocrats who have not made the conversion from love of honor to love of money.

III. DEMOCRACY

Can the same be said of democracy, that it comes about because of division among the rulers of the preceding, oligarchic regime? What Socrates contends is that the lean and tanned poor make war on the soft and fat rich (556c-d). Apparently, oligarchy topples, not from internal dissent, but from outside as sault by the democratic drones who disagree that wealth entitles a person to rule, who think instead that physical prowess, or the right of the stronger (when the stronger is the multitude), is the origin of political legitimacy. Civil war is the cause of democracy's institution, and the warring parties do seem to be of different social classes. But Socrates indicates that the drones who live in oligarchic cities are themselves the scions of oligarchic families

ignoble" "human beings who are not (555d4). They are the more self-indulgent of the rich who sell their property in order to purchase their pleasures (552b). 26 Interpretation

They are declasse oligarchs, and in this respect their rebellion is faction within the ruling class. Nor are they alone, or alone for long. For the oligarchic work ethic is threat ened by its own success. Wealth relieves the pressure of necessity and with that the fear which impels the oligarch to work. Socrates observes that the children of wealth and privilege are luxurious, soft, and idle (556b-c). The suggestion is that what distinguishes oligarchs from democrats necessary versus unneces sary pleasures passes in a generation or two. Thus not only are rebels former rulers and the civil war a struggle within the ruling class but the two classes are more alike than they are different. The

man," oligarch is a "squalid says Socrates, "getting a profit out of everything

praises" . .. exactly the kind of [man] the multitude (554al0-ll). Who is it, then, that the the have-nots admire? the haves. True enough, that as lean and "consent" tanned rebels against oligarchic rule, the poor withdraw their and even look to be timocrats spoiling for a fight; but once they are in power, their respect for money-making again asserts itself. Moreover, the primary differ ence between oligarchs and democrats, that the former love money and the latter love freedom, is not as firm as it may at first appear. For freedom re quires money, and money is for the sake of freedom democrats need oli garchs, and oligarchs complete themselves as democrats. The necessary and "money-making" desires of the oligarch provide the foundation for the unneces

"spendthrifty" sary and desires of the democrat (559c). And insofar as unneces sary desires are judged "harmful to the body and the soul with respect to pru

moderation" dence and (559b10-11; emphasis added), the oligarch himself succumbs to their charms, for his love of wealth, says Socrates, is incompatible with moderation (555c7-9), and his destruction of fellow oligarchs is an act of imprudence (like Marx's bourgeois despoiling their own class). The oligarch who is busy becoming a monopolist has much in common with the democrat whose life is devoted to hedonistic pursuits, for the pleasures of each are un necessary. One is reminded that in the best city oligarchs and democrats are treated as appetitive money-makers, members of the one, chrematistic class (when a distinction is made, it is between kinds of money-making bronze artisans and iron farmers rather than between amounts rich and poor). divisions.15 There is, then, in these middle regimes a blurring of class Democracy is created when the victorious democrats extend equal rights to those who remain and when the ruling offices are distributed mostly by lot (557a). Lot distribution defines democracy as property qualifications define oli garchy. Democracy rests upon the principle of equality, but Socrates says that its animating passion is freedom. In fact, freedom and equality are presented as complements, and they combine to produce an individualism verging on autonomy.

Notwithstanding the individual's extreme independence, democratic citizens live in a distinctive way, and their community is called a regime, although Socrates on the Decline and Fall of Regimes 27

Socrates is again imprecise about whether the regime is a consequence of the

(557a-b).16 citizens or the citizens a consequence of the regime Specifically, they are free to say and do as they wish. On account of this freedom they are private and various, and their city is home to all possible types of people and regimes. Political responsibilities are nonexistent, as are political restraints: Anyone can rule or not rule, be ruled or not be ruled as he sees fit; even a private war and a separate peace are permitted entitlements. Criminals are con demned but rarely punished. Education is neglected because useless to political advancement (supposing politics to be one's fancy), while substituting for edu cation is professed loyalty to the multitude. All in all, democracy and its prac tices are thought to be fair, exquisite, and sweet; it is the regime most appeal ing to females (557c).17 When aristocracy changes to timocracy and timocracy to oligarchy, the new order in each case sets its sights on the father of the unregenerate household. It humiliates and ruins him, causing the son to forswear his father's values and to remake himself in the image of the ascendant regime. This pattern, however, is not repeated with the establishment of democracy, perhaps because democracy has no central base or authoritative core from which to launch an attack against the family; democracy is amorphous and tolerant. What happens instead is that bad influences present in society take hold of the son and fill his soul with illicit desires. It is the son, not the father, who is the target, and the targeting is a seduction rather than an insult and rejection. The seduction reenacts the civil war that brought democrats into power. For the son's soul, divided between necessary and unnecessary desires, is like the oligarchic city divided between rich and poor citizens. Each part of his soul receives advice kindred to itself from the father shame and order (560a), from the drones "manifold and subtle

pleasures" (550d9) just as the factions of the city receive assistance from partisan allies abroad. The outcome is not predetermined, for both the father and the oligarchs can win temporary victories. Eventually though the armies of the new prevail in the case of the son by storming a psychic acropolis that has

guardians," been left empty of its "best watchmen and namely "fair studies and

speeches" practices and true (560b8-10). No detail in the city's civil war corre sponds to this undefended acropolis, but if there were one, likely it would be the failure of oligarchs to train and finance a warrior class (551d-552a, 555a). democrats' The victory is accomplished by killing and banishment, the drones

Lotus-eaters' values" and victory by the "transvaluation of virtues are recon stituted vices and driven out; vices are renamed virtues and brought in. The allusion to the Corcyrean Revolution is unmistakable (Thucydides, The Pelo ponnesian War, 3.82). Finally, with each of these conflicts there is a happy ending, for the democrats institute "a sweet regime, without rulers and many-

alike" colored, dispensing a certain equality to equals and unequals (558c4-6); while the son, if he has the luck not to be swept away by the fury of desire and if in growing older he readmits his exiled relations, "lives his life in accord 28 Interpretation

pleasures" with a certain equality of (561b2-3). Just as the democratic city establishes and defines itself by lot distribution, so the new-made democratic man chooses his pleasures as though by lot (561b4). City and man come to

egalitarianism18 gether at this very point of relativistic the city despising, but Socrates' with sympathy and without pettiness, all of educational plans (558b); the nonjudgmental man honoring all pleasures and desires equally (561c). The democratic city holds within its borders every possible human type (557d), and the democratic man takes up and puts down every significant human activity (561c-d).

Is it possible that contained in democratic relativism is a solution to the problem of faction? Socrates does not pose this question as such, but he has

"good" just portrayed a democracy at peace with itself, and it is worth consid ering whether its institutions and practices hold any promise of enduring. Where there is diversity coupled with equality as in a supermarket there is less cause for people to quarrel, for everyone gets what he wants. In the demo cratic city all occupations are present, but no one occupation is thought bet ter than another. Philosophy is present, as are soldiering and money-making (561d). These represent the three main classes of the best regime, and it was Socrates' business to arrange them in their proper order. But in democracy there are no rankings to create, no hierarchy to defend, no pursuit of virtue or concern for education, no determination to train and empower good leaders (558b, 561b-c). Could it be that such looseness is the formula for civil peace? It should first be noted that democracy is something of a mixed regime in that oligarchic exiles are reintegrated into the political life of the city. Demo cratic inclusiveness means that all citizens are members of the ruling class. On the other hand, democratic apoliticism means that the city is effectively without a ruling class (558c4). The former point is cause for worry, since with so many rulers agreement is difficult to attain; but the latter point is cause for hope, since there is little that democratic citizens need to agree about: the one thing people have in common is the conviction that nothing is worth having in com mon. Democracy is practically a nonregime regime. It is a nonregime because democrats love freedom but count among their fellow citizens oligarchs who love wealth. On the other hand, neither freedom nor wealth is necessarily a principle of rule. Democrats and oligarchs are not like timocrats, who to satisfy their love of honor must be given power and recognition. Democrats and oligarchs are private people, or at the least they are capable of leading private lives. Moreover and as mentioned above free dom and wealth are complementary principles: freedom is the end, and wealth is the means; money is not self-justifying, and unnecessary pleasures are not free. Socrates even suggests that rich and poor can live together in relative harmony. For the rich are orderly (564e6) and seemingly well-disposed toward (565b9 the multitude 11), and the poor are just insofar as they stick to their work and do not meddle in affairs (565al-2). Socrates on the Decline and Fall ofRegimes 29

IV. TYRANNY

But if democratic relativism can result in diversity and tolerance (everything is available, everything is sampled, nothing is important), it also can result in suspicion of inequalities and impatience with restraints (the rich are thieves, and the law itself is a tyrant). Socrates blames the fall of democracy on the principle of democracy made absolute. Anything carried to excess, says Socra tes, tends to engender its opposite (563e). Now democracy and oligarchy are the only regimes faulted for carrying their defining principles to excess (562b, 555b), but all regimes, in a sense, produce their opposite and despise what they leave behind: The wisdom-loving aristocrat produces the brutal and boorish timocrat; the violent timocrat produces the cowardly and parsimonious oligarch; the miserly oligarch the spendthrift and hedonistic democrat; and the freedom- loving democrat the slavish and enslaving tyrant. By comparison with these other regimes, democracy seems an exemplar of tolerance and moderation, for instead of expelling its predecessor and racing headlong toward its successor, democracy welcomes the return of oligarchs on an equal basis with everyone else. How then does our happy hedonist, the consummate amateur who makes no judgments, become the furious partisan of freedom? Part of the answer is pride. Freedom is elevating adult-like and democracy is the only regime befitting free men (562b-c). Pericles in his Funeral Oration expresses the pride Athenians feel in the democratic character of their city (Thucydides, 2.37-41). But if it is freedom which makes the city great and its citizens superior human beings, then more of this freedom should enhance their status even further. Thinking it impossible to overdo a good thing, democrats are predisposed to accept uncritically any enlargement of their liberty. Thus democratic excess arises partially from a mistake in judgment. It arises also, and more importantly, from the appetitive character of free dom and equality. As appetites, freedom and equality intensify once they are tried; when overindulged, they turn insatiable. The appetite for free living be comes insatiable when the demos, as if at a wine party, overdrink from an draught." "unmixed Their respect for authority erodes along with their willing ness to be governed by law. The authorities, in turn, fearing the loss of their positions and wanting not to offend, back away from enforcing the rules. Soon thereafter the anarchic spirit spreads from the political to the social and the familial, and teachers fawn on students and parents ape the manners of their children. In this lawless climate, nothing is so tyrannical as the presumption to know better than others and to deserve one's place in society's hierarchy. Hier archy is tyranny; equality is freedom. The culminating gesture is the effective emancipation of slaves and the equal treatment of women. Even domestic ani mals are said to benefit from the absence of authority. This last point about horses and asses taking right of way is of course a joke (or it would have seemed to be a joke before the advent of "speciesism"; per- 30 Interpretation haps it is prescient instead). But the point about slaves and women is of a different order. Why should there be human beings whose lives are purchased by others? And why should women be inferior to men? These are serious ques tions which are called to mind by the very way in which Socrates speaks that

slavery," he highlights the conventional nature of this and that sexual equality is a feature of his own best regime (563b). Is Socrates, then, being critical of democracy when he attributes to it the abolition of slavery and the equality of the sexes? He is explaining how the passion for freedom is a slippery slope leading to tyranny. But it is arguable that part of the attraction is an advance in justice which democracy brings about. Democratic partisans, it seems fair to say, are not out simply for a good time; they want also to make the world better. Their desire for equality, while given to ludicrous extremes, has the scent of progressiveness about it. Still, it must be admitted that there is little political consciousness animating Socrates' democrats. They are tender souls who so love their independence that they resent public interference of any kind and would rather live without laws than be lawgivers themselves (563d). Apoliticism is their characteristic fault

"individualism" or in the words of Tocqueville (Democracy in America, vol. 2, bk. 2, ch. 2). Preferring private pleasures to public power, they leave vacant the highest offices of state, as do their money-making compatriots. Democracy might survive its apoliticism if there were no warriors ready to seize control. But democracy breeds a warrior-like class of drones, both criminal and beggar, who become its leaders in the absence of citizen involvement. The main politi cal force operating in a democracy is the demagogue and his henchmen. They

winebearers" draught" are the "bad who intoxicate the demos with an "unmixed of freedom. Socrates implies that the drones could have been suppressed by doctor" prudent legislation (564b-c), but prudent legislation requires a "good beekeeper" or "wise to see far off dangers and to guard against emotional weaknesses. Democracy lacks this person and these precautions and is thus prey to a usurpation from below. The demagogic drones have but one objective, to foment a class war be tween democrats and oligarchs. As stated above, Socrates can imagine these

pigs."20 classes living peaceably together in a kind of advanced "city of But add drones' drones to the mix, and the solution is combustible. The first step in the conspiracy is to make the public business more agreeable by paying the people for their participation. Freedom means also, if secondarily, public power, and it is a plausible surmise that the drones play to the people's democratic pride, suggesting to them that anything less than full democracy is an assault upon their dignity. Reminded thus of the special legitimacy of popular rule, the peo ple look with a suspicious squint upon mixed elements and social inequalities. are now They drinking that strong fermentation which excites freedom to ex cess; and one mark of this excess is the demand that oligarchs surrender their property in order to finance the people's attendance at assembly. Predictably, Socrates on the Decline and Fall of Regimes 31 the oligarchs object, and their resistance is interpreted as hostility toward the people and as evidence of a plot to overthrow the democracy. In the process of defending themselves against these accusations, largely unwarranted, the oli garchs become in fact enemies of the people. The class war has begun. But why would a civil war between oligarchs and democrats end in tyranny, instead of in oligarchy or democracy? The outcome is not predetermined (de spite Aristotle's reading that it is; Politics 5.12.10-11): an oligarchic restora tion is possible (566a3), but a sustainable democracy seems not to be. The reason why democracy must fall, one way or the other, is its need for a leader to champion its cause against the oligarchs. This leader, Socrates argues, will utilize the judicial system as an instrument of murder; and once his lupine instincts are excited by blood, he, the people's champion, becomes their op pressor unless he is first destroyed by his intended victims. Indeed, it is the very effort to target the leader that makes possible his transformation into a tyrant: For his own defense he asks the people to supply him with a bodyguard. He then proceeds to kill his opponents among the wealthy, again calling them enemies of the regime. To curry favor with the people, he cancels debts and redistributes land. It is now that he is established in power, and he provokes a war in order to insure that the people will continue to need his leadership. The war effort impoverishes the citizens, depriving them of the wherewithal to plot against him. The war is also a pretext for proscribing free thought and free speech. Those among his associates who speak up and speak back are elimi nated, as are the courageous, the great-minded, the prudent, and the rich. For eign mercenaries and domestic slaves are hired as bodyguards. Sacred money is spent and private property taken. Finally, when these limited supplies are ex hausted, the property of the people is confiscated for the support of the tyrant's court. Since the tyrant was brought to power to defend the popular interest, it was expected that he would conduct himself as a fiduciary agent and as a respectful child. Thus when he turns against the people who made him their

protector, his oppressive measures are likened to a parricide committed by an ungrateful son.

Socrates' account of the tyrannic youth and the tyrannic man returns almost imperceptibly to the debate in Books 1 and 2 over the relative goodness of justice and injustice. What brings about this return is the choice given the tyrant, or the tyrant-in-making, of a private or public life. The tyrant is asked to would upon his chances for consider carefully the effects political power have happiness. Because Socrates means to dissuade the tyrant from seizing power, and thus from changing a democratic regime into a tyranny, it could be said that the whole discussion ofhappiness adds up to a practical, if not theoretical, because of defense of democracy. Recall that democracy changes to tyranny is a agitation by the drones. That there will be drones in a democracy given; that democrats will be open to their propaganda is also a given. But what now demagogu- seems not a given, rather a matter of deliberation and choice, is the 32 Interpretation ery of these drones and their tyrannic leader. For they are advised by Socra tes and have the option of following his advice not to enter politics with the goal of grabbing power, but to remain in private and to let democracy alone. Socrates' To be sure, the continuance of democracy is not the main point of tyrant;21 conversation with the it might, however, be the consequence if Socra tes succeeds rhetorically.

That Socrates has effected a subtle shift from detached regime analysis to activism on behalf of democracy and against tyranny is evident from his de scription of the tyrant as someone petty and contemptible. Every human type hitherto presented is animated by love of virtue, of honor, of wealth, of free itself.22 dom but the tyrant is the embodiment of love Lest we think well of the tyrant for an eroticism so exorbitant that it needs no object, Socrates likens eros to an insect, a winged drone. And since he earlier distinguished the winged drone from the footed drone who is human (552c), Socrates is in effect saying that the tyrant is not a human being; he is a bug. But he is not a harmless bug, for unlike most winged drones which are parasites without longing" stingers, the tyrant has the "sting of in him (573a7-8). He is a gadfly (577e2).

What sort of harm does the tyrant contemplate? The targets of his malice are those nearest to him, his parents when he is still a private citizen, and his fatherland when he moves up to political power. Socrates speaks of a tyrant in

sense" the "precise (573c7) who "gets the better of his father and his mother (574a8-9). An artisan in the precise sense, from the account in Book 1, is a worker who is governed by the knowledge of his craft, who serves others, and who gets the better only of his inferiors in knowledge and virtue. The tyrant, by contrast, has no art of tyranny and no respect for nature's hierarchies. Indeed, he seems particularly vindictive toward those who have commanded him. Even though the tyrant aspires to enslave his fatherland (575d) and to rule over human beings and gods (573c), it cannot be said that power is the object of his love. More often than not the tyrant is described as lusting after sex and food (571c, 573d, 574c, 574e, 579b). He is feckless, just like his democratic forebear, although he is more energetic. What is unique about the tyrant is the intensity of his love, and that it is unconstrained by reason, by honor, by neces sity, or law. The tyrant has no single object that defines him but is more auda him.23 cious in the pursuit of any object that attracts He is lawless and will do while awake what others dare only in their dreams (572b, 574e, 576b). The tyrant as eroticist is not a man of high ambition. This fact becomes clear if we consider for a moment an alternate entry of the tyrant into history. We might recall that and oligarchy democracy decline because of excessive attach ment to their defining principles: oligarchs love money and democrats love freedom with unabated zeal. It is curious that similar ardor is not attributed to timocrats. It is not their excessive love of honor that causes the decline of their regime. Decline happens to timocracy because of failure to protect its defining Socrates on the Decline and Fall of Regimes 33 principle against corruption by wealth. If timocracy were to go the way of oligarchy, the more honorable of the timocrats would exclude from office their less honorable peers, until only one timocrat was left or rebellion brought about a change of regimes. The love of honor carried to its conclusion is the love of glory; it points to monarchical rule and imperial expansion. Is it not possible then that tyranny could arise out of timocracy and that the tyrant could be described as a glory-seeking, world-conquering monarch? Such a man would inspire admiration and convince many an onlooker that the tyrant's life was well worth living. But instead of a lordly figure with grand designs a distinct possibility the tyrant we are given is a lusty gourmand and a petty criminal. It is worse for the tyrant, says Socrates, if he actually achieves power, for then a life driven by vulgar eros becomes a life tormented by mortal fear. The tyrant dreams of a city whose only purpose is the satisfaction of his desires. But in such a city he is defenseless, as vulnerable as a slaveowner alone on an island with his slaves (578d-e). The tyrant must somehow escape his isolation by giving others a stake in his career. As it happened, there were others who first came to him, looking for a leader to help them lay hold of a greater share of the city's resources (572e). The tyrant, then, has his own band of followers, but as they support him, so he has responsibilities to them it is his job to beer," "bring the so to speak. The problem facing the tyrant is that he is depen dent on and responsible to people who are also erotic (573e6), people whose loyalty is suspect because they are apt to aspire to becoming tyrants them selves. They are the tyrant's bodyguards, but they can hardly think the less of themselves for that since under different circumstances the tyrant was himself a bodyguard (575b). Add to this the fact that a life of pleasure-seeking leaves the tyrant soft and unprepared to contest with others (579c-d), and the conclusion is that the tyrant is threatened both by his associates and by the finer members of society. In the end Socrates says of the tyrant that he gets no satisfaction (579e) and that it is bad luck that has brought him to power (578c, 579c). A sensible person would not choose to be a tyrant; tyranny should be re sisted. It will be resisted, or not, depending on what the soul loves, or on what part of the soul rules. Socrates provides a reasoned account as to why the pleasures of appetite and spirit are inferior to the pleasures of mind. If this account succeeds in restructuring the soul's desires, the lawless eroticism of tyranny will cease to attract, to say nothing of the less intense pleasures of voice of reason been timocracy, oligarchy, and democracy. But where has the throughout the reported history of regime transformation? Funny that it should someone as "most distant be heard from only in conversation with described argument"tyrant the compli from philosophy and (587a7). Socrates pays the ment of arguing with him. the Again, where has reason been? In aristocracy it was in charge, educating without au spirit and commanding the appetites. Outside the best regime, and ineffectual (oli- thority, reason has either been silent (timocracy) or weak and 34 Interpretation garchy and democracy). It speaks now to the tyrant because the tyrant is, or may be, not the low-class sensualist as pictured above, but the philosopher's soul-mate and pedagogic rival. What the philosopher and the tyrant have in

"cave" common is the desire to transcend necessity the of opinion in the case of the former, the reach of the law in the case of the latter. As such they stand equidistant from the oligarch, the man of utmost necessity whose way of life is determined by fear. The commonality of the philosopher and the tyrant can be better perceived when looked at from the vantage point of oligarchy. Oligarchy, rather than the Socrates' middle regime of description, situated on a downward slope between aristocracy and tyranny, is a pinnacle rising from two points on a plane below. Or so oligarchy might see itself, claiming to be the best and the highest regime on grounds that it alone performs the grownup work of providing for life's necessities. Other regimes are childish by comparison, because in their pursuit of unnecessary pleasures they pretend that the necessary is secure. Most child ish of all are aristocracy and tyranny, regimes dedicated to good life but negli gent of mere life. The aristocrat wants virtue or the unnecessary pleasures of body.24 the mind (58 le); the tyrant wants license or the lawless pleasures of the When viewed against the realism of oligarchic fear, aristocracy and tyranny are equally hopeful and fantastic regimes. Tyranny is the body's attempt to render itself free of its own necessities, to find an almost spiritual delight in carnal indulgence and limitless freedom. This attempt to escape all limitation and to defeat all resistance explains why the philosopher bothers to talk to the tyrant, why reason is enlisted, after a long

conservation.25 quiescence, as an instrument of political The message to the tyrant the first message (576b-580c) is that tyranny is dysfunctional. It does not make the tyrant powerful but exposes him to death and impoverish

ment, deliverance from which requires that he return to the ways of past re gimes that he save his life by democratic lawfulness, and that he husband his resources by oligarchic orderliness. But there is little cause for supposing that the tyrant is better disposed toward pragmatic reasoning than is any other politi cal type, that an explication of consequences would make a difference to him but not to the timocrat or the oligarch. The real attraction is the second message (580c-588a), which states that the tyrant's pleasures are ill-chosen since they are more apparent than genuine, are mixed with pains, and are tainted by the (585c).26 impurities of becoming mutability, mortality, and falsity Rather than asked to retreat from tyrannic ambition because of fear of little influence with

this maddened soul the tyrant is invited to push ahead in pursuit of pleasures that are altogether satisfying. But he must take it on authority that there are such pleasures, pleasures of the mind, and he must accept the fact that his life will be led outside of politics. Socrates has set it up that the tyrant is more private than public, for the love of power is not what defines him, but has Socrates on the Decline and Fall ofRegimes 35

Socrates explained why a man so resentful of authority would ever accept the philosopher's word? Perhaps not, particularly if we think of the tyrant as the crazed parricide. But if for the tyrant we substitute Glaucon, then the project of philosophical seduction seems much less improbable. Glaucon, and Adeimantus his brother, set the conversation on its course by wondering aloud whether they should choose a life of tyrannic lawlessness. They are close to being enemies of democratic Athens when Socrates seduces them with philosophy. So delighted are the brothersGlaucon especiallythat Socrates' by the dialogue's end they are captives (Bloom, 1977, pp. 320-21; Christian, 1988, p. 58). Reason is determining what their souls will love, al though without the benefit of office and without the support of disciplined auxiliaries. Private education is its work when public education, or ruling, is forbidden it, and democracy is the regime where private education thrives. It is too much to say that tutelage of the young will save democracy from falling into tyranny. Not every youth, after all, can have a philosopher for a tutor, and there are examples of failure even among those who do. Nevertheless, this attempt to deflect the erotic young from careers as tyrants imparts a small note Socrates' of hopefulness to study of political decay. And since the defense of democracy is conducted by the making of philosophers (or gentlemen at the least), there is a return implied, if not to the aristocratic regime, then to the aristocratic family. But what better way of preserving democracy than by the addition of aristocrats, especially when these aristocrats are wouldbe drones? Aristotle is of a similar mind (Politics 5.8.17-18), but then Aristotle Socrates' faults Socrates for indecisiveness about the fate of tyranny when by own analysis it ought to belong to a cycle and be followed by the best regime (Politics 5.12.11). In point of fact, there is a cycle of sorts and a renewal. Renewal, however, is personal rather than political. Glaucon is quick to Socrates' catch on that just and happy man is not a ruler of anyone but himself (592a-b; also 580c2). And while Socrates does say that divine chance could institute the best regime in practice, divine chance would have to do more than

wisdom" make a philosopher king. For this "lover of would have to become wise, even infallible; and once wise he would have to interest himself in bring ing peace to the unwise, who in turn would have to accept as their ruler some one radically unlike themselves. All things considered, the best regime is im possible. And defective regimes are unreformable for the very reason that they are defective they lack education or the rational control of emotion and appe tite. The most that can be done, or that Socrates can think to do, is to draw away from politics a few of the young who are tyrants-in-waiting. It is impor tant to note then, and others have noted before (Strauss, 1987, p. 78; West, 1978, p. 172), that when Plato wants to reconsider the future of politics and what advantages might lie in law, he chooses a protagonist more political than Socrates. 36 Interpretation

NOTES

1. Translations of the Greek are from Bloom (1991). Line numbers are those in Platonis Opera (1978) and are given only when needed. 2. See Arendt (1958) for a discussion of the origins of the republican tradition among the ancients; Pocock (1975) for its revival among the moderns of the Atlantic community; and Wood (1969) for its role in the American Revolution and in the founding of the American regime. Politi cal decline owing to a loss of virtue is an important part of this tradition and is another sense in which Socrates is its progenitor (although the honor is often given to Aristotle). See, for instance, Wood (1968, pp. 48-53) and Pocock (1975, pp. 66-74). 3. Benardete (1989, p. 194) observes that the slaves of the aristocratic father inculcate the love of honor in his son. Benardete concludes that the slaves reflect the values of the timocratic regime,

rulers" and he generalizes that "the principle of the regime is never embodied in the and that "it would never be the case that the rulers of any city show to the fullest extent the impress of the

element." ruling Maybe. But still there is no instance of the rulers educating the ruled. 4. Augustine and Montesquieu, it might be mentioned, adopt a similar approach to regime analysis (City of God, 19.24; The Spirit of the Laws, 3.3-9). 5. Regimes are examined in the order in which they are thought to occur. The intimation of relative worth arises, by and large, from the fact that the best regime is in the beginning and the worst regime is at the end. But Socrates also attributes the ranking to what people commonly praise (544c). Popular consensus favors the Cretan or Laconian regime (timocracy), and oligarchy is Socrates' second in popular esteem. own assessment, however, may be somewhat different, for he

evil," describes oligarchy as a regime "filled with throngs of whereas democracy he describes without untoward comment only as oligarchy's adversary. Barker (1959, pp. 176-77) observes that the state declines in the reverse order in which it was constructed. The state began with workers, then added warriors and philosophers; so when it un ravels, the first to be removed are philosophers, then warriors, then successive stages of appetitive workers. 6. If the middle regimes were ranked also by their proximity to the best regime, then the timocrat should be more rational than the oligarch and the oligarch more rational than the democrat. But the timocrat is described as an unmusical brute (548e-549a), the oligarch as a calculator of gain (553d), and the democrat as a philosophical dilettante (561d). The further one is from aristoc racy, the more one has in common, intellectually, with the aristocrat. On the other hand, the timocrat has more of the habits of virtue than does the democrat, although without any of the aristocrat's prudence. And the timocrat is more public-minded. As to self-restraint, see Strauss (1964, p. 132). Bloom says that the ranking reflects the measure of desire present in a regime: the more appetitive a regime, the lower the rank (1968, pp. 417, 421). Nichols says that regimes are ranked by the extent of their fragmentation and that fragmenta tion is caused by the dominance of privacy and selfish desires (1987, p. 125). 7. There are three passages in Book 9 which argue the contrary. At 580b Socrates says or invites Glaucon to say that the degree of virtue and happiness corresponds to the regimes in their Socrates' order of presentation. At 583a Glaucon asserts following lead that the pleasures of honor are superior to the pleasures of gain. Finally, at 587c Socrates says about the oligarchic man that his pleasures are midway between those of the tyrant and the aristocrat. In each case the precise ranking of regimes, of their citizens, and of what they love is seemingly reaffirmed. But the contexts in which these reaffirmations occur do not support the precision: In the first, Socrates is that explaining the tyrant is miserable because he is a master rather than an equal and because his desires exceed his true power. But little can be inferred about other regimes from the tyrant's weakness and if are isolation; indeed, these the causes of unhappiness, then democracy would be preferable to on the oligarchy grounds that it is the stronger and more inclusive regime. In the Socrates is second, arguing that each part of the soul has its own peculiar pleasure. But the three parts of the soul (reason, spiritedness, and appetite) and their pleasures do not correspond to the five regimes and their loves; specifically, oligarchy and democracy are each subsumed under the Socrates on the Decline and Fall of Regimes 37 pleasures of gain; consequently, precise comparisons with the pleasures of honor are impossible. And in the third, Socrates is contrasting the pure pleasures of being with the impure pleasures of becoming, included in which are the pleasures of gain and honor treated quite equally (586a-d). If any status attaches to honor, it is as a consequence of spiritedness's capacity to ally itself to reason (589a-b). But the situation in Book 8 is that education is absent and that spiritedness and appetite are at liberty to pursue their own ends. 8. Taking education seriously, however, means returning to the regime of philosopher-kings. 9. Socrates ends Book 9 by affirming the possibility of an ordered soul, though not, it seems, of an ordered city (592a-b). But is there some deficiency of soul and body which brings about a decline of the best individual parallel to the decline of the best regime? Is passage through the stages of life a reproduction of oneself equivalent in riskiness to the reproduction of metallic types through mating? 10. Why does iron mix with silver and bronze with gold? They do have similar colors (the gray of iron and silver, the yellow of bronze and gold), but something more may be intended by these particular combinations. The Noble Lie assigns to reason or the philosopher the element of gold, to spiritedness or the warrior the element of silver, to appetite or the farmer the element of iron, and to appetite or the artisan the element of bronze (415a). The mixing of iron and silver means then the mixing of farmers and warriors; likewise the mixing of bronze and gold means the mixing of artisans and philosophers. At 373d fanners and warriors do mix in the sense that warriors are added to, or taken from, the city's population in order to provide through conquest the extra land needed

tillage." by farmers for "pasture and And at 495c-e artisans mix with philosophers when a worker

philosophy," in bronze, leaping "out of the arts into takes his master's daughter as his bride; the result of their union is sophistry (496a). Now the common understanding underlying conquest and sophistry is that justice is the advantage of the stronger. In other words, sophistry is the use of philosophy to rationalize conquest, such as the theft of land by avaricious fanners and the destruc tion of aristocratic rule by subordinate classes not minding their own business. Foreign and domes tic injustice are what these metallic combinations therefore suggest. What they do not suggest are new class alliances. For when faction does come to the best regime, it is gold and silver lining up against iron and bronze (547b).

men" 11. Sterling and Scott (1985) translate tous sophous (the wise) as "clever and meiktous "equivocators." (mixed) as 12. What Nichols (1987, p. 218, n. 1) observes of oligarchy is in fact true of all regimes that a failure of statesmanship is the cause of their decline, that law could save if only the rulers had the intelligence to legislate. 13. James Madison in Federalist 10 recognizes the mysteriousness of the human soul and so backs away from any project to prevent faction through education the "giving to every citizen the interests" same opinions, the same passions, and the same (1961, p. 78). He does not, however, despair of controlling faction's effects through the institutions of representative government. 14. He might also be dead or in exile (553b4). Still, there would have been time for fatherly counsel had Socrates thought it fitting. 15. But none of this reasoning seems sufficient to explain away the civil war that brings oli garchy to an end. There are angry people outside the ruling class, and whether or not they once were insiders themselves, they have since assumed a new identity by virtue of their exclusion and their poverty; and they topple the government, often with the help of foreign powers (556e). Accordingly, the survival of oligarchy depends on something more than the unanimity of oligarchs. Socrates' Why then is analysis indifferent to the phenomenon of class struggle? Perhaps he confines regime transformation to faction among the rulers in order not to detract from the lesson that a unsustainable and that education common love as the basis of unity is without education, rightly philosopher-kings. But philosopher-kings could not even save the done requires the guardianship of regimes in which do not rule to have their regime in which they ruled. Thus it is of little use to they problem of importance reaffirmed. The more Socrates emphasizes education, the more hopeless the faction becomes. present in a there are also 16. Because there are many different individuals democracy, many corresponds to the regime (man and parallel is different regimes (557d); hence the individual city 38 Interpretation

maintained), although it is not stated which of the two is causative. The formative power of form less democracy is indicated by the description of democratic man at 561c-d: democratic relativism induces the individual to try every activity. In other words, because democracy refuses to say that one way of life is superior to another (philosophy, soldiering, money-making), the individual is incapable of sustaining a choice for any one way of life, and so must choose them all. 17. It is also the regime most appealing to Socrates. Strauss (1964, p. 132) observes that this description of democracy has the look of a Socratic fantasy, for the regime's pluralism provides the philosopher with his subject matter, its apoliticism allows the philosopher the privacy to mind his own business, and its leniency saves the philosopher from exile or execution. 18. Cf. Bloom (1991, pp. 417, 419) who contends that the democratic man is unlike the democratic city. See also Annas (1981, pp. 301-2). 19. At 578d Socrates likens household slavery to tyranny in the city. 20. Compare this with Machiavelli, for whom rich and poor are class enemies. Machiavelli's account of the transition from democracy (republican government) to tyranny is quite similar to Plato's; but where there are differences (some of the tactics adopted by the tyrant/prince), class antagonism is the explanation. See The Discourses, 1.16, 40; and The Prince, ch. 9. 21. Proving that the just man is happier than the tyrant is the main point. "love" 22. I do not believe that anything can be made of the fact that the word for changes from philia (as in philonikiai kai philotimoai [548c6-7] and philochrematon [553d9]) to eros. In "greediness" the first place, the democrat's love is never called philia but (aplestia; 562b6, 562c5) "thirst" and (dipsa; 562c8); thus it is not the case that all three intermediate regimes are given a form of desiring, philia, that is in some way distinct from eros. Second, the tyrant's eros, while a leader of the soul rivaling the philosopher's reason, is a leader that is one with its followers: leader "desire,'' and followers are both named or epithumia. Eros is desire, but so too are money-loving and freedom-loving (and possibly honor-loving); they all belong to the appetitive part of the soul.

obsession" 23. White (1979, p. 220) calls the tyrant's eros an "unremitting that is active

not." "whether its object is present or Is it then the case that oligarchs, by contrast, desire wealth only when economic opportunities are present before them? "lawless" 24. Aristocracy is also in that it condones incest and attacks the structure of the family (cf. 461e and 571c-d; 457d ff. and 574a-b). And of course the philosopher is an erotic at least he is in other dialogues. Hence there are several points of commonality. 25. Aristotle makes the same point, that a tyrant, identified as a person wanting painless plea sures and independence of others, is properly satisfied and best restrained by philosophy (Politics 2.7.12-13). See Bloom (1991, 424-25). 26. For discussions of the quality and choiceworthiness of philosophical pleasures, see Nuss baum (1986, pp. 147-48); Murphy (1951, pp. 207-23).

REFERENCES

Annas, J. (1981). An Introduction to Plato's Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Arendt, H. (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Aristotle (1984). Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Augustine (1972). The City of God. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books.

Barker, E. (1959). The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle. New York: Dover Publications.

Socrates' Benardete, S. (1989). Second Sailing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hall." Bloom, A. (1977). "Response to Political Theory 5:315-30. (1991). Interpretive Essay. In The Republic ofPlato. New York: Basic Books. Christian, W. (1989). "Waiting for Grace: Philosophy and Politics in Plato's Republic. Canadian Journal of Political Science 21:57-82. Socrates on the Decline and Fall of Regimes 39

Hamilton, A., J. Madison, and J. Jay (1961). The Federalist Papers. New York: New American Library. Machiavelli, N. (1970). The Discourses. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books. (1985). The Prince. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Montesquieu, C.-L. (1949). The Spirit of the Laws. New York: Hafner Press. Murphy, N.R. (1951). The Interpretation ofPlato's Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Nettleship, R.L. (1937). Lectures on the Republic of Plato. London: Macmillan and Company. Nichols, M. (1987). Socrates and the Political Community: An Ancient Debate. Albany: State University of New York Press. Nussbaum, M. (1986). The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Plato (1978). Platonis Opera, vol. 4. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (1979). The Laws of Plato. New York: Basic Books. Pocock, J.G.A. (1975). The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sterling, R.W. and W.C. Scott, trans. (1985). Plato, The Republic. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Strauss, L. (1959). What Is Political Philosophy! Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. (1964). The City and Man. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company. "Plato." (1987). In L. Strauss and J. Cropsey, eds. History ofPolitical Philos ophy. 3rd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Thucydides (1982). The Peloponnesian War. New York: Random House. Tocqueville, A. de (1972). Democracy in America, vol. 2. New York: Random House. West, T. (1979). Plato's Apology of Socrates. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. White, N. (1979). A Companion to Plato's Republic. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Wood, G. (1969). The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Gulliver's Travels: The Stunting of a Philosopher

Richard Burrow

Gulliver is not Everyman: Both his inquisitiveness and his power of memory are exceptional. When we first see him he is "applying himself close to his Studies" Cambridge.1 at These are cut short at the age of seventeen because of his father's poverty, and he is apprenticed to a surgeon for four years. During this period his father sends him money, but he lays this out in "learning Navi gation, and other Parts of Mathematicks, useful to those who intend to travel, do." as he always believed it would be some time or other [his] Fortune to After his apprenticeship he scrapes together enough money from various rela tives to study "Physick two Years and seven Months, knowing it would be Voyages" useful in long (p. 19). In short, despite his poverty, the youthful Gulliver is more concerned with seeing the world than securing his future. Gulliver returns from his first voyage of three and a half years, having "re

me." solved to settle in London, to which Mr. Bates, my Master encouraged Condition," He is "advised to alter [his] and takes a wife, "with whom [he] Portion" received four Hundred Pounds for a (pp. 19-20). At the age of twenty-seven, conventional opinions combined with his own desire for finan cial and domestic security have induced Gulliver to turn away from his desire to travel, which has in any case been temporarily sated. His business fails, however, since he is unwilling "to imitate the bad Practice of too many among Brethren." [his] Gulliver lacks common worldliness, that small-mindedness which enables his rivals in business to put preservation of self and family at the top of their list of priorities. Not surprisingly, he decides to return to the sea in order to restore his fortunes. Although the overt purpose of this second voyage is to ensure the financial security of his family, Gulliver chooses this moment to reveal the intellectual pleasures which his travels afford him:

My Hours of Leisure I spent in reading the best Authors, ancient and modern; being always provided with a good Number of Books; and when I was ashore, in observing the Manners and Disposition of the People, as well as learning their Language; wherein I had a great Facility by the Strength of my Memory. (P. 20)

Nevertheless his voyages are now also financially successful, and when they cease to be so he returns home, growing "weary of the Sea, and intending] to Family." stay at home with [his] Wife and However, Gulliver's continuing

interpretation, Fall 1993, Vol. 21, No. 1 42 Interpretation

Wap- hankering for the sea is shown by his decision to move his practice to Sailors." fails ping, "hoping to get Business among the Once again he whether despite or because of this move is not made clear and once again he

mend" resolves to set sail, "after three Years Expectation that things would (p. 20). Gulliver's trip to Lilliputia is therefore his third major voyage. He embarks on it at the age of thirty-eight, having already spent nearly ten years at sea, reading and observing foreign customs. It would not be the full truth to say that he is once again forced by financial necessity to leave his family, since his poverty is the result of his distinctive nature, and his attempts to remedy it are so thoroughly in accord with that nature. Although at this stage the main mo tive of which Gulliver is aware is his desire to provide for his family, his sub- or superconscious yearnings seem to be a match for the opinions and impulses

soul."2 which "turn downward the vision of the Ultimately he resists all encour agements to settle into a domestic, acquisitive life. In Lilliputia Gulliver's nobility is emphasized as well as his intelligence. He is immediately willing to risk his life to defend the Lilliputian emperor, for Honour" which his reward is "the highest Title of and "all possible Enco

miums" (pp. 50, 53). His underlying motive seems to be the desire for such Emperor" honor, for he would have gone "to congratulate with the had he not suspected that the manner in which he had extinguished the flames might be resented. It is precisely his superior intellectual ability beyond the "common Understandings" Size of human which the Lilliputians favor (p. 59) that pre vents him from achieving his goal. His urination on the palace reveals a disre Realm" gard for "the fundamental Laws of the which arises from a clear view of what is beneficial to the state. His refusal to assist the emperor in his project of conquering the world is based on "many Arguments drawn from the Topicks Justice" of Policy as well as (pp. 53, 56). These two actions, which most clearly reveal Gulliver's large-mindedness, are the very two that eventually form the principal grounds of his impeachment (pp. 68-69). Gulliver's experiences among the Lilliputians affect him deeply in ways that are not all immediately obvious. At first he feels bitter "Of so little Weight are the greatest Services to Princes, when put into the Balance with a Refusal to Passions" gratify their while at the same time recognizing that his understand ing of political life has been deepened: "This was the first time I began to form Ministers" some imperfect Idea of Courts and (p. 54). But the more far-reach ing consequence of his disillusionment only begins to emerge during his return voyage. When he realizes he is about to be rescued he is joyful at the prospect

it." of seeing his "beloved Country, and the dear Pledges [he] had left in His Colours." joy increases when he sees the ship's "English Nevertheless it soon becomes clear that his attachments to his family and country have been weak ened: He stays a mere two months with his wife and children before his "insa tiable Desire of seeing foreign Countries would suffer [him] to continue no Gulliver's Travels 43 longer," Sides" though there are "Tears on both when he departs (pp. 79-80). This time profit is not the main motive for the voyage, as his wealth has in creased considerably, though he is still "in Hopes to improve [his] Fortunes" (p. 80). sets sail Relations" He "against the Advice of all [his] Friends and (p. 86).

This change in Gulliver which could best be described as the unleashing of a boundless Brob- curiosity becomes even more evident during the voyage to dingnagia. For the first time Gulliver shows a clear awareness of his own dis tinctive nature, referring to himself as "having been condemned by Nature and Life" Fortune to an active and restless (p. 83). Significantly, his ship is called The Adventure. It is his inquisitiveness that leads to his encounter with the Brobdingnagians in the first place. While a group of his shipmates were explor

armed" ing the island, "well and driven only by the need to find water, Gulliver requests "Leave to go with them, that [he] might see the Country, and make

could." what Discoveries [he] He returns, "seeing nothing to entertain his Curi osity," to find that he has been left stranded by his more prudent companions in their hurry to escape from a Brobdingnagian. Gulliver's appetite for knowledge seems at such times to override his instinct for self-preservation as well as his patriotic and domestic feelings, though fear for his own life and regret at the Children" prospect of his "desolate Widow, and fatherless return briefly (pp. 86, 92). His curiosity, which had hardly been mentioned in Book I, now be comes a constant feature (pp. 106, 110, 113, 114, 119, 137, 138). The voyage to Lilliputia therefore constitutes a decisive stage in the unfold ing of Gulliver's nature. In Lilliputia he learns that even acts of the most Size" uncommon nobility rely on understandings of the "common for their reward. Since honor is the highest worldly goal, an understanding of its limita tions calls into question all worldly attachments. The philosopher's purely intel lectual desires emerge more powerfully as he begins to see the vanity of his other motives. Events in Book II reveal that Gulliver is now ready to embark

present.3 on a deliberate enquiry into the best regimes of the past and The conversations between Gulliver and the Brobdingnagian king reveal the extent to which Gulliver's patriotism has been weakened. The king's own inter est in the English political system is not theoretical, but arises from a practical Imitation," concern as to whether anything about it might "deserve which tem Customs" porarily overrides his fondness for his "own (p. 127). In contrast Gulliver's very presence in Brobdingnagia is evidence of a much more pro found detachment. Nevertheless his continuing loyalty to his native regime is more apparent in the subsequent dialogue. He is deeply wounded by the king's Country" mockery of his "beloved (p. 106). His "Colour came and went sev eral Times, with Indignation to hear our noble Country, the Mistress of Arts

treated" and Arms ... the Pride and Envy of the World, so contemptuously Partiality" (p. 107). He displays what he calls a "laudable to his "Political

Mother," elude" which leads him to "artfully many of the king's enquiries and 44 Interpretation to give "to every Point a more favourable Turn by many Degrees than the

allow" Strictness of Truth would (p. 133).

Thoughts" However, Gulliver tells us that on "mature and having been "ac People," customed several Months to the Sight and Converse of this his sense of proportion was so altered that he too began to find the pride of the English ruling class ridiculous, and even "to imagine [him]self dwindled many Degrees Size" below [his] usual (p. 107). The king himself considers that, having travelling," "spent the greatest Part of [his] Life in Gulliver "may hitherto have Country" escaped many Vices of [his] (p. 132). The tension between Gulliver's patriotism and his curiosity is illustrated by his admission that "nothing but an extreme Love of Truth could have hindered me from concealing this Part of my Story" (p. 133). Gulliver's behavior during and after his return to England confirms that his conversations with the king have further weakened his attachment to family and country. The sailors who rescue him appear "the most little contemptible Crea

beheld." "Laughter" tures [he] had ever The sight of them fills him with and "a Wonder" Sort of (p. 147). To Gulliver, England seems as tiny as Lilliputia. Thinking himself a giant, he behaves so peculiarly that his family and friends are at first convinced that he has lost his wits (pp. 148-49). From the perspec tive of the ordinary citizen, who is dominated by "the great Power of Habit and Prejudice" (p. 149), even a partial emancipation from political and domestic loyalties seems monstrous.

Destiny" What Gulliver now calls his "evil has gripped him firmly, and his World" "violent Thirst ... of seeing the grants him only ten days respite before he agrees to set sail once again. This time his wife protests vehemently and is only persuaded to agree to his departure by "the Prospect of Advantage Children" she proposed to her (pp. 149-54). As experience and a study of the political alternatives have diminished Gulliver's respect for the highest goals of the active life, his purely intellectual desires have increasingly been given free rein. In Book III he begins a conscious examination of the merits of the philo sophical life. Gulliver's curiosity has clearly been shaped by the dominant intellectual tradition of his time. In Brobdingnagia his assumptions and methods are those of the New Science: He removes, measures, preserves, and later exhibits inter nationally, the stings of the gigantic wasps that attack him, donating three of them to Gresham College (p. 110). His familiarity with the scientific method is shown his reaction to the gigantic of by limbs the Brobdingnagian lice, which he says he can examine "much better than those of an European Louse through Microscope" 113). criticizes a (p. He the Brobdingnagian king's ignorance of and refusal to technology "reduce Politicks to a Science, as the more acute Wits done" of Europe have (pp. 134-35).

In Laputa Gulliver comes to realize that the Modern intellectual tradition limits the scope of philosophy. While drastically Gulliver himself is, as always, Gulliver's Travels 45

Island," eager to see the "Curiosities of the the Laputian king "discovered not the least Curiosity to enquire into the Laws, Government, History, Religion, or the Manners of the Countries where [he] had been; but confined his Questions Mathematicks" to the State of (pp. 166-67). Soon Gulliver grows weary of Companions" such "disagreeable and begins instead to converse with the uned

Answer" ucated populace, who will at least give him a "reasonable (p. 173). His desire is not merely for knowledge, but for a philosophical friendship, and this cannot be satisfied within the Modern tradition.

After his encounter with the Laputians Gulliver represents himself as some one who has outgrown his fascination with the New Science (p. 178). In Glubbdubdrib, when he has the opportunity to summon up the ghosts of emi nent figures from the past, his first impulse is to see Homer and Aristotle rather than Descartes and Gassendi (p. 197). Here Gulliver confronts the characteris tic Modernist preference for the absolute certainty of mathematical systems over the partial validity of common opinions, which the classical tradition ac discussion.4 cepted as the necessary starting point for philosophical We can note, however, that Gulliver remains a Modern in many respects even at the end of Book III, as is evident from the confidence with which he looks forward Motion" Medicine" to the discovery of "perpetual and "the universal (p. 210). Swift's increasing concentration on this theme in the latter half of the work indicates a conviction that the development of a philosopher in modern times is

impossible without a radical critique of the Modern philosophical tradition.

Gulliver's encounter with the ghosts of Glubbdubdrib allows us to gauge the extent of his continuing attachment to the political sphere. In fact the ghosts of the ancient and modern philosophers are not the first he asks to see. As soon as

Apprehensions" his "Curiosity has prevailed over [his] (which, typically, does Magnificence" not take long), he wants to conjure up "Scenes of Pomp and and

to meet those who are distinguished by their "Love of . . . Country, and gen Mankind" eral Benevolence for (pp. 195-96). Insofar as Gulliver has articu lated his thoughts on the subject, he still considers the glory of a life sacrificed for the benefit of one's country to be the supreme good. He passes on sur prisingly quickly from the great patriots, however, and in fact spends much Learned" more time conversing with the "antient (pp. 197-98). A voracious, if indiscriminate curiosity is now his primary characteristic. During his final conversations in Glubbdubdrib Gulliver comes to question his veneration for the political sphere as a whole. A study of modern history reveals "how great a Share in the Motions and Events of Courts, Councils and Senates might be challenged by Bawds, Whores, Pimps, Parasites and Buf foons" (p. 199). In every age he finds virtue threatened or extinguished by corruption. By the end of his stay his initial reverence for the civic virtues has Reflections" given way to "melancholy on the ephemerality of the greatest civi lizations (p. 201). Gulliver is overjoyed when he hears of the existence of a race of immortals 46 Interpretation

disin- called Struldbruggs. Here are beings who "have their Minds free and gaged, without the Weight and Depression of Spirits caused by the continual Death" Apprehension of (p. 208). When asked what he would do with his time if he himself were immortal he can answer at length:

I answered, it was easy to be eloquent on so copious and delightful a Subject, especially to me who have been often apt to amuse myself with Visions of what I should do if I were a King, a General, or a great Lord: And upon this very Case I had frequently run over the whole System how I should employ myself, and pass the Time if I were sure to live for ever. (P 209)

As an immortal Gulliver would pursue three goals, which correspond to his "Pomp," Virtue," Learning" threefold interest in "consummate and "Wit and in

Glubbdubdrib (pp. 195-97). His first aim would be to become "the wealthiest

Kingdom," Man in the his second, to serve the public, both by convincing Virtue" "hopeful young Men of the Usefulness of and by keeping a careful record of political and cultural changes as a means of opposing corruption as it World." "steals into the Thirdly Gulliver would simply enjoy the sheer "Plea sure of seeing the various Revolutions of States and Empires ... Barbarity

civilized" overrunning the politest Nations, and the most barbarous becoming (p. 210). Gulliver is horrified when he actually meets the Struldbruggs, for they turn out to possess "not only all the Follies and Infirmities of old Men, but many dying" more which arose from the dreadful Prospect of never (p. 212). His

"vision" saving," wisdom- of a "hospitable . . . yet .. . magnanimous and loving race is in direct contrast to the truth, which is that the Struldbruggs are infinitely covetous, small-minded and incurious. We learn that they are "unca- Friendship," pable of and "although they were told that I was a great Traveller, and had seen all the World . .. had not the least Curiosity to ask me a Question (pp. 212-13).

Happiness" It is the "natural Desire of endless Life and sublunary that im pelled Gulliver to expound his fantasies so gleefully (p. 210). Swift sees an Happiness" inseparable connection between the pursuit of "sublunary and the desire for immortality, since a life devoted to such a pursuit involves attributing a significance to human existence which a sober consideration of mortality reveals to be disproportionate. The recognition that the human condition is such that, even leaving aside death, passions become jaded or physically impossible to in time is to reduce satisfy bound, therefore, the intensity of all worldly desires. Gulliver "grew heartily ashamed of the pleasing Visions [he] had formed" (p. 214). His mortification reveals an awareness that he has been gov

over" "Visions," erned by pride. He has "frequently run his which have in as Lord," volved imagining himself "a King, a General, ... a great or "the Nation" Oracle of the (p. 209). He now begins to view his passions in a much more detached as he comes to appreciate light, the extent to which they are rooted in an irrational sense of his own significance. Gulliver's Travels 47

disingaged" Now more "free and in mind, Gulliver can begin to contemplate the summum bonum dispassionately. The three basic options correspond to the three projects he imagines himself pursuing if granted immortality. Although it "Visions" might appear that all of Gulliver's are equally deflated by his en counter with the Struldbruggs, this is in fact not the case. His patriotic fantasies have much in common with his desire to become the "wealthiest Man in the Kingdom," Pomp" just as in Glubbdubdrib his desire to see "Scenes of is

Virtue" scarcely distinguishable from his admiration for "consummate (pp. 195-96). Both arise from pride and involve forgetting the transient nature of Happiness." "sublunary Gulliver could only imagine himself devoting "about Years" two Hundred to the acquisition of riches before achieving his goal of excelling all others in wealth (p. 209). To achieve his second goal of instilling Men," virtue in "hopeful young he would have to become reconciled to their eventual death. The difficulties here are only partially concealed by Gulliver's optimistic account: "Length of Time would harden me to lose [them] with little or no Reluctance just as a Man diverts himself with the annual Succession of Pinks and Tulips in his Garden, without regretting the Loss of those which Year" withered the preceding (p. 210). All this vigilance would only "probably prevent" the onset of corruption. The sense of the ephemerality of all civilizations which Gulliver acquired in Glubbdubdrib now comes to the fore, as he begins to discuss the third way in which he would occupy his time as an immortal, namely with:

The Pleasure of seeing the various Revolutions of States and Empires; the Changes in the lower and upper World; antient Cities in Ruins, and obscure Villages become the Seats of Kings. Famous Rivers lessening into shallow Brooks; the Ocean leaving one Coast dry, and overwhelming another: The Discovery of many Countries yet unknown. Barbarity overrunning the politest Nations, and the most

barbarous becoming civilized ... the Progress and Returns of Comets, with the Changes of Motion in the Sun, Moon and Stars. (P. 210)

Although this is added almost as an afterthought by Gulliver, it in fact contra dicts rather than supplements the previous, patriotic fantasy, for where, in his Degeneracy," capacity as a defender of liberty, Gulliver would resist "continual as a lover of knowledge he would take positive pleasure in observing the cycli "Politeness." cal decay and rebirth of To a lover of knowledge all human activ ities would appear merely as one aspect of a great pageant of mutability, which ultimately includes the galaxy itself. Unlike Gulliver's previous fantasies this "Pleasure" does not involve a sense of superiority to others, which distin guishes it even from the noblest of ordinary human motives. The potential antidote to Gulliver's pride lies in his philosophical disposition, which leads him to embrace the largest perspective from which others shrink. It is hard to see how a Struldbrugg who possessed and cultivated a nature similar to Gul liver's could become jaded. By the end of Book III Gulliver is on the verge of making a conscious 48 Interpretation choice of the contemplative life. Swift allows us to calculate that Gulliver is roughly fifty years old at the end of the voyage to Laputa. His ripeness for philosophy is once again reflected in his ever-increasing detachment from ordi nary, domestic ties. Although he remains at home for five months this time a longer interval than that which preceded either of his two previous voyages Condition," and in a "very happy eventually he embarks once again on The Child" Adventure, and this time he leaves his "poor Wife big with (p. 221). The implication is that his curiosity is now in a sense both less passionate and more concentrated as a result of his third voyage.

Houyhnhnms' Although appearances suggest otherwise, the way of life is in fact governed by eros, but a rational eros, which distinguishes carefully be tween real and apparent satisfactions. Their complete liberation from pride is in fact the result of their complete dedication to the pursuit of knowledge. Swift refers insistently to their inquisitiveness concerning Gulliver. They are said to Wonder" Wonder" show "manifest Tokens of and then "new Signs of at his clothing, which they examine very closely, "using various Gestures, not unlike those of a Philosopher, when he would attempt to solve some new and difficult Phaenomenon" (pp. 224-26). The first we see of Gulliver's Master is his

Wonder" "Signs of at Gulliver's gloves. Behind his concerted effort to teach

Impatience." him the Houyhnhnm language is a great "Curiosity and He is learn" "eager to everything about Gulliver (p. 234). In particular he reveals Admiration" "great Signs of Curiosity and when he sees him undressed at last (p. 237). After the revelation of Gulliver's true appearance he is even more astonished at his reasoning powers, and urges him to exert "the utmost Dili gence" Wonders" to acquire the language, so that his "Impatience to hear ... might be eased as quickly as possible (pp. 237-38). When Gulliver is able to communicate his thoughts (as always he picks up the language quickly), his Master badgers him with frequent questions and interruptions, often desiring Satisfaction" "fuller as Gullivers vocabulary improves (p. 244-45). He does

satisfied" not rest until his "Curiosity seemed to be fully (pp. 259-60). The Houyhnhnm is the first being Gulliver has met whose inquisitiveness matches his own. If his dedication to the pursuit of knowledge is even greater than Gulliver's it is because he has had the advantage of being brought up in a Reason" society where the "grand Maxim is, to cultivate (p. 267). Friendship and benevolence are Houyhnhnms' mentioned first among the virtues. Al though neither of these are "confined to particular Objects, but universal to the Race," whole it soon emerges that only benevolence is truly indiscriminate: will have it that Nature teaches them "They to love the whole Species, and it is Reason that maketh a Distinction of only Persons, where there is a superior Virtue" of (p. 268). Since there Degree is no evidence that any Houyhnhnm falls short of perfection in the moral it is clear that the virtues, "Distinction of Persons" that leads to special friendships must be founded on some other crite rion. We have already been told that the Houyhnhnms differ greatly in intellec- Gulliver's Travels 49 tual ability (p. 256). The suggestion is that the Houyhnhnms who possess "Tal

them" ents of Mind [and] a Capacity to improve are drawn into friendships, the purpose of which is to exercise their intense curiosity. Philosophical conversa tion is the only activity specifically mentioned as giving the Houyhnhnms plea sure: "No Person spoke without being pleased himself, and pleasing his Com panions" (p. 277). Swift's description of their discourses on "Friendship and Benevolence; on Order and Oeconomy; sometimes upon the visible Operations of Nature, or ancient Traditions; upon the Bounds and Limits of Virtue; upon Reason," the unerring Rules of and on many other subjects, including Gulliver Houyhnhnms' himself, forms the culmination of his account of the way of life (pp. 211-19).'

Gulliver's encounter with the Houyhnhnms should also constitute the cul mination of his education. They are free from all the passions which are rooted in self-love, including the domestic and patriotic attachments which have hith erto formed the chief obstacle to Gulliver's development as a philosopher (pp. 268-69). This is most clearly illustrated by their calm acceptance of death (p. 275). Gulliver himself now seems ready to appreciate and imitate their virtues. The account of the human race which he gives his Master is much less eulogis tic than his description of England in Book II, as he himself is aware: "The Reader may be disposed to wonder how I could prevail on myself to give so free a Representation of my own Species, among a Race of Mortals who were Kind" already too apt to conceive the vilest Opinion of Human (p. 258). The explanation for his indiscretion is as follows:

The many Virtues of those excellent Quadrupeds placed in opposite View to human Corruptions, had so far opened mine Eyes, and enlarged my Understanding, that I began to view the Actions and Passions of Man in a very different Light; and to think the Honour of my own Kind not worth Managing. (P. 258)

Faults" He is led to find a "thousand in himself "which with us would never be

Infirmities." numbered even among human This partial overcoming of pride is Disguise." accompanied by an "utter Detestation of all Falsehood and He tells us, "Truth appeared so amiable to me, that I determined upon sacrificing every it" thing to (p. 258). This further weakening of Gulliver's attachment to the sphere of human Passions," "Actions and and the concomitant intensification of his devotion to the pursuit of knowledge, are caused less by his new understanding of the pervasive power of self-love, or by an abstract love of truth, than by what he Motive," Veneration" calls "a much stronger namely, "his Love and for the Houyhnhnms. It is this above all which leads him to resolve "never to return to human Kind, but to pass the rest of [his] Life among these admirable Houyhn Virtue" hnms in the Contemplation and Practice of every (p. 258). Love for one's instructors including admiration for the great classical authorities is a great part of the joy of philosophy, one can conclude. However, Gulliver's patriotism is still very much in evidence: 50 Interpretation

In what I said of my Countrymen, I extenuated their Faults as much as I durst before so strict an Examiner, and upon every Article, gave as favourable a Turn as the Matter would bear. For, indeed, who is there alive who would not be swayed by his Byass and Partiality to the Place of his Birth? (Pp. 258-59)

"malicious" He resents the comparisons that the Houyhnhnm draws between Kind," man and Yahoo, and is at times "silent out of Partiality to [his] own discover" 263- though he could "plainly the truth of what was being said (pp. Man" 64). His pride in the "Actions and Passions of is finally overthrown only by an accident which occurs while Gulliver is out on an expedition to observe the Yahoos. A female Yahoo is attracted by the sight of Gulliver naked as he is about to bathe and leaps on him passionately. Gulliver finds this experience both terribly frightening and mortifying, as he could now "no longer deny, that Feature" [he] was a real Yahoo, in every Limb and (p. 267). Gulliver's eulogistic account of the Houyhnhnms begins immediately after this episode, and with a curious abruptness. The implication is that he can for the first time appreciate fully their virtues now that his pride has been rooted out. From now on he views any contribution of his own to their conversations as "a Loss of so much Time for improving myself: But . . . was infinitely Auditor" delighted with the Station of an humble (p. 277). He regards the

Value" Houyhnhnms as the source of "all the little Knowledge ... of any that he possesses, and was "prouder to listen, than to dictate to the greatest and Europe." wisest Assembly in He is both awestruck at their wisdom and filled "with a respectful Love and Gratitude, that they would condescend to distin Species" guish [him] from the rest of [his] (p. 278).

understanding" Gulliver's "enlarged is now seemingly free from self-love in all its disguised and extended forms:

When I thought of my Family, my Friends, my Countrymen, or human Race in general, I considered them as they really were, Yahoos in Shape and Disposition, perhaps a little more civilized, and qualified with the Gift of Speech, but making

no other Use of Reason, than to improve and multiply . . . Vices. (P. 278)

In contrast to his behavior at the end of the voyage to Brobdingnagia, he does Littleness" not "wink at his own (p. 148), but is filled with even more "Horror Detestation" and at the sight of his own reflection than at the sight of a "com Yahoo" 278).6 mon (p. Gulliver also reveals a new, Houyhnhnm-like indif ference to his own death. When forced to depart from Houyhnhnmland his Despair" "utmost Grief and are caused less by the "certain Prospect of an un Death" Corruptions" natural than by the danger of relapsing into [his] old (p 280).

attempted rape of Thus the Gulliver represents a crucial moment in his edu cation. It is in many ways the most dense and enigmatic episode in the book. The fact that it is Gulliver's nakedness that arouses the lust of the Yahoo is Gulliver's Travels 51

for significant, Gulliver's clothes play a central role in the allegory of Book IV. When he Cloaths." arrives in Houyhnhnmland he is wearing his "best Suit of He is allowed to do so only because of some curious behavior on the part of his mutinous crew, who treat Gulliver with astonishing leniency as they set him ashore in Houyhnhnmland, even though they have successfully seized control of his and ship have previously subjected him to many violent threats and a long imprisonment (pp. 221-22). Not only do they let him change into his best clothes before being marooned, but they are even "so civil as not to search [his] Pockets," though they contained money. As they set him down ashore they Tide" advise him to "make haste, for fear of being overtaken by the (pp. 221- 22). Their contradictory behavior becomes explicable if one remembers that the "Buccaneers" crew itself is composed of two groups. The mutiny was led by whom Gulliver recruited in the West Indies to replace members of his crew

"debauch" who had died during the voyage from England. These the surviving members of Gulliver's original crew. It is surely this latter group who treat Gulliver in such a merciful way, for Gulliver asks them "who their new Captain

was" (p. 222). The motive for their civility is guilt and a desire to avoid a feeling of responsibility for Gulliver's death. From the start, then, Gulliver's clothes are linked with the moral and religious opinions which restrain man from barbarism. The traditional character of these opinions is suggested by the "Buccaneers" fact that they seem not to be shared by the rootless who lead the mutiny. As has been mentioned the Houyhnhnms are much puzzled by Gulliver's clothing (pp. 225-26). He is "obliged to [his] Cloaths, whereof they had no Conception" for their initial uncertainty as to whether or not he is a Yahoo (pp. Dress" 230-31). He keeps "the Secret of [his] as long as he can, in order to Yahoos." "distinguish [him]self as much as possible, from that cursed Race of His Master is fascinated both by his clothes and his body when the truth is revealed, and after a careful examination concludes that he is indeed a Yahoo. Gulliver's response is to express "Uneasiness at his giving me so often the Appellation of Yahoo, an odious Animal, for which I had so utter an Hatred Contempt," Covering" and and to request that the secret of his "false be kept for as long as possible (pp. 236-37). The power of Gulliver's clothes to con Feature" ceal the fact that he is a Yahoo "in every Limb and from the Houyhn hnms, and from Gulliver himself to a large extent, may remind us of the em brothers' broidery on the coats in A Tale of a Tub, which "served to hide or Flaw."7 strengthen any The religious tradition restrains man's bestial nature partly by concealing it, and emphasizing his unique status within the divine scheme. It obstructs the philosopher's progress towards self-knowledge because it masks the extent to which self-love underlies even some of the most noble motives.8 In a sense then, the attempted rape of Gulliver completes his educa tion, since it must finally lead to the rooting out of his patriotism and desire for honor, which have up to now formed the chief obstacles to a thorough "enlarg- 52 Interpretation

ing" of the understanding and a radical detachment from all that is local and transitory. The difficulty is that Gulliver's efforts to cling to his best suit seem entirely justified in the light of subsequent events. The revelation that he is a Yahoo "in

Feature" every Limb and leads to his exile from Houyhnhnmland and to his final misanthropism and self-loathing. The eradication of his worldly pride does not clear the way for his characteristic love of knowledge to become the domi nant force in his soul in the way one might expect. The implication is that the female Yahoo's assault on Gulliver not only facilitates but also radically dis torts his development as a philosopher. The reason for this is hinted at in the opening sentence of the episode, where Gulliver explains the motive behind his expedition.

As I ought to have understood human Nature much better than I supposed it possible for my Master to do, so it was easy to apply the Character he gave of the Yahoos to myself and my Countrymen; and I believed I could yet make further Discoveries from my own Observation. (P. 265)

These lines reveal that Gulliver's basic intellectual assumptions are still derived from the Modern tradition. His earlier rejection of the Cartesianism of the

Laputians has not affected his adherence to the new scientific method, which leads him to favor observation and experience over reason. Although the classi cal tradition provides the theoretical starting point, its lofty, contemplative character is presumed to render it unsuited to a detailed understanding of man's bestial drives. Ironically, it becomes a matter of pride for the Modern philoso pher to uncover the most mortifying truths, and to find clear and direct proof of man's bodily affinity to the beasts. Although this facilitates enlightenment in a sense, by creating an atmosphere in which the common opinions that mask this affinity are easily discredited, the price to be paid is a major distortion of emphasis in the philosophical account that replaces these opinions, which is brought about by too exclusive a concentration on the lowest elements in hu Feature," man nature. In deciding that he is a "real Yahoo in every Limb and Gulliver leaves his own characteristic, intellectual desires out of the account. The shock of Gulliver's enlightenment initially serves to open his eyes fully to the virtues of the Houyhnhnms, but ultimately closes the door to his participa tion in their happiness, for he has defined his nature in terms that deny the possibility of his imitating them. His exaggerated humility leads him to accept the justice of the decision to banish him much more readily than his Master does (p. 280). It leads also, paradoxically, to his eventual isolation from his fellow men, whom he now views as "a Species of Animals utterly incapable of Amendment" (p. 6).

"soft" "hard" Neither the nor the school of Gulliver's Travels criticism takes into account the gulf between the philosopher and the nonphilosopher in their IV.9 interpretations of Book While there is no reason to doubt that Swift Gulliver's Travels 53 equates the essential motives of the nonphilosopher with those of the Yahoo, there is every reason to suppose that he considers the potential of Gulliver in particular to imitate the Houyhnhnms to be very great indeed. The increasing dominance of the sense of wonder and the progressive subordination of pride in his soul are arrested only by a failure to become aware of himself as a philoso pher. The implication that the philosopher's education should culminate in an explicit recognition that his soul is characterized by a desire for knowledge is one of many indications that Swift's teaching is fundamentally Platonic.10 After Gulliver's traumatic enlightenment Swift draws a contrast between the Houy

governed" hnhnms, who are "wholly by reason, and Modern "Systems of Natu Philosophy." Honour" ral Gulliver's Master agrees with Plato (the "highest possible) that knowledge of such systems, even "if it were certain, could be of Use" no (pp. 267-68). Gulliver adds that "many Paths to Fame would be then World" shut up in the Learned were this advice heeded. These systems facili tate the enlightenment of nonphilosophers and potential philosophers who are not yet consciously ruled by the love of knowledge. In such circumstances the fact that man's kinship to the Yahoo is only partial (in "every Limb and Fea ture") can easily be forgotten. In Platonic terms the most useful knowledge is

governed" that which contributes to a life "wholly by reason. The fact that the systems of the Moderns like Gulliver's expeditions to observe the Yahoos stem from pride rather than curiosity is itself evidence of their uselessness in this sense.

In contrast, Gulliver's Master's approach represents the classical, especially the Platonic, stance. From the start he is convinced that Gulliver is a Yahoo, but tactfully conceals this fact (p. 234), placing more emphasis on his "Teach Cleanliness," "astonish" ableness, Civility and which him. As we have seen, he is consumed with curiosity; fascinated both by Gulliver's clothes and his body, and by the distinction between the two, but even more "astonished at my Ca pacity for Speech and Reason, than at the Figure of my Body, whether it were

no" Covering," covered or (p. 237). He agrees to keep the secret of his "false a promise that he seems to break only when directly challenged by his peers, by which time the truth has been revealed (pp. 272, 279). In fact he considers it wise for all Yahoos to "conceal many ... Deformities .. . which would else

supportable" be hardly (p. 260). In brief, his enquiries into human nature are contrasted to Gulliver's in several ways: His motive is curiosity rather than pride; he is interested rather than repelled when Gulliver's nakedness confirms his physical affinities to the Yahoos; and at the same time he recognizes that Gulliver's own attitude is very different, and so seeks to soften and delay his full enlightenment (p. 237).

One of the Houyhnhnm's aims in his conversations with Gulliver is to lead him gradually towards a sober and measured assessment of his own nature. Gulliver's concern with clearly observable phenomena, which causes him to identify himself as a Yahoo solely on the basis of external resemblances, is 54 Interpretation contrasted with his Master's attempt to encourage him to examine and discuss his own distinctive disposition. Such a self-examination, which might eventu that has ally have led Gulliver to a full awareness of the thirst for knowledge always been his underlying motive, could only be conducted through philo sophical conversation. The Houyhnhnm's intention was for Gulliver to move gradually towards an understanding both of the bestial and the rational elements in his nature. An analysis of his desire to grasp the most mortifying truths even as he was investigating them would have reduced their power to mortify. As it is, his typically Modern concentration on the commonest human passions leads him to finalize his account of his own nature before he has fully purified and articulated the motives behind his enquiries. Evidence of the Houyhnhnm's fundamental optimism concerning Gulliver's nature and his desire to teach him can be found throughout Swift's account of their developing relationship. Right from the start, as has been said, the Houyhnhnm is much more interested in Gulliver's "Capacity for Speech and Reason" than his body or clothes (p. 237). In fact his astonishment at Gul liver's rationality increases when his physical kinship to the Yahoos is con

me," firmed, for "he doubled the Pains he had been at to instruct even deceiv ing his friends as to the reason for introducing him into their company in his anxiety to have him always present (pp. 237-38). In the course of Gulliver's relatively honest account of his species, the Houyhnhnm pays him an unex Family" pected compliment, declaring that he must be "born of some noble in his own country, so superior is he both physically and mentally to common Yahoos (p. 256). He draws a parallel to Houyhnhnm society, where "the White, the Sorrel, and the Iron-Grey, were not so exactly shaped as the Bay, the Dapple-grey, and the Black; nor born with equal Talents of Mind, or a

them." Capacity to improve (Swift never makes it explicit that Gulliver's Mas ter shows him more respect than many, if not most, of his fellow Houyhnhnms in introducing him to his circle of philosophical friends [p. 277]). His wish to learn from Gulliver is inextricable from a desire to teach him. As we have seen,

self," he "daily convinced [him] of a thousand Faults in [him] during which time Gulliver is also learning by example to love truth (p. 258). Before stating his final verdict on the human race namely, that almost all its characteristic passions originate in a Yahoo-like self-love he commands Gulliver to "to sit down at some Distance, (an Honour which he had never before conferred on

me)" (p. 259). His aim seems to be to make it clear that he now considers Gulliver to be ready to accept the truth. During the course of his speech he distinguishes carefully between Gulliver and his countrymen, criticizing the latter for their misuse of reason, but the former only for his physical defects (p. 259).

of the between The intensity friendship Gulliver and his Master is eventually recognized Houyhnhnm who by the assembly, censure the latter for appearing Pleasure" to receive "some Advantage or from his conversations with Gulliver Gulliver's Travels 55

(p. 279). While telling Gulliver about this and the decision to exile him, the Houyhnhnm is careful to distance himself from the general view:

He concluded, that for his own Part he could have been content to keep me in his Service as long as I lived; because he found I had cured myself of some bad Habits and Dispositions, by endeavouring, as far as my inferior Nature was capable, to imitate the Houyhnhnms. (Pp. 279-80)

Further evidence of the Houyhnhnm's esteem for Gulliver emerges as the latter Gulliver' is preparing to depart. Resisting s humble efforts to bid him farewell at his home, "his Honour, out of Curiosity, and perhaps (if I may speak it without Vanity) partly out of Kindness, was determined to see me in my Canoo," even going so far as to bring along "several of his neighbouring Friends" (p. 282). Before Gulliver can kiss his hoof as a final gesture of re

Mouth." spect, his Master "did [him] the Honour to raise it gently to [his] Gulliver sees this act which is quite remarkable in the context of Book IV as a sign of a "noble and courteous Disposition"; that so "illustrious a Person should descend to give so great a Mark of Distinction to a Creature as inferior

I," as but it seems to have been intended rather as an expression of friendship and even respect. This is one of the many indications that the Houyhnhnm considers Gulliver to be a fundamentally rational being which the latter's dog matic humility leads him to ignore or misinterpret. The effects of the new, reductive analysis of human nature are illustrated by Houyhnhnms' the decision to banish Gulliver. Now that Gulliver's clothes have worn out it is commonly believed that he is a Yahoo (pp. 276, 279). Once the learned world has accepted that the nature of man is fundamentally bestial, the philosopher is denied the opportunity to form the philosophic friendships, which, in the Platonic view, represent his ultimate goal. Whereas the classical tradition had cultivated the love of knowledge by providing a theoretical ac count of its nature and ultimate goal, the Modern philosopher denies its very existence, even though it may constitute his fundamental motive. Thus Gul liver's eventual conception of himself as a fearless and solitary pursuer of loathsome truths represents a characteristically Modern distortion of the joyous and sociable openness to experience which initially distinguishes the potential philosopher. The consequences of a general unmasking of the common opin Covering" ions that provide a "false (p. 237) for human nature are, in the end, as far-reaching for the philosopher as they are for the nonphilosopher. At the end of Book IV Gulliver exhibits the despair and nausea which, Swift implies, were the original and natural reactions to the new account of human nature. One might wonder why he remains so dedicated to truth, since it is so clearly of no use to him in securing happiness. Like the narrator of A Tale of a Tub, one might expect him to search longingly for "an Art to sodder and patch Nature," of rather than up the Flaws and Imperfections continually "widening them."" that not do so is due to his and exposing The fact he does partly 56 Interpretation devotion to the Houyhnhnms, but his more fundamental motive turns out once again to be pride, though in an uncommon form. We are alerted to this in the final paragraph of the book, where he entreats Yahoos who themselves display

Vice" appear" this "absurd not to "presume to in his sight (p. 296). His feeling of superiority extends even to the Houyhnhnms themselves. He remains con vinced that they

were not able to distinguish this [vice] of Pride, for want of thoroughly understanding Human Nature, as it sheweth itself in other Countries, where that Animal presides. But I, who had more Experience, could plainly observe some Rudiments of it among the wild Yahoos. (P. 296)

The Modern philosopher assigns to himself a unique position in the history of thought. All previous philosophical traditions have been insufficiently radical in their analysis of the pervasive power of self-love, since they have relied on

experience.12 meditation and discussion rather than observation and common

Gulliver forgets that his Master had arrived at a knowledge of a "thousand

Faults" before" of which he himself "had not the least Perception (p. 258) purely by discussion and meditation, and had discovered many "Vices and Fol lies" in humanity which had never even been mentioned to him (p. 278). One may conclude that the Modern philosopher's despair is tempered, and indeed fuelled, by a perverse pride in his stern refusal to lose sight of the most painful truths, which he contrasts to the unthinking complacency of common folk and, in particular, to the cosiness and naivety of the classical tradition. However, once this pride has faded away along with memories of the tradition itself, Moderns' Swift implies that the discovery of self-love at the root of all action and thought will lead them to question both the possibility and the use of reason.

Gulliver's experiences reveal that premature enlightenment is more dan gerous to the philosopher's development than the more traditional obstacles, the moral and religious traditions which form the principal subject of the first three books. Gulliver's desire for knowledge grows as experience, study and medita tion on the approach of death expose the vanity of the noblest forms of human endeavor, and is further cultivated by his final encounter with philosophy in its classical form. His intense curiosity is ultimately a match for all distractions save those that present themselves as a part of his education.

NOTES

1 . The Prose Works ofJonathan Swift, Vol. 11, Gulliver's Travels, ed. Herbert Davis (Oxford, 1965), p. 19. All further references are given in the text. 2. See Plato's Republic, 519a-b. 3. For the resemblance between Brobdingnagia and the Greek polis see Allan Bloom, "An Travels," Outline of Gulliver's in Ancients and Moderns, ed. Joseph Cropsey (London, 1964). Gulliver's Travels 57

4. See Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, trans. E. Sinclair (Chicago, 1952), pp. 136-53. 5. The implication of this interpretation is that it is both desirable, and in some cases possible, to imitate the Houyhnhnms. Most twentieth-century critics deny this, or deny that it is Swift's view. for K. See, instance, Williams, Jonathan Swift and the Age of Compromise (London, 1970), Houyhnhnmland," pp. 187-91; C. Winton, "Conversion on the Road to Sewanee Review, 68 Satirist," (I960): Ernest "Swift: The Dean as 20-33; Tuveson, in Swift: A Collection of Critical ed. Ernest Tuveson p. 107. Essays, (London, 1964), There have been some dissenting voices, however: see particularly John Morris, "Wishes as Horses: A Word for the Houyhnhnms " The Yale Review, 62 (1972-73): 354-71. 6. The evidence seems to me to be clearly against those critics who argue that Gulliver is proud in the common sense of the word at the end of Book IV: See Winton, cited above in note 5, and Edward Rosenheim, Swift and the Satirist's Art (Chicago, 1963), p. 222. 7. Swift, A Tale of a Tub, ed. A.C. Guthkelch and D. Nichol Smith (Oxford, 1958), p. 136. 8. Some of these points are made by Max Byrd, "Gulliver's Clothes: An Enlightenment Mo tif," in Enlightenment Essays, 3 (1972): 41-46. "hard" 9. The school maintain that Swift finds man wanting according to the highest standards "soft" of rationality, while the critics deny that the Houyhnhnms represent such a standard and argue that he takes a more liberal view of human nature. See, for example, R.S. Crane, "The Ideas," Houyhnhnms, the Yahoos and the History of in Reason and the Imagination: Studies in the History ofIdeas 1600-1800, ed. J. Mazzeo (London, 1962), and K. Williams, cited above in note 5. My own approach owes more to Allan Bloom, cited above in note 2. "Charmides" 10. See D. Hyland, The Virtue ofPhilosophy: An Interpretation ofPlato's (Ohio, 1981). 11. A Tale of a Tub, p. 174. 12. See Leo Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy (Chicago, 1983), p. 212.

Book Reviews

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Charles E. Butterworth University ofMaryland at College Park

Long-time readers of Interpretation will remember Muhsin Mahdi's sugges tive explanation several years ago of the frame-story and dominant theme in The Arabian Nights. Since then, he has provided readers of Arabic with a

tales.1 painstaking scholarly edition of these intriguing And now Husain Had dawy has used that edition as the basis for a masterful and thoroughly charming translation of these same Alf Layla wa Layla, that is, The 1001 Nights or The Arabian Nights. Although Mahdi has already explained the basic structure of the tales, it bears repeating if only to prepare the way for speaking of how much this new translation may contribute to our own reflections on politics and literature. The main character is Shahrazad, the vizier's daughter who proves herself an ex tremely gifted raconteuse. She speaks ostensibly to her younger sister Di- narzad, who serves as a prompter to Shahrazad either by beseeching her night after night to relate another tale or by complimenting her on the marvels of what she has just recounted, and to King Shahrayar, the one who must learn to Shahrazad' see beyond the alluring appeal of s stories and come to understand human beings their passions and their aspirations better. Shahrayar is in need of these lessons because he has not learned yet how to overcome the deceit humans employ against one another. It is his younger brother Shahzaman who first alerts Shahrayar to the deceit ful ways of humans, especially women. And, to go back yet another step (an unfolding similar to what occurs in the tales themselves, one tale calling up another so that two or three smaller yarns are related before the larger story is completed), Shahzaman himself becomes aware of women's infidelity because of Shahrayar. Having ruled successfully over Samarkand far from his brother Shahrazad's for ten years, Shahzaman is visited by Shahrayar's vizier, father, and told of his older brother's longing to see him. Shahzaman eagerly makes all the preparations for the long journey and even camps outside the city on the eve

interpretation, Fall 1993, Vol. 21, No. 1 60 Interpretation of his departure in order to get an early start. But towards the middle of the night he decides to return and bid his wife farewell. This solicitous gesture leads him to discover his wife in bed with a lowly kitchen helper. Enraged, Shahzaman kills them both, throws their bodies out of the castle, and departs immediately. He travels relentlessly night and day until he reaches his older brother. Though Shahrayar notices that something is troubling Shah zaman, he cannot extract an explanation. To distract him, Shahrayar proposes a hunting expedition. But Shahzaman prefers to stay behind. Looking out the window of the guesthouse at the garden of his brother's palace quite by acci dent, he sees his brother's wife walking about with twenty of her female ser vants ten white and ten black. Suddenly, they all take off their clothes, and Shahzaman discovers that the ten black servants are really men. Each of them promptly settles down to sexual pastimes with one of the women servants as the queen cries out for her own lover. The moment his name (Mas'ud or "Lucky") is called, another black man jumps down from a tree and tends to her desires. The realization that not even his brother is safe from betrayal relieves Shah zaman's depression, and Shahrayar notices the change upon his return. Lengthy questioning finally leads to Shahzaman's explanation of the reasons for his depression and its cure as well as to a plan whereby Shahrayar can discover for himself how his wife deceives him. Throughout Shahzaman's account of his own misfortune and then of the infidelity of his brother's wife, we see Shah rayar both by his own admission and by the way he is portrayed as con sumed by immense anger. Whereas Shahzaman was content to slay his wife and her lowly lover, Shahrayar confesses: "By God, had I been in your place, I would have killed at least a hundred or even a thousand women. I would have

mad" been furious; I would have gone (p. 7). And we are told that "when King Shahrayar heard what his brother said and found out what had happened to

boiled." him, he was furious and his blood Thus, when the two brothers pre tend to go off on another hunting expedition, only to slip secretly back to the guesthouse so that Shahrayar may observe his wife's conduct in the garden, the narrator explains: "When King Shahrayar saw the spectacle of his wife and the

mind" slave girls, he went out of his (p. 8).

This rage does not yet lead Shahrayar to kill his wife and the slave girls nor to the decision that brings Shahrazad into the tale. Another experience is needed before he becomes so persuaded of the treachery or deceitfulness of women that he first wreaks his vengeance upon his wife and her servants and then concludes that the only way he can protect himself from the faithlessness of women is to kill them after spent having the night with them. But to step back a moment, his immediate reaction upon learning of his wife's infidelity like the reaction of his younger brother is flight. Unlike his younger brother, however, Shahrayar does not first kill his wife and her lover. Moreover, unlike Shahzaman, Shahrayar undertakes his voyage for the sake of learning: he wants Book Reviews 61 to find someone who suffers greater misfortune than they. Thus he proposes that if they find such a person, they will return and reestablish themselves; if

royalty." not, they will roam the land "without need for the trappings of Whereas all that has taken place until now is fully explicable within normal human norms, the tale that stands between us and the introduction of Shahrazad as the storyteller par excellence involves a being beyond human comprehen sion an 'ifrtt or a jinn, that is, a demon or supernatural being of suprahuman size and power. From this point on, we are confronted with the limits of our traditional skill and learning. Even religious knowledge is insufficient to coun ter the powers of these supranatural beings. At any rate, the wandering of a day and an additional morning having taken them to the edge of the sea, Shahrayar and Shahzaman are astonished to see an extraordinary being rise up out of the sea like a huge black pillar. Having seen the demon first, they are able to hide in a tree. As chance would have it, the black demon carrying a large glass

chest with four locks on it stops beneath just that tree and takes from the chest a beautiful young woman. Then, speaking to her of how he snatched her away on her wedding night and keeps her for himself in this padlocked chest at the bottom of the sea, the demon lays his head on her lap and falls asleep. brothers. The young woman happens to look up into the tree and see the two Gently placing the demon's head on the ground, she beckons them to come down to her and insists they make love to her or else she will awaken the demon. Now, then, they find themselves in the position of the kitchen helper and Mas'ud with respect to the demon, both insofar as they are demonstrably inferior to the demon and insofar as they have had illicit sexual relations with a

another.2 woman whose first allegiance should be to Their guilt is completely the passed over, however, in the emphasis the story places on the perfidy of what she young woman with respect to the demon. Indeed, after satisfying

need,3 refers to as her the young woman demands they give her their rings and shows them a small purse containing ninety-eight other rings of different shapes and colors. Each is from a man who has made love to her: although locked up

in a chest with four locks and kept at the bottom of the sea by the demon since ashore when he deems it her wedding night only to be brought perfectly safe, men! The explana she has still managed to betray him with a hundred different is that "when a tion, as she puts it so succinctly to Shahrayar and Shahzaman, her" woman desires something, no one can stop (p. 10). Shahrayar's condition has been met. They have surely found someone who return Shahrayar's suffers greater misfortune than they. Therefore they to After robes camp, and he sets about the task of ruling his kingdom. bestowing Shahrayar orders his of honor on those who had governed during his absence,

vizier Shahrazad's father to put his wife to death. It is he himself, however, decision that who puts the female servants to death. At this point he makes the leads to the tutelary role played by Shahrazad: 62 Interpretation

He then swore to marry for one night only and kill the woman the next morning, in order to save himself from the wickedness and cunning of women, saying, 'There

earth." is not a single chaste woman anywhere on the entire face of the (P. 10)

No further mention is made of his earlier anger, yet its very depth and the way it blinds him to the pursuit of his own good frame what follows. Indeed, after sending Shahzaman back to his kingdom, not to be mentioned again in the tales that follow, Shahrayar orders the vizier to find him a wife from among the daughters of the princes. Ordering the vizier to put this woman to death the next morning, he takes a daughter from among the army officers as a wife the next night and does the same. Then he turns to the daughters of the merchant class and eventually to those of the commoners, sleeping with each woman through the night and ordering the vizier to put her to death in the morning. However much this practice protects Shahrayar from the possible infidelity of his mates, it wreaks havoc among his subjects mothers and fathers as well as daughters. Soon the whole kingdom is in an uproar, and everyone is praying to the Creator for help.

At this point, Shahrazad is presented to us. She is described as a well-read, highly cultivated, and thoughtful young woman:

Shahrazad had read the books of literature, philosophy, and medicine. She knew poetry by heart, had studied historical reports, and was acquainted with the sayings of men and the maxims of sages and kings. She was intelligent, knowledgeable, wise, and refined. She had read and learned. (P. 11)

She is, moreover, a woman with a clear understanding of her exceptional abil ity who wishes to try to save her people from Shahrayar's wrongful rule. Con "bride." sequently, she asks her father to choose her as Shahrayar's next Though nothing has been said about her skill in telling tales, the account of how she counters her father's attempt to refuse her request illustrates her deep understanding of the narrative art. To dissuade her, he relates two tales about a merchant whose unusual gift for understanding the speech of animals almost leads to his death. It does so because for him to reveal this gift to others will bring about his death. But Shahrazad, seeing more clearly than her father the real impact of the tales, turns them against him in an unexpected manner. The first tale involves the merchant, who lives in the country and has a farm, overhearing a donkey tell an ox how to avoid work by pretending to be sick. When the ox follows this the merchant has advice, the donkey do the work normally assigned the ox. The realizes that he has made a donkey dreadful mistake by coaching the ox and will perish unless he can return things to their previous order. So, too, says the vizier, will Shahrazad perish by her mistake. When she he persists, responds by threatening to treat her as the merchant did his wife. through the stable Walking later that night with his wife, the Book Reviews 63 merchant hears the donkey tell the ox that he will be slaughtered if he feigns sickness the next day. Amused by the donkey's guile, the merchant laughs aloud. His wife insists on knowing the reason for his laughter. Even when he explains that for him to reveal what he heard will lead to his death, his wife continues to insist on knowing what he heard. As he is about to reveal his secret and thus die, he overhears a rooster who satisfies fifty hens tell a dog that all the merchant needs to do is push his wife into a small room and beat her with a stick until she relents. The merchant heeds the rooster's advice and is saved. But Shahrazad is not deterred by her father's threats to treat her in the same fashion. As Mahdi notes, the vizier's stories fail because he does not under

Nights," stand their real point (see Mahdi, "Remarks on the 7007 pp. 159-60). He likens his daughter to the donkey in the first tale, saying that her meddling will lead to her demise. And he likens himself to the merchant in the second tale, claiming that he will beat her until she relents just as the merchant did to his wife. He does not understand that the key to both stories is the merchant's secret knowledge of the way animals speak. That knowledge brought about the donkey's misery in the first story and the wife's beating in the second. The vizier misses the point of these stories because he does not appreciate the merchant's unusual gift. Shahrazad does, however. Even if she is not able to understand the secret language of animals, she is fully conversant in the secret language of human beings who resort to tales in order to communicate their ideas. Thus she sees that the real point of both stories is the donkey lying to trick the ox into resuming his work and the merchant substituting fear and pain for his wife's idle, even pernicious, curiosity. In keeping with her appre ciation of these tales, she threatens her father by telling him that unless he gives her in marriage to Shahrayar she will accuse him of begrudging his sovereign a woman such as herself.

Shahrazad's appreciation of her own gift and desire to use it for the instruc tion of Shahrayar finds its first expression in the wily instructions she gives to her sister Dinarzad:

Sister, listen well to what I am telling you. When I go to the king, I will send for you, and when you come and see that the king has finished with me, say, "Sister,

story." if you are not sleepy, tell us a Then I will begin to tell a story, and it will cause the king to stop his practice, save myself, and deliver the people. (P. 16)

Once she begins to spin tales, Shahrazad clearly demonstrates her unusual skill. She begins with the extraordinary or the superhuman, that is, the role demons and other enchanted beings play in our daily affairs, and moves to questions of strife between the religious communities as well as to the way rulers lose their power. Although the manuscript edited by Mahdi and translated by Haddawy contains tales lasting for only 271 nights, it is long enough to give us a view of

perception.4 the dangers lurking just beyond our immediate The last tale of the 64 Interpretation collection details how easy it is to fall under an enchantment or a spell and how hard it is to break that spell once it has taken hold of us. Several other stories show us and, above all, Shahrayar how prudent rulers can use disguise and elusive speech to present themselves as other than they are, thereby gaining better insight into what is going on in their kingdom. The compiler of these tales indicates how easy it is to become spellbound by showing us what occurs to King Shahrayar in the course of these nine months as he listens to Shahrazad. In the beginning, almost every night ends with a notation about how eager the king is to hear the end of the story or about how he tells himself he will delay Shahrazad's death until it is over. Sometimes, he explicitly presses her to finish a particular story. As time passes, however, his thoughts and even his commands become less a part of the framework: Shah razad's tales seem to take on a life of their own, and the king appears as content to hear her out as the rest of us; only rarely is mention made of his thinking to himself that he would like to hear the end of a particular tale and will then put Shahrazad to death. It would have been difficult to silence Shahrazad at the very beginning, for every tale seemed to beget another, thereby leading to tales that are themselves tales within tales. Thus, in the collection as presented here, there are only

recounted.5 seven major tales in addition to the tales of the prologue already Yet four of these major tales give rise to at least twenty-five smaller stories.

Even those tales that do not have explicit excursions nonetheless contain little byways that must be followed before the major theme can be regained. Given the incomplete nature of the collection, we do not learn how Shah razad eventually succeeds in leading King Shahrayar to stop his practice. But we gain insight into difficulties between men and women that go far beyond sexual infidelity, and we see that Shahrayar's experiences were nothing com pared to the deceptions that have befallen other rulers. We learn that some men discern the inequities in the practice of marrying more than one woman and urge against it (see p. 352). And we come to understand that both King Shahza man and King Shahrayar acted too impetuously when discovering the infidelity of their wives, for each one failed to find out why he had been deceived by his mate. In sum, Shahrazad's tales prompt us to greater reflection on what goes on in the world around us the seen as well as the unseen and on why people act as they do. No tale provides an explicit answer to these reflections or even the outlines of an answer. But taken in conjunction with the frame story, they remind us over and over again of how fleeting is our present contentment and how little deserved it is how little deserved truly and, more importantly, how little ap preciated until lost. In the end, then, we come to replace King Shahrayar by ourselves and to what ask Shahrazad's tales might teach us about rulership of ourselves as well as of others. Although we are, hopefully, not in as dire need Book Reviews 65 of lessons of statecraft as King Shahrayar, we can still learn much from the tales of this well-read and thoughtful woman.

Husain Haddawy's felicitous translation enlivens these tales and makes them more accessible than any previous English version. His rendering of the poetic verse is excellent, for it has both rhyme and meter. Shunning the older, Victo "oriental," rian practice of making the text mysterious or Haddawy translates what is on the page. He uses precise terminology for spices, flowers, clothing, and sexual allusions. When the languge is robust, even crude, in Arabic, Had dawy renders it in a similar English. Finally, footnotes are kept to a minimum, largely because in such a competent translation few things seem so arcane as to require learned explanation. Consequently, for the first time, one can wonder about how Shahrazad came to such an awareness of pleasantries between the sexes (see pp. 73-75) and thus appreciate how she holds Shahrayar's and our interest. In sum, this is as much a book for reading as it is for teaching. To students of literature and of comparative culture, it provides a delightful introduction to a quite different world. For thoughtful readers desirous of learning more about the problems of statecraft and the tensions between politics and revelation, The Arabian Nights is also most instructive. Husain Haddawy has presented here a very faithful rendition of tales that have thrilled millions of Arabic speakers for centuries patrons of coffee houses where these tales would be recited, as well as readers delighting in these tales at their leisure. The text has been extremely well prepared, and only a few typographical errors have slipped through:

"I" "It" p. 94, 9 lines from bottomread for "by" "my" p. 169, line 14read for "in" "on" p. 177, 15 lines from bottom read for "and" "ad" p. 305, 11 lines from bottomread for "Jewett" "Jowett." Inside jacket on hardback read for

NOTES

Nights," 1. Muhsin Mahdi, "Remarks on the 1001 Interpretation, 3 (1973), pp. 157-68. Alf Layla wa Layla, ed. Muhsin Mahdi (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984). 2. Shahrayar, moreover, reverses the racial roles here: he is white and the demon black. The issue is not race, however, but color as a sign of the oppressed class. As Mahdi notes in his Nights," "Remarks on the 1001 p. 158: "The declining fortunes of the royal house seem to be coordinated with the rising fortunes of a new religion, whose lucky star appears to signal a rise in the fortune of the unfortunate, the kitchen hand and the black man. In fact, the transformation of new conjunction of the stars is the the slave ladies into men . indicates that the favoring unfortunate in general, both women and black men, who are joining in a common rebellion against

position." the conventions that had established their inferior 66 Interpretation

3. Literally, her purpose (gharad). For whatever reason, Haddawy avoids the philosophical speculation such a literal translation would entail.

4. The story related on the 136th night, that is, the central night of this collection, explains how a noble young man came to have his right hand cut off as punishment for a theft it turns out he did not commit.

Demon" 5. Namely, "The Story of the Merchant and the (pp. 17-66), "The Story of the Porter Ladies" Apples" and the Three (pp. 66-150), "The Story of the Three (pp. 150-206), "The Story Hunchback" of the (pp. 206-95), "The Story of Nur al-Din Ali ibn-Bakkar and the Slave-Girl

al-Nahar" Shams (pp. 295-344), "The Story of the Slave-Girl Anis al-Jalis and Nur al-Din Ali ibn- Khaqan" Sea" (pp. 344-83), and "The Story of Jullanar of the (pp. 383-428). Steven M. Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism, and the American Revolution (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), x -I- 247 p.p., $37.50.

Michael P. Zuckert Carleton College

Steven Dworetz's Unvarnished Doctrine provides evidence that the counter revolution is proceeding in full swing, and, in the eyes of this interested ob server at least, is now near total victory. Dworetz joins such other retrogrades as John Diggins, Joyce Appleby, Isaac Kramnick, Thomas Pangle, and Robert Webking in attempting to roll back the revolution in the historiography of the American founding initiated almost a quarter century ago by Bernard Bailyn. It

revisionists" is obvious the time for a "revision of the has arrived, for the

paradigm," "republican as Dworetz calls it, has by now left the pages of its initial sponsors, Bailyn, Gordon Wood, J.G.A. Pocock, and Lance Banning, and become not only the dominant view among specialists, but also the staple of college textbooks and the received wisdom among nonspecialists, especially, it seems, legal nonspecialists. Dworetz's contribution to the counterrevolution is considerable. "The sub

book," ject of this he says, is "a critical examination of the republican revision and a reassessment of the role of Lockean-liberal ideas in the American revolu

tion" (p. 7). For those who have been in some sort of stupor since the late sixties he sketches the history of the historiography at some length, perhaps reflecting the origin of the book in a doctoral dissertation. The old, prerevolu- tionary view was captured well by the title of a famous article: "The Great Mr. Philosopher." Locke, America's The republican paradigm pushed Locke pretty far off stage; he had, at most, a negligible presence during the revolutionary era, much less significant than the classical republican or civic humanist con ception of politics associated by Pocock and others with Machiavelli, Har rington, and, of most importance for the Americans, John Trenchard and histo- Thomas Gordon, writing in the 1720's as Cato. Dworetz "considers this detail" riographical revolution in and concludes that the old view was essen tially correct, if not always well supported by its proponents. "In terms of language, theory, and prescription, American revolutionary thought differed in

theory" no essential way from Lockean-liberal political (p. 96). The nonspecialist might be pardoned for wondering why Dworetz devoted six or seven years of his life and why so many others get excited about what might appear a very academic question indeed, whether the Americans were

interpretation, Fall 1993, Vol. 21, No. 1 68 Interpretation more taken with Locke or Machiavelli. Like most specialists, Dworetz could defense" have made the classic "Everest ("Why do I pursue this research? Be cause it's there!"), but he insists the stakes are much higher than the mere posthumous reputations of Locke and a bunch of other dead political philoso phers. "A society's understanding of its founding doctrine is an integral part of its self-consciousness and the ultimate source of its sense of purpose and nor

vision" mative (p. 3). This self-consciousness provides "the Republic's self- understanding of its origins, purposes and national distinctions between good and bad, right and wrong, ... the standards by which citizens evaluate con

arrangements" temporary events, practices, and (pp. 3-4, 184). The Lockean version of the founding supplies "the essential source of historical legitimacy

age," for the defense of constitutional politics in the modern for Lockean theory is inherently liberal and constitutionalist (pp. 94, 186). The republican paradigm, by contrast, "does not inherently preclude, and may in part be inclined toward, the antithesis of constitutional politics and freedom" personal (p. 5). Although it is probably entirely foreign to their pur pose, the new historians are giving more than aid and comfort to liberalism's

enemies" politicians" contemporary "political (p. 38). Some unnamed "leading

rhetoric" are now engaging in "antiliberal encouraging "the Republic to reject

principles" its own first (p. 188). Insufficiently aware of the political implica tions of their own research, "the most principled scholars may inadvertently

assault" have helped to prepare the intellectual ground for this current political (p. 38). For reasons that will become clear later, this explicit political defense only partly tells the tale of Dworetz's engagement with his subject, however. Be neath the surface and between the lines pokes out another kind of motive. His sense of fairness and truth is offended. The republican historians miss or dis miss so much clear evidence in order to make their case that Dworetz's anger

power." and spirit swell forth to "speak truth to (It is power, by the way, because at the time Dworetz began his work the republican paradigm had a firm grip on the academic instruments of preferment and position.) He is concerned with historical truth, per se, and I for one find this at least as admirable if not quite so cosmic as his rising to the defense of the republic (cf. pp. 197 n. 43; 199 n. 72; 204 n. 31, 111-13). To be sure, this concern for historical truth

pre-"postmodern," makes him a but he seems blissfully untouched by such corrosive teachings.

He seems genuinely amazed that the historians could make some of the claims they do. For example, John Dunn, an English scholar for whom Dworetz retains much respect, asserted that the colonists, so far as they paid any attention to Locke in the prerevolutionary struggle, probably misread him in that thinking he supported their position. Instead, Dunn thought there was Treatises" but one "objective reader of the Two in those years, Peter van Schaack, who used Lockean arguments to conclude that revolution was not Book Reviews 69 justified (p. 21). Dworetz almost entirely disagrees with Dunn, believing in stead that the colonists both widely and accurately used Locke, but he finds especially noteworthy what Dunn failed to say about Peter van Schaack. Dunn

"left the theater at intermission. ... In 1776, Van Schaack, by his own account

principles" of the event, changed his mind, without changing his political (p. 28). Earlier he had "allowed the British government the benefit of the doubt"; more experience taught him that he had reasoned on the basis of "inadequate intentions" information concerning Parliament's (p. 28). The full story of Van Schaack, then, provides no support for the idea that a genuinely Lockean reac tion to the events of 1763-1776 would produce a Tory rather than a Patriot stance, for using the same Lockean principles, Van Schaack came to favor the revolution. But of this change of heart, we learn nothing from Dunn. Another example that seems to have energized Dworetz concerns the tally by one scholar of the number of Locke's works, relative to others, in colonial libraries. That scholar found a "priority accorded to [Algernon] Sidney's Dis Treatises," courses over Locke's a priority which that scholar was inclined to

meaning" find fraught with "special (p. 41). Dworetz rightly notices, however, that this scholar has counted only separate editions of Locke's Treatises and not sets of Locke's Works, which, of course, contain his political essay. Recal culating with the Works included produces a quite different result: "Locke on list" government now heads the (p. 41). Scholarly procedures such as Dworetz corrects here cannot but give the impression that the scholars have allowed their

pet points to prevail over their dedication to historical accuracy.

On these and other matters Dworetz shows how weak the empirical base for the republican thesis is. Acquaintance with the texts shows readily enough how prominent Locke was, and correspondingly, how much the historians have overstated the presence of Cato and other of the so-called classical republicans (p. 44). Dworetz tends, for the most part, to explain the empirical errors of his predecessors generously. Either they were not sufficiently acquainted with Locke to notice the presence of Lockean ideas when they saw them, or they labored under a questionable interpretation of Locke. Dworetz appears to find the first failing in Bailyn and the second in Pocock. An ability to recognize Lockean ideas is crucial because an investigator must be able to identify Lock "objective" ean ideas independently of indications like attributed quotations. In the eighteenth century our conventions of footnoting and attribution had little place (p. 43). Some eighteenth-century political pamphlets consisted of nothing but quotations from Locke (or some other source) strung together with not one mention of Locke's name or indication that the ideas expressed had an exog enous source, much less what that source was. It takes a learned eye, then, to spot the presence of Locke or any other source under those circumstances. Historical research, therefore, must be better grounded in political theory than most of the historians are. Dworetz believes that he can advance the question

theory" precisely because he brings "the interpretive discipline of political to it. 70 Interpretation

The interpretive issue centers on the meaning of Locke's political philoso phy. According to Dworetz, the proponents of the republican paradigm accept Locke," the "Chicago that is, Locke as interpreted by the late Leo Strauss. This "secular," "bourgeois" is, according to Dworetz, a Locke, who "represents

capitalism'" only 'the spirit of (pp. 115, 173). The republican historians are correct, he thinks, not to find this Locke in the American sources, for the Locke" Americans knew nothing of him. Dworetz favors a "Cambridge in stead, that is, Locke as interpreted by John Dunn, Peter Laslett, and others. This Locke is a real theist, indeed, is a thinker whose chief political commit ments to limited government, constitutionalism, and the right of resistance can be understood only in terms of his theological commitments (pp. 39, 117, 123). This Locke was a particular favorite of the New England clergy, who sowed the political ideas that produced an abundant harvest at the time of the

liberalism" revolution. This Locke's "theistic also had far more appeal to the clergy, and to the Americans in general, than the deistic doctrines of Pocock's republican theorists like Cato (pp. 135, 148). "The ministers must have felt

estate' more comforted with Locke, a fellow believer en route to the 'eternal

salvation" than on the civic humanist road to political (p. 183). Had the histo rians known about and looked for the Cambridge rather than the Chicago Locke, they would have found his unmistakable presence nearly everywhere. By his own admission Dworetz does not do a very adequate job in estab lishing the supremacy of the Cambridge over the Chicago interpretation of Locke, but it is nonetheless worth mentioning a few difficulties. For one thing, his version of Strauss's interpretation is nearly a caricature. Strauss never said

capitalism.'" Locke represented "only the 'spirit of Strauss also finds in Locke a liberal constitutionalist, as Dworetz does. Moreover, Dworetz's scholarship on this question is remarkably shoddy, ironically reminding a bit of the republi can history he criticizes so effectively. He does not pay attention, for example, to the specific criticisms raised against the Cambridge Locke. He pays no atten tion to Strauss's reasons for rejecting the theistic Locke. It's not as though the theistic Locke is not generally accessible: he lies sprawled across the surface of Locke's texts. Strauss thought he perceived clear indications by Locke himself of difficulties with the surface and tried to follow out those indications. Dworetz, moreover, pays insufficient attention to the many discussions of Locke's rhetorical strategies that have accompanied the Chicago interpretation. Dworetz waveringly concludes that his interpretation of Locke is only one among several, including Strauss's, which are textually defensible. "The fate of argument," my he says, "does not depend upon the proposition that the theistic Locke is the Locke only available in the Lockean corpus, or even upon denying the textual of the Locke" legitimacy bourgeois (p. 33). Although he does not always adhere to that tolerant position (cf. pp. 98, 110, 117, 125, 131, 138 he invokes it he the 151), because, believes, decisive issue is not really which Locke is the most but rather textually authentic, which Locke is most likely to Book Reviews 7 1

been have appropriated by the Americans. It is not merely a matter of what

meant," Locke "really but of what he was most likely to have been taken to mean by the population under investigation (p. 9). It was a religious age, there

am." fore the theistic Locke. As simple as "I think, therefore I Dworetz has an important, although not entirely an original point here. He is, however, merely restating without realizing it a point made by Strauss him self. Strauss argued that Locke's philosophic doctrine was not grounded in theistic thinking, but that it was presented (in part) in that form, and partly for that reason Locke's doctrine became practically successful. Much depends on whether these facts are understood in the manner of Strauss or in the manner of Dworetz, however. If Strauss is correct, then Dworetz is in danger of missing "willy-nilly" what I think of as the factor: by appealing to his audience with positions only ostensibly grounded in their theistic commitments, does not Locke perhaps set them off on paths which, willy-nilly, may lead them quite a way from where they first thought they were going? Dworetz involuntarily testifies to this possibility when he insists on the one hand that the Lockean liberal society remains, in his judgment, viable and desirable; but on the other that the theistic roots of it he finds in Locke no longer are so. Dworetz con cedes that under the aegis of liberalism, modern America has become secular; might this not have something to do with accepting Lockean political, moral, and epistemological ideas? He concedes also that liberalism is valuable quite independently of theism; therefore, there must be an alternate ground for it. Might Locke not have had such an understanding also? Dworetz's contribution to the demise of the recently triumphant republican paradigm is substantial and important; he unanswerably reinstates the centrality of Locke for the revolutionary generation, even disregarding the questionable parts of his discussion of the meaning of Locke. He is not persuasive, however, in his explanation for the shortcomings of the republican historians. First of all, Pocock surely is aware of the Cambridge Locke, being a close intellectual ally of the Cambridge political theorists. Secondly, the difference between Pocock's republicanism and liberalism may perhaps be more starkly drawn vis-a-vis the Chicago Locke, but the disagreements persist even with regard to the Cam bridge Locke. The issue has to do with the status of the political; Pocock's republicans find the fulfillment of personality in citizenship and political life. No version of Locke affirms that. Pocock's republicans are community ori ented; even Dworetz's Locke is emphatically individualist (cf. pp. 174-79).

purpose" Finally, it must be noted, Dworetz altogether fails in his "civic of reinvigorating contemporary liberalism by reinstating the Lockean character of Locke," the founding (p. 38). Dworetz's founding Locke is the "theistic but

"theistic liberalism is not an ideology for our times. . . . Indeed, the theistic Locke has been honorably retired"(pp. 187, 188). Accordingly, "we have to depart from the theistic Locke in order to make a persuasive case for liberalism today." Contrary to the premise of the enterprise, Dworetz does not uncover a 72 Interpretation

past" "usable for us, able to legitimate our present. But if Dworetz is at all correct about what is at stake in these debates, might not a more open-minded approach to a more secular Locke prove both more textually sound and more appropriable as well? This is the question with which Dworetz's helpful book leaves us. Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. Translated and edited by David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), xiii + 223 pp., cloth $49.50, paper $17.95.

Charles T. Rubin Duquesne Univeristy

Over the past thirty years what has come to be mainstream environmental- ism has been characterized by a serious ambiguity. As often as it has been a virulent critic of this or that particular result of modern science and technology, it has always relied on modern science and technology as the means by which environmental problems are to be solved. Indeed, that very rubric that mere are "problems" "solutions" finite in man's relationship with nature with definite testifies to the fact that environmentalism is deeply rooted in modernity. The success of this movement is an issue hotly contested between those of more and less environmental fervor (for today, we are all environmentalists). But those most committed are not so impressed by their accomplishments that they are unwilling to entertain the possibility that their failures stem from not having thought through environmental problems in a sufficiently radical way. In the 1950s and 1960s it was sufficiently progressive to question that we were always in every way brought better living through chemistry. But the cutting edge has moved on.

ecology," We are told now, by a movement that calls itself "deep that to deal with environmental problems it is necessary to question the very premises of modernity. Such an enterprise will hardly shock readers of this journal; in deed, for many it might be prima facie evidence for giving deep ecology a serious hearing. The volume reviewed here provides an excellent occasion for such consideration, as it is largely written by the spiritual and philosophical father of deep ecology, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. David Rothenberg, who is something more than an editor and translator of Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, but less than a coauthor, characterizes

"system" ontology" Naess's work as a that provides a "new for man's relation

understood" ship with nature (p. 2). If "fully this ontology makes it "no longer possible ... to injure nature wantonly, as this would mean injuring an integral

ourselves" "Naess' part of (p. 2). Yet at the same time, he notes that result is not a work of philosophical or logical argumentation 'It is primarily intu

says" "ecosophy" itions', he (p. 2). As a result, to have an or philosophical

philosophy" ecology, is to have "a personal system, a personal (p. 5). Rothenberg introduces three important themes in these remarks. In what way

interpretation, Fall 1993, Vol. 21, No. 1 74 Interpretation is deep ecology a philosophically based movement; what does it understand philosophy to be? How is its philosophical character reconciled with its per sonal, intuitional basis? And how do philosophy and intuition combine to teach "wanton" us what harm to nature is, and why it should be avoided? As a movement, deep ecology prides itself on what it sees as a high degree of philosophical sophistication. This sophistication is what makes it an advance

"shallow" "reform" over the previous or environmentalism, with its too ready acceptance of the perspective of modernity. Deep ecology is radical in part because it is philosophical; because it claims to question whatever is to a depth hitherto unreached by environmental theorists. What does deep ecology question about? Philosophy is stressed because our environmental problems represent a crisis of values. Although there is "no ar ticulated world-view which endorses mankind's current [destructive] role in the

ecosphere" (p. 87) there is a "deeply grounded ideology of consumption and

unecological" production that is (p. 104). This ideology must be challenged by the forceful articulation and defense of alternative norms. Ideally, these norms "ecosophy." are to be part of a system, an "A system is a structured assemblage of statements, all provisional and tentative. An all-encompassing philosophical system is meant to express all fundamental (or basic) premises for thought and

application" action and to suggest some areas of concrete (p. 73). The develop ment of such a system seems to be the philosophical task. It may seem odd, then, that throughout the book, questions Naess admits are important philosophical issues are raised only to be dropped or deferred. The provisional and personal character of much of what is discussed is, as in the above quotation, freely admitted. Indeed, Naess withholds the articulation of the system upon which this book is based his personal ecosophy, called Eco sophy T until the final chapter, and even there he notes that the "complete formulation of an ecosophy is out of the question (p. 196). Such modesty could be understood as called for by the philosophical enter prise itself, and Naess appears genuinely to have his share of that modesty. But that is apparently not always its source. A hint of an alternative purpose is that the bulk of the book is more a political handbook, or even tract, then it is a philosophical text. But Naess is concerned lest deep ecology appear to have a rigid ideology. Thus, while Chapter 1 contains an eight-point platform of the deep ecology movement, it is highly general in tone. It speaks of the impor diversity" tance of "richness and of life on earth, the need to limit human interference with this richness and diversity as much as possible, and the way in which such limitation will require fundamental changes in "basic economic,

structures" technological and ideological (p. 29).

The book as a whole is an explication of this platform, but in so explaining one message comes across with perfect clarity: the deep ecology movement must seek the widest circle of allies possible. To do so it must be prepared both to confront its (probable) enemies in ways most likely to make them friends Book Reviews - 75 and also be careful not to alienate those inclined to be friends by insisting on "method" ideological conformity. Naess's philosophical of "precisation"be ginning with very general formulations such as those in the platform, and only slowly and in stages exploring more precise meanings is well designed to produce the maximum level of consent to deep ecology's propositions and min imize conflict. In Naess's forest there are many glades. For example, he takes pains to show from an examination of selected passages that "A person's opin ion about the ecological movement cannot be derived from the fact that he or

Bible'" she 'believes in the (p. 187), the presumption being that such people are not likely to be sympathetic. Deep ecologists can even learn something from economists, normally considered the hereditary enemy of environmentalists. One might argue in respect to these observations that to a becoming philo sophical modesty Naess has added a certain necessary prudence. What makes both these interpretations doubtful is what Naess understands philosophy to be doing when it contributes to systemization and precisation. He presents his

goal" ecosophy with the "main of emphasizing "the responsibility of any inte grated person to work out his or her reaction to contemporary environmental

view" problems on the basis of a total (p. 163). Furthermore, he says of the final, philosophical chapter "a basic positive attitude to nature is articulated in philosophical form. It is not done to win compliance, but to offer some of the many who are at home in such a philosophy new opportunities to express it in

words" "basic," (p. 164). The platform is designed to suggest views that are but not "in an absolute sense, but basic among the views that supporters have in common"(p. 29). There seems to be less to the questioning stance in principle taken by deep ecology than meets the eye. Far from being a way of life that questions all opinions, it seems philosophy for Naess is to be used to articulate a total view "reactions." that is compatible with pre-existing attitudes or It questions in or der to find justifications. Far from challenging all the decisive premises of modernity, Naess's deep ecology falls into the modern instrumental employ ment of philosophy. The system is a tool of the political reform program. Another reason grounded in principle explains the highly personalized way in which Naess presents his philosophical speculations. The centerpiece of

"Self-realization!" Naess's ecosophy turns out to be the exclamation point indicating the existence of a moral imperative. "Self here is certainly not to be understood narrowly, as an isolated ego. The burden of much of the work is to show how Self must be understood in all its manifold connectedness to Other, or as a certain perspective on the totality of what is. Self-realization means knowing that "[t]he identity of the individual, 'that I am something', is devel oped through interaction with a broad manifold, organic and inorganic. There is no isolatable social unity. To oneself no completely isolatable I, distance from

'natural' nature and the is to distance oneself from a part of that which the T is built up of (p. 164). 76 Interpretation

This observation suggests that what we become depends on all becoming. It readily develops into an equality in principle at least of all becoming, or the life" blossom" "unfolding of (p. 165). There is "the universal right to live and (p. 166). Naess knows full well that the blossoming of some requires the harm of others, a point we will return to shortly. But if the properly understood Self is so deeply connected with everything else, why must philosophy be so partic ularized in light of who is philosophizing? Presumably because the Self does not arise by virtue of a self finding its place within a larger, perhaps ordered, "manifold" whole. Instead, the Self is founded in whatever it happens to find itself in. Despite Naess's denial of an isolated social self, the Self appears to be radically isolated in its dependence upon the contingent circumstances of its particular situation.

T." The best example is the fact that Naess labels his ecosophy "Ecosophy Tverga- Rothenberg notes, "The name T is said to represent his mountain hut stein (cross the stones) but it is its personal nature that is most important. It suggests that there might be many other ecosophies (A, B, C, . . (p. 4). Ecosophy T unfolds from the particular circumstances of Naess's life, as his very Self unfolds. Presumably, it is on the basis of this unfolding that Naess's intuitions have developed. Now, it may be expected, and indeed we know it to be true, that at some level, those with differing experiences can come to similar intuitions, if the level of generality is kept sufficiently high. But for that rea son, no philosophical system can ever be anything more than personal, as the attempt is made to articulate the full meaning of those intuitions. Philosophy

wisdoms," must at best become "love of but more likely simply love of one's own opinions, as one endlessly articulates their ramifications. We pass over the historicism implicit in this stress on particularity in order to examine how it serves as a foundation for the green political arrangements that Naess describes if politics properly speaking can be built at all on such foundations. Highly critical of the nation state for its centralizing propensities,

positive" Naess outlines "certain properties which are considered that have been

communities" developed by "green (p. 144). These include small geographic size, population small enough so that members of the community can know each other, direct democracy, economic self-reliance (with education being pri marily directed to this end, i.e., education in the arts and trades), small income and wealth differentials. In addition, "Counteracting antisocial behavior is done directly with friendliness. There is little direct influence from the outside which inside" interferes with that order (p. 144). In other words, as Naess later makes clear, orderliness is maintained primarily through intense social pressures (p. 159). Once again, a suggestion that the ancient city had certain virtues will hardly shock readers of this journal. As in the case of deep ecology's philosophic pretensions, the willingness to consider such a radical political alternative to modernity might even be all the more grounds for giving it a serious hearing. Book Reviews - 77

Unfortunately, it is not clear Naess appreciates the extent to which he is revis ing Aristotle. It may be for that very reason that he is curiously silent about the well-known defects of such communities that arise from the constraints of na ture and human nature: their instability, their tendencies toward tyranny and oppression, their tendencies to war and imperialism. There are vague hints that Naess may be content to "let nature take its course" in respect to such ills, that he understands the hard side of the politics he describes. At one point he says, "The world's health organisations are per haps in need of an ideology influenced to a greater extent by the health evi

nature" denced in (p. 194). Since the story of medicine is the story of overcom ing the health evidenced in nature, this passage may suggest a means by which the drastic global population cut Naess recommends (albeit to take place over many, many generations) may be achieved. Or again, we have already spoken of "the universal right to live and blos

som" (p. 166). Naess understands that such a right, in isolation, would be completely untenable. Harm and killing are necessary. He tends to focus his arguments against those who fear that any such right would be too protective, that human beings would suffer by it (p. 170). But how much protection the right is intended to afford is actually problematic. It is part of a strong condem nation of animal testing of consumer products (p. 171). But it produces the following remarkable statement about intrahuman relations: "The ecological viewpoint presupposes acceptance of the fact that big fish eat small, but not

small" necessarily that large men throttle (p. 195). Not necessarily? One reason for this rather half-hearted formulation may be that Naess is against attempting to justify violations of the right to live and blossom on the basis that some beings have greater intrinsic value than others either because they are ensouled, or rational, or self-conscious, or higher on an evolutionary scale. But this cuts both ways; neither would these qualities be grounds for a special respect for human life.

... it is against my intuition of unity to say T can kill you because I am more

valuable' but not against the intuition to say T will kill you because I am hungry'.

In the latter case, there would be an implicit regret. ... In short, I find obviously right, but often difficult to justify, different sorts of behaviour with different sorts of living beings. But this does not imply that we classify some as intrinsically more valuable than others. (P. 168).

Such passages seem to suggest Naess's reluctance to see in the unfolding of life any sort of ordered whole in which specific human capacities might find their proper place, purpose and limits. Rather, if big men do not necessarily throttle small, it may be because for the most part big men do not want to eat them. But despite such hints at a rather hard world, it seems more likely that Naess believes that such problems can be overcome. A motto of deep ecology is

ends." "simple in means rich in Of this motto Naess says, "It is not to be 78 Interpretation

self-denying" confounded with appeals to be Spartan, austere, and (p. 88). (This having tried to link deep ecology with Aristotelianism, Buddhism, Confu cianism all of which seem to call for a high degree of austerity and self- denial.) I will argue that despite the hard conclusions his arguments sometimes point to, Naess relies on another key premise of modernity, a belief in the human conquest of nature, to avoid them. That there should be any such acceptance is in the highest degree ironic, since the legitimacy of this premise is under attack in deep ecology. "The great Western emphasis upon the subjugation of nature goes against this insight of

unity" (p. 194). Or again,

This glorification of human beings at the expense of nature becomes ecosophically relevant when it is manifest in value priorities. To the extent that it serves to depreciate, or blind us to, [n]on-human realms, it has an obviously negative ecological effect.

"physical'

Towards the end of the Middle Ages . . [o]ur depreciation of the reality continued, now in the form of exploitation. Nature came to be interpreted as both slave and raw material. Like the slaves, nature could revolt, and the

nature' expression 'struggle against has been in continuous use since then. (Pp. 190-91)

depreciate," Yet when Naess says "to the extent it serves to an important quali fication is already suggested. How is it developed? "systemization" As Naess presents the of his personal ecosophy, he dis cusses the proposition that "The higher the level of Self-realisation attained by

others" anyone, the broader and deeper the identification with (p. 197). This hypothesis is crucial to understanding the proposition summarized at the begin ning of this review, that human beings could hardly harm nature when they come to view it as part of themselves. Such identification, a product of Self- realization, is to replace calculation as the hallmark of human relatedness to

home" nature (p. 175). Naess comments that those "who feel at with this hy pothesis, will hardly be pleased with what they see in nature:

They see a lonely, desperately hungry wolf attacking an elk, wounding it mortally but being incapable of killing it. The elk dies after protracted, severe pains, while the wolf dies of slowly hunger. Impossible not to identify with and somehow feel the pains of both! But the nature of the conditions of life at least in our time are

cruel' such that nothing can be done about the fate of both. The general situation

elicits sorrow and the search for means to interfere with natural processes on behalf of any being in a state of panic or desperation, protracted pains, severe suppression or abject slavery. But this attitude implies that we deplore much that actually goes on in that we deplore much that nature, seems essential to life on Earth. In short, the assertion of [the hypothesis that higher Self-realization leads to higher reflects an attitude identification] opposed to any unconditional Verherrlichung of life, and therefore of nature in general. (Pp. 198-99) Book Reviews 79

The sentiment Naess describes will surely be familiar to many of us; what is remarkable is not the sentiment but what he does with it. When he says that "at

time" least in our nothing can be done about the situation of the wolf and elk, there is an implication that perhaps there will come a time when something can be done. This inference seems to be confirmed by the fact that he goes on to discuss what might be done in the way of improving on nature. It may or may not be that in speaking of slavery, suppression, and panic Naess is engaging less in identification than in anthropomorphism. But in any case, the "pacifica

existence" tion of implied in this passage may be on a level well beyond any thing ever imagined by Bacon, since it extends to the benefit of all beings, rather than to the comfortable self-preservation of human beings only. This passage about the elk and wolf makes clear in a practical way the ideal of a humanized nature that can now be made explicit on the theoretical level. As Naess recognizes, the human capacity for Self-realization is at least far beyond that of any other being, and it may be unique. While all things might be able to unfold to their specific capacities (p. 166), only human beings seem to have the ability to see in those capacities something that transcends them intimations that are crucial to the prospect for identification (p. 175). Other beings may realize themselves; only humans can speak about Self-realization. While this capacity for a discursive account may at times seem suspect to Naess (p. 179), the fact of the matter is his project would be evidently self-contradic tory if he did not see its importance. And even if more or less realized Self- realization turns out to be only a sentiment of the oneness of all, it would still seem it could only be appreciated as a sentiment by human beings.

The uniqueness of Homo sapiens, its special capacities among millions of kinds of other living beings, has been used as a premise for domination and mistreatment. Ecosophy uses it as a premise for a universal care that other species can neither understand nor afford. (P. 171)

Any way you look at it, Naess's world turns out to be a humanized world, built to our measure at least until some higher type of being comes along (cf. pp. 169, 192). He likens the desired relationship to nature as a whole to that be tween dogs and the humans who feel very close to them. But of course, the dog "domesticated" is commonly classified as a animal. Thus, any appeals to what sounds like the ancient city come in the context of a belief in overcoming natural constraints on a scale that is entirely alien to ancient political thought. But calling for a love of nature like the love of pets is not the only strand of thought in this part of Naess's account. His recourse to "rights" "harder" the language of liberalism may be an attempt to reconcile his "softer" and teachings about nature. For, despite the pretense throughout the book that liberalism barely exists as a meaningful political philosophy, and the near dismissal of it as a positive political force, rights are important to Naess. We have seen how he recognizes that the principle of the equal rights of all 80 Interpretation

forms," beings is not a "practical norm about equal conduct towards all life since life forms must injure and kill each other (p. 167). This conflict of rights evidently recapitulates the problem posed by natural rights in the state of na ture. Thus when Naess speaks about working out the particular accommoda tions and limits that need to be placed on killing, is he not articulating the need

society" for a "civil that will adjust these conflicting demands? In effect, the

politics" "international of our current relationship with nature is to be replaced

politics" by a "domestic that does not end conflict, but softens and regulates it. If so, then Naess is asking that all beings be included under that great human artifice, the social contract. As the rights of man seem to be realized ever more on the global political scene, is it then indeed time to turn our attention to the rights of beings? The small communities of the future green world, each of whose character is deter mined by the particular circumstances of its relatedness to its surroundings is this the ultimate step in liberal self-determination? Is there a third form of the end of history, which is neither the universal and homogeneous state nor the sinking of humanity into natural contingency? It would appear ungrateful to a book that raises such important questions to complain because it does not pro vide definitive answers. But has Naess provided the most fruitful context for attempting to come to grips with them? Perhaps Naess should be judged by his own standards. He laments the limits that our imaginations place on thinking about what a green utopia might be like. Has he really stretched his own imagination to the limit? A world where humans and animals live peaceably side by side, where nature flourishes under such control that elks need not fear wolves, nor wolves suffer lack, a world that is not defiled by waste, and where the inevitable frictions of life are taken care of less by police than by expectations, a world in which human diversity is celebrated, and cultures live peaceably side by side is this world so unimagin able? As compared with the Norwegian landscape he so evidently loves, Naess surely recoils from Disney World. But he may share more with that Magic Kingdom than he cares to admit. An of index Volumes 1 through 10 appears in Volume 1 1 , Number 3 Index

to Volumes 1 1 through 20

Lucia Boyden Prochnow

AUTHORS

OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN INTERPRETATION

Georgics," "Socrates' Adler, Eve. "The Invocation to the Bolotin, David. Critique of Hedo Philebus," 11(1)25 nism: A Reading of the 13(1)1; Alvis, John. "Philosophy as Noblest Idolatry "The Theaetetus and the Possibility of Lost" Opinion," in Paradise 16(2)263 False 15(2,3)179; "The Con Arnhart, Larry. Book Review: The Artist as cerns of Odysseus: An Introduction to the Odyssey," Thinker: From Shakespeare to Joyce, by 17(1)41 George Anastaplo, 13(2)277 Boucher, David. "The Denial of Perennial Problems: The Negative Side of Quentin Skinner's Theory," 12(2,3)287 Balch, Stephen H. Review Essay: Main Cur Bradshaw, Leah. "Tyranny: Ancient and Mod

ern," rents of Marxism: Vol. I, The Founders; 20(2)187 Vol. II, The Golden Age; Vol. Ill, The Brubaker, Stanley C. Discussion: "Piety and Breakdown, by Leszek Kolakowski, Temptation," 19(1)61 14(1)135 Bruell, Christopher. "Xenophon and His Soc Barlow, J. Jackson. Discussion: The Constitu rates,"16(2)295 Eironeia," tion of 1787: A Commentary, by George Burger, Ronna. "Socratic 13(2)143 Anastaplo, 18(3)475 Burrow, Richard. "Credulity and Curiosity in Tub," Barnouw, Jeffrey. "The Pursuit of Happiness A Tale of a 15(2,3)309 in Jefferson and Its Background in Bacon Burstein, Harvey. Review Essay: The Consola Hobbes," and 11(2)225 tions of Philosophy, by Henry M. Rosen Barrus, Roger M. "David Hume's Theology of thal, 17(3)449 Liberation," 18(2)251; and Richard Sher Butterworth, Charles. Book Review: The Mod lock, "The Problem of Religion in Liberal ern Self in Rousseau's Confessions: A Re ism," 20(3)285 ply to St. Augustine, by Ann Hartle, Bartky, Elliott. "Marx on Self-Consciousness, 13(3)429; "An Account of Recent Scholar Gods," Philosophy," the City and the 19(1)3 ship in Medieval Islamic Berns, Laurence. Discussion: "Spiritedness in 16(1)87; Translation: The Book of the Ethics and Politics: A Study in Aristotelian Philosophic Life, by al-Razi, 20(3)227; Psychology," 12(2,3)335; "The Relation "The Origins of al-RazI's Political Philoso

Religion," phy," Between Philosophy and 20(3)237 19(1)45 Bessette, Joseph M. Book Review: Bureau crats, Policy Analysts, Statesmen: Who Canavan, Francis. Book Review: Selected Let Leads?, edited by Robert A. Goldwin, ters of Edmund Burke, edited and with an 11(1)129 introduction by Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Blanchard, Kenneth C, Jr. "Ethnicity and the 13(3)434 Equality," Problem of 20(3)309 Cantor, Paul A. "Hamlet: The Cosmopolitan Prince," Blits, Jan H. "Socratic Teaching and Justice: 12(1)15 Plato's Clitophon, 13(3)321 Capaldi, Nicholas. Discussion: "Exploring the Sherover," Blitz, Mark. "Response to Limits of Analytic Philosophy: A Critique 12(2,3)381 of Nozick's Philosophical Explanations, 82 Interpretation

Capaldi, Nicholas (cont.) Dorter, Kenneth. "Freedom and Constraints in 12(1)107; Book Review: Hume's Philoso Prometheus Bound," 19(2)117 phy of Common Life, by Donald W. Liv ingston, 13(3)432 Laughter," Carpino, Joseph J. "On 13(1)91; Eden, Robert. "Tocqueville and the Problem Right," Review Essay: "On Eco's The Name of the of Natural 17(3)379 Rose," 14(2,3)389 Emberley, Peter. "Rousseau and the Manage Passions," Christensen, Kit R. "Individuation and Com ment of the 13(2)151; "Rous monality in Feuerbach's 'Philosophy of seau versus the Savoyard Vicar: The Man,'" Considered," 13(3)335 Profession of Faith Cladis, Mark S. "Emile Durkheim and Pro 14(2,3)299 Ethics," Howells' vinces of 17(2)255 Engeman, Thomas S. "William Dean Coby, Patrick. Book Review: Socrates in the 'Poor Real Life': The Royal Road to the "Apology" Character," by C.D.C. Reeve, 19(1)101 American 19(1)29 Codevilla, Angelo M. Discussion: "De Gaulle as a Political Thinker: On Morrisey's Re flections on De Gaulle, 13(1)103 Farrenkopf, John. "Nietzsche, Spengler, and Despair," Cohler, Anne M. "Montesquieu's Perception the Politics of Cultural 20(2)165 of His Audience for the Spirit of the Faulkner, Robert K. "The Empire of Progress: Laws," 11(3)317 Bacon's Improvement Upon Machiavelli," Colmo, Christopher A. "Reason and Revela 20(1)37 Strauss," tion in the Thought of Leo Feder-Marcus, Maureen. Book Reviews: Be 18(1)145; Discussion: "Reply to Low yond Nihilism: Nietzsche without Masks, enthal,"18(2)313 by Ofelia Schutte, 13(2)251; Time, Free Corngold, Stanley, and Michael Jennings. Dis dom, and the Common Good: An Essay in cussion: "Walter Benjamin/Gershom Public Philosophy, by Charles Sherover, Scholem," 12(2,3)357 18(2)317 Cropsey, Joseph. "The Dramatic End of Flaumenhaft, Mera J. "Seeing Justice Done: Socrates," Aeschylus' Plato's 14(2,3)155; "On Plea 'Oresteia,'" 17(1)69 sure and the Human Good: Plato's Phi Fortin, Ernest L. "Gadamer on Strauss: An In

lebus,'' terview," 16(2)167; "The Whole as Setting 12(1)1; Discussion: "Rational Timaeus," for Man: On Plato's 17(2)165; Theologians and Irrational Philosophers: A Moderns," Perspective," "On Ancients and 18(1)31; Straussian 12(2,3)349; Re "Virtue and Knowledge: On Plato's Pro view Essay: "Faith and Reason in Contem

tagoras," 19(2)137 porary Perspective Apropos of a Recent Dilemmas," Book," Crosson, Frederick J. "Mill's 14(2,3)371; "Thomas Aquinas and Education," 16(2)229 the Reform of Christian 17(1)3 Curley, Thomas F., III. "How To Read The Franck, Matthew J. Discussion: The Tempting Consolation Philosophy," 14(2,3)211 of of America: The Political Seduction of the Law, by Robert H. Bork, 19(1)77 Frisch, Morton J. "Edmund Burke and the Constitution," American 17(1)59; "Shake D'Amico, Jack. "The Virtu of Women: Machi speare's Richard III and the Soul of the Clizia," Tyrant," avelli's Mandragola and 20(3)275

12(2,3)261 Fuller, Timothy. "Temporal Royalties and Vir Dannhauser, Werner J. "Leo Strauss as Citizen tue's Airy Voice in The Tempest," Jew," and 17(3)433 11(2)207; Discussion: The Constitution of Davis, Michael. "Politics and Poetry: Aris 1787: A Commentary, by George An VIII," totle's Politics, Books VII and astaplo, 18(3)467 19(2)157 den Hartogh, Govert. "Made by Contrivance and the Consent of Men: Abstract Principle Galston, William A. "Socratic Reason and and Historic Fact in Locke's Political Phi Lockean Rights: The Place of the Univer losophy," Democracy," 17(2)193 sity in a Liberal 16(1)101 Index 83

Freedom," Geise, J.P., and L.A. Lange. "Deliberate Be cal 15(1)3; "Humanizing Certi lief and Digging Holes: Joseph Conrad and tudes and Impoverishing Doubts: A Restraint," the Problem of 16(2)193 Critique of The Closing of the American Mind," Gildin, Hilail. "The First Crisis of Modernity: 16(1)111 Rousseau," Leo Strauss on the Thought of Jennings, Michael, and Stanley Corngold. Dis 20(2)157 cussion: "Walter Benjamin/Gershom Gillespie, Michael A. Book Review: Heideg Scholem," 12(2,3)357 Time'' ger's "Being and and the Possibility Jensen, Pamela K. Discussion: "The Moral Republic," of Political Philosophy, by Mark Blitz, Foundations of the American 11(3)399 15(1)97; "Beggars and Kings: Cowardice Gillis, Hugh. "Gaston Fessard and the Nature and Courage in Shakespeare's Richard 11, Authority," of 16(3)445; Translation: "Ko- 18(1)111 Documents," jeve-Fessard 19(2)185 Johnson, Laurie M. "Rethinking the Diodotean Gossman, Lionel. "Antimodernism in Nine Argument," 18(1)53 teenth-Century Basle: Franz Overbeck's Antitheology and J.J. Bachofen's Anti- philology,"16(3)359 Gourevich, Victor. "Rousseau's Pure State of Kain, Philip J. Book Review: Greek Antiquity Nature," 16(1)23 in Schiller's "Wallenstein," by Gisela N. Grasso, Kenneth L. "Pluralism, the Public Berns, 15(1)143 Good and the Problem of Self-Govemment Kelly, Christopher. Book Review: Reading Federalist," in The 15(2,3)347 Rousseau in the Nuclear Age, by Grace G. Griswold, Charles, Jr. "Philosophy, Education, Roosevelt, 20(2)209; and Roger D. Mas Laches," and Courage in Plato's ters, "Rousseau on Reading 'Jean-Jacques': 14(2,3)177 The Dialogues," 17(2)239 Kessler, Sanford. "Tocqueville on Sexual Mo rality,"16(3)465 Hamowy, Ronald. "Progress and Commerce in Kleven, Terence. "A Study of Part I, Chapters Maimonides' Anglo-American Thought: The Social Phi 1-7 of The Guide of the Per

Ferguson," plexed," losophy of Adam 14(1)61 20(1)3 Hemmenway, Scott R. "Philosophical Apology Koritansky, John C. "Socratic Rhetoric and Theaetetus," Phaedrus," in the 17(3)323 Socratic Wisdom in Plato's Hennis, Wilhelm. 'Tocqueville's Perspective: 15(1)29; "Civil Religion in Tocqueville's America," Democracy in America in Search of the Democracy in 17(3)389 Politics,'" 'New Science of 16(1)61 Krason, Stephen M. Book Review: Principles Herz, John H. "Looking at Carl Schmitt from of Politics: An Introduction, by John J. 1990s," the Vantage Point of the 19(3)307 Schrems, 15(1)145 Hobbes, Thomas. "1608 Appendix to Le Kuic, Vukan. "Foreword for "The Politics of

viathan," Alain,' Simon," Translated with an Introduction by Yves R. 13(2)213 and Notes by George Wright, 18(3)323 Horwitz, Robert. "John Locke's Questions Concerning the Law ofNature: A Com

mentary," edited by Michael Zuckert, Lange, L. A., and J. P. Geise. "Deliberate 19(3)251 Belief and Digging Holes: Joseph Conrad Restraint," Howland, Jacob A. "Socrates and Alcibiades: and the Problem of 16(2)193 Politics," Eros, Piety, and 18(1)63 Langiulli, Nino. Book Review: Philosophy and Hyland, Drew A. "Republic, Book II, and the the Mirror of Nature, by Richard Rorty, Philosophy," Origins of Political 16(2)247; 13(1)119; Review Essay: "Affirmative Ac "Plato's Three Waves and the Question of tion, Liberalism, and Teleology: On Utopia," Order,'' 18(1)91 Nicholas Capaldi's Out of 14(2,3)415; Book Review: Individuals and Their Rights, by Tibor Machan, 20(1)81 Jaffa, Harry V. "Equality, Liberty, Wisdom, Lawler, Peter A. "Was Tocqueville a Philoso pher?" Morality and Consent in the Idea of Politi 17(3)401 84 Interpretation

'Tacitus' Leake, James C. Teaching and the Masugi, Ken. Discussion: "The Tempting of Rome," Decline of Liberty at 15(1)55, America: The Political Seduction of the 15(2,3)195 Law," 19(1)85 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. "Ernst and Folk, Mathie, William. "Reason and Rhetoric in Leviathan," Dialogues for Freemasons, a translation Hobbes's 14(2,3)281; Book Maschler," with notes by Chaninah 14(1)1 Review: The Rhetoric of "Leviathan": Levy, David. "S. T. Coleridge Replies to Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cul Adam Smith's 'Pernicious Opinion': A tural Transformation, by David Johnston, Engineering," Study in Hermetic Social 17(1)145 14(1)89 McGuinness, Celia. "The Fundamental Consti Lewis, Mario, Jr., "An Interpretation of tutions of Carolina as a Tool for Lockean Euthyphro," Scholarship," Plato's (Introduction; Part I, 17(1)127 Sections 1-3), 12(2,3)225, (Part I, Section Meier, Heinrich. 'The Discourse on the Origin 4-End), 13(1)33 and the Foundations of Inequality among Men" Lewis, Thomas J. "Refutative Rhetoric as True 16(2)211 Gorgias," Rhetoric in the 14(2,3)195 Mindle, Grant B. "Shakespeare's Demonic Lidov, Joel B. Discussion: "Justice in Transla Prince," 20(3)259

tion," 12(1,2)83 Mitias, Michael H. "Hegel on the Source of Authority," Lowenthal, David, "Leo Strauss's Studies in Political 12(1)29 Philosophy," Platonic Political 13(3)297; Moors, Kent. "Justice and Philosophy in Play," "Macbeth: Shakespeare Mystery Plato's Republic: The Nature of a Defini tion," 16(3)311; Discussion: "Comment on 12(2,3) 193 Colmo," 18(1)161 Morris, T. F. "The Argument in the Pro tagoras that No One Does What He Be lieves To Be Bad," 17(2)291 MacAdam, Jim. "Rousseau's Contract With Morrisey, Will. "Reflections on DeGaulle: Re Codevilla," and Without His Inequality; 12(2,3)275 ply to 13(1)113; Discussion: Philosophy," Maletz, Donald J. "An Introduction to Hegel's "Delimiting 15(1)129; "Rob 'Introduction' Right" 1923-87," to the Philosophy of ert H. Horwitz, 15(2,3)367; 'Will' 13(1)67; "The Meaning of in "How Bloom Did It: Rhetoric and Principle Right," Mind," Hegel's Philosophy of 13(2)195 in The Closing of the American Marshall, Terence E. Book Review: Political 16(1)145; Book Reviews: Plato's 'Phaed vol. Luc 20(2)217 rus' Philosophy, 1, by Ferry, : A Defense of a Philosophic Art of Martin, Marie A. "Misunderstanding and Un Writing, by Ronna Burger, 11(3)401; Aris derstanding Hume's Moral Philosophy: An totle on Political Reasoning: A Commen "Rhetoric," Essay on Hume's Place in Moral Philoso tary on the by Larry Arnhart, Nicholas 19(2)169 "Emile" Education," phy, by Capaldi, 11(3)402; or "On by Chaninah. Ernst and Maschler, "Lessing, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, translated with an Falk, Dialogues for Freemasons, a Trans introduction by Allan Bloom, 11(3)402; Notes," lation with 14(1)1: "On the Wis The Reveries of the Solitary Walker, by Nathan," dom of Book Jean- 15(2,3) 347; Jacques Rousseau, translated with Review: Death and the Disinterested Spec preface, notes, and an interpretive essay by tator: An Inquiry into the Nature of Philos Charles E. Butterwoith, 11(3)403; The Po Ann "Some ophy, by Hartle, 17(1)152; litical Philosophy of the Frankfurt School, Phaedo" Observations about Plato's by George Friedman, 1 1(3)405; After Vir 18(2)177 tue, by Alasdair Maclntyre, 12(1)131; Ni Joseph. "The Armed Founder versus Masciulli, hilism: a Philosophical Essay, by Stanley the Catonic Hero: Machiavelli and Rous Rosen, 12(1)131; Plato's "Phaedo": An Leadership," seau on Popular 14(2,3)265 Interpretation, by Kenneth Dorter, Masters, Roger D. "Philosophy, Science, and 12(1)137; Averroe's Three Short Commen Mind," the of the "Topics," "Rhetoric," Opening American taries on Aristotle s and Natu " 16(1)139; "Evolutionary Biology and 'Poetics, edited and translated ralism," by 17(1)111; and Christopher Kelly, Charles E. Butterworth, 12(1)138; Dissi- "Rousseau on 'Jean-Jacques': The Reading dence et philosophie au moyen dge: Dante Dialogues" 17(2)239 et ses antecedents, by E. L. Fortin, Index 85

12(1)139; Algeny, by Jeremy Rifkin, 15(2,3)373; The Crisis of Liberal Democ 12(2,3)387; How Democratic Is the Consti racy: A Straussian Perspective, edited by tution? and How Capitalistic Is the Consti Kenneth L. Deutsch and Walter Soffer, tution?, edited by Robert A. Goldwin and 16(3)481. Understanding the Political William A. Schambra, 12(2,3)391; States Spirit: Philosophical Investigations from manship: Essays in Honor of Sir Winston Socrates to Nietzsche, edited by Catherine S. Churchill, edited by Harry V. Jaffa, H. Zuckert, 17(2)309; Socrates and the So 12(2,3) 395; Winston Churchill's World phistic Enlightenment: A Commentary on View: Statesmanship and Power, by Ken Plato's Protagoras, by Patrick Coby, neth W. Thompson, 12(2,3)395; Richard 17(2)313; Socrates and the Political Com Hooker and the Politics of a Christian En munity: An Ancient Debate, by Mary P. gland, by Robert K. Faulkner, 12(2,3)400; Nichols, 17(2)317; An Introduction to Po Education and Culture in the Political litical Philosophy: Ten Essays by Leo Thought of Aristotle, by Carnes Lord, Strauss, edited by Hilail Gildin, 17(3)465; Machiavelli' 12(2,3)401; s New Modes and Rebirth of Classical Rationalism: An Intro Orders: A Study of the Discourses on Livy, duction to the Thought of Leo Strauss, edi by Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., 12(2,3)404; ted by Thomas L. Pangle, 17(3)465; The Rousseau's Social Contract: The Design of De Gaulle Story, by William Faulkner, the Argument, by Hilail Gildin, 12(2,3) 17(3)469; Taming the Prince: The Ambiva 407; Rousseau's State of Nature: An Inter lence of Modern Executive Power, by pretation of the Discourse on Inequality, Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., 18(1)163; Win by Marc F. Plattner, 12(2,3)409; Beyond ston S. Churchill on Empire, by Kirk Em- Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Her mert, 19(1)95; Questions Concerning the meneutics, and Praxis, by Richard J. Bern Law of Nature, by John Locke, 19(2)217; stein, 13(2)268; G. W. F. Hegel: An Liberal Democracy and Political Science, Introduction to the Science of Wisdom, by by James W. Ceaser, 19(3)319; Empire of Stanley Rosen, 13(2)268. Book Notices: Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jeffer Rhetoric and American Statesmanship, ed son, by Robert W. Tucker and David C. ited by Glen Thurow and Jeffrey D. Wallin, Hendrickson, 20(2)205 "Colling- 13(2)287; Power, State, and Freedom: An Muller, James W. Review Essay: Liberalism," Interpretation of Spinoza's Political Philos wood's Embattled 20(1)63 ophy, by Douglas J. Den Uyl, 13(2)290; Myers, Richard. "Christianity and Politics in John Stuart Mill and the Pursuit of Virtue, Montesquieu's Greatness and Decline of Romans," by Bernard Semmel, 13(2)292; Essays in the 17'(2)223 Political Philosophy, by J. E. Parsons, Jr., 13(2)294; Review Essay: Shakespeare's Rome: Republic and Empire, Paul A. by Nelson, Allan D. "John Stuart Mill: The Re Cantor; Rome and the Romans Reformed," According former 13(3)359 to Shakespeare, by Michael Piatt; The End Neumann, Harry. "The Closing of the Philo of the Ancient Republic, by Jan H. Blits, sophic Mind: A Review of The Closing of 14(1)1 15; Book Review: The Politics of Mind," the American 16(1)157 Moderation: An Interpretation Plato's of Newell, Waller R. "Zarathustra's Dancing Dia John F. 14(1)147; lectic," Republic, by Wilson, 17(3)415 Jerusalem versus Athens, by Paul Eidel Nicgorski, Walter. "Leo Strauss and Liberal How Does the Consti Education," berg, 14(2,3)441; 13(2)233 tution Secure Rights?, edited by Robert A. Nichols, Mary Pollingue. "The Good Life, Goldwin and William A. Schambra, Slavery, and Acquisition: Aristotle's Intro Freedom Expression, Politics," 14(2,3)448; of by duction to 11(2)171 Francis Canavan, 14(2,3)455; Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution, by Forrest McDonald, 15(1)148; In Defense of Liberal Democ Owens, Mackubin Thomas, Jr. "Alexander Prudence," racy, by Walter Berns, 15(1)148; The Fate Hamilton on Natural Rights and of the Self, by Stanley Corngold, 14(2,3)331 86 Interpretation

Palmer, Michael. "The Citizen Philosopher: Schaefer, David. "Libertarianism and Political Rousseau's Dedicatory Letter to the Dis Philosophy: A Critique of Robert Nozick's Inequality" Utopia," course on 17(1)19 Anarchy, State, and 12(2,3)301 Parsons, J. E., Jr. Book Notices: Eighty Years Schalow, Frank. Book Review: Kant and the of Locke Scholarship: A Bibliographical Problem of Metaphysics, by Martin Guide, by Roland Hall and Roger Wool- Heidegger, 19(1)111 house, 13(2)285; John Locke's Moral Phi Schaub, Diana. Book Review: Natural Right losophy, by John Colman, 13(2)285; Book and the American Imagination, by Cath Review: Locke's Education for Liberty, by erine H. Zuckert, 19(1)105 Nathan Turcov, 13(3)425 Schram, Glenn M. "The Place of Leo Strauss Education," Paterson, Timothy H. "Bacon's Myth of Or in a Liberal 19(2)201 pheus: Power as a Goal of Science in Of Sheehan, Colleen A. "Madison's Party Press Ancients" Essays," the Wisdom of the 16(3)427 17(3)355 Payne, Thomas, "The Crito as a Mythological Sherlock, Richard, and Roger Barrus. "The Mime," Liberalism," 11(1)1 Problem of Religion in Peterman, Larry. "Dante and Machiavelli: A 20(3)285 Last Word," 20(1)17 Sherover, Charles M. Discussion: "The Politi Piatt, Michael. Discussion: "Souls Without cal Implications of Heidegger's Being and Longing," Time' 18(3)415 Time: On Heidegger's 'Being and and the Possibility of Political Philosophy, by Mark Blitz," 12(2,3)367 Alain," Simon, Yves R. "The Politics of trans Ray, John. "The Education of Cyrus as Xeno lated by John M. Dunaway, 13(2)215 'Statesman,'" phon's 19(3)225 Simpson, Peter. "Autonomous Morality and Noble," Richardson, Joan. Book Review: Character the Idea of the 14(2,3)353 Names in Dostoevsky's Fiction, by Charles Smith, A. Anthony. "Ethics and Politics in the Habermas," E. Passage, 12(1)127 Work of Jurgen 11(3)333 William D. "Melville's 'Benito Richardson, Smith, Robert F. Book Reviews: Masters of Cereno': Civilization, Barbarism and International Thought, by Kenneth Race," 11(1)41 Thompson, 11(1)134; Morality and For Roochnik, David. "The Serious Play of Plato's eign Policy, by Kenneth Thompson, Euthydemus," 18(2)211 11(1)134 Rubin, Leslie G. "Love and Politics in Xeno Sorenson, Leonard R. "Rousseau's Socratism: Cyropaedia," phon's 16(3)391 The Political Bearing of 'On Theatrical Im Russell, Greg. "Eric Voegelin on the Truth of itation,' 20(2)135 In-Between Life: A Meditation on Existen Stambaugh, Joan. Book Review: Philosophical Unrest," tial 16(3)415; "Jeffersonian Ethics Apprenticeships, by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Affairs," in Foreign 18(2)273 14(2,3)456

Teaching," Strauss, Leo. "Exoteric edited by Kenneth Hart Green, 14(1)51; "Some Re marks on the Political Science of Mai Robert. 'The Lion and the Ass: A Farabi," Sacks, monides and translated by Robert Commentary on the Book of Genesis Bartlett, 18(1)3 35- (Chapters 31-34), 11(1)87; (Chapters Sullivan, Robert R. Review Essay: "The Most (Chapters 38 & Habermas," 37), 11(2)249; 39), Recent Thinking of Jurgen (Chapters 11(3)353; 40-43), 12(1)49; 14(2,3)431; Book Review: Unterwegs zur (Chapters 12(2,3)141 44-50), Interpretation Hinweise zu einer Theorie Charles. "The Wisdom of Plato's Salman, der Literatur in mit Aristophanes," "Phaedrus' Auseinandersetzung Cos " 18(2)233; Gadamers "Wahrheit und Symposium," Methode, by mology in the 20(2)99 Horst-Jurgen Gerigk, 17(2)305 Arlene W. "An Unspoken Saxonhouse, Theme Sumberg, Theodore A. "Machiavelli's Castruc- War," in Plato's Gorgias: "The Castracani," 11(2)139; cio Vico Aristophanes' 16(2)285; "Reading Net of Hephaestus: Speech Times," Three "Belfagor: Ma Symposium," 17(3)347; in Plato's 13(1)15 Story," chiavelli's Short 19(3)243 Index - 87

Tessitore, Aristide. "Aristotle's Political Pre Wagar, W. Warren. Book Review: Arnold sentation of Socrates in the Nicomachean Toynbee and the Crisis of the West, by Ethics 16(1)3; Book Review: Aristotle on Marvin Perry, 14(1)150 the Human Good, by Richard Kraut, Webking, Robert. "Virtue and Individual 19(3)315 Rights in John Adams' Defence," 13(2)177

Lenin," Teti, Dennis. Book Review: American Conser West, Thomas G. "Marx and 11(1)73; vatism and the American Founding, by Discussion: "Defending Socrates and De Harry V. Jaffa, 13(3)435 fending Politics: A Response to Stewart Politics," Thiele, Leslie Paul. "Nietzsche's Umphrey," 11(3)383 17(2)275 Wright, George. Introduction to Thomas Leviathan" Tovey, Barbara. "Shakespeare's Apology for Hobbes, "1668 Appendix to Imitative Poetry: The Tempest and The Re 18(3)323 public,"11(3)275 Tress, Daryl McGowan, "Feminist Theory and Discontents," Its 18(2)293 Yeager, K. L. "Man and Nature in Plato's Phaedo,' Turner, Jeffrey S. "The Images of Enslave 15(2,3)157 ment and Incommensurability in Plato's Mew," 20(2)1 17 Zuckert, Catherine. "Aristotle on the Limits Life," and Satisfactions of Political Umphrey, Stewart. Book Review: The Being 11(2)185 "Theaetetus," of the Beautiful: Plato's Zuckert, Michael P. "Appropriation and Un "Sophist," "Statesman," and translated derstanding in the History of Political Phi Method," with a commentary by Seth Benardete, losophy: Quentin Skinner's 14(1)145 13(3)403; Editor: Robert Horwitz, "John Locke's Questions Concerning the Law of Nature: A Commentary," 19(3)251; Book Velkley, Richard, Book Review: Dialogue and Reviews: Alexis de Tocqueville: Selected Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Letters on Politics and Society, edited by Plato, by Hans-Georg Gadamer, translated Roger Boesche, 16(3)487; Alexis de Toc with an introduction by P. Christopher queville and the New Science of Politics, Smith, 13(2)261 by John C. Koritansky, 16(3)487

TITLES

OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN INTERPRETATION

Philosophy: Quentin Skin "An Account of Recent Scholarship in Medi tory of Political Method," Philosophy," But- eval Islamic Charles E. ner's Michael P. Zuckert, terworth, 16(1)87 13(3)403 "Antimodemism in Nineteenth-Century Basle: "The Argument in the Protagoras that No One Bad," T. F. Franz Overbeck's Antitheology and J. J. Does What He Believes To Be Antiphilology," Bachofen's Lionel Goss- Morris, 17(2)291 "Aristotle on the Limits and Satisfactions of man, 16(3)359 Life," "Aristotle's Political Presentation of Socrates Political Catherine Zuckert,

Ethics" in the Nicomachean Aristide Tes 11(2)185 "The Armed Founder versus the Catonic Hero: sitore, 16(1)3 Machiavelli and on Popular "Alexander Hamilton on Natural Rights and Rousseau Leadership," Prudence," Mackubin Thomas Owens, Jr., Joseph Masciulli, 14(2,3)265 and Idea of the 14(2,3)331 "Autonomous Morality the No ble," Peter 14(2,3)353 "Appropriation and Understanding in the His Simpson, 88 Interpretation

"Bacon's Myth of Orpheus: Power as a Goal "The Denial of Perennial Problems: The Nega Theory," of Science in Of the Wisdom of the An tive Side of Quentin Skinner's cients"Timothy H. Paterson, 16(3)427 David Boucher, 12(2,3)287 "Beggars and Kings: Cowardice and Courage "The Discourse on the Origin and Foundations

II," Men" in Shakespeare's Richard Pamela K. of Inequality among Heinrich Meier, Jensen, 18(1)111 16(2)211 Story," Socrates," "Belfagor: Machiavelli's Short The "The Dramatic End of Plato's Jo odore A Sumberg, 19(3)243 seph Cropsey, 14(2,3)155 The Book of the Philosophic Life, Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyya al-RazI, trans lated by Charles E. Butterworth, 20(3)227 "Edmund Burke and the American Constitu tion," Morton J. Frisch, 17(1)59 "Christianity and Politics in Montesquieu's "The Education of Cyrus as Xenophon's Romans," 'Statesman,'" Greatness and Decline of the John Ray, 19(3)225 Ethics," Richard Myers, 17(2)223 "Emile Durkheim and Provinces of "The Citizen Philosopher: Rousseau's Dedica Mark S. Cladis, 17(2)255 Inequality,'' tory Letter to the Discourse on 'The Empire of Progress: Bacon's Improve Machiavelli," Michael Palmer, 17(1)19 ment Upon Robert K. Faulk "Civil Religion in Tocqueville's Democracy in ner, 20(1)37 America" John C. Koritansky, 17(3)389 "Equality, Liberty, Wisdom, Morality and Freedom," 'The Closing of the Philosophic Mind: A Re Consent in the Idea of Political view of The Closing of the American Harry V. Jaffa, 15(1)3 Mind," Harry Neumann, 16(1)157 "Eric Voegelin on the Truth of In-Between Liberalism" Unrest," "Collingwood's Embattled (Re Life: A Meditation on Existential view Essay), James W. Muller, 20(1)63 Greg Russell, 16(3)415 Colmo" "Comment on (Discussion), David "Ernst and Falk, Dialoguesfor Freemasons: Lowenthal, 18(1)161 Gotthold Ephriam Lessing, A translation Maschler," "The Concerns of Odysseus: An Introduction with notes by Chaninah 14(1)1 Odyssey" to the David Bolotin, 17(1)41 "Ethics and Politics in the Work of Jurgen Habermas," "The Constitution of 1787: A Commentary, by A. Anthony Smith, 11(3)333 Equality," George Anastaplo (Discussion), Timothy "Ethnicity and the Problem of Ken Fuller, 18(3)467; J. Jackson Barlow, neth C. Blanchard, Jr., 20(3)309 Naturalism," 18(3)475 "Evolutionary Biology and Roger Tub," "Credulity and Curiosity in A Tale of a D. Masters, 17(1)111 Teaching," Richard Burrow, 15(2,3)309 "Exoteric Leo Strauss, 14(1)51 Mime," "The Crito as a Mythological Thomas "Exploring the Limits of Analytic Philosophy: Payne, 11(1)1 A Critique of Nozick's Philosophical Ex planations" (Discussion), Nicholas Capa- ldi, 12(1)107 Word," "Dante and Machiavelli: A Last Larry Peterman, 20(1)17 Liberation," "David Hume's Theology of Discontents," Roger M. Barrus, 18(2)251 "Feminist Theory and Its Daryl "Defending Socrates and Defending Politics: A McGowan Tress, 18(2)293 Umphrey" Response to Stewart (Discus "The First Crisis of Modernity: Leo Strauss on Rousseau," sion), Thomas West, 1 1(3)383 the Thought of Hilail Gildin, "De Gaulle as a Political Thinker: On Mor- 20(2)157 Gaulle" Alain' risey's Reflections on De (Discus "Foreword for 'The Politics of by Yves Simon," sion), Angelo M. Codevilla, 13(1)103 R. Vukan Kuic, 13(2)213 "Deliberate Belief and Digging Holes: Joseph "Freedom and Constraints in Prometheus Restraint," Bound" Conrad and the Problem of J. Kenneth Dorter, 19(2)117 P. Geise and L. A. 16(2)193 Lange, "The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina Philosophy" Scholarship," "Delimiting (Discussion), Will as a Tool for Lockean Celia Morrisey, 15(1)129 McGuinness, 17(1)127 Index 89

Interview," Jew" "Gadamer on Strauss: An Ernest "Leo Strauss as Citizen and (Discussion), L. Fortin, 12(1)1 Werner J. Dannhauser, 17(3)433 Authority," Education," "Gaston Fessard and the Nature of "Leo Strauss on Liberal Walter Hugh Gillis, 16(3)445 Nicgorski, 13(2)233 "The Good Life, Slavery, and Acquisition: Ar "Leo Strauss's Studies in Platonic Political Politics," Philosophy," istotle's Introduction to Mary David Lowenthal, 13(3)297 Pollingue Nichols, 11(2)171 "Libertarianism and Political Philosophy: A Critique of Robert Nozick's Anarchy, Utopia" State, and David Schaefer, "Hamlet: The Cosmopolitan Prince," Paul A. 12(2,3)301 Cantor, 12(1)15 "The Lion and the Ass: A Commentary on the Authority," Genesis," "Hegel on the Source of Political Book of Robert Sacks, (Chapters Michael H. Mitias, 12(1)29 31-34) 11(1)87; (Chapters 35-37) "How Bloom Did It: Rhetoric and Principle in 11(2)249; (Chapters 38 & 39) 11(3)353; Mind" 44- The Closing of the American Will (Chapters 40-43) 12(1)49; (Chapters Morrisey, 16(1)145 50) 12(2,3)141 "How To Read the Consolation of Philoso "Looking at Carl Schmitt from the Vantage 1990s," phy"Thomas F. Curley, III, 14(2,3)211 Point of the John H. Herz, "Humanizing Certitudes and Impoverishing 19(3)307 "Love and in Xenophon's Doubts: A Critique of The Closing of the Politics Cy ropaedia" American Mind," Harry V. Jaffa, 16(1)111 Leslie G. Rubin, 16(3)391

Play," "The Images of Enslavement and Incommen "Macbeth: Shakespeare Mystery David Meno" surability in Plato's Jeffrey S. Lowenthal, 16(3)311 Castracani," Turner, 20(2)117 "Machiavelli's Castruccio The "Individuation and Commonality in Feuer- odore A. Sumberg, 16(2)285 Man,'" bach's 'Philosophy of Kit R. "Made by Contrivance and the Consent of Christensen, 13(3)335 Man: Abstract Principle and Historical Fact Philosophy," Euthyphro," "An Interpretation of Plato's in Locke's Political Govert Mario Lewis, Jr. (Introduction; Part I, Sec den Hartogh, 17(2)193 Essays," tions 1-3) 12(2,3)225; (Part I, Section 4- "Madison's Party Press Colleen A. end) 13(1)33 Sheehan, 17(3)355 Phaedo," 'Introduction' "An Introduction to Hegel's to "Man and Nature in Plato's K. L. Right" 15(2,3)157 the Philosophy of Donald J. Yeager, Lenin," Maletz, 13(1)67 "Marx and Thomas G. West, 11(1)73 Georgics" "The Invocation to the Eve Adler, "Marx on Self-Consciousness, the City and the Gods," 11(1)25 Elliott Bartky, 19(1)3 'Will' "The Meaning of in Hegel's Philosophy Right," of Donald J. Maletz, 13(2)195 "Jeffersonian Ethics in Foreign Affairs," Greg "Melville's 'Benito Cereno': Civilization, Bar Race," Russell, 18(2)273 barism and William D. Richardson, "John Locke's Questions Concerning the Law 11(1)43 Dilemmas," Nature," "Mill's Frederick J. of Robert Horwitz, 19(3)251 Crosson, Reformed," "John Stuart Mill: The Reformer 16(2)229 Allan D. Nelson, 13(3)359 "Misunderstanding and Understanding Hume's Moral Philosophy: An on Hume's "Justice and Philosophy in Plato's Republic: Essay Definition," Nicholas the Nature of a Kent Moors, Place in Moral Philosophy, by Capaldi," 12(2,3)193 Marie A. Martin, 19(2)169 "Justice in Translation" (Discussion), Joel B. "Montesquieu's Perception of His Audience Laws" Lidov, 12(1)83 for the Spirit of the Anne M. Cohler, 11(3)317 "The Moral Foundations of the American Re

public" Documents," "Kojeve-Fessard translated by (Discussion), Pamela K. Jensen, Hugh Gillis, 19(2)185 15(1)97 90 Interpretation

Aristophanes' "The Net of Hephaestus: Speech "Progress and Commerce in Anglo-American in Plato's Symposium," Arlene W. Saxon Thought: The Social Philosophy of Adam Ferguson," house, 13(1)15 Ronald Hamowy, 14(1)61 "Nietzsche, Spengler, and the Politics of Cul "The Pursuit of Happiness in Jefferson, and Its Hobbes," Despair," tural John Farrenkopf, 20(2)165 Background in Bacon and Jeffrey "Nietzsche's Politics," Leslie Paul Thiele, Barnouw, 11(2)225 17(2)275

"Rational Theologians and Irrational Philoso

Perspective," Moderns," Ernest L. "On Ancients and Joseph Cropsey, phers: A Straussian 18(1)31 Fortin, 12(2,3)349 Times," "On Laughter," Joseph J. Carpino, 13(1)91 "Reading Vico Three Theodore A. "On Pleasure and the Human Good: Plato's Sumberg, 17(3)347

Philebus,'' Joseph Cropsey, 16(2)167 "Reason and Revelation in the Thought of Leo Nathan," Strauss," "On the Wisdom of Chaninah Christopher A. Colmo, 18(1)145 Leviathan," Maschler, 15(2,3)347 "Reason and Rhetoric in Hobbes's "The Origins of al-Razi's Political Philoso William Mathie, 14(2,3)281

phy," Code- Charles E. Butterworth, 20(3)237 "Reflections on De Gaulle: Reply to villa,"Will Morrisey, 13(1)113 "Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the

"Phaedrus' Symposium," Gorgias" Cosmology in the Thomas J. Lewis, 14(2,3)195 Charles Salman, 20(2)99 "The Relation Between Philosophy and Reli Theaetetus," gion," "Philosophical Apology in the Laurence Berns, 19(1)43 Lowenthal," Scott R. Hemmenway, 17(3)323 "Reply to Christopher A. Colmo, "Philosophy as Noblest Idolatry in Paradise 18(2)313 Lost," John Alvis, 16(2)263 "Republic, Book II, and the Origins of Politi Philosophy," "Philosophy, Education, and Courage in cal Drew A. Hyland,

Plato's Laches Charles Griswold, Jr. , 16(2)247 Sherover" 14(2,3)177 "Response to (Discussion), Mark "Philosophy, Science, and the Opening of the Blitz, 12(2,3)381 Mind," Argument," American Roger D. Masters, "Rethinking the Diodotean Laurie 16(1)139 M. Johnson, 18(1)53 Temptation" 1923-1987," "Piety and (Discussion), Stanley "Robert H. Horwitz: Will Mor C. Brubaker, 19(1)61 risey, 15(2,3)367 "The Place of Leo Strauss in a Liberal Educa "Rousseau and the Management of the Pas tion," Glenn N. Schram, 19(2)201 sions,"Peter Emberley, 13(2)151 "Plato's Three Waves and the Question of "Rousseau on Reading 'Jean-Jacques': The Di

Utopia," alogues," Drew A. Hyland, 18(1)91 Christopher Kelly and Roger D. "Pluralism, the Public Good and the Problem Masters, 17(2)239 Federalist," of Self-Government in The "Rousseau versus the Savoyard Vicar: The

Considered," Kenneth L. Grasso, 15(2,3)323 Profession of Faith Peter Em- "The Political Implications of Heidegger's Be berly, 14(2,3)299 ing and Time: On Heidegger's 'Being and "Rousseau's Contract With and Without His Time' Inequality," and the Possibility of Political Phi Jim MacAdam, 12(2,3)275 Blitz" Nature," losophy, by Mark (Discussion), "Rousseau's Pure State of Victor Charles M. Sherover, 12(2,3)367 Gourevich, 16(1)23 "Politics and Poetry: Aristotle's Politics, "Rousseau's Socratism: The Political Bearing VIII," Imitation,'" Books VII and Michael Davis, of 'On Theatrical Leonard R. 19(2)157 Sorenson, 20(2)135 Alain," "The Politics of Yves R. Simon, trans lated by John M. Dunaway, 13(2)215 Liberalism," "The Problem of Religion in "S. T. Coleridge Replies to Adam Smith's Richard Sherlock and Roger Barrus, 'Pernicious Opinion': A Study in Hermetic Engineering," 20(3)285 Social David Levy, 14(1)89 Index ' 91

Aeschylus' Oresteia," "Seeing Justice Done: "The Theaetetus and the Possibility of False Mera J. Flaumenhaft, 17(1)69 Opinion," David Bolotin, 15(2,3)179 Euthydemus," "The Serious Play of Plato's "Thomas Aquinas and the Reform of Christian David Roochnik, 18(2)211 Education," Ernest L. Fortin, 17(1)3 Shakespeare's Apology for Imitative Poetry: "Tocqueville and the Problem of Natural Republic" Right," The Tempest and The Barbara Robert Eden, 17(3)379 Morality," Tovey, 11(3)275 'Tocqueville on Sexual Sanford Prince," "Shakespeare's Demonic Grant B. Kessler, 16(3)465 Mindle, 20(3)259 "Tocqueville's Perspective: Democracy in Shakespeare's Richard III and the Soul of the America in Search of the 'New Science of Tyrant," Morton J. Frisch, 20(3)275 Politics,'" Wilhelm Hennis, 16(1)61 Leviathan," Modern," "1668 Appendix to Thomas "Tyranny: Ancient and Leah Hobbes, translated with an introduction and Bradshaw, 20(2)187 notes by George Wright, 18(3)323 "Socrates and Alcibiades: Eros, Piety, and Pol itics," Jacob A. 18(1)63 Howland, Unspoken Theme in Plato's Gorgias: "Socrates' "An Critique of Hedonism: A War," Reading Arlene W. Saxonhouse, 11(2)139 Philebus," of the David Bolotin, 13(1)1 "Socratic Eironeia" Ronna Burger, 13(2)143 "Socratic Reason and Lockean Rights: The "The Virtu of Women: Machiavelli's Man Place of the in a Liberal De University Clizia" mocracy," dragola and Jack William A. Galston, 16(1)101 D'Amico, 12(2,3)261 and Wisdom in "Socratic Rhetoric Socratic Adams' Phaedrus," and Individual Rights in John Plato's John C. Koritansky, "Virtue Defence," Robert 13(2)177 15(1)29 Webking, "Virtue and Knowledge: On Plato's Pro "Socratic and Justice: Plato's Cli- Teaching tagoras" tophon," Joseph Cropsey, 19(2)137 Jan H. Blits, 13(3)321 Phaedo" "Some Observations About Plato's Chaninah Maschler, 18(2)177 Scholem" "Some Remarks on the Political Science of "Walter Benjamin/Gershom (Discus

Farabi," Maimonides and Leo Strauss, sion), Stanley Corngold and Michael Jen translated by Robert Bartlett, 18(1)3 nings, 12(2,3)357 Longing," Philosopher?" "Souls Without Michael Piatt "Was Tocqueville a Peter A. 18(3)415 Lawler, 17(3)401 "Spiritedness in Ethics and Politics: A Study in "The Whole as Setting for Man: On Plato's Aristotelian Psychology" (Discussion), Timaeus" Joseph Cropsey, 17(2)165 Howells' 12(2,3)335 "William Dean 'Poor Real Life': The Character," "A Study of Part I, Chapters 1-7 of Maim Royal Road to the American

onides' Perplexed," The Guide of the Ter Thomas S. Engeman, 19(1)29 Aristophanes," ence Kleven, 20(1)3 "The Wisdom of Plato's Charles Salman, 18(2)233

'Tacitus' Teaching and the Decline of Liberty Rome," at James C. Leake, 15(1)55, Socrates," "Xenophon and His Christopher 15(2,3)195 Bruell, 16(2)295 "Temporal Royalties and Virtue's Airy Voice in The Tempest," Timothy Fuller, 11(2)207 "The Tempting of America: The Political Se Dialectic," Law" "Zarathustra's Waller R. duction of the (Discussion), Matthew Dancing J. Franck, 19(1)77; Ken Masugi, 19(1)85 Newell, 17(3)415 92 Interpretation

TOPICS City, 18(1)91, 19(1)3, 19(2)157, 20(2)192 Civilization, 11(1)43, 20(2)165 Cleon, 18(1)53 Achilles, 11(1)1 Clerisy, 14(1)107 Acquistion, 11(2)171 Commerce, 14(1)61 Action, 11(3)340, 20(1)64 Commonality, 13(3)335 Administration, 15(2,3)206 Communism, 11(1)73, 19(2)185 Agathon, 18(2)233 Community, political, 17(2)263, 18(1)91 Agriculture, 11(1)25 Conquest, 17(1)139 Alcibiades, 18(1)63 Consciousness, 16(3)415 Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr, 18(1)3 Consensus, 19(3)279 Ambition, 20(3)259 Consent, 15(1)3, 17(2)193 Amour-propre, 13(2)160 Constitution: mixed, 15(1)91; U.S., 17(1)59, Analysis, 13(3)368 18(3)467, 475, 19(1)61 Anamnesis, 20(2)129 Constraints, 19(2)117 Anarchy, 12(2,3)301 Contradiction, principle of, 18(1)149 Ancients, 18(1)31,20(1)17 Contrivance, 17(2)193 Antimodemism, 16(3)359 Convention, social, 17(2)193 Apology, philosophical, 17(3)323 Cosmology, 20(2)99 Aporia, 20(2)129 Cosmos, 17(2)169, 20(2)101 Appropriation, 13(3)403 Courage, 14(2,3)177, 16(1)5 Aquinas, Thomas, 19(3)256 Credulity, 15(2,3)309 Arete, 18(2)212, 20(2)129 Curiosity, 15(2,3)309 Aristophanes, 13(1)15, 18(2)233 Customs, 20(1)50 Aristotle, 18(2)253, 20(3)309 Cyropaedia, 19(3)225 Assembly of Estates, 12(1)42 Cyrus, 16(3)391, 19(3)225 Atheism, 18(1)145, 19(2)185 Athens, 11(1)1, 18(1)53 Augustus, 11(1)25 Death, 18(2)177 Authority, 12(1)29, 16(3)445 Definition, 12(2,3)193 Autobiography, 17(2)239 Delano, Captain Amasa, 11(1)43 Democracy, 13(2)246, 16(1)61, 17(2)269, 20(2)200 Babo, 11(1)43 17(3)389, Despair, 20(2)165 Bacon, Francis, 20(3)289 13(3)379, 11(3)321 Bad, 17(2)291 Despotism, Development: Barbarism, 11(1)43 economic, 20(1)45; 14(1)76 Basle, 16(3)359 spontaneous, 17(3)415 Beggars, 18(1)111 Dialectic, Behavior, 17(1)111 Dialogue, 14(2,3)155, 222, 17(2)239, 117 Belief, 16(2)193 18(2)257,20(2)99, Diodotus, 18(1)53 Bible, 11(1)87, 11(2)249, 11(3)353, 12(1)49, Diotima, 20(2)101 12(2,3)141, 13(3)323, 20(1)4 18(2)273 Biology, 17(1)111 Diplomacy, Disobedience, 16(2)280 Dogmatism, 17(1)117 Caesar, Julius, 20(3)275 Drama, 11(2)207, 11(3)275, 12(1)15, 14(1)115, Castracani, Castruccio, 16(2)285 14(2,3)155, 16(3)311, 17(1)69, Cause, 16(2)176 19(2)117,20(3)259, 275 Dreams, 11(2)207 Cereno, Benito, 11(1)43 Character, American, 17(3)389, 19(1)29 Christianity, 14(1)1, 16(3)311, 17(1)3, Eclecticism, 14(2,3)211 17(2)223, 19(2)185, 20(1)17, 20(3)285 Economics, 14(1)89, 17(3)355 Citizen perspective, 11(1)43 Education, Citizenship, 17(1)19, 19(2)157 13(2)233, 14(1)51, 14(2,3)177, Index 93

299, 16(1)101, 111, 139, 145, 157, Hamilton, Alexander, 17(3)355 17(1)3, 18(1)91, 19(2)157, 201, 19(3)225, Happiness, 17(3)406: pursuit of, 11(2)225 20(2)117 Hedonism, 13(1)1, 20(2)157 Eironeia, 13(2)143 Hegel, G.W.F., 19(1)6, 19(2)195 Enquiry, 15(2,3)309 Heidegger, Martin, 17(3)415 Enslavement, 20(2)117 Heresy, 18(3)368 Epicurus, 19(1)3 Hermetism, 14(1)89 Equality, 15(1)3, 16(1)73, 17(3)389, 18(1)92, Hero, 14(2,3)273 20(2)136, 20(3)309 Historicism, 20(2)168 Eros, 13(1)15, 16(3)391, 18(1)63, 18(2)233, Historicity, 12(2,3)288 20(2)102 Historiography, 13(3)403 Esotericism, 20(1)3 History, 17(2)199, 17(3)347, 20(1)70, Ethics, 11(3)335, 17(1)115, 17(2)255, 20(2)165 18(2)273, 20(1)69 Hobbes, Thomas, 18(2)254, 20(2)157, Ethnicity, 20(3)309 20(3)286 Evil, 16(3)311 Holiness, 13(1)33 Evolution, 17(1)111 Honor-seeking, 20(2)188 Exotericism, 14(1)51 Hope, 13(3)382 Humanitarianism, 20(1)41

Faith, 14(2,3)299, 371, 17(1)3, 18(3)349 Fear, 13(2)167, 15(2,3)208 Idolatry, 16(2)263 Federalism, 17(3)355 Imitation, 20(2)135 Feelings, 13(3)361 Immortality, 18(2)177, 19(3)287 Feminism, 18(2)293 Inclination, natural, 19(3)251 Finite, 16(2)174 Incommensurability, 20(2)117 Foreign affairs, 18(2)273 Incontinence, 16(1)18 Forms, 18(2)177 Individualism, 17(2)269, 275, 19(1)29 Fortune, 19(3)246 Individuation, 13(3)335 Founders, American, 14(2,3)269, 20(3)299 Inequality, 16(2)211, 20(3)309 France, 13(1)103, 113 Infinite, 16(2)173 Freedom, 13(2)197, 15(1)3, 16(1)71, Institutions, growth of, 14(1)76 17(3)389, 19(2)117,20(2)136 Interaction, 16(1)82 Freemasonry, 14(1)1 Intersubjectivism, 19(2)172 Irony, 16(1)11 "Is-Ought," 19(2)175

General will, 12(1)29 Isolation, 16(1)78 Geneva, 17(1)19 Germany, 19(3)307 "Jean-Jacques," God, 13(3)297, 18(1)145, 18(2)315, 18(3)323, 17(2)239 20(3)229, 243 Jefferson, Thomas, 20(3)299, 309 Gods, 11(1)25, 13(1)15, 33, 48, 17(1)41, Jovian Age, 11(1)25 19(1)3, 20(2)99 Judaism, 20(1)3 Golden Age, 11(1)25 Justice, 12(1)83, 12(2,3)193, 225, 13(1)48, Good, 16(3)311, 17(2)293, 20(2)187: human, 13(3)321, 16(2)247, 17(1)41,69, 16(2)167; public, 15(2,3)323 19(3)243 Good Life, 11(2)171 Goodness, 17(2)291 Government, 11(3)317, 17(1)59, 127, Kings, 18(1)111,20(3)259,275 17(3)355, 18(1)3, 18(2)253, 18(3)467, Knowledge, 17(3)323, 19(2)137 475, 19(3)225, 243 Greece, 17(2)232 Groups, occupational, 17(2)259 Labor, division of, 16(2)255 Guilt, 11(3)384 Language, 16(1)50, 20(1)17 94 Interpretation

Laughter, 13(1)91 19(3)251: human, 17(1)120; State of, Law, 19(3)307: constitutional, 19(1)61; divine, 16(1)23, 16(2)218, 254, 17(2)194 15(2,3)222, 18(1)11; moral, 15(2,3)222; Nicene Creed, 18(3)349 natural, 15(2,3)222, 16(2)264, 18(2)282, Nietzsche, Friedrich, 18(3)433 19(3)251 Nihilism, 16(1)157, 17(1)115 Laws, 11(1)6 Noble, 14(2,3)353 Leadership, 14(2,3)265 Learning, 20(2)117 Legislator, 14(2,3)277 Objectivity, 17(1)119 Legitimacy, 17(2)203 Obligation, 19(2)175 Leninism, 11(1)73 Odysseus, 17(1)41 Liberalism, 16(2)193, 20(1)63, 20(3)285 Oedipus, 18(1)65 Liberation, 18(2)251 One, 16(2)174 Libertarianism, 12(2,3)301 Opinion, 15(2,3)179: Christian, 11(3)320 Liberty, 15(1)3, 55, 15(2,3)195, 16(2)229, Oratory, 15(2,3)272 17(3)406, 20(2)135 Oresteia, 17(1)69 Life: good, 11(2)171; philosophic, 16(2)272, Orpheus, 16(3)427 20(3)227, 237; political, 11(2)185 Limits, 20(3)232, 247 Literature, 16(2)193 Paganism, 20(1)27 Locke, John, 20(3)286 Parents, 18(3)416 Love, 13(1)15, 16(3)391, 19(2)128, 19(3)245 Parties, political, 17(3)383 Luther, Martin, 18(3)323 Partisanship, 18(2)253 Pascal, Blaise, 17(3)407 Passions, 13(2)151 Machiavelli, Niccolo, 20(3)259, 280, 287 Peloponnesian War, 18(1)53 Madison, James, 20(3)299 Perception, 15(2,3)184 Madness, 18(1)67 Perfectibility, 13(2)153 Maimonides, Moses, 18(1)3 Persia, 19(3)225 Man, 15(2,3)157, 16(1)23, 16(2)211, 17(2)165 Phaedrus, 20(2)99 Many, 16(2)173 Philosopher-king, 11(3)310, 18(1)100 Marxism, 11(1)73, 14(1)135 Philosophers, 12(2,3)349, 17(3)401, 18(2)177, Mathematics, 20(2)117 211,20(2)145 Matter, 17(2)175 Philosophy, 14(2,3)177, 15(2,3)175, 272, Media, 19(3)225 16(1)157, 16(2)263, 16(3)427, 17(1)3, Meditation, 16(3)415 17(3)402, 18(1)145, 18(2)211, 19(1)43, Methodology, 15(1)77 20(2)135, 157: analytic, 12(1)107; ancient, Metaxy, 16(3)415 19(1)44; Islamic, 20(3)277; medieval, Mime, 11(1)1 16(1)87, 19(1)46; modem, 19(1)46; moral, "new," Mind, American, 16(1)111 19(2)169; 13(3)335; political, Moderation, 15(2,3)222 11(3)392, 12(2,3)301, 13(3)297,403, Modernism, 16(3)370 16(2)247, 17(2)193, 17(3)379, 18(2)251, Modernity, 11(3)392, 20(2)157, 20(3)285 20(2)157, 165, 187; social, 14(1)61, 89 Moderns, 18(1)31, 20(1)17 Piety, 12(2,3)225, 13(1)48, 18(1)63 Moral sentiment theory, 19(2)169 Plato, 11(1)1, 11(3)275, 18(3)431, 19(1)6 Morality, 14(2,3)353, 15(1)3, 15(2,3)222, Pleasure, 13(1)1, 16(2)167, 17(2)291 16(1)111, 16(3)465, 17(1)117, 17(2)255, Pluralism, 15(2,3)323 19(1)29: sexual, 16(3)465 Poetry, 11(3)275, 19(2)157, 20(2)143, 187 Music, 19(2)157 Polis, 17(2)165 Mythology, 11(1)1, 13(3)405 Politics, 11(3)335, 383, 16(1)61, 16(2)196, Mytilenean Debate, 18(1)53 16(3)391, 17(2)223, 275, 18(1)63, 18(2)251, 19(1)5, 19(2)157, 19(3)309, 20(1)66, 20(2)165 Naturalism, 17(1)111 Power, 11(3)340, 16(3)427, 19(3)309, Nature, 13(3)387, 15(2,3)157, 16(1)23, 20(2)187, 20(3)275 Index ' 95

Prejudice, 20(3)309 Sense, 19(3)272 Principate, 15(2,3)195 Sickness, 18(1)67 Problems, 12(2,3)287 Slavery, 11(2)171, 17(1)139, 20(3)309 Progress, 14(1)61 Society, 16(2)196, 17(1)19 Prometheus, 19(2)117 Socrates, 11(3)383, 13(1)1, 14(2,3)155, Property, 17(1)136 16(1)3, 16(2)277, 295, 17(2)105, Prophecy, 18(1)12 17(3)323, 18(1)63, 18(2)177, 211, Protagoras, 19(2)137 19(2)137, 20(2)99, 20(3)227, 237 Protreptic, 18(2)212 Solon, 17(2)166 Provinces of ethics, 17(2)255 Sophistry, 18(2)211 Prudence, 14(2,3)311, 16(1)13 Sophists, 18(2)211 Psychology, Aristotelian, 12(2,3)335 Soul, 15(2,3)157, 17(2)275, 18(2)177, Pursuit, happiness of, 11(2)235 18(3)323, 19(3)287, 20(2)192 Spiritedness, 12(2,3)335 State, 12(1)29, 12(2,3)301, 13(1)67, 17(2)275, Race, 11(1)43,20(3)309 19(3)307, 20(1)53, 20(3)285 Realism, 14(2,3)354 Statesman perspective, 11(1)43 Reason, 13(2)157, 14(2,3)281, 371, 16(1)101, Statesmanship, 14(2,3)265 16(2)270, 17(1)119, 17(3)406, 18(1)145, Status, 17(1)136 18(3)323, 19(3)251 Strauss, Leo, 17(3)379, 433, 19(1)43, Rebellion, 11(1)43 20(2)187 Recognition, 20(2)188 Students, 18(3)415 Recollection, 15(2,3)165, 18(2)185 Subjectivism, 19(2)172 Reform, 13(3)359: educational 17(1)3 Supremacy, judicial, 19(1)61 Regime, best, 19(2)157 Supreme Court, 19(1)61 Relativism, 16(1)101, 111, 17(1)115 System, Rousseauian, 17(2)239 Religion, 14(1), 14(2,3)299, 17(1)3, 129, 17(3)347, 389, 18(1)145, 18(2) 251, 18(3)323, 19(1)3, 43, 19(2)185, 19(3)253, Teachers, 18(3)415 20(3)285 Teaching, 13(3)321, 14(1)51, 15(1)55, Republics, 11(3)321, 14(1)115, 15(1)80, 18(3)415 17(3)355 Techne, 18(2)219 Restraint, 16(2)193 Textism, 13(3)405 Revelation, 18(1)145, 19(3)261 Theaetetus, 17(3)323 Revenge, 17(1)69 Theologians, 12(2,3)349 Rhetoric, 14(2,3)195, 281, 15(1)29, 75 Theology, 16(3)359, 17(1)9, 18(2)251, Richard II, 18(1)111 18(3)323, 19(2)185 Richard III, 20(3)259, 275 Theory, 13(3)413, 18(2)293 Right, 13(1)67, 16(1)101: natural, 14(2,3)331, Tiberius, 15(2,3)196 17(3)379, 19(3)254, 20(2)157 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 20(3)302 Rights, individual, 13(2)177 Torah, 18(1)8 Rome, 11(1)25, 14(1)115, 15(1)55, Tradition, 16(1)118, 16(2)229, 19(3)264 15(2,3)195, 17(2)223 Tragedy, 17(1)69 Ruling, 19(3)225, 20(2)187 Transcendence, 19(1)7 Russia, 11(1)73 Treason, 11(3)325 Trials, 17(1)86 Tyranny, 14(2,3)265, 15(1)55, 15(2,3)245, 14(2,3)243, 15(2,3)309 Satire, 19(2)117, 20(2)187, 20(3)259, 275 Science, 16(3)427, 17(1)111, 17(3)347, 20(2)159: political, 16(1)61, 18(1)4 Self-consciousness, 19(1)3 Self-government, 15(2,3)323 Understanding, 13(3)403, 19(1)85 Self-interest, 13(2,3)277, 17(3)393 Unity, 16(2)169 Self-justification, 20(3)234, 250 University, 16(1)101, 18(3)415 Self-realization, 12(2,3)283 Unrest, 16(3)415 96 Interpretation

Usury, 11(3)325 Weber, Max, 11(3)339 Utopia, 12(2,3)301, 18(1)91 Whole, 17(2)166 Will, 13(2)195: general, 12(1)29, 17(3)391 Wisdom, 15(1)3, 29, 15(2,3)347, 17(1)41, Vina, 12(2,3)263 18(2)211 Virtue, 11(2)207, 13(2)177, 15(2,3)230, Women, 12(2,3)262, 18(2)293 19(2)137, 20(2)136 Work, 16(2)198

War, 11(2)139, 18(1)53 Zarathustra, 17(3)415 Waves, three, 18(1)91 Zeus, 19(2)117

AUTHORS OR WORKS

INTERPRETED IN ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN INTERPRETATION

Adams, John, 13(2)177 Federalist, The, 15(2,3)323 Adams, John Quincy, 18(2)273 Ferguson, Adam, 14(1)61 Aeschylus, 17(1)69, 19(2)117 Fessard, Gaston, 16(3)445, 19(2)185 Alain (Emile Chartier), 13(2)213 Feuerbach, Ludwig, 13(3)335 Alcibiades II, 18(1)63 Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr, 16(1)87, 18(1)3 Al-Razi, Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyya, 20(3)227, 237 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 12(1)1 Aquinas, Thomas, 17(1)3 Genesis, 11(1)87, 11(2)249, 11(3)353, Aristotle, 11(2)171, 185, 12(2,3)335, 16(1)3, 12(1)49, 12(2,3)141 19(2)157 Averroes, 16(1)87 Habermas, Jurgen, 11(3)333 Hamilton, Alexander, 14(2,3)331 Bachofen, J. J., 16(3)359 Hegel, G. W. F., 11(3)337, 12(1)29, 113, Bacon, Francis, 16(3)427, 20(1)37 13(1)67, 13(2)195 Benjamin, Walter, 12(2,3)357 Heidegger, Martin, 12(2,3)367 Hobbes, Bloom, Allan, 16(1)101, 111, 139, 145, 157, Thomas, 14(2,3)281, 18(3)323 18(3)415 Homer, 11(1)1, 17(1)41 Bork, Robert H., 19(1)61 Horwitz, Robert H., 15(2,3)367, 19(3)25 Burke, Edmund, 17(1)59 Howells, William Dean, 19(1)29 Hume, David, 18(2)251, 19(2)169

Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 14(1)89 Collingwood, R. G., 20(1)63 Jefferson, Thomas, 11(2)225, 18(2)273 Conrad, Joseph, 16(2)193 Consolation of Philosophy, 14(2,3)211 Constitution of 1787 (U.S.), 18(3)467, 475 Kojeve, Alexandre, 19(2)185

Dante, 20(1)17 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, 11(1)73 De Gaulle, Charles, 13(1)103, 113 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 14(1)1 Drury, Shadia B., 19(2)201 15(2,3)347 Durkheim, Emile, 17(2)255 Locke, John, 17(1)127, 17(2)193, 19(3)251 Index 97

Machiavelli, Niccolo, 12(2,3)261, 14(2,3)265, Schmitt, Carl, 19(3)307 16(2)285, 19(3)243, 20(1)17, 37, 20(2)187 Shakespeare, William, 11(2)207, 11(3)275, Madison, James, 17(3)355 12(1)15, 14(1)115, 16(3)311, 18(1)111, Maimonides, Moses, 18(1)3, 20(1)3 20(3)259, 275 Marx, Karl, 11(1)73, 19(1)3 Skinner, Quentin, 12(2,3)287, 13(3)403 Melville, Herman, 11(1)45 Smith, Adam, 14(1)89 Mill, John Stuart, 13(3)359, 16(2)229 Socrates, 11(1)1, 13(2)143. See also Plato. Milton, John, 16(2)263 Spengler, Oswald, 20(2)165 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, Strauss, Leo, 12(1)1, 13(2)233, 13(3)297, 11(3)317, 17(2)223 17(3)433, 18(1)145, 161, 19(1)43, 19(2)201, 20(2)157, 187 Swift, Jonathan, 15(2,3)309 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 17(2)275, 17(3)415, 20(2)165 Nozick Robert, 12(2,3)301 Tacitus, 15(1)55, 15(2,3)195 Thucydides, 18(1)53 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 16(1)61, 16(3)465, Overbeck, Franz, 16(3)359 17(3)379, 389, 401

Plato, 11(1)1, 11(2)139, 11(3)275, 12(1)83, 12(2,3)193, 225, 13(1)1, 15, 33, 13(3)321, Umphrey, Stewart, 11(3)383 14(2,3)155, 177, 195, 15(1)29, 15(2,3)157, 179, 16(2)167, 247, 17(2)165, 291, 17(3)323, 18(1)63, 91, 18(2)177, Vergil, 11(1)25 211,233, 19(2)137,20(2)99, 117 Vico, Giambattista, 17(3)347 Voegelin, Eric, 16(3)415 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 12(2,3)275, 13(2)151, 14(2,3)265, 299, 16(1)23, 16(2) 211, 17(1)19, 17(2)239, 20(2) 135, 157 Xenophon, 16(2)295, 16(3)391, 19(3)225

BOOKS

REVIEWED IN INTERPRETATION

A1-' (Averroes' Alawi, Jamal al-DIn. Al-Matn al-Rushdt: Madkhal li-Qird'ah Jadidah Corpus: Pref ace to a New Reading) (Casablanca: Editions Toubkal, 1986), 16(1)87 Mabddi' Ara' Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr. Al-Farabi on the Perfect State: Abu Nasr al-FardbTs AM al- Madina al-Fddilah, a revised text with introduction, translation, and commentary by Richard Walzer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 16(1)87 Interpretatione," . Al-Farabi's Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle's "De trans lated with an introduction and notes by F. W. Zimmerman, The British Academy Classical and Medieval Logic Texts (London: Oxford University Press, 1981), 16(1)87 Anastaplo, George. The Artist as Thinker: From Shakespeare to Joyce (Athens, OH: Swallow Press, 1983), 13(2)277

.The Constitution of 1787: A Commentary (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 18(3) 467, 475 "Rhetoric" Arnhart, Larry. Aristotle on Political Reasoning: A Commentary on the (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981), 11(3)402 98 Interpretation

"Theaetetus," "Sophist," "Statesman" Benardete, Seth. The Being of the Beautiful: Plato's and (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 14(1)145 Benjamin, Walter. Briefwechsel 1933-1940, edited by Gershom Scholem (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), 12(2,3)357 "Wallenstein" Berns, Gisela N. Greek Antiquity in Schiller's University of North Carolina Studies in the Germanic Languages and Literatures, vol. 104 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 15(1)143 Berns, Walter, In Defense ofLiberal Democracy (Chicago: Gateway Editions, 1984), 15(1)148 Bernstein, Richard J. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 13(2)268 Blits, Jan H. The End of the Ancient Republic: Essays on Julius Caesar (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1982), 14(1)115 Time" Blitz, Mark. Heidegger's "Being and and the Possibility of Political Philosophy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), 11(3)399, 12(2,3)367 16(1)101 Bloom, Allan. The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), , 111, 139, 145, 157, 18(3)415 Boesche, Roger, editor. Alexis de Tocqueville: Selected Letters on Politics and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 16(3)487 Bork, Robert H. The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Free Press, 1990), 19(1)61,74, 85 "Phaedrus" Burger, Ronna. Plato's : A Defense of a Philosophic Art of Writing (University: Uni versity of Alabama Press, 1980), 11(3)401 Burke edited and with an introduction C. Burke, Edmund. Selected Letters of Edmund , by Harvey Mansfield, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 13(3)434 Averroes' Butterworth, Charles E., editor and translator. Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle's "Topics," "Rhetoric,'' "Poetics" and (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 12(1)138

Canavan, Francis. Freedom of Expression: Purpose as Limit (Durham, NC, and Claremont, CA: Carolina Academic Press and The Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesmanship and Politi cal Philosophy, 1984), 14(2,3)455 Shakespeare' Cantor, Paul A. s Rome: Republic and Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 14(1)115 Capaldi, Nicholas. Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), 19(2)169

.Out of Order: Affirmative Action and the Crisis of Doctrinaire Liberalism (Buffalo: Prom etheus Books, 1985), 14(2,3)415 Ceaser, James W. Liberal Democracy and Political Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 19(3)319 Coby, Patrick. Socrates and the Sophistic Enlightenment: A Commentary on Plato's Protagoras (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1987), 17(2)313 Collingwood, R. G. Essays in Political Philosophy, edited by David Boucher (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 20(1)63 Colman, John. John Locke's Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983), 13(2)285 Corngold, Stanley, The Fate of the Self: German Writers and French Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 15(2,3)373

Den Uyl, Douglas J. Power, State, and Freedom: An Interpretation ofSpinoza's Political Philoso phy (Assen, Neth.: Van Gorcum, 1983), 13(2)290 Deutsch, Kenneth L., and Walter Soffer, editors. The Crisis of Liberal Democracy: A Straussian Perspective (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 16(3)481 "Phaedo" Dorter, Kenneth. Plato's : An Interpretation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1982), 12(1)137 Index ' 99

Eco, Umberto. The Name of the Rose (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983), 14(2,3)389 Eidelberg, Paul. Jerusalem versus Athens: In Quest of a General Theory of Existence (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 14(2,3)441 Emmert, Kirk. Winston S. Churchill on Empire (Durham, NC, and Claremont, CA: Carolina Aca demic Press and The Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesmanship and Political Philoso phy, 1989), 19(1)95

Faulkner, Robert K. Richard Hooker and the Politics ofa Christian England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 12(2,3)400 Faulkner, William. The De Gaulle Story, vol. 3 of Faulkner: A Comprehensive Guide to the Brodsky Collection, edited by Daniel Brodsky and Robert W. Hamblin (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1984), 17(3)469 Ferry, Luc. Political Philosophy, vol. 1, RightsThe New Quarrel Between the Ancients and the Moderns, translated by Franklin Philip (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 20(2)217 Fortin, Ernest L. Dissidence et philosophie au moyen age: Dante et ses antecedents (Montreal: Bellarmin, and Paris: J. Vrin, 1981), 12(1)139 Friedman, George. The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer sity Press, 1981), 11(3)405

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, translated with an introduction by P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 13(2)261 Philosophical Apprenticeships, translated by Robert R. Sullivan (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 14(2,3)456 Gerigk, Horst-Jiirgen. Unterwegs zur Interpretation Hinweise zu einer Theorie der Literatur in Methode" Auseinandersetzung mit Gadamers "Wahrheit und (Hurtgenwald: Guido Pressler Verlag, 1989), 17(2)305 Gildin, Hilail. Rousseau's Social Contract: The Design of the Argument (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 12(2,3)407 Goldwin, Robert A., editor. Bureaucrats, Policy Analysts, Statesmen: Who Leads? (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), 11(1)129 editors. How Capitalistic Is the Constitution? (Washington: . and William A. Schambra, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982), 12(2,3)391 American Enterprise Institute for Pub . How Democratic Is the Constitution? (Washington: lic Policy Research, 1980), 12(2,3)391 (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for . How Does the Constitution Secure Rights? Public Policy Research, 1985), 14(2,3)448

Habermas, Jurgen. Der philosophisches Diskurs der Moderne (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985), 14(2,3)431 14(2,3)431 . Die neue Unubersichtlichkeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985), Hall, Roland, and Roger Woolhouse. Eighty Years of Locke Scholarship: A Bibliographical Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983), 13(2)285 Hartle, Ann. Death and the Disinterested Spectator: An Inquiry into the Nature of Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 17(1)152 to St. Augustine (Notre . The Modern Self in Rousseau's Confession: A Reply Dame, IN; University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 13(3)429 Heidegger, Martin. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 4th edition (enlarged), translated by Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 19(1)111 Horwitz, Robert H., editor. The Moral Foundations of the American Republic, 3rd edition (Char lottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1986), 15(1)97 100 Interpretation

Jaffa, Harry V. American Conservatism and the American Founding (Durham, NC: Carolina Aca demic Press, 1984), 13(3)435

. editor. Statesmanship: Essays in Honor of Winston S. Churchill (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1981), 12(2,3)395 Johnston, David. The Rhetoric of "Leviathan": Thomas Hobbes and the Politics ofCultural Trans formation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 17(1)145

Kogan, Barry S. Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 16(1)87 Kolakowski, Leszek. Main Currents of Marxism: vol. 1, The Founders; vol. 2, The Golden Age; vol. 3, The Breakdown, translated from the Polish by P. S. Falla (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 14(1)135 Koritansky, John C. Alexis de Tocqueville and the New Science ofPolitics (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1986), 16(3)487 Kraut, Richard. Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 19(3)315

Leaman, Oliver. An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer sity Press, 1985), 16(1)87 Livingston, Donald W. Hume's Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 13(3)432 Locke, John. Questions concerning the Law ofNature, edited by Robert H. Horwitz, Jenny Strauss Clay, and Diskin Clay (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 19(2)217 Lord, Carnes. Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), 12(2,3)401

Machan, Tibor. Individuals and Their Rights (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1989), 20(1)81 Maclntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 12(1)131 Mansfield, Harvey C, Jr. Machiavelli's New Modes and Orders: A Study of the Discourses on Livy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), 12(2,3)404 . Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence ofModern Executive Power (New York: Free Press, 1989), 18(1)163 McDonald, Forrest. Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1985), 15(1)148 Morrisey, Will. Reflections on De Gaulle: Political Founding in Modernity (Washington: Univer sity Press of America, 1983), 13(1)103

Nichols, Mary P. Socrates and the Political Community: An Ancient Debate (Albany: State Univer sity of New York Press, 1987), 17(2)317 Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 12(2,3)301

J. Jr. Essays in Parsons, E., Political Philosophy (Washington: University Press of America 1982), 13(2)294 Passage, Charles E. Character Names in Dostoevsky's Fiction (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis 1982) 12(1)127

Marvin. Arnold Toynbee and the Crisis the Perry, of West (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1982), 14(1)150 Piatt, Michael. Rome and the Romans According to Shakespeare, revised edition (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 14(1)115 Index - 101

Marc Plattner, F. Rousseau's State of Nature: An Interpretation of the Discourse on Inequality (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1979), 12(2,3)409

C. D. C. Socrates the Socrates" Reeve, in "Apology": An Essay on Plato's "Apology of (Indi anapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1989), 19(1)101 Rifkin, Jeremy, in collaboration with Nicanor Perlas. Algeny (New York: Viking, 1983), 12(2,3)387 Roosevelt, Grace G. Reading Rousseau in the Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 20(2)209 Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 13(1)119 Rosen, Stanley. G. W. F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 13(2)268

. The Limits ofAnalysis (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 15(1)129 . Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 12(1)131 Rosenthal, Henry M. The Consolations of Philosophy: Hobbes's Secret; Spinoza's Way (Phila delphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 17(3)449 "Emile" Education," Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. or "On translated with an introduction and notes by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 11(3)402

. The Reveries of the Solitary Walker, translated with preface, notes, and an interpretive essay by Charles E. Butterworth (New York: New York University Press, 1979, cloth; New York: Harper and Row, 1982, paper), 11(3)403

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INTERPRETATION, Queens College, Flushing, New York 11367-0904, U.S.A.

Forthcoming

Thomas Lewis Identifying Rhetoric in the Apology: Does Socrates Use the Appeal for Pity?

Joel Lidz Reflections on and in Plato's Cave

Bernard Jacob Aristotle's Dialectical Purpose: Part I, Dialectic and the Organon Part II, Aristotle's Dialectic

Mary L. Bellhouse Rousseau under Surveillance

Peter A. Lawler Tocqueville on Socialism and History

Maurice Auerbach Carl Schmitt's Quest for the Political: Theology, Decisionism, and the Concept of the Enemy

Discussion

Victor Gourevitch The End of History?

Reviews

Will Morrisey Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus, by Charles L. Griswold, Jr.

Aristotle' Leslie G. Rubin Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of s Politics, by Mary P. Nichols ISSN 0020-9635 Interpretation, Inc. Queens College Flushing N.Y. 11367-0904 U.S.A.

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